History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

and National Policy 

1947-1949 

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

and National Policy 

Volume II 

1947-1949 

Kenneth W. Condit 

Office of Joint History 

Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Washington, DC, 1996 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Condit, Kenneth W. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and national policy, 1947--1949 / 

Kenneth W. Condit. 

p. cm. - (History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ; v. 2) 

Includes index. 

1. United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff-History. 2. United 

States-Military policy. 3. United States-History, Military-20th 

century. I. Title. II. Series. 

UA23.7.C66 1996 

355’.03373-dc20 96-36319 

CIP 
Foreword 

Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strategic direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

(JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, 

have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge 

of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of 

their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of 

crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history 

of the United States. For these reasons. the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an 

official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for 

the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source 

of information for staff studies will be readily recognized. 

The series, The Joint Chiefs of Stuff ancl iVatiod Policy, treats the activities of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff since the close of World War 11. Because of the nature of the 

activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the sensitivity of the sources, the 

volumes of the series were originally prepared in classified form. Classification 

designations, in text and footnotes, are those that appeared in the original classified volume. Following review and declassification, the initial four volumes, covering the years 1945 to 1952 and the Korean War, were distributed in unclassified 

form within the Department of Defense and copies were deposited with the National Archives and Records Administration. These volumes are now being made 

available as official publications. 

Volume II describes JCS activities during the period 1947 to 1949 except for activities related to Indochina which are covered in a separate series. This volume 

is the work of Mr. Kenneth W. Condit of the Historical Division, Joint Secretariat; 

he developed the volume’s concept and outline, performed the research, and 

wrote the chapters. The initial draft of Chapter 8 was prepared by Miss Judith A. 

Walters. Mr. William J. Tobin contributed to the production of Chapter 14. Final 

revision and historical editing proceeded under the supervision of the Chief, Histories Branch, Dr. Robert J. Watson. Resource constraints have prevented revision 

to reflect recent scholarship. 

Readers familiar with the present-day operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

will note that the activities described in this volume reflect a somewhat different 

organization and set of procedures-those existing some years before the implementation of the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. As orgaV 
the Joint Logistics Plans Group. At an organizational level above the three Joint 

Staff Groups were three joint committees composed of Service representatives 

(such as the Joint Strategic Plans Committee overseeing the work of the Joint 

Strategic Plans Group). The Joint Chiefs of Staff normally assigned tasks to one of 

the committees, which in turn called on its corresponding Joint Staff Group for a 

report. The resulting paper passed to the joint committee for review, amendment, 

and approval for return with instructions for revision) before being submitted to 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

The JCS Committees and Groups that were established under the National Security Act of 1947 were direct successors of elements of the wartime JCS organization that had continued to function in the postwar period. The transition from 

old forms to new occurred during October 1947 and involved extensive changes 

in titles. Since some of the earlier organizational elements are mentioned in the 

text of this volume, the following table is presented to identify each one with its 

successorunder the National Security Act. 

Old 

Joint Staff Planners 

Joint Intelligence Committee 

Joint Logistics Committee 

Joint War Plans Committee 

Joint Intelligence Staff 

Joint Logistics Plans 

Committee 

New 

= Joint Strategic Plans Committee 

= Joint Intelligence Committee 

= Joint Logistics Plans Committee 

= Joint Strategic Plans Group 

= Joint Intelligence Group 

= Joint Logistics Plans Group 

This volume was reviewed for declassification by the appropriate US Government departments and agencies and cleared for release. The volume is an official 

publication of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but, inasmuch as the text has not been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it must be construed as descriptive only and 

does not constitute the official position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any subject. 

Washington, DC DAVID A. ARMSTRONG 

September 1996 Director for Joint History 

vi 
Preface 

The period 1947-1949 marked the beginning of new responsibilities and new 

challenges for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With the passage of the National Security 

Act of 1947, they acquired legal status and legally assigned duties for the first 

time. They were called upon to discharge these duties under particularly trying 

circumstances. As “principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary 

of Defense” the Joint Chiefs of Staff were called upon to support the national policy of “containment” by recommending military forces strong enough to prevent 

further communist advances. But an economy-minded President and Congress 

failed to provide them. As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were compelled to 

shape their recommendations on military strategy and national policy to the 

means at hand. The result was a military strategy for general war that conceded 

the initial loss of both Western European and Eastern Asia, and a cautious approach to military commitments in situations below the level of general war. 

The author received help from many sources in the preparation of this volume 

and freely acknowledges his indebtedness. A special debt is owed to Mr. Ernest 

H. Giusti, Chief of the Historical Division during most of the time this volume 

was being written, for his support and encouragement and to Dr. Robert J. Watson, then Chief of the Histories Branch, for his meticulous and constructive review of the manuscript. Without the research assistance of Mr. Sigmund W. 

Musinski and his staff in the JCS Records Information and Retrieval Branch, and 

of the Modern Military Records Division, National Archives and Records Service, 

the author’s task would have been far more difficult. Special thanks are due to 

CWO William A. Barbee and Ms. Janet M. Lekang of the JCS Declassification 

Branch, for the many hours they devoted to reviewing and declassifying JCS documents cited in the volume. Miss Anna M. Siney, Editoral Assistant, and her successor Mrs. Janet W. Ball made an invaluable contribution through their cheerful 

and efficient direction of all phases of preparing the original manuscript. I also 

wish to thank Ms. Susan Carroll for preparing the Index and Ms. Penny Norman 

for performing the manifold tasks necessary to put the manuscript into publication form. 

KENNETH W. CONDII 

vii 

Contents 

l.ANewEraBegins .............................. 

New Framework for National Defense: 

The National Security Act of 1947. ................. 

From Collaboration to Cold War. ................... 

Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan ................. 

“Playing with Fire” ........................... 

2. Countering Soviet Expansion in the Middle East 

and Eastern Mediterranean ................... 

US Policy toward the Region. ................... 

Initiation of Military Aid to Greece ................ 

The British Proposal for Troop Withdrawal. ........... 

The Chamberlin Mission ...................... 

NSC 5: The Question of Deploying US Forces to Greece .... 

1 

1 

5 

9 

11 

15 

15 

17 

18 

20 

24 

27 

29 

31 

32 

36 

38 

Military Operations: Successes and Failures ........... 

Continuation of Military Assistance for Greece ......... 

Final Victory in Greece ....................... 

Strengthening Anti-Communist Forces in Italy ......... 

Aid to Turkey ............................ 

Aid to Iran .............................. 

3. Palestine: US Middle East Policy at Cross Purposes. ... 

Genesis of the Palestine Problem .............. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Oppose Partition ......... 

President Truman Decides for Partition. .......... 

The General Assembly Votes for Partition ......... 

The United States Advocates a UN Trusteeship ...... 

The Situation Deteriorates .................. 

Arab-Israeli War ........................ 

International Peace Force for a Neutral Jerusalem. .... 

International Peace Force for Palestine ........... 

Marine Guards for the Jerusalem Consulate ........ 

US Policy after the 1949 Armistice. ............. 

Military Assistance to Israel and the Arab States ..... 

The Tripartite Declaration of 1950 .............. 

. 41 

41 

43 

44 

44 

45 

48 

49 

51 

53 

54 

55 

57 

58 

ix 
Communist Coup in Czechoslovakia ............ 

Consolidation of the Western Zones. ............ 

Restrictions on Access to Berlin ............... 

The Soviets Blockade Berlin ................. 

The Initial Western Response. ................ 

Diplomacy Fails ........................ 

NSC Action 84: National Policy Reaffirmed ........ 

JCS 1907: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Join the Policy Debate. 

Plans for Restoration of Ground Access. .......... 

New Diplomatic Initiatives. ................. 

US Policy Reappraised .................... 

Failure at the United Nations. ................ 

The Blockade Is Lifted. .................... 

Contingency Planning for a Future Berlin Blockade. ... 

The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Berlin Crisis . . 

5. Key West and Newport: Roles and Missions. .......... 

The National Security Act and Executive Order 9877 ...... 

Roles and Missions Disputes Renewed .............. 

The Decision to Issue a New Roles and Missions Directive. .. 

Deadlock in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ............... 

Basic Roles and Missions Decisions: The Key West Agreement 

Decision on Control of Atomic Weapons: 

The Newport Agreement. .................... 

6. The FY 1949 Supplemental Budget: Initial Effort to Rearm 

Resumption of Selective Service ................ 

Proposals for a $3 Billion Supplemental Appropriation. .. 

The 70-Group Air Force. .................... 

JCS Appraisal of the Impact of a 70-Group 

Air Force on Force Structure. ................ 

Presidential Decision on the Supplemental Appropriation 

Congressional Action on FY 1949 Appropriations. ..... 

7. The FY 1950 Budget: Rearmament Falls Short .......... 

Policy Guidance for the Budget .................. 

NSC 20/4: National Policy Guidance for the Military Budget . 

JCS Responsibilities for F’Y 1950 Budgetary Preparations. ... 

The JCS Estimate of Military Requirements ........... 

Search for a $14.4 Billion Budget: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Fail. 

The Secretary of Defense Takes a Hand ............. 

The JCS Budget Recommendations ................ 

Recommendations of the Secretary of Defense. ......... 

President Truman’s FY 1950 Military Budget .......... 

The Budget before Congress .................... 

62 

63 

64 

66 

67 

71 

72 

73 

74 

75 

77 

80 

80 

82 

83 

87 

87 

89 

90 

92 

95 

97 

99 

100 

101 

103 

105 

109 

110 

113 

113 

116 

121 

122 

124 

128 

131 

134 

135 

136 

X 
“Red Bricks” ......................... 

The Four Estimates ..................... 

TheIkeIandIIForces. ................... 

Imposition of a $13 Billion Presidential Ceiling ..... 

Secretary Johnson’s Ceilings ................ 

The President’s Budget Requests ............. 

9. Strategic Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Origins of Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

HALFMOON/FLEETWOOD: The First Joint Emergency 

War Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

TROJAN: Blueprint for Strategic Bombing . . . . . . . . . 

OFFTACKLE: Making Strategy Conform to Capabilities . 

Planning for the Longer Term . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

COGWHEEL: Strategic Basis for Mobilization Planning . 

10. Challenges to Strategy. ......................... 

Reservations Concerning Emergency War Plans. .......... 

The Harmon Report: Evaluation of the Effects of 

Atomic Bombing ........................... 

JCS Disagreement over Delivery Capabilities ............ 

Cancellation of the Carrier USS United States. ............ 

Navy Charges against the B-36 .................... 

The Decision of Congress to Investigate ............... 

The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Hearings. ........ 

Service Preparations for the Hearings. ................ 

The Navy Challenge to Strategy. ................... 

The Navy’s Alternate Strategy ..................... 

. . 142 

. . 142 

. . 144 

. . 146 

. . 147 

151 

. . . . 153 

. . 153 

156 

158 

. . 159 

. . 163 

. 164 

167 

167 

168 

169 

171 

176 

177 

178 

180 

180 

182 

The Challenge to Strategy: Views of Admiral Denfeld ....... 

The Defense of Approved Strategy .................. 

Criticism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff .................. 

The Committee Findings ........................ 

Relief of Admiral Denfeld ....................... 

The WSEG Report. ........................... 

11. Collective Defense of the Atlantic Community ...... 

TheBrusselsPact ....................... 

The US Reaction to the Brussels Pact ............ 

US Participation in Brussels Pact Military Planning. ... 

Negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty. ........... 

Determining the Military Structure of NATO ....... 

Military Planning Begins ................... 

183 

184 

185 

187 

187 

188 

191 

191 

192 

197 

200 

204 

212 

xi 
JCS Doubts: US vs NATO Rearmament. . 222 

The European Response . . . . . . . . . . 224 

Preparing the Military Assistance Program. . . . . . 227 

The Military Assistance Program in Congress . . . . 231 

Reprogramming Military Assistance . . . . . . . . 233 

13. The Communist Victory in China ............ . . 235 

Background: US China Policy after World War II ... . . . 235 

The Wedemeyer Mission ................. 237 

TheChina Aid Act of 1948 ................ . 239 

JUSMAGCHINA. ..................... . 241 

The Withdrawal from Tsingtao. ............. . . 244 

A Policy of Reality for China. .............. . , . . 248 

The Question of Continuing Aid to Nationalist China . . . . 250 

The Final Collapse of the Nationalists. ......... . . . . 255 

The Issue of Taiwan .................... . . 257 

14. Consequences of the Communist Victory in China 

on US Far East Policy ................. . . 263 

Reassessment of Policy toward the Far East ...... . . . 263 

Japan: Preparations to End the Occupation. ...... . . 263 

The Philippines: Base Rights and Military Assistance. . . 271 

Korea: Support for a Divided Country ......... . . . 274 

Development of a Regional Policy. ........... . . 275 

15. The Soviet Atomic Explosion and Its Consequences ........ 279 

The Soviet Union Detonates a Nuclear Device. ........... 279 

Reevaluation of Intelligence Methods. ................ 280 

The Effect on Strategic Plans ...................... 283 

Expansion of Fission Bomb Production ................ 283 

Continental Air Defense ........................ 286 

Proposals for Development of Fusion Weapons ........... 289 

JCS Recommendations for Development of Fusion Weapons ... 291 

Decision to Develop Fusion Weapons. ................ 298 

Maps 

1. UN Plan of Partition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 

2. Palestine 1949 Cease-Fire Boundaries . . . . . . . . 52 

3. Germany Zonal Boundaries and Air Corridors. . . . . . 84 

xii 
I. Actual Military Strength, 30 June 194731 December 1949 . 301 

II. Department of Defense, New Obligational Authority for 

Military Purposes, FY 1948-1951. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301 

III. Principal Civilian and Military Officers. . . . . . . . 303 

IV. List of Abbreviations and Acronyms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 

Notes.................................... 307 

Bibliographic Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337 

Index.................................... 339 

x111 

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

and National Policy 

1947-1949 

A New Era Begins 

The middle of the year 1947 marked a new departure both for US foreign policy and for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After two and a half years of unsuccessful 

attempts to collaborate with the Soviet Union in conducting world affairs according to the principles of the United Nations, the United States Government concluded that its interests could only be served by a policy designed to prevent the 

imposition of totalitarian regimes on free peoples by direct or indirect Soviet 

aggression. President Truman viewed the spread of Soviet rule as undermining 

the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United 

States. The result was a period of “cold war” consisting of diplomatic and military confrontations of varying intensity but always short of actual armed conflict 

on the part of US forces. Meanwhile the United States evolved a new complex of 

governmental institutions, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were assigned a key 

role, to deal with problems of national security. 

New Framework for National Defense: 

The National Security Act of 1947 

n 26 July 1947, President Truman affixed his signature to Public Law 253, the 

National Security Act of 1947, and thus conferred legal status upon the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff for the first time.’ Since February 1942, when the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff came into existence informally to provide the US component of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had neither a legal mandate nor formally defined duties. They were left free to extend their activities as needed to 

meet the requirements of the war. The desirability of preserving this useful flexibility was the chief reason offered by President Roosevelt himself for declining to 

seek congressional authorization for the Joint Chiefs of Staff or to issue them a 

basic directive. After the war had ended, the need for reform of the military 

establishment, including some legal provision for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was 

0 
Congress intended, in providing for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Public Law 

253, to perpetuate what was generally considered to be a successful military 

institution rather than to innovate. “The bill contemplates the continuation of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff with duties substantially as at present, and permits functioning in accordance with procedures developed by wartime experience,” read the 

Senate report on the proposed legislation. And the House report stated that the 

intention was to continue “on a permanent basis the most effective interservice 

coordinating agency developed during the war.“” 

To this end, Public Law 253 gave legal status to the existing membership of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff-namely, the Chief of Staff, US Army; the Chief of Staff, 

US Air Force; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, should the President choose to fill this last office. 

As a statement of their continuing duties, Public Law 253 specifically directed 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 

(1) to prepare strategic plans and to provide for the strategic direction of the 

military forces; 

(2) to prepare joint logistic plans and to assign to the military services logistic 

responsibilities in accordance with such plans; 

(3) to establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security; 

(4) to formulate policies for joint training of military forces; 

(5) to formulate policies for coordinating the education of members of the 

military forces; 

(6) to review major materiel and ersonnel requirements of the military 

forces, in accordance with strategic and Pogistic plans; and 

(7) to provide United States representation on the Militar Staff Committee of 

the United Nations in accordance with the provisions o Y the Charter of the 

United Nations. 

The law also provided a broad degree of flexibility in the functions of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff by specifying that they would serve as the “principal military 

advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense” and would “perform such 

other duties as the President and the Secretary of Defense may direct or as may 

be prescribed by law.“4 

Although Congress intended to continue the Joint Chiefs of Staff “with duties 

substantially as at present,” the enumeration of duties in Public Law 253 

reflected the tasks carried out during World War II and was not an accurate 

description of the functions actually being performed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

in the summer of 1947. True, they had drawn up, and obtained presidential 

2 
y ggp, jpq

ments of the military forces, or formulated policies for joint training or education. 

They had, however, been called upon to prepare strategic estimates. 

Since the end of World War II, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had become increasingly involved in foreign policy questions. Even before the war had come to an 

end, President Roosevelt had asked their advice about the terms to be imposed 

on the vanquished powers and on aspects of the proposed United Nations Organization. In subsequent years, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave their views on such 

subjects as disarmament and the control of atomic energy, military alliances, provision of military assistance to friendly powers, base rights overseas, relations 

with the Soviet Union, and policy towards China. The involvement of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff in these matters could find legal justification only in Public Law 

253 under the “such other duties” clause. This clause, if considered in the light of 

the congressional intention to continue the Joint Chiefs of Staff with duties “substantially as at present,” could be construed as a congressional mandate to continue these activities in the foreign relations field. 

If Public Law 253 was conservative in prescribing the functions of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, it was far more innovative in setting up the environment in which 

those functions would be carried out. By creating the position of Secretary of 

Defense, whom the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to serve as “principal military 

advisers,” Congress for the first time fixed responsibility over the entire defense 

establishment in one Cabinet official. He would have the following duties: 

(1) Establish general policies and programs for the National Military Establishment and for all of the departments and agencies therein; 

(2) Exercise general direction, authority, and control over such departments 

and agencies; 

(3) Take ap ropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fie Pds of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and 

research; 

(4) Supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates of the 

departments and agencies comprising the National Military Establishment; formulate and determine the budget estimates for submittal to the Bureau of the 

Budget; and supervise the budget programs of such departments and agencies 

under the applicable appropriation Act.” 

Congress, while assigning broad responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense, 

was less generous in providing him the necessary authority to carry them out. By 

limiting his authority over the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and by 

guaranteeing them direct access to the President as well as a position on the 

National Security Council, Congress, in effect, merely established a coordinator of 

the three existing Departments; there was no “Department” of Defense. 

3 
The National Military Establishment over which the Secretary of Defense was 

to preside was also created by the Act. It consisted of the Departments of the 

Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Research and Development and Munitions Boards. The Department of the Air Force replaced the former Army Air Forces. The Munitions Board was an existing joint Army-Navy 

agency, while the Research and Development Board had formerly enjoyed independent status. 

Public Law 253 also established a National Security Council (NSC), consisting 

of the President; the Vice President; the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, 

and the Air Force; and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board 

(another new creation, whose task was to coordinate civilian and military mobilization plans). This body was charged with advising the President “with respect 

to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the 

national security.” The function of the National Security Council was, in effect, to 

correlate the efforts of the executive agencies primarily concerned with national 

security matters. The Act made no provision for any relationship of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff to the National Security Council. Military input into NSC deliberations was evidently intended to come from the civilian Secretaries of Defense, 

Army, Navy, and Air Force. 

The National Security Council superseded an earlier body, the State-War-Navy 

Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), created during World War II, which had 

undertaken to coordinate political and military policies at the assistant secretary 

level. Service representatives served on the working subcommittees of SWNCC, 

while important papers were referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment, a 

practice soon adopted also by the NSC. After the passage of the National Security 

Act, SWNCC was renamed “State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating Committee” (SANACC) and continued in existence until 30 June 1949.6 

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), also established by the National 

Security Act under the NSC, served to assist, rather than to restrict, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff in the performance of their duties. Under the provisions of the 

Act, existing intelligence activities of the military departments and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff were to continue as before. The CIA was to assist them in these 

activities by performing for their benefit “such additional services of common 

concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently 

accomplished centrally.” 

In specifying that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to be “principal military advisers to the President,” the Act sought to continue a central working relationship of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During World War II, President Roosevelt had chosen to 

deal directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in matters pertaining to military operations and strategy and had deliberately by-passed the Secretaries of War and 

Navy. After the war had ended, President Truman resumed the practice of referring most matters concerning the armed forces to the Service Secretaries. On occasion, however, he dealt directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, like his predecessor. 

4 
of State on such matters as the military consequence of Soviet acquisition of cer

tain eastern Turkish provinces, and gave their views on international control of 

atomic energy to the US representative on the UN Atomic Energy Commission. It 

was not clear whether these direct relationships would continue after the newly 

authorized Secretary of Defense took office. 

The officers who were about to take up the task of making the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff function effectively in the new national security machinery established by 

Public Law 253 were all individuals who had exercised high command with distinction during World War II. Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, the Chief of Staff 

to the Commander in Chief, had held the post ever since it was created in 1942. 

He had presided over the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had provided 

invaluable liaison between them and the White House. Representing the Army 

on the Joint Chiefs of Staff was the Chief of Staff, General of the Army Dwight D. 

Eisenhower, who had commanded the victorious Allied armies in Western 

Europe. The Navy was also represented by a successful theater commander of 

World War II, the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. 

As Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), he had commanded the operations 

across the Pacific against Japan. General Carl Spaatz, the Chief of Staff of the 

newly created Air Force, had served under General Eisenhower in Europe as 

Commanding General, US Strategic Air Forces. 

The new “boss” of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was also a man with broad experience in military affairs. James V. Forrestal, who took office as the first Secretary of 

Defense on 17 September 1947, was a successful investment banker who had 

come to Washington as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1940. He became Secretary of the Navy in 1944 following the death of Secretary Knox. In these posts, he 

played a significant role in the building of the wartime Navy. 

From Collaboration to Cold War 

A s the Joint Chiefs of Staff took up their duties in the new national defense 

establishment, conditions in the world confronted the United States with serious challenges. Two years after the surrender of Hitler’s Reich, the victorious 

Allies had not yet been able to agree on peace terms for Germany or upon a political order for the liberated territories of Eastern Europe. To the contrary, the United 

States and the United Kingdom had engaged in an increasingly bitter struggle to 

prevent Soviet dominance on the European continent. Elsewhere in the world the 

end of World War II had not brought peace. China was wracked by civil war, the 

Indian subcontinent was the scene of communal strife between Moslems and Hindus, and Palestine was plagued by violent conflicts of its Arab and Jewish inhabitants against each other and against the British mandate authorities. 

This was not the world order of cooperation under international law, free 

from spheres of influence, exclusive alliances, and balances of power, that the 
pj, , 

Britain, and the Soviet Union, shared interests in common to a sufficient degree 

to support a world order based on self-determination and democracy and regulated by an international organization of all peace-loving nations. To this end, the 

United States had taken the lead in forming the United Nations and in committing the “Big Three” powers, through the Declaration on Liberated Europe, to 

support the liberated peoples in creating democratic institutions of their own 

choice. The effect of these measures, as President Roosevelt expressed it in 

reporting to Congress on the Yalta Conference, was expected to be the “end of 

the system of unilateral action and exclusive alliances and spheres of influence 

and balances of power and all other expedients which have been tried for centuries-and have failed.“7 

A few months later, when President Roosevelt died, the policy was already 

beginning to prove unworkable and, as time passed, it proved to be increasingly 

unrealistic. In Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, disregarding its solemn pledges 

to support free elections and democratic institutions in the liberated countries of 

Eastern Europe, had chosen instead to seek to control them through communistdominated puppet regimes. By the end of 1945, the Soviets had imposed their 

control over Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Albania, and Yugoslavia-a process 

facilitated by the presence of the Red Army in all these countries except the last. 

These events caused American officials to begin to question the basic premise 

of US foreign policy as expressed by President Roosevelt after Yalta. Their fears 

were confirmed by Premier Stalin in a speech delivered in Moscow on 9 February 

1946. This speech, as Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson described it, “stated 

with brutal clarity the Soviet Union’s postwar policy.” Finding the causes of 

World War II in the dynamics of capitalist imperialism, and the same forces still 

in control of the other major powers, Stalin concluded that a peaceful international order was impossible. He called, therefore, for the Soviet Union to prepare 

for any eventuality. The basic materials of national defense-iron and steelmust be trebled, and coal and oil, the sources of energy, doubled. Consumer 

goods, so desperately needed in Russia, must wait on rearmament.H 

In response to a request for elucidation of this speech, George F. Kennan, the 

US Charge d’Affaires in the Soviet Union, cabled a long dispatch analyzing 

Soviet attitudes and behavior. He found that at the bottom of the Kremlin’s attitude toward the outside world was a neurotic fear that reflected centuries of Russian insecurity. To the government, whether czarist or bolshevik, penetration by 

the Western World was its greatest danger. Mr. Kennan predicted that Soviet policy would use every means to infiltrate, divide, and weaken the West. To seek a 

modus vivendi with Moscow would prove chimerical, a process leading not to an 

end but only to a continuation of political warfare.’ Mr. Kennan’s message had a 

profound effect upon the attitudes of officials in the State, War, and Navy Departments, but US policy remained unchanged until President Truman asked for aid 

to Greece and Turkey more than a year later.‘” 

6 
treaties were finally signed with the five lesser Axis powers (Hungary, Rumania, 

Bulgaria, Italy, and Finland). But to obtain agreement, the United States and the 

United Kingdom had been obliged to agree to provisions such as heavy reparations that gave the Soviets an undue amount of continuing influence. 

Of far greater concern to the United States than the status of Eastern Europe 

was an evolving struggle with the Soviet Union for the control of Germany. The 

United States had hoped to put a permanent end to the threat of German aggression by means of disarmament and demilitarization. To attain these objectives, 

the United States favored a politically decentralized Germany consisting of 

Laender, or states, exercising the normal functions of local government and a federal government empowered to deal with economic affairs on a nationwide 

basis but severely limited in other respects. It would specifically be denied any 

control of police or education. The United States also recognized that Germany 

should make reparation for the devastation caused by her aggression but should 

be left with an economy sufficient to maintain an average European living standard without outside aid. Some adjustment of Germany’s eastern boundary was 

felt justified to compensate Poland for lands taken from her in the east by the 

Soviet Union. 

Apparent agreement on these policies was attained by the United States, the 

United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union at Yalta and Potsdam. In practice, however, there was very little progress in carrying them out. By interallied agreement, Germany was divided into US, British, French, and Soviet zones for purposes of occupation, with policy coordination vested in an Allied Control 

Council consisting of the military governors of the four zones. From the beginning, agreements in the Allied Control Council were few and far between, and 

the occupying authorities of the Western zones were compelled to act on their 

own to avoid stagnation and breakdown. They introduced democratic political 

institutions, including free elections and guarantees of civil liberties, while the 

Soviet Union in its zone followed the now familiar lines that had been applied 

in Eastern Europe. The result was the emergence of two Germanies: a democratic west consisting of the US, British, and French zones; and a communist east 

consisting of the Soviet zone. This process was accelerated by the failure to coordinate the economies of the several zones. In the west, the absence of an interzonal flow of goods compelled the occupying authorities to subsidize their 

zones, a procedure they were unwilling to continue indefinitely. To ease this 

financial burden, the British and US Governments merged the economies of 

their zones on 1 January 1947. In the east, the Soviets nationalized the major 

industries and engaged in large-scale removal of industrial plants to the Soviet 

Union as reparations. 

Any hope that these divisions could be healed by a peace settlement were 

quickly dashed when the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union met in Moscow in February 1947 to write a 

treaty. Agreement proved impossible on all the major issues. In the economic 

7 
powers found these positions unacceptable. In the political field, all the powers 

agreed that before the conclusion of a peace treaty there should be a single German government capable of carrying out its terms. But they disagreed on its 

composition and duties. The Soviets, evidently confident of their ability through 

communist organization and penetration to turn a united centralized Germany to 

the east, proposed a strong, centralized government responsible for state security. 

The Western powers, because they feared that such a government could be captured and exploited by a totalitarian movement of the right or left, proposed a 

federal structure reserving to the Laendu all but certain specified limited powers. 

There was also disagreement over Germany’s future boundaries and the procedure for drafting a peace treaty. 

The Moscow Conference was an important turning point. The irreconcilable 

positions taken by the US and Soviet delegations on every controversial point 

indicated that neither saw any possibility of a German or European settlement 

based on four-power agreement. After Moscow, the United States, together 

with Britain and France, turned to the task of reconstructing western Germany 

along their own lines, just as the Soviet Union had been doing for some time in 

eastern Germany. 

In Asia, as in Europe, the United States was disappointed by the trend of 

events during the two years following World War II. United States policy was 

based on the assumption that peace and stability in Asia could be assured by a 

strong, united and democratic China which, as one of the great powers of the 

world, would play a constructive part in the work of the United Nations. But 

attainment of this goal proved far more difficult than its enunciation, for China 

was not united; a state of civil war prevailed between the legal government of 

Chiang Kai-shek and the communist forces of Mao Tse-tung. When World War II 

ended, there was a race between Chiang’s forces and the communists for control 

of Japanese-occupied territory. The United States came to the aid of Chiang by 

sending occupation forces to North China and transporting Chiang’s armies to 

key points. These actions, the result as much of the need to effect the surrender of 

the Japanese armies as of a deliberate policy of aiding Chiang at the expense of 

the communists, did nothing to restore the unity so necessary if China was to 

play her hoped-for role in the post-war period. 

Hoping to rectify the situation, President Truman sent General George C. 

Marshall to China as his special emissary. General Marshall’s mission was to seek 

a strong, united, and democratic China by broadening and democratizing the 

government of Chiang Kai-shek. To this end, General Marshall persuaded both 

the government and the communists to accept an armistice and to open negotiations on a broadening of the regime to include the communists and other nongovernment parties. In spite of some initial success, this effort soon collapsed. 

Fighting resumed, and the negotiations were broken off. General Marshall’s mission ended in January 1947. In his final report, he blamed the “irreconcilable 

Communists” and the “dominant group of reactionaries” in the government for 

the failure of his efforts. 

8 
sion for Soviet expansion arose from the occupation of Korea, a former Japanese 

territory now to become free and independent by virtue of a decision of the 

Allied powers at Cairo in 1943. The necessity to disarm and repatriate the 

Japanese forces in Korea led to a partition into Soviet and US occupation zones 

along the 38th parallel. To achieve freedom and independence, Korea would 

have to be unified, but efforts at unification, undertaken during 1946 by means of 

a joint US-Soviet commission, failed. Disagreement was ostensibly over what 

groups of Koreans, by virtue of their adherence to “democratic” principles, 

should be allowed to participate in the government of a unified Korea. The real 

issue, however, was that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wished to 

see a unified Korea that was dominated by the other. By mid-1947, the United 

States Government was thus compelled to abandon hopes for collaboration with 

the communists and to adopt a policy of supporting and strengthening the anticommunist elements in China and Korea. 

The challenges facing the United States loomed even larger as it became 

apparent that the United Kingdom, the staunch wartime partner, was no longer 

able to play the role of a great power. That nation depended for its world position on the solidarity of the Commonwealth and on the maintenance of a worldwide empire, linked together by strategic routes and strong points. By 1946 the 

British system had been gravely weakened. To fight the war, Britain had to liquidate many of its investments overseas and to incur heavy debts. Its industrial 

plant was run down and its people were exhausted. Faced by great problems at 

home, they no longer had the power to hold their empire together or to meet the 

responsibilities inherent in great power status. The liquidation of the empire was 

forecast by agreements to offer independence or dominion status to India, 

Burma, and Ceylon. The waning of British power was also reflected in decisions 

to surrender the Palestine mandate in the face of an increasingly bitter ArabJewish civil war, and to terminate aid programs to Greece and Turkey, which the 

British people could no longer afford. 

Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan 

T his last decision was to lead to a major new departure in US foreign policy. 

The Greek Government was facing a serious communist insurgency supported by the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites. Turkey, while not 

directly threatened at the time, had been under varying degrees of Soviet pressure since 1945 and was therefore compelled to keep its entire army mobilized at 

great expense. President Truman now faced a fateful decision. As he and Secretary of State George C. Marshall explained to congressional leaders on 27 February 1947, Greece was in grave danger of falling under communist control, thus 

isolating Turkey which then might suffer a similar fate. Soviet influence might 

then extend throughout the entire Middle East and as far as India. The choice, as 

9 
session of Congress on 12 March 1947 to request military and economic aid to 

Greece and Turkey. 

The issue, however, was far larger than the fate of Greece and Turkey. Failure 

to maintain their freedom and independence, the President explained, would 

have a profound effect upon other countries struggling to maintain their freedom. The President then discussed the “broad implications” in the action he proposed. One of the primary aspects of American foreign policy, he said, was “the 

creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a 

way of life free from coercion,” an objective we could not attain unless we were 

willing to “help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national 

integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes.” It must therefore be “the policy of the United States to support free 

peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. . We cannot allow changes in the status L~~L(I in violation of the 

Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration.” I* 

The Truman Doctrine dealt with only a part of the problem of maintaining 

stability in Europe. There was also a severe economic crisis confronting the warweakened countries of the continent. By March 1947, many European countries 

faced economic collapse, which would offer opportunities for communist political exploitation unless aid could be quickly furnished. On 5 March, Under Secretary of State Acheson asked the SWNCC to examine the whole question in consultation with the Treasury Department, thus setting off a seriesof studies, drafts, 

and proposals that finally resulted in a program for US economic aid to Europe. 

It was first announced by Secretary of State George C. Marshall in a commencement address at Harvard on 5 June. The plan, as unveiled by the Secretary of 

State, called for the provision of US aid to meet needs identified and presented to 

the United States by the European nations, preferably acting together. 

The hardest issue to resolve in drawing up the Marshall Plan was whether or 

not to invite the Soviet Union to participate. The administration was anxious to 

avoid the appearance of dividing Europe by limiting the offer of aid to the democratic nations of Western Europe but feared that Soviet participation would make 

the program so expensive that Congress would reject it in its entirety. The solution was to offer aid to the Soviet Union but to require full disclosure of economic 

and financial conditions, a proposal that the Soviets would be unlikely to accept. 

The Western European democracies quickly endorsed the Marshall Plan. The 

Soviet Union rejected it partly because of an unwillingness to make the required 

economic disclosures but also because of a desire to appear as the defenders of 

the East European satellites against American imperialists. A group of 16 European countries, meeting during the summer of 1947, prepared a joint economic 

recovery program. On the American side, the Truman administration prepared 

legislation for a comprehensive program. It was presented to Congress in Deccmber 1947; congressional approval was forthcoming in April 1948.11 

10 
I n March 1947, when President Truman announced his determination to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities 

or by outside pressures,” US military forces were in no condition to give this policy effective support. The United States was, as General Marshall later expressed 

it, “playing with fire while we have nothing with which to put it out.” As the 

result of precipitous demobilization in response to irresistible public pressure, 

the victorious wartime forces had all but disappeared. Military manpower of the 

United States, which had totalled more than 12,000,OOO on 30 June 1945, had 

dwindled to about 1,566,OOO two years later. This number was divided among 

the Services asfollows: 

Army (excluding AAF) 683,837 

Navy 484,025 

Marine Corps 92,222 

Army Air Forces 305,774 

1,565,85814 

In terms of effective combat power, the decline was even more striking. On 

VJ-Day, US ground forces consisted of 91 Army and 6 Marine divisions, all at a 

high pitch of combat effectiveness. The Army Air Forces, on that date, had an 

inventory of 68,400 aircraft and a force structure of 218 groups. The Navy at its 

maximum wartime strength consisted of 8,165 vessels of all types and included 

1,304 major combatant ships, of which 40 were carriers and 24 were battleships.‘” 

By 30 June 1947, this once-mighty host had almost ceased to exist. Only 12 

ground divisions, 10 Army and 2 Marine, remained, and all were understrength. 

All the Army divisions were committed to occupation duties, except for two divisions of the “general reserve ” in the continental United States. They were so 

reduced in numbers that battalion training exercises were only possible by drawing on the entire personnel of the parent regiment. The Marine divisions were 

also greatly understrength and lacking in combat effectiveness. The Army Air 

Forces had dwindled to 38 groups, of which only 11 were operationally effective. 

Worse still, none of the 9 B-29 groups authorized for the Strategic Air Command-the units designated to carry out nuclear strikes-was fully manned or 

operational. The Navy had shrunk to a total fleet of 1,003 ships of which 289 

were major combatant types, including 14 fleet carriers and 4 battleships.lh 

The military budgets for Fiscal Year (FY) 19413offered little or no prospect of 

improvement in either the quantity or quality of the US armed forces. Prepared 

separately by the Service Departments without assistancefrom the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, they provided new obligational authority totalling $9.757 billion, of which 

$3.935 billion was for the Navy, $4.562 billion was for the Army, and $1.260 billion was for the Air Force. The average personnel strength to be supported by 

these funds was 1,641,000, a significant decrease from the average strength of 

2,108,OOOmen maintained during FY 1947.‘7 

11 
the Selective Service Act, in effect since 1940, to expire. Henceforth, unless an 

alternative form of compulsory service could be found, the Armed Services 

would have to rely on voluntary enlistments. The Truman administration’s substitute for selective service was universal military training, a program first proposed by General of the Army George C. Marshall in 1945 and adopted by President Truman shortly thereafter. As presented by him to Congress on 23 October 

1945, it called for one year of military training for all men at age 18, or upon 

graduating from high school. Upon completion of their training, the men would 

become members of the general reserve, after which they would move into the 

secondary reserve. Congress was not enthusiastic about the proposal and never 

acted on it.lX 

President Truman, showing continuing interest in the subject, appointed a 

commission on 19 December 1946 headed by Dr. Karl Compton, president of the 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to study universal military training. The 

Commission’s report, submitted on 29 May 1947, borrowed features from each of 

its predecessors. It called for compulsory military training of at least one year for 

all men at age 18, or upon completion of secondary school. The training was to be 

divided into two parts, the first six months being devoted to basic training, followed by one of the following options: enlistment in one of the Services for two 

years; a second six months training; enrollment in a national Service academy; 

enrollment in the National Guard or Organized Reserve; or enrollment in 

Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). A civilian commission was to be in overall charge of the program.14 

Congressional reaction was again unfavorable, and the Compton Report was 

quietly buried. Fear of “militarism” and the estimated cost of the program, $1.75 

billion a year, were two major obstacles to congressional acceptance. Another 

was the belief that universal military service would be unnecessary if adequate 

funds were voted for the military and the unification measure, then before 

Congress, were approved.2(1 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, although they made no formal comment on the final 

report, did endorse the general concept of universal military training. Responding to a request for their views on the subject from Dr. Compton, they informed 

him on 17 January 1947 that, in their opinion, “an adequate system of universal 

training is necessary to insure the future security of the United States.” Their 

opinion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, was based on their belief that a future war 

would be global in scale and, despite certain technical innovations, would 

require massive conventional military forces. In the future, the United States 

would no longer be able to count on allies to hold the line while the United States 

mobilized and trained its own forces. Armed forces that could be rapidly mobilized were therefore essential. And the more the regular establishment was 

reduced, the more necessary it was to have a large, well-trained and rapidly 

mobilizable reserve.*’ 

Soviet military forces, by comparison, vastly exceeded those of the United 

States and any potential allies. According to the most recent estimate by the US 

12 
the air forces, and 300,000 in the navy. Active ground combat units totalled about 

150 divisions. Soviet air strength consisted of about 89,000 aircraft of all types, 

although many of these planes were believed to be obsolescent. Moreover, the 

Soviet Air Force was predominantly a tactical force. Its strategic arm, the Long 

Range Bomber Force, was deficient both in quality and quantity. The Soviet Navy 

was far weaker than the Soviet air and ground forces. It was believed to consist 

of 4 overage battleships, 9 cruisers, 55 destroyers, 42 escort vessels, and 132 

ocean-going submarines.22 

The absence of approved joint strategic and logistic plans was a further source 

of weakness in the US military establishment. Had the woefully weak US forces 

been called upon to counter Soviet military aggression in mid-1947, they would 

have had no strategic plan to guide their operations, no assessments of the forces 

needed to defeat the Soviet Union, and no plans for mobilizing personnel and 

materiel resources. A beginning had been made on these planning tasks, however. Acting on their own initiative, the Joint Staff Planners had proposed, and 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff had begun, a series of strategic studies preliminary to 

developing a formal joint emergency war plan and industrial mobilization plans. 

To rectify this military imbalance by establishing armed forces adequate to 

support President Truman’s foreign policies of resistance to Soviet expansionism 

was the major objective of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the period of this volume. The disparity between commitments and military means weighed heavily 

on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and affected the nature of their response when they 

were called upon to advise the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense 

on the military aspects of foreign policy. These were tasks they undertook as 

members of the new national security team established by the National Security 

Act of 1947. They were thus simultaneously striving to attain the necessary levels 

of military preparedness and working out their relationships with the President, 

the NSC, the Secretary of Defense, and the Military Departments. 

13 

2 

Countering Soviet Expansion in the Middle 

East and Eastern Mediterranean 

US Policy toward the Region 

A t the same time that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were entering into the new 

institutional relationships established by the National Security Act, they 

were participating in a serious effort to resist Soviet expansionism. The area of 

concern was the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, where President Truman and his administration believed vital US interests were at stake, and where 

a Soviet-inspired challenge to those interests first developed. In Iran, Soviet 

troops had occupied the northern province of Azerbaijan during World War II 

and had only withdrawn in 1946 under intense pressure from the United States. 

Turkey had been confronted by Soviet demands for cession of two provinces 

that had formerly been within Czarist Russia and for a share of control over the 

Dardanelles, along with military and naval bases from which to exercise this 

authority. Italy contained a large and disciplined Communist Party which 

seemed on the verge of winning power at the ballot box. And Greece faced an 

active communist insurgency. 

In these circumstances, President Truman had enunciated his famous “doctrine” 

on 12 March 1947, when he had declared, among other things, that “if Greece 

should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, 

Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well 

spread throughout the entire Middle East.” These events, should they occur, would, 

in Mr. Truman’s opinion, have worldwide consequences. “The disappearance of 

Greece as an independent state,” he said, “would have a profound effect upon those 

countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and independence while they repair the ravages of war. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for 

15 
Formal enunciation of US policy toward the Middle East and Eastern Mediter

ranean did not come until November 1947, although the basic elements of it had 

already become apparent through actions concerning various parts of the region. 

This policy formulation was a product of the so-called “Pentagon Talks” between 

US and British civilian and military representatives but not including the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. These talks took place as a result of US-British differences over the 

withdrawal of British troops from Greece and had as their purpose the resolution 

of differences and the development of a common policy towards the Middle East 

and Eastern Mediterranean.2 

The policy statement, approved by President Truman on 24 November 1947, 

had been prepared originally in the Department of State and introduced into the 

“Pentagon Talks” as the “American Paper.” It was adopted by the NSC on 21 

November. The statement said: 

The security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East is vital to 

the security of the United States.. . 

The security of the whole Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East would be 

jeopardized if the Soviet Union should succeed in its efforts to obtain control of 

any one of the following countries: Italy, Greece, Turkey, or Iran. 

. . it should be the policy of the United States.. . to support the security of 

the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. As a corollary of this olicy the 

United States should assist in maintainin the territorial integrity an x political 

independence of Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Bran. 

In carrying out this policy the United States should be prepared to make full 

use of its political, economic, and, if necessary, military power in such manner as 

may be found most effective. Before resortin to the actual employment of force, 

the United States should exhaust politica 7 and economic means, includin

recourse to the United Nations. Any resort to force should be in consonance wit a 

the Charter of the United Nations and, so far as possible, in cooperation with 

like-minded members of the United Nations.? 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not formally consulted on this policy statement, 

evidently because they had not been designated as members of or advisers to the 

National Security Council. Secretary Forrestal, however, referred it to them informally with a request for their views. This was a practice he was to follow 

throughout his term of office and reflected his own desire to call on the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, as his statutory “principal military advisers,” for their views on 

national security policy.4 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, replying on 19 November, agreed that the security of 

the Eastern Mediterranean and Near East was important to the United States but 

described it as of “critical” rather than “vital” importance. The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff also warned of the consequences of military commitments to the region. 

“Any additional deployment of U.S. armed forces to this area will, in view of our 

16 
strength would make partial mobilization a necessity.? 

Initiation of Military Aid to Greece 

T he major testing ground for this policy was Greece, a country that had suffered major economic and political dislocations during World War II and was 

facing an active insurgency supported by neighboring communist states. At the 

end of World War II, the Greek Communist Party and its allies had believed, with 

good reason, that it could achieve political control of the country by means of 

insurgent operations that would open the way for a “people’s democracy” similar to those in power in the Soviet satellites of Eastern Europe. Not only were the 

Greeks exhausted by war and occupation but many seemed sympathetic to the 

wartime communist-controlled National Liberation Front, believing that it would 

bring them long-overdue social and economic reforms. An abortive attempt to 

seize power by force during December 1944-February 1945 led only to further 

suffering and was crushed by Greek and British troops. A reaction set in which 

resulted in electoral victory for a conservative-royalist coalition. The communists, 

who had boycotted the elections, determined to resume the struggle by violent 

means, a course of action they were encouraged to pursue by support from the 

governments of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Under the leadership of 

Markos Vafiades, the communists began guerrilla operations in March 1946 on a 

gradually escalating basis. In October, the Greek Communist Party publicly 

declared its alliance with the guerrillas.” 

After the United Kingdom, in February 1947, announced that it could no 

longer provide financial support to the Greek or Turkish Governments, President 

Truman asked Congress to supply aid for Greece and Turkey in the amount of 

$400 million for the period ending 30 June 1948. By Public Law 75, Congress, on 

22 May 1947, authorized the President to furnish assistanceto Greece and Turkey 

under four categories: 

1. by sending financial aid in the form of loans, credits, grants, or othcrwise . . ; 

2. by detailin to assistthese countries any persons in the employ of the Government of the 3 nited States.. ; 

3. by detailing a limited number of members of the military services or the 

United States to assist those countries, in an advisory capacity only;. . . 

4. by providing for (a) the transfer to.. . those countries of any articles, 

services, and information, and (b) the instruction and training of personnel of those countries.. . . 

17 
ate funding for aid to Greece, pending passage of this appropriation, Congress 

had earlier directed the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, in the authorization 

act, to advance up to $100 million.7 

To administer US aid to Greece, the administration formed the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG), which operated directly under the Secretary of 

State. It was separate from the US Embassy in Greece, but the two organizations 

were expected to work in close collaboration. Mr. Dwight P. Griswold, a former 

governor of Nebraska and at that time a member of General Lucius Clay’s military government staff in Germany, was named Chief of the Mission. Included in 

AMAG were Army and Navy Groups whose responsibility was to administer the 

provision of military and naval equipment and supplies to the Greek armed 

forces. They were not authorized to extend operational advice.x 

On 15 July 1947, when Mr. Griswold arrived in Athens accompanied by a 

small staff, he found a country facing deteriorating economic conditions and 

increasing insurgency. At this moment, the military situation in Greece seemed to 

American observers to take a serious turn for the worse. Up to this time, insurgent activity had consisted of scattered raids and ambushes, but on 12 July a 

well-armed force numbering about 2,500 men crossed into Greece from Albania 

and attacked the town of Konitza. A second column of similar strength was also 

reported moving into Greece. Secretary of State Marshall viewed the situation as 

so serious that on 16 July, he described these events in a memorandum to President Truman, in which he judged that the purpose of the insurgents was to set up 

a “people’s republic,” or its equivalent, along the Greek border. “It would 

appear,” he warned, “that the likelihood of civil war is considerable.“” 

The following day, Secretary Marshall sent a more detailed statement of the 

situation to Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Secretaries of 

War and Navy, describing, in addition to the attack on Konitza, a skirmish along 

the Greek-Yugoslav border in which the insurgents were supported logistically 

and by fire from Yugoslav territory. The Secretary of State pointed out, also, that 

because of the Soviet veto power, the United Nations might be incapable of 

action to protect Greek independence and territorial integrity. Secretary Marshall 

discussed the matter with President Truman the same day. They agreed that the 

Secretary of State would talk to Admiral Leahy and tell him informally that he 

and the President thought the Joint Chiefs of Staff should formally consider the 

matter immediately.10 

The British Proposal for Troop Withdrawal 

T he US Government received a further shock on 30 July, when the British 

Charge d’Affaires delivered a note to Secretary Marshall stating that his government had decided, because of financial difficulties and manpower shortages, 

18 
p,pp

the 10th Infantry Brigade, with its combat strength of 3,500 deployed at Salonika, 

and 1,500 headquarters and supply personnel in Athens. The mission of the 10th 

Infantry Brigade was to represent the power of Great Britain and the Western 

democracies, to deter an attack on Greece by her communist neighbors, and to 

have a “stabilizing” effect on the internal Greek situation. The Brigade was not 

able, nor was it intended, to withstand an attack in force.12 

The State Department made representations to Foreign Secretary Bevin in 

strong terms, urging that British troops remain in Greece until after the United 

Nations had completed an investigation then in progress of violations of the 

Greek border and until the US and UK Governments had engaged in a frank discussion of the consequences of troop withdrawals’3 Mr. Bevin replied to Mr. 

Marshall on 20 August. He was willing to have the Greek situation discussed by 

the UK and US Chiefs of Staff, but he made it clear that it was essential for his 

government to withdraw its troops during the autumn season. He suggested that 

what was most necessary to stabilize the situation in Greece was an expansion of 

the Greek Army.14 

The British Chiefs of Staff, on 29 August, supplied the US Joint Chiefs of Staff 

with further details of the British position presented by Mr. Bevin. Withdrawal of 

troops from Greece must be completed by 31 October, they said, and would 

therefore have to begin by the end of September. The offsetting buildup of Greek 

forces, they recommended, should be as follows: the Army from 120,000 to 

150,000, thereby permitting the organization of 10 extra battalions; the Air Force 

from 22 to 36 squadrons (all flying British aircraft); the Navy by 6 fast patrol craft 

to be supplied by the United States.ls 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied that they considered that withdrawal by 31 

October was ill-timed, entailed consequences of global significance, and could 

not be reconciled with the drastically changed conditions in Greece. The proposal 

to offset the withdrawal by enlarging the Greek Army was unacceptable. It 

would disrupt US supply plans and, more important, could not provide a substitute for the presence of British troops in Greece, which exerted a stabilizing influence out of all proportion to the size and cost of the commitment. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff therefore made an “urgent request” that withdrawal of British 

troops from Greece be postponed indefinitely, and that the British Government 

consider meeting its manpower limitations by reducing forces in other areas.lh 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also supplied to the Secretaries of War and Navy, at 

their request, a military evaluation of the consequences of a British withdrawal. 

British forces in Greece, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, were symbolic of the 

determination of Great Britain and the Western democracies to ensure the continued independence of the Greek state. Their departure might be taken as an 

opportunity by Greek insurgent leaders to call for assistance from neighboring 

communist countries in defending the newly proclaimed “Free State of Northern 

Greece.” The Greek Army could not cope with such a military threat. Thus there 

would be grave danger of a communist victory in Greece, an event that would 

19 
would be in a position to interdict shipping in the Mediterranean; Turkey would 

be outflanked and might be lost to the Western democracies; and Italy and Iran 

would be under similar pressures to loosen their ties with the West. In addition, 

resistance to communism would be seriously weakened throughout the nonSoviet world.17 

On IO September, the US Ambassador to the United Kingdom, speaking on 

instructions from the Secretary of State, stated all these arguments against withdrawal to Mr. Bevin and again urged that the British Government not withdraw 

its troops from Greece pending a full-dress review by the US and British Governments of Middle East policies. Mr. Bevin agreed to limit the immediate withdrawal to one battalion and to postpone the departure of the remainder of the 

brigade until 15 December. Secretary Marshall, on 13 September, reluctantly consented to this arrangement.lx 

The Chamberlin Mission 

T his temporary delay in the departure of British troops from Greece, while 

helpful, was not considered by US officials as sufficient action to counter a 

worsening situation. On 15 September, Mr. Griswold reported that increasing 

insurgent strength and activities required a greater concentration by AMAG on 

military problems. He called for transfer of $9 million from economic to military 

programs to finance continuation of a temporary overstrength of 20,000 men in 

the Greek Army until early January, and a permanent addition thereafter of 

10,000 men. The effect would be to raise the total allotted to military assistance 

from the $157 million originally budgeted by AMAG to $168 million. The breakdown of this amount by Services was as follows: Army, $151 million; Air Force, 

$5 million; and Navy, $12 million. Mr. Griswold recommended also that the 

British, because they had forces in Greece, be requested to furnish operational 

advice to the Greek forces. If the British were unable or unwilling to undertake 

this task, the United States should do so, dispatching 125 to 150 officers for the 

purpose. The Department of State approved the proposed transfer of funds from 

economic to military programs.ly 

To gain a further insight into the military situation in Greece, the Department 

of State requested the War Department to send a mission to make an on-the-spot 

survey of local conditions and recommend prompt remedial action. The mission, 

headed by Major General S.J. Chamberlin, USA, arrived in Athens on 26 September and departed on 11 October. The members visited numerous points in the 

area of operations, talked with commanders and staffs of Greek army units, and 

conferred with all the principal US and UK representatives and key members of 

the Greek cabinet. 

General Chamberlin submitted his report on 20 October. The struggle in 

Greece, he reported, was simply one phase in the “worldwide struggle between 

20 
Soviet satellite states or by the Soviet Union itself. In these circumstances, General Chamberlin believed, US policy objectives were not stated with “sufficient 

breadth to guide the Department of the Army through successive situations 

pyramiding in seriousness.” To remedy this deficiency, he assumed that the US 

objective was “to assure the survival of Greece as a fully independent democratic 

nation,” first because of “our traditional policy of allowing or assisting any country to choose its own government free from coercion,” and second because “totalitarian regimes imposed on the people of Greece by aggression undermine the 

security of the United States.” To meet this assumed objective, in General Chamberlin’s opinion, the United States had only two alternatives: to get out of Greece; 

or to stay and commit the means to win. 

Turning to an estimate of the current situation in Greece, General Chamberlin 

assessed the insurgent force as consisting of some 17,000 “regular” troops, 5,000 

partisans in Greece, and another 5,000 in neighboring countries. The recruitment 

rate he estimated at 1,000 per month. In quality, these forces were well trained 

and equipped with infantry weapons and ably and aggressively led through battalion level. But higher staffs were inadequate, there was a complete lack of aviation and artillery, and communications and logistics were weak. 

To combat these insurgent forces, the Greek Government had at its disposal 

an army with a current authorized strength of 140,000 and consisting of 4 field 

and 3 mountain divisions. Personnel were generally well-trained but lacked 

offensive spirit. The larger units had not been adequately trained. A major operational liability of this army was deployment of more than half of its maneuver 

battalions on static or semi-static guard duty, thereby severely limiting its offensive capabilities. As a remedy for this situation, the Greek Government proposed 

to organize 100 home guard battalions to take over the security duties. The Royal 

Hellenic Air Force consisted of 5,772 personnel and 107 operational aircraft, 

including two squadrons of Spitfire fighters and one of Dakota transports. Qualifications, training and experience of pilots were excellent. 

General Chamberlin believed that elimination or reduction of the insurgent 

forces to negligible proportions was essential to the success of the US economic 

aid program. But they could not be eliminated without a revitalization of the 

Greek National Army, a task that could be accomplished by three measures: (I) 

organization of a Home Guard, as already planned; (2) provision of high-level US 

operational guidance to overcome political influence on the Greek high command; and (3) assignment of US observers to lower echelons in order to overcome inertia and stimulate aggressive offensive action against the insurgents. 

The US Army Group, Greece (USAGG), General Chamberlin warned, was not 

a suitable agency for furnishing operational guidance because it was a component of AMAG and was therefore not subject to control by the duly constituted 

US military authorities. A separate military agency was required, nominally 

responsible to the senior representative of the US Government in Greece but 

reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

21 
tives in Greece at the highest level; that the United States approve and fund 50 

Home Guard battalions; and that there be established in Greece a US Advisory 

and Planning Group under nominal control of the Ambassador but reporting 

directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This group would, upon request, furnish 

high-level military advice, coordinated with the British, to the Greek Government and its armed forces. It would also advise the US Ambassador, the Chief of 

the Aid Mission and the US Armed Forces. General Chamberlin recommended 

also that US observers, responsible to the Joint Advisory and Planning Group, be 

assigned Greek Army units with the mission of “energizing operational action, 

restoring the offensive spirit, and advising on planning and operations.“211 

On the initiative of the Acting Secretary of State, General Chamberlin’s report 

was considered by the National Security Council on 27 October. The Council 

agreed that an advisory and planning group should be established to provide 

advice to the Greek forces from high command down to and including the division level. This group should be a part of AMAG but with direct communication 

to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In carrying out his advisory functions, the head of the 

group would for the most part be free to make military decisions on his own 

responsibility. However, military decisions involving “high policy” would be 

referred through the Chief of AMAG to the Ambassador. High policy matters 

were those involving political considerations, such as actions by US representatives, to bring about changes in the Greek cabinet or military high command; any 

proposals for substantial increases or decreases in the Greek armed forces; disagreements with Greek or British authorities that might impair cooperation 

between US, British, and Greek officials; major questions involving Greek relations with the UN or foreign nations; major questions of Greek policies of punishment or amnesties; and any matters relating to Greek internal politics. 

The Council recognized also that the current aid program, scheduled to 

expire on 30 June 1948, could not assure the realization of US goals in Greece. 

Accordingly, the members agreed that the Secretary of State, subject to approval 

by the President, would make a strong recommendation to Congress at an 

appropriate time that assistance to Greece continue beyond the expiration of the 

current program.*’ 

President Truman approved these recommendations on 3 November. Secretary Marshall asked Secretary Forrestal to take steps to form and dispatch 

the advisory group. Because it was to include representatives of all three Services, Secretary Forrestal delegated responsibility for its formation to the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff.22 

Up to this point, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been formally consulted on 

the matters discussed by General Chamberlin. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC), however, had undertaken on its own initiative to prepare recommendations as to the size, composition, terms of reference, and functions of the proposed advisory group.*? 

22 
ber, forwarded their recommendations to him. After minor amendment to accommodate the views of the Services, the Secretaries of the Army, Air Force, and Navy 

issued the recommended directive governing the establishment and operation of 

the Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group in Greece (JUSMAPG) on 31 

December. In conformity with the President’s instructions, the JUSMAPG was 

made a component of AMAG but with the authority to report directly to the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. The Director, JUSMAPG, was to be designated by the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. The principal functions of JUSMAPG were to formulate plans for the 

employment and coordination of the Greek armed forces and to furnish them and 

the Greek Government with operational advice. The JUSMAPG was also to advise 

the US Ambassador, the Chief, AMAG, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military situation in Greece and the employment of Greek military forces.z4 

In sending their recommendations to Secretary Forrestal, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff nominated Major General William G. Livesay, USA, who was then Commanding General of US Army Group, Greece, as Director of JUSMAPG. Secretary of State Marshall concluded, however, that it was urgent to name a more 

impressive personality to head the US military program in Greece. With the concurrence of General Eisenhower, he recommended to the President that Major 

General James A. Van Fleet, “one of the outstanding aggressive fighting corps 

commanders of the campaign in Europe,” be promoted to Lieutenant General 

and designated Director, JUSMAPG, and Commanding General, USAGG. With 

President Truman’s approval, this appointment was made on 5 February.2” 

Action to support a substantial home guard to relieve regular Greek forces 

from static security duties was already under way when General Chamberlin 

submitted his report. On 29 October, the Department of State approved the application of $6 million in aid funds to support 32 National Defense Corps battalions 

in lieu of a lO,OOO-man increase in the regular army. And on 30 December the 

Department, acting on recommendations by General Livesay and the Department of the Army, approved support of an additional 68 battalions, for a total 

National Defense Corps of 100 battalions. The Department also, in a reversal of 

its earlier position, agreed to support a permanent increase of 12,000 men in the 

regular army. The cost of these increases, estimated at $15 million, was to be met 

by transferring funds from civilian projectszh 

By February 1948, the administration judged the time appropriate to seek 

additional funds for Greece and Turkey and requested $275 million for the period 

ending 30 June 1949. Congress, on 3 April 1948, authorized this amount in the 

Greek-Turkish Assistance Act of 1948; however, only $225 million was appropriated. Of this amount, the administration allocated $150 million to Greece. 

During the period in which these events took place there had been two 

changes in the membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Fleet Admiral Nimitz 

retired as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) on 15 December, to be replaced by 

Admiral Louis Denfeld. Unlike his predecessor, the new CNO had not achieved a 

great reputation during World War II as a combat or theater commander. He had 

served as Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for most of the war and com23 
JCS and National Policy 

manded a battleship division for a short time near the end of that conflict. After 

the war, Admiral Denfeld returned to the Bureau of Personnel, where he served 

as Chief until March 1947; he then became Commander in Chief Pacific, a position he continued to hold until his appointment as CNO. On 7 February, General 

Eisenhower followed his colleague Admiral Nimitz into retirement, to be succeeded by General Omar N. Bradley. Known as the “G. 1.‘~ General,” the new 

Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) had been one of the outstanding combat commanders of World War II. He had commanded successively a corps, an army, and 

an army group in North Africa, Sicily, and Germany.27 

NSC 5: The Question of Deploying US Forces to Greece 

N o amount of military advice, no matter how soundly based, was likely by 

itself to attain the goal sought by the United States in Greece-the establishment of a stable and prosperous democracy. The “American Paper” had stressed 

the strategic importance of Greece. In a report submitted to the Council on 6 January 1948, designated NSC 5, the NSC Staff proposed a wide variety of decisions 

and preparatory actions intended to protect the US interest in Greece. The major 

ones were the following: be prepared to send armed forces to Greece or elsewhere in the Mediterranean if necessary to prevent Greece from falling the victim 

to direct or indirect aggression; assign the Commander in Chief, US Naval 

Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM), responsibility for 

making recommendations direct to the US Government on overall military policy 

with regard to Greece and other communist-threatened areas in his theater, and 

on economic and political matters; direct him to coordinate military activities in 

the Eastern Mediterranean by advising and assisting the Chiefs of Mission in 

countries of the area; and appoint a single director of all US activities in Greece.28 

In keeping with his usual procedure at that time, Secretary Forrestal made an 

“informal request” to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment. They responded on 6 

January, objecting to the proposed new duties for CINCNELM as unsound and 

confusing because the resulting lack of clear lines of authority would be 

embarassing to all concerned. The naming of a single director responsible for all 

US activities in Greece, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, was the “most logical step 

to improve our position in Greece at the present time. . . .” 

Of greatest concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff was the suggestion that US military forces might be dispatched to Greece. Acting on their own initiative, they 

had already directed a study of the problem by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) in connection with the British announcement of troop withdrawals. 

The conclusions of this study were that the United States was not capable of 

deploying sufficient armed forces to Greece to defeat a combined attack by 

Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. Any US force sent should therefore be small. 

It should be solely for the purposes of stiffening morale of the Greeks and of contributing to stability in areas where it was stationed.29 

24 
force required to meet various contingencies. They limited their response to a 

repetition of the warning they had given on 19 November 1947 concerning the 

Middle East-Eastern Mediterranean area as a whole: 

a. Any additional deployment of United States armed forces to this area will, 

in view of our present extended position, automatically raise the question of the 

advisability of partial mobilization, and 

h. Any deployment of appreciable military strength in this area will make a 

partial mobilization necessary.“” 

Within the Department of State, there were those who seemed less hesitant 

than the Joint Chiefs of Staff about committing US forces to Greece. Mr. Loy Henderson, the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, commenting on NSC 5 on 9 January to the Secretary of State, stated his conviction that a 

failure of the United States to convince the Soviet Union, its satellites, and the 

Greek people of its determination to prevent the Soviet conquest of Greece 

would lead to the most serious consequences. “Either Greece and the whole Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, not to speak of Europe, will be lost to the 

Western world,” he wrote, “or the neighbors of Greece will have gone so far 

before realizing the extent of our determination that they cannot draw back and 

there will be the beginnings of a new World War. “ It was therefore essential that a 

decision be made at once that the United States Government would be prepared 

to send armed forces to Greece if that country was in “grave danger and.. . lifl 

the presence of our forces might save her.” Among the possible missions for US 

troops would be to garrison or protect parts of Greece, to seal off certain valleys 

which hostile forces might use in entering Greece from abroad, or to carry out 

maneuvers designed to deter the northern neighbors of Greece from attempting 

an armed coup such as the sudden occupation of Thrace by Bulgarian troops.“’ 

Secretary Marshall, however, felt that a decision on commitment of US troops 

to Greece was premature. His views were presented to the National Security 

Council by Under Secretary Lovett during debate on NSC 5 on 13 January. Before 

the matter could be decided, in Secretary Marshall’s view, there would have to be 

a definition of the purpose of any action involving armed forces, an assessment 

of force and logistics requirements, and an estimate of the probable effects on US 

domestic economy and public opinion. A redraft of NSC 5, prepared by the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, was introduced in the meeting. It 

indicated the State Department view of the conditions that should be met before 

US military forces were sent to Greece. It would “have to be clear” that Greek 

independence could not be preserved without these forces; the forces to be sent 

must be capable of accomplishing the mission at hand; the size of the force must 

be carefully considered in the light of other commitments; and withdrawal of the 

force should be feasible within a reasonable time without prejudice to the objective for which it had been committed and without detriment to US prestige. 

25 
als for added responsibilities for CINCNELM and for appointing a single director for all US activities in Greece. The Council then returned the paper to the staff 

for revision in the light of the Policy Planning Staff version and the discussion in 

the meeting.72 

The NSC Staff submitted its redraft, designated NSC 5/l, to the Council on 3 

February. After rejecting termination of aid as unacceptable because of adverse 

political effects, the staff reiterated the conclusion in the initial draft: the policy of 

the United States should be to “make full use of its political, economic and if necessary, military power. . to prevent Greece from falling under the domination of 

the USSR either through external armed attack or through Soviet-dominated 

Communist movements within Greece, so long as the legally elected government 

of Greece evidences a determination to oppose such communist aggression.” 

The uses of military power would include one or more of the following: 

deployment of a token force; commitment of available forces to take necessary 

action to defeat the communists in Greece; strengthening of forces in the Mediterranean outside Greece; or initiation of partial mobilization as an indication of 

determination to resist communist expansion. 

The NSC Staff did not adopt the limitations on the use of military force proposed by the State Department Policy Planning Staff, nor did it accept the JCS 

view that deployment of more than token US forces to Greece would make partial mobilization necessary. Partial mobilization in the NSC Staff draft was a measure additional to force deployments and not a prerequisite to them. A decision 

to use military power, however, should await further expressions of view by the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, the National Security Resources 

Board, and the Central Intelligence Agency.3s 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, commenting on NSC 5/l at Secretary Forrestal’s 

request, informed him that the parts of the new paper having military implications were identical to the original in substance if not in words. Their views on it, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, therefore remained unchanged.“4 

This reiteration of views by the Joint Chiefs of Staff had no apparent effect; the 

National Security Council adopted the revised draft with only minor changes, 

none of which affected the matters of JCS concern. The President approved the 

conclusions of the revised paper, now designated NSC 5/2, on 16 February.“” 

Following President Truman’s approval, the Executive Secretary of the National 

Security Council solicited the views of the appropriate departments and agencies 

on the commitment of US military forces to Greece, as called for by NSC 5/2.7h 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their reply on 19 April, not only reiterated the 

views they had expressed on NSC 5 and NSC 5/l but also broadened the scope 

of their comments. “The overall world situation,” they warned, “has deteriorated 

to such a degree as to dictate the necessity for strengthening immediately the 

potential of our National Military Establishment. Some form of compulsory military service will be required to attain additional strength and should be initiated 

at once.“x7 It should, they added, be accompanied by increased appropriations 

necessary for “strengthening the potential of our National Military Establishment 

26 
been taken, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned, every effort should be made to 

“avoid military commitment with implications extending to likelihood of major 

military involvement.” 

With respect to the situation in Greece, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended 

against the commitment of any US military forces there unless: (1) it was clearly 

understood by all concerned that the United States was ready and able to back 

them up to a reasonable extent; (2) intelligence indicated the Soviet Union or its 

satellites would not respond by overt military action; and (3) the United States 

had decided not to take military action elsewhere. To commit token forces would 

accomplish little; they could not be fully supported with currently available 

resources. The current aid program should suffice for the defeat of the communist guerrilla forces unless the Soviet Union or her satellites intervened with their 

armed forces. If by the end of the year the communists had still not been 

defeated, a decision could be made at that time whether to deploy US forces, taking into account the factors already listed.‘H 

State Department representatives gave the opinion that the American people 

and Congress would support the employment of US forces in Greece if it had 

been already demonstrated to be in the national interest and in conformity with 

the basic principles of the United Nations. 

The CIA judgment was that: a token force would be helpful but not decisive; a 

substantial force would assure the pacification of Greece and would probably not 

provoke the Soviet Union to open war; and the strengthening of US forces in the 

Mediterranean would ameliorate the situation in Greece to some extent and 

might cause the Soviets to reconsider their current policies. Partial mobilization, 

the CIA believed, would have no direct effect in Greece but would reassure 

friendly countries in Europe and the Middle East and might cause the Kremlin to 

reappraise its policies. 

The National Security Resources Board agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

that necessary statutory authorization for civilian and industrial readiness 

should be invoked as necessary.Jy 

The expression of views on 19 April was one of the last JCS actions in which 

General Spaatz participated. He retired on 30 April and was replaced as Air 

Force Chief of Staff by General Hoyt S. Vandenberg. Like General Bradley, General Vandenberg had been an outstanding World War II combat commander. The 

two men had, in fact, been close associatesin the campaigns in Western Europe, 

where Vandenberg’s Ninth Air Force had given tactical support to Bradley’s 12th 

Army Group. 

Military Operations: Successes and Failures 

By late May 1948, when the NSC Staff received these views, US officials took a 

much more optimistic view of the Greek situation than had been the case the 

27 
in offensive spirit, was given little chance of success. In the ensuing months, 

however, the US aid program had, it appeared, achieved notable results 

This state of affairs to a large degree was the result of measures undertaken 

by JUSMAPG under the leadership of General Van Fleet. He had assumed his 

new duties on 24 February and quickly undertook a series of actions to improve 

the fighting qualities and tactics of the Greek armed forces. The day following 

his arrival, the National Defense Council met at General Van Fleet’s request and, 

on his recommvndation, designated the Chief of the Greek National General 

Staff as Commander of the Greek National Army with broad powers to plan and 

conduct operations against the communist insurgents. By the end of March he 

and Mr. Griswold had persuaded the Greek Government to retire incompetent 

senior officers and promote deserving juniors. General Van Fleet also made frequent trips in the company of Lieutenant General Yiadis, the Greek Chief of Staff, 

to command posts in the field down to and including division level. During these 

trips and at every opportunity, he stressed the importance of seizing the initiative. The activation of the home guard battalions, or National Defense Corps, 

authorized the previous October, and their assumption of the mission of static 

defense, made regular army formations available for offensive operations. 

To give form and direction to an offensive strategy, the JUSMAPG worked 

closely with the Greek general staff to draw up plans for a spring offensive and 

assigned advisers to Greek units down through division level to aid in carrying 

them out. Two major operations, DAWN and CROWN, comprised the spring 

offensive. The former, employing three divisions, was designed to envelop and 

destroy an insurgent force estimated at about 2,000 and located in the Roumeli 

area of east central Greece. The latter, a six-division operation, was directed 

against the main insurgent base area in the Grammos Mountains on the Albanian 

border.“” By the end of March, General Van Fleet reported optimistically to the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff that, unless the Soviet Union or its satellites intervened, the 

insurrection in Greece would be crushed by the end of the year.41 

DAWN, which began on 15 April and ended on 20 May, was an auspicious 

beginning for the spring offensive. Greek National Army units achieved their 

objective of destroying enemy forces in the area, claiming to have killed, 

wounded, or captured a total of 2,602 enemy troops.42 

Another cause for optimism was the failure of neighboring Soviet satellite 

states to provide aid to the Greek insurgents on the scale that their apparent 

preparations could have supported. This default, in the opinion of the NSC Staff, 

was probably a deliberate policy of the Soviet Union. It caused misgivings 

among the insurgents, by suggesting that the Soviet Government was merely 

exploiting them to impose economic attrition on the United Statesb7 

In light of these favorable developments and of the views submitted by the 

departments and agencies, the National Security Council on 3 June concluded 

that the United States should not send armed forces of any size to Greece at that 

time, but that the Council should reconsider the question if the situation deteriorated. Decisions as to the strengthening of US forces in the Mediterranean area 

28 
Truman approved these conclusions on 21 June.@ 

The operational forecasts underlying these policy decisions unfortunately 

proved overly optimistic, and by autumn of 1948 it was apparent that General 

Van Fleet’s prediction of an end to the insurgency in 1948 would not be attained. 

CROWN, the operation intended to destroy the Grammos Mountain base area 

and thus break the back of the insurgency, jumped off on 16 June. Following 

about two months of hard fighting, the Greek National Army succeeded in OCCUpying the entire area, but the insurgent forces retreated intact into Albania. After 

regrouping and receiving fresh supplies, they recrossed the border and established a stronghold near the border town of Vitsi. Attempts by the Greek 

National Army, undertaken during September and October, to reduce this position were repulsed. By October, offensive operations had halted.45 

This was the state of affairs on the battlefield when Secretary of State Marshall 

visited Greece in mid-October. He found flagging morale among some members 

of the AMAG and in the Greek Army-the result of the failure of the CROWN 

operation and of the feeling that no conclusion to the insurrection was in sight so 

long as Albania and Yugoslavia offered sanctuary to the insurgents. The Greek 

troops were tired and despondent over the gloomy prospects for the future. 

In these circumstances, Secretary Marshall gave his support to a proposal by 

General Van Fleet for an increase of 15,000 men in the Greek Army. This would be 

an “overage” and would not be used to form new units. It would permit the 

retirement of some older men and the relief of other men from combat duty, while 

at the same time avoiding the cost to the United States of equipping new units.46 

The Department of State and the National Military Establishment having 

determined that funds were available from the existing appropriation for military aid to Greece, the 15,000-man increase in the Greek National Army was 

approved. The Royal Hellenic Air Force also received an increase of 700 officers 

and men.47 These modest increases in the Greek Army and Air Force served to 

improve combat capability to some degree, but it was obvious that military victory over the insurgent forces was highly unlikely before the current US aid program expired on 30 June 1949. Clearly further assistance to Greece would be necessary if the US goals for that country were to be achieved. 

Continuation of Military Assistance for Greece 

C onsideration of continued military aid to Greece began in October and 

looked beyond immediate needs of the counterinsurgency operations. On 15 

October, the State Department member of SANACC recommended that the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff be asked to define any long-range US strategic interests in the military establishments of Greece and Turkey that would justify military assistance to 

them for a period longer than the current emergency. This request was duly 

passed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.4H 

29 
Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East was of critical importance to the United 

States. Greece and Turkey, because of their geographical positions, stood in the 

way of Soviet expansion southward into this region. To prevent Soviet control or 

domination of these countries therefore was “highly important” to US national 

security interests. 

Greece, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, lacked the military and economic 

strength to withstand attack by the Soviet Union or her satellites, even if furnished considerable military aid. The long-range US strategic interest in the military establishment of Greece was therefore as follows: 

A Greek military establishment capable of maintaining internal security in 

order to avoid the Communist domination of Greece.“” 

General Van Fleet, meanwhile, had submitted alternate FY 1950 budgets for 

military assistance to Greece of $450 and $541 million. These figures did not find 

favor with the US Ambassador to Greece, Mr. Henry F. Grady. He saw them as an 

attempt to solve the insurgent problem simply by creating larger forces, an 

approach that he considered militarily ineffective and likely to impose an insupportable burden on the Greek economy. He recommended a maximum of $150 

million. The Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and State also found 

General Van Fleet’s budget unacceptable but raised the Ambassador’s figure to 

$200 million.“” 

General Van Fleet prepared a budget in this amount, which was approved by 

Ambassador Grady and forwarded to Washington where it was approved by the 

Department of State, along with a similar submission by the Ambassador to 

Turkey for $100 million, for presentation to the Bureau of the Budget. The 

Department of State sought the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense in this 

program. Secretary Forrestal, however, first sought the advice of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, asking them to recommend the allocation of $300 million in aid for 

Greece and Turkey between the two countries and among their Armed Services.“’ 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 20 December. They chose not to recommend a reapportionment of the total $300 million but accepted the State Department’s allocation of $200 million for Greece and $100 million for Turkey. They 

recommended that the money for Greece be allocated as follows: Army, $165 million; Navy, $10 million; Air Force, $25 million. In submitting these figures, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that they were inadequate to maintain operations at 

their present scale.52 

The military aid program for Greece was incorporated into a comprehensive 

one approved by the Truman administration early in 1949, in connection with the 

establishment of the North Atlantic Alliance. Guidelines for a single program 

embracing all aid recipients were laid down in February 1949 by an interdepartmental group known as the Foreign Assistance Coordinating Committee (FACC). 

It operated under the direction of a Foreign Assistance Steering Committee 

(FASC), consisting of Secretaries Marshall and Forrestal and Economic Coopera30 
Countering Soviet Expansion in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean 

tion Administration (ECA) Administrator Paul Hoffman. Under the FACC proposals, countries scheduled for military assistance were grouped into three priority categories, and the amount of aid that each was to receive was defined broadly 

as “substantial,” “ limited,” or “token.” Greece was placed in Priority II as a recipient of “limited” aid, which was defined as the amount needed to ensure internal 

security and to enable the performance of limited military missions.53 

Specific dollar amounts for each country in the FACC program were initially 

recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For Greece, they simply proposed the 

$200 million program they had recommended on 20 December 1948.54 The JCS 

recommendations for all countries totalled almost $1.8 billion. The FACC 

reduced the total to $1.45 billion and, in the process, cut back Greece to $178.16 

million, while allowing $102.3 million for Turkey.55 The legislation finally enacted 

in October 1949 (the Mutual Defense Assistance Act) limited Greece and Turkey 

to a combined total of $211.37 million. At the,request of the Secretary of Defense, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff allocated $130.05 million to Greece, dividing it among the 

Greek armed forces as follows: Army, $106.45 million; Navy, $7.9 million; and Air 

Force, $15.7 million.56 

Final Victory in Greece 

T he major question raised by the reduction in the money sought for Greece by 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff was whether the Greek armed forces could defeat the 

insurrection without significant reinforcement. By late October 1949, when the 

military aid program for FY 1950 was finally approved, the issue had largely 

been resolved on the battlefield in favor of the government. But in the winter and 

spring of 1949, when the Truman administration was making its basic decision 

on the level of military aid to Greece, the outcome was still in doubt. 

The British Government espoused the view that the Greek forces, at their 

existing size, could not defeat the insurgency. This view was expressed in a 

report by Field Marshal Sir William J. Slim, the Chief of the Imperial General 

Staff, which was endorsed by the British Chiefs of Staff and the British Defense 

Committee. Field Marshal Slim maintained that an increase in the Greek armed 

forces was necessary because the alternative, an improvement in the quality o

the existing forces, was not attainable. A large increase-from 8 to 14 or 15 divisions-had been recommended by the heads of the US and British Missions, but, 

General Slim recognized, was not feasible because of the reluctance of the United 

States to finance it. A modest increase, however, would provide the necessary 

margin for victory in 1949 to 1950. He recommended increases of one infantry 

division, two infantry pursuit groups, two fighter bomber squadrons and one 

reconnaissance squadron.57 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom the British Chiefs of Staff referred this document in the hope of obtaining US approval for its recommendations, found little 

merit in them. Replying on 11 May 1949, they countered that the proposed reinforcements were unnecessary, were too expensive, and would not become available 

31 
ship, should be able to establish a reasonable degree of law and order within one 

year. The estimated cost of $43 million would probably not be acceptable to the US 

Government, and the new units could not be ready for combat until 195O.5x 

The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proved not only correct but actually 

overly conservative. Under the leadership of Field Marshal Alexandros Papagos, a hero of World War II recalled to active duty and invested with broad powers over organization and operations, the Greek armed forces launched offensives, designated ROCKET and TORCH, that resulted in defeat of the 

communist insurgents by the end of August 1949. This was a landmark victory, 

involving the first postwar combat between communist and pro-Western forces. 

Several important factors contributed to the outcome. One was disaffection 

between communist and national elements within the ranks of the insurgents, 

which weakened their effectiveness. Another was the closing of the Yugoslav 

border in July 1949 by Marshal Tito as a consequence of his split with the Soviet 

Union and his expulsion from the Information Bureau of the Workers’ and Communist Parties (COMINFORM).lq But there can be little doubt of the enormous 

significance of the moral support and tangible assistance, economic and military, 

that the United States provided to the Greek Government during its most desperate period. 

Strengthening Anti-Communist Forces in Italy 

U nlike the situation in Greece where civil war was in progress, in the summer 

of 1947 the contest in Italy between communist and anti-communist groups 

was still being waged by legitimate political means. Nevertheless, the struggle 

between a powerful Italian communist element and more democratic political 

groups for control of the governmental machinery had become intense. 

Alarmed at the situation, the National Security Council, at its first meeting on 

26 September, directed its Staff to assess and appraise the position of the United 

States with respect to Italy. The Staff, in its report, NSC 1, submitted on 15 October 1947, found that Italy, because of its strategic position astride the lines of 

communication through the Mediterranean, was of primary security interest to 

the United States. To preserve this interest, the NSC Staff view was that the basic 

objective of the United States in Italy should be to preserve that country as an 

“independent, democratic state, friendly to the United States, and capable of 

effective participation in the resistance to communist expansion.” 

The Italian Government was ideologically inclined toward Western democracy, the NSC Staff reported, but it was weak and under continuous attack by a 

strong Communist Party which had been excluded from the government only 

the previous June. Resentful of this exclusion, the communists were exerting 

strong pressure to regain lost ground and to gain the ultimate goal of a communist Italy aligned with the Soviet Union. 

32 
ern part of the country. United States and British occupation troops, which might 

serve to deter this result, were required by the peace treaty that had gone into 

effect on 15 September to withdraw by 15 December 1947. 

To protect US security interests in Italy, the NSC Staff concluded, measures 

should be undertaken without delay. These measures should include various 

manifestations of political support and extensions of economic assistance to the 

present Italian Government or equally satisfactory successor governments. The 

NSC Staff also concluded that the US Government should assist the Italian armed 

forces by transferring military equipment to them. 

In the event that a communist-dominated government came to power in all or 

part of Italy by ilIega1 means, the United States should, among other measures, 

extend the strategic deployment of US armed forces in Italy and other parts of 

the Mediterranean. To facilitate this extension, the US should seek the use of Italian air and naval basesremaining under the control of a noncommunist government. Steps should be taken now to acquire use of the air basesfor training.h” 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom the Secretary of Defense referred NSC 1 on 

an informal basis, replied on 30 October that, while they were in general agreement with its military provisions, they felt it necessary to point out the limited 

capabilities of US military forces for action in the Mediterranean. There was no 

surplus of military equipment for transfer from US to Italian forces. There were 

only three divisions (two Marine and one Army) available for immediate deployment to meet additional requirements over and above present commitments 

(although another Army division could be made available in two or three 

weeks). The Navy and Air Force were in better shape, both having the capability 

of dealing with any opposition in the Mediterranean, unless opposed by major 

Soviet air strength. There was, in addition, a potential danger in committing US 

forces to action in the Eastern and Central Mediterranean unless the United 

States had first received assurance of passagethrough the Straits of Gibraltar.h’ 

The NSC, on 14 November, adopted a version of NSC 1 revised to accommodate the JCS views at least in part. The new document, designated NSC l/l, 

provided that assistance to the Italian armed forces would be limited to the 

provision of technical advice. The transfer of surplus equipment, which the JCS 

had said was not available, was no longer included. However, the Council 

agreed that the possibility of providing surplus equipment would be investigated further. The “extension of strategic disposition” of US forces cautioned 

against by the Joint Chiefs of Staff remained a part of the revised paper. The 

President approved the NSC conclusions and directed their implementation on 

24 November.h2 

The further examination of the transfer of weapons and equipment from US 

to Italian armed forces began with the submission by the Italian military authorities of a list of the required equipment, which consisted of infantry items plus a 

limited number of armored cars and light tanks. Commenting on the matter, the 

US Ambassador in Rome advised the State Department that the equipment 

appeared to be necessary. According to Italian military sources, he said, the 

33 
such a situationh” 

The matter was studied by the SANACC, which, on 9 February 1948, submitted an interim report recommending that the President direct the transfer to Italy 

of all or part of the equipment requested by the Italian Government on a reimbursable basis. The National Security Council adopted this recommendation on 

12 February and recommended to President Truman that he direct its implementation. The President approved the transfer on 13 February.h4 

The NSC Staff, meanwhile, had reassesseddevelopments in Italy and on 10 

February had issued a report for the Council (NSC l/2) attributing the communist strength in Italy to the nation’s economic distress. The Staff warned that failure to implement the European Recovery Program (ERR) before expiration of US 

interim aid on 31 March might lead to communist participation in the government after the April elections. Communist failure to achieve such an electoral 

success,combined with implementation of ERP, might induce the Soviet Government to order an armed insurrection in Italy as a final effort to prevent economic 

recovery under a Western-oriented regime. 

Echoing the conclusions of the SANACC, the NSC Staff expressed doubt as to 

the ability of the Italian armed forces to cope with an insurrection because of 

deficiencies in arms and equipment. The Staff concluded, therefore, that everything feasible should be done to supply the necessary items and to furnish technical advice. In the event that the communists succeeded by force or other illegal 

means in gaining control of part of Italy, more drastic military measures would 

be required. It would then be necessary to strengthen the US military establishment, to reinforce US forces in the Mediterranean, and to be prepared to deploy 

forces to Sardinia, Sicily, or government-controlled portions of peninsular Italy 

upon request of the Jtalian authorities. These deployments should be subject to a 

JCSdecision that they were militarily sound.h5 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, commenting on NSC l/2 at the request of the Secretary of Defense on 19 February, advised him that shipments of US arms and 

equipment could not reach Italy before the April elections. Moreover, such 

shipments could only be made at the expense of the programs for Greece and 

Turkey. With regard to reinforcements for US forces in the Mediterranean, additional naval and air units could readily be deployed without a dangerous lowering of available reserve forces. Any further deployment of ground forces, 

however, would require a partial mobilization. Deployment of US forces to 

peninsular Italy, Sicily, or Sardinia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned, would 

entail serious risks of global warfare and should be preceded by complete 

mobilization. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, finally, warned against the over-commitment of US 

military resources. It was, they said, “unrealistic to conclude that the United 

States should.. . make full use of its military power to prevent Italy from falling 

under the domination of the USSR, unless the United States has available sufficient military forces to accomplish this objective.” This was particularly true 

34 
The priorities for deliveries of military equipment had already been resolved 

in favor of Grcccc and Turkey before the two JCS memorandums were sent. Writing to Secretary Forrestal on 17 February, Under Secretary of State Lovett stated 

that, on the basis of information received from the Department of the Army that 

equipment could not arrive in Italy before the elections, there was no point in 

giving shipments to Italy before the elections, and there was no point in giving 

shipments to Italy priority over those to Greece and Turkey. But because of commitments to the Italian Government and the psychological importance to it of 

assurances of US assistance, the deliveries should be made as soon as possible 

without interfering with the programs for Greece and Turkey.h7 

In a subsequent study of the Italian situation (NSC l/3, 8 March 1948), the 

NSC Staff looked at the political situation and considered the possibility that the 

communists might win “participation “ in the Italian Government or even attain 

outright domination. On the basis of current trends in the electoral campaign, the 

first of these was judged as “not improbable.” The second might be brought 

about through the usual communist methods of infiltration and domination of 

key ministries, the police, and the armed forces. 

As military measures to deal with the first contingency, NSC l/3 provided for 

reinforcing US forces in the Mediterranean, strengthening the potential of the US 

Defense Establishment, and delivering US military supplies only to noncommunist elements. Military measures to deal with the second contingency included 

further deployments to the Mediterranean, initiation of combined staff talks with 

selected nations, and a limited mobilization.hx 

Once again, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were asked to comment by the Secretary of 

Defense. They replied on 10 March 1948, confining their views to the military proposals. Problems involved in the deployment of additional forces to the Mediterranean or stationing them in Italy remained as stated in their views on NSC l/2, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff said. And mobilization, while desirable as a support for 

further ground force deployments to the Mediterranean, could not be expected to 

produce any substantial augmentation of combat strength for at least a year. 

But Italy was only a part of an alarming worldwide situation, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff emphasized, that called for a prompt strengthening of the National Military Establishment, a condition that could only be achieved without long delay 

by some form of compulsory military service.6y 

The NSC adopted NSC l/2 and l/3 on 12 March, without revising either 

paper to accommodate JCS views except to specify that any deployment contemplated under the former would require partial mobilization. President Truman 

approved both papers on 15 March. 7oThey apparently had little practical effect, 

except insofar as US policy furnished moral support that may have contributed 

to the decisive defeat of the Italian communists in the election of April 1948. It 

was not until more than a year later that military assistance for Italy became a 

reality under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, in which Italy was 

included along with other signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty.71 

35 
T urkey, unlike Greece, was not in the throes of civil war. There was, therefore, 

no need to implement the Truman Doctrine by furnishing operational 

advice; the need was rather to strengthen Turkish armed forces through the provision of military supplies and equipment and the training of Turkish personnel. 

The first step in this program was the dispatch to Turkey of a survey team of 

Army, Navy, Air Force, and State Department personnel to advise the US 

Ambassador on the specific materiel requirements and organization of the Turkish armed forces, the training they should receive from the United States and the 

United Kingdom, and the nature and composition of any US mission required in 

Turkey. The decision to send the survey group was made by the Departments of 

State, War, and Navy, acting on the recommendations of SWNCC but without 

JCS participation7* 

The group, headed by Major General Lunsford E. Oliver and Rear Admiral 

Ernest E. Herrman, arrived in Ankara on 22 May 1947 and spent more than a 

month surveying the Turkish military situation.7” After receiving their conclusions, US Ambassador to Turkey Edwin C. Wilson reported to the Secretary of 

State on 15 July. The group believed that the Turkish forces, if rearmed with 

modern weapons, could probably hold off invading Soviet armies until British 

or American help arrived. The available funds (the $100 million authorized by 

PL 75) appeared insufficient to attain this result. However, the survey group 

submitted, and the Ambassador endorsed, a plan for using these funds, under 

which almost half ($48.5 million) would go to the Turkish Army; most of the rest 

would be divided among the other two services, with $10 million earmarked for 

road construction and improvement of arsenals. Separate Army, Navy, Air 

Force, and civilian missions were recommended to train the Turks in using and 

maintaining US equipment. 74These recommendations met with the approval of 

the Departments of State, War, and Navy. The advisory groups, however, were 

consolidated into the American Mission for Aid to Turkey, with Ambassador 

Wilson as Chief.75 

The activities of the military components of the Mission came under the general supervision of Major General Horace L. McBride, Chief of the Army Group, 

as Coordinator, Armed Forces Groups. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the concurrence of SWNCC, dispatched a letter to General McBride on 16 January 1948, 

instructing him to coordinate the activities of the three Service groups, each of 

which would advise and assist its corresponding component service in the Turkish armed forces. The object was to increase the effectiveness of the Turkish 

armed forces by ensuring proper utilization of the military equipment and supplies to be furnished under the aid program.7h 

To General McBride, these instructions seemed insufficient and on 19 February he asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for further guidance. He asked three questions: What part of the Turkish Armed Forces should the United States Mission 

plan to modernize with aid funds? How should these funds be apportioned 

among the Services? What priority should be given to financing highways, ports, 

36 
For reasons not indicated in available sources, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not 

reply until 30 September 1948, when they informed General McBride that they 

were not in a position to tell him what portion of the Turkish armed forces 

should be modernized at US expense. This decision was one for the Turkish 

authorities, “assisted by broad guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the 

over-all apportionment of U.S. funds among the three services and aided further 

by advice from your Mission on the basis of your knowledge of local conditions, 

strategic considerations and other pertinent factors.” The apportionment of funds 

should be substantially as follows: Army, 54 percent; Navy, 12.3 percent; and Air 

Force, 33.7 percent. Military aid funds should not be used for such projects as 

arsenal expansion or port and highway construction unless, in the opinion of the 

senior officer of the cognizant Service within the US Mission, such expenditure 

would make a greater military contribution than a similar expenditure for military equipment.7x 

With one exception, the details of provision of military equipment and training to the Turkish armed forces were carried out by the Service Departments 

without JCS participation. The exception was the establishment of a joint communications center for the Turkish armed forces, assigned to the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff because it required the participation of all the Services. Acting at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formed and instructed a 

survey party consisting of members nominated by the Services to study the matter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the report of the survey party and transmitted its recommendations for the installation of communications facilities. These 

recommendations were approved by the Secretary of Defense.7y 

United States military assistance to Turkey was extended through 30 June 

1949 by the appropriation of $225 million by Congress under the Greek-Turkish 

Assistance Act of 1948. Of this amount, $75 million was allocated to Turkey.x’l 

When continuation of military assistance to Turkey through FY 1950 came 

under consideration, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were called upon to take 

an active part. It will be recalled that SANACC, on 15 October 1948, asked the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff to define any long-term strategic interest the United States 

might have in the military establishments of Greece and Turkey that would justify continuing military assistance to them. xI In their reply, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff stressed the importance of retaining control of these two countries in 

friendly hands, so long as the Soviet Union persisted in its aggressive tendencies. 

Turkey, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded, had the capability, because of its “military potential,. . . high national spirit and geographic situation,” to impose 

“appreciable delay and eventually, with continued U.S. aid, to offer strong resistance to invasion.” The long-range US strategic interest in the military establishment of Turkey was, therefore, as follows: 

A Turkish military establishment of sufficient size and effectiveness to insure 

Turkey’s continued resistance to Soviet ressure; the development of combat 

effectiveness to the extent that any overt E oviet aggression can be delayed long

37 
JCS and National Policy 

enough to permit the commitment of U.S. and allied forces in Turkey in order to 

deny certain portions of Turkey to the USSR.s2 

The Department of State, after consulting appropriate officers of the Army, 

Navy, and Air Force, requested that General McBride prepare a budget on the 

basis of an appropriation of $100 million. This budget was prepared, approved 

by the Ambassador to Turkey, and submitted to the Department of State, which 

accepted it as the basis for a request to the Bureau of the Budget in this amount. 

The Department requested the approval or recommendations of the Secretary o

Defense on the proposal, as well as his recommendation on the allocation of the 

total sum among the Services. 83Secretary Forrestal in turn passed this request to 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who endorsed the allocations recommended by General 

McBride and accepted by the Services. They accordingly recommended the following: Army, $54 million; Navy, $12.3 million; and Air Force, $33.7 million. 

These amounts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, were in the same percentages as had applied in the past fiscal year. Secretary Forrestal communicated his 

approval of these recommendations to the Secretary of State on 23 December.84 

The two Departments were thus in agreement on the military assistance 

appropriations to be requested of Congress for FY 1950. President Truman was 

prepared to increase this amount. The consolidated aid program drafted in 1949 

incorporated $102.3 million for Turkey. Congress, however, allowed only $211.37 

million for Greece and Turkey combined, of which $130.05 million was allotted to 

Greece on recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.85 The remaining $81.12 

million for Turkey was divided among the Services as follows: 

Army $41.90 million 

Navy 8.84 

Air Force 30.38 

$81.12 millions6 

Aid to Iran 

I n the postwar years Soviet pressure on Iran, an oil-rich southern neighbor o

the Soviet Union that also bordered the oil-producing Middle East areas and 

the communications routes from Europe to South and East Asia, caused grave 

concern to the Truman administration. During World War II Soviet troops occupied the northern Iranian province of Azerbaijan. When they failed to leave after 

the war, a crisis developed because of American and British fears that the Soviet 

Union would attempt to control all of Iran and thereby threaten Turkey and the 

Arab Middle East. Faced with a united Anglo-American opposition in the UN 

Security Council, the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Iran. 

To maintain a friendly and independent Iran became a goal of US foreign policy. One means taken to attain it was the furnishing of credit to Iran with which 

to purchase US surplus arms at prices substantially below replacement cost. This 

proposition was put to the Iranian Government on 26 November 1946 and 

38 
A decision to continue military aid to Iran and to place it on a grant basis was 

taken in connection with the consolidated military assistance program for FY 

1950. The Foreign Assistance Coordinating Committee placed Iran in the second 

of three priority groups but proposed that it be granted only “token” military 

assistance,defined as aid sufficient to ensure the political orientation of the r&pient towards the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, commenting at the 

request of the Secretary of Defense, found this program to be “generally sound” 

and offered various comments, none of which dealt with Iran.88 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended specific military aid programs to the 

Secretary of Defense on their own initiative on 7 March. They found that Iran, 

because of her geographical position, would be of strategic importance to the 

United States in the event of war with the Soviet Union, and that the United 

States should maintain friendly relations with Iran, so as to stabilize the Iranian 

Government as a means to prevent communist encroachment. The long-range 

security objective of the United States should therefore be to supply the Iranian 

Army with such equipment and support “as would reasonably insure maintenance of internal security, a stabilized government, and the prevention of interference from outside forces, other than direct invasion.” To this end, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff recommended the appropriation of $12.3 million for military assistance to Iran, divided among the Services as follows: Army, $10 million; Air 

Force, $2.3 million.xy 

The FACC increased the amount for Iran to $15.2 million in the consolidated 

$1.45 billion aid program that was approved by the administration in April 1949. 

Congress, however, provided only $211,370,000 to be shared by Iran along with 

Korea and the Philippines. Of this total, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set aside $10.45 

million for Iran, of which $8.62 million would be for the Army and $1.83 million 

for the Air Force. 

By the end of 1949, the US Government had reason to be satisfied that it had 

blunted Soviet expansionist drives in the Mediterranean and Middle East. In 

Greece the communist insurrection had been suppressed. In Italy the Communist 

Party had been defeated at the polls. In Turkey and Iran, modernization of their 

armed forces as a deterrent to Soviet pressures was under way, And these results 

had been achieved by a relatively small investment of US resources in military 

and economic assistanceto the countries involved. 

39 

Palestine: US Middle East Policy 

at Cross Purposes 

Palestine, an Arab country, was also the historic homeland of the Jews. It was 

a land with special importance to Christians and Moslems and, in more recent 

times, a scene of growing Arab nationalism. The question of its disposition in the 

postwar world was of a complexity that contributed much to negate the efforts of 

the United States to build an anti-Soviet buffer in the Middle East. By favoring 

the Jewish claim for a homeland in Palestine, the United States antagonized Arab 

opinion in spite of belated efforts to adopt a policy of “even-handedness” 

towards both groups. As a result, the Arab countries became increasingly hostile 

to the United States, and ultimately turned increasingly to the Soviet LJnion for 

military weapons and economic assistance. 

Genesis of the Palestine Problem 

T he “Palestine problem” was essentially a conflict between Arabs and Jews for 

the same territory, a conflict that was exacerbated by the actions of the great 

powers and the disasters that befell the Jewish people during World War 11.Until 

1918, Palestine was a part of the Ottoman Empire; the population was predominantly Arab. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, anti-Semitic persecutions 

in Russia and elsewhere, plus the rise of the organized Zionist movement, 

brought about an increase in the pace of Jewish immigration to Palestine. The rising tide of Jewish immigrants created what was to become an irreconcilable conflict between rival Arab and Jewish communities, each attempting to establish a 

political state on the same territory.’ 

The victory of the Allied Powers in World War I ended Turkish rule over 

Palestine. It became a League of Nations mandate administered by the United 

Kingdom. The British had played the primary role in defeating the Turks, but 

41 
provinces, except for those areas (Lebanon and Syria) claimed by France. To the 

Jews, by the so-called Balfour Declaration, they expressed sympathy for Jewish 

aspirations to reestablish a national home in Palestine. The charter of the League 

of Nations mandate specifically charged Great Britain with bringing about the 

establishment of a Jewish homeland. 

During two decades of British rule, the conflict in Palestine was exacerbated. 

Jewish immigration and settlement accelerated, and Arab opposition to the Jewish presence crystallized into a Palestine Arab nationalist movement, which 

erupted into violence. In 1939, on the eve of World War II, the British issued a 

“White Paper” calling for the establishment of a joint Arab-Jewish state after 10 

years, with limitations on Jewish immigration and land purchase during the 

interim. But this plan was unacceptable to the Jews and encouraged the Arabs to 

hold out for even greater concessions. 

World War II, while it marked suspension of open hostilities in Palestine, 

immensely complicated the problem by creating vast numbers of displaced Jews 

in Europe, the victims of Hitler’s policies and of the dislocations of war, to whom 

Europe no longer seemed to offer a congenial environment. The plight of these 

unfortunate refugees was to have a profound effect on US policy towards Palestine. Prior to 1945, the United States Government had not pursued an active 

Palestine policy, limiting its activity to general statements of sympathy with both 

sides. But in 1945, President Truman, moved by reports of the flight of Jewish 

refugees in Europe, urged British Prime Minister Attlee to admit 100,000 Jews to 

Palestine. Effective appeals by the Zionist organizations in the United States, 

combined with a general sympathy for the refugees, made President Truman’s 

proposal popular with American citizens, who could perhaps hardly appreciate 

the possible effect of violent Arab hostility on the US strategic position in the 

Middle East. But it did not find favor with the British Government, which proposed instead an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. This body, duly constituted, submitted a report in which it rejected partition and proposed that Palestine should be neither an Arab nor a Jewish state; it should have the fullest 

measure of self-government consistent with the paramount principle that neither 

community should dominate the other. It also proposed continuation of the 

British mandate and admission of 100,000 Jews as soon as possible. 

This plan was acceptable to President Truman, but he made no offer to share 

the task of implementing it. The omission did not find favor with Prime Minister 

Attlee, since the United Kingdom was not prepared to take on single-handedly 

the heavy burdens involved. An Anglo-American Cabinet Committee began 

meetings in London in July 1946 to consider implications of the plan. The result 

was the Morrison proposal for a federal Palestine of Jewish, Arab, and neutral 

provinces. The British Government announced its willingness to admit 100,000 

Jews if both Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine accepted the Morrison 

Plan. But it was acceptable to neither. After further negotiations, the British in 

January 1947 made a final offer: a five-year British trusteeship with wide local 

autonomy; admission of 96,000 Jews for the first two years, after which the High 

42 
course of action. 

When both Arabs and Jews rejected this plan, the British Government, having 

exhausted all alternatives, placed the problem before the United Nations on 2 

April 1947. The General Assembly met in special session on 28 April to consider 

the British request. On 15 May the Assembly created the UN Special Committee 

on Palestine, composed of delegates from 11 minor states, to study the problem 

and make recommendations to the General Assembly. The Special Committee, 

reporting back on 31 August 1947, submitted a majority view recommending 

partition into separate Arab and Jewish states grouped into an economic union, 

and a minority position which called for a federal state consisting of Arab and 

Jewish provinces. The Special Committee report was placed on the agenda of the 

General Assembly for 16 September. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Oppose Partition 

ithin the US Government, opinions were divided on the solution to the Palestine problem. Elected officials tended to support partition, while the bureaucracy, military and diplomatic alike, were nearly unanimous in opposing it. The 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 10 October 1947, made their views unmistakably clear. Acting in the belief that the United States might be called upon to enforce partition, 

they volunteered a strong dissent to the Secretary of Defense. “A decision to partition Palestine, if the decision were supported by the United States,” the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff wrote, “would prejudice United States strategic interests in the Near and 

Middle East” to the point that “United States influence in the area would be curtailed to that which could be maintained by military force.” There was also, they 

added, “grave danger that such a decision would result in. . . serious disturbances 

throughout the Near and Middle East.. . . As a consequence the USSR might replace 

the United States and (Great Britain in influence and power throughout the area.” 

The strategic consequences of these adverse effects of the partition plan were 

outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with prophetic insight. Not only would a 

buffer area between the Soviet Union and “areas of great strategic importance to 

the United States and potential allies” be lost but access to vital supplies of oil in 

Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia would be prejudiced.’ The result would be that, in 

case of war, the United States would have to fight an “oil-starved war” and would 

be incapable of “bringing to bear its maximum potential power against the USSR 

by hampering United States air and naval action, transportation ability and war 

production.” It was therefore of “great strategic importance to the United States to 

retain the good will of the Arab and Moslem states. However, these states are 

strongly, if not violently, opposed to any solution of the Palestine problem involving partitioning of that state.” 

In the event that the General Assembly approved partition, as recommended 

by its Special Committee, the most desirable means of implementation would be 

43 
USUK trusteeship, the Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed as unacceptable. The former 

would “establish the interests of the USSR in the area”; the latter would require 

troop commitments that would “invalidate entirely current estimate of required 

strengths of the Army, Navy and Air Force,” and would deprive the United 

States of the “extremely small strategic reserve it now possesses.“? 

Mr. Loy Henderson, Director of the State Department Office of Near Eastern 

and African Affairs, had already expressed similar views to the Secretary of 

State on 22 September. Claiming to speak for “nearly every member of Ihe Foreign Service or of the Department who has worked to any appreciable extent on 

Near Eastern problems,” Mr. Henderson maintained that partition would undermine relations with the Arab world, would obligate the United States to contribute to its enforcement, and would be unworkable because it would not be 

acceptable to the Arabs.” 

President Truman Decides for Partition 

President Truman was not persuaded by these arguments. He recognized that, 

while the Jews generally favored the majority plan, the Arabs were extremely 

hostile to it. The proposed partition, however, calling as it did for economic 

union of the partitioned areas, could open the way for peaceful collaboration 

between the Arabs and Jews. Economic development under Jewish leadership 

could then be undertaken to the benefit of all inhabitants of the area, whether 

Jew or Arab. The partition plan would also redeem the pledge of the Balfour Declaration to establish the Jewish homeland and would rescue at least some of the 

victims of Nazism.” 

So intense was Arab opposition to the partition plan that the Arab League 

Council instructed the governments of its member states to move troops to the 

Palestine border. President Truman learned of this development on 9 October 

1947 but was undeterred; he ordered the Department of State to support the partition plan that was before the General Assembly.” 

The General Assembly Votes for Partition 

0 n 11 October, the Deputy US Representative informed the General Assembly 

that his government supported the basic recommendations of the partition 

plan but proposed certain modifications in detail. He also expressed the willingness of the United States to assist in the establishment of a constabulary for Palestine recruited on a volunteer basis by the UN.7 

The Soviet delegate also announced that his government would support partition. Many ascribed this decision to a desire to diminish British influence in the 

44 
pg pg

Following intensive maneuvering and debate, the General Assembly on 29 

November 1947 voted 33 to 13 in favor of partition. The United States and the 

Soviet Union voted “yes.” The United Kingdom abstained, and all six Arab 

States voted “no,” giving some hint of troubles to come. Before the vote, six states 

that had indicated their intention to oppose partition were reportedly subjected 

to intensive lobbying from American sources. 

The General Assembly plan called for division of Palestine into sovereign 

Arab and Jewish states, and a special internationalized Jerusalem as indicated on 

Map 1, all linked by an economic union. The proposed Jewish state was to 

encompass approximately 55 percent of the total land area and to contain a population of 498,000 Jews and 400,000 Arabs. The Arab state would have a population of 725,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews. The mandate was to terminate as soon as 

possible but not later than 1 August 1948; the new plan was to take effect by 1 

October 1948. To supervise transition from mandate to independent status, a fivemember Palestine Commission was established, composed of representatives of 

Denmark, Bolivia, Panama, Czechoslovakia, and the Philippines. 

Any slim hope that partition might be accepted was immediately dashed 

when the Arab leadership condemned it and initiated guerrilla attacks on Jewish 

settlements. On 15 December, the British announced that the mandate would end 

as of 15 May 1948 but refused to cooperate with the UN Palestine Commission or 

even to allow it to enter Palestine until 1 May 1948. In these circumstances, the 

Commission, which had not been provided any means to enforce its decision, 

reported to the Security Council that it could not discharge its responsibilities. 

The United States Advocates a UN Trusteeship 

T hese developments provided an opportunity for those within the US Government who opposed partition to reassert their views and ultimately to achieve 

a reversal of policy. Secretary of Defense Forrestal addressed the subject in a 

paper stating that it would be unwise to allow the situation in Palestine to 

develop in such a way as to do “permanent injury to our relations with the 

Moslem world.” He saw two potential danger points that might develop in the 

near future: a movement to give or sell arms to the Jews in Palestine; or pressures 

to force the United States to enforce the UN partition decision unilaterally. In 

view of these dangers, Secretary Forrestal proposed that the Secretary of State 

take up the matter with the President. 

The Secretary of Defense showed this paper to Under Secretary of State Lovett 

on 21 January. Mr. Lovett agreed in general with the conclusions and in turn 

showed Secretary Forrestal a paper that had just come from the State Department’s 

Policy Planning Staff. It concluded that the UN partition plan was not workable 

and that the United States should seek to have it withdrawn as soon as possible.x 

45 

y, py py 

deteriorating and that the United States had already lost much good will among 

the Arabs by supporting partition. In response to the CNO’s recommendation, 

the JSSC prepared a paper expressing the view that an effort by the United States 

to enforce the UN partition plan would lead to the results the United States 

should try to prevent: Arab hatred and consequent loss of oil; intrusion of the 

Soviets (under the cover of helping to enforce the UN plan); and a call on the 

United States to commit troops to Palestine. The Joint Chiefs of Staff chose not to 

forward these views but merely noted them.” 

The Palestine Commission, in its first report to the Security Council on 16 

February 1948, warned that, because of the disorders resulting from Arab refusal 

to accept partition, the General Assembly’s resolution for partition could not be 

carried out without military force. Foreseeing that there would be a security vacuum when the mandate ended, the Commission urged prompt action by the 

Security Council to create a non-Palestinian security force.“’ 

When the Security Council convened on 24 February, it had this report before 

it, as well as a request from the General Assembly to consider the Palestine situation as a threat to peace. The US Delegate, Ambassador Warren R. Austin, introduced a resolution endorsing the Assembly’s action and establishing a committee 

of five permanent members to determine whether the existing situation in Palestine was a threat to peace. In this connection, he made a distinction between 

enforcing a political system, which the Council could not do under the Charter, 

and acting in the event of a breach of the peace, which it could do. The Security 

Council was cool to any enforcement of partition and rejected all the US proposals. The Council’s only action was to request the permanent members to appeal 

for an end to violence in Palestine.” 

By the time the Security Council met again on 19 March, the Truman administration had reversed its position. Ambassador Austin announced that his government now favored a temporary UN trusteeship over Palestine, since it had 

become evident that partition could not be carried out by peaceful means. He 

called on the Security Council to convene a special session of the General Assembly to establish a trusteeship. A resolution that he submitted for this purpose was 

approved by the Council.‘* 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been consulted regarding the administration’s decision to support trusteeship, but they found an opportunity to express 

their views on the military aspects of the new proposal shortly after it was introduced into the UN. On 2 April, the Secretary of State asked the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff three questions: (1) What outside military forces would be required to maintain law and order under a temporary trusteeship? (2) What nations should contribute forces and how large should each national contingent be? (3) What were 

the military implications of the introduction of this outside force? I3 

The State Department inquiry was discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 

Secretary Forrestal on 4 April 1948. Mr. Dean Rusk, Director of State’s Office of 

UN Affairs, explained that the trusteeship proposal assumed: (1) that responsible 

47 
ppy g

USSR to capture control of Palestine, either by infiltrating trained terrorists or by 

capitalizing upon widespread violence. Should there be a prospect of wholesale 

slaughter of Jewish residents, the United States might be compelled to intervene 

under circumstances requiring a much larger force than that needed to support a 

trusteeship. Mr. Rusk pointed out also that the presence of US forces in Palestine 

would afford strategic advantages. 

The JCS members agreed with Mr. Rusk that failure to support the trusteeship 

might present the United States with a much worse situation. However, they 

foresaw that an effective truce would probably prove impossible, owing to the 

actions of irresponsible elements on both sides. Maintenance of order would 

require a minimum of approximately 104,000 troops, and perhaps two or three 

times as many if a truce broke down completely. It was agreed that the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff would prepare detailed force recommendations for submission 

direct to the President.‘d 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted these recommendations the same day. 

They estimated the force requirements at 3 infantry divisions, 6 destroyers, and 4 

reconnaissance and 1 troop carrier squadrons, for a total of 104,121men. Accepting the Secretary of State’s assumption that the British would be willing to cooperate, this force should be 45 percent US, 45 percent British, and 10 percent 

French. The military consequences of providing it would be serious. They 

included the necessity for a supplemental budget, partial mobilization, the lossof 

the general reserve for six months while new units were being formed, and a further over-extension of US forces.iS 

The Situation Deteriorates 

T he two months preceding the official end of the British mandate were taken 

up by UN debate on one hand and by increasing unrest in Palestine on the 

other. On 17 April 1948 the Security Council called for a cease-fire. Nine days 

later the Council set up a Truce Commission composed of the United States, 

France, and Belgium, the three countries not directly involved in the conflict having permanent consulates in Jerusalem.lhThese moves, however, proved ineffective in restoring calm. At the special General Assembly session devoted to Palestine, which lasted from 16 April to 15 May, it became clear that the Soviet Union 

still favored partition. The USSR was thus allied with the Zionists, who were 

strongly opposed to trusteeship in their desire for an independent Jewish state. 

The Arab countries were aligned with the United States in favoring trusteeship. 

These differences of opinion could not readily be reconciled or compromised, 

and time ran out before the General Assembly could decide what to do when the 

mandate ended. 

48 
infiltrated Palestine to attack Jewish settlements, and Arab armies were obviously making preparations to invade. Violence took the form of acts of terrorism 

during a tense period of waiting for British withdrawal. But in April 1948, Jewish 

fighting forces secured some significant victories. These successes spurred the 

flight of Palestinian Arab refugees (eventually numbering over 900,000) from 

their homeland. Further victories placed the Jews firmly in control of the areas 

allotted to them by partition. 

On May 1948 the Provisional Government of the Jewish territories, headed by 

Premier David Ben Gurion, proclaimed the existence of the state of Israel. Immediately upon being informed of this action, President Truman moved to extend de 

frzcto recognition of the new state, making the United States the first great power 

to do so. As he acknowledged, this gesture met with the strong disapproval of 

some career State Department officials. I7 It also startled the US delegation in the 

United Nations, which was in the midst of promoting temporary trusteeship. 

Arab-Israeli War 

T he proclamation of Israel was the signal for invasion by the Arab League 

states. Due to many weaknesses, including lack of a unified command, these 

forces were not successful in seizing Israeli-held lands or in preventing the new 

part of Jerusalem from falling into Israeli hands. The Egyptians made probably 

the worst showing; the British-trained Arab Legion of Transjordan conducted 

itself best. 

The General Assembly on 14 May 1948 had created the position of United 

Nations Mediator to cooperate with the Truce Commission established by the 

Security Council. Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden was appointed to the position. On 11 June he succeeded in concluding a four-week truce.18 Numerous violations were charged, but there were no large-scale engagements. However, since 

no political settlement followed, fighting resumed when the truce expired. On 25 

July 1948 the Security Council was able, by using threats of sanctions, to impose 

another truce, with no stated time limit. I9 This truce was violated even more frequently and disastrously than its predecessor, and attitudes on both sides became 

increasingly rigid. On 17 September, Count Bernadotte was assassinated in 

Jerusalem, apparently by Jewish extremists enraged by a new territorial settlement which he had proposed on the previous day. 

Count Bernadotte’s death produced a sense of shock among delegates to the 

UN in Paris, but it unfortunately did not foster an attitude of compromise among 

the conflicting groups involved in the Palestine crisis. The General Assembly, 

meeting from 21 September to 11 December 1948, made a few last attempts to 

impose a political solution of its own devising but without success. In midNovember the Security Council called for a general armistice, turning over to its 

49 
ppy y 

the Bernadotte Plan, made public on 16 September 1948. The Mediator’s ideas 

came close to acceptance by the great powers in the UN, even as the Israelis 

moved militarily to forestall their execution in the field. Briefly, Count 

Bernadotte’s recommendations included armistice and demilitarization; a territorial settlement giving Galilee to the Jews and the Negev to the Arabs; merger of 

central Palestine (previously captured by the Arab Legion) with Transjordan; 

internationalization of Jerusalem; and creation of a UN conciliation commission to work out a permanent accord. On 21 September 1948 Secretary of State 

Marshall endorsed this plan. Foreign Secretary Bevin did so shortly thereafter.*” 

However, events combined to defeat the Bernadotte Plan. Statements by President Truman in the final weeks of the 1948 campaign made observers doubt that 

the United States would forcefully support any solution that took some territory 

away from Israel. On the other hand, the Israeli Government acted on the 

assumption that the plan might be carried out. In late October and early November 1948, Israeli forces seized western Galilee and the Negev, routing Egyptian 

troops and creating a new military situation that was not likely to be reversed by 

UN resolutions or armistice negotiations. Finally, the Soviet General Assembly 

delegation stood behind partition and attacked the motives of the United States 

and Great Britain in their support of the Bernadotte Plan. The outcome was a resolution by the General Assembly on 11 December 1948 creating a Conciliation 

Commission to conduct peace negotiations, without attempting to suggest the 

form that a settlement should take.2L 

Meanwhile the Security Council had called on both sides to withdraw to positions on 14 October. This request had no effect. A call for armistice negotiations 

issued on 16 November was more influential, because it coincided with weaknessesand disunity among the Arab states. Egypt, perhaps because she had been 

most discouragingly defeated, was the first state to agree to negotiate with Israel 

through the mediation of Dr. Ralph Bunche, an American who had succeeded 

Count Bcrnadotte. 

The negotiations were limited in scope, because the Arab states refused to recognize the existence of Israel, and because there were many issues that the 

Israelis declined to discuss except as an aspect of a permanent and formal peace 

settlement. Nevertheless, agreements regarding lines of demarcation, reduction 

of garrisons, demilitarization of some areas, and exchange of prisoners were concluded by Israel with Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Syria by July 1949. The 

territorial settlement reflected the military reality of early 1949, with Israel continuing to hold the Negev (except for the narrow Gaza strip along the southern 

coast), the northern part of Palestine (Galilee), and new Jerusalem, together with 

a corridor leading to that city. 

With this phase of the settlement completed, attention turned to a conference 

set up by the UN Conciliation Commission at Lausanne. These meetings, lasting 

from late April until the end of 1949, were intended to seek a permanent peace 

settlement and to deal with the status of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and 

50 
International Peace Force for a Neutral Jerusalem 

D uring these months of conflict and discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were 

concerned primarily with the possible involvement of US armed forces in 

truce-keeping or security functions in Palestine. Any such involvement they consistently opposed, whether it took the form of an international police force in 

Jerusalem, recruitment and training of an international peace-keeping force for all 

of Palestine, or the assignment of US Marines as guards for US diplomatic posts. 

The question of committing Americans for security duty in Palestine first 

arose on 25 June 1948. Secretary General Trygve Lie informed the US Representative to the UN that Count Bernadotte was attempting to negotiate the demilitarization of the city and therefore might require a l,OOO-man guard force, to be 

contributed equally by the three nations comprising the Truce Commission. The 

Mediator was interested in securing a well-selected group of responsible men, 

preferably veterans.22 

In reply, the Secretary of State proposed to agree to the Secretary General’s 

formula for contributing the force and to advise him that he would have to 

recruit the US contingent himself. The United States Government would not do 

the recruiting, nor would it assign organized US units to UN guard duty; it 

would, however, assist the Secretary General in screening personnel and giving 

medical examinations.23 

The Secretary of Defense found no objection to this proposed reply, except for 

the offer of assistance by US military authorities in processing recruits. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, in response to a request from the Secretary of Defense for their 

views, agreed with the Secretary’s objection. To process American recruits for the 

UN guard force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, might easily lead to involvement of the US Military Services in matters of training, uniforms, equipment, or 

even transportation and support, with the result that the American contingent 

would come to be regarded as a US military force.24 Under Secretary of State 

Lovett, on 20 July, informed the Secretary of Defense that the State Department 

accepted the JCS position.2s 

The neutralization of Jerusalem proposed in the Bernadotte plan of September 

1948 provided an opportunity for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to modify these views. 

Believing that US acceptance of this plan constituted a commitment to establish 

some form of international police force in the city, the Acting Secretary of State 

asked the Secretary of Defense which type of force the US Government should 

support: a body made up of contingents supplied by certain governments; or one 

recruited by the UN Secretary General. Under the former method, it might be 

possible to exclude Soviet military units or Soviet nationals in the status of private citizens. Under the latter method, however, it was likely that a certain number of such nationals would be recruited for the force.2h 

51 

in Palestine. They therefore stated their preference for a Jerusalem police force 

recruited by the Secretary General, because Soviet personnel who might be 

recruited would enter Palestine as individuals and not as members of Soviet units. 

To include US citizens in such a force was “highly undesirable.” This statement represented a stiffening of opposition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the employment of 

Americans in Jerusalem in a peace-keeping role. Previously, they had merely 

opposed the processing of American volunteers by the US Armed Serviccsz7 

On the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, the question of a neutral 

police force for Jerusalem was taken up by the NSC, which concluded there was 

no feasible way of providing such a force that would satisfy the security interests 

of the United States. The Council agreed that, if such a force were recommended 

by the UN General Assembly, it would be least objectionable to the United States 

if members of the force were recruited asindividuals and excluded citizens of the 

United States and the Soviet Union. In any event, the United States should not 

accept a Jerusalem police force including armed force contingents of the United 

States, the Soviet Union, or Soviet satellites. President Truman approved these 

conclusions on 24 November 1948.2H 

However, the final Armistice Agreements, which left Jerusalem divided and 

firmly under the control of Jordan and Israel, effectively ended any prospect that 

an international police force would materialize for the city. 

International Peace Force for Palestine 

I

n the summer of 1948 a possibility arose that US forces might be requested to 

help enforce the Security Council cease-fire resolution of 15 July 1948,which had 

declared that failure to comply would be considered a breach of the peace within 

the meaning of Article 39 of the UN Charter. This article empowered the Security 

Council to call on member states to contribute armed forces to maintain peace. 

General Vandenberg, anticipating a UN call for troops for this purpose, feared 

that the United States, because of its policy of support for the United Nations, 

might not be able to avoid responding. Soviet forces might also become involved. 

He called upon his colleagues to determine the “least adverse solution” in the 

event that the United Nations voted to introduce military forces into Palestine.2y 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly addressed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on 19 August 1948, in which they strongly reiterated their view 

that neither US nor Soviet forces should be deployed to Palestine. The entry of 

Soviet forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, would entitle the Soviet Union to 

land or sea lines of communications to its forces, thereby introducing Soviet 

forces into other Middle East areas and paving the way for Soviet domination of 

the region. 

A commitment of US forces to Palestine would ultimately require the entire 

existing ground force reserve and would therefore make it impossible for the 

53 
military resource. In these circumstances, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended 

that “United States policy neither endorse nor permit a decision by the United 

Nations to employ military enforcement measures in Palestine.““” 

Secretary Forrestal forwarded these views to the National Security Council on 

19 August. The Council discussed them the same day and agreed to hear State 

Department comments on them at its next meeting. These were presented by the 

Secretary of State 3 September. He agreed with the views of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff and stated that his Department had effectively blocked all attempts by the 

Soviet Union to establish a military presence in Palestine. This policy would continue, Secretary Marshall said, but he could not exclude the possibility that at 

some future date it might be necessary to use armed forces to protect vital US 

interests in the Middle East. Any such decision would, of course, have to be 

made by the President in the light of all existing circumstances, “including the 

availability of armed forces and our military commitments elsewhere.” The 

Council noted these views but took no other action.71 

Marine Guards for the Jerusalem Consulate 

T he JCS view expressed in regard to the assignment of Marine guards to the 

Jerusalem Consulate was a similarly cautious one. The Consulate had been 

almost in a state of siege since at least the date of the UN partition resolution. It 

had been bombed just after the announcement of US support of the resolution. 

On 10 December 1947, Consul General Robert B. Macatee reported again on the 

seriousness of the situation in Jerusalem, noting that even with 60,000 British 

troops still present in the country, cars owned by non-Arabs were stoned and 

fired upon and all other forms of travel were also hazardous. Mr. Macatee 

requested an independent guard force and a direct radio link with naval forces in 

the Mediterranean. On 31 December, he reported that the British no longer 

seemed capable of controlling violence and that the Consulate was only able to 

function due to the security zone maintained by the British.“* 

Conditions did not improve, and on 25 April 1948 Admiral Denfeld reported 

to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the State Department had indicated that it might 

request a reinforced Marine company-some 300 men-to guard the Jerusalem 

Consulate. Since this action might encourage other powers to introduce troops, 

Admiral Denfeld recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff study the implications of the proposal.“” As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 13 May, informed 

the Secretary of Defense that to introduce US forces, however small, into 

Jerusalem would create a dangerous situation. Arabs and Jews might interpret 

their dispatch as a sign of American intentions to enforce partition, with consequent heightening of hostility toward the United States. Sending Marines might 

also become the first step in a series of commitments; they could readily become 

involved in enforcing a truce, protecting Jerusalem, rescuing Europeans and 

54 
would have to be deployed, resulting in neglect of other responsibilities and 

depletion of reserves. A dangerous precedent, the sending of troops into a mandate, would also be set, and the Soviet Union would have every excuse to do 

likewise in the future. To avoid all these hazards, it would be preferable to withdraw US consular personnel if necessaryZ4 

But on 28 June the new Consul General, John Macdonald, communicated to 

the State Department that the civilian guard detachment at the Consulate had 

proved “unsatisfactory, undisciplined and totally incapable.. . .” He urgently 

requested the detailing of 22 Marines before the four week truce ended. The 

Under Secretary of State on 1 July requested the National Military Establishment 

to provide these personnel, and also to assign 11 Marines to the new US Mission 

at Tel Aviv. In replying on 7 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated their previous 

reasoning and again suggested that withdrawing consular staff would be wiser 

“in view of the worsening world situation and the international appreciation of 

our current lack of military preparedness.” In a letter to Under Secretary of State 

Lovett, Secretary Forrestal said that he was inclined to assign about a dozen 

Marines to Jerusalem but none to Tel Aviv. He thought that this matter was 

important enough to be considered in a Cabinet meeting. On 15 July, the President approved Mr. Forrestal’s view and authorized a Marine guard of 13 in 

Jerusalem. This figure was later raised to 40 by a Presidential decision of 4 October because of increased terrorist activity? 

US Policy after the 1949 Armistice 

T he armistice agreements ending the Arab-Israeli conflict signed early in 1949 

created a situation calling for a reappraisal of US policy. For the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, this reappraisal began on 7 March 1949, when General Vandenberg 

pointed out to his colleagues that their position on Palestine, because it dealt primarily with a possible US involvement in a UN peace-keeping force, had now 

been overtaken by events. Israel, he said, had emerged as an independent state 

and as a military power in the Middle East second only to Turkey. It was possible 

that the United States, as a result of its support of Israel, might gain strategic 

advantages in the Middle East that would offset the effects of the decline of 

British power in that area. He requested, therefore, that the JSSC restudy US 

strategic objectives with regard to Israel and prepare a new statement of JCS 

views to be transmitted to the Department of State.“h 

The resulting study was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 6 May and 

sent to the Secretary of Defense with the request that he forward it to the Secretary of State. In this new study, the Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed the strategic 

importance of Israel entirely in the context of general war pitting the United 

States and its allies against the Soviet Union and its satellites. In such a situation, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff found Israel to be of little immediate value as a base area, 

55 
interfere with the operations of the United States and its allies. From the tactical 

point of view, Israel’s territory and her combat-experienced forces would be an 

asset to either side in any contest for the control of the area. Israel, because of close 

ties to the United States, was considered to be generally pro-Western, although 

her announced policy was officially neutral. There was, however, an opportunity 

for communist infiltration through the immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe 

and the Balkans. Israel was also surrounded by defeated and still unfriendly foes 

and might, as an expedient, accept overtures from the Soviet Union. 

On the basis of these considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that 

US security interests with respect to Israel were as follows: 

(1) That Israel should be oriented towards the Western Democracies and away 

from the USSR; 

(2) That Communist infiltration should be blocked and domination of Israel 

by the USSR should be prevented; 

(3) That the differences between the new Israeli state and the neighborin 

Arab states should be reconciled at least to the extent that Israel and the Ara a 

states would act in concert to oppose Soviet aggression; and 

(4) That. . . it would be advantageous if British relations with Israel were such 

that a common approach could be taken b the United States and the United 

Kingdom in achieving mutual objectives wit K respect to Israel.“7 

Secretary Johnson approved the JCS recommendations and forwarded them to 

the Secretary of State. He also sent them to the National Security Council, with the 

recommendation that it develop an up-to-date policy towards Israel, reflecting the 

views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the events of the preceding 12 months? 

The Department of State accordingly drafted a position paper which, after 

being modified in conference with representatives of the Department of Defense, 

was adopted by the NSC on 17 October 1948 as NSC 47/2. The President 

approved its conclusions on 20 October. By this action, the US Government 

adopted an “impartial but firm policy” towards Israel and the Arab states which 

would “instill moderation in both parties.. . and help to ensure that the competing nationalisms do not get out of hand.” This policy was based on the following 

“fundamental propositions”: that the political and economic stability and security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East were of critical importance 

to the security of the United States; that it was in the national interest to have the 

respect and, insofar as possible, the good will of all the peoples of the Middle 

East and their orientation toward the West and away from the Soviet Union; and 

that their differences should be reconciled at least to the extent that they would 

act in concert to oppose Soviet aggression. To attain these broad goals, the new 

policy called for asserting “constructive leadership” in the solution, on an impartial basis, of the economic, political, and social problems of the area. 

56 
junction with the United Kingdom. In the matter of Arab refugees who had fled 

Jewish-controlled areas during the fighting, the United States was prepared to 

encourage Israel to allow refugees to return, to encourage the Arab states to 

resettle those unwilling or unable to return, and to seek adequate compensation 

for them from IsraeI for their lost lands. In the matter of territories, the United 

States was prepared to assist the parties to reach a final settlement, accepting any 

solution they freely agreed to, but adopting the principle that Israel should make 

compensation for territories retained that were allocated to the Arab Palestine 

under the UN resolution of 29 November 1947. As for Jerusalem, the United 

States would support the principle of internationalization as defined in the General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1Y48.7’J 

Military Assistance to Israel and the Arab States 

T he question of military assistance towards Israel and the Arab states was one 

of considerable delicacy. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this matter arose in connection with Israel on 22 March 1949, when the Israeli Foreign Minister informed 

the Under Secretary of State that Israel wanted to hire a limited number of US 

Army reserve or retired regular officers as advisers in military organization to the 

Israeli Army. The Secretary of Defense, to whom this request was referred, 

replied that, according to legal experts in the Department of the Army, the Israeli 

proposal was contrary to US law, and that any military assistance to Israel should 

be provided by a military mission consisting of regular officers on active duty.“” 

Secretary Johnson also considered it advisable to refer the Israeli request to 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They agreed that any advice provided should be through 

a formal military mission. They believed, however, that it would be inadvisable 

to establish such a mission so long as a risk of war between Israel and the Arab 

states continued to exist. The Israeli Army was not in dire need of foreign technical assistance, and the United States might become overtly involved if the ArabIsraeli conflict resumed after a US military mission had been established. And 

finally, US strategic interests in the Middle East would unquestionably suffer 

under these circumstances. Secretary Johnson forwarded these JCS views to the 

State Department, where they were presumably accepted; nothing more was 

heard of the matter.4’ 

The question of supplying arms to Israel and the Arab states was reopened by 

the UN Security Council in a resolution of 11 August 1949, which lifted the 

embargo on shipments of arms to the belligerents in the Arab-Israeli conflict. At 

that time, the United States had taken the position in the Security Council that it 

would not “allow the export of arms which would permit a competitive arms 

race in the area” and would therefore limit arms exports to those needed for 

“legitimate security requirements.” On 1 September President Truman, acting on 

a recommendation by Secretary Acheson, defined “legitimate security require57 
“providing for reasonable requirements of self-defense.“42 This position was 

incorporated in NSC 47/2, which stated that the United States should permit the 

export of “reasonable amounts of military material to Israel and the Arab states” 

within the scope of “legitimate security requirements” in order to promote 

“internal security as a basis for general security in the Near Eastern area.“‘*” 

Under this policy, the Department of State, with Defense Department concurrence, granted a few export licenses for arms and equipment to both Israel and 

the Arab states. At first, arms purchases by all the states concerned were at a low 

level, but during the winter of 1950, the Israeli Government began gradually to 

increase its orders in the United States to include not only commercially available 

surplus munitions but also advanced weapons in use by US forces. This latter 

category included 63 tanks, 90 armored cars, 66 105mm and 155mm howitzers, 

68 90mm antitank guns, 66 40mm and 90mm antiaircraft guns, and 18 jet aircraft. 

Because of the numbers and types of weapons on this list, the Munitions Board 

asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether provision of the weapons was justified 

under the President’s guidelines.44 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 5 May 1950 that, on the basis of available 

intelligence, an increase in the arms level of Israel was not necessary in order to 

ensure internal order or to provide an adequate defense. They were opposed, 

therefore, to the release to Israel of the equipment listed by the Munitions Board 

as being in excess of legitimate defense requirements. The JCS views were presumably accepted at higher levels.45 

The Tripartite Declaration of 1950 

T his acquiescence in the British arms program for Egypt quite naturally 

aroused Israeli fears that the Arabs might attempt a “second round” of warfare against them. The Arabs, on the other hand, feared that continued Jewish 

immigration into Israel, combined with Israeli aggressiveness, would lead to 

efforts to incorporate all of Arab Palestine into Israel. To assuage these mutual 

fears, the Department of State proposed separate declarations by the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France, reaffirming their policies of 

support for the independence and territorial integrity of the states of the Middle 

East and announcing their intention to take action to oppose violation of frontiers 

of these states by external force. An appropriate occasion for issuing these declarations, the Department of State believed, would be the forthcoming tripartite 

Foreign Ministers meeting in London.46 

Responding to a request from the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff vigorously opposed this proposal because it implied the use of armed forces 

by the signatories to preserve the integrity of Middle Eastern states. Such 

employment of US forces, regardless of the size of the initial commitment, must 

be regarded as the “probable genesis” of a series of US military deployments to 

58 
also be taken as an excuse by the Soviet Union or its satellites to move forces into 

the area and would open the way for possible Soviet dominance over it.47 

These JCS dissents proved of no avail. At their meeting in London the Foreign 

Ministers of the United States, United Kingdom, and France issued a joint declaration on 25 May 1950 using the identical language of the State Department draft. 

The three governments, should they find that any of these JMiddle Eastern] 

states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently 

with their obli ations as members of the United Nations, immediately take 

action, both wit a in and without the United Nations, to prevent such action. 

Arms shipments to Middle Eastern states would, however, continue, the signatories declared, because they recognized that the Arab states and Israel all 

needed to maintain a “certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring 

their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to 

play their part in the defense of the area as a whole.“4N 

59 

4 

The Berlin Crisis 

The Foreign Ministers Fail at London 

bile the struggle against communist expansionism in the MediterraneanMiddle East area was at its height, a more serious Soviet challenge arose in 

Central Europe. The major confrontation between the United States and the 

Soviet Union involved Berlin. The immediate disagreements concerned legal 

technicalities of occupation policy, but the underlying issue was control of the 

city, which was the principal battleground in the struggle to control Germany.’ 

Under agreements reached during World War II, Germany, following her 

unconditional surrender in 1945, was partitioned into four occupation zones 

administered by the United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet 

Union. The commanders in chief of the occupation forces of those four powers 

constituted an Allied Control Council, which exercised joint control over Germany. Berlin, although lying wholly within the Soviet occupation zone, was likewise under four-power rule administered by a body entitled the Kommandatura. 

The Commander of US Occupation Forces was General Lucius Clay, who was 

also Military Governor of the US zone of Germany and US Representative on the 

Allied Control Council. As Commander of US Forces in Europe (USCINCEUR), 

General Clay was responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Chief of 

Staff, US Army, who had been designated the JCS executive agent for the European Command. In matters relating to the occupation, General Clay dealt 

directly with the Department of the Army.* 

Competition for control over Germany had been intensifying ever since the 

failure of the Foreign Ministers to agree on a German peace treaty at Moscow in 

March 1947 had revealed the seemingly irreconcilable views of the major powers 

on the future of Germany. The Ministers met again on 25 November 1947 in London to make another effort at drafting a German peace treaty. By the time the 

Conference adjourned sine die on 15 December, agreement on a treaty was even 

more remote than when it opened. The participants touched upon the whole 

63 
The principal stumbling block at London was the political structure of the 

German state to be created by a peace treaty. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov 

outlined a plan for a strong centralized German government: socialized basic 

industries, more thorough de-nazification, and demilitarization. He then 

attacked Western opposition to these measures as calculated to prevent German 

economic recovery and encourage German reactionary elements. Secretary of 

State Marshall, while agreeing that a centralized German government was necessary, insisted that it be both effective and genuinely democratic; it must provide for 

basic freedoms of the individual, which were nonexistent in the Soviet zone, and 

for the free flow of persons, ideas, and goods throughout the whole of Germany. 

Subsequent discussions degenerated into a repetitive exchange of assertions, 

contradictions, and accusations, culminating on December 12 in a long and 

insulting attack on the Western powers by Mr. Molotov. The three Western foreign secretaries were now convinced that there was no possibility of agreement. 

They therefore agreed that Mr. Marshall should deliver a firm rebuttal to Mr. 

Molotov at the next session. 

Secretary Marshall, in his statement delivered on 15 December, reviewed the 

major issues over Germany dividing the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. He 

placed primary emphasis on the relationship between economic and political factors. Agreement on economic principles, the Secretary maintained, was essential 

to the establishment of political unification. Soviet insistence upon reparations 

drawn from current production and in excess of the amounts agreed to at Potsdam, and exploitation of the industry of its zone by means of the organization of 

a gigantic Soviet trust had made it impossible for Germany to play a part in the 

recovery of Europe. In fact, these practices had greatly increased the need of 

Western Germany for outside aid supplied by the United States and the United 

Kingdom. If a peace treaty permitted these circumstances to continue, the resulting German government, in General Marshall’s words, “would subtract from 

rather than add to a real union of the German people.” Since the Soviets seemed 

unwilling to modify their stand, the Secretary concluded, it seemed impossible to 

make practical progress, and the Council of Foreign Ministers might now consider 

adjournment. The conference concluded after a harsh rebuttal by Mr. Molotov.” 

Communist Coup in Czechoslovakia 

T wo months after the collapse of the London Foreign Ministers’ Conference, 

events took an ominous turn in Central Europe. On 23 February 1948, a communist coup toppled the liberal democratic regime of Czechoslovakia and drew 

that country into the Soviet orbit. President Truman and his advisers placed an 

ominous interpretation on this event. The President, speaking to a joint session of 

Congress on 17 March, accused the Soviet Union of pursuing a “ruthless course 

of action” that had brought about the “tragic death of Czechoslovakia” and had 

62 
bear, the President continued, “on Finland, to the hazard of the entire Scandinavian peninsula. Greece is under direct military attack from rebels actively supported by her Communist-dominated neighbors. In Italy, a determined and 

aggressive effort is being made by a Communist minority to take control of that 

country. The methods differ,” President Truman concluded, “but the pattern is all 

too clear.” 4 

The immediate response by the Western powers was limited. On 26 February, 

the United States, Great Britain, and France joined in a public statement voicing 

their indignation and alarm “over developments which place in jeopardy the 

very principles of liberty to which all democratic nations are attached.” This 

response perhaps did credit to their powers of observation, but it reflected their 

inability to alter the situation. 

Consolidation of the Western Zones 

ith the breakup of the London Conference, the Western powers determined to push ahead with plans for organizing their own zones of Germany. On 23 February, representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, 

and France began discussions on Germany in London, and on 26 February, they 

were joined by representatives of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. 

At the conclusion of their first series of meetings on 6 March, they issued a communique announcing that the participating powers had in view “the necessity 

of ensuring the economic reconstruction of Western Europe including Germany, 

and of establishing a basis for the participation of a democratic Germany in the 

community of free peoples.. . . “ To this end, the communique stated, the conferees had agreed that prompt action should be taken to coordinate the economic 

policies of the US, UK, and French occupation zones of Germany in such matters 

as foreign and inter-zonal trade, customs, and freedom of movement for persons 

and goods.5 The Soviets reacted sharply to this Western initiative. They 

protested the convening of the London Conference in notes to Washington, London, and Paris and organized a rival conference of the Foreign Ministers of 

Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, who also delivered notes of protest to 

the three Western capitals. 

The deteriorating relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers also affected the work of the occupation machinery in Germany. From midJanuary on, the atmosphere in the Allied Control Council steadily deteriorated 

until early March it had become impossible to reach agreement on even the most 

routine questions. The Soviet delegation seized upon every question on the 

agenda, no matter how simple, to launch violent propaganda attacks on the three 

other delegations. These diatribes concentrated on three main allegations: that 

the Western powers had violated agreements such as Potsdam; that the United 

States and the United Kingdom intended to disrupt quadripartite administration; 

63 
when Marshal Vasily D. Sokolovsky, the Soviet Military Governor, walked out of 

the Allied Control Council, charging that action by the Western powers on German issues at London without Soviet participation had virtually destroyed the 

Council as an organ of four-power government of Germany.7 

Restrictions on Access to Berlin 

A n event of far greater import occurred on 30 March when the Soviet authorities in Germany issued regulations governing lines of communications of 

the three Western powers with their occupation forces in Berlin. These new regulations were spelled out for the US authorities by General Mikhail S. Dratvin, the 

Soviet Deputy Military Governor in Germany, in a letter to Major General George 

I! Hayes, USA, the US Deputy Military Governor. Effective 1 April, General 

Dratvin wrote, US personnel travelling through the Soviet zone by rail or highway would be required to present documentary evidence of identity and affiliation with the Military Administration of Germany; military freight shipments 

from Berlin to the Western zones would require a Soviet permit; freight shipments from the Western zones to Berlin would have to be cleared by accompanying documents; and all baggage, except for personal belongings carried by individuals in private automobiles or railway passenger cars, would have to be 

inspected at Soviet checkpoints.x 

The Soviets, by threatening the communication lines of allied forces in Berlin, 

were striking at an extremely vulnerable point of the Western position in Germany. By the terms of the World War II occupation agreements among the United 

States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and France, Germany and Berlin had been 

divided among them into four zones for administration purposes. Berlin, 

although administered by all the occupying powers, lay some 110 miles within 

the Soviet zone.” The right of access by the Western powers to Berlin across the 

Soviet zone of occupation became, therefore, a matter of the greatest importance. 

Without it, the United States, Great Britain, and France could be squeezed out of 

Berlin by the simple Soviet action of closing the borders of the Soviet zone to 

Western traffic. 

The Western powers’ right of access to Berlin was implicit in the agreement 

that provided for the stationing of their forces in the city. Unfortunately no written agreement guaranteeing ground access was ever concluded. In talks between 

Marshal Georgi Zhukov, the Soviet commander in Germany, and Generals Lucius 

Clay and Sir Robert Weeks, representing the US and British commanders, to 

arrange for the movement of US and British forces into Berlin, a verbal understanding was reached that, as a temporary arrangement, the two Western powers 

would have the use of a major highway and a rail line.“’ 

Access by air, however, had become the subject of written agreements among 

the occupying powers. Because of the need to provide flight safety over Berlin 

64 
with the Western zones. 

General Clay felt compelled to resist the restrictions announced by General 

Dratvin. The new Soviet regulation, he cabled General Omar N. Bradley, Chief 

of Staff of the Army, on 31 March, would “make impossible travel between 

Berlin and our Zone [by American personnel] except by air. Moreover it is 

undoubtedly the first of a series of restrictive measures designed to drive us 

from Berlin.” He therefore proposed to tell the Soviet Deputy Commander that 

US train commanders would supply only a cargo manifest and passenger list, 

together with official orders, but would not submit to search by Soviet pcrsonnel. “It is my intent,” he added, “to instruct our guards to open fire if Soviet soldiers attempt to enter our trains.” I2 

In Washington, the announced Soviet restrictions were carefully studied by 

the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, and Under 

Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett, acting for Secretary George C. Marshall who 

was attending the International 

not appear that the Joint Chiefs 

erations in Washington was 

approved by President Truman 

Royal1 in a telecon on 31 March: 

You are authorized to move 

that the normal train guard be 

normally carried. Also that the 

Conference of American States in Bogota. It does 

of Staff were consulted. The result of these delibthe following set of instructions, which was 

and transmitted to General Clay by Secretary 

trains as you see fit. It is considered important 

not increased and that they carry only the arms 

Russians be not prohibited from taking actions 

which have been customarily followed. Furthermore, it is important that our 

guards not fire unless fired upon.‘” 

To test Soviet intentions, General Clay dispatched 

border without stopping for inspection by Soviet 

some distance into the Soviet zone but was finally 

where it remained for a few days before withdrawing 

Thereafter, personnel and baggage of the allies’ 

to and from Berlin by rail. During April the Soviets 

a passenger train across the 

officials. The train proceeded 

switched off onto a siding, 

ignominiously.14 

garrisons no longer moved 

imposed further restrictions 

on rail communications between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany. On 

the lst, they refused to allow mail cars carrying packages to leave Berlin for the 

West; on the 3rd they closed the Hamburg-Berlin and Bavaria-Berlin lines, 

requiring all freight to move to Berlin via Helmstedt; and on the 23rd, they suspended international train service from Berlin by refusing to attach the two 

international coaches to the interzonal train between Berlin and Osnabruck. 

Communications of the Western powers with Berlin were further impeded 

when the Soviets ordered the US and British telephone repeater stations maintained in the Soviet zone to be removed.is 

65 
I n the midst of this Soviet harassment, the Western powers reconvened the sixpower London Conference. On 7 June the conferees announced that they were 

preparing to summon a constituent assembly to draft a constitution for Western 

Germany. The prospect of a separate German political entity in the Western 

Zones must have alarmed the Soviets, but they did not react immediately.lh 

The three Western powers took a further step towards a separate West Germany on 18 June when they introduced a currency reform in their zones. This 

had long been planned by the Western governments as necessary to restoration 

of a healthy German economy. The Soviets had been invited to participate but 

had insisted on the right to print notes in their own zone. Unwilling to lose control of the volume of note issue, the Western powers determined to give up 

quadrilateral unanimity and introduce the currency in their own zones. 

The Soviet response was immediate and strongly adverse. On 19 June, Marshal Sokolovsky issued a statement accusing the three Western powers of disrupting German economic unity and stating that the Soviet Union would not 

allow the new currency to circulate in Berlin. At a hastily arranged conference of 

financial experts of all four occupying powers on 22 June, the Western representatives offered to accept Soviet zone currency as the currency for all of Berlin provided that its issuance was under four-power control. Rejecting this bid, the 

Soviet Union on the same day declared the currency of the East zone to be the 

legal currency for Berlin. The Western powers thereupon announced that the new 

Western currency would be introduced into their zones of Berlin.17 

The Soviet Union did not limit its response to economic countermeasures but 

immediately initiated a series of actions that within a few days was to constitute 

a nearly total isolation of Berlin from the Western world. On 19 June, Soviet 

authorities suspended all passenger train traffic between the Eastern and Western zones, restricted rail freight traffic from the West to Berlin to one train a day, 

and stopped all road traffic from the Western zones into the Soviet zone. That the 

Soviets meant business and were not merely bluffing was demonstrated on 21 

June, when General Clay, after appropriate notification, ordered a US military 

freight train to proceed to Berlin via the regularly authorized line. At the checkpoint, Soviet officials refused to allow the train to pass, and when the US train 

commander attempted to force the train through, it was forced to withdraw 

because a section of rail had been removed.lx These measures were followed two 

days later by a suspension of all rail and barge traffic into Berlin from the West 

and by the cutting off of electricity supplied to the Western sectors of Berlin by 

generators in the Soviet sector. Finally, on 24 June, the Soviets prohibited the distribution of supplies from the Soviet zone to the Western sectors of the city. 

Except for the air routes, Berlin was now totally blockaded.‘” 

66 
G eneral Clay, acting on his own initiative, responded on 24 June to the blockade by directing his air commander, Major General Curtis LeMay, USAF, to 

assign every available transport aircraft to carry supplies to the beleaguered city. 

The first aircraft landed in Berlin on the morning of 25 June.20 

At national level, however, the appropriate responses to the Soviet actions 

were by no means clear. As an immediate reprisal, the Western powers suspended trade between their zones and the Soviet zone, thus depriving the latter 

of large shipments of coal and steel from the Ruhr.2’ However, there was neither 

an agreed long-range tripartite policy nor a presidentally approved unilateral US 

policy to meet the situation. 

Six months earlier, in January 1948, the Army General Staff had completed a 

study of possible courses of action in the event of a Soviet effort to force the 

United States out of Berlin. Secretary Royal1 had forwarded the study to Secretary of Defense Forrestal merely for his information. Mr. Forrestal asked whether 

the study should be referred to the National Security Council so that a definite 

policy could be established but was informed by Mr. Royal1 that no such action 

was necessary because the Departments of State and the Air Force had concurred 

in the proposed courses of action. Secretary Forrestal did not pursue the matter 

further. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were never formally consulted. 

The Army staff in its study made no attempt to assess the strategic importance of Berlin to the United States and its allies but limited itself to a consideration of the steps the United States might take to counter possible Soviet moves. 

Two courses of action appeared to be available to the Soviets to drive the Western 

powers out of Berlin: direct military action, which would result in war and 

would occasion a US response determined by issues larger than Berlin; and 

“administrative difficulties” which would be easy to apply, because access to 

Berlin was limited to one road, two railroads, and one air corridor. These “difficulties” might consist of such measures as harassment of communications and 

interference with utilities and would make life unpleasant for US forces. Or the 

Soviets might take the much more serious step of limiting the transportation of 

supplies to Berlin (perhaps arranging to feed the population from their zone). It 

would be impossible for the Western powers to supply the population of their 

sectors solely by air if ground supply channels from the Western zones were disrupted. If confronted by “administrative difficulties” of this nature, the Army 

staff concluded, the United States should make every effort to remain in Berlin, 

using all available means to supply the city, and should publicize the situation in 

order to place the blame, in the eyes of world public opinion, squarely on the 

Soviet Union.22 

As the relations between East and West over Germany deteriorated during the 

winter and spring of 1948, the US Government made no preparations to deal 

with the situation. And when the crisis broke at the end of June, the Truman 

administration met it with a series of ad hoc improvisations. The elaborate 

machinery set up to deal with such situations under the National Security Act of 

1947 was not brought into play until the middle of July, when the Berlin crisis 

67 
President Truman brought up the Berlin situation at a meeting of the Cabinet 

on 25 June and heard reports from Secretary Royal1 on the serious situation that 

was developing and on General Clay’s emergency airlift.23 Following the Cabinet 

meeting, the President engaged Secretaries Forrestal and Royal1 and Under Secretary Lovett in a fuller discussion of Berlin. They concluded that “determined 

steps” should be taken to remain in Berlin. The nature of these steps was not 

decided, but there was agreement not to pursue a proposal by General Clay for 

countermeasures outside Germany, such as closing US ports and the Panama 

Canal to Soviet shipping. These measures, it was felt, would be ineffective.24 

One obvious “determined step” to remain in Berlin was taken on 26 June by 

President Truman when he directed that General Clay’s improvised airlift be put 

on a regular basis and that every aircraft available to the European Command be 

pressed into service. 25General Clay implemented this directive the same day, 

employing 70 C47s, which provided a capacity to lift about 225 tons per day.2” 

The airlift as originally mounted was obviously an emergency measure of 

very limited capacity. Efforts to raise the blockade were therefore urgent, and to 

this end General Clay proposed both military and diplomatic moves. “I am.. 

convinced,” he informed Secretary Royal1 on 25 June, “that a determined movement of convoys with troop protection would reach Berlin and that such a showing might well prevent rather than build up Soviet pressures which could lead to 

war. Nevertheless I realize fully,” he continued, “the inherent dangers in this proposal since once committed we could not withdraw.” An effort at negotiation 

was also necessary. To this end, he proposed a conference with Marshal 

Sokolovsky to point out the seriousness of the situation and to suggest a practical 

solution to the currency problem. This approach would probably not work, General Clay admitted, but it could do no harm and would at least demonstrate a 

willingness to reach a solution and to prevent suffering by the German people.27 

The next day, the British sought to employ the diplomatic approach. Their 

effort was in the form of a letter from General Sir Brian Robertson, the Military 

Governor in Germany, to Marshal Sokolovsky protesting his action in closing off 

the access routes to Berlin from the West. General Robertson’s letter reflected a 

determination by the British to stand fast in Berlin. Although the British Government had not yet taken an official position, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin told 

US Ambassador Lewis Douglas that the Western powers should stand firm in 

Berlin because to abandon the city would have serious, if not disastrous, consequences in West Germany and throughout Western Europe. All available aircraft 

should therefore be assigned to the airlift. 

Mr. Bevin also sought to revive the top-level military policy and planning 

institution that had worked so effectively in World War II. He proposed to call 

upon the Combined Chiefs of Staff to make a military appreciation arising from 

the Berlin situation, including an appraisal of the deployment of additional 

heavy bombers to Europe, and to join the military governors in Germany in a 

study of the logistics required to feeding the civilian population of Berlin. Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA, of the Army General Staff, who was 

68 
and as guidance in forthcoming talks in the Combined Chiefs of Staff.2x 

General Clay endorsed the proposed air reinforcements. The Soviets, he 

advised General Bradley on 27 June, “are definitely afraid of our air might. Moreover, arrival of aircraft will be a deciding factor in sustaining allied firmness.” 

General Clay recommended, specifically, increasing the B-29 force in Germany 

from a squadron to a group, deploying additional B-29s to England and possibly 

to France, and carrying out immediately the movement to Germany of a fighter 

group scheduled for August.2” 

It was now becoming apparent to high-level officials in Washington also that 

an appraisal of US policy was in order. To this end, Secretary Forrestal, Secretary 

Royall, Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan, Under Secretary Lovett, and General Bradley gathered in Secretary Royall’s office on 27 June. Lieutenant General 

Lauris Norstad, the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, was also in 

attendance. Their discussion proceeded on the assumption that existing food 

stocks, plus the supplies that could be brought in by air, would avert serious food 

shortages for about 30 days. This period could perhaps be extended to 60 days if 

dried foods were used. 

Three possible courses of action were discussed, as follows: 

1. To make a decision now, in concert with the United Kingdom and France, to 

withdraw at an appropriate time in the future, presumably when a constituent 

assembly for a West German government was called on 1 September. 

2. To decide now to employ all possible means to remain in Berlin, including the 

use of force to supply the city as a last resort after all diplomatic effort had failed. 

3. To maintain the present “unprovocative but firm” stand in Berlin, using 

every diplomatic means to obtain recognition of the rights of the Western powers 

to be in Berlin while postponing the ultimate decision to remain in Berlin or to 

withdraw. To withdraw from Berlin, the conferees recognized, would damage US 

policy in Europe. To remain would be to invite recurring crises and frequent 

humiliation. To attempt to supply the city by force would run the risk of war. 

Agreement on any one course of action proved impossible. It was decided 

that Secretaries Forrestal and Royal1 and Under Secretary Lovett would present 

the issues to President Truman the next morning. 

While the conferees were unable to reach a decision on basic policy, they 

found merit in the suggestion that additional heavy bombers be deployed to 

Europe. They accordingly agreed to ask Ambassador Douglas to explore the possibility of basing two groups of B-29s in Britain. They also agreed that no useful 

purpose would be served by referring the Berlin question to the Combined 

Chiefs of Staff, as proposed by Foreign Secretary Bevin. There was therefore no 

reason to follow up on General Wedemeyer’s suggestion for a referral of the 

question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in fact no such referral was made. The 

Joint Chiefs of Staff were not to join in Berlin policy planning until 19 July and 

then they did so on their own initiative.“” 

On 28 June, Messrs. Forrestal, Royall, and Lovett met with President Truman 

in the White House. Mr. Lovett recited the details of the meeting of the previous 

69 
say, as Secretary Forrestal recorded in his diary, “that there was no discussion on 

that point, we were going to stay period.” Secretary Royal1 expressed some concern as to whether this matter had been fully considered, warning that the United 

States should not be committed to a position in which it might become necessary to 

“fight our way into Berlin.” The President’s rejoinder, again as recorded by Secretary Forrestal, was “that we would have to deal with the situation as it developed,” 

but that the essential fact was “that we were in Berlin by terms of an agreement 

and that the Russians had no right to get us out by either direct or indirect pressure.” Towards the end of the meeting, the President evidently had second 

thoughts about staying in Berlin at all costs. This was a tentative position, he said. 

A final decision would await further consideration of alternatives. 

The President approved the recommendation of his Cabinet officers to deploy 

B-29s to Europe. He gave positive assent to the immediate dispatch of two 

squadrons to Germany, and he did not dissent when Under Secretary Lovett said 

that he assumed that two additional groups of the big bombers would go to England as soon as the British Government gave its consent. The President also acquiesced in General Clay’s proposal for a conference with Marshal Sokolovsky.7i 

On the following day, 29 June, the British Government officially took a strong 

stand on Berlin. While it did not take as hard a line as President Truman’s “we 

are going to stay, period,” the British Government saw the confrontation in Berlin 

as a vital test of strength that the West could not afford to lose. The British Government felt that the airlift together with the deployment of heavy bombers 

would show the Soviets that Great Britain and the United States meant business 

and would hearten the continental countries, particularly France.32 

Seeking to implement this strong governmental stand, the British Chiefs of 

Staff arranged a meeting between their representatives in Washington and the US 

Joint Chiefs of Staff to give urgent consideration to possible military measures 

that would enable the two governments to hold their positions in Berlin. The 

meeting, which took place on 30 June, failed to add any substantial measures to 

the airlift and bomber-deployment moves already being taken. The British delegation, headed by Admiral Moore, reported that the British Chiefs of Staff 

opposed any attempt to fight through to Berlin on the ground, a position with 

which Admiral Leahy said the US Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed because of the 

weakness of available US-UK forces. Admiral Moore announced that General 

Robertson had been instructed to reconnoiter additional troop locations in Germany as part of the war of nerves. He suggested that General Clay be given similiar instructions. Admiral Leahy and General Bradley objected to such a procedure on the ground the Soviets would recognize it as a bluff because they knew 

the United States had no more troops to send. 

An exchange of information on aerial supply capabilities revealed that the 

two Air Forces could deliver 2,000 tons per day at the present level of operations. 

Of this amount, the Royal Air Force would fly about 750 tons, a figure that represented the maximum effort of which the British were capable. The British were 

prepared to take a strong position on any attempt to interfere with the airlift. The 

70 
decision, Admiral Leahy stated, but would probably exchange notes with the 

Soviet Government before authorizing attacks on balloons or other obstructions 

in the corridorsO” 

Diplomacy Fails 

Efforts to resolve the crisis by diplomatic approaches, meanwhile, went forward between Military Governors in Germany and then at the governmental 

level in Washington, London, and Paris. Acting on instructions from Washington, 

General Clay arranged a meeting between Marshal Sokolovsky and the three 

Western Military Governors. The purpose of the meeting was to feel out Soviet 

intentions concerning Berlin. At the meeting, which took place on 3 July, Marshal 

Sokolovsky ascribed the interruptions of traffic to “technical reasons,” and added 

that actions by the Western Allies at the London Conference had created “economic disorders” in the Soviet zone that had made it impossible to provide alternative routes. The three Western governors concluded that Marshal Sokolovsky’s 

conduct reflected a decision by the Soviet Government that the question of access 

to Berlin would only be considered in connection with the entire German problem. Further action on their part, they decided, would serve no useful purpose.34 

With the failure to find a solution at the local level, the three Western governments carried the issue directly to the Soviet Government. In notes delivered to 

the Soviet Ambassadors in Washington, London, and Paris, the three governments reasserted their rights to be in Berlin, demanded that the Soviets restore 

arrangements for the movement of freight and passenger traffic to Berlin in 

accordance with existing agreements, and offered to negotiate in Berlin any dispute arising out of the administration of the city once access had been restored. 

The reply, delivered on 14 July, reiterated that the blockade of Berlin had resulted 

from currency reform and from plans for a separate West German Government, 

both violations of the Potsdam Accord and other agreements on the occupation 

of Germany. The Soviet Government expressed a willingness to negotiate, but 

without preconditions, and only on the German question as a whole.‘5 

The consensus in Washington and London now was that further efforts at 

negotiation should not be immediately undertaken, but that military measures 

such as the deployment of the B-29s to Britain and an increase in the airlift should 

be accelerated. Already, on 2 July the buildup of B-29s in Germany had been completed with the arrival of all elements of the 3Olst Bombardment Group. 

On 14 July, the British Government agreed to the stationing of two B-29 

groups in Britain. The NSC immediately agreed to send them, and by the end of 

the month the 28th and 307th Bombardment Groups completed movement to 

British bases. The B-29s were widely known as atomic bomb carriers, but, significantly, the 509th Bombardment Group, which still possessed the only atomic 

71 
JCS and National Policy 

capability, was not deployed to England; it remained at its home base in the 

United States.36 

NSC Action 84: National Policy Reaffirmed 

By mid-July, it was evident to President Truman and his principal advisers that 

a reexamination of available courses of action in support of the policy decision to remain in Berlin was in order. To this end, the President called General 

Clay and his political adviser, Robert D. Murphy, home for consultations. A 

series of meetings was held in Washington culminating in a session of the 

National Security Council on 22 July. 

General Clay, reporting to the Council at President Truman’s request, said he 

could supply the summertime needs of Berlin with an airlift of 3,500 tons per 

day, but that coal shipments required during the winter months would raise this 

figure to 4,500 tons. General Clay believed he could meet the lower figure with 

an additional 75 C-54s to supplement his existing fleet of 52 C-54s and 80 C47s. 

General Vandenberg expressed reservations to the assignment of the additional 

75 aircraft on the ground that it would disrupt the Air Transport Service and 

would expose the aircraft to destruction by the enemy in the event of war. 

The President asked General Clay what risks would be involved in attempting 

to supply Berlin by armed convoys. The General, who had evidently modified his 

views on the subject since 25 June, replied that the Soviets would meet the convoys 

with armed force. The President asked whether he believed the Russians wanted 

war. General Clay answered that he did not believe so; rather they seemed to be 

trying to force the Western powers out of Berlin, either now or after winter weather 

forced a curtailment of the airlift. President Truman said the question then was 

how to remain in Berlin without risking all-out war. General Vandenberg repeated 

his fear that the concentration of enough aircraft to make the airlift effective would 

involve unacceptable risks. The President replied that the alternative was to 

attempt to resupply Berlin by ground convoy at the very great risk that Russian 

resistance would lead to war. The airlift, the President pointed out, would involve 

far less risk. He directed the Air Force to furnish all possible support to the airlift. 

General Vandenberg interjected at this point that an effective airlift would not be 

possible without additional airfields in Berlin, to which General Clay replied that 

he had already selected a site for an additional field to be built by German labor.37 

At the conclusion of this meeting, the National Security Council formally reiterated the determination to remain in Berlin “in any event,” approved construction of an additional airfield in Berlin, and assigned an additional 75 C-54s to the 

airlift, pending a future decision on even more planes for a larger effort.38 

Implementation of the National Security Council’s decisions followed quickly. 

On 23 July, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force ordered 9 Military Air Transport 

Service (MATS) squadrons (totalling 81 C-54 aircraft) to Germany and directed 

the establishment of a special task force under CINCUSAFE to direct the airlift. 

On 29 July, Airlift Task Force (Provisional) was activated, under the command of 

72 
ber 1948. 

JCS 1907: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Join the Policy Debate 

T he National Security Council had taken its decisions of 22 July without formal participation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. lndividual members had 

attended the meeting and had participated in the discussion, but the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff had not as yet presented formal views on the situation in Berlin. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff had not been inactive, however. Acting on the initiative of General 

Bradley, they had a paper on Berlin in preparation at the time the National Security Council made its decisions, though it did not reach the Council in time to 

influence these decisions. 

General Bradley had addressed a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 

17 July in which he dealt with many of the issues that faced the National Security 

Council on the 22nd. According to information supplied by General Clay, the 

Army Chief of Staff reported, the present airlift could not continue to meet the 

3,000 tons of supplies required daily by Berlin. The present maximum combined 

US-UK lift was about 2,250 tons per day, of which 1,500 tons were carried by US 

aircraft. Over the long term, however, the average lift would decline to about 

1,700 tons per day. 

General Clay’s proposal for opening ground access by armed convoys, General Bradley stated, had only a limited chance of success but might be necessary 

if political considerations required a long-term support of the present policy to 

stay in Berlin. The British military authorities, he reported, had considered the 

use of armed convoys but had reserved their position for governmental decision. 

The French were opposed. 

General Bradley recommended, therefore, that General Vandenberg provide 

as many C-54s to the airlift as the Berlin airfields could handle; that the Department of the Army request additional funds to cover the costs; that the Joint 

Strategic Plans Committee revise war plans to allow for the possible loss of aircraft employed on the airlift; that the Secretary of Defense be requested to 

arrange with the Secretary of State to ask the British and French to give maximum support to the airlift and to join the United States in contingency planning 

for combined armed ground convoys; and that USCINCEUR be directed to prepare unilateral plans for the same purpose.“” 

General Bradley’s memorandum, JCS 1907, was referred to the Joint Strategic 

Survey Committee, whose report, submitted on the 19th, was then referred back 

to them, along with the original memorandum by General Bradley, for consolidation into a single document. This report was completed on the 21st and acted 

upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff the next day. Their recommendation to the Secretary of Defense that he forward their views to the National Security Council was 

not implemented until 26 July, too late to influence the Council’s decision.41 

73 
lift. They said that Berlin could be supplied by air indefinitely if a maximum 

effort was made but at the cost of seriously reduced capabilities to implement the 

air transport missions in war plans. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also stated that supply of Berlin by armed ground 

convoy was highly unlikely to succeed and could lead to major war involvement. 

Therefore they did not recommend it unless the following conditions had been 

met: every other solution to the Berlin situation had been tried or discarded; the 

operation appeared likely to succeed; the United States Government had decided 

that it would go to war if necessary to maintain its position in Berlin; and all possible time had been gained in order to prepare for war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

did recommend combined contingency plans to be prepared at once for use in 

event the higher authorities decided to attempt supply of Berlin by the overland 

route, and they asked the Secretary of Defense to arrange with the Secretary of 

State for consultations with the British and French Governments on these plans. 

The disadvantage of a continuing airlift and the hazard of attempting to supply Berlin by ground convoys led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to suggest political initiatives. “It is assumed,” they wrote, “that diplomatic effort together with all possible counterpressure will continue to be used to arrive at peaceful solution to the 

Berlin problem. In this connection, it may not be altogether out of the question to 

consider. . . the possibility that some justification might be found for withdrawal 

of our occupation forces from Berlin without undue loss of prestige.” 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded their memorandum with a plea for a “decision now as to our future military course of action regarding Berlin,” taking into 

account the shortcomings of air supply and the fruitlessness of armed ground 

supply attempts. If the decision was that US occupation troops would remain “in 

any circumstances short of war,” and that an effort would be made “to supply 

Berlin by force if supply can be maintained in no other way,” they recommended 

that: “(1) All possible time. . . be gained for preparation for the event of war by 

augmentation of the air supply method, and (2) full-out preparations for. . . war 

be inaugurated immediately.“4z 

The Secretary of Defense forwarded the JCS views to the Executive Secretary 

of the National Security Council on 26 July. He circulated them to members of 

the Council as NSC 24 on 28 July. At its meeting on 5 August, the Council noted 

this paper.4” 

Plans for Restoration of Ground Access 

Secretary Forrestal, as requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asked Secretary of 

State Marshall to initiate discussions with the British and French Governments on combined planning for armed convoys to Berlin. In a letter dated 28 

July, the Secretary of Defense stressed that this planning should be purely of a 

contingency nature and should not represent a decision by the US Government 

74 
1 

efforts to resolve the Berlin problem had failed.44 

The Secretary of State, replying on 30 July, stated that governmental level 

negotiations were undesirable at present because of recent reconstitution of the 

French Cabinet, and suggested instead that the matter be taken up with the 

British in the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Forrestal, concurring with Secretary Marshall, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to handle the matter in this way.4s 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly addressed their British opposite numbers 

on 18 August. They warned that armed convoys to supply Berlin might have to 

be employed as a last resort, so that plans should be prepared at an early date. 

The convoys should be composite and consist of US, UK, and French forces. But 

in view of the French political situation, added the Joint Chiefs of Staff, initial 

planning should be carried out by the US and British Commanders in Germany, 

who should not consult the French until authorized to do 50.~~~ 

The British Chiefs of Staff replied on 27 August that they were still convinced 

that any attempt to force armed convoys into Berlin would be “militarily 

unsound and politically undesirable.. . . Whatever the conditions may become in 

the future, the fundamental impracticability of the proposals will remain.” The 

Joint Chiefs of Staff decided th at ‘t was uselessto press the British Chiefs of Staff 

further. They therefore directed USCINCEUR to develop a plan for composite 

US-UK-French convoys but not to discuss it with the British and French Commanders. In response to this directive, USCINCEUR submitted “Plan: Task Force 

Truculent” on 8 September.47 

New Diplomatic Initiatives 

T he US Government, meanwhile, remained determined to pursue a diplomatic 

solution to the Berlin crisis. Following receipt of the Soviet note of 14 July, 

high-level deliberations on the next step were conducted in Washington. As a 

result, President Truman decided on 20 July to make a direct approach to Premier 

Stalin before engaging in any further exchange of formal notes. This approach 

was to be on an agreed US-UK-French basis with the senior ambassador of the 

three powers in Moscow acting asthe spokesman.4H 

The French and British Governments having agreed to a direct approach to 

Stalin, the Ambassadors of the three powers requested and were granted an 

interview with the Soviet Premier. The meeting took place on 2 August. United 

States Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith, speaking for the three Western powers, 

offered once again to negotiate the currency problem of Berlin or any question 

relating to Germany once the restrictions on accessto Berlin had been removed. 

Stalin at first reiterated the Soviet contention that the restrictions on accesshad 

been made necessary by the decisions of the Western powers at the London Conference to establish a new German government at Frankfort and to introduce a 

special currency in Berlin. He then proposed a settlement on the following terms: 

75 
Soviet objection to the London decisions as a condition for settlement of the 

Berlin issues, but with the understanding that the Soviet Government was still 

strongly opposed to the implementation of the accords. The Western Governments accepted this proposal but on condition that the introduction of Soviet 

zone currency into Berlin be subject to effective quadripartite control. 

Attempts by the three ambassadors to implement these decisions in confcrences with Foreign Minister Molotov during the period 6-16 August ended in 

failure. The unwillingness of the Soviet Foreign Minister to accept four-power 

control over the currency in Berlin was the main point of disagreement. A second 

meeting with Stalin was therefore arranged, and a new agreement resulted. 

Restrictions on access to Berlin from the Western zones were to be removed, and 

the German mark of the Soviet zone was to be the sole currency for Berlin. 

Arrangements relating to the currency changeover were to be made by the four 

Military Governors, and were to ensure a “satisfactory basis for trade” between 

the Western zones and Berlin. This agreement was transmitted to the Military 

Governors for implementation4” 

The Military Governors, meeting during the period 31 August to 7 September, were unable to carry out their assignment. The reason for this failure was 

the position of Marshal Sokolovsky, who soon made it clear that he was not prepared to honor the understandings reached in Moscow. During the course of the 

meetings, he took the position, in direct contravention of the directive from the 

four governments, that the proposed four-power financial commission should 

have no effective power to control the currency. He also tried to limit the 

removal of restrictions on access to Berlin to those imposed after 18 June, the 

date of the Western currency reform in Berlin. He later receded from his initial 

position on this point but continued to insist on a limitation of access by air to 

military aircraft. Commercial flights to Berlin, he insisted, would not be permitted. He contended further, again in contradiction to the directive, that the Soviet 

authorities had the sole right to control trade between Berlin and Western Germany and third countries. As a result, the talks ended without an agreed report 

to the four governments.5(1 

Even before the final breakdown of the Military Governors’ talks in Berlin, the 

US Government had decided upon its future diplomatic actions in the event the 

negotiations should fail. Meeting on 7 September, the National Security Council, 

with President Truman presiding, concurred in Secretary of State Marshall’s proposal to “bring the disagreed issues to a definitive conclusion in Moscow and, if 

no satisfactory solution is reached, then to refer the Berlin situation to the United 

Nations Security Council. . . . “51 

To implement this decision, the ambassadors of the three Western powers in 

Moscow delivered an aide-memoire to Mr. Molotov, pointing out the deviations 

by Marshal Sokolovsky from the quadripartite directive and asking whether the 

Soviet Government intended to live up to its terms. The Soviet Government 

replied on 18 September, denying the allegations of the Western powers and 

insisting that Marshal Sokolovsky had scrupulously observed the letter and spirit 

76 
ppy 

and the Western zones and insisted that the four-power finance commission control the issuance of currency in Berlin. The Soviet Government maintained that 

commercial traffic on the air routes would have to be subjected to the same controls as railways, water routes, and highways; and that the powers of the finance 

commission should be, as stated in the directive of 30 August to the Military 

Governors, to implement currency issue measuresrather than to control them. 

Direct negotiations between the three Western powers and the Soviet Union 

had now apparently reached an impasse. The Foreign Ministers of the Western 

powers, meeting in Paris on 26 September, announced that they would now carry 

the Berlin question to the United Nations Security Council.12 

US Policy Reappraised 

T he failure of diplomatic negotiations forced the US Government to reexamine 

its policy towards the Berlin crisis. Up to this point, the airlift had been supplying the city with its basic needs, and General Clay had reported that it could 

continue to do so if adequately reinforced. On 10 September he requested 116 

additional C-54s-69 to be made available by 1 October and the remaining 47 by 

1 December. In response, a decision was made to augment the airlift by 50 additional C-54s. On 24 September, General Clay pointed out that he needed the 

entire augmentation in order to build up a stockpile for the winter months and 

requested that his full original request be met.5” 

The National Security Council, however, felt that a major reappraisal of US 

policy in the Berlin crisis was called for before making a decision on the future of 

the airlift. Anticipating the breakdown of negotiations, the Council on 16 September had requested the Department of State to prepare a report on what position 

the US should adopt if the negotiations failed. In connection with this report, the 

Secretary of Defense was asked to s~ipply an appraisal of the military implications of continuing the airlift through the ensuing winter. Secretary Forrestal, on 

4 October, passed this request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for action.“” An additional request for views on the airlift came to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 October, when the National Security Council requested them to recommend military 

actions against Soviet forces interfering with the airlift within or over the air corridors to Berlin.ss 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, replying to both requests in two memorandums to 

the Secretary of Defense on 13 October, repeated the reservations about longterm continuation of the airlift that they had offered the previous July. “It is the 

considered opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . ,I‘ they wrote, “that our present 

military power cannot effectively support the supply of Berlin by air lift on an 

indefinite basis without such a diversion of military effort as has affected and 

will continue progressively to affect seriously and adversely the ability of the 

77 
inherent in the Berlin situation must not be ignored. However, disregarding 

cost, both in money and in readiness for war emergency.. . air supply to Berlin 

can theoretically be continued indefinitely.” And in view of the President’s 

decision of 22 July “to remain in Berlin in any event,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

recommended that the airlift be augmented by 66 aircraft in addition to the 50 

already furnished, in order to give General Clay the 116 that he had requested 

on 10 September. 

This recommendation for an augmentation did not mean, however, that the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff were prepared to accept the existing Berlin policy without 

question. To the contrary, they actively sought to have that policy modified. 

Taken literally, they said, the words “in any event” might be “construed to 

include the determination of the United States to remain in Berlin even if this 

course results in war. It appears possible that this construction.. . may not, however, have been definitely contemplated.” This point should be clarified “beyond 

all doubt,” and the “military implications and views inseparable from a determination to remain in Berlin and of extreme importance from the standpoint of 

national security Jshould] be included in such consideration.” 

These “military implications and views” were set forth by the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff in their formal recommendations: 

That there be full recognition of the facts that the Berlin airlift cannot be a permanent solution of the problem; that the USSR could by direct action adversely 

affect and quite possibly drastically reduce our su ply of Berlin by airlift; that 

with increases in personnel and funds, and in the a&sence of direct action by the 

Soviets, the lift could be continued indefinitely; and that such direct Soviet action 

can in turn easil brin forth the necessity for decision by the United States as to 

whether or not tKe Ber7.m situation constitutes a war issue. 

That decision be reached now as to whether or not the added risk of war 

inherent in the Berlin airlift is acceptable. 

That, if decision is in the affirmative full-out preparations for the early eventuality of war be inaugurated immediately. 

That, if decision is in the negative, plans logically now be made and action 

taken leading to our withdrawal from Berlin. . . . 

But regardless of what the administration decided with respect to Berlin, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff clearly realized that the military strength of the United 

States was not adequate to the demands of the nation’s foreign policy. They 

accordingly recommended that efforts be continued to “strengthen our military 

capabilities in all respects in order that military support for our foreign policies 

may be available without undue weakening of our readiness for war emergency.” And finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that steps be taken to 

offset the budgetary and personnel drains on the National Military Establishment resulting from the airlift.5(> 

78 
able, fighter patrols in the corridors, they believed, could be defeated by determined Soviet air action, and selective antiaircraft fire at Soviet planes violating 

air traffic rules would invite retaliation in kind. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended against both measures because of their ineffectiveness and because the 

Soviets would consider them as acts of war. 

A possible course of action would be to issue warnings to the Soviets not to 

interfere with flights of the Western Allies to Berlin. These warning announcements could be (1) that fighters would escort transports if the latter were 

attacked, or (2) that any serious interference would be regarded as an act of war. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned that making these announcements involved a 

risk of war, They accordingly recommended against them unless the US Government had decided that war “in the near future and for the Berlin cause is acceptable.” They emphasized, however, that, from the military viewpoint, to start a 

war “in our present state of readiness and for the Berlin issue would be neither 

militarily prudent nor strategically sound. . . .” 57 

The two JCS memorandums of 13 October produced an immediate reaction, 

but not of the type anticipated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Far from bringing 

about a change in national policy, the JCS recommendations met a vigorous 

rebuff at a special session of the National Security Council on 14 October. Present were Under Secretary Lovett; Secretaries Forrestal, Royall, Symington, and 

Sullivan; the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the exception of Admiral Leahy; General 

Gruenther; the Executive Secretary of the NSC, Mr. Sydney Souers, and his 

deputy, Mr. James S. Lay. Secretary Royal1 and Under Secretary Lovett were the 

most vocal. Mr. Lovett insisted that the decision of 22 July to remain in Berlin “in 

any event” was made with full knowledge of the facts and was intended to stress 

that the United States would not be forced out of Berlin. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

he said, seemed to have a “case of the jitters,” and their recommendations served 

no useful purpose except as a justification for additional military appropriations. 

To Secretary Royall, the Joint Chiefs of Staff seemed to be trying to “pass the 

buck.” The tone underlying the JCS papers was unfortunate, particularly the passage dealing with the NSC decision to remain in Berlin “in any event.“58 

While Mr. Lovett and Mr. Royal1 reiterated the determination of the Truman 

administration not to be forced out of Berlin, neither attempted to answer the 

central question posed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Would the United States go to 

war to remain in Berlin? Their evasion suggested a policy of postponing decision 

until faced with necessity to fight or get out. To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who 

would be responsible for planning operations should war come, such a postponement was understandably unsettling. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to withdraw both papers and, after further 

study, resubmit them in modified form. The National Security Council then proceeded to adopt the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for an immediate reinforcement of the airlift. As approved by the President on 22 October, these 

measures were: to augment the airlift by 66 C-54s; to assure the necessary sup79 
financial support for the airlift. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their revised recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on 20 October; he sent them to the members of the National 

Security Council on the following day. In this revision, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

still cautioned that the Berlin airlift could be continued indefinitely if enough 

resources were allocated to it but only at the cost of seriously degraded capabilities to meet primary national security responsibilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

also repeated their recommendation for an across-the-board military buildup to 

provide support for foreign policies, but they deleted their recommendations for 

an immediate decision whether Berlin was a war issue, together with the corollary recommendations to mobilize or withdraw.“” 

Failure at the United Nations 

Efforts to solve the Berlin crisis by diplomacy in the United Nations, meanwhile, were to have no more success than earlier diplomatic efforts in Berlin 

and Moscow. The three Western powers referred the dispute to the United 

Nations on 29 September and, after some debate, the Security Council agreed to 

accept it. The neutral members then tried to find a formula acceptable to both 

sides. Their initial proposal called for simultaneous lifting of the blockade and 

introduction of the Soviet zone mark into Berlin. The Soviets accepted but the 

Western powers refused to discuss currency questions while the blockade was 

still in force. The neutrals then introduced a substitute proposal providing for a 

lifting of the blockade, followed, first, by a meeting of the four Military Governors to effect the substitution of the eastern for the western mark, and, second, by 

a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss the whole German situation. The Western powers supported this proposal, but the Soviet delegate vetoed 

it on 25 October. The next step was a proposal for direct quadripartite talks, 

accepted by the Soviets but rejected by the Western powers, who could see no 

purpose in repeating the frustrations of Berlin and Moscow, and preferred to 

keep the question in the United Nations. After further discussions the four powers finally agreed to the appointment of a committee of experts to produce a solution to the currency problem to be put into effect simultaneously with the end of 

the blockade. The committee, established on 30 November 1948, finally reported 

in February 1949 that agreement was impossible and ceased its labors.“’ 

The Blockade Is Lifted 

ith augmentations in C-54 aircraft, the effectiveness of the airlift steadily 

increased to the point where even the bad weather conditions of the winter 

80 
daily tonnage requirement from an austere 4,500 tons to 5,600 tons, which permitted an increase in the daily ration from 1,600 to 1,880 calories.h2 

The citizens of the beleaguered city obviously had to sustain substantial hardships, but in spite of these privations, the morale of the Berliners remained high 

and their adherence to the Western powers unswerving. On 29 July 1948, the City 

Council ignored Marshal Sokolovsky’s offer to feed the entire city and, after the 

communist-front Socialist Unity Party members had walked out, voted to condemn the Soviet blockade of the city as a crime against humanity. Communistinspired mobs disrupted proceedings of the Council at its building in the Russian 

sector, whereupon it withdrew on 6 September to the British sector. Elections 

were scheduled to be held in Berlin on 5 December but were prohibited by Marshal Sokolovsky in the Soviet sector. In the other sectors, 86 percent of the electorate went to the polls and delivered an overwhelming majority to the anticommunist parties, thus demonstrating the substantial support of the Berlin 

population for the west and against the east.“” 

These developments probably had some effect in persuading the Soviet Government that the Berlin blockade could not prevent the development of a regime 

in the Western zone of Germany oriented to the West. In any event, Marshal 

Stalin, on 30 January 1949, in a matter-of-fact way, let it be known to an American 

journalist that the Soviet Government might end the blockade if the Western 

powers postponed establishment of a separate West German Government pending a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers and simultaneously ended the 

restrictions on trade with East Germany and East Berlin that had been imposed 

by the Western powers in reprisal for the blockade. The Soviet premier made no 

mention of the currency question as a prior condition for removing the blockade. 

Discreet diplomatic inquiries revealed that the omission had been deliberate. 

Negotiations followed, and on 5 May the four governments concerned issued a 

communique announcing that the blockade of Berlin and the Western countermeasures against East Germany and East Berlin would end on 12 May, and that 

the Council of Foreign Ministers would convene 11 days later. The blockade was 

lifted on the day agreed upon, and the first trucks and trains to reach the 

beleagured city, decked with flowers, were greeted by a jubilant population.h4 

Even after the lifting of the blockade, the airlift remained in effect for a time. 

On 20 July 1949, General Bradley recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that 

they seek authority of the National Security Council to phase out the airlift 

beginning on 1 August but under conditions that would permit its resumption in 

90 days. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted this proposal and made suitable representations through channels to the National Security Council and the President, 

who approved the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 July 1949. 

On 30 September, the last C-54 took off for Berlin, thus ending the airlift.@ 

American leaders were convinced that their Berlin policies had successfully 

met the immediate Soviet challenge and had strengthened American prestige in 

Western Europe. “The Berlin blockade was a move to test our capacity and will to 

81 
with their cooperation we would act, and act resolutely, when their freedom was 

threatened.” The airlift and the breaking of the blockade thus “proved a beacon 

light of hope for the peoples of Europe.“hh Secretary of State Dean Acheson 

agreed with the President that the airlift had been a success, but he cautioned 

that the lifting of the blockade had not solved the German problem. Whether a 

solution could be reached depended upon whether or not the Soviets were willing to accept the “progress the Western powers had made in their efforts to make 

West Germany a peaceful and constructive member of the community of free 

nations of Europe.” Mr. Acheson’s own view was that, with the blockade a failure, 

Stalin had lifted it “in order to carry on the war against a West German government by political means.” In this prediction, Mr. Acheson proved to be correcth7 

Contingency Planning for a Future Berlin Blockade 

Even before the decision to terminate the airlift, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had 

initiated consideration of and obtained presidential approval for the course 

of action to be taken by the United States if the Soviets reimposed the Berlin 

blockade. On 13 May, General Bradley had proposed to his fellow chiefs that 

they study the subject and be prepared to make recommendations upon 

request. Before the Joint Chiefs of Staff could act, the National Security Council 

made such a request on 17 May. In response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a resumption of the airlift and of economic reprisals against the Soviet 

zone of Germany. They reiterated their opposition to an attempt to force open 

ground access using ground convoys. They also opposed a “probe” of Soviet 

intentions by a ground force, a possibility suggested by the Secretary of State in 

the National Security Council on 17 May. Such a course of action would risk the 

loss of prestige and, if war resulted, would thrust upon the United States the 

blame for starting hostilities. These JCS views were accepted by the Acting 

Secretary of Defense and incorporated in a paper forwarded by him, with the 

concurrence of the Department of State, to the National Security Council on 

1 June.“” 

The Secretary of State, in commenting on the JCS views, again suggested that 

an armed convoy be employed to determine whether the Soviets, after announcing a restriction of surface access to Berlin, would physically prevent vehicles 

from proceeding to Berlin. In response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained traffic 

would not be halted upon mere administrative notification by the Soviets that 

passage was restricted, but would continue until confronted by a physical barrier, an armed guard, or other evidence of force. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated their opposition to employing an armed convoy.6y The National Security 

Council on 16 June adopted the pohcy recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff; the President approved them on the following day.70 

82 
T he airlift had thwarted Soviet attempts to force the three Western powers out 

of Berlin, but for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the course of events during the 

Berlin crisis had not been without frustrations. During the initial formulation of 

policy to meet the crisis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body had been 

largely ignored. In the only effort at contingency planning before the crisis began, 

by the Army Staff during January 1948, JCS participation had been specifically 

rejected. And during the initial stages of the blockade, while individual members 

participated in formulating policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not participate as a 

corporate body. Thus they had no collective voice in the initial decision to mount 

the airlift, or in the rejection of alternatives such as the abandonment of Berlin and 

the effort to break the blockade by force. In similar fashion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

were not consulted when the Truman administration reviewed its Berlin policy in 

late July. Once again, individual members participated, but the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff were not called upon for collective views. Not until the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

took the initiative and addressed the Secretary of Defense on 22 July 1948 did their 

views on Berlin policy matters reach high-level policymakers in the Truman 

administration. And on this first occasion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were too late to 

influence national policy. They were obliged to await a second reappraisal of policy, in October, before they were able to play a role in the formulation of policy. 

One reason for the failure to consult the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at least at NSC 

level, may have been the fact that the National Security Act did not specify a relationship between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council. 

There was no statutory requirement for consultation. This deficiency was remedied in 1949, when the Act was amended to provide, among other things, that 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be “principal military advisors to the. . . National 

Security Council.” 

If the Joint Chiefs of Staff had encountered difficulties in presenting their 

views to the high levels in the Truman administration, they encountered similar 

problems in getting these views accepted once they had gained an audience for 

them. Their recommendation that the risk of war over Berlin be frankly faced 

and, depending on the decision, the necessary preparations be made either to 

mobilize or withdraw, was unfavorably received in the Council. Their plea for a 

strengthening of US military capabilities, regardless of the decision on Berlin, in 

order to bring US power in line with foreign policies, was effectively rejected 

when the administration decided not to seek significantly increased military 

appropriations for FY 1950.71 

The apprehensions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, given the wide disparity 

between the Soviet Union and the United States in military strength, were understandable. They were seeking to avoid a military showdown where the Soviet 

Union would have every advantage. In this regard, they displayed a traditional 

military conservatism, in contrast to the President’s policy of accepting a certain 

degree of calculated risk. Responsible as they were for the overall military security of the nation, they judged the Berlin situation in the light of their acute consciousness of the weakness of the forces available to support the proposed policies. 

83 

Korean War period. It was to be waged in two areas: at home through unilateral 

efforts to build up the US military establishment; and abroad through collective 

security arrangements in the form of alliances and the extension of military aid to 

allies. These efforts are the subject of the ensuing chapters of this volume. 

85 

5 

Key West and Newport: 

Roles and Missions 

The National Security Act and Executive Order 9877 

A major obstacle to the efforts of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to strengthen the US 

military establishment was continuing disagreement among the Armed Services over their roles and missions. The passage of the National Security Act of 

1947, climaxing as it did a two-year struggle to “unify” the armed forces, was 

expected to clear the way for unified, and therefore efficient, planning and development of armed forces and strategy. But the expectations of the benefits to be 

derived from the National Security Act proved not to be fully realizable. Deepseated disagreements over roles and missions still divided the Services and made 

effective planning extremely difficult, if not impossible. As Rear Admiral Cato D. 

Glover, the Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, explained to the Director, Joint 

Staff (Major General Alfred M. Gruenther, USA), on the completion of the first 

post-war emergency war plan in 1948: 

there are no splits involved. However, it should be understood that this paper 

employs the forces in being as of 1 July 1948 and that there are therefore no questions concerning justification for the forces. It is for this reason and this reason 

on1 that we are able to submit this Plan without a split.. . . We still have great 

dif Yiculty utting out plans involving requirements for forces in the future which 

may estab Yish the size and composition of the respective Services.1 

The interservice differences had supposedly been resolved and the functions of 

the Services spelled out by the National Security Act of 1947 and its implementing 

directive, Executive Order 9877. The doctrine laid down by them based the functions of each Service generally on the geographical element in which they operated. Thus, the Army, according to the Act, was to be “organized, trained, and 

equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on 

land,” the Navy for “prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea,” 

and the Air Force for “prompt and sustained . . . air operations.” 

87 
well. The Army was therefore to include not only land combat and service forces 

but also “such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein.” The 

Navy was to include such aviation as was organic to naval combat and service 

forces. This naval aviation was to “consist of combat and service and training 

forces” and was to include “land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for 

naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in the operations 

and activities of the United States Navy, and the entire remainder of the aeronautical organization of the United States Navy, together with the personnel necessary therefor.” 

The Marine Corps, by virtue of its status as an amphibious force, did not fit 

neatly into a geographical environment. It was to “provide fleet marine forces of 

combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the 

fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of 

such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.” Other missions, more clearly identified with strictly naval operations, 

included the provision of security detachments on board naval vessels and at 

naval installations ashore. There was, finally, a catch-all provision that the Marine 

Corps would “perform such other duties as the President may direct.“* 

As a means to convert the provisions of the National Security Act into a directive to the Armed Services prescribing their primary functions and responsibilities, President Truman promulgated Executive Order 9877 on 26 July 1947, the 

same day he signed the National Security Act. By means of the Executive Order, 

the President not only directed the Armed Services to carry out the functions 

assigned to them by the National Security Act but also specified more precisely 

the functions each Service was to perform. 

The mission of the Army was elaborated by the Executive Order to include the 

seizure or defense of land areas (including airborne and joint amphibious operations) as well as the occupation of land areas. The Navy’s operations were to 

include control of vital seaareas,protection of sealanes, suppression of enemy sea 

commerce, support of occupation forces as required, naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, protection of shipping, and seizure of those shore positions 

capable of reduction by “such landing forces as may be comprised within the fleet 

organization.” The assignment of operational responsibilities to the Marine Corps 

was not further elaborated by the Executive Order. The responsibility of the Air 

Force was to include gaining and maintaining of general air supremacy, establishing local air superiority as required, conducting of strategic air warfare (including 

reconnaissance therefor), airlift and airborne support, air support to land and 

naval forces, and air transport operations except as provided by the Navy. In addition, each Service was responsible for conducting joint operations.? 

The scope and functions of naval aviation and of the Marine Corps had been 

spelled out in the Act in more detail than those of the Army and Air Force at the 

insistence of certain members of the Congress. They had acted to guarantee the 

continued independence of naval aviation and to assure for the Marines a role in 

amphibious warfare such as they had played in World War II.4 

88 
T hat the allocation of functions in the National Security Act and Executive 

Order 9877 had not permanently stilled interservice rivalries became apparent during January 1948. The controversy that arose then stemmed from Navy 

claims to a role in strategic atomic warfare, assigned to the Air Force by the Act 

and Executive Order, and the predictable Air Force reaction. The Navy position 

was succinctly stated by Admiral Nimitz in his final report as Chief of Naval 

Operations, submitted prior to his retirement on 15 December 1947 but not 

made public until 6 January 1948. The US Navy, Admiral Nimitz maintained, 

held such complete control of the seas that it could operate carrier task forces off 

any shore. These forces were “capable of remaining at sea for months” and thus 

had “raised to a high point the art of concentrating air power within effective 

range of enemy objectives.. . . The net result is that naval forces are able, without 

resorting to diplomatic channels, to establish offshore anywhere in the world, 

air fields” that were “virtually as complete as any air base ever established. 

They constitute the only air bases that can be made available near enemy territory without assault and conquest.” With these carrier task forces, the Navy of 

the future would be able to launch devastating atomic attacks against enemy 

vital areas. 

Admiral Nimitz denied that he was disputing the role of the Air Force, but he 

emphasized that 

it is improbable that bomber fleets will be capable, for several ears to come, of 

making two-wa trips between continents.. . with heavy loa d s of bombs. It is 

apparent then t rl at in the event of war within this period, if we are to reject 

our ower against the vital areas of any enemy across the ocean before t: eachhea crs on enemy territory are captured, it must be by.. . aircraft launched from 

carriers; and by heavy surface ships and submarines projecting guided missiles 

and rockets.” 

The intention to press ahead with the creation of this “Navy of the future” 

became apparent when the Navy sought to include funds for a large, flush-deck 

carrier, capable of launching atomic bombers, in the budget for FY 1949. Admiral 

Louis Denfeld, who had succeeded Admiral Nimitz as Chief of Naval Operations 

on 15 December 1947, told a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on 17 February that this carrier was intended to “handle radically 

advanced types of aircraft required for planned operations and not capable of 

being operated from our present carriers.” Vice Admiral John D. Price, Deputy 

Chief of Naval Operations for Air, explained further: 

The rapidly increasing size and weight of aircraft having greater range, speed, 

and bomb capacities, mean carriers of large size and greatly increased deck 

strengths. From these carriers we will be able to launch air attacks that can strike 

any target in the world, while maintaining the mobility and elusiveness of their 

floating base.h 

89 
of Secretary of Defense Forrestal, asking whether he would support any such 

innovation in the supposedly agreed relationships of the Navy and Air Force. 

Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan felt constrained to deny any intent to 

infringe upon the responsibility of the Air Force for strategic bombing7 

The Decision to Issue a New Roles and Missions Directive 

Secretary Forrestal unwittingly brought the dispute among the Services over 

roles and missions to a head on 20 January 1948. On that date, he sent to the 

three Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment a redraft of 

Executive Order 9877, revised to eliminate certain minor differences in wording 

between its provisions and those of the National Security Act. Replies were to be 

made in time to permit the Secretary to submit his recommendations to the President on 1 February. The disparities between the two documents had come about 

because the draft Executive Order had originally been drafted at the same time as 

the Act but had subsequently been issued in some haste and hence failed to 

reflect changes in the legislation that was finally enacted.H 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff referred Secretary Forrestal’s request to an Ad Hoc 

Committee consisting of Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA, Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad, USAF, and Rear Admiral Charles W. Styer, USN. 

On 28 January, the Committee concluded that the proposed revision of Executive 

Order 9877 was, in many respects, more ambiguous in defining roles and missions than the original version. What was needed was not an executive order that 

merely reproduced the language of the Act, but one that provided clear-cut guidance by removing all misunderstanding as to the tasks of each Service. Limitations on “money, manpower and industrial capacity,” said the Committee, made 

it “essential” to resolve the difficulties asa prerequisite to sound planning. 

The Committee recommended, therefore, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be 

authorized to draft a complete revision of Executive Order 9877, instead of 

merely commenting on the Secretary’s draft. As a means of expediting this revision, the Committee recommended that, pending a reply from the Secretary of 

Defense, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee be directed: 

(1) To submit no later than 23 February 1948 a new draft Executive Order 

based upon an agreed concept of operations, or 

(2) Failing to reach agreement on a concept of o erations, to submit a split 

aper which will state the controversial issuesin sueR a manner as to enable the 

roint Chiefs of Staff to: 

(a) Resolve the disagreement, or 

(b) Forward the matter to the Secretary of Defense or to the President for 

decision. 

90 
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward it to the Secretary of Defense. Generals 

Wedemeyer and Norstad opposed this recommendation. They stated, further, 

that, although they had only been able to give Admiral Styer’s draft a “cursory 

examination,” they “definitely disagreeld] with certain specific statements 

made therein.” y 

Admiral Louis Denfeld, commenting on the Committee report on 30 January, 

informed his colleagues that, while he agreed with the considerations underlying 

the Committee’s report, he did not approve of the recommended procedures. 

“Pressures from members of Congress, the press, and the public are such that this 

matter must be settled with the greatest expedition,” Admiral Denfeld pointed 

out. The Admiral feared that “to refer the matter to another committee would 

simply result in the continuation and the extension of the disagreements which 

have already taken place in planning committees where the delineation of specific roles and missions are [sic] points of issue.” He recommended therefore that 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff meet as soon as possible, each bringing his own proposed 

revision of the Executive Order, and attempt to resolve any Service disagreements. If they failed to agree, they should forward a statement of their disagreements to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.“’ 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted neither the recommendations of the Ad Hoc 

Committee nor those of Admiral Denfeld. Meeting on 4 February, they concluded 

that a statement by the Secretary of Defense defining roles and missions would 

be preferable to an Executive Order. They therefore informed the Secretary on 6 

February that they would submit such a statement to him with a recommendation that it be promulgated as a replacement for Executive Order 9877. To the Ad 

Hoc Committee they assigned the task of drafting the statement, with a deadline 

of 11February.” 

Secretary Forrestal, meanwhile, had received the comments of all three 

Service Secretaries on Executive Order 9877. Like the Ad Hoc Committee, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royal1 was of the opinion that the redraft of Executive Order 9877 did not “solve or decrease the outstanding difficulties occasioned by differing views as to roles or missions and responsibilities, but. . . might 

well tend to increase these difficulties by the breadth and generalization of some 

of the language used.” In particular, the portion dealing with the Navy and 

Marine Corps not only overemphasized their functions but also embodied general language “which might be construed to extend Naval functions clearly into 

the area of conflict with the other Departments.” A resolution of the differing 

Service views was important, but must await “clarification of the respective 

roles and missions.” Consequently, the Secretary of the Army recommended 

that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be directed to forward, no later than 1 March 1948, 

their recommendations as to specific roles and missions of the Services; after 

approval by Secretary Forrestal, these recommendations should then become the 

basisfor a redraft of the Executive Order to be prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.‘* 

Secretary of the Air Force Symington agreed with Secretary Royall’s comments on the proposed redraft of Executive Order 9877. He recommended, however, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff proceed at once to draft a new version, 

91 
Replying to the three Service Secretaries on 3 February, Mr. Forrestal pointed 

out that, judging from the comments, any revision that would meet with unanimous approval would be extraordinarily difficult at present. This state of affairs 

the Secretary of Defense attributed “primarily” to the “fact that until the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff have completed their joint strategic plans, there is no solid foundation on which to base a meaningful assignment of roles and missions.” Secretary 

Forrestal thus took the opposite view from that advanced by the Ad Hoc Committee, which had concluded that clarification of roles and missions must precede planning. 

Secretary Forrestal agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the final statement of Service functions should be in the form of a directive from the Secretary 

of Defense rather than an Executive Order. His “present inclination,” therefore, 

was “to do nothing about the Executive Order at the present moment, but to 

work towards a situation under which 1 will issue a directive simultaneously 

with a rescission of the Executive Order by the President.” The Secretary made 

no formal reply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning their recommendation of 6 

February. On 11 February, however, one of his Special Assistants, Mr. Marx Leva, 

forwarded to General Gruenther a copy of Secretary Forrestal’s memorandum to 

the Service Secretaries and pointed out that Secretary Forrestal’s proposed course 

was identical with that recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.14 

Deadlock in the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

T he Ad Hoc Committee, meanwhile, had proceeded with the task of drafting a 

new statement of Service functions. Agreement on all issues could not be 

reached by the deadline of II February, but before that date the Committee had 

approved “in principle” a broadly-worded statement. Two areas of controversy 

remained, however. These were the Navy-Air Force disagreement over the role of 

carrier aircraft in strategic air operations, and a difference of opinion between the 

Army and the Air Force involving the conduct of air defense of land areas. The 

Committee hoped to submit its final report, with or without unanimous agreement, by 18 February.‘? 

Subsequent efforts by the Committee to resolve these differences resulted in 

widening, rather than narrowing, the divisions among the Services. At a meeting 

on 10 February, the Committee directed its supporting Working Group to prepare 

a new draft “delineating more clearly the specific primary and secondary functions of each Service.” But the result of the Working Group’s efforts to attain this 

greater precision was to reopen the old Service splits, such as those concerning 

the roles of naval aviation and the Marine Corps, that had supposedly been 

resolved by the passage of the National Security Act.16 

92 
Key West and Newport: Roles and Missions 

The Ad Hoc Committee and its subordinate Working Group struggled with 

these problems for the remainder of the month to no avail. Finally, on 3 March, 

the Committee gave up and submitted a draft statement that embodied a number 

of disputed provisions. The major differences revolved around one broad question: Was the Navy to have its own “army” and “air force” and to decide for itself 

how large they were to be and how they were to be used? On this question, the 

Army and Air Force stood opposed to the Navy. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were unable to resolve the broad issues. They did settle a lesser difference between the Army and Air Force over “collateral functions,” when General Bradley agreed to accept General Spaatz’ definition of the 

phrase. The Army position had been that such functions would “not constitute a 

requirement to provide forces additional to those necessary for the accomplishment of primary functions.” The Air Force view, now accepted by the Army, was 

that such functions, “including. . . nature and extent and any requirements developed thereby, shall be as determined by the component charged with the primary 

function.” Although the fact was not stated in its draft, the Army staff had been 

of the opinion that this Air Force view, now accepted by General Bradley, 

“appears to be extreme in that it could make each Service supreme judge in its 

field of primary responsibility. It is considered that the Joint Chiefs of Staff constitute a more appropriate final authority.“17 

When it became apparent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they could not agree 

on the major issues, they forwarded a split “functions” paper to Secretary Forrestal 

along with a position statement by each Service. They were, they said, “prepared 

to meet with the Secretary of Defense at his convenience for the purpose of 

explaining further the respective views” of the individual members.‘8 

The approach taken by all three Services in presenting their views was to state 

what they considered to be the “fundamental issue” responsible for interservice 

disagreements, then to show how this applied to particular areas of operations 

and to specific passages in the draft statement of functions. To the Air Force, the 

question was 

whether we should have three Services, s ecialists in their normal fields, operating as a team of the National Military Esta 7)lishment or whether the Services shall 

be free to duplicate, within each one of them, forces and equipment for which 

another Service has rimary responsibility. The Air Force firmly believes that the 

three Services shoul if operate as a balanced and integrated team. 

To the Army, similarly, “maximum avoidance of duplication in operations” 

was the goal to be attained . It should be “insured bY the use of that component 

[i.e. Service] which is already organized and equipped to perform the operations 

incidental (or secondary) to the main operations. No component should develop 

or maintain, on an appreciable scale, forces which already exist in another component.” The Navy, on the other hand, held that “the effectiveness of our military 

establishment is best served through a full utilization and exploitation of the 

intrinsic capabilities and potentialities of the weapons of any Service, wherever 

such utilization and exploitation will contribute effectively to the attainment of 

93 
Navy participation in strategic air warfare was a major point at issue. The Air 

Force, supported by the Army, accepted the participation of Naval aviation units, 

whose normal primary function was to conduct operations at sea, in strategic air 

operations “whenever and wherever such use will result in increased effectiveness or economy.” The “nature and extent” of these operations, however, should 

be determined by the Air Force as the Service having primary responsibility for 

strategic air warfare. Nor should the Navy engage in the “unnecessary, wasteful 

and confusing” practice of establishing unilaterally requirements for forces and 

equipment designed specifically to conduct such operations. 

The Navy was strongly opposed to granting this “veto power” to the Air 

Force over the development of Naval forces having a strategic air capability. The 

Air Force view, the Navy maintained, was aimed specifically at curtailing the 

“supercarrier” program then in its initial stages. Carrier task forces possessed the 

unique capability to deliver bombing attacks on enemy targets on land from 

mobile bases using conventional or atomic weapons. They were, therefore, a 

“potentially valuable adjunct to the strategic air effort of land-based heavy 

bombers.” Carrier task forces, in fact, might be more than a mere auxiliary; they 

might be the “only means by which this nation could retaliate promptly and 

effectively, should we be attacked, and the only means by which we could take 

early action to blunt the enemy’s offensive.. before our own war-making capacity could be seriously crippled.” Heavy land-based bombers, the Navy claimed, 

had reached their practical limit in size and combat radius, compelling the Air 

Force to plan on one-way flights and unproven refueling techniques in order to 

“reach the enemy heartland from bases of which we can be assured.” 

The extent of Marine Corps combat operations on land was a second major 

issue dividing the Services. The Army, supported by the Air Force, maintained 

that in modern war the seizure, occupation, and defense of land areas would 

usually require joint operations involving two or more components. In an 

amphibious or airborne operation involving units as large as a division, the 

Army should properly furnish the land forces. “For the Navy to organize, equip 

and maintain Marine divisions, corps or larger units against such a contingency 

violates.. the Congressional mandate for maximum integration of the Armed 

Forces, elimination of unnecessary duplication, and operation of forces under 

unified command,” according to the Army view. 

The Navy rejected these attempts to limit the size and role of Fleet Marine 

Forces. The functions paper should specify that Fleet Marine Forces would consist of “combined arms” and would conduct “such land operations as may be 

essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.” This last phrase was defined 

by the Navy as “an operation or a connected series of operations.. . for the purpose of gaining, extending, or maintaining control of the sea.” 

As a doctrinal justification for its views, the Navy sought to define its operations as those “at or from the sea.” This was an extension of the wording of the 

Act, which provided that the Navy should be organized, trained, and equipped 

for combat “incident to operations at sea.” This phrase, the Navy maintained, 

94 
this instance a liberal interpretation of the language of the Act, though elsewhere 

a major portion of its case rested upon a strict interpretation of the provisions of 

the Act that recognized the existence of the Marine Corps and of Naval aviation. 

The passages dealing with collateral, or secondary, functions opened another 

area of contention. The Army and Air Force maintained that “forces developed to 

perform the primary functions.. . shall be employed to support and supplement 

the other components in carrying out their primary functions.. whenever such 

participation will result in increased effectiveness and economy and will contribute to the accomplishment of the over-all military objectives.” The Service 

having responsibility for a primary function would determine “the nature and 

extent” of collateral participation by the other Services as well as “any requirements developed thereby” for weapons or equipment for the Services furnishing 

collateral support. The Navy view was that all the Services should be assigned 

specific collateral functions for which they would be responsible without regard 

to the greater responsibilities of another Service for the same function. The extent 

of participation in a collateral function, as well as the equipment and weapons 

needed to discharge it, would be determined by the Service performing the collateral function. The Navy claimed the right, as part of its collateral functions, to 

“interdict enemy land and air power and communications through operation at 

and from the sea,. . . conduct carrier-based strategic air operations,. . conduct 

close air support for land operations, [and] furnish aerial photography for cartographic purposes.” “) 

Basic Roles and Missions Decisions: The Key West Agreement 

I n the hope of resolving the Service disagreements, Secretary Forrestal called a 

prolonged meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Key West Naval Base to 

thrash out the whole controversy and to decide “who will do what with what.” If 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to reach agreement, he informed a press conference 

on 10 March, “I shall have to make my own decisions.“2i) 

When the Joint Chiefs of Staff convened at Key West on 11 March, Secretary 

Forrestal announced a decision on one of the major controversies. The Navy 

would retain its air power, he said, and would be responsible for determining the 

means required to carry out naval air missions. But this authority could not be 

used to justify creation of a naval strategic air force. Strategic bombing was the 

responsibility of the Air Force. Both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief 

of Staff, US Air Force, appeared to accept this ruling. Admiral Denfeld stated that 

the Navy had no intention of developing a separate strategic air force, and General Spaatz responded that the Air Force had no desire to deprive the Navy of its 

carriers2’ 

During ensuing sessions at Key West on 12, 13 and 14 March, followed by a 

final session in Washington on the 20th, Secretary Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs 

95 
capabilities of naval aviation should be utilized to the maximum. Consequently, 

the Navy would be assigned essentially the collateral functions that it had 

sought: interdicting land communications and land-based air, providing close 

support to land operations, and participating in the overall air effort. Decisions 

regarding the extent of the use of naval aviation for these purposes would be 

made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting on recommendations of the Chief of 

Staff, US Air Force. The Chief of Naval Operations, however, was not to be 

denied the right to address the Joint Chiefs of Staff on any issue. Regarding collateral functions in general, it was agreed that, while these might be accepted as 

constituting additional justification for “stated force requirements,” they would 

nut be used “as the basis for establishing additional force requirements.” 

The size, composition, and functions of the Marine Corps, were settled at Key 

West largely on the basis of concessions by General Bradley. He dropped the 

Army’s insistence on limiting Marine Corps units to less than division-size. The 

agreement reached was that there should be no attempt to abolish the Marine 

Corps or to restrict it unduly in the discharge of its functions. But to avoid unnecessary duplication, the Marine Corps, for present planning purposes, should not 

exceed four divisions or have a field unit headquarters higher than a corps.z2 

A memorandum formally recording these understandings, commonly known 

as the “Key West Agreement,” was sent to the Secretary of Defense by the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff on 29 April 1948. After amending one paragraph that dealt with 

research and development, the Secretary formally approved it on 1 July 1948.23 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a new statement of “Functions of the 

Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff” on the basis of the Key West Agreement and submitted it to the Secretary of Defense on 26 March. He approved it 

the same day and recommended to President Truman that he revoke Executive 

Order 9877 and direct the issuance of the new “Functions Paper” in its stead. 

President Truman accepted this recommendation on 21 April, and on the same 

day Secretary Forrestal issued the “Functions Paper” to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

and the Service Secretaries.z4 

Any hope that the Key West Agreement would finally resolve the major issues 

dividing the Services was quickly dashed. Even while it was being worked out 

there were indications that the apparent agreement over air power by the Air 

Force and Navy was not the product of mutual conviction. On 16 March, General 

Spaatz informed Secretary Forrestal that the Air Force did not wholly agree with 

the decisions reached at Key West. The basic question, General Spaatz said, was 

whether there were to be two air forces, with separate and duplicating components such as training and service commands. Secretary Forrestal rejoined that 

the existence of the Navy’s air arm had been recognized in the National Security 

Act; hence General Spaatz was proposing, in effect, that the Act be amended. He 

did not intend to be drawn into a discussion on this point, added the Secretary, 

“because we had a law that was given us by Congress and it was up to us to 

carry it out.“25 

96 
A more serious obstacle to interservice harmony was an issue not resolved at 

Key West-control of atomic weapons. One of the oral agreements reached 

there was that the Navy should not be denied the use of these devices. But even 

before the Key West Agreement had obtained final approval, General Spaatz 

stated his claim to exclusive control by the Air Force of all use of these dominant 

weapons by the Military Establishment. On 23 March 1948, he called upon the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend to the Secretary of Defense that the Chief of 

Staff, US Air Force, be designated as the executive agent of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff “for directing and supervising the operational functions of the Armed 

Forces Special Weapons Project.” This organization had been formed early in 

1947 by the Secretaries of War and Navy to assume responsibility for all participation by the armed forces in developing the military uses of atomic energy. As 

organized in March 1948, it was under the direction of all three Service Chiefs. 

This was a situation, General Spaatz maintained, that “could result in the Armed 

Forces Special Weapons Project receiving individual uncoordinated, and even 

conflicting requests and instructions,” a condition inimical to the effective discharge by the Air Force of its assigned responsibilities for the conduct of strategic 

air operations.2h 

General Bradley, on 13 July 1948, informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he 

shared the concern expressed by the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, and concurred 

in his proposal for obtaining control over activities of the Armed Forces Weapons 

Project relating to strategic atomic air operations.27 

Admiral Denfeld, however, objected that the Air Force proposal would deny 

the Navy essential support for atomic operations in support of naval operations. 

He maintained, in addition, that existing command relationships adequately supported strategic air operations by the Air Force.2x 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, meeting on 22 July, were unable to resolve these differences and accordingly agreed to forward the separate Air Force and Navy 

views to the Secretary of Defense. These views, forwarded on 28 July, elicited 

from the Secretary a request for the views of the other members of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Leahy, responding on 7 August, opposed the Air Force 

recommendation on the ground that it would “effectively and probably permanently transfer from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to one of its members, the Chief of 

Staff of the Air Force, complete control of the preparation and use of all atomic 

weapons.. . “ General Bradley, in his reply of 3 August, reiterated his support of 

the Air Force position but in modified form. He now recommended that, pending 

completion of a study of command and control procedures by the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the Armed 

Forces Special Weapons Project be directed to report to General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, who had succeeded General Spaatz as Air Force Chief of Staff, for instructions on atomic aspects of HALF MOON, the current agreed emergency war plan.*” 

At the time Secretary Forrestal received these communications from the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, he had already had occasion to discuss the matter with the three 

97 
tary Forrestal had suggested that the dispute might be settled by assigning the 

atomic bomb to the Air Force on the basis of dominant interest but with rights of 

appeal by the Navy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense, and limiting Navy atomic air sorties to strategic targets assigned by the Air Force and 

targets of purely naval interest.“” 

Secretary Forrestal did not, however, act immediately along these lines. He 

chose instead to seek more information and, to this end, recalled General Spaatz 

and Admiral John H. Towers, former chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, to active 

duty. He directed them to “set down your fundamental concept of strategic warfare as it might have to be waged in the defense of the United States. . I think it 

desirable to do two things: (1) point up the issues involved; (2) recommend the 

decisions which should be made on these issues.“o’ 

The two retired officers were no more successful in resolving the divergence 

of view than their colleagues on active duty had been. In their report to the Secretary of Defense on 18 August Admiral Towers held that operational control of.. . 

(atomic) weapons should not be vested in any one Service,” and General Spaatz 

insisted that control “should be vested in the Chief of Staff of the Air Force acting 

as executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.““* 

Faced with disagreement on the part of his principal military advisers, Secretary Forrestal once again called the Joint Chiefs of Staff into extended session outside Washington. From 20 to 22 August they met at the Naval War College in 

Newport, Rhode Island, and, as at Key West, reached agreement, at least temporarily. In a decision favoring the Air Force, it was agreed that, as an “interim 

measure,” the Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, would report to the 

Chief of Staff, US Air Force. But in line with the Army recommendation, “any 

decision concerning the permanent future organization for the control and direction of atomic operations” would be postponed until the Military Liaison Committee had completed its study. The Navy interest was protected to a degree by a 

supplement to the “Functions Paper ” to the effect that, while each Service “must 

have exclusive responsibility for programming and planning” in the field of its 

primary missions, they must “take into account the contributions which may be 

made by forces from other Services.“31 

The Key West and Newport Agreements resolved some, but by no means all, 

of the interservice differences over their respective functions. But, as will be 

revealed in the ensuing chapters, the severe budgetary stringency imposed by 

President Truman on the Military Establishment served to reopen many of the 

disputes that had supposedly been settled by these agreements. 

98 
6 

The FY 1949 Supplemental Budget: 

Initial Effort to Rearm 

Communist expansionism in the Mediterranean and Czechoslovakia, coming 

on the heels of earlier evidence of Soviet imperialism (such as the reduction of 

Poland and the Balkan countries to the status of satellites), convinced the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff that a substantial degree of rearmament was imperative. Existing 

US military capabilities, they warned during the Berlin crisis, were not adequate 

to support foreign policies. 1 A stronger military establishment seemed clearly 

indicated in view of the aggressive foreign policy being pursued by the USSR. 

But this imbalance between forces and commitments had become evident well 

before the crisis of 1948. In the immediate postwar years, US armed forces, short 

of both men and money, appeared woefully inadequate to protect the national 

interest. The shrinkage of the Army and Navy, which began as soon as World 

War II ended, continued. President Truman, in his budget for FY 1948, had 

sought to arrest the decline; in fact, he proposed a modest increase to an average 

manpower strength of 1,641,OOO in FY 1948, as compared with the 1,566,OOO in 

service on 30 June 1947. Congress, however, had reduced the President’s budget 

request by almost 10 percent, from $9.647 billion to $8.751 billion.2 Manpower 

objectives were accordingly reduced. Even so, however, they proved impossible 

to attain, owing to the expiration of selective service and the failure of Congress 

to enact the President’s Universal Military Training (UMT) program. The Army, 

especially, was hard hit as discharges outran enlistments by a wide margin.” 

The condition of the nation’s armed forces was explained in detail by General 

Gruenther, Director of the Joint Staff, at a White House meeting on 18 February 

1948. He presented the following figures to demonstrate the manpower shortage 

in the Services: 

99 
Army 

Navy 

Marine Corps 

Air Force 

Total 

General Gruenther stressed 

of the Army, which, he forecast, 

He cited the “possible explosive 

and Palestine (the crises over 

seen). He pointed out that the 

560,000 552,0004 

439,000 397,000 

87,000 79,000 

362,000 346,000 

1,448,OOO 1,374,ooo 

particularly the continuing decline in the strength 

would be short 165,000 men by the end of 1948. 

points in the world,” listing Greece, Italy, Korea, 

Czechoslovakia and Berlin being as yet unforeemployment of any force larger than a division 

would necessitate partial mobilization. The Navy’s personnel situation he characterized as “acute,“ resulting in the immobilization of 107 ships, although it was 

anticipated that this situation would improve by 1 July 1948. The condition of the 

Air Force was “satisfactory,” despite a small deficiency in manpower. Indeed, 

that Service had succeeded in increasing its unit strength to 55 groups by January 

1948, as compared with 38 at the end of FY 1947.1 In spite of General Gruenther’s 

presentation, President Truman took no immediate remedial action. 

Resumption of Selective Service 

G eneral Bradley, surveying the condition of the armed forces, proposed to his 

colleagues on 11 March 1948 that they urge the Secretary of Defense to seek 

resumption of selective service as the only way to meet manpower needs in the 

light of the world situation. He pointed out that present military manpower was 

well below the projected strength requirements of current joint war plans. Universal military training, he added, was at best a long-range solution which would 

not provide the necessary manpower in time.” 

General Bradley’s paper was taken up the following day at Key West, where 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense were deliberating on Service 

roles and missions. They agreed that it was now necessary to ask for an immediate resumption of selective service.7 

President Truman accepted the recommendations of Secretary Forrestal and 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on 15 March informed the Secretary of his decision 

to “go all out” for selective service and UMT.X To give his remarks maximum 

impact, the President delivered them before a joint session of the two houses of 

Congress on 17 March. Stating that the United States had learned the “importance of maintaining military strength as a means of preventing war,” he recommended the prompt enactment of UMT as the “only feasible means by which the 

civilian components of our armed forces can be built up if we are to be prepared 

for emergencies,” and as “unmistakable evidence to all the world that our determination is to back the will to peace with the strength for peace.” To restore the 

100 
The President also urged quick action on the European Recovery Program. 

Congress responded with alacrity to the request for the reinstitution of the 

draft. On I2 June 1948, it passed the Selective Service Act of 1948, which President Truman signed into Iaw on 24 June. Far from proving a temporary measure, 

however, the military draft was to remain in effect until 1973, a quarter of a century later.Y 

Proposals for a $3 Billion Supplemental Appropriation 

Besides seeking to reinstitute conscription, the President also decided upon an 

immediate increase in military personnel to a total of 1,734,OOO at a cost of 

$1.5 billion over the budget for FY 1949. The Service Departments indicated that 

they needed much more money, however. The President tentatively agreed to 

preparation of a program of $3 billion.‘” 

The $3 billion proposal represented about a 30 percent increase in the new 

obligational authority the President had originally requested for FY 1949. These 

original figures were Army, $4.660 billion; Navy, $3.668 billion; Air Force, $1.469 

billion; and OSD, $6.395 million, for a total of $9.803 billion. The Air Force figure 

provided only for the salaries of the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Air Force 

and for procurement, maintenance, and operation of aircraft. Remaining Air 

Force fund requests were combined with those of the Army. This funding was 

intended to provide an average personnel strength of 1,423,427, of which 560,000 

had been allocated to the Army, 417,589 to the Navy, 83,548 to the Marine Corps, 

and 362,290 to the Air Force. With this strength, it was planned to maintain IO 

Army and 2 Marine divisions, 55 air groups, and 260 major combatant ships 

including 11 fleet carriers.]’ 

Secretary Forrestal presented the $3 billion supplemental to Congress on 25 

March. Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, he called for “a 

balanced strength in manpower-on the ground, on the sea, in the air.. We 

need,“ he continued, 

a strong air force, capable of striking sustained blows far beyond the peripheral 

bases we now hold.. . We need a ground force to protect our air bases. . . [and] 

to seize and hold more distant bases-should the attack fall upon us-in order to 

take the war to the enemy and not suffer its ravages here in America.. . We 

need a Navy capable of defending.. . sea lanes. . , of developing antisubmarine 

warfare, of insuring the sea transportation of our manpower and our logistical 

supplies.. . to distant oints, and of assisting both attack and defense through 

air-sea power and amp R ibious operations. 

To meet these needs, fhe Secretary pointed out, would require an increase in 

military manpower. He accordingly proposed a program divided into two parts. 

The first part, designed to provide for the immediate need to build up the regular 

101 
Incram by Frm To 

Army 240,000 542,000 782,000 

Navy 63,000 397,000 460,000 

Marine Corps 11,000 81,000 92,000 

Air Force 35,500 364,500 400,000 

Total 349,500 1,384,500 1,734,oo 

To finance these increases, Secretary Forrestal explained, would require $3 billion in additional obligational authority for FY 1949. Of this sum, $775,000,000 

would be allocated to aircraft procurement and research and development for the 

Air Force and Naval aviation. The remainder of the $3 billion would be allotted 

to procurement, support, maintenance, and operations of the three Services. 

The second part of the Secretary’s program was designed to provide adequate 

reserves. It was to be achieved by building up the National Guard and the 

Reserve Corps by means of UMT. He made no request for additional funding, 

pointing out that the initial budget requests for FY 1949 included $500,000,000 to 

establish UMT.12 

On 1 April, President Truman addressed a letter to the Speaker of the House 

of Representatives stating that he had authorized the Secretary of Defense to 

prepare detailed estimates for additional appropriations totalling $3 billion, 

and giving more detail on the allocation of this sum. The President’s breakdown was as follows: lo 

1. Additional military personnel $775,000,000 

2. Aircraft procurement and research 

and development; Air Force 465,000,OOO 

Navy 310,000,000 

3. Maintenance and operation of facilities and equipment 860,000,000 

4. Procurement and production 500,000,000 

5. Research and development other than air, civilian 

components, administration, contingent expenses 90,000,000 

Secretary Forrestal had already requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff on the allocation of the $3 billion. In a memorandum of 30 March, the Secretary requested their recommendations on the “basic principles and assumptions” to guide the Office of Budget of the Secretary of Defense in preparing tentative allocations.14 

With this request, Secretary Forrestal brought the Joint Chiefs of Staff into the 

budgetary process for the first time. Before the passage of the National Security 

Act, the War and Navy Departments had budgeted separately for their own 

needs and without guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The two Departments 

had already submitted their budgets for F’Y 1949 to the Bureau of the Budget at 

102 
for FY 1949. On 3 October 1947, an ad hoc budget committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Wilfred McNeil, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 

and including representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Departments, discussed budget procedure under the newly enacted National Security 

Act, including the question of JCS participation in the preparation of the FY 1949 

budget.‘” General Gruenther proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that their participation be in the form of a presentation before the assembled appropriate congressional committees in support of the separate Service budgets. After some discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided on 19 February 1948 that they would 

participate in that manner, basing their testimony on joint intelligence estimates 

of enemy capabilities, since JCS strategic guidance had not been provided in the 

preparation of the budget.‘” 

The JCS recommendations regarding the extra $3 billion for FY 1949 were 

transmitted on 16 April. In arriving at the requested “basic principles,” they had 

felt it necessary to make them applicable to the total FY 1949budget “in order to 

further the security of the Western Hemisphere and promote the development of 

its warmaking capacity.” The guiding principles, according to the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, should be: to prepare for the implementation of emergency war measures 

through the maintenance of the regular forces in a high state of readiness, to support US foreign policy, to attain superiority in all fields of warfare by means of 

research and development programs, and to prepare for rapid industrial mobilization in the event of war. 

With regard to the allocation of the money, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated 

their understanding that $1.586 billion had already been allocated for aircraft 

procurement and personnel increases. This amount, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

wrote, together with the sums provided by the regular FY 1949 budget, “would 

assist the armed forces in developing an improved state of readiness of their 

present forces.” The balance of the $3 billion, therefore, should be for measures 

essential to effective implementation of emergency war plans, including maintenance of an effective intelligence organization and rehabilitation and maintenance of equipment and bases essential to mobilization. Any funds remaining 

after these needs were met should be devoted to increased research and development and industrial mobilization planning.17 

The 70-Group Air Force 

T he prospect of an expanded military budget kindled hopes within the Services 

and among their congressional backers for achievement of the force structures each considered essential to national security. This development was most 

pronounced in the Air Force and centered on the desire of that Service to attain a 

strength of 70 groups. This was a goal that had its genesis in a study prepared 

103 
The 70-group objective received powerful support early in 1948 from a prestigious civilian panel-the President’s Air Policy Commission. This body was 

appointed by President Truman on 18 July 1947to make an “objective inquiry into 

national aviation policies and problems, ” including “the utilization of aircraft by 

the armed services.” Named as Chairman of the Commission was Thomas K. 

Finletter, a prominent New York attorney, who had served in the Department of 

State briefly during World War II, though he had no background or experience in 

military aviation. Three of the other members, while distinguished in engineering, 

publishing, and finance, were similarly unfamiliar with the subject at hand. Only 

George I’. Baker, a Harvard economist who had been vice-chairman of the Civil 

Aeronautics Board, had any direct experience in aviation. 

The Commission opened its hearings on 8 September 1947 and closed them 

on 3 December. During that period it met more than 200 times and heard about 

150 witnesses, including the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries, the 

members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and leaders of the aircraft industry and the 

scientific community. It also visited the major US aircraft factories and observed 

naval air operations aboard the carrier USS Midway. 

The Commission submitted its report to President Truman on 30 December 

1947. The defense of the United States “must be based on air power,” the Commission concluded, because new aircraft and new weapons which could be delivered by air made possible a devastating attack upon the continental United 

States. A strong, well-equipped modern air force was therefore essential to defeat 

hostile air attack and to deal the aggressor a crushing counteroffensive blow. At 

present, the Commission conceded, potential enemies possessed neither the 

atomic weapons nor the means of delivery to launch a devastating air attack 

upon the United States, but scientific progress was so rapid in these fields that it 

would be imprudent, in the Commission’s opinion, to assume in defense planning that such an attack would not be possible by the end of 1952. By that date, 

the Commission believed that the United States must have in being an Air Force 

consisting of a regular establishment of 70 groups (6,869 frontline aircraft), an Air 

National Guard of 27 groups (3,212 frontline aircraft), an adequately equipped 

34-group Air Reserve, and a replacement reserve of 8,100 aircraft. An adequate 

defense against an enemy possessing atomic bombs and the means to deliver 

them in the United States would also require a Naval air arm consisting of 5,793 

frontline planes, plus about 5,100 in support. 

The buildup of air power must begin at once, the Commission concluded, and 

continue until 1952. Air Force appropriations for FY 1948 and FY 1949 should 

therefore be increased by $1.3 billion each year. Navy appropriations by FY 1948 

should be increased by $192 million and $502 million for FYs 1948 and 1949, 

respectively. Appropriations for later years should be determined by a complete 

review of the Military Establishment, which the Commission recommended take 

place on 1 January 1950. The trend in defense appropriations, unless substantial 

economies could be realized by unification, would result in an $18 billion budget 

for FY 1952, the Commission predicted.‘” 

104 
current intelligence calculations that the US monopoly on atomic weapons would 

last until 1952, was for a regular Air Force of 70 groups and 22 squadrons backed 

up by 27 National Guard and 8% Reserve groups. A total of 20,599 aircraft, 12,441 

in units and 8,158 in reserve, would be required. The Navy during the same 

period would require 14,474 aircraft. Problems of aircraft production, however, 

made it impracticable for the Air Force and Navy to attain the desired strength 

before 1 July 1952. The second estimate, for the period when a potential enemy 

possessed weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them on cities 

of the United States, was highly speculative and therefore should not be published. It was for an Air Force of 104% regular, 28 National Guard, and 34 Reserve 

groups and a total of 43,499 aircraft, plus 17,472 aircraft for the Navy. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, in making these estimates of airpower requirements, stressed the 

need to make parallel expansions of other forces in order to maintain a balanced, 

effective military organization.2” 

The size of the Air Force became an issue during Secretary Forrestal’s testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 25 March on the proposed 

$3 billion increase in the FY 1949 military budget. On that occasion he was asked 

the cost of a defense establishment of balanced military forces including a 70­

group Air Force. Secretary Forrestal replied that the total cost of such a force 

would amount to some $15 to $18 billion over and above the amounts requested 

for FY 1949.2’ 

JCS Appraisal of the Impact of a 70-Group 

Air Force on Force Structure 

U pon his return from Capitol Hill, Secretary Forrestal asked the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff to reexamine their previous position and to address the question of 

“the size of the military establishment that would be required if the ‘/O-group 

program and all of the supporting elements were put into effect.” The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff were to include supporting budgetary estimates and also to recommend whether the administration should now advocate such a pr0grarn.l’ On 

8 April, Mr. Forrestal rephrased his inquiry, indicating the specific questions that 

he wished to have answered as follows:2” 

1. Has re-examination of strategic lans resulted in affirmation of the previous 

plan submitted-namely, 70 groups Por the Air Force and 14,474 planes for the 

Navy-To wit: That parallel ex ansion of other forces is necessary? If not, what 

modifications are recommende 1 ? 

2. If the previous recommendations are affirmed, what is the appropriate size 

of the three Services? 

105 
support, and in what priorities? 

4. Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the request of the Air Force for a 70­

group program, regardless of whether the Army and Navy receive increases? 

5. Is there, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, any necessity for “war 

gaming” the plans presently recommend? 

6. Should the administration, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, advocate the 70-group rogram, and, if so, should such advocacy include or exclude 

increases for the otK er Services? 

Whatever the Joint Chiefs of Staff might recommend, Secretary Forrestal had 

evidently determined that some buildup in air power was urgently needed. On 8 

April, the same day he posed his question to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary proposed to the House Appropriations Committee that all funds for aircraft 

procurement requested in the regular and supplemental budget requests for FY 

1949 be considered as FY 1948 supplemental requests and be made available 

immediately for contract authorization. His purpose was to expedite the expansion of aircraft production. 

In making this proposal, the Secretary pointed out that he was neither for nor 

against a 70-group Air Force. This neutral attitude was not, however, the case in 

Congress, where a bipartisan group headed by Representative Carl Vinson, the 

ranking minority member on the House Armed Services Committee, moved to 

add an additional $922 million for the 70-group Air Force. Secretary Symington 

and General Spaatz testified in its favor before the Committee. In spite of Secretary Forrestal’s urging of an orderly buildup of air power, the House on 15 April 

added $822 million to Forrestal’s aircraft procurement proposal and passed the 

whole by a vote of 343 to 3. But in final form the bill had been softened somewhat through the efforts of Representative John Taber, who had succeeded in 

amending it to stretch out the effective period to two years and to make the 

spending of the money dependent on a Presidential finding as to necessity.24 

The answers to Secretary Forrestal’s questions of 8 April were thus in danger 

of being at least partly overtaken by congressional action when the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff supplied them on 14 April. They were in the form of a report by the Joint 

Strategic Plans Committee given to the Secretary informally to ascertain whether 

the answers supplied all the information required. Secretary Forrestal stated that 

it was his “understanding that this draft represents the unanimous opinion of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff.” The draft, h owever, contained divergent Service views on 

two of the six questions. 

106 
further study demonstrated a need for D-day forces actually in excess of these 

estimated earlier. The procurement of reserve aircraft, however, might be 

deferred. They agreed also that expansion of air power to the stated goals (70 

groups for the Air Force and 14,474aircraft for the Navy) should be matched by a 

parallel expansion of surface forces. 

Regarding the appropriate size of the Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded separate estimates from each Service of its “appropriate size. . within a 

balanced military establishment,” together with cost figures. The Army sought a 

strength of 837,000 with which to support 12 regular divisions, 13 full-strength 

National Guard divisions, and 25 Reserve divisions. The desired personnel 

strength was to be achieved by the end of FY 1950, the regular divisions would 

be ready by the end of FY 1949, and the Reserve and National Guard divisions by 

the end of FY 1952. The Navy sought strengths of 560,400 Naval and 108,200 

Marine personnel by the end of FY 1950, with a fleet of 384 major combat ships, 

including 16 fleet carriers, by the same date. No force structure for the Marine 

Corps was indicated. The Army had prepared its own recommendations regarding the size of the Navy, and proposed a limit of 552,000 for the Navy and Marine 

Corps combined, with active fleet units in keeping with this figure. The Air Force 

desired a personnel strength of 502,000with which to attain 70 groups by the end 

of FY 1953. Budget estimates to attain these force levels called for new obligational authority in the following amounts (millions): 

Army 

Navy 

Air Force 

FY1949 FY 1950 FY 7951 FY 1952 

$6,280 $7,207 $ 7,225 $7,335 

7,579 7,965 7,965 7,965 

5,442 6,553 7,343 7,480 

Total $19,301 $21,725 $22,533 $22,780 

The cost figures for FY 1949 exceeded the President’s original budget by over 

$9 billion, or about three times as much as the supplemental appropriations 

request that had just been sent to Congress. It was therefore necessary to choose 

among Service programs, as Secretary Forrestal had requested in his third question, and indicate those to be supported with the limited funds available. The 

Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that rehabilitation of the aircraft industry and 

increases in the dangerously low personnel strength of the armed forces were 

urgent requirements. The $3 billion supplemental request allocated $1.586 billion 

for these purposes, leaving a balance of $1.414 billion. This amount, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff pointed out, was insufficient to give adequate and balanced support to the increases in personnel and aircraft that the $1.586 billion would provide. To support an Army of 780,000, a Navy-Marine Corps of 552,000, and an 

Air Force of 400,000, as called for in the supplemental budget request, would 

require, by individual Service estimates, the following additional amounts: 

107 
Air Force 906,916,000 

Total $2,665,916,000 

The difference between this sum and the $1.414 billion balance was 

$1,251,916,000, which was the additional amount that would be required over 

and above the $3 billion supplemental. 

In responding to the Secretary’s request for their judgment on the 70-group 

Air Force program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff found themselves unable to reach 

agreement. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force maintained that a 70-group force 

was necessary to bring existing forces into balance. Some buildup of Army support was necessary to meet peacetime requirements, he conceded, and additional 

balanced expansion of all three Services within the limit of available funds was 

desirable after the 70-group goal had been attained. 

The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, on the 

other hand, were only prepared to support the Air Force request for 70 groups 

on condition that the Army and Navy received “commensurate” increases. An 

increase in the Air Force alone, they contended, would leave that Service 

“unable effectively to deploy-or employ-its aircraft against the enemy.” This 

was the case because the limited range of available aircraft made it essential to 

seize and defend advanced operational bases-a task requiring adequate sea 

and ground forces. 

With regard to war gaming of the recommended plans, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff concluded that it was desirable but not practicable because the forces in 

question were peacetime forces that did not entirely fit any existing plan. However, studies already completed demonstrated that, for a war in 1952 or thereafter, “the D-day requirement for forces will be considerably in excess of those 

forces herein proposed .” 

As for the Secretary’s last question, regarding the nature of the military program that should be supported, the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave it as their opinion, 

“based solely on military considerations, ” that “the Administration should advocate a balanced military establishment commensurate with the 70-group program 

for the Air Force.” With regard to the phasing of this program, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff recognized that non-military factors, such as the capability of the aircraft 

industry to expand, the impact on the national economy, and the risks that could 

be accepted in the light of changing world politico-military situations, would 

also have to be taken into account. 

The apparent unanimity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in recommending a “balanced military establishment commensurate with the 70-group program” concealed a disagreement over what constituted “balance.” As the answers to the 

Secretary’s fourth question revealed, the Air Force felt that an increase to 70 air 

groups was necessary to create balanced forces. The Army and Navy, on the 

other hand, believed that the Services were presently in balance and that an 

108 
y p, ggy y, 

did not provide enough advice regarding the disposition of supplemental funds. 

He accordingly asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make specific force recommendations to fit a $3 billion budget supplemental, as well as a hypothetical larger 

one of $5 billion.2h 

On 18 April, Secretary Forrestal learned from General Gruenther that the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff were meeting the next day “to go over the program of each 

Service, seventy-group wise, money-wise and every-wise.” They were going to 

“find out and analyze, criticize and knock the-out of each other’s budgetary programs.” The Secretary determined, as he told Senator Chan Gurney, to “keep their 

nosesin this until I get an answer that has somemeaning to it.. . . because 1do not 

want to go down there [to Congress] with speculative and unfirm answers.“27 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were joined by Secretary Forrestal in their deliberations on 19 April. It quickly became apparent that no agreement could be reached 

on a division of $3 billion. The Secretary then asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff how 

nearly they could reach their objectives with $3.5 billion. On this basis, agreement 

was reached on a program costing $3,481,000,000, which would provide the following personnel strengths by the end of FY 1949: 

Army 790,000 

Navy/Marines 552,000 

Air Force 453,000 

Total 1,795,ooo 

Presidential Decision on the Supplemental Appropriation 

n 21 April President Truman authorized Secretary Forrestal to have the 

Services prepare detailed estimates in support of the $3.481 billion 

program.2HThe approval implied by this action, however, was tentative; the program had still to be reviewed by the Bureau of the Budget. 

Secretary Forrestal discussed the supplemental request with the Director of 

the Bureau, Mr. JamesE. Webb, on 6 May. The Bureau had by then reviewed the 

$3.481 billion program and reduced it to about $3 billion. Mr. Webb saw this 

request as presaging even larger ones in succeeding years, with the result that by 

FY 1952 the defense budget would approximate at least $18.2 billion, or $20 billion if prices continued to rise. The result would be a total Federal budget of $50 

billion, an amount that, in Mr. Webb’s opinion, was wholly unacceptable. He 

accordingly proposed a further reduction in the FY 1949 supplemental request to 

$2.5 billion, and a downward revision in force goals to the point where requests 

for new obligational authority could be held to $15.3 billion in FY 1950 and $15 

billion in subsequent years. 

109 

0 
elements of the Navy program, including procurement of aircraft and antisubmarine warfare components, and making some reduction in Army materiel support. 

Mr. Forrestal was willing to accept the reduction to $3 billion, but he demurred at 

any further cut, because he believed that the next 18 months to 2 years would 

prove a critical period in US-Soviet relations.2y 

The President announced his decision on 13 May, at a meeting of the Secretary 

of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. 

Reading from a memorandum that had been drafted by Mr. McNeil to the President’s and Mr. Webb’s specifications, Mr. Truman forecast that the $3.481 program would require about $15.5 billion in future years. A continuing level of 

about $15 billion, the President stated, was all the economy could stand, and 

unless there was a drastic deterioration in the world situation he did not intend 

to exceed that ceiling. To do so would be to end with a total national budget of 

about $50 billion, an amount that was several billion dollars more than estimated 

income at present tax rates. The result would be a resort to deficit financing, even 

with full employment and prosperity. 

Even the $3 billion supplemental program of the Bureau of the Budget, the 

President said, was more than should be asked of Congress at present. But he 

was prepared to request it on condition that “administratively we do not, in the 

next eight months, create a military structure which would require in excess of 

approximately $15 billion for the next fiscal year. I do not want immediate action 

taken toward the activation of all the units contemplated-and by that I mean 

such things as Army training camps, Naval air stations and air groups.” He was, 

in effect, willing to request the money but unwilling to let the Services spend it. 

In September, the President continued, there would be a review of the military 

program “to see if administratively we should not place a ceiling on our program 

at less than we contemplated in this supplemental.““o 

The President submitted his supplemental request to Congress the same day. 

He asked for $2.434 billion, which, added to the $725 million already requested 

for aircraft procurement on 8 April, totalled $3.159 billion in supplemental funds. 

Total requests for new obligational authority for FY 1949 thus became $12.962 billion (the original $9.803 billion plus the new item of $3.159 billion).?’ 

Congressional Action on FY 1949 Appropriations 

C ongress had already indicated a desire to increase this amount by its action 

in adding to the administration’s aircraft procurement bill. When legislative 

action on the military budget was completed, Congress had provided 

$13,942,102,023 in new obligational authority (including the $822 million 

already approved for aircraft procurement). Of the total, $3,061,307,200 was 

made available in FY 1948. The allocations to the Services were as shown below 

(in billions):“2 

110 
Available 

FY 1949 $.007 4.136 3.989 2.748 10.880 

Total $007 $4.217 $4.924 $4.793 $13.941 

The figure approved by Congress exceeded the President’s request by nearly 

$1 billion and in effect gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff more than they had agreed to 

accept, since the original supplemental figure of $3.48 billion, when added to the 

initial request of $9.8 billion, would have totalled only $13.3 billion. It was, however, less than the amount they believed necessary to support the force levels 

required by existing world conditions. Their search for a larger and more effective (and therefore more costly) military establishment was to continue through 

the preparation of the budgets for FYs 1950 and 1957. 

111 

7 

The FY 1950 Budget: Rearmament 

Falls Short 

Policy Guidance for the Budget 

T he Joint Chiefs of Staff, having failed to attain a level of military forces in 

keeping with national commitments through supplements to the FY 1949 

budget, sought this goal through the regular military budget for FY 1950. President Truman’s decision to limit this budget to $15 billion placed a ceiling on the 

means the Joint Chiefs of Staff could expect to be available for the attainment of 

their goal. However, new procedures were to give them a major voice in determining the size and character of military forces to be provided under this ceiling.’ 

From the outset, it was apparent that fiscal considerations would powerfully 

influence the budget for FY 1950, as they had the supplemental request for FY 

1949 (described in the preceding chapter). On 20 March 1948, while the earlier 

budget was still under consideration, Secretary Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff met with Mr. Webb, of the Bureau of the Budget, to discuss plans for FY 

1950. Secretary Forrestal put forth several preliminary estimates based on various 

manpower strengths. Mr. Webb judged that all would require deficit financing, 

which was contrary to the administration’s current policy. He warned, moreover, 

that requirements for the European Recovery Program were deemed to take priority over any “substantial” military appropriations.2 

The amount of money to be available for defense purposes in FY 1950 was 

announced by the President on 13 May 1948, at the same time that he laid down 

his decision limiting the Services to $3 billion in supplemental funds for FY 1949.? 

Nothing was to be done, he ordered, to create a “military structure” that would 

require more than $15 billion during the coming fiscal year. The President offered 

one concession to the Services, stipulating that the ceiling would be subject to 

review in December. Otherwise, his instructions were firm. Speaking as Commander in Chief, he concluded, he expected his orders “to be carried out wholeheartedly, in good spirit and without mental reservations.“3 

113 
estimated at $600 million. In effect, therefore, the Services were limited to $14.4 

billion in new obligational authority for 1950. The problem for the Services, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense, was to reconcile this predetermined ceiling with requirements based on military estimates. 

The money requests of the National Military Establishment for FY 1950 constituted the first unified military budget ever prepared in the United States. As such 

they raised questions of procedures to be followed and of the responsibilities to 

be discharged by the various elements of the National Military Establishment 

and other elements of the national security machinery. Secretary Forrestal was 

particularly sensitive to the need for orderly budgeting procedures and was 

determined to assign major responsibilities in this field to the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. He had already called upon them for advice on both force structure and 

cost figures during the preparation of the FY 1949 supplemental requests. He had 

also insisted upon agreed recommendations. Both these practices were continued 

during preparation of the budget requests for FY 1950. 

Mr. Forrestal’s view of the military budget process extended beyond the 

National Military Establishment. Sound military plans, he believed, must be 

based on national policy guidance. To obtain this guidance, he addressed a memorandum to the National Security Council on 10 July 1948, pointing out that military planning presupposed determination by the appropriate authorities of 

potential threats to US national security. Such a determination must reflect US 

national objectives and should be based on collateral factors such as the psychological effects of varying degrees of military strength on potential enemies and 

on friends, as well as existing or probable international commitments. On the 

basis of approved objectives, it would be possible to determine the share of 

national resources to be allocated to military purposes and, within the limits of 

resources, the kinds of forces needed. At present, Soviet Russia was the only 

country likely to attack the United States in the next 10 years. Appraisals should 

therefore be made of the following possibilities: aggressive war by the Soviet 

Union; war started by Soviet miscalculation; and communist expansion by political or psychological means. 

In view of these considerations, Secretary Forrestal saw an imperative need 

for a comprehensive statement of national policy, particularly as it related to the 

Soviet Union, to include an evaluation of risks, a statement of objectives, and an 

outline of measures to be taken to achieve them. The preparation of such a statement, in Secretary Forrestal’s opinion, was clearly a function of the National 

Security Council, which, under the National Security Act, was responsible for 

“the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the 

national security.” Since many of the basic issues involved concerned matters 

within the province of the Department of State, Mr. Forrestal suggested that 

State be asked to prepare an initial draft for use as a basis for discussion in the 

National Security Council. 

Secretary Forrestal attached such importance to this project that he wrote a 

letter to President Truman describing it and recommending it be given the high114 
The procedure envisioned by Secretary Forrestal was eminently logical. If followed, it would produce a military establishment closely attuned to national 

needs, as defined by higher authority. But it was not clear how this procedure 

was to be reconciled with the budget limit already laid down by the President-a 

limit based on considerations unrelated to “national security” as usually defined. 

Secretary Forrestal made no mention, in his memorandum to the Council or his 

letter to the President, of this incipient conflict. 

The National Security Council had not been entirely idle in this field prior to 

this time. On 30 March 1948, the Council Staff, acting on its own initiative, had 

produced NSC 7, a paper entitled “The Position of the United States with 

Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism.” Describing the “ultimate objective” of the Soviet Union to be “domination of the world,” the NSC Staff concluded that to frustrate the attainment of this goal was vital to the security of the 

United States. This could not be achieved by a defensive policy. The United 

States, therefore, must take the lead in organizing a worldwide counteroffensive 

to mobilize the free world against the danger of Soviet domination. To this end, 

the United States should take immediate measures at home, including some 

form of compulsory military service, to strengthen its military establistment, to 

maintain superiority in nuclear weapons, and to suppress domestic communists. Abroad, the United States should give general support to anticommunist 

countries, giving first priority to Western Europe, by adopting the European 

Recovery Program, endorsing the Western European Union, and helping to 

increase the military potential of member countries by providing machine tools, 

military equipment, and technical advice. The United States should also be prepared to take military measures in support of the Western European Union and 

other friendly nations in the event of unprovoked armed attack, to support 

underground movements behind the lron Curtain, and to make US determination to resist aggression unmistakably clear so as to avoid accidental war 

through miscalculation6 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom NSC 7 was referred by the Secretary of 

Defense on 1 April, replied that they were in general agreement with the analysis in the paper but wished to stress the importance of attaining sufficient 

armed strength before adopting measures that might result in military action 

against the Soviet Union. To this end, they expressly endorsed the suggestion 

for compulsory military service and called for increased military appropriations. They cautioned in particular against any kind of guarantee for the Western European Union, or message of resolve to the Soviet Union, without sufficient military strength to back them up. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also opposed 

diversion of resources to West European governments or East European 

undergrounds until US needs had been met. At their request, the Secretary of 

Defense forwarded the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the NSC. Action on 

NSC 7 was still pending when it was superseded by the project initiated by 

Mr. Forrestal 

115 
A cting in response to Secretary Forrestal’s request of 10 July 1948, the Department of State forwarded a paper entitled “U.S. Objectives with Respect to 

Russia” to the Council on 18 August. This paper was prepared by the Policy 

Planning Staff, whose Director, Mr. George Kennan, was a leading specialist in 

Soviet affairs. Mr. Kennan’s views on Soviet behavior had already had wide 

influence at high levels of the Truman administration and among the general 

public. In his message of 22 February 1946 from Moscow, Mr. Kennan had offered 

an interpretation of Soviet policy, based on his reading of Russian history, as 

implacably hostile to the Western democracies. To seek a modus vizlcrz~fi with the 

Soviet regime, Mr. Kennan had argued, would prove a chimerical process leading 

not to an end but only to a continuation of political warfare.H 

In a famous article entitled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” that appeared in 

the magazine Foreign Affairs for 1 July 1947 under the pseudonym “X,” Mr. Kennan elaborated these views and outlined his recommendations for a suitable US 

policy. The “political personality” of Soviet power, Mr. Kennan wrote, was a 

product of Marxist ideology combined with circumstances. The situation that followed the Russian revolution, when the communists ruled as a tiny minority 

while beset with civil war and foreign intervention, made the establishment of 

dictatorial power necessary. The effort to consolidate their absolute power, which 

had not been fully realized, absorbed most of the attention of the communist 

rulers. It led them to suppress all opposition at home and to attempt to expand 

beyond Russia’s borders in order to secure their power against the outside world. 

The interrelationship of these forces of ideology and circumstance created a 

mentality dominated by certain concepts. The first was that of innate antagonism 

between capitalism and communism, which meant that the Soviet leaders could 

never assume a community of aims between their country and the capitalist powers. The second was that of the infallibility of the Kremlin; truth was considered to 

reside in the Communist Party and nowhere else. A third was tactical flexibility; 

the Soviet leadership, rather than invariably conforming to communist dogma, felt 

free to advance any particular thesis found useful at a given moment. These three 

concepts together, according to Mr. Kennan, made it impossible for Soviet leaders 

to be swayed by what Westerners regarded as logic; they could only be moved by 

actions. But since they believed that they represented the inevitable force of history, 

they felt no compulsion to accomplish their purposes in a hurry; they were prepared to accept temporary setbacks and to retreat in the face of superior force. 

“In these circumstances,” Mr. Kennan wrote, “it is clear that the main element 

of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, 

patient but firm and vigilant contaimncnt [italics supplied1 of Russian expansive 

tendencies. . .” This would be designed to “confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the 

interest of a peaceful and stable world.” 

The possibilities for US policy were by no means limited to “holdin 7 the line 

and hoping for the best,” Mr. Kennan maintained. The United States, Ple wrote, 

116 
circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to pro

mote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or 

the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.” 

The State Department Policy Planning Staff, in the paper to the National Security Council, elaborated on this last point by proposing specific ways in which 

the United States could reduce Soviet power and induce the Soviet Government 

to change its approach to international relations. The basic objectives of the 

United States with respect to the Soviet Union were two: to reduce the power and 

influence of Moscow so that it no longer constituted a “threat to the peace and 

stability of international society”; and to bring about a “basic change in the theory and practice of international relations” by the Soviet Government. If these 

objectives could be achieved, relations between the United States and the Soviet 

Union would be reduced to “normal dimensions.” 

There were two spheres in which the power and influence of Moscow had 

been projected beyond Soviet borders. One was in the geographically contiguous 

“satellite” states of Eastern Europe, where the presence or proximity of the Red 

Army had been a vital factor in establishing and maintaining Soviet hegemony. 

The other was in countries more geographically distant from the Soviet Union 

where there were groups or parties that looked to Moscow for political guidance 

and gave to it, consciously or otherwise, their basic loyalty. In the second of these 

two spheres, a complete retraction of undue Soviet power should be possible 

without engaging the more vital interests of the Soviet Union. The same was 

largely true in the first sphere, except in cases where the Soviet Union had actually extended its boundaries since 1939. 

The aims of US policy toward the Soviet Union should flow logically from the 

nature of the Soviet threat to the peace and stability of international society. The 

means to achieve these aims would naturally differ in peace and in war. In time 

of peace, the retraction of Soviet power and influence from the satellite states 

would be achieved by placing the “greatest possible strain on the structure of 

relationships by which Soviet domination. . is maintained and gradually, with 

the aid of the natural and legitimate forces of Europe, to maneuver the Russians 

out of their position of primacy and to enable the respective governments to 

regain their independence of action.” The offering of economic aid to the satellite 

countries under the Marshall Plan, thereby forcing the Soviets either to permit 

the satellites to develop ties with the West at the expense of exclusive relations 

with the Soviet Union, or to force them to reject the offered assistance at heavy 

economic sacrifices to themselves, was a case in point. The disaffection of Tito, to 

which the strain caused by the Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan undoubtedly 

contributed, clearly demonstrated that it was possible for stresses in Soviet-satellite relationships to lead to disruption of Soviet domination. 

To bring about the retraction of Soviet power beyond the satellite area was 

primarily a task of enlightenment through effective information policies. This 

was so because the Soviet hold over people in those countries rested for the most 

117 
nomic security. By its very excesses, however, the Soviet system was vulnerable 

to be exposed and discredited. 

The second major objective, namely to change the concepts of international 

relations prevalent in Moscow’s governing circles, could only be achieved over a 

long period, Mr. Kennan believed. To change the basic political psychology of the 

present Soviet leaders was impossible. They could not be swayed by arguments, 

but they could be influenced by a concrete situation in which it was not in the 

Russian interest to emphasize conflict. If this situation could be maintained for a 

long enough period, it might permanently modify the outlook and habits of 

Soviet rulers. 

In taking up the pursuit of US objectives in time of war, the Policy Planning 

Staff first dismissed those considered as infeasible. First, it would not be practical 

to occupy all of the Soviet Union and impose military government over it. Second, and in consequence of the first consideration, the Soviet leaders would 

probably not surrender unconditionally but would seek a compromise peace. 

There was no likelihood, however, that the United States could find an alternate 

Russian leadership that would be “democratic “ in the US sense of the term. Even 

after a successful military conflict, the United States would probably be forced to 

deal, in one degree or another, with a regime of which it did not entirely approve. 

The “possible and desirable” aims in the event of war with Russia, were, 

therefore, the same as the ones to be sought in time of peace. Their attainment 

after military defeat of the Soviet Union, however, would be assured. Communist 

regimes in satellite countries would be overthrown, and Soviet prestige and 

influence abroad would be destroyed.“’ 

The Policy Planning Staff paper went to the NSC Staff, which prepared a draft 

for consideration by the National Security Council. Entitled “U.S. Objectives with 

Respect to the USSR to Counter Threats to U.S. Security” and designated NSC 

20/3, it contained all of the State Department’s objectives and aims in slightly 

reworded form but omitted the supporting rationale. NSC 20/3 also contained 

an analysis of the Soviet threat to the United States which was different in form 

from but not inconsistent with the views in Mr. Kennan’s paper. 

“The will and ability of the leaders of the USSR to pursue policies which 

threaten the security of the United States,” read NSC 20/3, “constitute the greatest single danger to the U.S. within the foreseeable future.” The “will” of the 

Soviet leaders derived from the tenet of communist ideology that the Soviet 

Communist Party as the “militant vanguard of the world proletariat in its rise to 

political power” and the USSR as the “base of the world communist movement” 

would not be safe until the noncommunist nations had been so weakened that 

communist influence was dominant throughout the world. The “ability” rested 

upon a number of bases: the complete centralization of power in the USSR and 

throughout the communist world; the appeal of a “pseudo-scientific ideology 

promising panaceas,” disseminated by modern totalitarian propaganda machinery; the highly effective techniques of subversion, infiltration and capture of 

political power; the intimidating effect of Soviet military power; instability in 

118 
Soviets’ ability to exploit the tolerance accorded communists and their dupes in 

democratic countries. 

There seemed little prospect that any Soviet action short of war could endanger US security, now that political stability had been restored to the countries of 

Western Europe. The Soviet capabilities for threatening the United States by 

armed forces, however, were dangerous and immediate. According to present 

intelligence estimates, Russian military forces had the capability to overrun all of 

continental Europe and the Middle East as far west as Cairo within six months, to 

subject Great Britain to severe air and missile bombardment, to wage serious submarine warfare, and to launch a number of one-way bomber sorties against the 

United States. These capabilities would increase progressively, and by 1955 the 

Soviet Union would be capable of launching “serious” air attacks against the 

United States, employing atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. If the Soviet 

leaders were able to consolidate their control over Western Europe and integrate 

it into the Soviet system, they would have at their command a concentration of 

power that would pose an “unacceptable threat to the security of the United 

States.” However, a rapid conquest of Eurasia would tax Soviet logistic facilities 

and severely strain the Soviet economy. If, at the same time, the Soviet Union was 

engaged in a war with the United States and was subjected to air attack, it might 

not be able to hold the seized territories. 

In spite of these Soviet capabilities, the Soviet Union was not thought to be 

planning any military action that would involve the United States at present. 

War, however, might result from a local incident between Soviet and US forces or 

through a miscalculation by the Soviet Union of US resolve to resist further 

encroachments. In any event, the danger of war was sufficiently great to warrant 

timely and adequate preparation by the United States. 

To counter these threats to US national security posed by the Soviet Union, 

NSC 20/3 adopted the Policy Planning Staff’s objectives and aims in slightly 

modified language. A new note, however, was a caution against over-spending which, as already indicated, had become a matter of serious concern to the 

Truman administration. “In pursuing these objectives,” read NSC 20/3, “due 

care must be taken to avoid permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and institutions of our way of life.” There were two general objectives, to be pursued by the US Government in both peace and war: 

To reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world 

family of nations. 

To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the 

overnment in power in Russia, to conform with the purposes and principles set 

Porth in the UN charter. 

The United States should seek to obtain these objectives “by methods short of 

war,” as follows: 

119 
boundaries and the emergence of t Re satellite countries as entities independent of 

the USSR. 

To encourage the development among the Russian peoples of attitudes which 

may help to modify current Soviet behavior and permit a revival of the national 

life of grou s evidencing the ability and determination to achieve and maintain 

national in Bependence. 

To eradicate the myth b which people remote from Soviet military influence 

are held in a position of su 6”servience to Moscow and to cause the world at lar e 

to see and understand the true nature of the USSR and the Soviet-directed wor Hd 

communist party, and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward them. 

To create situations which will compel the Soviet government to recognize the 

practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the 

necessity of behaving in accordance with precepts of international conduct, as set 

forth in the purposes and principles of the UN charter. 

The attainment of these aims would require action in the military field. The 

passage on this subject furnished the most precise guidance contained in NSC 

20/3 that the National Military Establishment could use for budgetary planning 

purposes. The passage reads as follows: 

Develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, as indispensable support to our political attitude toward the USSR, as a source of encouragement to nations resisting 

Soviet political aggression, and as an ade uate basis for immediate military commitments and for rapid mobilization shou 9 d war prove unavoidable. 

To attain these aims would also require the United States to strengthen its 

economy; to assure internal security against sabotage, subversion, and espionage; to inform the US public fully of the threats to national security; to 

strengthen the orientation of non-Soviet nations towards the United States, and 

help them increase their economic and political stability and military capability. 

The United States should also seek to place the maximum strain on Soviet relations with the satellites. 

In the event of war with the Soviet Union, US objectives should be to eliminate Soviet domination over areas outside the Soviet Union, and to destroy the 

structure of relationships by which Russian communist leaders dominated individuals or groups in countries not under communist control. It should also be an 

objective of policy to deny to any postwar Russian regime military power to 

engage in aggressive war, to prevent the reestablishment of anything resembling 

the present “iron curtain” restrictions on contacts with the outside world, and to 

deny to any surviving communist regime in Russia the capability to fight on 

even terms with any other regime on Russian soil. The United States, finally, 

should create postwar conditions that would prevent the development of power 

relationships dangerous to the security of the United States.” 

120 
in general agreement with it but wished to reiterate the great importance they 

attached to keeping military capabilities in balance with foreign commitments. 

They reminded the Secretary of views they had expressed on 2 November 1948. 

At that time they had said that “current United States commitments involving 

the use or distinctly possible use of armed forces are very greatly in excess of our 

present ability to fulfill them either promptly or effectively.” To this warning, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff now added the view that if adequate armament was deemed 

to be excessive in cost, as warned against in NSC 20/3, it would be “appropriate 

to take very careful account of the dangers inherent in undue disparity between 

our capabilities and our commitments. ” The memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff was circulated to the National Security Council for consideration in connection with NSC 20/3.‘* 

The National Security Council adopted NSC 20/3, after making an editorial 

change, as NSC 20/4 on 23 November; the President approved it on 24 November. Secretary Forrestal now had his comprehensive statement of national policy. 

But he received it too late to be of any value in preparing the National Military 

Establishment budget estimates for FY 1950, which was the purpose for which 

he had requested it. President Truman’s approval of NSC 20/4 came only a 

week before the Secretary of Defense submitted his budget estimates to the 

White House.“’ 

JCS Responsibilities for FY 1950 Budgetary Preparations 

T he Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized the need for participating in the preparation of the budget of the new National Military Establishment almost from its 

inception. The JCS role had been discussed by the ad hoc committee under Mr. 

McNeil that was appointed in October 1947, after the passage of the National 

Security Act. I4 Following a suggestion made during these discussions, General 

Gruenther on 23 October recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they prepare, by 1 January 1948, a strategic concept and outline a strategic war plan to 

serve asthe basisfor the budgets of the Services. These should be presented to the 

Bureau of the Budget about 1 June so that the Bureau’s recommendations for 

appropriations would reflect the requirements of the armed forces. On the recommendation of General Bradley, this proposal was expanded to include a statement 

of military requirements, in order to provide the Services with a firm foundation 

for the preparation of their budget estimates. The statement of requirements was 

to be based on agreed strategic concepts, joint outline war plans, and current 

national security commitments and would include the following: a list of tasks 

and the priority of each; force requirements; and general strategic guidance for the 

development of military installations and bases.Since time was pressing, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff directed that the statement of requirements for FY 1950 be submitted not later than 15 April, and for subsequent years by January. 

121 
and basic military requirements, for his use in apportioning military appropriations. This statement would be revised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if necessary, by 

September and again in January for use by the Secretary of Defense and the military services in defending the budget estimates before the Bureau of the Budget 

and Congress.” 

The orderly procedure adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, designed to tailor the budget requests to previously agreed requirements, might, had it been 

carried out, have introduced some degree of harmony into the budget estimates 

of the National Military Establishment. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not 

complete their estimate of requirements by their self-imposed target date of 15 

April. They did not approve the statement of requirements until 24 July. By that 

time the Services were far advanced in preparation of their own estimates, 

based on unilateral assumptions of strengths, major programs, and operational 

requirements, and in accordance with the normal budget timetable, which had 

begun in April.‘” 

Secretary Forrestal, through informal discussions with the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, was aware of their study of military requirements. On 17 July he addressed 

a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff directing them, as his principal military advisers under Section 211 of the National Security Act, to submit “specific 

recommendations as to the relative readiness of the forces to be maintained during Fiscal Year 1950, i.e., the composition, size, organization and general deployment of the military forces, together with a statement as to the required major 

materiel programs and a statement of the required levels of operations, training, 

maintenance and construction.. . .“ 

All these estimates, the Secretary wrote, were to be “based on military 

requirements alone.” However, as will be recalled, President Truman had already 

on 15 May established a ceiling of $15 billion (or, more precisely, $14.4 billion) on 

military obligations for FY 1950. Mr. Forrestal evidently anticipated that estimates prepared without concern for costs would exceed President Truman’s budgetary limitation, for he directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish priorities 

and prepare revisions in basic plans by which major cost reductions could be 

accomplished if required.17 

The JCS Estimate of Military Requirements 

T he Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their statement of military requirements to 

Secretary Forrestal on 24 July. Time limitations and the absence of planning 

methods applicable to two or more military departments had prevented the 

preparation of a truly integrated joint requirements statement. As a result, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff merely forwarded the unilateral estimates of the Army, Air 

Force, and Navy. A coordinated, jointly prepared budget estimate for all three 

Services would not be possible for FY 1950, they informed the Secretary. Their 

122 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff accompanied their statement of military requirements 

with a supporting appraisal of the world situation in terms of the menacing role 

of the Soviet Union and of the US policies dictated by that menace. This was the 

material that Secretary Forrestal hoped to persuade the National Security Council 

to provide in the form of definitive political guidance. His request, however, had 

not gone to the Council until 10 July, and its response would not be forthcoming 

until 24 November. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, were forced in effect to 

provide their own political guidance. 

The basic fact of international political life, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, was that it was dominated by two irreconcilable great powers-the 

United States and the Soviet Union. The ultimate aim of the latter was to impose 

a communist dictatorship on the world; its immediate aim was to extend or consolidate control over adjacent areas, to seek the establishment of at least friendly, 

if not subservient, governments in states lying immediately beyond the adjacent 

areas. To achieve its goals the Soviet Union would employ all means short of war, 

using political and psychological war in its broadest sense. 

Although, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Soviets intended to 

avoid a major war in the near future, they would strive for the maximum military buildup in the shortest possible 

domination. To this end, they were 

their tactical concepts, and striving 

possessed the capability to overrun 

time in order to further their goal of world 

reorganizing their force structure, revising 

to develop new weapons. Already the Soviets 

Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Far 

East; to launch large-scale air attacks against the United Kingdom; and to harass 

the continental United States by sporadic one-way air attacks. 

To counter these Soviet military capabilities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed 

FY 1950 force levels recommended by the Services to serve as the base for a 

phased buildup (of unspecified size) to be completed by 1952. The resulting 

forces would be capable of meeting the initial requirements of a joint emergency 

war plan and would be adequate to meet existing military commitments in support of US national policies. 

The force requirements stated by the Services for FY 1950 were as follows: 

Army, 12 regular, 34 National Guard, and 25 Reserve divisions; Navy, 993 active 

ships and 1,657 Reserve ships (of which 434 and 508, respectively, would be of 

major combatant types); Marine 

groups. To man these units would 

Army 

Navy 

Marine Corps 

Air Force 

Corps, 2 divisions and 2 air wings; Air Force, 70 

require the following personnel: lH 

Rr%wJc 17lld 

R~~<C$~~~ Nationnl Guard 

947,000 1,137,ooo 

519,196 1,555,ooo 

104,075 165,838 

502,000 140,500 

2,072,271 2,998,338 

123 
Departments: $12 billion for the Army, $10 billion for the Navy, and $8 billion for 

the Air Force.‘” 

This total was mom than twice the $14.4 billion allowed the Services under 

the established ceiling. The President’s oral directive on this subject, laid down 

on 13 May, had in fact been reaffirmed in writing two months later.20 The task 

now was to reduce the Service requirements so as to bring them within the established limit. 

Secretary Forrestal had already discussed this problem with the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. On 23 June 1948 they had agreed to assume responsibility for recommending the allocation of funds under the $14.4 billion ceiling. At his suggestion, each 

Service Chief appointed a senior officer as his full-time budget adviser. The officers named were General Joseph T. McNarney, USAF, Major General George J. 

Richards, USA, and Vice Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN. These officers became 

known collectively as the “McNarney Board” after their senior and most eloquent member.l’ 

Search for a $14.4 Billion Budget: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Fail 

D uring August and September, the newly appointed budget advisers strove 

valiantly to reduce the Service submissions to the President’s ceiling. By 

simply paring the Services’ force structure, they managed to attain a figure of 

$23,600,000,000. Unable to agree to further reduction, they passed the problem up 

to their respective Chiefs.22 In defense of their recommendation for a budget of 

$23.6 billion for FY 1950, the budget advisers pointed out that merely to maintain 

the current readiness level would require $3.6 billion more than in FY 1949: $2.1 

billion additional to finance the long-range aircraft procurement program, and 

$1.5 billion to cover rising operational and support costs. Thus the amount 

required merely to stay even would be $18.6 billion (the $3.6 billion additional 

plus the approximate current cost of $15 billion for all defense programs, including stockpiling). This sum, however, in the opinion of the budget advisers, would 

not buy “minimum necessary readiness.” To attain it would cost an additional $5 

billion, thus bringing the total needed for military purposes to $23.6 billion.22 

The three Service Chiefs, sitting as uniformed heads of their respective Services 

and not as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with their budget advisers to cut the military budget to $15 billion on Saturday, 2 October. The meeting lasted all day and 

most of the night and resumed again on Sunday evening. Also present were Vice 

Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Vice Chief of Naval Operations; Lieutenant General 

Albert C. Wedemeyer, Director of Plans and Operations, Army General Staff; 

Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Air Staff; 

and Major General Alfred M. Gruenther, Director, Joint Staff. 

As a first approach, the group examined what General McNarney called the 

“unescapable overhead/‘-the items that would have to be provided under any 

124 
posal was to reduce the funding of these items as much as possible, then determine the forces that could be supported with the remainder of the $14.4 billion 

allocated for military purposes and the strategy these forces could support. The 

only positive result from the ensuing discussion was agreement to reduce the 

research and development budget from $790 to $550 million. 

The group then turned to an examination of the basic missions under the current emergency war plan. z4 The missions included a strategic air offensive against 

the Soviet Union, the securing of essential sea lines of communications, defense 

of the continental United States, and the meeting of certain political commitments under treaties and World War II agreements to occupy Germany, Austria, 

and Japan. 

As a minimum program for the strategic air offensive, General McNarney 

proposed to limit operations to strikes flown from Iceland and England cmploying six medium bombardment groups, six strategic reconnaissance groups, six 

penetration fighter groups, two strategic air squadrons (to transport bombs), and 

three supporting medium bombardment groups in the United States. In a foreshadowing of what was to become the major controversy in the deliberations on 

the budget, the Navy representatives resisted attempts to reduce the naval forces 

not assigned to maintain the sea lines of communications essential to the support 

of the strategic air offensive. Control of the sea, Admiral Carney maintained, was 

a worldwide problem and could not be subdivided. 

Following inconclusive discussion of various wartime missions, General 

Bradley proposed the deletion of all operations from the Cairo-Suez area from 

the strategic offensive. He based his proposal on two grounds. First, the operations, which involved carrier activities, were budgeted by the Navy at $6.5 billion, an amount that was not feasible under a $14.4 billion budget. Second, naval 

operations in the Eastern Mediterranean were not tenable without a ground 

force, which would have to attain a size of six to eight divisions in the Cairo-Suez 

area by D plus three months to provide adequate defense. Admiral Denfeld 

objected strenuously to General Bradley’s proposal, claiming that carrier operations in the Eastern Mediterranean were essential in order to evacuate American 

nationals from the area and to mount strategic air operations against the Soviet 

Union, thereby forcing the Russians to divide their retaliatory operations and 

making a knock-out blow against the United Kingdom impossible. 

A sharp interservice debate ensued. Admiral Radford questioned the ability 

of the Air Force to deliver the atomic bomb with existing 300-knot aircraft. Admiral Denfeld suggested limiting the Army to forces needed to defend the United 

States and overseas air bases, and General Bradley refused to accept a budget 

allocating more money to the Navy than to the Army. 

The group finally decided to adjourn for lunch and ask the Service planners 

to recommend, when the meeting reconvened at 1430, minimum force requirements, and the costs thereof, for the strategic concept in the emergency war 

plan. In the short time available to them, the planners were unable to recommend any significant cuts in the FLEETWOOD force tabs. They were accord125 
JCS and National Policy 

ingly dismissed, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, their deputies, and advis

resumed their deliberations. 

General Bradley accepted an Army force structure adequate only to carry 

the occupation of Germany and Japan, defend the continental United States, 

provide a minimum mobilization base. This concession made it possible to 

agreement, since the occupation forces in Germany and Japan had not been 

tioned. The major units to be maintained by the Army under this agreement 

shown in the table. There were, in addition, miscellaneous combat and se

units in the mobilization base. 

Defense of the Western Hemisphere 

Divisions 

Infantry 

Airborne 

Regimental 

Anti-aircraft 

Japan-Ryukyus 

Divisions 

Infantry 

Germany 

Divisions 

Infantry 

combat teams 

battalions 

Constabulary (3 armored cavalry regiments) 

Totals 

Divisions 

Regiments/regimental combat teams 

2 

1 

1 

2 

36 

4 

4 

1 

3 

7 

5 

Anti-aircraft battalions 36 

General Vandenberg also showed a willingness to accept substantial re

tions in the Air Force structure, with the result that agreement was qui

reached on the following major units: 

Strategic Offensive 

Groups 

Medium bomber 

Penetration fighter 

Day fighter 

Heavy troop carrier 

Strategic reconnaissance 

Squadrons 

Strategic air support 

Defense of US and Alaska 

Groups 

Fighter 

Troop carrier 

20 

6 

6 

2 

2 

4 

2 

2 

12 

10 

2 

126 
Fighter 

Transport 

Far East 

Groups 

Fighter 

Light bomber 

Transport 

Totals 

Groups 

Independent squadrons 

2 

1 

6 

4 

1 

1 

41 

2 

Admiral Denfeld, however, claimed it was not possible to subdivide Navy 

missions and thus reduce them to the minimum essential wartime tasks. He 

insisted on retaining substantial carrier task forces even though operations in the 

Eastern Mediterranean had been deleted from war plans. The consequence was a 

split resulting in the submission of two Navy force structures as indicated in the 

following table: 

Namy Army-Air Force 

Major Combatant Ships 289 

Fleet Carriers (11) 

Escort Carriers (13) 

Cruisers (19) 

Destroyers/D.Escorts (166) 

Submarines (80) 

Mine Craft 58 

Patrol Vessels 50 

Amphibious Vessels 85 

Auxiliaries 268 

750 

240 

(5) 

(14) 

(171 

(1241 

(80) 

58 

50 

85 

259 

692 

Even the adoption of this austere program would not bring the military budget within President Truman’s ceiling. Costing of the austere force levels by the 

Military Departments produced a total of $16.5 billion for the Navy plan and 

$15.8 billion for the Army-Air Force plan, broken down as follows: 

Army 

Air Force 

Navy 

Arm-Air Forw Navy 

$ 5.1 billion $ 5.1 billion 

5.5 5.5 

5.2 5.9 

$15.8 billion $16.5 billion 

127 
of their inability to recommend a budget within the $14.4 billion ceiling2? 

The Secretary of Defense Takes a Hand 

Secretary Forrestal, accompanied by Secretaries Royall, Sullivan, and Symington, met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their budget advisers and deputies 

on 4 October. General Gruenther opened the meeting with a presentation of the 

program developed by the military officers the previous day, As part of this presentation, Admiral Denfeld gave a spirited defense of the Navy position. Reading from a prepared statement, he attacked the Army-Air Force program for the 

Navy as a “basic departure” from the strategic concept approved by the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and used as the basis for US plans and for planning talks with the 

Canadians and British. It would abandon the Mediterranean and offered no 

direct assistance to Western Europe.2” 

Admiral Denfeld did not limit his presentation to a critique of Army and Air 

Force proposals for the Navy. He also questioned the competence of the Air 

Force to proceed in the strategic offensive. The “unpleasant fact remains,” he 

said, “that the Navy has honest and sincere misgivings as to the ability of the 

Air Force successfully to deliver the [atomic] weapon by means of unescorted 

missions flown by present-day bombers, deep into enemy territory in the face of 

strong Soviet air defenses, and to drop it on targets whose locations are not 

accurately known.” It was therefore unsound, Admiral Denfeld maintained, to 

demobilize the existing Navy carrier force, which, from stations in the Mediterranean, could launch air strikes against the lines of communications of Soviet 

forces invading Western Europe.27 

Secretary Forrestal responded to this statement by pointing out that it was not 

a question of scrapping the JCS concept of war because the issue to be resolved 

was not how to prepare to win a war in the immediate future, but what military 

forces could be supported under the $14.4 billion ceiling. 

Fleet Admiral Leahy, who had not attended the previous day’s session (since 

it had been a meeting of the Service Chiefs and not of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), 

proposed an alternative approach. What would be the objection, he asked, to 

telling the Services to cut their estimates by whatever percentage was necessary 

to reduce the whole National Military Establishment budget request to the 

imposed ceiling. 7 “Instead of inventing a whole new concept of war,” he said, 

“we tell the Military Services, ‘This is all the money you can have. Do the best 

you can with it.‘” Admiral Leahy’s approach was not favored by the other conferees and was not pursued. Arguments against it were expressed by General 

Bradley, who pointed out first that there was no agreement among the Services 

on the proposed division of $23.6 billion. To impose a percentage cut would 

merely foster disagreement. The proper approach, he maintained, was to determine the priority of missions. Secretary Royal1 expressed a similar point of view 

128 
After an extended but inconclusive discussion, Secretary Forrestal directed 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend the allocation of $14.4 billion among the 

Services, indicating clearly the consequences in terms of national defense, and 

then to recommend the forces that they considered necessary for national security, with an estimate of their cost. If he was convinced that $14.4 billion was 

inadequate, he said, he would recommend a higher figure to the President.2x 

On 5 October, Secretary Forrestal reported progress to date on the military 

budget to President Truman. The Secretary of Defense explained that a budget 

limited to $14 billion, which he would submit, wouId limit operations in war to 

retaliatory air strikes from basesin England. Action in the Mediterranean would 

not be possible. He also planned, the Secretary of Defense said, to submit a budget 

predicated also on holding lines of communications in the Mediterranean, which 

would probably be on the order of $18.5 billion. The President said he wished the 

second budget held in reserve because its presentation would be interpreted as a 

step toward preparation for war. Additional estimates, the President said, could 

take the form of supplementals, to be presented if and when conditions became 

more dangerous. Secretary of State Marshall, the President added, was being 

recalled to Washington from Europe to review the international situation.“’ 

Admiral Leahy convened the Joint Chiefs of Staff the same day to carry out 

Secretary Forrestal’s directive to distribute the allotted $14.4 billion among the 

Services. Like Secretary Forrestal, he had talked to the President that day, and 

had been told that that amount was “all we are going to get.” He opened the 

meeting by repeating the proposal he had made in the meeting with Secretary 

Forrestal: “Why would it not be advisable. to just distribute the money among 

the Services?” General Bradley readily agreed that this would be relatively easy 

“If we just come up and mathematically divide without considering all the 

forces-anybody could divide it by three.” But to do so would be irresponsible. 

“I think it is up to us,“ he said, “to make a recommendation to the Secretary of 

Defense of the [division of] the 14.4 based on what we consider the relative 

importance of the three Services in fighting the war against Russia.” General 

Vandenberg and Admiral Denfeld evidently agreed with their Army colleague, 

for the simple three-way division of available funds ceased to be a topic of discussion. Instead, the focus turned to ways of achieving further economies while 

still retaining the capability to carry out the minimum war plan previously 

agreed. At one point the Budgetary Assistants joined the meeting, but they had 

no acceptable solutions to offer. Finally, after several hours of fruitless discussion, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave up their attempt to reach agreement and forwarded 

split views to the Secretary of Defense. 

Admiral Leahy, General Bradley, and General Vandenberg recommended an 

allocation of $4.9 billion for the Army, $4.4 billion for the Navy, and $5.1 billion 

for the Air Force. Admiral Denfeld objected to this division pending examination 

of the details of its effect on the Navy. In submitting these recommendations, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff also reiterated their view that a budget of $14.4 billion was 

“insufficient to implement national policy in any probable war situation that can 

129 
Although they were unable to reach a meeting of the minds on allocation of 

$14.4 billion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did agree to cost out a strategy with a 

Mediterranean operation conducted as far east as possible under a ceiling of 

$17.5 billion for the total plan3” 

Replying the same day, the Secretary of Defense called upon the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff to make further efforts to reach agreement. “I want to have it clearly 

established in your minds,” he wrote, “that I am expecting a definitive recommendation from you, as an entity, as to the division of funds in the 1949-50 budget-specifically, as to the allocations to the respective services, under a ceiling of 

fourteen billion four million dollars.” This must be done, the Secretary said, 

“before we talk of any larger amount.“?’ 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff tried and failed again to carry out Mr. Forrestal’s 

instructions on 7 October. As a result, they forwarded separate views, as follows 

(figures in billions): 

CSA-CSAF CNO 

Army $4.9 $4.9 

Navy 4.4 4.9 

Air Force 5.1 4.6 

$14.4 $14.4 

In defense of his position, Admiral Denfeld said that he considered the division 

of funds recommended by the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff to be “unacceptable to the Navy as it will not keep a balanced Navy nor one in an acceptable 

state of readiness in the event of an emergency.” General Bradley supported the 

Army position by rejecting the Navy plan to place a fleet in the Mediterranean 

without ground forces to hold bases. Without this mission, he held that the 

increase in Navy funds recommended by the Chief of Naval Operations could 

not be justified. General Vandenberg made no comment on the Navy position.“* 

Secretary Forrestal’s reaction was that the budgetary efforts of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff had “degenerated into a competition for dollars.” He directed them to try 

again to agree to a $14.4 billion dollar budget. His examination of the data in earlier presentations, he said, indicated that it might be possible to support larger 

forces under the President’s budget ceiling than the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought 

possible. He therefore proposed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider force levels 

higher than those used as the basis for their presentation of 7 October but not as 

high as those that were the basis for the $23.6 billion budget-levels that could be 

supported by a figure in the “general area” of $14.4 billion, though not necessarily that exact amount.“” 

The failure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree on force levels could not be 

allowed to bring the budget process to a halt. Secretary Forrestal accordingly 

directed the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to prepare preliminary 

“project estimates,” using staffing, maintenance, and operations rates not in 

excess of the FY 1949 level .04 

130 
T he Joint Chiefs of Staff, meanwhile, turned their attention to their agreement 

of 5 October to develop a strategy that would be feasible under a ceiling of 

$17.5 billion (or $16.9 billion when allowance was made for the cost of the stockpile). On 14 October they instructed General McNarney, Admiral Carney, and 

General Richards to develop force requirements for such an alternative plan. As 

guidance, they approved a twofold strategic concept. The first part called for the 

following actions: maintain security of the Western Hemisphere and of vital lines 

of communications; defend the main Japanese islands; secure sources of vital raw 

materials; conduct a strategic air offensive employing both conventional and 

atomic weapons from the United Kingdom, Iceland, and Okinawa; and seize 

defensible and logistically supportable bases in the Mediterranean (possibly as far 

east as Tunisia) from which to launch initial air operations. The second part of the 

strategic concept called for fulfilling political commitments, maintaining appropriate bases in Alaska and Okinawa, and maintaining the mobilization base.T’5 

At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 October, Secretary Forrestal 

approved the development of an intermediate budget between the President’s 

$14.4 billion and the $23.6 billion of the budget advisers. Such a budget could 

hardly provide forces adequate to defeat Russia, but it should yield a “possible 

force that could jump off if war came.” The Secretary emphasized the importance 

of JCS agreement on an intermediate budget of this nature because it would have a 

tremendous effect for the country and a tremendous gain in stature for the 

JCS. . . 1 think it is vitally important that the concept of the JCS not lose face in 

the country. I think it is a dangerous thing for the country if it does. You confess 

to some extent a confession of inability to get away from Service interests and 

look at the whole business in the light of what the national interest is.sh 

The intermediate budget had not been completed when Secretary Forrestal, on 

29 October, wrote the Joint Chiefs of Staff to tell them that the “time has now come 

to announce a definite schedule for resolution of the 1950 budget problem.” Not 

later than 8 November, the Secretary wrote, he wanted a “written statement. . . making agreed recommendations for allocation of both forces and funds within the fiscal limitations of $14.4 billion, or stating, if necessary, that you cannot reach an 

agreed recommendation. In either case,” Mr. Forrestal continued, “I will make and 

announce to the Services the allocation on November 9.” By 14 November, the Secretary directed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were to recommend the additional allocation 

of forces and funds that should be made to the Services under a budget ceiling of 

$16.9 billion, accompanied by a statement of the resulting increases in capabilities 

and changes in strategy made possible by the higher figure. If agreement could not 

be reached, the Secretary wanted individual recommendations. In either case, he 

would announce the allocation of funds not later than 17 November.“7 

Mr. Forrestal’s persistence finally paid off. On 8 November the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff forwarded agreed recommendations on the allocation of $14.4 billion to the 

Services, as follows: 

131 
Air Force 5.0 

$14.4 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were still unable to agree on the number of fleet carriers and carrier task groups to bc included in the Navy force requirements. General Bradley advocated a single group of six ships, on the basis of careful evaluation in the light of possible enemy capabilities and US joint strategic plans. To 

provide a larger number, he maintained, would unbalance the overall force, giving the Navy a capability to conduct operations in which the other two Services 

could not participate. General Vandenberg maintained that the Navy should be 

allowed one task group of only four carriers. A balanced force capable of sustained operations in the Mediterranean, the mission for which additional carriers 

were intended, was not attainable with a budget limited to $14.4 billion, he 

believed, and there was therefore no point in providing more than four ships. 

Admiral Denfeld, in arguing for nine ships organized in two task groups, maintained that Naval forces should be the best attainable without regard to any particular area of operations. A force of nine 

ance with the other Services. 

The force structure to be supported by 

Artny 

Divisions 

RCT 

Cavalry Regiment 

Artillery Battalions 

AA Battalions 

Tank Battalions 

Engineer Battalions 

Chemical Mortar Battalions 

Navy 

Combatant Ships 

Fleet Carriers 

Light Carriers 

Escort Carriers 

Cruisers 

Destroyers-Destroyer Escorts 

Submarines 

Other Ships 

Mine and Patrol Craft 

Amphibious vessels 

Auxiliaries 

Total 

132 

carriers, he insisted, was not out of bal­

$14.4 billion was as follows: 

10 

10 

35 

4 

6 

282 

(9 Navy, 6 Army, 4 Air Force) 

( 4) 

( 7) 

( 18) 

(164) 

( 80) 

443 

( 99) 

( 84) 

(260) 

725 
Strategic Reconnaissance Groups 

Light Bomb Groups 

Fighter Groups 

Tactical Reconnaissance Groups 

Medium Troop Carrier Groups 

Heavy Troop Carrier Groups 

Emergency Rescue Squadrons 

Strategic Support Squadrons 

6 

1 

20% 

% 

2 

4 

48 groups 

8 

2 -

10 squadrons 

Personnel strengths to be supported by $14.4 billion, expressed in man-years, 

were as follows: 

Army 677,000 

Navy (including Marines) 526,880 

Air Force 412,273 

1,616,153 

In making these recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff once again expressed their unhappiness with the $14.4 billion ceiling. It 

was, they reiterated, “insufficient to implement national policy in any probable 

war situation that can be foreseen.““” 

Secretary Forrestal approved these recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff on 9 November. And true to his word to resolve any remaining differences, 

the Secretary ruled that the Navy would be authorized two task groups of eight 

carriers. This was a compromise decision that was closer to the views of the 

Navy than of the Army or Air Force.‘” 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded to the second part of Mr. Forrestal’s directive on 15 November, when they forwarded to him their recommendations for 

allocation of $16.9 billion: 

Army $5.575 billion 

Navy 5.375 

Air Force 5.950 

With these funds, it would be possible to maintain forces consisting of 12 Army divisions, 319 combatant ships (including 10 fleet carriers), and 59 Air Force groups. Personnel strengths under the higher budget ceiling would be, in man-years, as follows: 

Army 800,000 

Navy 580,000 

Air Force 460,000 

1,840,000 

133 
Chiefs of Staff were still unsatisfied. The additional financing, they said, “does not 

provide the balanced forces considered necessary.. to assure adequately the 

national security in the current international situation.““” Mr. Forrestal approved 

these recommendations on 17 November, on the understanding that the cost estimates were valid and the programs could be carried out within the recommended allocation of funds.4’ 

Recommendations of the Secretary of Defense 

Secretary Forrestal now had in hand the advice he had sought from the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. But before submitting his budget recommendations to the President and the Bureau of the Budget, he sought the views of Secretary of State Marshall on-the current world situation. A previous attempt, at a meeting on 10 October, had been disappointing. Secretary Marshall had stressed the importance of 

furnishing military equipment to Western European nations. When Mr. Forrestal 

explained that he wanted to be able to submit a budget to the President stating 

the military needs of the country in the light of the current international situation, Mr. Marshall replied only that care must be taken to conserve US manpower 

and to take advantage of Western Europe’s military potential. On 31 October, Mr. 

Forrestal wrote the Secretary of State, described the military budget situation, 

and asked three questions as follows: 

1. Had the international situation improved sufficiently in the past year to 

warrant a substantial reduction in military forces planned for the end of the current fiscal year? 

2. Had the situation worsened so that there should be an augmentation of the 

planned forces? 

3. Or was the situation about the same? 

Replying on 8 November, Mr. Marshall said that “we must expect for the current 

fiscal year a situation which is neither better nor worse than that which we have 

faced in 1948 insofar as it affects the ceiling of our military establishment.“:! 

On 1 December, Mr. Forrestal sought more precise political guidance from the 

State Department, related to a specific dollar figure. In response to a telephone 

call from Under Secretary of the Army William H. Draper, Jr., Acting Secretary of 

State Robert Lovett approved inclusion in the budget recommendations of a 

statement to the effect that forces supportable by $16.9 billion would “provide a 

military posture and state of readiness better calculated.. . to instill the necessary 

confidence in democratic nations everywhere than would the reduced forces in a 

more limited budget.” 41 

134 
military budget of $16.9 billion for FY 1950. On 1 December, he submitted a rec

ommendation to this effect to President Truman, explaining that it represented a 

compromise between the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Forrestal reminded the President, did not believe 

they could safeguard the national security with the forces that could be maintained by the President’s figure of $14.4 billion. The recommended compromise 

was justified in terms of “existing international conditions,. . . the impact of rising prices on the Military Establishment, . . . the fiscal impact of national security 

requirements, and the effect of such requirements on scarce materials and civilian production. .I‘ The Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed on the division of $16.9 

billion among the Services and on the forces each Service would maintain with 

its share of the funds. They did not believe that the $16.9 billion would provide 

the strength necessary for national defense under present international conditions. But Mr. Forrestal stated that he could not “conscientiously recommend a 

budget larger than $16.9 billion, unless the international situation should 

become more serious.“44 

President Truman’s FY 1950 Military Budget 

n 9 December, Secretary Forrestal, the Service Secretaries, and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff briefed President Truman on the three alternative budgets 

and their effects on military capabilities. The President listened politely but was 

noncommittal. At the end of the short meeting (which lasted less than an hour), 

the $14.4 billion limit still stood. Indeed, the President gave no indication that he 

considered a decision necessary; his only comment on the presentation was that 

it was “very interesting.” No doubt he regarded the size of the budget as having 

long since been settled.4” 

The President’s commitment to the ceiling became apparent when he submitted his FY 1950 budget to Congress on 10 January 1949. His request for new obligational authority was in fact slightly below the ceiling. He asked for $13.399 billion for the three Service Departments: $4.498 billion for the Army, $4.347 for the 

Navy, and $4.554 for the Air Force. This sum, added to $830 million for contingent items to be distributed later among the Services and $11 million for OSD, 

brought the total to $14.240 billion. Reductions in the original $14.4 figure (made 

by the Bureau of the Budget) consisted primarily of $173 million deducted from 

the Navy’s shipbuilding funds, with the remainder distributed among various 

supporting and operating programs. In spite of these reductions, the President 

proposed the same military personnel levels and force structure that, according 

to Mr. Forrestal’s letter of 1 December, could be supported under a $14.4 billion 

budget. These figures were identical to the ones proposed by the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff on 8 November.4h 

135 

0 
T he Joint Chiefs of Staff, in appearances before congressional committees, 

were not unanimous in supporting the President’s budget. They expressed 

views ranging from positive agreement, through lukewarm endorsement as the 

best figure attainable, to outright disagreement. General Bradley testified that he 

was aware that the country “cannot afford to maintain over a long period of time 

the force that can assure a quick victory. However, we can afford, and must 

afford, sufficient forces in being, including the mobilization base and necessary 

reinforcements, to avert disaster in the event we are attacked.” In this context, he 

supported the President’s budget as “a very carefully thought out one, and one 

which did provide balanced forces which would avert disaster in case of an 

emergency. ” Admiral Denfeld was less positive. He refrained from endorsing it 

as providing adequate defense and stated merely that “the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

felt that that was the best division of the funds that we could agree on.. . .” General Vandenberg “heartily” subscribed to a statement by the Secretary of the Air 

Force that about $15 billion would buy an adequate defense if the Air Force were 

given a larger share than that allowed under the budget. Under questioning, 

General Vandenberg stated that the Air Force would require an additional $2 billion if it was to provide “the minimum defense forces, as far as the Air Force is 

concerned,” namely a 70-group Air Force.47 

After extended debate, Congress, on 18 October 1949, made appropriations 

which resulted in new obligational authority of $13.912 billion to the Services 

for military purposes-some $500 million more than the President had requested. 

As indicated in the table, the sums allocated to the Army and Navy were 

reduced, while those for the Air Force were significantly increased: 

Army 

Navy 

Air Force 

OSD and Undistributed 

Prcsidznt's Rcqwst 

$ 4.498 billion 

4.347 

4.554 

.841 

Corf<yrwiorfal 

Apppriatiorr 

$ 4.420 billion 

4.183 

5.309 

$14.240 $13.912 

The addition to Air Force appropriations originated in the House and was 

intended to add an additional nine groups to Air Force strength. The President, 

however, refused to spend the entire sum and placed $735.7 million “in reserve.“4X 

The funds made available would not support the minimum forces recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet national security requirements. Once 

again, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had failed to obtain the money needed to reach 

what they regarded as a necessary level of military preparedness. Their failure 

was, of course, attributable to policy choices dictated by considerations far 

beyond their control. President Truman was aware that foreign policy commitments required sound military support. But the cost of the forces deemed necessary for that purpose by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would have thrown the national 

136 
President Truman overruled his military advisers and accepted the calculated 

risk inherent in smaller military forces. His decision was implicitly endorsed by 

Congress, which sought to alter the administration’s approved balance of forces 

but not to increase the total resources devoted to military security. 

137 

8 

The FY 1951 Military Budget: 

Rearmament Is Cut Back 

Initial Steps 

From the outset of the budget cycle for 

Chiefs of Staff that chances for attaining 

ness than in FY 1950 were extremely slim. 

Congress on 10 January 1949 presenting 

1950, said: 

I am convinced that we should plan our 

FY 1951, it was apparent to the Joint 

a higher level of military preparedPresident Truman, in his message to 

his budget recommendations for FY 

militar structure at this time so as to 

insure a balanced military ro ram in the foreseea I?le future at approximately the 

level recommended in this Kc? u get.’ 

In keeping with this view, the President indicated that the appropriation 

request for 1951 would not exceed the $15 billion allowed for FY 1950. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff were informed of this decision on 24 January in a meeting with 

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, former Chief of Staff, US Army, and 

World War II commander in Western Europe. General Eisenhower had retired 

and had become President of Columbia University, but he had been summoned 

from retirement to act as special adviser to President Truman and as presiding 

officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Forrestal hoped that the General 

would be able to guide the Joint Chiefs of Staff toward a settlement of the numerous issues that had divided them. 

General Eisenhower’s most important task, as he recalled it, was “to relate the 

strengths of our forces to the probable situations we might encounter in a war, 

and out of that to develop a budget that would be presented for fiscal year 1951.“ 

At the meeting on 24 January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that they would 

make no effort to submit a budget in excess of the President’s ceiling, based 

purely on military requirements, as they had attempted for FY 1950.2 

139 
who had given the Joint Chiefs of Staff a key role the previous year, proposed to 

continue this arrangement. To this end, he wrote them on 6 December 1948, giving them responsibility for “the early development of specific recommendations 

as to the composition, size, organization and general deployment of military 

forces, together with a determination of the major related materiel programs, the 

required levels of operations, training, maintenance, construction, etc.” To aid 

them in this task, the Secretary suggested that they consider appointing a committee of senior advisers, comparable to those appointed in connection with the 

FY 1950 budget, but responsible collectively to the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather 

than individually to the Chiefs of the Services.’ 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that the budgetary responsibilities assigned by 

the Secretary had such “far-reaching implications” that they should not be delegated to subordinate advisers. Replying to Secretary Forrestal on 5 January 1949, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that they themselves planned to devote the necessary time to “determine the forces and related budgetary allocations with 

respect to over-all requirements and to stipulated National Military Establishment budget ceilings.” The role of the Special Budgetary Assistants, they said, 

would be simply to recommend procedures to be followed in preparing Service 

budgets for FY 1951 .4 

Despite this latter statement, the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves spent a considerable time in discussion of procedural matters during January and February. 

They agreed on the need for realistic war plans as the basis for the budget and 

directed the preparation of a short-range plan based on the forces provided by 

the FY 1950 budget. However, the plan, entitled OFFTACKLE, was not finally 

approved until 8 December 1949, far too late to be of any value in the FY 1951 

budget cycle.5 The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed also on the desirability of a phased 

time schedule to guide budgetary planning (replacing the one they had approved 

earlier in connection with FY 1950).” However, they could not agree on the details 

and, on 3 March, referred the matter to their newly appointed Budget Advisory 

Committee, which consisted of Vice Admiral Robert B. Carney, Major General 

William H. Arnold, USA, and Lieutenant General Edwin H. Rawlings, USAF. The 

whole question was overtaken when General Eisenhower, on 28 February, initiated his own procedures for developing the military budget.7 

Most of the subsequent activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the FY 1951 

military budget were to be under the guidance of a new Secretary of Defense, 

Louis Johnson, who replaced Secretary Forrestal on 28 March. Mr. Johnson was a 

West Virginia lawyer, a past National Commander of the American Legion 

(1932-19331, former Assistant Secretary of War (1937-1940), and an active member of the Democratic Party who had earned President Truman’s gratitude 

through his services during the 1948 election campaign. 

General Eisenhower’s first action in connection with the budget was to direct 

each Service Chief to prepare a rough outline of the forces and deployments 

required by his Service to support the “concept agreed upon at the most recent 

140 
thought could be attained under existing budgetary realities. They also proved 

difficult to correlate because of the differing assumptions and procedures 

employed by the Services in preparing them. After extensive discussion, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff agreed that the Operations Deputies, assisted by their respective 

planners, would prepare a presentation that would show the force requirements 

for the individual Services, area by area, to accomplish each task, with the tasks 

arranged in order of priority. It was also expected that the Operations Deputies 

would “mesh [the] capabilities of one Service into those of another.“” 

At this stage of discussion, the Services were far apart. The divergence was 

attested by estimates prepared by each Service of its own needs and of those of 

the other Services. While there was general agreement on the order of magnitude 

of Army and Air Force requirements, those of the Navy were the subject of fundamental disagreement. 

The estimates of Army needs varied by only % division, 1 independent regiment and 4 antiaircraft battalions, as shown in the table: 

Divisions 

Independent regiments 

AAA Battalions 

Amy/Air Forcr Non!/ 

11 10% 

12 11 

56 52 

Divergences over Air Force requirements were somewhat greater and showed 

a three-way split, but even under the Navy estimate, which was the lowest, the 

Air Force still retained substantial striking power. The estimates were as follows 

(by Air Forw Arrrry Nay 

Heavy bomber 4 4 4 

Medium bomber 16 12 9 

Fighter and fighter/bomber 30 30 22 

Other 21 21 13 

71 67 48 

groups): 

The Army and Air Force estimates of Navy requirements, however, struck a 

devastating blow at the Navy’s offensive capabilities. Both Services proposed to 

eliminate all Marine Corps air units. The Air Force would also do away with all 

the fleet carriers, while the Army would leave only four of these ships on the 

active list. The following table illustrates these proposals: lo 

Navy hII!/ Air Fww 

Fleet carriers (CV-CVB) 10 4 0 

Light and escort carriers 12 12 12 

Other major combatant ships 333 269 254 

Marine air squadrons 7% 0 0 

Marine Battalion Landing Teams 11 6 6 

141 
G eneral Eisenhower then devised the so-called “Red Bricks System” in an 

effort to reconcile the Service differences. Service estimates were prepared 

and the lowest estimate in each force category was selected. The Air Force was 

thus tentatively assigned 48 groups; the Army, 10% divisions, 11 independent regiments, and 52 antiaircraft battalions; and the Navy, 253 major combatant ships, 

but no large aircraft carriers.” 

As could be expected, Admiral Denfeld took strong exception to “Red Bricks.” At 

a JCS meeting on 5 May, he pointed out it would result in the entire elimination of 

fleet carriers and Marine aviation, 50 percent of the cruiser force, and 45 percent of 

the Fleet Marine Force. These deletions would create an unbalanced force incapable 

of carrying out functions prescribed in the Key West and Newport Agreements and 

would eliminate forces provided by the National Security Act. This situation had 

come about, the Chief of Naval Operations believed, because the “Red Bricks” system did not accord sufficient weight to the views of a Service Chief. He recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff rectify this situation by requiring written justification for any changes proposed by a Service Chief in another Service. With regard to 

the specific issues, Admiral Denfeld recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

immediately determine the number of attack carriers and Marine battalion landing 

teams and air squadrons, or else refer these questions to the Secretary of Defense.12 

At the meeting on 5 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed Admiral Denfeld’s 

views but were unable to resolve any of the issues he had raised. They agreed, 

however, to price the “Red Brick” forces. Estimates were then prepared by the 

Services, but they totalled substantially more than the ceiling amount the President had indicated he would accept. “Red Bricks” was consequently abandoned.17 

The Four Estimates 

G eneral Eisenhower then adopted a new approach. I le directed the Services to 

prepare force tabs under several dollar ceilings. To the Air Force he assigned 

four ceilings: $6 billion; $5.8 billion; $5.7 billion; and $5.6 billion. To the Army and 

Navy he assigned three ceilings but specified that one of these be submitted showing two variations: one with major units determined by the Service Chief; the other 

with major units as designated by General Eisenhower. For the Army, these figures 

were $4.8 billion, $4.4 billion, $4.6 billion and a force level of 10 divisions, and $4.6 

billion with unspecified force levels. For the Navy, the figures were $4 billion, $4.4 

billion, $4.2 billion limited to 5 fleet carriers, and $4.2 billion without limitation. 

I 2 .3 4 

Groups 61 58 55 57 

Personnel 463,500 463,500 463,500 463,500 

$ billions 6.0 5.8 5.6 5.7 

The Air Force, responding on 21 May, submitted the following estimates: 

142 
called for by the Joint Chiefs of Staff could be carried out. Under Number 3, air 

defense forces in Great Britain would be so curtailed as to risk the loss of the 

island as a base for operations.14 

The Army, responding on the 23d, submitted the following estimates but 

without evaluation:‘” 

Divisions 

Personnel 

$ billions 

1 2 3 4 

10% 9% 8% 9% 

677,000 635,000 600,000 600,000 

4.8 4.6 4.4 

The Navy estimates, submitted on the same day, provided the following: 

1 2 3 4 

Major combatant ships 283 288 288 295 

(CV-CVB) (8) (8) (8) (5) 

Personnel 488,729 513,682 513,682 502,338 

$ billions 4.0 4.2 4.4 

None of these estimates, in the opinion of the Chief of Naval Operations, was 

adequate to permit the Navy to carry out its assigned missions. Number 4, which 

provided only five fleet carriers, would make it impossible for the Navy to carry 

out certain of its essential D-day tasks or to provide close air support for 

amphibious operations during the first six months of the war. Number 1, which 

involved lesser cuts in combatant forces but not in fleet carriers, would reduce 

these forces below a level adequate to undertake, with an acceptable degree of 

risk, the D-day tasks of the Navy. Numbers 2 and 3, while they would maintain 

the combatant forces at desirable levels, required cuts in the shore establishment 

and mobilization base that would have an adverse effect on the Navy’s capability 

to sustain operations. 

There were, in Admiral Denfeld’s opinion, even more serious inadequacies in 

General Eisenhower’s “four estimates” approach than these shortages of funds. 

He felt so strongly on this point that he addressed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense challenging the basic premise that an adequate military defense 

could be established by assigning arbitrary dollar ceilings. “Force needs,” he 

wrote, “must be based on roles and missions,. . jointly approved plans, and 

peacetime requirements.. . . Dollar needs,“ he continued, “cannot be readily 

established until forces are set up, supporting programs are screened, and program costs are screened.” To achieve maximum efficiency and economy in this 

process, common budgetary standards were required for the Services and thorough review of their submissions should be carried out by the JCS Budget Advisory Committee. There was, finally, a “fundamental strategic principle” involved 

in General Eisenhower’s allocation because the Navy, with worldwide D-day 

responsibilities, received the lowest amount.1” 

143 

4.6 

4.2 
Army and Navy members of the Budget Advisory Committee doubted the value 

of the estimates for budgetary planning because the dollar ceilings appeared to 

have been arbitrarily selected and without a determination of the actual needs of 

the Services for operating forces.17 

The Ike I and II Forces 

T he next development came when General Eisenhower assigned the Services 

specific force structures and set a ceiling of $14,050,000,000 on military 

spending. This figure had been arrived at by deducting $400,000,000 from stockpiling, $300,000,000 for construction, and $250,000,000 for retired pay from the 

initial figure of $15,000,000,000. General Eisenhower made no attempt to allocate 

the $14,050,000,000 among the Services, nor did he indicate a procedure for 

reducing individual Service estimates if they totalled more than this amount. 

The force levels assigned by General Eisenhower to the Services, which 

became know as “Ike I,” were as shown in the following table.‘” 

Amy 

Divisions 10% 

Infantry 

Airborne 

Armored 

Regimental Combat Teams 3 

Separate regiments 6 

Infantry 

Armored cavalry 

Anti-aircraft battalions 46 

Navy 

Major combatant ships 263 

Fleet carriers 6 

Light and escort carriers 12 

Cruisers 15 

Destroyers and destroyer escorts 160 

Submarines 70 

Amphibious lift (divisions) 1% 

Marine Battalion Landing Teams 6 

Marine Air Squadrons 18 

Air Foucc 

Groups 

Heavy bomber 

144 

57 
Fighter 

Strategic reconnaissance 

Tactical reconnaissance 

Troop carrier 

The Ike I forces represented a substantial 

24 

6 

1 

8 

gain for the Navy over the “Red 

Brick” forces, which would have entirely eliminated fleet carriers. By comparison 

with the FY 1950 budget, however, the Ike I forces would reduce fleet carrier 

strength by two ships. The Army force structure under Ike I remained substantially unchanged from “Red Bricks,” and represented an increase over the 9 divisions provided in the budget for 1950. For the Air Force, Ike I provided increases 

over both “Red Bricks” and the 1950 budget, from 48 to 57 groups.‘” 

“Flash” estimates by the Services of the costs of Ike I forces produced figures 

which resulted in a total $1,318,000,000 in excess of the ceiling imposed by General Eisenhower: X) 

Army 

Navy 

Air Force 

Total 

Ike I Ceiling 

Excess 

$ 4.530 billion 

4.699 

6.139 

15.368 

14.050 

$ 1.318 

On 20 June, the Budget Advisory Committee reported to the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff that, on the basis of these “flash” estimates, the Ike I forces could not be 

under the ceiling without a substantial reduction in aircraft procurement.21 

General Eisenhower then directed the Budget Advisory Committee to restudy 

aircraft procurement programs, annual flying hours and pilot procurement. The 

Committee was also to determine the cost of a force structure reduced from Ike I 

by the elimination of 1%Army divisions and 4 antiaircraft battalions, 2 Navy carriers and 23 other combat ships, and 7 Air Force groups. At the same time, an 

administrative reserve ranging from $300 million to $600 million was to be set 

aside as a hedge against rising prices and Service reclamas.22 

Despite these reduced force levels (which became known as the Ike II forces), 

the Services were unable to reach the budget limit set by General Eisenhower 

even without allowing for the administrative reserve. The Service estimates for 

the Ike II forces were as follows (in billions): 

Army $ 4.357 

Navy 4.536 

Air Force 5.460 

$14.353 

145 
administrative reserve were included.27 

The Budget Advisory Committee, to whom the Service estimates were 

referred, was unable to agree on reductions to bring the total down to General 

Eisenhower’s $13.450 billion ceiling. Each member submitted individual views in 

writing. Admiral Carney, addressing technical aspects, found that the Air Force, 

because it used planning factors at variance with those accepted by the Army, 

Navy, and Secretary of Defense, had estimated personnel, maintenance, and 

operations costs about $500 million too high. General Arnold, the Army member, 

generally agreed but was not prepared to accept Admiral Carney’s exact figure 

without a thorough examination of the estimates. The Air Force member, General 

Rawlins, disagreed with his colleagues, claiming that the Air Force, as a new and 

expanding Service, could not be expected to use the same standards and planning factors as the long-established Services. 

Admiral Carney then recommended that the allocation of funds should be: 

Army and Navy, Ike I; Air Force, Ike II. This would, in effect, grant to the Army 

and Navy the larger of the two alternative figures, while according the Air Force 

the lesserof the two. This allocation was necessary, Admiral Carney said, to “provide as strong an Air Force as can be bought and maintained without emasculation of required Army and Navy capabilities.” General Arnold disagreed that any 

such emasculation would take place and recommended that the Navy and the Air 

Force prepare detailed budgets on the basis of Ike II. General Rawlins contended 

that Admiral Carney had demonstrated that an adequate Army, Navy, and Air 

Force, as presently conceived by the three Services, could not be achieved under 

present budget ceilings. In these circumstances, he maintained, first priority 

should be accorded to the Air Force, which, under accepted JCS strategic concepts, would be charged with accomplishing the highest priority tasks.24 

Imposition of a $13 Billion Presidential Ceiling 

A t this juncture, when the Services were nearing agreement on the distribution of funds, President Truman threw into question all the partial agreements that had been so painstakingly negotiated. He announced that the ceiling 

on new obligational authority for military purposes would be reduced to $13 billion. This was some $1.4 billion less than the earlier tentative ceiling established 

in January, which had been used by all elements of the National Military Establishment for budgetary planning2” 

For the administration, the $13 billion ceiling was considered imperative to 

meet national economic conditions. The tax structure, which Congress was 

believed unwilling to change, was expected to yield only about $38 billion in FY 

1950. Of this amount, about $33 billion was allocated to national defense, payments to veterans, interest on the national debt, and other irreducible expendi146 
tive to meet domestic and international responsibilities and to provide a level of 

expenditure for the National Military Establishment that could be sustained over 

the next 5,10, or 15 years2( 

President Truman announced the reduced ceiling at a White House meeting 

attended by the Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. General Eisenhower later testified before a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee that he 

was not consulted about it in advance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, had 

furnished the Secretary of Defense their general view on the overall size of the 

military budget. The Secretary had requested them to do so pursuant to an agreement with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget that JCS views be supplied 

for his use in discussing FY 1951 budget ceilings with the President. The JCS 

view, transmitted on 18 May 1949, was that, because the “basic objectives and 

military capabilities” of the Soviet Union remained unchanged, 

it is mandatory.. . that ade uate and appropriate military forces be maintained.. The same degree o9 security must be maintained and approximately 

the same budgetary level of expenditures for military purposes must be maintained for Fiscal Year 1951. . . . Minimum desirable security, from a purely military point of view, would require approximately 15 billion dollars.27 

Secretary Johnson’s Ceilings 

Force structures and manpower strengths intended to reflect the newly 

announced $13 billion ceiling were set by Secretary Johnson on 5 July 1949. In 

making these decisions, the Secretary said, he had reviewed the several analyses 

prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the comments of the Budget Advisory 

Committee on them. His purpose was to “comply with mandatory instructions 

respecting the budgetary ceiling for 1951 and yet to give maximum consideration 

to the weight of professional opinion.” To provide for this consideration, he specified that the forces and ceilings were “tentative only, and I shall be glad to consider modifications in them on the basis of recommendations from the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff.” 

The timetable and allocation of tasks set by the Secretary of Defense called for 

the Services to prepare detailed estimates in support of fund requests to support 

the designated forces and to submit them concurrently to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would then 

“make an analysis from a strategic viewpoint of the tentative forces,. . with a 

view toward the most effective utilization of the monetary ceilings prescribed.” 

The Services would conduct the necessary studies as to the soundness of cost and 

related factors. Both tasks were to be completed and recommendations submitted 

to the Secretary of Defense by 1 August. 

147 
Groups, and 238 major Navy combat ships, of which 4 were fleet carriers. Personnel ceilings, expressed in man-years, provided a total of 1,481,000, divided 

among the Services as follows: Army, 630,000; Navy, 435,000; and Air Force, 

416,000. In a separate action, Secretary Johnson announced to the Services their 

allocations of the available $13 billion: $4.1 billion to the Army; $3.8 billion to the 

Navy; and $4.5 billion to the Air Force (the remaining $600 million being 

reserved for pay increases and for distribution by the Secretary).2W 

All three Service Chiefs took advantage of the Secretary’s expressed willingness to consider modification in his tentative force allocation to recommend 

increases in the forces for their respective Services. As in the case of “Red Bricks” 

and the “Ike” forces, Admiral Denfeld entered the most vigorous dissent. He 

claimed that the Secretary’s force structure for the Navy, which would cut carrier 

strength to 36.4 percent of the pre-November 1948 level (4 ships as compared 

with 111, would so reduce naval offensive power as to make it inadequate for 

sustained operations in the face of significant air opposition. The result would be 

seriously to limit the use of the seas by the United States; no longer could the 

Navy operate offensively or project elements of the Army and Air Force onto the 

Eurasian continent. In terms of strategic concepts approved by the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, it would be impossible to support the British in the Cairo-Suez area or to 

deny the Iberian peninsula and the northern littoral of the Mediterranean to 

Soviet forces, and availability of the United Kingdom as a base for offensive 

operations would be jeopardized because the Soviets, who would not be facing 

attack elsewhere, would be free to concentrate all their forces against it. To preserve the offensive capability of the Navy, Admiral Denfeld concluded, would 

require the addition to the Secretary’s force levels of 4 fleet carriers, 15 destroyers, 1 Marine BLT, and 2 Marine air squadrons. These increases could be supported by an additional 10,000 military personnel and $110 million. 

Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad, acting for and in the absence of General 

Vandenberg, stated that 67 groups were the minimum required to support the 

JCS strategic concept. The Air Force would not enter a reclama for additional 

forces, he said, but would merely request an additional 12,171 military personnel and $505 million to eliminate deficiencies in a 48-group Air Force. General 

Bradley limited his requests to one additional division to be organized without 

an increase in the allotted personnel ceiling, and $33 million to remedy equipment deficiencies in reserve forces and to enhance the research and development program.*” 

General Eisenhower, while he did not advocate the specific numbers recommended by the Air Force, supported the strategic concepts upon which that Service based its force level recommendations. Writing to Secretary Johnson on 14 

July, he stressed the importance of a “known ability to deliver.. . Jthe atomic 

bomb] to targets as a deterrent to any potential aggressor who may be contemplating war as a solution to international problems.” The financial stringency 

imposed by the budgetary ceiling meant, however, that resources would not be 

available to support the strategic doctrines of all the Services. “It was clear,” Gen148 
gency value to us.” In these circumstances, it became “more necessary than ever 

that such decisions as the Secretary of Defense finds it necessary to make in the 

shifting or transfer of funds tentatively allocated, and particularly in distributing 

amounts held in reserve, should take into consideration the great value of a 

known ability to deliver a sudden and powerful bombing offensive.“?” 

General Eisenhower’s memorandum was one of his last official acts as Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of Defense and presiding officer of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 10 August, the President signed into law amendments to the National Security Act which, among other things, created the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His duties were to preside over the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide agenda for their meetings, and to inform the Secretary of Defense of issues on which the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not agree. To 

fill the new office of Chairman, President Truman named the Army Chief of 

Staff, General Omar N. Bradley, who assumed his new duties on 16 August 

1949. His former position was then filled by General J. Lawton Collins, while 

General Eisenhower returned to civilian life. 

The 1949 amendments to the National Security Act also extended the advisory 

functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to include the National Security Council, as 

well as the President and Secretary of Defense. This change gave legal status to 

the actual practice which had gradually developed since the original law was 

passed in 1947. Other provisions of the law redesignated the National Military 

Establishment as the Department of Defense, removed the Service Secretaries 

from membership on the NSC, and downgraded the status of their organizations 

from executive to military departments. The Secretary of Defense was now 

allowed a deputy secretary, three assistant secretaries, and a comptroller. Elaborate provisions for uniform budgeting and accounting procedures were also provided. These changes came too late, however, to affect the role of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff in budgetary provision for FY 1951 ..I1 

In spite of the protests of the Service Chiefs, Secretary Johnson made only 

minor changes in his tentative budget decisions of 5 July 1949. On 15 August he 

informed President Truman of the highlights of his proposed budget. He justified 

a reduction in military manpower on the grounds that better materiel and training 

and economies resulting from unification would yield offsetting improvements in 

effectiveness. The establishment of NATO and the launching of military assistance 

to other countries would also, in effect, augment US military strength. At the same 

time, he acknowledged that economic as well as military factors had been taken 

into account. “The Department of Defense recognizes,” he wrote, “the overriding 

necessity of keeping military costs within limits which will not endanger fhe fundamental soundness of our economy-one of our primary military assets.“12 

The budget estimates, as presented to the Bureau of the Budget in September, 

reflected further adjustments and granted force increases to the Navy consisting 

of two fleet carriers and about 25,600 personnel. These additions were, of course, 

substantially lower than those requested by the Navy. The Army and Air Force 

received neither additional personnel nor major units. The funding recom149 
ygygp

sented refinements made by the Budget Office of the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense in consultation with the Services. The military personnel and obligational authority recommended by Mr. Johnson were as follows: 33 

Pmorlnd 

Man-!/czars Ed FY 

Army 630,000 630,000 

Navy 460,605 446,740 

Air Force 416,000 416,000 

OSD 

Retired pay 

Public works 

Contingent reserve 

1,506,605 1,492,740 

fM@tioYlu/ Authority 

$ 4,096,400,000 

3,781,300,000 

4,322,600,000 

11,400,000 

300,000,000 

300,000,000 

229,300,OOO 

$13,041,000,000 

With these funds and personnel, Secretary Johnson planned to maintain military forces as follows: 

ATI 

Divisions 

Infantry 

Airborne 

Armored 

Regimental Combat Teams 

Separate regiments 

Infantry 

Armored cavalry 

Separate combat battalions 

Anti-aircraft 

Other 

Navy 

Major combatant ships 

Battleship 

Fleet carriers 

Light and escort carriers 

Cruisers 

Destroyers and destroyer escorts 

Submarines 

Other ships 

Total ships 

Amphibious lift (divisions) 

Marine Battalion Landing Teams 

Marine Air Squadrons 

150 

9 

6 

2 

1 

5 

7 

3 

4 

84 

46 

38 

237 

1 

6 

8 

12 

140 

70 

414 

651 

1% 

6 

20 
Heavy bomber 

Medium bomber 

Light bomber 

Fighter 

Strategic reconnaissance 

Tactical reconnaissance 

Troop carrier 

Separate squadron 

The President’s Budget Requests 

4 

11 

1 

20 

5 

1 

6 

13 

I n the ensuing four months, the budget was further discussed by Secretary 

Johnson with the Service Departments and with the President. Refinements 

were made in both funding and force structure. As a result, the budget that was 

sent to Congress by President Truman on 9 January 1950 provided an additional 

division for the Army and another fleet carrier for the Navy. 

The figures submitted by the President provided obligational authority for the 

Services as follows: Army, $4.018 billion; Navy, $3.881 billion; Air Force, $4.433 

billion, making a total of $12.3 billion. These funds were to support a military 

establishment with an average strength of 1,507,OOO men, of which 630,000 were 

allocated to the Army, 461,000 to the Navy, and 416,000 to the Air Force. The 

major forces to be supported under this budget included 10 Army divisions, 238 

combatant ships including 7 fleet carriers, and 48 Air Force Groups of which 15 

consisted of heavy and medium bombers. A request for $800 million for Department of Defense activities, when added to the Service figures, brought the total to 

$13.1 billion-slightly over the ceiling. An additional $600 million was sought for 

stockpiling, making a total of $13.7 billion in obligational authority for all 

national defense purposes. However, the President asked only $12.8 billion in new 

obligational authority, the remainder to be carried over from prior years. Expenditures for national defense purposes in 1951 were estimated at $13.545 billion.4 

The President’s requests, if approved, would have reduced by 44,456 the 

number of military personnel on active duty on 31 December 1949. But it was not 

to apply uniformly to all the Services: the Air Force actually stood to gain 

sIightly, while the Navy/Marine Corps would lose more heavily than the Army. 

The following table compares the FY 1950 manpower objectives with actual 

strength as of 31 December 1949? 

1950 IIeclY4Y 

HlrLf<yc~t Actd 

Army 630,000 641,225 

Navy/Marine Corps 461,000 496,945 

Air Force 416,000 413,286 

Total 1,507,000 1,551,456 

151 
alarmed by the trend of world conditions, was beginning a comprehensive reexamination of US policies in relation to available military power. The conclusion that 

emerged from this study was that more money was needed for defense. The document embodying this conclusion (NSC 68) was not approved until after the Korean 

War broke out in June 1950. However, in April, while the budget was pending 

before Congress, the administration sent in a request for an additional $350 million 

for procurement of aircraft and ships. Congress had not completed action on the 

budget when the Korean War began. Thereafter the original budget was swamped 

by greatly increased supplemental requests intended to meet the immediate 

emergency and also to raise the overall level of US military preparedness.“” 

152 
9 

Strategic Planning 

The Origins of Planning 

Preparation of joint strategic war plans was a primary task assigned by the 

National Security Act to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These plans would guide the 

employment of US forces in war. They were expected also to provide the basis for 

industrial mobilization planning and for preparation of budgetary requests. To 

Secretary Forrestal, the completion of joint strategic plans was of capital importance. The lack of such plans, he said, had been a “source of embarrassment to all 

of the Departments before Congress this year.” I 

Strategic planning had been in progress in the Joint War Plans Committee 

(later the Joint Strategic Plans Group) since March 1946. At first, their efforts were 

limited to the preparation of strategic studies of particular areas or of specific 

military problems. These studies were known collectively as the PlNCHER 

series. On 16 July 1947, the Joint War Plans Committee concluded that this series, 

though not completed, had progressed far enough to justify the preparation of a 

joint war plan for the initial stages of a war beginning within the next three 

years.2 The Joint Staff Planners concurred in this judgment, and, on 29 August, 

directed the Joint War Plans Committee to prepare joint war plan BROILER for 

hostilities forced upon the United States by Soviet aggression within the next 

three years. The Joint War Plans Committee was to assume that atomic weapons 

would be used by the United States, and that the United Kingdom and Canada 

would be allies of the United States. The basic strategy would be to secure bases 

in North America, the United Kingdom, and the Cairo-Suez area and to launch a 

strategic air offensive against the Soviet Union. The forces needed to perform 

these tasks were to be calculated by the Joint War Plans Committee, starting 

with estimates of available forces as of 1 March 1948 supplied by the Services. 

The problem of meeting deficiencies in these requirements was deferred until 

later stages in the planning process.” 

153 
quate as a basis for mobilization planning, and accordingly, on 20 November 

directed the Joint Strategic Plans Group to develop for this purpose a joint outline plan for war against the Soviet Union during 1955. The plan was also to 

establish a basis for estimating aircraft requirements as requested by the Finletter Commission. Like the short-range BROILER, the guidance for the new longrange plan, designated CHARIOTEER, assumed the loss of Western Europe 

and the need for a massive atomic strategic air campaign launched from 

peripheral bases. 4 CHARIOTEER, as submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 5 

December, addressed only the immediate problem of aircraft requirements. The 

time-consuming task of preparing a basis for mobilization planning was 

deferred by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee for later development. The 

Joint Chiefs of Staff approved CHARIOTEER as a basis for planning on 10 

December but relegated it to second priority below BROILER, which was to be 

the primary planning task.” 

BUSHWHACKER, a war plan with a D-day of 1 January 1952, was drafted by 

the Joint Strategic Plans Group early in 1948 and submitted to the Joint Strategic 

Plans Committee on 8 March.h The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, never acted on 

BUSHWHACKER, perhaps because their attention was now devoted to the 

short-range plan. 

On 11 February, the Joint Strategic Plans Group submitted BROILER to the 

Joint Strategic Plans Committee. On 10 March, the Committee presented the plan 

in outline form to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who approved this abbreviated version for “planning purposes.” A week later the Committee submitted a slightly 

revised version, designated FROLIC, for submission to the Secretary of Defense. 

It included a paragraph explaining that objectives were necessarily limited 

because the plan was based on forces available on D-day, supplemented only by 

those that could be mobilized during the first year of l~ostilities.7 

The planners had had no authoritative political guidance (such as was later to 

be provided by the National Security Council) either for BROILER or for 

FROLIC. In its absence, they assumed that the objectives of a war would be to 

compel Soviet withdrawal at least to the 1939 boundaries and to ensure that the 

Soviet Union would abandon its policies of political and military aggression. The 

wide disparity in ground forces between the Soviet Union and the Western powers compelled the planners to accept the loss of Western Europe and the Middle 

East in the early phases of a war. A ground offensive to recover this territory 

could not be mounted before D+lO months. The US strategy therefore was to 

secure the Western Hemisphere, together with three bases from which to 

launch a strategic air offensive employing atomic weapons. The British Isles and 

Okinawa appeared in both plans as locations for two of these bases. As for the 

third base, BROILER stated a preference for Cairo-Suez, with Karachi as the alternative in the event the preferred area could not be held; in FROLIC, however, the 

alternative, Karachi, was listed as the single choice. In any case, it was expected 

that by D+lO months, forces would be available to begin ground operations to 

recover the Middle East and its great resources of oil and to seize additional 

154 
Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff had given qualified approval to the original 

brief of BROILER, FROLIC became a matter of discussion among them. Admiral 

Leahy, in approving BROILER, had made it clear that his action did not necessarily indicate approval of the use of atomic bombs.‘I His implied reservation regarding the strategy underlying both plans was set forth more clearly and at greater 

length by Admiral Denfeld, who, in a memorandum to his colleagues on 6 April, 

argued at some length against what he regarded as excessive reliance upon an 

atomic offensive. His comments were directed toward FROLIC but were equally 

applicable to BROILER. 

Admiral Denfeld judged FROLIC unsatisfactory except to meet an immediate 

emergency. He contended that the strategy embodied in FROLIC was completely 

at variance with US foreign policy and national objectives. It abandoned Western 

Europe to the Soviets without a struggle, thus in effect handing over the manpower, resources, and industrial capacity of the region for use against the United 

States; it accepted almost certain loss of the Mediterranean Sea; and it left the oil 

producing areasof the Middle East inadequately defended. 

Moreover, continued Admiral Denfeld, the successof the strategy was doubtful. The atomic offensive would have to be carried out at extreme ranges and 

against heavy opposition. If not successful, it would lead to the loss of so much 

territory, so many strategic positions, so many allies, so many resources, and so 

much time that ultimate victory would be extremely uncertain. It was, he said, a 

strategy that overemphasized Soviet capabilities and underestimated those of the 

United States. A preferable and realistic strategy, Admiral Denfeld maintained, 

would be to concert with European powers to establish a defense along the 

Rhine. A strategy aimed at retaining part of Western Europe now appeared to be 

attainable as a result of several actual or prospective developments: the creation 

of the Western Union military alliance by Great Britain, France, and the Benelux 

countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxenburg); the stiffening attitude of 

the Scandinavian countries toward their Soviet neighbor; and the augmentation 

of US military strength that was being considered by the administration at that 

time.“’ 

General Spaatz pointed out that FROLIC had been intended precisely for the 

limited purpose (short-range emergency planning) for which Admiral Denfeld 

had admitted it to be acceptable. He agreed, however, that it should not be 

approved in its present form, because revisions could be expected as a result of 

“current planning conversations. ” When it had been revised and resubmitted, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff should approve it and should then initiate additional emergency planning, taking into account actions taken to augment US military 

strength, increased capabilities of Western European nations and their will to 

resist communist penetration, and up-to-date estimates of Soviet capabilities.11In 

the end, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took no formal action on FROLIC. 

155 
A lthough BROILER was never transmitted to the Services as a planning 

guide, it provided a focus for discussion in tripartite staff conversations by 

the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada several weeks after it was 

approved. Planning officers from the three countries met in Washington from 12 

to 21 April 1948. They approved an outline emergency war plan, with the short 

title HALFMOON, as a basis for the development of “unilateral but accordant” 

plans in each country. HALFMOON was an abbreviated version of BROILER, 

modified to broaden the list of countries expected to be allied against the Soviet 

Union and to substitute, at British suggestion, a base in the Cairo-Suez area for 

Karachi. The latter, however, was retained as an alternative by the United States. 

The planners incorporated from BROILER the assumptions regarding war objectives, since no other guidance was available.12 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved HALFMOON “for planning purposes” on 

19 May. In doing so, they rejected the recommendation of the JSI’C that it be 

accepted as the “primary” short-range plan. They took this action on the suggestion of Admiral Leahy, who questioned the wisdom of placing sole reliance 

on the atomic bomb at a time when there was no assurance that its use would 

be authorized.‘? 

With the completion of HALFMOON, the Joint Chiefs of Staff achieved at last 

a goal they had been seeking for more than two years. The military departments 

and the unified and specified commanders now had authoritative joint guidance 

upon which to base their own plans. On 22 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed 

them to bring their plans into consonance with HALFMOON (or FLEETWOOD, 

as it was renamed a month later).lJ 

HALFMOON was for a war forced upon the United States by aggressive 

actions of the Soviet Union during FY 1949. The objectives, as taken from 

BROILER and approved by the tripartite planners, were to compel the Soviet 

Union to withdraw to its earlier boundaries and to abandon an aggressive course 

of conduct. It was assumed in HALFMOON that the British Commonwealth, 

France, the Benelux countries, and the countries of the Western Hemisphere 

would be allies of the United States, and that Turkey, Spain, Norway, Iraq, Iran, 

Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Syria, 

Lebanon, and Yemen would become allies of the United States if attacked by the 

Soviet Union. The plan assumed, further, that the United States would employ 

atomic bombs and that the Soviet Union would do the same if such weapons 

became available. According to US intelligence estimates, however, the Soviet 

Union would not possess atomic bombs in FY 1949. 

The Soviets, according to HALFMOON, were expected to launch concurrent 

or successive offensives aimed at the destruction or neutralization of all allied 

forces on the Eurasian land mass and the seizure of the Middle East oil resources. 

They would also attempt to neutralize the British Isles and all other areas from 

which the Western powers might strike swiftly and effectively at the USSR. 

To counter these Soviet attacks, HALFMOON provided for operations 

designed to secure vital home and base areas and lines of communications 

156 
war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had recognized that failure to provide for assistance 

to Western European countries and to assure the defense of Middle Eastern oil 

resources was a major flaw of the plan, but shortage of forces left no alternative. 

The strategic air offensive was to be initiated by D+15 days from three 

points-the United Kingdom, Cairo-Suez, and Okinawa-by medium bombers 

of the Strategic Air Command. The bombing effort would be relatively evenly 

distributed among these bases, with two groups each operating from the United 

Kingdom and Okinawa, and one group operating from Cairo-Suez. By D+12 

months, the strategic bombing force was to grow to a total of one heavy bomb 

group flying from bases in the United States and ten medium groups: five at 

Cairo-Suez, three in the United Kingdom, and two on Okinawa. 

Bases and home areas to be defended included the Western Hemisphere, the 

United Kingdom, and the Cairo-Suez area. US forces totalling the equivalent of 

five and two thirds divisions and six fighter groups, and Canadian forces consisting of a brigade group and two light bomb squadrons would defend the Western 

Hemisphere. British forces, consisting primarily of 24 fighter squadrons and 20 

antiaircraft artillery regiments, would constitute the defenses of the United Kingdom. The defense of the Cairo-Suez base area would also be a British responsibility and would be entrusted to one and one third ground divisions and nine aircraft squadrons. 

The maintenance of lines of communication would be a responsibility of the 

allied navies. The line running through the Mediterranean was the only one considered to be in danger. Enemy action might close it by D+6 months. As a result, 

the preponderance of heavy naval units was assigned there. Of the six US fleet 

carriers deployed on D-day, four would operate in the Mediterranean, where 

their mission would be to gain air superiority and to interdict those lines of communication supporting enemy forces as they advanced south by land towards 

the Mediterranean. By D+12 months this carrier force would swell to 20 out of 24 

ships in service. 

Because no serious effort would be made to hold Western Europe, allied occupation forces would immediately fall back to the Rhine. Thereafter, they would 

offer what resistance they could to advancing Soviet armies while withdrawing 

to French and Italian seaports for evacuation. 

The defensive action in the Far East would be along the Bering Sea-Japan SeaYellow Sea line and would include the defense of Japan and the Ryukyus. US forces 

in Korea would be withdrawn, but those in China would remain in place, redeploy 

to more tenable locations, or be withdrawn, depending on the circumstances. 

By D+6 months, Soviet advances were expected to require reinforcement and 

counteraction by the United States and its allies to defend vital base areas. British 

forces in the United Kingdom, faced by a large buildup of Soviet air forces in 

Western Europe, would require additional fighter aircraft and antiaircraft 

artillery. The Cairo-Suez base, under threat of attack by advancing Soviet armies, 

would also require additional forces. The minimum reinforcement to become 

available was two US infantry divisions and six and two thirds fighter groups. 

157 
forces already deployed, approximately 11 divisions plus air groups totalling 

about 1,344 aircraft. Possible missions for these forces, according to HALFMOON, were to reopen the Mediterranean and to regain Middle East oil. 

A major ambiguity in HALFMOON concerned the role of Navy carriers in the 

strategic air operations. This was to be a major cause of misunderstanding 

between the Services throughout 1948 and 1949. Navy participation in strategic 

operations could be justified by two brief passagesin the plan. The first was a 

statement in the description of the initial air offensive, to the effect that “Carrier 

task groups will supplement and support the air offensive to the extent practical 

consistent with their primary task.” The other, which described measures to be 

taken to secure the Cairo-Suez base area, provided that heavy US carrier task 

forces operating in the Mediterranean would be used “primarily for offensive 

missions in securing and maintaining air superiority over the LOCs and in interdiction of enemy LOCs.” The Navy, as already noted, allocated four of its fleet 

carriers available at D-day to the Mediterranean. It was not apparent from 

HALFMOON how broadly the Navy viewed its responsibility for “supplementing and supporting” the strategic air attack. That was to become clear later, when 

budgetary restrictions necessitated curtailment of carrier forces and led to a 

major confrontation between the Navy and the Air Force.lS 

TROJAN: Blueprint for Strategic Bombing 

T he Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a new short-range Joint Emergency War 

Plan on 28 January 1949. Designated TROJAN, it was an updated version of 

FLEETWOOD, and differed primarily by the addition of an annex outlining the 

proposed atomic offensive. A broad range of industrial facilities in 70 Soviet 

cities comprised the target list. Twenty of these cities, including Moscow and 

Leningrad, were considered first priority targets. To destroy all targets on the list, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated, would require a total of 133 atomic weapons, 

of which eight would be dropped on Moscow and seven on Leningrad. The first 

strike should be launched by D+9 days and should consist of 20 to 25 bombs. The 

Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the existing stockpile, combined with the 

anticipated production rate during the first two months of war, would supply 

enough bombs to support these operations.lh 

Delivery of the atomic offensive called for by TROJAN would be carried out 

by the same types of forces as provided by FLEETWOOD: B-29 and B-50 

medium bombers flying from the United Kingdom, Cairo-Suez, and Okinawa; 

and B-36 heavy bombers flying from the continental United States. Deployment 

of strategic air forces would be as follows: 

158 
UK 3 medium groups 4 medium groups 

Cairo/Suez 4 medium groups 

Okinawa 1 medium group 2 medium groupsI 

Other differences between the two plans were slight. In the intelligence 

appraisal, TROJAN added Italy, Greece, the Philippines, Portugal, Ireland, Iceland, Switzerland, and South China to the list of probable US allies in FLEETWOOD. TROJAN, in an apparent reaction to the establishment of Israel and the 

first Arab-Israeli war, was less sanguine than FLEETWOOD on the probable attitude of the Arab states in a war situation. The new plan said merely that they 

would be “less ill-disposed” to the United States and Britain than to the Soviet 

Union, whereas FLEETWOOD had asserted that the Arabs would ally with the 

United States if attacked by the Soviet Union. 

With regard to US operations, TROJAN differed from FLEETWOOD primarily 

by the assignment of US National Guard units to Malta, Gibraltar, and North 

Africa to guard the line of communications through the Mediterranean, and by a 

reassessment of Navy mobilization capability which resulted in lowering the estimate of active fleet carriers on D+12 months from 24 to 14.1x 

OFFTACKLE: Making Strategy Conform to Capabilities 

D uring deliberations on the military budget for FY 1950, held during the 

autumn of 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had concluded that their current 

strategy could not be implemented with the forces that could be generated under 

the stringent spending ceilings ordered by the President. They accordingly 

directed, on 28 January 1949 at the time they approved TROJAN, that a new 

short-range emergency war plan be prepared, based on forces expected to be 

available under the President’s budget estimates for FY 1950.1”The Joint Strategic 

Plans Group undertook the task but soon disagreed over several basic questions: 

the degree of reliance to be placed on strategic bombing, the importance of the 

United Kingdom as a base for operations, and the participation of carrier aircraft 

in the strategic air attack.*” 

Before these issuescould be resolved, planning efforts took a somewhat different direction under impetus from General Eisenhower, in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.21On 25 February, General Eisenhower 

assigned the Operations Deputies a measure of responsibility for strategic planning. At the same time, he provided them with a “policy memorandum” setting 

forth US wartime objectives in Western Europe. This document declared that: 

The security of the United States requires the ursuance of a definite olicy to 

insure, at the earliest possible moment, the ho1cping of a line containing tRe West159 
Cairo-Suez [area1 on the right flank. 

Recognizing that the Rhine could not be held with the forces then available, 

General Eisenhower called for plans to be drawn so that a “substantial bridgehead” might be held in Western Europe, or if even this more limited objective 

was not possible, to provide for a “return, at the earliest possible moment, to 

Western Europe, in order to prevent the communization of that area with long 

term disastrous effects on U.S. national interests.” 

In supplementary oral instructions to the Operations Deputies, General Eisenhower listed three essential tasks: to ensure the integrity of the United Kingdom; 

to ensure US entry into the Western Mediterranean; and to hold a position in the 

Middle East area. In addition to these tasks, General Eisenhower said, he wanted 

attention given to the following “MUSTS”: security of the United States, Iceland, 

and Greenland; and protection of lines of communication to the United Kingdom, Straits of Gibraltar, Alaska, South America, Okinawa, and Japan.72 

As a result of this initiative by General Eisenhower, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

issued a new directive to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee on 26 April 1949. A 

joint outline emergency war plan was to be prepared covering the first two years 

of a war beginning on I July 1949, based on forces available under the FY 1950 

budget. The overall concept, as before, would combine a strategic offensive in 

Western Eurasia with defense in the Far East. However, the new guidance laid 

down by General Eisenhower was to be incorporated into the plan.21 

The new plan, designated OFFTACKLE, was more than seven months in 

preparation. Resolution of wide-ranging Service disagreements proved timeconsuming. By 3 September 1949 the one remaining issue was the size of Navy 

carrier forces. All Services agreed to a buildup of fleet carriers to 10 ships by 

D+18, but the Navy wanted to increase the number to 16 by D+21, while the 

Army and Air Force insisted upon a maximum of 10. With regard to light and 

escort carriers, the Army and Air Force maintained that two ships were sufficient, while the Navy wanted to build up to 15, for use in support of amphibious 

operations in the Mediterranean, by D+24. The Secretary of Defense resolved the 

dispute in favor of the Army and Air Force.2” 

Another round of planning conferences with the British and Canadians, lasting from 26 September through 4 October, further delayed final approval of OFFTACKLE, which, in draft form, was used as the basis for discussion. The conferees were unable to agree on a specific plan, but they did adopt a strategic concept 

for 1950 and 1951 (essentially that in OFFTACKLE) to be used in individual 

national plans.*’ OFFTACKLE then underwent final revision and was approved 

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 December 1949, replacing TROJAN.?” 

This was the first strategic plan to be based on politica guidance from the 

National Security Council. NSC 20/4, approved by the Council and the President 

in November 1948, had ruled out initiation of military action by the United States 

against the Soviet Union. “We should endeavor to achieve our general objectives 

by methods short of war,” NSC 20/4 stated, and even though war might “grow 

160 
determination and willingness of the United States to resort to force in order to prevent the development of a threat intolerable to U.S. security.“27 NSC 20/4 thus provided authoritative support for an assumption that had been incorporated into all 

the draft plans beginning with BROILER, namely, that if a war took place it would 

be as a result of the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union or its satellites. 

From NSC 20/4, the Joint Chiefs of Staff learned also that they would not be 

required to plan military operations that would bring about unconditional surrender by the Soviet Union, nor would they be required to prepare for military 

occupation and government of Soviet territory. This guidance, however, was of 

little use to them in preparing OFFTACKLE, which dealt only with the initial 

stages of a war. 

OFFTACKLE in most of its major provisions was similar to TROJAN, the plan 

it superseded. Both plans called for a strategic offensive in Europe and a strategic 

defensive in the Far East. The strategic offensive, during the early stages of the 

war, would consist entirely of strategic air operations against the Soviet Union 

employing atomic and conventional bombs. In the new plan, however, the objectives of this operation had been broadened and made more ambitious. In OFFTACKLE, the air offensive was to “destroy” vital elements of the Soviet warmaking capacity, rather than merely to be directed “against” them as in TROJAN. 

OFFTACKLE also included, as a new objective, the “retardation” of Soviet 

advances in Western Europe. 

To accomplish these missions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted a more ambitious target plan than the one provided for TROJAN. The new targeting plan, 

which had been prepared by the Air Force, was aimed at accomplishing the following objectives: disruption of Soviet industry; elimination of the political and 

administrative controls of the Soviet Government over its people; undermining 

the will of the Soviet Government and people to continue the war; and disarming 

of the Soviet armed forces. These objectives were to be achieved by inflicting critical damage on petroleum refineries, electric power plants, submarine construction facilities, high octane aviation gasoline production facilities, and other warsupporting industries. 

To carry out this bombing campaign would require the dropping of 292 

atomic bombs and 17,610 tons of conventional bombs during the first three 

months of operations, to be followed by continuing attacks to deliver 246,900 

tons of conventional weapons by D+24 months. Delivery of these bombs by the 

specified method of attack was designed to provide 85 percent probability of 

complete destruction of the key industrial targets listed for atomic attack. 

The results of these operations, in terms of the Soviet warmaking capacity, 

would be to bring about immediate stoppage of major portions of the principal 

war-supporting industries through the loss of electric power, the extension and 

prolongation of those stoppages by major destruction to other war-supporting 

industries, and the creation of chaos and possible panic among the labor force. 

Moreover, the strategic air operations were expected to retard the Soviet 

advance into Western Europe by curtailing supplies of petroleum products, air161 
a possible loss of morale, would force the Soviet high command to reassess the 

strategic situation with immediate though unpredictable consequences for current military operations.2x 

Units available for the strategic air offensive were slightly augmented for 

OFFTACKLE over those provided for TROJAN in spite of an overall drop in 

Air Force groups. Both plans allotted 11 groups to the strategic offensive, but 

the OFFTACKLE force included 2 heavy groups by D+12, double the number 

of TROJAN. 

In the deployment of bomber groups, the principal change as compared with 

TROJAN was that none were allotted to the Cairo-Suez area, which had been 

abandoned as a launching point for the strategic air offensive. Defense of the 

region was regarded as beyond the capability of US forces and was accordingly 

left to the British. The strategic air forces that had been assigned to Cairo-Suez 

under TROJAN were redistributed by allocating one medium bomb group to the 

United Kingdom and the remaining three to Northwest Africa. The overall 

deployments plan was as follows: 

D-h/ n+72 rrrorr~hs 

us 1 heavy group 2 heavy groups 

UK 2 medium groups 5 medium groups 

NW Africa 3 medium groups 

Okinawa 1 medium group 1 medium group 

The weakness of the United States in ground forces, which necessarily limited 

initial offensive operations to air attack, also meant that the United States could 

do little to aid the Western European nations in defending their territories, 

despite the newly concluded North Atlantic Alliance. The importance of denying 

Western Europe to the Soviet Union was recognized in the plan, in accord with 

General Eisenhower’s instructions. A continuing policy to develop, along with 

the nations of Western Europe, the capability to hold a defense line no farther 

west than the Rhine was accorded the utmost importance. However, since forces 

available during 1950-1951 would not be sufficient for the task, two alternatives 

were considered: (1) holding a substantial bridgehead north of the Pyrenees; or if 

this proved impossible, (2) the earliest possible return to Western Europe. Available forces were believed inadequate for the first alternative, and the second 

would probably have to be adopted. 

To facilitate their return to Western Europe, the United States and its allies 

would have to hold the United Kingdom and the Western Mediterranean area, 

including Gibraltar, as bases and staging areas. The United Kingdom, which was 

also to be the primary base for the strategic bombing campaign, was believed to 

be readily defensible by British forces, reinforced by modest US antiaircraft and 

fighter strength. 

Ability to defend the Western Mediterranean, however, was more in doubt. 

Northwest Africa was considered relatively secure from Soviet attack. The 

162 
Spain, the major defensive line would probably be in southern Spain along the 

Guadalquivir River and Sierra Nevada Mountains, so as to ensure retention of 

Gibraltar and the western entrance to the Mediterranean. 

Reentry into Western Europe, according to the estimate in OFFTACKLE, 

would not be possible before approximately D+24 months. By that time the necessary forces, totalling some 41 US divisions and 63 tactical air groups, would 

have been generated. The exact tactical pattern could not be set in advance, but it 

was expected to resemble that of World War II, with invasion forces reentering 

Europe from the United Kingdom and from North Africa. 

The strategic defensive in the Far East, as contemplated in OFFTACKLE, 

would have as its major objectives the continued availability of Okinawa as a 

base for military operations and the defense of Japan. To attain these objectives 

would also require the retention of Formosa, the Philippines and the other 

Ryukyus Islands. These tasks would have to be carried out by the forces in the 

area on D-day, namely four divisions, seven tactical air groups, and ten cruisers 

and destroyers. There was no provision for retaining a foothold on the Asian continent. Such operations were not considered feasible with available forces.2’ 

Planning for the Longer Term 

A s an “emergency” plan, OFFTACKLE, like its predecessors, was designed for 

execution in the immediate future and therefore reflected limitations based 

on existing forces. It was thus comparable to the later Joint Strategic Capabilities 

Plan (JSCP). “Midrange” planning, intended to guide future decisions on budgets and force levels before the outbreak of war (eventually institutionalized in 

the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan), was represented during 1947-1949 by the 

abortive BUSHWHACKER, which never reached the JCS agenda. No further 

efforts in this direction were attempted until 1950.30 

The problem of long-range planning had been dealt with in 1947 in the preparation of CHARIOTEER, which, however, had been limited in scope and purpose. In 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff undertook to prepare a complete long-range 

war plan, looking eight years into the future. On 16 August they appointed an ad 

hoc committee to draft a plan for a war beginning on 1 July 1956 (later advanced 

to 1 January 1957). The outline plan submitted by the committee on 31 January 

1949 embodied a basic strategy similar to that in HALFMOON and FLEETWOOD, except that it provided for a defense along the Rhine and the Alps; this 

provision, however, was contingent upon the furnishing of adequate US military 

assistance to the countries of Western Europe. The Joint Chiefs of Staff examined 

this plan and instructed the committee to develop it in more detail. An expanded 

version was accordingly submitted on 19 December 1949. However, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff never acted on it, and it was withdrawn in February 1951, being 

completely out of date by then.31 

163 
A primary function of joint strategic plans was to provide the basis for mobilization planning. Force level projections incorporated in each plan were 

expected to guide the Services in preparing detailed plans for mobilization. The 

Munitions Board, a creation of the National Security Act of 1947 (successor to the 

Army-Navy Munitions Board of World War II) reviewed mobilization plans for 

logistic feasibility in connection with its responsibility for the “military aspects of 

industrial mobilization.” 

Prodded by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services undertook mobilization 

planning in 1947. They computed mobilization requirements on the basis of general guidance supplied by the Joint Logistics Committee. The stated requircments, however, when reviewed by the Munitions Board, far exceeded what was 

expected to be available. 12The Chairman of the Munitions Board advised the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1948 that realistic mobilization planning must 

await the completion of a strategic plan.?? 

Following their approval of HALFMOON, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded 

a brief of the strategic concept of the plan and the force tabs to the Munitions 

Board to serve as a basis for mobilization planning. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized that this material was of limited value to the Munitions Board because it 

only projected force buildups and deployments through D+12. They therefore 

agreed to provide additional guidance as soon as practicable on deployments 

through D+24 months.“4 

Secretary Johnson was also aware that something better than HALFMOON 

was needed. Writing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 July, he informed them that 

the lack of suitable guidance was hampering the Munitions Board in its plans for 

industrial mobilization. He requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to submit an 

acceptable plan by 1 September 1948.“? 

In response to the Secretary’s request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff produced and 

distributed COGWHEEL, a brief of a short-range emergency plan for the first 

two years of a war forced upon the United States by the Soviet Union on 1 July 

1949. This plan was in consonance with HALFMOON for the first year of war. 

For the second year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff simply extended its concepts and 

force requirements. The result, they believed, was a “representative phased 

deployment of U.S. armed forces which might reasonably be achieved during the 

first 24 months of war commencing 1 July 1949.” The force levels were projected 

as follows: 

D D+Z2 Ll+24 

Army (divisions) 20 40 80 

Air Force (groups) 66 103% 186 

Navy (combat ships) 510 1,785 2,976 

(carriers) (11) (16) (25) j(, 

On one point in COGWHEEL the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not agree and forwarded split views to the Secretary of Defense. At issue was whether to start construction of three new flush-deck attack carriers (designated CVX) on D-day. The 

164 
backup which gave the strategic air operations a reasonable chance of success. The 

Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff contested this point of view. They claimed that 

the Navy had sufficient carriers (active and reserve) for assigned missions, and 

that the new ships could not be completed before D+30 at the earliest; by which 

time the Air Force would be fully deployed and capable of performing its missions without the assistance of Navy aircraft from the new carriers.“7 

COGWHEEL merely provided the strategic basis on which the Services could 

draft their short-range mobilization plans. Before such planning could begin, 

additional guidance to the Services of a logistical nature would be required. In a 

memorandum of 6 December 1948 to the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air 

Force and the Chief of Naval Operations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed them 

to develop their own logistic and mobilization plans, to compute their own 

requirements and to submit them to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review.“x 

Before these requirements could be developed, the Munitions Board cast 

doubt on the basis on which they were being computed. The Board had undertaken its own analysis of the resources necessary to support COGWHEEL and on 

17 February 1949 submitted an interim report in which it concluded that, even if 

all required manpower and material were available, there would be a 40 percent 

shortage of new production aircraft during the first 24 months after D-day.lY 

To meet fhis and other inadequacies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Services to prepare revised estimates of their mobilization capabilities and force 

readiness as of 1 July 1949. These were to be used by the Joint Strategic Plans 

Committee in revising COGWHEEL. General Eisenhower’s guidance for emergency war plan OFFTACKLE was also to be reflected in the revision.4(’ 

Before the revision of COGWHEEL could be completed, the Munitions Board 

submitted its final report on the feasibility of the plan as originally submitted. 

The findings were not encouraging: requirements for manpower, manufacturing 

capacity for munitions, construction, and copper and aluminum exceeded the 

resources expected to be available to the National Military Establishment. In the 

manpower area, the requirements for inductees for the first nine months 

exceeded the rate at which Selective Service could process them, and the buildup for military personnel from all sources was probably faster than the National 

Military Establishment could digest. These factors suggested a slower rate of 

buildup through M+9 months. From M+12 on, the total manpower requirements 

would exceed supply by an increasing amount. At M+12, the shortage would be 

270,000, by M+24 it would be 4.2 million, and by M+36 it would reach 4.7 million. From these figures, it was evident that the proposed intake of military personnel could not be attained without jeopardizing the supporting productive 

effort by the civilian economy. A scaling down of military manpower requirements was therefore in order. 

The indicated materiel shortages, which included tanks, aircraft, and ship 

components, could be reduced by such measures as the use of substitutes and 

an increase in war reserve stocks. Scaling down of manpower requirements 

would also reduce these shortages, but some further steps, such as rephasing 

165 
The Munitions Board evaluation was further evidence of the inadequacy of 

COGWHEEL. General Vandenberg proposed that the revised version of that 

plan already in preparation by the Joint Logistics Plans Committee be held up 

while the Committee undertook to analyze the effects of the shortages cited by 

the Board and the Services revised their force estimates. On the recommendation of General Collins, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 6 October 1949 

rejected this proposal. General Collins reasoned that most of the logistic deficiencies had already been identified and taken into account in OFFTACKLE, 

which was already available in draft and was being used by the Joint Logistics 

Plans Committee.42 

A “joint mobilization plan,” JCS 1725/47, was completed by the Joint Logistics Plans Committee in August 1949. The purpose was to lay down joint policies 

regarding materiel procurement, stock level maintenance, use of manpower, and 

various other logistical matters to guide the Services. Strategic guidance in JCS 

1725/47 had been drawn from COGWHEEL, although the revision of that plan 

was not yet complete.“” During JCS discussion of this plan, Admiral Denfeld 

challenged the use of a war plan as a basis for mobilization planning. Greater 

flexibility would result, he thought, if the Services were simply assigned broad 

tasks and functions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected this view and decided that 

strategic guidance for mobilization planning would still be in the form of a joint 

outline war plan, which would include a phased deployment of forces. Instead of 

being derived from the current emergency plan, however, it was to be typical of 

strategic plans which the Joint Chiefs of Staff might adopt for operational use in 

the ensuing three years. As a concession to Admiral Denfeld, they agreed that in 

cases where a Chief of Service felt the force deployments in the mobilization plan 

did not adequately reflect the roles and missions of his Service, he should propose suitable modifications of the plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

As interim guidance pending completion of a new plan, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff directed the Services to use COGWHEEL, adapted to bring it into consonance with their capabilities as of 1 July 1949. Deployments projected for mobilization planning purposes through D+24 months should not exceed those of 

OFFTACKLE. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then approved JCS 1725/47 and directed 

the Services to use it.44 As an interim measure pending completion of detailed 

statements of requirements by the Services based on the new guidance, the 

Munitions Board decided to base its planning on 50 percent of the requirements 

generated by COGWHEEL.45 

STRAIGHTEDGE, the proposed replacement for COGWHEEL, was delayed 

and did not reach the Joint Chiefs of Staff until January 1951. At that time, they 

rejected it on the ground that the current Joint Emergency War Plan, REAPER, 

contained all necessary guidance for mobilization planning. A special plan for 

that purpose was therefore unnecessary.“h 

166 
10 

Challenges to Strategy 

Reservations Concerning Emergency War Plans 

T he Joint Chiefs of Staff had completed an emergency war plan in line with 

existing capabilities (OFFTACKLE), but the pressures of fiscal stringency had 

forced them to make hard choices. Faced with an insufficiency of funds to support all the desirable forces, they had chosen to fund them on a priority basis, 

providing first for those most necessary at the outset of war. The result was to 

place main reliance for offensive action on the Strategic Air Command employing atomic weapons in strategic bombing of the Soviet Union and to restrict the 

Army and Navy to the roles of securing basesand maintaining lines of communications. Funding for carrier task forces and ground combat divisions was accordingly restricted. 

These strategic choices by the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not go unchallenged. 

There was an understandable concern on the part of the Navy over the curtailment of funds for naval forces. But others with no personal or institutional interest in competing strategies or military forces also felt some misgivings over the 

emphasis on strategic nuclear bombing at the expense of other forms of warfare. 

Secretary Forrestal was a leading skeptic where heavy reliance on strategic 

bombing was concerned. “I do not believe that air power alone can win a war,” 

he wrote on 27 October 1948. In fact, he considered it impossible to predict the 

“form and character” of any future war. War planning was “largely an intellectual exercise” in which the planners tried to estimate the nature of a war 

against possible enemies who usually refused to oblige by playing the script 

written for them.’ 

Holding these views, Secretary Forrestal was naturally concerned over the 

prospect of committing billions of dollars to aircraft procurement without first 

ascertaining whether the aircraft could perform their assigned missions. On 22 

September 1948 he had proposed to General Gruenther a war game to test the 

capabilities of strategic bombers to attack industrial targets in the United States. 

A few days later he expressed his doubts to Secretary Symington as to whether 

167 
denberg that he was “absolutely certain.. the bomb could be dropped where, 

how and when it was wanted.“2 

Mr. Forrestal was evidently not satisfied with the response, for on 23 and 25 

October he addressed memorandums presenting the problem to the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff. “Since our current war plans contemplate the early initiation of a powerful strategic air offensive against vital elements of Soviet war-making capacity,” 

he wrote, “I desire that you make an evaluation of the chances of success of 

delivering this effort.” He also directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate the 

effect on the war effort of the USSR, to include an appraisal of the “psychological 

effects of atomic bombing on the Soviet will to wage war.“? 

To conduct the study of the effects of atomic bombing, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff appointed an ad hoc interservice committee under the chairmanship of 

Lieutenant General H. Ii. Harmon, USAF. Responsibility for assessing the capabilities for delivering the bomb to the target they assigned to the Chief of Staff of 

the Air Force.” 

The Harmon Report: Evaluation of the Effects of 

Atomic Bombing 

T he Harmon Committee submitted its report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 

May 1949. It was an evaluation of the initial, or atomic, phase of TROJAN, 

based on the assumptions that a circular error probability (CEP) of 3,000 feet 

would obtain and that current intelligence reports were “appropriate bases” for 

the evaluation? The Committee concluded that physical damage to installations, 

personnel casualties suffered in industrial communities, and other direct or indirect cumulative effects would result in a 30 to 40 percent reduction in Soviet 

industrial capacity. Of particular importance, damage to the petroleum industry 

would be severe. Personnel casualties, the Committee concluded, might run as 

high as 6,700,000, of whom 2,700,OOO would be killed, out of a population in the 

target areas of 28,000,OOO. For the survivors, the problems of carrying on would 

be vastly complicated by destruction of large numbers of homes. 

These atomic attacks would not affect the capability of Soviet armed forces to 

advance rapidly into selected areas of Western Europe, the Middle East, and the 

Far East, but their capability to sustain these advances would progressively 

diminish because of inability to resupply. Petroleum products would dwindle 

rapidly and supplies would become critical for all branches of the armed forces. 

Logistic support generally would be handicapped by disruption of plans, impairment of controls, and damage to industry and transportation. The overall result 

would be to force the Soviet high command to reappraise its strategic position 

and probably to limit, postpone, or abandon certain campaigns. 

There were certain adverse effects from the US viewpoint. Atomic bombing, 

psychologically, would unify the Soviet people and stiffen their will to resist and 

168 
would be a major element of Allied military strength in any war with the USSR.” 

It would constitute “the only means of rapidly inflicting shock and serious damage to vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity.” Early employment 

would “facilitate greatly the application of other Allied military power with 

prospect of greatly lowered casualties. . . . From the standpoint of our national 

security, the advantages of its early use would be transcending. Every reasonable 

effort should be devoted to providing the means to be prepared for prompt and 

effective delivery of the maximum numbers of atomic bombs to appropriate target systems.“” 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 28 July 1949, forwarded the Harmon Committee 

report to the Secretary of Defense, along with a memorandum indicating their 

general concurrence with its conclusions and offering additional comments. The 

30 to 40 percent reduction in Soviet industrial production to be expected as a 

result of atomic attack was a valid measure of overall damage, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff agreed, but did not reflect completely the dislocations that could be 

expected. “Certain target systems. . ,“they wrote, “such as the petroleum industry, would receive appreciably greater damage. Furthermore, this magnitude of 

the destruction and the brief time span in which it occurs should retard Soviet 

recuperative action to an indeterminate but considerable extent.” Employment of 

atomic weapons by the United States would admittedly lead the Soviet Union to 

retaliate to the fullest possible extent; however, the Soviets could in any case be 

expected to use all their available mass destruction weapons whatever the 

United States did. As to the psychological effects, the Harmon Committee’s conclusion, while probably the best estimate generated to date, should be regarded 

only as an informed opinion on an “admittedly abstruse and controversial matter.” Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, the Harmon Committee evaluation was predicated upon successful delivery of the atomic offensive, a subject 

that was being examined separately.7 

JCS Disagreement over Delivery Capabilities 

G eneral Vandenberg, to whom the Joint Chiefs of Staff had assigned responsibility for examination of delivery capabilities, had assured his colleagues on 

21 December 1948 that the strategic air offensive could be carried out as planned. 

Soviet air capabilities, offensive or defensive, were not highly regarded. The 

Soviets’ antiaircraft artillery was believed ineffective above 25,000 feet, their allweather fighter force was insignificant, and their radar was incapable of providing sufficient early warning for effective fighter attacks. As for their offensive 

strength, Air Force estimates showed that it was unlikely that the Soviets would 

be able, through air attacks of their own, to render untenable the bases required 

for the US strategic attack.x 

169 
to current Soviet technical accomplishments and military capabilities had led his 

Air Force colleague to draw conclusions “predicated on assumptions not supported by known facts.” The air offensive based on this insufficient intelligence 

would, however, expend a quantity of atom bombs that would “represent a very 

substantial portion of our natural resources for waging war.“ Therefore, in his 

view, the risks involved and the probable degree of success in launching this 

offensive should receive searching, careful, and impartial appraisal. To this end, 

he recommended that the Air Force study be given an overall review by the Joint 

Strategic Plans Committee and that its intelligence assumptions be examined by 

the Joint Intelligence Committee (JlC).ll 

To General Vandenberg, Admiral Denfeld’s remarks seemed to imply that the 

Air Force was incompetent to plan strategic bombing and to challenge its right to 

do so as provided by the Key West Agreement. He reminded his Navy colleague 

that the Air Force had practiced strategic bombing successfully during World 

War II and had since refined it on the basis of extensive tests. The analysis of 

enemy capabilities and intentions, he continued, was based on estimates prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee. If, after careful review of the implications of his remarks, the Chief of Naval Operations still questioned the capability 

of the Air Force to judge the feasibility of one of its primary missions, he should 

state his specific objections to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.“’ 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were unable to resolve the dispute between Admiral 

Denfeld and General Vandenberg and on 17 February forwarded split views to 

the Secretary of Defense. General Bradley endorsed the views expressed by General Vandenberg. Both, however, agreed to make their conclusions of the intelligence data in the Air Force report subject to an analysis by the Joint Intelligence 

Committee. Admiral Denfeld, while restating his earlier views, agreed that the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff should continue to base their planning on the prompt initiation of a strategic air offensive, although he was not prepared to agree that a 

“powerful strategic air offensive can be delivered as planned if such statement is 

considered to convey a high degree of success in delivery on assigned targets. . The risks as now estimated to exist are acceptable for present planning 

purposes only.” I1 

Admiral Denfeld’s dissent was symptomatic of a deepening concern with the 

role of the Navy in military strategy and its position in the National Military 

Establishment. During the preparation of the military budget for FY 1950, Admiral Denfeld and other Navy representatives had strongly resisted Army and Air 

Force efforts to reduce the Navy’s carrier force, claiming an important role for it 

in the overall strategy for war against the Soviet Union, including the strategic 

air offensive. Admiral Denfeld now extended the Navy’s argumentation beyond 

a defense of Navy force structure to a questioning of the validity of the strategic 

air offensive.12 

The Joint Intelligence Committee, on 3 March 1949, upheld Admiral Denfeld’s 

judgment. The Committee concluded that the Air Force study oversimplified the 

intelligence presented and ignored some pertinent information. Its overall assess170 
mated. Moreover, intelligence did not support the forecast in the study that 

destruction of the 70 primary targets would reduce Soviet industrial output by 50 

percent (a figure that exceeded the estimate of the Harmon Committee) or the 

conclusion that an attack on a target would necessarily lead to its destruction.13 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly directed the Joint Intelligence Committee to 

prepare a joint intelligence estimate which could be used to evaluate the chances 

for successof the strategic air offensive. They also directed the newly established 

Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG), on the basis of this intelligence 

assessment,to evaluate the “weapons aspects” of the air offensive plan.‘” 

The Joint Intelligence Committee completed its estimate on 25 August. It did 

not offer an overall appraisal of Soviet air offensive and defense capabilities but 

merely recited the numbers, types, and performance capabilities of equipment 

believed to be in Soviet operational units. The data presented did not differ substantially from those presented by General Vandenberg on 21 December 1948, 

except in Soviet bomber forces available to attack the United Kingdom between 

D-day and D+lO. The JIC estimated these forces to be 150 four-engine bombers 

and 1,000 light bombers, in contrast with the 100 heavy and 520 light bombers 

estimated by General Vandenberg to be available on D-day.‘” 

The JIG report went to the WSEG, as previously directed by the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. Before that group could complete its study of the feasibility of the strategic 

air offensive, however, public criticism of existing military policies by senior 

naval officers brought into the open the whole dispute over strategy, force levels, 

and roles and missions. The result was a public debate culminating in sensational 

hearings before the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives. 

Cancellation of the Carrier USS United States 

T he immediate cause for the open dissent by high-ranking Navy officers was the cancellation of the “super carrier,” the USS United States, by Secretary of 

Defense Louis Johnson on 23 April 1949. This action was taken to be symptomatic of the “anti-Navy” military policies represented by recent strategic and 

budgetary decisions. The super carrier was a major element in the Navy’s postwar program. It was designed to advance the art of carrier warfare and also was 

to give the Navy a “piece of the action” in atomic warfare. Flag officers commanding carrier task forces in the later stages of World War II had strongly urged 

the construction of carriers larger than any in commission or planned, to accommodate larger aircraft. After the war, Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, who became 

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations in 1945, approved a plan for a flush-deck carrier capable of handling aircraft large enough to carry the atomic bomb. Funds to 

begin construction of a ship of this new type were included in the Navy Department appropriations requests for FY 1949.I6 Since the military budgets for FY 

171 
In their statement of aircraft requirements submitted to the Finletter Commission in December 1947, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had included large carriers among Navy force requirements. I7 The Acting Chief of Staff, US Air Force, 

setting forth the Air Force position, had limited his approval of the JCS submission to the “over-all aircraft figures” as representing “reasonable estimates as to 

the air requirements for our national security.” He could not approve it in detail, 

he said, because of “unresolved points,” and because differing Air Force and 

Navy organization and computation methods precluded the preparation of a 

“precise, integrated statement of requirements. “ As a result, “much if not most” 

of the data presented reflected “individual service approaches to the problem.” 

Although he did not mention the large (CVX) carrier, his reservations at least cast 

doubt on the extent to which the JCS memorandum to the Finletter Commission 

could be construed as indicating approval of this ship.lX 

The big new carrier received attention also during the Key West Conference 

on 11 to 14 March 1948, but the record of what was decided there is unclear. The 

only reference to this ship in JCS files occurs in a memorandum for record prepared by General Gruenther, the Director of the Joint Staff. According to this 

document, the subject came up in connection with “collateral functions” of the 

Services. General Gruenther wrote: 

One illustration that was brought out in connection with requirements for the 

execution of collateral functions was the construction of a large carrier. . . it was 

assumed that the Navy might not be able to establish a requirement for the carrier solely on the basis of its naval functions. A consideration of its purely naval 

function, plus the contribution which it could make to strategic air warfare, 

might be enough to warrant its construction.‘” 

Although General Gruenther referred merely to a “large” carrier, there can be 

little doubt that the “super” carrier was meant. The discussion did not indicate a 

formal JCS position in favor of the new ship, but it might be construed as implying tacit approval, since the issue appeared to be how to rationalize a decision in 

favor of construction. 

Secretary Forrestal, in reporting to President Truman on the Key West meetings on 15 March 1948, listed, among other agreements reached by the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, the following: “Navy to proceed with development of 80,000-ton 

carrier and development of HA [high altitude] aircraft to carry heavy missiles 

therefrom.“2o Later, however, in discussing with reporters the outcome of the 

conference, the Secretary said that the super carrier might be built “if so decided 

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” implying that the issue remained open.21 

The question entered the arena of public controversy on 14 May 1948, when 

Admiral Denfeld told a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee 

that, at the Key West conference, “the Joint Chiefs of Staff said they would go 

along with it [the supercarrier] because it was in the President’s program, and 

had been approved by the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense. 

It was not discussed at great length, but it was tacitly approved by all the mem172 
the Finletter Commission, but he did not mention the reservations expressed by 

the Air Force.22 

Admiral Denfeld’s version of these events was disputed a few days later by 

General Spaatz. Addressing the National Press Club on 25 May, the recently 

retired Air Force Chief of Staff denied that the Air Force had approved the 

Navy’s plan to build a super carrier. In response to questions, he said specifically that the Air Force had not approved it in the paper that went to the Finletter Commission.2? 

It was against this background that the Secretary of Defense requested the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff to clarify their views on the subject. Meeting on 26 May, they 

addressed the question: “Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve construction of the 

so-called 6A carrier?” Admiral Leahy, Admiral Denfeld, and General Bradley 

replied in the affirmative, but General Vandenberg declined to give his assent. 

“Approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of a project of this magnitude,” he stated, 

“requires a thorough examination of its military characteristics and usefulness . . . . 1 have had no opportunity to reach conclusions on these points. The 1949 

budget,” he reminded his colleagues, “was prepared and submitted on a unilateral basis. It was not coordinated or examined in detail by the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. Hence, I cannot at this time approve or disapprove one particular part of 

the budget of one Service without the thorough consideration of the programs 

and budget requirements of all three Services.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff reported 

these views to the Secretary of Defense on 28 May.24 

Congress, evidently deciding that the case for the big new carrier was conclusive-including as it did support by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and 

three of the four members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-provided funds for the 

first year of construction in the Navy Department appropriation for FY 1949. 

And on 18 February 1949, the Navy ceremoniously laid the keel for the USS 

Unifcti States‘ at Norfolk.2s 

At this point, prospects for the development of the new carrier looked favorable. However, events were soon to take a different course under the direction of 

the new Secretary of Defense, Mr. Louis Johnson, who took office on 28 March 

1949, a little more than a month after the laying of the keel of the USS Unitd 

States. Unlike his predecessor, Mr. Forrestal, who had strongly advocated construction of the new ship, Mr. Johnson professed to have no firm notions about it 

one way or the other. He discussed it briefIy with the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Key 

West on 11April. On the following day he was asked about the carrier at a press 

conference in Washington and replied that he would make a statement on the 

subject in due course.*” 

Mr. Johnson evidently concluded at this time that he should reexamine the 

decision of his predecessor approving construction of the carrier. His reasons for 

making this reexamination are not stated in available sources, but the budgetary 

stringency ordered by the President for both FY 1950 and FY 1951 probably had 

much to do with it. In any event, on 15 April he addressed a letter to General 

Eisenhower stating that he wished “the benefit of the judgment of the Joint 

173 
“for the purpose of discussing this particular subject.” 

In this letter, Mr. Johnson stressed that he had an open mind concerning the 

ship and in fact knew little about it. “I have no preconceived notions with respect 

to this carrier,” he wrote, “and I have not as yet formed any opinion as to 

whether or not its construction should go forward.. . . I have not attempted to go 

deeply into the matter myself and shall not attempt to.. until such time as 1 

have received the views of the Chiefs.“27 

A major share of the burden for deciding the fate of the big ship therefore came 

to rest on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At General Eisenhower’s suggestion, they took 

up the matter without waiting for him to return to Washington from Augusta, 

Georgia, where he was vacationing. They met on 19 April but, finding themselves 

hopelessly divided, agreed to submit separate views to the Secretary of Defense.*” 

Admiral Denfeld, in a memorandum dated 22 April 1949, strongly urged the 

Secretary to continue to support construction of the USS Unit& Sfates. The ship, 

he said, was necessary “to meet requirements for jointly agreed naval responsibilities” and had been supported by three of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, the President and Congress solely on 

the basis of its value in performing these missions. However, all the authorities 

were “cognizant of its potential application as a mobile base for aircraft capable 

of carrying the atomic bomb.” 

The size and design of the new carrier were necessary to operate heavier aircraft of superior performance and large numbers of small aircraft, particularly 

fighters; to provide essential antiaircraft armament, radar, communications 

equipment, armor, and compartmentation; and to carry fuel essential for prolonged operations. Existing carriers could not be modified to make them comparable to the USS United States. 

The qualities of the new ship, Admiral Denfeld maintained, would “facilitate 

greatly the accomplishment of specific naval tasks of any strategic concept which 

is likely to be adopted.” The tasks included: assuring control of the sea; attacks 

on submarines, their facilities and construction yards; mining of coastal waters; 

direct attacks on enemy air and ground forces in areas near the sea; support of 

US air and ground forces in amphibious or airborne operations; and finally, other 

operations including the use of “the heaviest atomic bomb prospectively available, if directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or higher authority.“2y 

General Bradley, replying the same day, took the opposite view from Admiral Denfeld. He concluded that it was “militarily unsound to authorize at this 

time the construction of additional aircraft carriers or to continue expenditures 

on the USS united States.” The primary task for which the super carrier was 

designed, namely to employ heavy, long-range bombing aircraft, had been 

assigned to the Air Force as a primary function. As the Air Force was fully capable of performing this function, there was no need for a heavy aircraft carrier to 

share in it nor was there any need for such a ship to maintain the control of vital 

sea areas and lines of communication, which were the primary functions 

174 
reinforced by the navies of Great Britain and other allies, would be more than 

adequate to deal with the Soviet undersea threat. There was therefore no justification for diverting scarce resources from other programs intended to create balanced land, sea and air forces.“” 

General Vandenberg, in his reply dated 23 April, opposed the super carrier on 

similar grounds. He, too, maintained that it was not needed for heavy bombardment, that existing ships were adequate to perform the purely naval missions of 

controlling the seas, and that therefore expenditure of funds on the super carrier 

was unwarranted.“’ 

Admiral Denfeld, acting in his capacity as senior member of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, forwarded these memorandums to Secretary Johnson on 23 April.“* Mr. 

Johnson, having seen draft copies, was already familiar with their contents and 

had shown them to President Truman. He had also discussed the matter with 

General Eisenhower by telephone. As a result, the Secretary of Defense had 

already decided to cancel the super carrier and had obtained President Truman’s 

approval for the action when he received Admiral Denfeld’s memorandum of 23 

April enclosing final statements of the JCS members. After ascertaining that the 

memorandum contained nothing new, he telephoned the President to inform him 

of the fact, released to the press a notice of the cancellation, and sent a memorandum to the same effect to the Secretary of the Navy.“? 

At the time, Secretary Sullivan was in Texas on a speaking engagement. He 

hastened back to Washington and submitted his resignation to President Truman. 

His reasons, as stated in a letter to Secretary Johnson, were that the ship was considered to be of highest priority in the Navy and, more important, that the arbitrary manner of its cancellation, without consultation with the Secretary of the 

Navy, was “unprecedented” and might have “far-reaching” consequences. His 

resignation was accepted.‘4 

The cancellation of the USS Unit& Stattls released some $130 million for 

other projects in FY 1950. Acting Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball recommended to Mr. Johnson that some of these funds be spent for the conversion of 

existing ships, principally two Essex class fleet carriers which were to be 

adapted to handle jet aircraft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom the Secretary 

of Defense referred this recommendation, were no more able to agree to the 

conversion of two Essex class carriers than they had been on the construction of 

a super carrier. Once again, the Chief of Naval Operations encountered united 

opposition from the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff. They argued that the 

Navy had no need for the ships, which would be capable of handling 52,000 

pound aircraft. The Navy already had three heavy carriers in service and three 

more under construction, a number General Bradley considered to be sufficient. 

General Vandenberg maintained that even this number was excessive. Both 

agreed that the funds saved by cancellation of the USS United States should be 

returned to the national economy, or, if this was not feasible, be spent on antisubmarine warfare. 

175 
Failure to convert the two ships would limit them to use with obsolescent aircraft. There was no intention, he said, to employ them for heavy bombers. The 

conversions were not intended to increase the number of modern carriers currently in active status; the purpose was to add to the pool of ships available in the 

event of mobilization. To convert a carrier required two years. A decision against 

the proposed conversions would therefore limit the Navy carrier force to six 

ships during the first two years of war.?5 

Secretary Johnson, in contrast to his action on the super carrier, supported the 

Navy on the ship conversions. After considering the JCS memorandum of 13 

June and hearing the views of the Services at a meeting of the War Council, he 

announced his approval of the conversion on 21 June. This decision, he added, 

had already been approved by the President.?(> 

Navy Charges against the B-36 

T he opening round in what was to become a public challenge by members of 

the Navy Department against the recent strategic and budgetary decisions 

was fired by Mr. Cedric Worth, civilian assistant to the Under Secretary of the 

Navy. He prepared an anonymous document charging that the Air Force B-36 

bomber was a “billion dollar blunder,” a mediocre aircraft incapable of performing its combat role effectively. It was only kept in production because the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force had a financial interest in it, 

and because they owed personal and political favors to Mr. Floyd Odlum, head 

of Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft, the company that was manufacturing the B-36.z7 

The big bomber was a tempting target for Navy salvos. It had come to symbolize for the Navy critics what they considered to be over-reliance on an unsound 

military policy-strategic atomic bombing-and a resulting curtailment of Navy 

programs. Action taken by the Air Force some months before to increase procurement of B-36s now was viewed by the Navy critics as confirming their fears. 

The design of the B-36 dated back to 1941. A production order for 100 had 

been let in 1943, but actual production did not begin until after World War II 

ended. The first models encountered design deficiencies, but these were overcome, and the Air Force, after considering a cancellation of the program, decided 

to continue production. Production models of the B-36 were beginning to enter 

the Air Force inventory by the middle of calendar year 1948. 

Here matters stood in December 1948 when the President decided to limit the 

Air Force to 48 groups during FY 1950. There were then 59 active groups in the 

Air Force, with 7 more scheduled to be activated by 30 June 1949. The Air Force 

convened a board of general officers to plan the necessary reduction from 59 to 

48 groups. Their recommendation, made on 6 January 1949, was to deactivate 11 

groups, all but one of which were tactical, and to cancel procurement of aircraft 

176 
groups, the Board recommended the expenditure of $172,949,000 of the savings 

for 39 additional B-36B and RB-36B aircraft with which to convert two SAC 

medium bomb groups to heavy bombers? 

The Secretary of the Air Force approved these recommendations and on 28 

January requested the Secretary of Defense to allocate the necessary funds. He in 

turn sought the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who replied on 21 February that 

they had no objection in view of assurances by the Air Force Chief of Staff that 

there would be no change in the “strategic concept or basic composition of the 

forces concerned. . .” 24 

The Air Force had made a public announcement on 17 January that the additional B-36s would be procured. This action served to further Navy suspicions 

that the Air Force was attempting to “railroad” through the purchase of the aircraft. As Admiral Radford later testified before the House Armed Services Committee, the Air Force “placed Mr. Forrestal and the Chief of Naval Operations, as 

a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the anomalous position of either going 

along with the Air Force plans or of repudiating them after they had been 

announced to the public and to the aircraft industry.“4o 

The Air Force recommended, and the Secretary of Defense approved, still 

another purchase of 36 B-36s on 14 April 1949. As in the case of the previous procurement authorization, this one involved no additional money and no increase 

in the total aircraft inventory, nor did it alter the force structure of the Air Force. 

Unlike the previous action, it did not result in an increase in the number of active 

heavy bombardment groups. All that was involved was the cancellation of procurement of B-54 aircraft, considered by the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air 

Command (CINCSAC), to be inferior to the B-36, and the enlargement of the 

existing four heavy bomber groups from 18 to 30 aircraft to accommodate the 

additional B-36s. The only participation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in this transaction was to “note” it at the request of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, an 

action taken on 9 ApriL41 

The Decision of Congress to Investigate 

A copy of Mr. Worth’s document was placed in the hands of Congressman 

James Van Zandt, a champion of Navy interests who demanded that the 

charges be investigated. Accordingly, the House Armed Services Committee, 

headed by Congressman Carl Vinson, launched an investigation.J2 

The Committee met on 9 June 1949 and adopted an agenda that ranged 

beyond the specific charges made by Mr. Worth and into major questions of strategy, roles and missions, and unification. It was as follows: 

1. Establish the truth or falsity of all charges made by Mr. Van Zandt and others the committee may find or develop in the investigation. 

177 
3. Examine the erformance characteristics of the B-36 bomber to determine 

whether it is a satis Pactory weapon. 

4. Examine the roles and missions of the Air Force and Navy (especially Navy 

aviation and Marine aviation) to determine whether or not the decision to cancel 

the construction of the aircraft carrier USS Uvzitcd States was sound. 

5. Establish whether or not the Air Force is concentrating upon strategic 

bombing to such extent as to be in’urious to tactical aviation and the development of adequate fighter aircraft an cl fighter-aircraft techniques. 

6. Consider the procedures followed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the development of weapons to be used by the respective Services to determine whether 

or not it is pro osed that two of the three Services will be permitted to pass on 

the weapons o P the third.

7. Study the effectiveness of strategic bombing to determine whether the 

Nation is sound in following this concept to its present extent. 

8. Consider all other matters pertinent to the above that may be developed 

during the course of the investigation4? 

The hearings on these matters were divided into two separate phases. Inquiry 

into items one and two, having to do with the validity and source of the Worth 

charges, constituted the first phase and took place daily from August 9 through 

August 12 and August 22 through August 25. They resulted in complete exoneration of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force and their subordinates. “There has not been,” the Committee concluded, “. one iota, not one 

scintilla of evidence offered.. . that would support charges or insinuations that 

collusion, fraud, corruption, influence, or favoritism played any part whatsoever 

in the procurement of the B-36 bomber.” The remaining items, which dealt with 

broad issues of strategy and unification of the Armed Services, occupied the 

Committee’s time from 6 through 21 October. It was this phase that aired the 

Navy challenge to the JCS strategic concepts and to the functioning of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff.j” 

The Role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Hearings 

T he individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting in their capacity as 

professional heads of their respective Services, played a prominent part in 

both phases of the hearings. General Bradley, the newly appointed Chairman, 

testified also, but as an individual and not as a spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. During their testimony, the members described past actions, positions, and 

178 
Participation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the hearings as a corporate body 

was limited to furnishing the congressional committee with a written answer to 

item number seven on its agenda, having to do with the effectiveness of strategic 

bombing. This item was the subject of investigation during the second phase of 

the hearings. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff became involved in preparing an answer to this question as a result of a directive of 13 June from the Under Secretary of Defense, 

who, concerned about the broadened scope of the congressional investigation, 

directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to present their views to the War Council. At the 

same time they were to consider the extent to which JCS papers and methods of 

operation should be made public. The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the matter 

on 21 June and decided to present their views to the War Council, which was 

scheduled to meet the next day.4s 

At the War Council meeting on 22 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Secretary 

Johnson that their only concern was with the Committee’s item seven, having to 

do with the effectiveness of strategic bombing and its place in current strategy. To 

answer questions on this topic, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed, would lead to 

the revelation of classified information that should be withheld in the interests of 

national security. General Bradley proposed that Congressman Vinson be asked 

to withdraw the item, but General Vandenberg made the point that, even if this 

were done, the subject was sure to be brought up by some Committee member 

during the hearings. He suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff furnish the Committee a strong statement that, in their collective judgment, the present concept of 

and reliance on strategic bombing was sound. Such a statement, he believed, 

would be acceptable to the Committee and would preclude later detailed probing into the matter by its members. 

Secretary Johnson then asked each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether 

he favored the current concept of and reliance on strategic bombing. All replied 

in the affirmative, including Admiral Denfeld. After some further discussion, the 

Secretary directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a statement as proposed by 

General Vandenberg.4h 

The statement, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 July and delivered 

to Mr. Vinson, was a ringing endorsement of the strategic concept in the current 

joint war plan TROJAN. “The Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed,” read the statement, “that in the initial phases of a war the greatest possible advantage will 

accrue to the United States through the prompt launching of a strategic bombing 

offensive against the enemy’s war-making potential. . . .‘I This position had been 

arrived at after “exhaustive study” and the preparation of strategic studies and 

joint plans for national defense. All the plans called for the employment of 

strategic bombing, a concept which had been tested through joint studies and 

found to “offer the most effective methods of securing our national 

defense. . The Joint Chiefs of Staff separately and jointly are of the firm opinion that the concept of strategic bombing, and the extent of its employment as 

now planned, are sound.“47 

179 
T he individual Services, not the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided the bulk of the 

testimony during the 8-36 hearings. Their preparation for the task showed a 

marked contrast. The Air Force established a special office under W. Barton 

Leach, a reserve colonel in the Air Force and a Harvard Law School professor 

with wide government experience. Secretary Symington and General Vandenberg gave Mr. Leach and his group their full support. 

The Navy preparations were assigned to career Navy line officers of OI’ 23, 

the Organizational Policy and Research Division of the Office of the Chief of 

Naval Operations, which was headed by Captain Arleigh A. Burke. OP 23 was 

an existing organization that had other functions and could provide only limited 

support for Navy witnesses. Secretary Mathews and Admiral Denfeld did not 

concern themselves directly with the preparations. Leadership of the effort was 

provided by Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the former Vice Chief of Naval Operations and current Commander in Chief, Pacific, who had been recalled to Washington to testify at the request of Congressman Vinsonds 

Admiral Denfeld, although he did not participate actively in preparing the 

Navy’s case,later testified that he fully supported the “broad conclusions” of the 

Navy witnesses. Secretary of the Navy Mathews read Admiral Radford’s prepared 

statement the day before it was delivered but did not give it his official approvalJY 

The procedure for presenting testimony adopted by Admiral Radford and his 

associatesemphasized a “team” approach of the type often used in military briefings. Admiral Radford led off with a broad overview of the case.Subsequent witnessesproduced and developed evidence to support specific points introduced by 

Admiral Radford. These witnesses fell into two categories: relatively junior officers 

testifying astechnical experts on aerial warfare and aircraft performance; and senior 

officers who dealt with broad questions of policy and strategy. This latter group 

included officers from the retired list who had exercised high command in World 

War II and immediately thereafter, as well as officers on active duty who were currently occupying major command positions in the Navy. The retirees included Fleet 

Admiral Ernest J. King, former Commander in Chief (COMINCH) and CNO; Fleet 

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, former CNO and CINCI’AC; and Fleet Admiral Willian 

F. Halsey and Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, who had commanded the huge 

fleets, built around fast carrier task forces, that ranged the Pacific during World War 

II. The active duty officers included the current Chief of Naval Operations and three 

officers serving as the commanders of unified and specified commands: Admiral 

Radford, CINCPAC; Admiral William H. I? Blandy, Commander in Chief, 

Atlantic (CINCLANT); and Admiral Richard L. Conolly, Commander in Chief, 

Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM). 

The Navy Challenge to Strategy 

T he case against strategic atomic bombing consisted of two charges. First, the 

operations as conceived could not be carried out with available aircraft. Sec-
operations employing the B-36, although current war plans placed primary 

reliance on B-29s and B-50s flying from basesin the United Kingdom and Okinawa. Admiral Radford provided an explanation for this concentration on the 

B-36. It had become, he said, in the minds of the American people, 

a symbol of a theory of warfare-the atomic blitz-which promises them a cheap 

and easy victor if war should come.. . Since the B-36 does symbolize this theory, this plane i: as attained an importance out of proportion to the real issues 

involved.. . For this reason, it is better that we first consider the capabilities of 

the B-36 in order to make a more objective analysis of the theories of warfare 

which will be presented later.“” 

The concentration on the B-36, however, introduced an element of artificiality 

into the discussion of strategic atomic bombing. Admiral Radford and his associates went to great lengths to discredit a strategy that, although widely advocated 

by unofficial spokesmen for the Air Force, had never been proposed officially by 

that Service nor approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.F1 

To determine whether the B-36 was a satisfactory weapon, according to 

Admiral Radford, would first require an answer to the question: “Can the B-36 

be intercepted and destroyed in unacceptable numbers?” The answer was “Yes,“ 

if the bomber was unescorted by fighters. The evidence to support this conclusion was given by technical experts who testified that aircraft in service or soon 

to be introduced into service with the Fleet could easily track and destroy a B-36 

flying at 40,000 feet even at night. They based their opinions on actual intercepts 

under test conditions and on extrapolation from the results of daylight raids 

against Germany by B-17s during World War 11.12None of the witnesses 

attempted to hypothesize the conditions to be encountered by American bombers 

attacking the Soviet Union in 1949, as had been done, for example, in the Air 

Force study of delivery capabilities in December 1948.51In that study, the Air 

Force had taken into account the factors that currently limited the effectiveness of 

Soviet antiaircraft defense. The Navy witnesses, on the other hand, spoke in 

terms of weapons that could, because of the state of the art, be assumed to be 

available to the Soviet Union at that time or in the near future. 

The second question to be answered in evaluating the B-36, as set forth by 

Admiral Radford, was “. . . if the B-36 reaches a target can it hit what needs to be 

hit from high altitude?” The answer to this question was “No.““” The evidence, 

again, came from testimomy by a technical witness, Commander Eugene Tatom, 

a radar specialist. He described the difficulties involved in bombing by radar and 

visual sighting from high altitude, as illustrated by errors made by the Eighth Air 

Force in bombing Germany during World War II. He also described the characteristics of the atomic bomb, contending that, while it was completely devastating in the immediate vicinity of its burst, it was limited in its area of destruction. 

Precision bombing was therefore essential, but, judging from the experience of 

World War II, unattainable. There could thus be no assurance of destroying a particular target from 40,000 feet, the altitude at which the B-36 was to operate, 

181 
This saturation bombing, the Navy officers maintained, did not support the 

policies, objectives, and commitments of the United States. This part of the case 

was presented by Rear Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie, formerly a member of the Joint 

Strategic Bombing Survey and currently a member of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission. He argued that, since war was an 

instrument of national policy, the method of waging it should be adjusted to policy objectives. The greatest defect of strategic bombing as currently planned was 

that it was not related to policy. It would not contribute to the defense of Western 

Europe. It would result in the wholesale extermination of civilians, an outcome 

that was contrary to fundamental 

opposed by the American people 

damage on the physical structure 

attainment of a stable postwar 

achievement of the stated American 

the peoples of the world.5h 

American ideals and would therefore be 

on moral grounds. And it would wreak vast 

of civilization, thereby placing in jeopardy the 

world economy, which was essential to the 

aim of a lasting peace and prosperity for all 

The Navy’s Alternate Strategy 

I f area bombing employing atomic weapons was not a strategy that would 

serve the national interest, what did the Navy witnesses propose in its place? 

Their answer to this question derived from their identification of strategic objectives to be attained in a war with the Soviet Union, of the tactics to be employed 

to achieve them, and of the forces needed to put the tactics into effect. 

Strategic objectives were not developed in detail by the Navy witnesses, who 

devoted most of their attention to tactics and types of forces. Admiral Ofstie presented the most complete identification of strategic objectives, which he listed as 

defense of Western Europe, defense of allied bases, and control of the sea. The 

importance of the last item in Admiral Ofstie’s list, as might be expected from 

naval officers, was stressed by all the witnesses who addressed strategic questions. The necessity to control the seas was not a controversial matter. It had been 

endorsed by the leaders of all Services and had been incorporated in the strategic 

plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

It became apparent during the hearings that the real area of disagreement 

between the Air Force and Army and their Navy critics concerned the application of air power to a land war in Western Europe. The Navy witnesses main 

tained that air power to be effective should be employed tactically in support of 

the armies of Western European countries and in strikes on the advancing Soviet 

armies and their vulnerable lines of communications. Without strong tactical air 

support the Western European armies could not successfully oppose major 

enemy ground attacks. These enemy armies, before launching an offensive, 

would be well-stocked, manned, and prepared to fight for a long time without 

182 
attack. The defending forces should therefore concentrate on the advancing 

enemy forces themselves and on their vulnerable lines of communication. They 

should strike at rail lines, bridges, supply depots, and advancing columns of 

enemy troops. 

These forces required to implement these tactics, the Navy witnesses maintained, were tactical air forces-light bombers and fighter-bombers capable of 

precision attacks on rail lines, marshalling yards, bridges, storage dumps, and 

troop columns. Both Air Force and Navy aircraft should be employed in these 

attacks. Aircraft operating from carriers would be especially valuable where land 

baseswere limited or unavailable. 

The heavy long-range strategic bomber could not perform these essential tactical missions efficiently. The Air Force, therefore, should not be allowed to “put 

its eggs in one basket” by overemphasizing procurement of the heavy bomber at 

the expense of tactical bombers and fighters.57 

The Challenge to Strategy: Views of Admiral Denfeld 

T he last witness for the Navy was Admiral Denfeld, who faced a real 

dilemma. As Chief of Naval Operations, he had sat on the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff and had approved Joint Emergency War Plans HALFMOON/FLEETWOOD 

and TROJAN, both of which provided for air operations employing the atomic 

bomb and carried out by the Strategic Air Command as the only major offensive 

action in the early stage of war. He had also approved the purchase of additional 

B-36s in February and April 1949 and had joined with the other chiefs in their 

strongly worded endorsement of strategic bombing for the Armed Services Committee in June. But as uniformed head of the Navy he was faced with a revolt of 

major proportions against these very strategic concepts by many influential 

admirals on both the active and retired lists.sx 

Admiral Denfeld’s dilemma was reflected in his testimony. At the outset he 

generally endorsed the views expressed by the Navy witnesses. “I fully support 

the broad conclusions presented to this committee by the naval and marine officers who.. . preceded me,” he informed the Committee. The consensus of these 

witnesses, as already pointed out, had been that strategic bombing as conceived 

by the Air Force was a mistake, and that it should be replaced by a tactical air 

offensive aimed at enemy forces in the field and their lines of communication. In 

support of this position, Admiral Denfeld now testified before the Committee 

that the “early air offensive.. . must be directed with far greater precision and 

selectivity than the bombing effort in the last war.” The delivery of this offensive, 

furthermore, was “not solely a function of the United States Air Force. This country’s total military air power is the combined air strength of the Air Force, the 

Navy, and the Marine Corps.” 

183 
referred to the WSEG and the Harmon Committee as essential to an evaluation of 

strategic atomic bombing. At the time of his testimony, only the Harmon Committee had completed its work. Admiral Denfeld testified that he concurred in its conclusions, a position that would seem to contradict his earlier statements. The Harmon Committee, it will be recalled, had concluded that every effort should be 

made to deliver the atomic bomb to appropriate targets. And if the WSEG findings 

were essential to an evaluation of strategic atomic bombing, then it would seem 

premature to support the views of those who had, in effect, already rejected it. 

In dealing with purely naval matters, Admiral Denfeld faced no such 

dilemma. He had consistently championed a strong Navy with a large modern 

carrier component and had resisted every effort to cut back naval forces whether 

in the Joint Chiefs of Staff or in Defense Department budget preparations. As a 

witness before the Armed Services Committee, he continued to press this case. 

He took particular pains to counter the arguments made by General Bradley and 

General Vandenberg in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and advanced by them and other 

Army and Navy spokesmen in other forums, that the weakness of Soviet sea 

power diminished the need for a strong US Navy. There was, he testified, a 

“steady campaign to relegate the Navy to a convoy and antisubmarine service, 

on the grounds that any probable enemy possesses only negligible fleet 

strength.” This was a misconception. “After the possibility of naval action has 

been eliminated . . . ,“ he told the Committee, “the need for a powerful fleet is in 

nowise lessened. . . The Navy’s ultimate function in war is to exert the steady, 

unrelenting pressure of our Nation’s military might against the homeland of an 

enemy. ” To illustrate, he pointed to the example of the Okinawa operation of 

World War II, “where the largest fleet of warships in history was essential to victory, long after the Japanese Fleet had been largely annihilated.““” 

The Defense of Approved Strategy 

T he task of countering the Navy contentions on strategy fell primarily to General Bradley and General Vandenberg. ho Strategic bombing, because it had 

been singled out by the Navy for attack, was the major topic of their rebuttal. 

General Bradley found justification for it in general terms on the ground that 

“any damage you can inflict upon the war-making potential of a nation, and any 

great injury you can inflict upon the morale of that nation contributes to the victory.” It would have particular importance, he felt, during the early stages of war, 

when it would “affect an enemy’s ability to prosecute a war and give us some 

needed time to mobilize our resources.“” General Vandenberg pointed out that 

strategic bombing was a way to save American lives. “A prime objective of this 

country,” he said, “must be to find a counterbalance to the potential enemy’s 

masses of ground troops other than equal masses of American and Allied ground 

troops. No such balancing factor exists other than strategic bombing.““’ Both 

184 
the so-called atomic blitz and stated that a war with Russia would ultimately 

be won on the ground. 

Both Generals also made particular efforts to rebut the Navy contention that 

strategic bombing was not feasible. They defended strategic bombing in general 

and the B-36 in particular. In addressing the first topic, they relied heavily on the 

experience of World War II. General Bradley maintained that the air offensive 

“had a decisive effect on the ultimate ability of the allies to defeat Germany in a 

shorter time, saving many, many lives.” And General Vandenberg reminded the 

Committee that “no bombing mission set in motion by the Army Air Force in 

World War II was ever stopped short of its target by enemy opposition.““4 

Their defense of the B-36 consisted of assertions that the plane had been 

judged and found acceptable by officers with long experience in strategic bombardment. “I think the country should know,” said General Vandenberg, “that 

the officers who are in charge of the strategic bombing program.. . have heard 

[the Navy assertions] . . . and have concluded that the assertions are unfounded. 

The men who have arrived at that conclusion are the most experienced men in 

the world in conducting long-range operations.“hs And General Bradley pointed 

out that the Navy had no direct experience with the big bomber. “No Navy pilot 

has flown a B-36,” he said, “nor have [Naval officers] participated in tests with 

this bomber.” hh 

General Bradley took particular pains to answer the charges that the Navy 

had been so reduced that its offensive power had been destroyed. Employing the 

same arguments that he had advanced in JCS deliberations on the matter, General Bradley insisted that the Navy was adequate to perform its assigned missions of keeping open sea lanes by combatting enemy fleets which were weak in 

surface vessels but strong in submarines. The Navy arguments for more large 

carriers, however, had not been based on the need for “action against a Russian 

fleet,” or even against “the menace of the submarine,” but on an alleged need “to 

attack land targets and to oppose hostile air in limited areas for a limited time. 

This,” he concluded, “is not the Navy’s primary mission.” Such a capability 

“would be nice to have,” but “it cannot be furnished without reducing the 

strength of either the Army, the Air Force, or the Navy’s ability to perform its 

primiry mission of keeping the sealanes open.““7 

Criticism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

T he Navy witnesses had attributed the faulty strategic decisions to misapplications of the unification law. Admiral Denfeld, who summed up the Navy 

case on this subject, cited a number of examples. One was the premature 

announcement by the Air Force in January 1949 that additional B-36s would be 

procured, before the matter had been studied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Secretary of Defense. Another was Secretary Johnson’s abrupt reversal of the decision 

185 
a copy of the press announcement of the cancellation just forty minutes after he 

delivered to the Secretary the JCS memorandum of 23 April on the subject.“H 

The 1950 budget was another source of complaint. Under that budget, Admiral Denfeld charged, the Navy’s combat forces had, for the first time, been determined by “arbitrary decision.” His objection was to the procedure introduced by 

Secretary Forrestal, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were required to determine 

the composition of military forces under an imposed monetary ceiling. The result 

had been the establishment of strategic priorities that dictated a reduction in 

Naval ship strength below the level deemed prudent by Navy leaders.hyThus the 

Navy had been denied the opportunity of earlier years to “construct the best possible Navy with the funds appropriated by Congress.” The situation had been 

made worse, according to Admiral Denfeld, by the fact that the Navy had 

recently been directed to make a further cut below the amount already requested 

of Congress for FY 1950. The impact of this last-minute reduction had not been 

discussed with Naval authorities, nor had the proposal been placed before the 

JCS Budget Advisory Committee. 

The budgetary decisions and the cancellation of the super carrier, according to 

Admiral Denfeld, reflected a developing cleavage within the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

in which the Navy was opposed by the other two Services. Most of the issues 

involved the Navy’s air arm, the future of which was thus gravely imperilled, 

although the need for Naval aviation had been recognized by Congress in the 

National Security Act of 1947. 

Admiral Denfeld’s conclusion was that the 1947 law “has not yet begun to 

function as the Congress intended.” He proposed several remedies. Each Service, within the limitations of its budget, should be permitted to “design and 

develop its own weapons.” In the “present stage of unification,” it should be 

recognized “that the views of a particular service are entitled to predominant 

weight in the determination of the forces needed by that service to fulfill its missions.” Finally, the “scope and activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” should be 

limited to “those specifically mentioned in the National Security Act,” and the 

law, as well as the Key West Agreement on roles and missions, should be supported “literally.” 7o 

Implicit in these latter remarks was Admiral Denfeld’s own interpretation of 

the National Security Act. Others, however, might contend that the law could be 

“literally” interpreted as assigning to the Joint Chiefs of Staff some of the very 

power that the Chief of Naval Operations wished to reserve to the Services. One 

of the duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set forth in the law was to “review 

major materiel and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance 

with strategic and logistic plans.” Was a combat vessel of the magnitude and 

importance of the USS United States a “major materiel requirement” as contemplated by this provision of the law? Secretary Johnson evidently believed that it 

was. Secretary Forrestal seems to have thought so too, as indicated by his 

remarks to the press on the subject after the Key West conference. And both obvi186 
The Committee Findings 

The hearings on unification and strategy conducted by the House Armed 

Services Committee had aired serious charges by Navy officers against the 

judgments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on broad issues of national military policy 

and against the decisions of the President and Secretary of Defense on those 

issues. As a political body, the Committee quite correctly refrained from attempting to resolve professional military disagreements. The Committee also avoided 

making judgments on specific weapons systems. It held that “the Nation must 

rely upon the judgment of its professional leaders in their respective fields in 

matters of this nature-and that the Nation’s leaders in respect to weapons of the 

Air Force are the leaders of the United States Air Force. . . . The Nation’s leaders 

in respect to naval weapons are the leaders of the United States Navy.” The Committee therefore proposed no interference with the B-36 program. It deplored the 

manner in which the USS United States had been cancelled, but decided not to 

recommend resumption of construction in view of budgetary limitations and the 

pressure of other shipbuilding programs. 

Turning to matters of Defense organization, the Committee indicated its 

approval of the concept of unification and, by implication, of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff. However, added the Committee, the JCS structure, as presently constituted, 

did not “insure at all times adequate consideration for the views of all Services.” 

It proposed therefore to sponsor legislation to require rotation of the position of 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after a two-year term, and to add the Commandant of the Marine Corps as a member.7J 

Relief of Admiral Denfeld 

hile the reaction of the House Armed Services Committee to the charges 

made by Navy officers was relatively mild, the administration responded 

with greater severity. This was to be expected, because it was the authority of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President that had been 

challenged when virtually the entire high command of the Navy had taken their 

case to Congress and to the public. The action taken was to replace Admiral Denfeld as Chief of Naval Operations, who, by order of President Truman, was transferred to other duties on 27 October 1949. Secretary of the Navy Mathews had 

requested the transfer because his relations with Admiral Denfeld had deteriorated to the point where it was extremely difficult for them to work together. “A 

military establishment is not a political democracy,” the Secretary said. “Integrity 

187 
official ranks.” 72 To replace Admiral Denfeld, President Truman named Admiral 

Forrest P. Sherman, who assumed his new duties on 2 November 1949. 

The WSEG Report 

A definitive answer to divergent Service views on strategy and weapons was 

hardly to be expected from any source. The establishment of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, however, raised the prospect that the extent of disagreement might eventually be narrowed by application of the techniques of scientific 

analysis. “It is our hope, through the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, to bring 

the capabilities of various weapons.. . out of the area of interservice controversy 

and into the area of fact,” said Secretary Johnson, during the Committee hearings7” 

The WSEG report on the US capability to deliver an atomic offensive, which 

had been some months in preparation, was finally submitted to the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff on 8 February 1950. The Group had assumed a target date of 1 May 1950 

in order to reflect current US capabilities. The WSEG had also found it necessary 

to overcome a serious deficiency in intelligence data by hypothesizing two sets of 

Soviet air defense capabilities: a lower level, and a higher one reflecting possible 

improvements in anticipation of a war in 1950. The two estimates did not necessarily bracket the actual Soviet capabilities. 

Assuming that Soviet capabilities did not substantially exceed the higher 

level, WSEG concluded the atomic phase of the strategic air offensive called for 

by OFFTACKLE could be carried out if certain deficiencies in US forces were rectified. These deficiencies included a shortage of medium bomber bases in the 

United Kingdom and inadequate defenses for existing bases; conflicting claims 

on airlift, which threatened to limit the number of transport aircraft available to 

support the strategic air offensive; and a shortage of aviation fuel stocks in operating areas. The conventional phase of the attack was not feasible, however, 

because of logistic difficulties and expected bomber losses. 

If the deficiencies were overcome, WSEG estimated that about 70 to 85 percent 

of the atomic bomb carriers would succeed in dropping their bombs in the target 

areas. Each bomb was capable of destroying from one-half to two-thirds of an 

industrial target. Bomber losses to be expected in these operations would be 

about 30 percent in night operations and 50 percent in attacks carried out in daylight. The WSEG concluded that, in the interests of national security, action 

should be taken to correct the grave deficiencies in intelligence of enemy capabilities and to re-examine the OFFTACKLE target list in view of the infeasibility of 

carrying out the conventional phase of the bombing planTd 

The WSEG report, atthough it shed considerable light on the feasibility of the 

strategic air offensive, did not provide a final answer to the question posed by 

Secretary Forrestal in October 1948 regarding the wisdom of giving primary 

emphasis to atomic bombing. The question had, however, been overtaken by 

188 
Air Force for use in correcting the deficiencies in strategic forces and in reviewing 

operational plans. WSEG was given the further task of applying the conclusions 

of its study to the findings of the Harmon Committee-in short, of refining the 

estimates of the impact of strategic bombing on the Soviet war effort.‘” 

Whether the WSEG report, if submitted earlier, could have headed off the confrontation between the Navy and the Air Force may be doubted. In any case, it 

had come too late to do so. It assumed significance, however, as part of the continuing effort to keep US military strategy abreast of the requirements of the 

national policy of containment. 

189 

11 

Collective Defense of the 

Atlantic Community 

The Brussels Pact 

The Soviet seizure of Czechoslovakia and the blockade of Berlin, climaxing 

other aggressive Soviet actions in the postwar period, provided the stimulus 

for a drastic alteration in US foreign policy. The traditional avoidance of “entangling alliances” gave way to a search for security through collective arrangements with like-minded nations. The North Atlantic Treaty and its accompanying 

military aid program were the result. As President Truman recalled in his memoirs, “Russia’s toughness and truculence in the Berlin matter had led many Europeans to realize the need for closer military assistance ties among the Western 

Nations, and this led to discussions which eventually resulted in the establishment of NATO. Berlin had been a lesson to all.” ’ 

The idea of a defensive alliance among anticommunist nations had first been 

proposed by Winston Churchill in 1946 in his famous “iron curtain” speech at 

Fulton, Missouri. The Canadian Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Louis St. Laurent, had expressed similar views in a speech before the UN General Assembly in 

September 1947.2 

The first concrete step in the development of the Atlantic alliance came in the 

winter of 1948, when the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 

Luxembourg joined together in a treaty of mutual defense, signed in Brussels on 

17 March. The train of events leading to the BrusselsTreaty had been set in motion 

by British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin on 22 January. In a speech in the House 

of Commons he proposed bilateral agreements linking Great Britain with Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, similar to the Dunkirk Treaty of March 

1947 between Britain and France. The Benelux countries felt, however, that the 

Dunkirk formula was inadequate because it was designed to guard against German aggression and not against the Soviet Union, which they considered to be the 

main threat. They proposed instead the multilateral form that was ultimately 

191 
By the terms of the Brussels Treaty, its signatories agreed to give all possible 

military aid to any one of them that might be attacked, to coordinate their economic activities, and to foster popular understanding of the principles forming 

the basis of their common civilization. A Consultative Council, so organized as to 

function continuously, was set up, consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the signatories. It was supported by a Permanent Commission, made up of the four 

Ambassadors in London together with a British official having ambassadorial 

status. The organization was known as the Western European Union (WEU).4 

The Brussels Treaty did not identify the power or powers from whom an 

attack might come. That the Soviet Union was the potential aggressor was made 

clear during the negotiations. Foreign Secretary Bevin, in his speech in the House 

of Commons on 22 January, pointed out that the actions of the Soviets since 

World War II had “revealed a policy. . to use every means in their power to get 

Communist control in Eastern Europe, and, as it now appears in the West as well. 

It matters little how we temporize, and maybe appease, or try to make arrangements. . . . These developments. . point to the conclusion that the free nations of 

Western Europe must now draw closely together.“i 

The US Reaction to the Brussels Pact 

T he British proposal for an alliance with France and the Benelux countries was 

known to the US Government before it was publicly announced. In a letter 

forwarding an outline of Foreign Secretary Bevin’s plan, the British Ambassador, 

Lord Inverchapel, expressed the hope that it would meet with the approval of the 

US Government.” After consulting President Truman, Secretary Marshall replied 

that the initiative Mr. Bevin was taking would be “warmly applauded in the 

United States. I want him to know that.. . I wish to see the United States do 

everything which it properly can in assisting the European nations in bringing a 

project along this line to fruition.” 7 

Encouraged by this response, Mr. Bevin sought further support for the Western European alliance. Lord Inverchapel told Under Secretary of State Lovttt 

frankly that, in Mr. Bevin’s view, the proposed treaties could not be effective 

without assurance of US support for the defense of Western Europe. Mr. Bevin 

did not expect a specific commitment of US forces to operate on the continent of 

Europe, but he hoped for a general agreement by the United States with Great 

Britain to go to war with an aggressor. 

The US view, as stated by Mr. Lovett, was that no military commitment by the 

United States could be undertaken until the European nations had entered into 

binding agreements among themselves. In addition, Congress had reached a crucial state in its deliberations on the European Recovery Program, and any suggestion of new and extensive military commitments might have an adverse effect 

upon them.H 

192 
dent Truman included in his address to Congress on the same day the statement 

that the signing of the treaty was a development that “deserves our full support. 

I am confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the 

free nations the support which the situation requires. I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by 

an equal determination on our part to help them to protect tl~emselves.“y 

Efforts to specify the “support which the situation requires” began with the 

submission by the Department of State to the National Security Council Staff of a 

paper on the US position toward the WEU. With minor amendments, which were 

concurred in by representatives of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air 

Force and the National Security Resources Board, it was designated NSC 9, placed 

on the National Security Council agenda and circulated to the Council members. 

The principal conclusion in NSC 9 was that military as well as economic support from the United States for the anticommunist nations of Western Europe 

would be required if they were to resist Soviet aggression. But the United States 

should not become a party to the Brussels Treaty. It should, rather, begin a procedure aimed ultimately at achieving a larger collective defense agreement, 

embracing the entire North Atlantic area. 

The first step towards this goal would be to ask the signatories of the Brussels 

Treaty whether they would enter into such an agreement. It should include Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, and Italy. If the Brussels powers agreed, the necessary diplomatic approaches would be made to the prospective members by the 

United States, the United Kingdom, and France. 

Assuming the success of these steps, the President would then declare that 

any hostile action in the North Atlantic area against one of the Brussels Treaty 

signatories would be regarded by the United States as an attack on itself, to be 

dealt with under Article 51 of the UN Charter (which established the right of selfdefense for member nations). He would at the same time offer to extend similar 

support to any other Western European country that acceded to the Brussels 

Treaty. Pending agreement among the Brussels Pact nations on collective defense 

measures, the United States would decide what steps to take unilaterally. 

The United States would then invite all of the above-named powers, and in 

addition Canada, Eire, and Portugal, to a conference for the purpose of drawing 

up a collective defense agreement for the North Atlantic area. This agreement 

should apply to the continental territory of any party in Europe and America, 

any territory in Europe occupied by the forces of any party, all islands in the 

North Atlantic, and the waters thereof, including the air above them. Acts of 

aggression against any member within this area would be considered as aggression against all. Until implementing agencies had been set up and the means for 

joint action had been worked out, each party would determine for itself the necessary measures to fulfill the obligations of the Agreement. As a means to 

achieve some measure of mutual security as rapidly as possible, military conversations should be held between the United States and the present and future 

193 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their views on NSC 9 to Secretary Forrestal, 

at his request, on 23 April and asked him to transmit them to the National Security Council. They appreciated the need for a policy of collective defense as 

embodied in NSC 9, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, but they were concerned that 

the United States might make commitments in excess of its military capabilities. 

Every effort should therefore be made to avoid “commitment with implications 

extending to likelihood of major military involvement,” unless preparatory measures were taken first. These measures should include, as a minimum, “increased 

military manpower. . . and increased appropriations necessary for strengthening 

the potential of our National Military Establishment in all respects” and statutory 

authorizations for industrial mobilization of the type employed in World War 11. 

These measures should be devised to meet “at least requirements for effective 

emergency action and [should] be so planned that it will be practicable to extend 

their scope to all-out war effort without avoidable delay.” The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff were particularly concerned lest the United States surrender freedom of 

action in determining its global strategy in order to obtain reciprocal military 

support. They opposed any agreement that would have such a result. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked to be allowed to examine the proposed defense 

agreement before commenting definitively. By way of provisional comment, they 

objected that the North Atlantic area was not clearly defined in NSC 9. They 

objected also to the inclusion of islands in the North Atlantic not belonging to 

any party to the agreement and to the inclusion of the waters of the North 

Atlantic and the air over them. Such provisions would increase the possibility of 

war without the sanction of international law. A provision for consultation 

among all parties in the event that any party felt its territorial integrity or political independence to be threatened also drew criticism from the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, on the ground that consultation might lead to requests for military actions 

for which the United States was not prepared. 

With regard to the proposal for coordination of military production and supply with the Brussels powers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out that, as a practical matter, “coordination” meant provision of arms aid by the United States to 

the other nations. This was desirable, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized, but 

should not be allowed to interfere with the satisfaction of US arms requirements. 

The United States should also avoid the distortion of strategy that might result if 

arms aid were granted solely to meet foreign needs and without regard to strategic plans.” 

The Western European powers, meanwhile, were seeking an early start of military collaboration with the United States. On 17 April, the Foreign Ministers of 

Great Britain and France sent a messageto Secretary of State Marshall urging the 

United States to take the initiative and begin military talks with WEU representatives in WashingtonI 

The Truman administration was reluctant to begin negotiations without congressional approval. To this end, Secretary of State Lovett had opened discussions on 1XApril with Senator Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela194 
resolution stating that it was the sense of the Senate that the United States should 

enter into regional security arrangements. Final agreement on procedures was 

reached on 27 April at a meeting between Secretary Marshall, Under Secretary 

Lovett, Senator Vandenberg, and the Republican foreign policy adviser, Mr. John 

Foster Dulles. They agreed that the State Department would produce a short 

draft resolution for introduction in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Senator Vandenberg and Mr. Dulles were opposed to the convening of a large international conference to draft an Atlantic Defense Agreement. To do so, they 

argued, would lay the United States open to charges that it was undermining the 

United Nations by encouraging regional pacts. To meet this objection, the conferees agreed that, once the Senate had approved the resolution, the State Department would arrange for the Brussels Pact powers to consult on matters concerning international peace and security.‘” 

To accommodate these decisions, the NSC staff produced a new version of 

NSC 9. The new policy paper, NSC 9/2, concluded as follows: I4 

1. A resolution should be worked out with the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee along the lines of an annexed draft setting forth the “sense of the 

Senate” that the United States should pursue association “with such regional 

and other collective arrangements, based on self-help and mutual aid, as affect 

its national security.” 

2. After introduction of the resolution, the State Department, in reply to the 

message from the French and British Foreign Ministers, should indicate that the 

United States was now willing to participate in military talks scheduled by the 

five powers to take place in London. The United States was prepared to concert 

military plans against Soviet aggression in Europe and to coordinate military 

production and supply. 

3. At the London military talks, representatives of the National Military Establishment should make clear to the Brussels powers that, to receive US arms aid, 

they must satisfy two conditions: a. they must first plan their coordinated 

defense with the means presently available; and b. they must then determine 

how their collective military potential can be increased by coordinated production and supply, including standardization of equipment. The United States 

would then be prepared to consider their requests for necessary supplementary 

assistance but would expect as much reciprocal assistance from them as possible. 

4. The Department of State should discuss with the member nations of the 

Brussels Pact, the possibility of enhancing the security of Norway, Denmark, 

Sweden, Iceland, Italy and Portugal through some form of association with the 

Brussels treaty system or otherwise. 

5. The Department of State should seek Canadian participation in the London 

military talks. 

6. If, as a result of diplomatic talks with the Brussels powers, the US Government 

became convinced that some further political commitment was necessary to bolster 

public confidence in Western Europe, it should discuss with the Brussels powers 

and Canada some form of association along the lines of the Senate resolution.” 

195 
observed, appeared to have been written on the assumption that the United 

States would support the Western Union and other related free world countries. 

As evidence, they noted that the draft resolution had already been given to the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee where it was under active consideration. 

The problem to be addressed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded, was therefore to determine the steps the United States should take to increase the confidence of the Western European powers in their ability to defend themselves and 

to deter the Soviet Union from acts of aggression. In this connection, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff recommended that the role of US military representatives at the 

London military talks be clearly stated to be “on a non-membership basis.” This 

change in language should make clear the firm intent of the United States not to 

be committed to any agreement that might adversely affect its world strategy 

through grants of military assistance. It should also preclude being drawn into 

any command arrangement that could be expanded prematurely into an allied 

military council for global strategy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also recommended 

an amendment to NSC 9/2 to permit expansion of the Brussels Treaty to include 

Spain and the Western Zones of Germany and Austria. 

Turning their attention finally to the provision of NSC 9/2 for a formal association of the United States with the Brussels Pact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated 

that they “do not disagree.” But any such association reinforced the view repeatedly stated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for “United States military strength appropriate to our national policy and for every effort to avoid military commitment . . unless preceded by at least the degree of military strengthening that the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended.” Ih 

The National Security Council considered NSC 9/2 on 20 May, noted the proposed Senate resolution, and approved in principle the proposed course of 

action. The Council decided to review its actions after receiving the report by the 

Foreign Relations Committee and in the light of the JCS comments.‘7 

The State Department accordingly prepared a revised paper, NSC 9/3, but by 

the time it was finished on 28 June, the Senate had already approved the resolution. Designated Senate Resolution 239 and passed on 11 June, this document 

became popularly known as the “Vandenberg Resolution” in honor of its sponsor. The operative language, so far as US participation in collective defense was 

concerned, was as follows: 

Resolved.. that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate that this 

government. . should . . pursue. . within the United Nations Charter. . association of the United States, by Constitutional process, with such regional and 

other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help 

and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.lH 

NSC 9/3 acknowledged the Senate’s action by stating that Resolution 239 

should be “implemented to the fullest extent possible.” Two of the JCS recommendations-one calling for considering the extension of the Brussels Pact to 

196 
were accepted. In other respects, NSC 9/3 was identical to NSC 9/2. The 

National Security Council adopted NSC 9/3 on 1 July 1948; the President 

approved it on 2 July. 

US Participation in Brussels Pact Military Planning 

A s a result of the President’s approval of the recommendations in NSC 9/3, 

the National Military Establishment became directly involved in the military 

affairs of the WEU. Acting on the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary Forrestal dispatched a seven-man joint mission headed by Major General Lyman 

Lemnitzer, USA, to London to attend sessions of the WEU Military Committee.2’) 

As guidance for the US delegation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff laid down basic 

considerations to govern US military cooperation in both strategy and logistics. 

The current strategy of the WEU, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, was to 

fight “as far east in Germany as possible” so as to keep the Soviets away from the 

borders of the member states until American reinforcements could arrive. But the 

US delegation was to state frankly that initially American military support 

would be limited to forces already in Europe when hostilities began and to strategic air forces. The delegation was to encourage the development of short- and 

long-term strategic concepts based on the assumption that significant additional 

US forces would not be deployed to Europe except possibly in the late stages of 

the war. The continental powers should nevertheless be encouraged to plan, even 

in the short term, a denial of Western Europe to Soviet occupation. Given a reasonable time for capabilities to be brought into harmony with intentions, this 

course of action would be of substantial security benefit to the United States. It 

was well within the capabilities of the Western European nations, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff stated, to fill the military vacuum in Western Europe within a very few 

years. In the logistics sphere, the Joint Chiefs of Staff limited their instructions to 

standardization of equipment. Standardization should be sought, they said, 

using US equipment as a basis?’ 

At the same time, another aspect of US military collaboration in Western 

Europe, the coordination of US and British troop movements in Germany in the 

event of hostilities, was under bilateral US-British discussion. The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff Committee had been considering command 

relationships on a worldwide basis in conjunction with the emergency war plan 

HALFMOON, which had been approved by the United States, United Kingdom, 

and Canada.** 

To the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agreement on overall command responsibility for 

US and British occupation forces in Europe in the event of war was of immediate 

concern. At a meeting with the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff (BCS) 

in Washington on 16 June, both sides had accepted the Rhine as the initial 

defense position in Western Europe and agreed that the withdrawal of forces to 

197 
action.*? On 23 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote the representatives of the 

British Chiefs of Staff, suggesting that, if an American officer was desired as commander in chief, General Clay should be named to the post. He should have a 

British air officer as his deputy and French and American commanders for the 

ground and air forces respectively. General Clay would be responsible to the 

Combined Chiefs of Staff, to which a French member would be added.14 

At a meeting in Washington on 13 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that 

General Clay should not be appointed to the proposed position of Supreme Commander because, as the BCS representatives pointed out, he was fully occupied 

with his duties as military governor. Moreover, to appoint any US officer to such 

a position at that time would occasion political difficulties. It was agreed, therefore, that a French officer should be designated as temporary Allied Commander 

in Western Europe. Meanwhile a Supreme Commander and a deputy (one 

British, the other American, as decided later) would be appointed on a standby 

basis. The appointments would become effective on the outbreak of hostilities, at 

which time the French officer would step down to the position of commander of 

allied land forces. 

Regarding command at a higher level, the British proposed a tie-in with the 

Western European Union, since the alliance among Britain, France, and the 

Benelux countries would come into play as soon as British forces in Germany 

were attacked. They suggested that the WEU Chiefs of Staff, with an accredited 

US representative, constitute a body to whom the Supreme Commander would 

be responsible. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted this proposal in principle, subject to the stipulation that the WEU Chiefs of Staff would in turn be responsible 

to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who would maintain overall direction of the 

military effort. 

As for subordinate commanders, the British proposed that the air commander 

be British rather than American, because the Royal Air Force would be intimately 

concerned in the organization and training of the air forces of the WEU countries. 

They suggested also that a French naval officer be named Flag Officer, Western 

Europe, with the primary responsibility to organize port facilities. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff agreed to these proposals.25 

Meeting at Newport, Rhode Island, on 20 to 22 August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

and the Secretary of Defense refined these plans further. An allied Commander in 

Chief for Western Europe, either a British or French officer with an American 

deputy, should be designated at once, they concluded. Acceptable candidates for 

Commander in Chief, were Marshal Alphonse Juin, Field Marshal the Viscount 

Montgomery of Alamein, and Field Marshal the Viscount Alexander of Tunis. 

Either General J. Lawton Collins or General Lucius Clay should be named as 

deputy. In other respects, the command relationships would be the same as those 

proposed to the British on 13 August. President Truman approved these recommendations on 23 August, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed them to the 

British Chiefs of Staff the next day. The US Government also notified the Chiefs of 

Staff of the Western Union Nations, then meeting in London, of its decision.*h 

198 
that the United States might be persuaded to accept the top post delayed decision 

until late in September, when the US delegate to the Military Committee 

informed the French delegate that the US position would not be changed. The 

Western Union Defense Ministers then adopted a British proposal to form a 

Western Union Commanders in Chief Committee, with a British officer as chairman. The membership of this body, as announced on 5 October, was Chairman, 

Field Marshal Montgomery; Air Commander in Chief, Air Marshal Sir James 

Robb; Land Commander in Chief, General Jean Lattre de Tassigny; Flag Officer, 

Western Europe, Vice Admiral Robert Jaujard.27 

The function of the Commanders in Chief Committee was limited to the preparation, in consultation with the three Western Military Governors in Germany, of 

plans for meeting both the immediate and long-range Soviet threats to Western 

Europe. On or before the outbreak of war a supreme allied commander, having 

operational control over all allied forces made available by governments, would 

be appointed. Prior to that time, operational control would reside in the three Military Governors in Germany or other authorities designated by governments. 

General Clay, commanding US forces in Germany, was instructed by the 

Department of the Army to make available to the Commanders in Chief Committee any pertinent war plans prepared by his headquarters and to be prepared to 

relinquish responsibility for overall emergency planning to the Commanders in 

Chief Committee when it was ready to assume responsibility for planning. At the 

appropriate time, and in consonance with the overall plans of the Commanders 

in Chief, General Clay was to issue the necessary instructions to his forces to 

ensure coordinated action in the event of war.2x 

In accordance with the original US-UK proposals on command relationships, 

the Defense Ministers of the Western European Union agreed to form a Chiefs of 

Staff Committee, on which all five member nations would be represented, and to 

invite US participation. The invitation was issued on 14 October and was favorably received by the Department of State, with the understanding that the United 

States would function in a non-membership status. Secretary Forrestal favored 

this position, but before taking a definitive stand he asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

for their views. They replied on 13 December that they favored participation on a 

non-membership basis, as proposed by the Department of State, and wished to 

nominate Lieutenant General Clarence R. Huebner, USA, the Deputy US 

CINCEUR, for the position. Secretary Forrestal accepted this proposal and forwarded it with his endorsement to the Department of State, where it was also 

approved. Official acceptance of the WEU offer was transmitted on 23 December.2” 

Field Marshal Montgomery attacked the problems confronting him in his new 

position with his customary vigor, and by the end of January 1949 had produced 

an outline plan for defense of Western Europe in the short term. In keeping with 

earlier concepts, it called for defense on the Rhine. Forces expected to be available as of 1 July 1949, the effective date of the plan, were 10 divisions (or their 

equivalent) including 950 tanks and 395 aircraft. They would face Soviet forces 

consisting of 25 divisions including 5,000 tanks and supported by 2,000 aircraft. 

199 
the plan.?” 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff found this plan to be “generally in accord with US 

strategic concepts” but concurred in the objections raised by the US European 

Command to the provision calling for the employment of US forces as a reserve 

for allied forces deployed along the Rhine. General Huebner, acting on guidance 

from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, communicated these views to the Western Union 

Chiefs of Staff when they took up the plan on 23 March 1949. Transfer of command over US forces could not take place until they had moved west of the 

Rhine, and even after command had passed, they must serve as an entity in 

their own sector under American command. They would, therefore, not be 

available as a reserve.“’ 

Negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty 

President Truman, by approving NSC 9/3, had committed the United States to 

discussions with representatives of the Brussels Pact signatories and to exploration of the possibility of bringing other European nations into some form of 

association. To this end, Under Secretary of State Lovett began conversations in 

Washington with the Ambassadors of the Brussels Treaty nations and Canada on 

6 July 1948. During these talks, Mr. Lovett explained that the United States could 

make no formal military commitments without full bipartisan approval, which 

could not be obtained until after the presidential elections. He pointed out further that no US commitment could be made definitive or be implemented without congressional action in accordance with the Constitution. Nevertheless, he 

was successful in persuading the other participants to proceed with military talks 

without seeking a formal US commitment. They stressed, however, the need for 

such a commitment at the earliest possible time in order to strengthen morale in 

Western Europe. Indeed, some idea of the nature of the relationship contemplated under the Vandenberg Resolution was essential before the European countries could consider further steps in military collaboration. 

Given suitable assurances on this score, the conferees readily reached agreement on the desirability of close and continuing cooperation among the nations 

having a primary interest in the security of the North Atlantic area. On 10 

September they recommended to their respective governments the establishment 

by treaty of a North Atlantic Security Arrangement including the United States, 

Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. They recommended also that some means be found to associate Denmark, 

Norway, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, and Italy with this Security Arrangement. 

Eventually, but not at present, the relationship of Western Germany and Spain to 

the Arrangement would have to be determined.‘l 

By the end of October the Governments of Canada and the Brussels Treaty 

countries had accepted these recommendations, and Under Secretary Lovett and 

200 
reached agreement on all but a few points and had produced a draft treaty 

encompassing the areas of agreement. On 24 December they forwarded the draft 

and a statement of the disagreements to their respective governments and asked 

for further instructions. 

The draft treaty provided that the signatories would consider an attack 

against any one of them within the treaty area as an attack against all and would 

take whatever action was necessary to assure the security of the North Atlantic 

area.?l To this end, the parties would consult together whenever, in the opinion of 

any one of them, the “territorial integrity, political independence or security” of 

any one of them was threatened, or whenever there was a threat to or breach of 

the peace. They would also seek to strengthen their capacity to resist aggression 

through continuous self help and mutual aid. To facilitate the implementation of 

the treaty, the draft called for the creation of a Council on which all parties would 

be represented. The Council would set up necessary subsidiary bodies, particularly a defense committee which would recommend measures to implement the 

mutual assistance and mutual defense provisions of the treaty. 

The Working Group recommended that invitations to join the treaty be issued 

to Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Ireland, and Portugal, and that Sweden be informed 

indirectly that an application to join would be favorably received. Greece and 

Turkey could hardly be admitted to an Atlantic Pact, but they (and perhaps also 

Iran) should be given assurances that their security was “a matter of concern.” 

The Working Group had been unable to agree on two major issues: whether 

to include French North Africa, and whether to invite Italy to adhere to the 

treaty. The first of these disagreements saw France and Great Britain pitted 

against the others. On the second issue, France stood against the British representatives (joined by those of Canada) in favoring Italian membership. The 

Benelux nations, while recognizing that something should be done to strengthen 

ties between Italy and the Western powers, were inclined to oppose Italian 

membership in the treaty. US representatives took a similar position and favored 

some form of Italian association (not necessarily membership) with both the 

Atlantic and Brussels treaties.“” 

As part of the review process within the US Government, the Acting Secretary 

of State asked the Secretary of Defense for comments on the Working Group 

report. Secretary Forrestal decided that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would speak for 

the National Military Establishment. He accordingly asked them for their views.?; 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in comments submitted to the Secretary of Defense 

on 5 January, reiterated the position they had expressed in commenting on NSC 9 

on 23 April and NSC 9/2 on 19 May 1948. They said: 

The idea of collective defense embodied in the proposed North Atlantic Pact 

is an essential feature of a United States policy directed toward preservation of 

our national security; and 

201 
the pact.. . . 

While agreeing.. with the idea of collective defense embodied in the roposed pact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that its scope should not be sue K as 

to result in undue disparity between our commitments and our present and 

prospective strength. 

To keep commitments within capabilities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested a 

careful examination of the wording of the articles calling for consultations and for 

mutual assistance in case of armed attack. In the former article, the term “territorial integrity,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, could be interpreted to include 

colonies of the signatories. The call for consultation, because it was not limited, 

could apply in case of aggression anywhere. The scope of this article, therefore, 

should be “no broader than it is at present and, preferably,. . . should be restricted. 

In any case there should be clear understanding that consultation is not in itself a 

commitment to military action.” The provision for mutual assistance was generally commendable but was so phrased that the term “armed attack” might be construed as applying to internal as well as external assaults. “From the military 

viewpoint, so broad a provision is open to question,” they argued, “in that the 

intention of the pact as a whole is taken to be the development of collective 

defense against external aggression and, further, in that the limitation of mandatory commitment, where reasonably practicable, is good business in terms of 

future military contingencies.” 

The machinery proposed to implement the treaty the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered generally satisfactory, except that the authority delegated to the proposed 

defense committee was too sweeping. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended 

that this committee be empowered to recommend only general, rather than 

detailed, measuresfor implementation. 

With regard to the divergencies in the draft, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended against including North Africa in the treaty area. To do so, they said, 

would unnecessarily and dangerously broaden US commitments. Italy, they felt, 

could make no military contribution to the Atlantic Treaty but could help 

strengthen the Brussels Treaty, owing to its central location with respect to 

Europe and the Mediterranean.‘” 

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who had succeeded General Marshall on 21 

January 1949, wisely decided to seek approval of key senators before the treaty 

was signed, since it would eventually go to the Senate for ratification. To this end, 

he consulted closely on the draft with Senators Tom Connally and Arthur Vandenberg of the Foreign Relations Committee, while at the same time working on the 

draft treaty with appropriate foreign ambassadors. The Senators proved to be 

reluctant to enter into binding commitments, while the Ambassadors, quite naturally, sought as firm a commitment from the United States as possible. The final 

compromise that emerged in the key Article 5 provided that an attack against any 

202 
The recommendations of the Working Group concerning the membership of 

the proposed alliance occasioned considerable discussion at governmental level. 

Some problems were resolved though compromises. Thus French support for the 

admission of Norway was gained through agreement to include Algeria in the 

treaty area. (The rest of French North Africa-Tunisia and Morocco-was 

excluded). Once Norway applied and was accepted, Denmark and Iceland followed suit. The adherence of Portugal was unanimously desired, but that nation 

was reluctant to join a treaty from which Spain, owing to strong objections from 

many of the members, was rigidly excluded. Eventually the Portuguese agreed to 

join after they had satisfied themselves that the North Atlantic Treaty was not 

incompatible with their existing treaty obligations toward Spain. There were two 

refusals. Sweden preferred to remain strictly neutral; Eire refused to join so long 

as northern Ireland remained separate. 

Italy proved to be a special case. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff had pointed out, 

she was not a North Atlantic State and was not expected to make a substantial 

military contribution. Secretary of State Acheson argued successfully, however, 

that political considerations dictated the admission of Italy. As a former enemy 

state without connections with Western Europe or North America, he argued, 

Italy might suffer from an isolation complex, and with its large communist party, 

fall victim to seduction from the Soviet bloc.7x 

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington on 4 April 1949 by the 

Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United 

States. Within five months it had been ratified by the parliaments of the member 

countries. The US Senate approved the treaty by a vote of 83 to 13 on 21 July after 

extensive hearings. 

General Bradley was the only member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to testify 

during the hearings. He gave a ringing endorsement to the treaty as a means to 

gain the added military strength of a highly industrialized people totaling 300 

million. But he chose not to express the concern felt by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

over the inability of the United States to honor the new treaty commitments or to 

advocate increased military spending for the purpose of bringing military capabilities in line with the commitments.?” 

The basic core of the North Atlantic Treaty was Article 5: 

The Parties agree that an armed attack a ainst one or more of them in Europe 

or North America shall be considere A an attack a ainst them all; and 

consequently. . . each of them. . . will assist the Party or B‘arties so attacked by 

taking.. individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it 

deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the 

security of the North Atlantic Area. 

To provide the necessary strength to give meaning to Article 5, Article 3 provided that: 

203 
, p py 

armed attack. 

The mutual guarantees provided bp Articles 3 and 5 were strengthened by 

Article 4: 

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the 

territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is 

threatened. 

Article 6 defined the NATO Area: 

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is 

deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in 

Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occuation forces of any party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any 

Y‘arty in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or 

aircraft in this area of any of the Parties. 

Machinery for implementing the Treaty was provided by Article 9: 

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. . The 

Council shall set up subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall 

establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for 

the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.4” 

Determining the Military Structure of NATO 

A rticle 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty was to be of primary concern to the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff in the first year of their dealings with NATO. This was to be 

expected, because planning for mutual defense could hardly take place before the 

necessary military agencies had been established. 

Even before the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

had directed a staff study of the proposed military organization for NATO. On 31 

January, General Bradley had pointed out that the defense committee envisioned 

under the treaty was of obvious interest to the National Military Establishment. 

Consequently, he recommended that the JI’C study “the organization and 

responsibilities of this committee and its subordinate elements and comment 

upon their relation to instrumentalities already established under the Brussels 

Pact as well as their relation to other similar organizations already established by 

our Government.“41 

Early in their deliberations, the JSPC received the views of the British Chiefs 

of Staff on NATO military organization. In a paper dated 18 March and transmit204 
ture, necessarily to be achieved by indirect rather than direct methods. 

Should war come, said the British Chiefs of Staff, there were three ways of 

providing higher military direction. The first was through the present Combined 

Chiefs of Staff, advised by an Allied Military Council on which all the nations 

would be represented. Although most satisfactory to the United States and the 

United Kingdom, this concept would not be acceptable to France and possibly to 

other nations. Another method would be to place nominal higher direction in 

some form of Chiefs of Staff organization having a larger membership. Under 

this arrangement, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and UK Chiefs of Staff would have 

to cooperate closely so that the larger Chiefs of Staff organization did in fact take 

the decisions previously agreed to by the British and the Americans. A third 

method would be to add France to the existing Combined Chiefs of Staff, an 

unacceptable method because the other nations would then demand admission. 

In peace, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty would be concerned with 

coordination of strategy between various theaters, a matter having to do primarily with allocation of resources. This coordination could be achieved either by 

vesting responsibility in the Combined Chiefs of Staff (the preferable solution) or 

in a North Atlantic Chiefs of Staff including representatives of all member states. 

As in the wartime situation, adoption of the larger Chiefs of Staff organization 

would require close Anglo-American coordination to achieve the results desired 

by the United States and the United Kingdom. 

The British Chiefs of Staff reluctantly concluded that the only acceptable form 

of organization would be an Atlantic Pact Chiefs of Staff Committee on which all 

the major Atlantic powers were represented. But as agreement on overall strategy in this Committee would be most unlikely, it would be necessary to decentralize responsibility as much as possible by means of regional chiefs of staff subcommittees. These sub-regions would be Western Europe, Atlantic Ocean, 

Mediterranean, and Scandinavia. The existing Western European Union organization, but with full US and Canadian participation, would be responsible for 

Western Europe. Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States 

would be responsible for planning and operations in the Atlantic. The Norwegians and Danes, advised by US and UK representatives, would be responsible 

for the defense of Scandinavia. The Mediterranean would be solely a US-UK 

responsibility; it would be inadvisable to include France and Italy in defense 

planning, though admittedly they had interests in the area.42 

Following the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the British Chiefs of Staff 

communicated modified and more restrictive views on North Atlantic military 

organization to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The British Chiefs now proposed an 

Atlantic Pact Chiefs of Staff Steering Committee in place of the Chiefs of Staff 

Committee formerly proposed. Membership in the Steering Committee would be 

limited to the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France. Subordinate to the Steering Committee there would be only two regional subcommittees; 

the WEU Chiefs of Staff Organization, responsible for Western Europe, and an 

Atlantic Defense Organization, responsible for planning the defense of the North 

205 
Chiefs of Staff of other member states would be consulted whenever the interests 

of their countries were directly affected.47 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in making their own recommendations on NATO 

military organization to the Secretary of Defense on 23 June, modified the 

approach recommended by the British. They proposed to allow all members of 

the alliance a voice in high level military policymaking, and all the countries 

directly concerned a role in appropriate regional planning bodies. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff also realized that effective military planning would require strong 

guidance from a group of limited membership. In particular, the United States, as 

the principal contributor, would have to give “vigorous leadership” required to 

make the military provisions of the Treaty effective. 

While recognizing the need for serving the interests of the member states, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff also recognized the need for protecting the national interests 

of the United States. The military organization, they said, should reserve for the 

United States the “choice of its strategic course and maximum freedom of action 

in its execution.” And as the principal contributor, the United States should control the allocation of its military resources to the other NATO nations. 

To give effect to these principles, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a 

defense organization for NATO as follows. (The top two echelons were provided 

specifically by the Treaty, but their military functions had not been spelled out.) 

1. The North Atlantic Council, which should establish a suitable military organization for conducting military operations. 

2. The North Atlantic Defense Committee, consisting of defense ministers of 

all member nations, whose functions would be to recommend to the Council a 

suitable military organization to plan and conduct military operations. 

3. The Defense Committee Executive and Steering Group, consisting of representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, whose duties 

would be to supervise the implementation of Defense Committee policies and to 

submit broad questions of security policy to the Committee for approval. 

4. The North Atlantic Military Advisory Council, consisting of military representatives of all member nations, whose duties would be to advise the Defense 

Committee and give general policy guidance and information of a military 

nature to the Military Steering and Executive Group. 

5. The Military Advisory Council Steering and Executive Group, consisting of 

the Military Advisory Council representatives of the United States, the United 

Kingdom, and France, which would direct the North Atlantic Military Staff, coordinate plans drafted by the regional planning groups and, when authorized, take 

executive action in the name of the Council. 

6. The North Atlantic Military Staff, consisting of a US director and an integrated staff, which would prepare outline defense plans (together with force and 

supply requirements) and would review plans submitted by the regional groups, 

preparing recommendations to go to the Steering and Executive Group of the 

Military Advisory Council. 

206 
Committee on military supply problems and give guidance, in accordance with 

established policy, to member nations on the military supply efforts. 

If these agencies were to function effectively, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed, 

they would have to be supported by bodies specifically designed to prepare 

detailed defense plans for the major regions of the Treaty area. Each of the bodies 

would consist of the Chiefs of Staff (or their representatives) of all countries having a direct interest in a particular region. As a practical matter, maximum use 

should be made of existing institutions, namely the Canada-US Military Cooperation Committee and the Western European Union Chiefs of Staff Committee. 

The United States, as the major supplier of military equipment, should be represented on all regional groups. 

Under these guidelines, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the formation 

of five regional planning groups: The Canada-US Group; the Western European 

Group, consisting of the members of the WEU; the Northern European Group, 

including Norway and Denmark; the Western Mediterranean Group, made up 

of Italy, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States; and the North 

Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group, including the United States, the 

United Kingdom, and Canada as full-time members and with provision for participation by France, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, and Portugal on special planning issues,as appropriate. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Secretary of Defense forward 

their views to the Secretary of State and that they be authorized to hold informal 

discussions with the British and French Chiefs of Staff.44 

The Secretary of Defense, before completing his own review of the JCS recommendations, forwarded them to the Secretary of State on 29 June and received a 

generally favorable reaction on 22 July. In some areas, however, the Secretary of 

State believed there was room for improvement: the Steering and Executive 

Group of the Defense Committee was unnecessary and should be deleted; the 

Miljtary Supply Board should be assigned responsibility for all NATO finance 

and economic functions; and the Steering and Executive Group of the Military 

Advisory Council should be enlarged, for political reasons, by the inclusion of 

Canada. Moreover, the matter of a military command organization, raised by the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff in discussing the functions of the North Atlantic Council and 

the Defense Committee, needed further clarification. Obviously it would be necessary to appoint a supreme commander for all Atlantic Pact forces. However, 

Secretary Acheson thought that consideration of this subject could well be postponed while the Defense Committee addressed more pressing problems.-” 

Commenting on these State Department views to the Secretary of Defense on 2 

August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to delete the Steering and Executive Group 

of the Defense Committee. However, they opposed the addition of Canada to the 

Military Advisory Council Steering Group, considering that such representation 

was undesirable from the military point of view. The assignment of additional 

functions to the Military Supply Board should await further study by the Joint 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff toured Western Europe during early August to ascertain the views of military authorities of the other members of NATO on military 

organization. They consulted the Chiefs of Staff of nine countries and discovered 

that only two of them, the British and French, had given extensive consideration 

to the problems involved. All nevertheless had definite views on many of the 

major organizational issues.J7While they accepted the JCS plan in general, most 

national military leaders expressed some degree of disagreement over some or all 

of the following points: composition of a steering and executive group of the Military Council; the desirability of a military staff; the location of the steering group 

and the military staff; and the composition of regional groups. 

There were five different positions on the composition of the steering group. 

The US position-that the membership should be limited to the United States, 

United Kingdom, and France-found favor also with the United Kingdom, Denmark and Portugal. France favored the addition of Canada, thereby making four 

members. Norway favored three members but preferred Canada to France. The 

Benelux countries wanted five members, including a Benelux and a Northern 

European representative, in addition to the United States, the United Kingdom 

and France. Italy expressed no preference for a specific number but insisted upon 

Italian membership. 

The question of a military staff found the United Kingdom at odds with the 

other member nations. The former favored a very small staff-one that would in 

fact amount to a mere “secretariat.” Under this plan, most staff work would be 

done by national staffs. All the other countries save Portugal, which expressed no 

opinion, preferred a full-fledged military staff, though they disagreed on its composition. France, Norway, and Luxembourg wanted all 12 signatories represented, while the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark preferred a limited membership. Italy also desired a limited participation but, again, insisted on 

membership for itself. 

The primary point at issue regarding the regional groups had to do with the 

extent of US participation. Both the French and British Chiefs of Staff held that 

Western European military planning would never be realistic until the United 

States participated directly. The British, in particular, were insistent that the 

United States participate fully in all regional groups.48 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, reporting their findings to the Secretary of Defense 

on 22 August, concluded that certain modifications in their previous position 

were necessary but that they should “hold the line” against some of the changes 

advocated by the other members of the alliance. They were adamant in wanting 

the Steering and Executive Group limited to three members, though they agreed 

that provision should be made for consultation with other signatory nations by 

means of accredited missions or representatives. Limited membership was necessary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, for purposes of efficiency, while the 

208 
With regard to the regional planning groups, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended certain modifications in proposed membership. Portugal would be 

dropped from the Western Mediterranean Group, and the United States and the 

United Kingdom, instead of being full members, would merely participate “as 

appropriate.” On the North Atlantic Group, France would become a full member 

and Belgium and the Netherlands would participate as appropriate. On the Western European Group, the United States, then functioning only in observer status, 

would increase its role to “participation as appropriate.” Thus the United States 

would be able to exercise the necessary leadership in military planning for Western Europe without becoming so involved that the European powers would relax 

their own efforts. 

The position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a military staff for the Steering and 

Executive Group had undergone considerable change. In their recommendation 

of 23 June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had seen the need for a combined and integrated staff headed by a Director to coordinate the voluminous details of planning accomplished by each regional planning group. They now endorsed the 

British plan for a small secretariat. To gain acceptance by the other nations, it 

would be necessary to use the title “military staff,” but the organization should 

be kept small in size and limited in function.4y 

The signatory powers had agreed, at the time of signing the North Atlantic 

Treaty, to convene a working group in Washington to draw up recommendations 

for establishing the machinery called for by the treaty. This body began its work 

on 23 August; its recommendations 

at its first meeting, scheduled for 

ing Group included representatives 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

were to go before the North Atlantic Council 

17 September. The US delegation to the Workof the Department of State, the Joint Staff, 

and the Munitions Board.s’1 

The US position on the military machinery, developed by the US delegation 

for introduction into the Working Group, displayed a predominant JCS influence. 

Although there were extensive changes in organization and in wording, the US 

position paper called for the creation of the machinery advocated by the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff on 23 June and 22 August. 

The Working Group labored until 12 September in a vain attempt to reach 

agreement on the implementing machinery for the North Atlantic Treaty. On that 

date, with the Council meeting due to open in only five days, the Working Group 

gave up and submitted a split report to the member governments. 

Of major concern to the European signatories was the part to be played by the 

United States in planning the defense of Europe. The ambiguous phrase “participation as appropriate” in the US draft proved unacceptable. The United Kingdom took the lead in urging the United States to play a larger role. On 29 August, 

the UK Chiefs of Staff informed their representatives in Washington that they 

209 
defense of the key region in the whole system. Failure to do so might undermine 

the Western European regional group.5’ 

The US delegation agreed to replace the phrase “participation as appropriate” 

with a statement that the United States was “ready to participate fully in the 

planning.” This substitution did not entirely resolve the matter, and the British 

Chiefs of Staff on 7 September asked for clarification of the new language. Did it 

mean that the United States would be represented on an equal basis in regional 

meetings of Defense Ministers or Chiefs of Staff? Would US representatives on 

regional groups speak with the full authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

would they reveal the full extent of US contribution to the’defense of the 

region.1~ The US reply, worked out by the delegation to the Working Group, was 

to substitute for the existing language the equally ambiguous sentence: “The 

United States has been requested and has agreed to participate actively in the 

defense planning as appropriate.“5’ 

This substitution proved unacceptable not only to the British representative 

on the Working Group but to the representatives of Belgium, Denmark, France, 

Italy, and Portugal as well. The result was that they all reserved their positions on 

the new US language in the final Working Group report. 

Another major split arose over Italian insistence on membership on the Standing Group and on the Western European Regional Planning Group. In support of 

their position, the Italians argued that theirs would be the second largest army in 

Europe and that the defensive position in Western Europe would be a continuous, or at least a connected, line stretching from the North Seato the Adriatic.s4 

The issue of the size of the staff for the Standing Group was postponed for 

later determination. The final report said that the Defense Committee and its 

“subsidiary bodies” should make “such arrangements for their staff and secretarial services as they consider necessary, bearing in mind the desirability of restricting as far as possible the number of persons so employed.” 

In most other respects, the Working Group recommendations did not differ 

substantially from the US position. Major changes in the military structure 

devised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff included two changes in designation and two 

changes in the composition of regional groups. The Military Advisory Council 

became the Military Committee, and its Steering and Executive Group became 

the Standing Group. The United Kingdom became a full member of the Northern 

European Group, and all signatory nations except Luxembourg and Italy became 

full members of the North Atlantic Ocean Group.55 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on their own initiative, reviewed the Working Group 

report, and on 16 September informed the Secretary of Defense that, because it 

did not differ materially from their position on the subject, it was acceptable as 

the basis for establishing the military organization to implement the North 

Atlantic Treaty.5h 

The Anglo-American differences over US participation in regional groups 

were resolved in direct negotiation between Secretary of State Acheson and 

Foreign Secretary Bevin on 14 September. Mr. Bevin, while recognizing political 

210 
be represented by high ranking officers who could speak authoritatively for the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Acheson replied that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not 

be expected at this time to define “participation as appropriate” or to express 

complete views on war strategy. The unwillingness of the United States to commit forces piecemeal did not imply any dodging of responsibility. Mr. Bevin 

then accepted a formula developed at working level the previous day as “not 

all that he would desire” but as “the best we could give.“s7 The formula, 

intended as an informal understanding between the two governments and not 

to be included in the formal description of the North Atlantic Treaty machinery, 

was as follows: 

The United States will appoint representatives to play an active role in the work 

of the three European Regional Planning Grou s within the limits of the policy of 

the United States Chiefs of Staff, and it is hope % that their work will lead to the further development of policy by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as may be necessary.5H 

Secretary Acheson also dealt successfully with the issues raised by Italy. 

Both the United States and the United Kingdom opposed Italian membership 

on the Standing Group, and Secretary Acheson agreed to attempt to persuade 

the Italians not to press their claim. Judging by the fact that the final agreement 

did not grant the Italians what they wanted, Mr. Acheson was evidently successful in his efforts.5y 

Once the divergencies had been resolved, the North Atlantic Council moved 

swiftly to establish implementing machinery to carry out the provisions of the 

North Atlantic Treaty. On 17 September, the Council approved an amended 

Working Group report, issued an implementing directive to the Defense Committee, and directed the Working Group to recommend suitable machinery to deal 

with military production and supply as an integral part of the defense of the 

North Atlantic area and with financial and economic factors affecting the development and implementation of military plans. As approved by the Council, the 

military machinery of the Alliance consisted of the following: 

1. The Defense Committee, composed of one representative of defense minister rank from each party and charged with recommending measures to implement Articles 3 and 5 of the Treaty. 

2. The Military Committee, to be established by the Defense Committee and 

consisting of one respresentative at Chiefs of Staff level from each party. It would 

provide general guidance to its Standing Group and would recommend to the 

Defense Committee military measures for the unified defense of the North 

Atlantic Area. (Iceland, which had no military establishment, might, if it so 

desired, be represented by a civilian official.) 

3. The Standing Group, composed of one representative each from France, the 

United Kingdom, and the United States. It was to act as an executive for the Military Committee and as such would give specific guidance to the Regional Planning Groups and coordinate and integrate regional defense plans. 

211 
ity) and the members of each were as follows: 

a. Northern Europe: Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom; 

b. Western Europe: Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and 

the United Kingdom; 

c. Southern Europe-Western Mediterranean: France, Italy, and the United 

Kingdom; 

d. Canada-United States; 

e. North Atlantic: all parties, except Italy and Luxembourg. 

The United States agreed to “participate actively in the defense planning as 

appropriate” of all regional groups of which it was not a full member. Canada 

accepted a similar status on the Western European Group. 

To give proper representation to the views of parties not members of the 

Standing Group, the North Atlantic Council established the right of any party 

whose forces, facilities or resources were involved in a regional plan to participate in its review by the Standing Group. Moreover, regional plans might be presented for review by any member of the responsible planning group (not necessarily one who was also on the Standing Group). Similar authority for all parties 

was also made applicable to the work of the Regional Planning Groups.ho 

Two of the regional planning groups were created from existing bodies: the 

Chiefs of Staff Committee of Western European Union became the Western 

Europe Group; the Canada-US Cooperation Committee became the Canada-US 

Group. The others were organized specifically to discharge functions in support 

of the North Atlantic Treaty. To coordinate US participation on the three European regional groups, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the JCS Joint Representatives, Europe, consisting of CINCEUR, CINCNELM, and CINCUSAFE. They 

represented the United States on the Western, Southern Europe-Western Mediterranean, and Northern Groups respectively. To provide the necessary staff support 

for their representatives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Joint American 

Military Advisory Group Europe, which was also to support the US Military 

Representative for Military Assistance in Europe.“’ 

Action to provide a logistic agency in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

was taken by the Defense Committee at its first meeting on 5 October. The resulting 

North Atlantic Military Production and Supply Board, which had been approved by 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff when presented to them in draft form, was a body on which 

all parties were represented at subministerial level. Its functions were to review the 

availability of supplies to meet requirements and recommend ways to remedy any 

deficiencies. It was also to promote more efficient production methods.h2 

Military Planning Begins 

T he newly-formed military components of NATO moved quickly to plan for 

the defense of the North Atlantic area. At its first meeting, on 5 October, the 

212 
order to ensure early completion and integration of regional defense plans.(‘” 

To assist the Standing Group deliberations on the subject, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff supplied the US representative, General Bradley, with a draft “concept” 

paper which, with minor modifications, was accepted by the British and French 

representatives on 10 October and referred to their respective Chiefs of Staff as 

SG 1. The Military Committee, after study of the document by national staffs, 

approved it with minor modifications on 6 December and issued it as DC 6/l. 

The North Atlantic Council approved it on 6 January 1950. 

By agreement with the Department of State and the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, the concept paper was also judged, when approved by the North 

Atlantic Council, to meet the requirements of military aid legislation for release 

of $900,000,000 when the President was satisfied that NATO was undertaking 

coordinated defense planning. 

The concept paper laid down certain basic principles: mutual cooperation in 

defense against armed attack; contributions from each nation, in accordance with 

its situation, responsibilities and resources; military buildup without endangering economic recovery; coordinated military force in accordance with a common 

strategic plan; assumption by each nation of the tasks for which it was best 

suited; and a successful defense at the least cost in manpower and resources. 

These principles gave rise to two objectives: to coordinate the military and economic strength of the alliance as a deterrent to attack; and to develop plans to be 

applicable in the event of war. To achieve these objectives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

proposed certain basic undertakings: assure the capability for strategic atomic 

bombing (essentially a US responsibility, with other nations assisting “as practicable”); arrest and counter enemy attacks as soon as practicable, relying at first 

primarily on European ground forces, tactical air forces, and air defense; secure 

and control essential seaand air lines of communication, relying primarily on US 

and UK forces; secure essential ports, air bases, and main base areas; and mobilize according to war plans, This concept paper had been kept purposely vague 

because of the “political and security implications” attendant upon its consideration by the Defense Committee and the North Atlantic Council and its use to 

meet provisions of military aid legislationh4 

To provide a suitable basis for regional planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

believed, would require more detailed guidance than was provided by DC 6/l. 

They therefore approved strategic guidance designed as a basis for the “medium 

term,” which was defined as beginning on 1 July 1954. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

assumed that the Soviet Union would attack the NATO nations and attempt to 

reach the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. A further assumption 

was that atomic weapons would be used by both sides. 

According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the objectives of the NATO nations in 

such a war were basically defensive. The allied nations should seek to defeat the 

Soviet Union and its allies to the extent necessary to assure the integrity of the 

NATO nations. This would entail eliminating Soviet domination over non-Soviet 

states, preventing the Soviet Union and its satellites from interfering in the inter213 
erful enough to launch an aggressive war. 

The specific tasks that the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned to the various 

Regional Planning Groups were essentially defensive. Of key importance was the 

retention of “those base areas and. . . sea areas essential for offensive operations, 

including those required for launching and supporting air offensive operations.” 

Other major tasks were to hold the line of the Rhine, together with a defensible 

Scandinavian bastion and as much of Italy as possible, and to defend transAtlantic communications.h” 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff amended their guidance paper to accommodate the 

views of the State Department and of Major General J. H. Burns, Assistant to the 

Secretary of Defense for political-military matters. Most of the changes had to do 

with political planning assumptions, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff readily 

accepted. There was one of major military significance that was proposed by 

General Burns. The assumption that the United States would use atomic bombs 

was by no means justified in view of the fact that the President had not yet 

reached a decision on the subject. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted the objection 

and changed the assumption from “will be used” to “may be used.“66 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their guidance to the US representative on 

the Standing Group on 16 November. Using the US paper as the basis, the Standing Group prepared a draft and forwarded it to governments for comment. The 

Standing Group version (SG 13) differed from the JCS document primarily by 

requiring short-term as well as medium-term planning, and by deleting war 

objectives, which were to be determined by governments.h7 

After having received the comments of all nations except Italy and Portugal, 

the Standing Group staff incorporated them into a new version designated SG 

13/9. The defense policy laid down in SG 13/9 was to deter Soviet aggression 

against NATO, but if deterrence failed, to defend the treaty areas as far forward as 

possible on the ground and at the same time launch air attacks on the Soviet 

Union employing atomic bombs. Special emphasis was to be placed on the 

defense of Europe, since its loss might doom efforts to defend NATO territories as 

a whole. Regional planning groups were instructed to plan for war beginning on 1 

January 1954 (the mid-range plan) and also for defense of the area with forces 

expected to be available on 1 September 1950 (the short-term plan). The mid-term 

plan, with an estimate of necessary forces, a time-phased buildup program to 

attain them, and a statement of difficulties expected at the end of the first phase (1 

January 1951), was to be submitted to the Standing Group by 1 March 1950.“x 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after incorporating the views of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of State, furnished guidance defining the 

US position to the US representative for use in Standing Group deliberations on 

SG 13/9. For the most part, this guidance consisted of minor clarifications. However, it was made clear that all NATO responsibility for strategic air operations 

should be deleted from SG 13/9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered these operations to be primarily a US responsibility. Also, at the behest of the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense and the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indi214 
receiving these and other comments on SG 13/9, issued revised strategic guidance to the Regional Planning Group on 4 January 1950.70 

To assure that US representatives on Regional Planning Groups would reflect 

current US strategic policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff dispatched copies of OFFTACKLE, the current Emergency War Plan, to the JCS Joint Representatives, 

Europe, and the US Representatives to the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group and the Military Committee. Force deployments set forth in OFFTACKLE, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed, would be used as guidance for the 

probable employment of US forces in the short-term only, pending development 

of increased allied capabilities71 

Even before the Standing Group issued its strategic guidance, the regional 

groups had begun planning in conformity with instructions from the Defense 

Committee that they were to begin operating not later than 1 November 1949.72 

Receipt of the planning guidance facilitated the work, and by 1 March the 

regional plans had been submitted and integrated by the Standing Group into a 

Medium Term Defense Plan. 

The purpose of the plan was to provide a basis for determining minimum 

force requirements for the defense of the treaty nations. This was a primary 

objective, the Standing Group said, in view of the present inadequate state of 

their defenses. The target date chosen for the plan was 1 July 1954. 

The overall strategic aim set forth in the plan was, in the event of an attack by 

the Soviet Union and her allies, to destroy their will and capabilities to wage war 

by a strategic offensive in Western Eurasia. This was conceived as a task to be 

accomplished in four phases: 

Phase l-From D-Day to the stabilization of the initial Soviet offensive, to 

include the initiation of the allied air offensive; 

Phase 2-From stabilization of initial Soviet offensive to allied initiation of 

major offensive operations; 

Phase 3-Allied initiation of major offensive operations until Soviet capitulation was obtained; 

Phase 4-Final achievement of Allied war objectives. 

The Plan, however, addressed only Phase 1. The strategy to be employed 

was to contain the initial Soviet offensive on the following positions: the RhineIjssel line in Western Europe, as already provided by WEU plans; the Italo-Austrian Alps and the Isonzo in southern Europe; along the Kiel Canal and northern Norway if possible, but around certain key base areas in any event, in 

northern Europe. To support this defense, control of North Atlantic sea and air 

lanes and North American sources of reinforcement would have to be assured 

by local air defense and defense of Portugal, Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, 

and the Faroes against sea-borne raids. The strategic air offensive, which by 

previous agreement had been made a unilateral US responsibility, was not 

detailed in the Plan. 

To mount the defense of all these positions and territories was calculated 

to require 90 divisions and 259 battalions and brigades of ground troops, 

215 
was as follows: 7o 

Ground Forces 

Divisions 

AA Btrys 

Brigades 

battalions 

Nnval Forces 

Combat ships 

Others 

Air Form 

Aircraft 

w. Eur. s. EliK N. Eur. NA 0ccv111 ‘wil 

54 21 14 1 90 

1,241 275 189 1,705 

6 1 7 

l 60 91 1 252 

10 225 34 810 1,079 

600 723 307 147 1,777 

5,864 1,688 718 550 8,820 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after reviewing the Plan, informed the US representative on the Standing Group that the Plan advocated highly unrealistic force 

requirements that could not be attained by the European members of the 

Alliance by June 1954. The financing and equipping of these forces would be 

largely a responsibility of the individual member nations, but even the combined resources of all the NATO countries would probably not be sufficient to 

raise the forces called for within the prescribed period. In these circumstances, 

force requirements of the magnitude proposed would almost certainly cause a 

congressional reaction in the United States that would make the enactment of 

any more military assistance programs impossible. A more realistic plan for FY 

1954 was needed-one that would reflect estimates of forces likely to be available. The regional groups should be requested to develop such a plan as a matter of highest priority. 

The Air Force representative on the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, which 

had conducted the initial review of the Plan, had taken exception to certain language that, in his view, seemed to imply that strategic air forces might be 

diverted to support ground operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly 

stipulated that nothing in the Plan was to be construed as implying a commitment to use the US Strategic Air Command in a ground support role without 

specific US approval.74 

Despite these JCS comments, the Military and Defense Committees, at meetings on 28 March and 1 April, gave their general approval to the Medium Term 

Plan. They agreed that the force requirement figures represented a first estimate 

of what was necessary to provide the North Atlantic Treaty area with a reasonable degree of security by 1954 and accepted them as the basis for a progressive 

buildup of the North Atlantic Defense Forces. To attain these force levels, the 

Defense Committee recognized, would require a major increase of individual and 

collective military establishments. The Committee therefore directed the Military 

Committee, through the Standing Group, to invite the nations to study the extent 

216 
At the same time, the Defense and Military Committees recognized that the 

estimates of requirements might well be reduced as the result of further study. 

The Military Committee accordingly instructed the Standing Group to issue necessary guidance for such revisions to the Regional Planning Groups.75 These revisions had not yet been completed when the outbreak of the Korean War drastically changed the framework of NATO planning.7” 

217 

12 

Military Assistance for NATO Countries 

From the earliest consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it 

was apparent that for NATO to be effective the United States would be required 

to provide large grants of military assistance to its European members. Because 

of heavy war damage, the industrial complex of Europe, once a major contributor 

to the industrial production of the world, was incapable of producing the quantities of weapons needed to arm the forces of the Western European countries 

against Soviet attack. Since the United States was the only source of large-scale 

armaments within the alliance, an orderly system for providing them became 

highly desirable. The provision of military assistance to the European members 

of NATO was integrated into a larger program involving assistance to countries 

around the globe. 

Since the end of World War II, the United States had provided military aid in 

varying quantities to individual countries that were either directly threatened by 

communist aggression, such as Greece, Turkey, China, Iran, and the Philippines, 

or were located in areas where the United States had a political interest, as was 

the case in Latin America. This aid had been furnished either by special appropriations by Congress or in the form of surplus equipment under the Surplus 

Property Act. i 

Formulating the Policy 

C onsideration of a comprehensive aid program had been under study by subcommittees of the SWNCC late in 1947 and early in 1948 without conclusive 

results. In March 1948, the National Military Establishment and the Department 

of State hastly drafted an addition to the European Recovery Program bill, then 

under consideration by Congress, which would have granted broad authority to 

the President to distribute military aid. This Title VI was presented by Secretaries 

Forrestal and Marshall to the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Proposals for 

219 
of the European Recovery Program bill.2 

Interest in the program remained alive, however, and the subject came before 

the NSC on 14 June in the form of a report prepared by the NSC Staff on its own 

initiative. In this report, designated NSC 14, the Staff concluded that certain 

nations, whose security was vital to the United States, should be granted military 

assistance in order to defend themselves against Soviet aggression. The United 

States should therefore: 

a. Enact legislation which will broaden the authority of the President to provide military assistancefor foreign states. . . 

b. Under this authority, a propriate funds for military assistance to selected 

non-communist nations in vr estern Europe and the Middle East to meet urgent 

requirements consistent with an overall program. 

Any grant of military aid should be consistent with US strategy and should 

not jeopardize the fulfillment of US materiel requirements as determined by the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. It should provide a continuing supply of spare parts and 

replacements and should not endanger the economic stability of the United 

States or of recipient countries. 

Recipient countries should provide as much in self-help and mutual assistance as possible. To this end, they should be encouraged to integrate their arms 

industries, standardize weapons production on US types, and compensate donor 

nations as much as possible. First priority in the granting of military aid should 

go to countries of Western Europe.” 

Prior to consideration by the National Security Council, NSC 14 was referred 

by the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review. In reply the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary on 7 July 1948 that the report was 

“consistent with policies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff previously furnished.. . .‘I4 

The NSC, after making a minor amendment, adopted the report under the new 

designation NSC 14/l on 1 July; the President approved it on 10July 1948.” 

The NSC, meanwhile, had sketched out the first steps for the provision of military aid to Western European countries. US policy toward the Western European 

Union, as set forth in NSC 9/3 (approved by President Truman on 2 July), envisioned that the distribution of US materiel assistancewould follow the pattern of 

the European Recovery Program. The US representatives taking part in WEU military talks should state the following conditions to be met by the European countries: 

(1) The must first plan their coordinated defense with the means presently 

available, (”2) they must then determine how their collective military potential can 

be increased by coordinated production and supply, including standardization of 

e ui ment, (3) we would then be prepared to consider and screen their estimates 

o47w lat supplementary assistance from us was necessary, (4) we would expect 

reciprocal assistancefrom them to the greatest extent practicable, and (5) legislation would be necessary to provide significant amounts of military equipment 

220 
The State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC) undertook to establish criteria for processing requests from foreign countries for US 

military aid. A subcommittee of SANACC produced a report recommending a 

far-reaching system of priorities. The subcommittee’s proposals covered the 

entire globe and listed 57 countries, of which 20 were allotted an order of priority 

and were listed for either “substantial” or “limited” assistance. The remaining 37 

were included because the subcommittee concluded that all “free” countries 

should be eligible for “token” assistance, without regard to priorities. SANACC 

established seven priorities, as follows:7 

Priority COWltr~ 

1 Benelux 

Canada 

France 

United Kingdom 

2 Greece 

Italy 

Turkey 

3 Denmark 

Norway 

Portugal 

Spain 

Sweden 

4 Iran 

India 

Pakistan 

Saudi Arabia 

5 China 

6 Mexico 

Brazil 

7 South Africa 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, commenting on this plan on 

Cntcpry of Aid 

Substantial 

Limited 

Limited 

Limited 

Limited 

Limited 

Limited 

1 November, viewed 

with concern the inclusion of so many countries. They realized, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff said, that no actual recommendation had been made to grant aid to any 

countries and that the “substantial” category was found to be justified only for 

the six member states of WEU. Nevertheless, continued the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

even consideration of substantial military aid for six countries, limited aid for 

sixteen other countries, and token aid for thirty-seven more can result, in terms 

of granted requests, in tremendous commitments. There cannot be too much 

emphasis, therefore, on the necessity for the most careful consideration of the 

great potential over-all scope of military aid commitments in relation to our 

221 
The subcommittee’s report, though finally approved by SANACC in March 

1949, was overtaken by events. y It did, however, provide the basis for the military 

aid program adopted by the Truman administration for FY 1950, as described in 

a subsequent portion of this chapter. 

JCS Doubts: US vs NATO Rearmament 

President Truman, by approving NSC 14/l, had established as national policy that grants of military aid to foreign governments “should not jeopardize the fulfillment of the minimum materiel requirements of the United States 

armed forces, as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” This statement did 

not, however, totally allay fears that the provision of military aid to foreign 

governments would be at the expense of the buildup of US military forces. 

Addressing his colleagues in a memorandum written on 13 July, General Vandenberg expressed misgivings about US involvement with the Western European Union, which, he said, would inevitably generate pressure on the United 

States to furnish emergency supplies of military equipment, as well as longterm assistance in military reconstruction. 

Under normal peacetime conditions, General Vandenberg stated, the economic burden of trying to rearm both the United States and Western Europe 

would be insuperable. He therefore recommended a staff study to provide the 

basis for an accurate military assessment of the entire policy of association with 

collective security arrangements called for by NSC 9/3. This study should be in 

two parts. First, the JSSC should answer three questions: (1) Was war with the 

Soviet Union so imminent that US aid could not be given to the Western European countries in time to be effective? (2) If not, would the allocation of US 

resources to the buildup of Western European forces contribute more to US security than the total application of those resources to US rearmament? (3) How 

much should the United States contribute to potential allies at the expense of its 

own rearmament program? Second, the Joint Logistics Plans Committee (JLPC) 

should determine what weapons might be provided the Western European 

Union from current US stocks in an emergency.‘” 

The JSSC, reporting on 5 August, concluded that there would be time to give 

military aid to the Western European Union but that it should be limited to 

amounts that would not prevent the timely completion of the US rearmament 

program. II General Vandenberg found this report to be unsatisfactory because it 

failed to provide a means for determining US needs. He suggested that the 

United States might better serve its security interests by curtailing its own 

requirements in order to make a larger contribution to the revitalization of the 

military power of the WEU. It was apparent that the “fundamental problem of 

overall security” should be restudied. He recommended, therefore, that the JSSC 

222 
General Bradley found himself in agreement with General Vandenberg 

regarding the allocation of resources to US military forces and to those of the 

WEU. “It would seem a great mistake,” he said, “to concentrate our entire 

resources on a United States rearmament program in the belief that such action 

alone will contribute most to our national security. . . . it would be harmful to 

arrive at any decision at this time which would preclude aid to Western [European] Union on the basis that your complete emphasis should be placed on 

preparation of our own forces for war.” I0 

The JSSC submitted their revised study on 12 November. The basic question 

of how far the United States should contribute to allies at the expense of its own 

rearmament, the Committee said, had already been resolved at higher levels by 

NSC 14/l, which had specified that “minimum materiel requirements” of US 

armed forces should not be jeopardized by foreign military assistance. All that 

remained, therefore, was to determine these requirements. The JSSC defined 

them as the amount required to equip the forces in COGWHEEL, the current 

emergency war plan being used by the Services for mobilization planning.14 

Once again, General Vandenberg found the efforts of the JSSCto be deficient. 

He pointed out that COGWHEEL had set US force levels that probably could not 

be attained in view of present and prospective budgetary limitations. To pile military assistance on top of the requirements of COGWHEEL would risk the economic, and therefore the military, security of the United States. As a “tentative 

and preliminary” alternative, General Vandenberg proposed that the minimum 

US requirement be defined as the materiel needed to acquire and support forces 

for an atomic offensive, to meet occupation commitments, to provide a “platform” for mobilization, to maintain lines of communication, and to provide initial air defense of the United States.‘” 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, meeting on 11 January 1949, agreed to reject COGWHEEL asa basis for determining minimum US materiel requirements. Instead of 

approving any substitute criteria, however, they decided to judge each request for 

aid on an individual basis. To this end, they assigned the Joint Munitions Allocation Committee responsibility for processing requests and recommending to the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff what materiel should be furnished, either from existing stocks 

or from new procurement. The Committee was to establish a pricing policy for 

items taken from existing stocks and was also to recommend priorities for providing requested equipment. Recommendations for grants of aid were to be submitted 

to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) for 

comments on the strategic implications of furnishing the requested materieli 

Any hope that surplus US equipment would make a substantial contribution 

to European rearmament had already been dashed. The JLPC, reporting on the 

subject on 30 December, enclosed lists of available equipment drawn up by the 

Services and concluded that the items would, by themselves, be of little value in 

establishing effective Western European military forces. They could, however, 

supplement equipment on hand or to be procured from European or US sources. 

The Committee concluded also that a long-range military aid program would 

223 
standardization of weapons among potential allies. Because of the costs involved 

and the inadequacy of US surplus stocks to meet foreign needs, the Committee 

concluded that an appropriation by Congress would be required. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, while agreeing with the Committee that a long-range program 

would be advantageous, decided to defer further action pending clarification of 

detailed studies and actions then underway in various government agenciesI 

The European Response 

w 

hile the Joint Chiefs of Staff were grappling with the relationship of foreign 

military aid to US rearmament, the US Government had stated its terms for 

granting such aid, and the European countries were attempting to respond. On 

22 July 1948, Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, the US delegate, delivered the 

terms called for by NSC 9/3 to the delegates of the Western European Union 

gathered in London for military talks. General Lemnitzer suggested that the 

Western European Union nations complete the necessary plans and appraisals 

and submit their requests for US military aid in time to permit authorizing legislation to be introduced into Congress in January 1949.1x 

By mid-October, it was apparent to the WEU Military Committee that the 

time-consuming task of preparing supply requests, taking into account the commitments of member countries outside Europe and the force requirements of 

WEU commanders, could not be completed in time to meet the goal suggested 

by General Lemnitzer. The Committee recognized, however, that some statement 

of the needs of member countries was essential. It adopted, therefore, a British 

proposal for an interim supply plan based on an already prepared computation 

of forces to be maintained in the “next year or so.” Under the British plan, the 

Western European Union would inform the US Government of the following: 

progress in planning the defense of Western Europe with the means now available; progress made in standardizing equipment, coordinating production, and 

pooling resources; the estimate of forces to be maintained in the immediate 

future both in being and mobilizable by M+90 days; the extent to which these 

forces could be equipped from present indigenous stocks and new production 

without interfering with economic recovery; the amount of outside assistance 

needed; and the amount of such assistance that could be obtained from sources 

other than the United States.‘” 

On 25 October, the Department of the Army, as Executive Agent for the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, informed the US delegate to the Western European Union that the 

original terms were still sound and must be adhered to in principle. At the same 

time, it appeared likely that the administration would submit a military aid program for FY 1950 to Congress once the Western European Union had submitted 

its coordinated requirements for materiel. The interim solution offered by the 

British would therefore be of considerable assistance in obtaining an “authentic 

224 
The interim supply plan delivered to Washington in November 1948 con

sisted of four parts: an informal list of materiel deficiencies; MC (49)1, consisting 

of a brief and generalized statement of Western European Union defense policy, a 

generalized statement of deficiencies, and a listing of intraservice priorities; MC 

49/5, including a listing of inter-service priorities; and FC(48) 23, summarizing 

forces mobilizable during 1949. 

The objective of Western European Union Defense Policy as defined in 

MC(49)1, was to convince the Soviet Union that “war would not pay,” an objective that could be attained by three principal methods: (1) by counteracting RUSsian subversion; (2) by open determination of the five Western European Union 

powers to undertake a common defense of their territories; and (3) by building 

military strength so as to present Russia with tangible evidence that the five 

powers could defend themselves and attack an aggressor at once with “powerful and effective” weapons. In the event of attack, the vital strategic interests of 

the WEU would be to hold the enemy as far to the east in Germany as possible, 

to defend Western European Union countries against air and airborne attack, to 

defend the Middle East as an offensive base, to defend North Africa, and to control seacommunicationszl 

To carry out this military policy, the five WEU nations had the following 

forces in being as of the beginning of 1949: 

A my 

Divisions 

Independent 

Independent 

Artillery/AA 

NUZJY 

Battleships 

Carriers 

Cruisers 

Destroyers 

Frigates 

Submarines 

Brigades/Regiments 

Battalions 

Regiments 

10 

32 

9 

95 

3 

11 

19 

61 

78 

41 

Minesweepers 75

Air Force 

Fighters 497 

Bombers 192 

Reconnaissance 96 

Maritime (other than Naval) 34 

Transports 289 

225 
Army 

Light Infantry 

Light Infantry 

Navy 

Battleships 

Carriers 

Cruisers 

Destroyers 

Frigates 

Submarines 

Minesweepers 

Air Force 

Fighters 

Battalions 3 

Companies 25 

4 

4 

15 

70 

136 

38 

180 

160 

There were, in addition, personnel to form 8 additional divisions, 5 brigades, 

4 armored regiments, 10 artillery regiments, 7 anti-tank regiments, and 3 infantry 

battalions if equipment for them could be supplied.22 

Even in the forces listed as “in being,” there were serious deficiencies in 

equipment.2” The military authorities of the Western European Union planned 

to remedy these deficiencies from 

according to a priority list in seven 

being would be brought to a state 

combat and training aircraft and 

spares for US equipment presently 

priority, first-priority army units 

any outside sources that became available 

stages. As the first priority, ground forces in 

of combat readiness, air forces would receive 

radar equipment, and navies would receive 

installed on minesweepers. As the second 

would get two months supply backing, and 

air forces would get airfield construction equipment and maintenance equipment for combat aircraft. The third priority would consist of equipment and 

two months’ backing for army units mobilizable by M+90. The fourth priority 

would consist of spare parts for US equipment on naval vessels not provided in 

the first priority. The fifth priority would consist of remaining maintenance for 

army forces, and war reserves of aircraft for three months at war wastage. The 

sixth priority would provide for naval escort forces, and the seventh, for all 

remaining naval needs.2d 

On 11 February 1949, after examining the “interim supply plan,” the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff set a price tag of $995,647,000 on the amount of military assistance 

to be furnished Western European Union countries. This amount was divided 

among the Services as follows: Navy, $113,028,000; Army, $730,652,000; and Air 

Force, $151,967,000. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also concluded that the statement of 

Western Union Defense Policy was “basically sound and is in general consonance 

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff strategic thinking.“25 

226 
the time the interim supply plan arrived in Washington, the Truman By 

administration had decided to submit a comprehensive military assistance program to Congress along with the North Atlantic Treaty. To guide the preparation of 

this program, Secretaries Forrestal and Marshall and ECA Administrator Paul 

Hoffman constituted themselves a Foreign Assistance Steering Committee (FASC) 

to meet when necessary to consider matters requiring their personal approval or 

referral to the President. The daily work became the responsibility of a subordinate 

interdepartmental group, the Foreign Assistance Coordinating Committee (FACC), 

composed of representatives of the three members of FASC.2h Responsibility for 

administering the program was assigned to the Secretary of State.27 

Secretary Forrestal’s representative on FAAC, and also his special assistant 

for Military Assistance Programs, was Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA. 

Announcing General Lemnitzer’s appointment on 6 January 1949, the Secretary 

of Defense called attention to the wide range of problems FAAC would have to 

deal with and asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, 

and Air Force and the Chairmen of the Munitions Board, the Research and 

Development Board, and the Military Liaison Committee for Atomic Energy to 

name representatives to assist General Lemnitzer. The Joint Chiefs of Staff named 

Major General Alfred M. Gruenther, the Director, Joint Staff, to represent them.*” 

Originally, General Lemnitzer intended to consult these representatives only 

occasionally and on specific issues, but by the end of January they were functioning as a working group jointly with State Department and ECA experts assisting 

FACC representatives of those agencies.*” 

On 7 February, the working group completed drafts of two papers: FACC 

D-3, defining basic policies underlying military assistance programs; and FACC 

D-3/1, applying these policies to produce general guides for programing, a priority list of recipients of military aid during FY 1950, and indications of US objectives with respect to these recipients. The next day, the Secretary of Defense 

referred both papers to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries, and the 

Chairman of the Munitions Board for comment prior to consideration of the 

papers by FACC and ultimate forwarding to FASC.70 

In FACC D-3, the working group proposed that the military assistance program cover direct and indirect costs of aid furnished to regularly constituted 

and recognized armed forces, to include finished military materiel, raw materials and machinery for production of military materiel in foreign countries, technical assistance and training of armed forces, and reimbursement for costs arising out of diversion of resources to military programs. Requests for this aid, the 

working group recommended, should be judged primarily by the resulting contribution to the security of the United States. Other criteria should be the effects 

on the economy of the United States and the recipient countries, consistency 

with US strategy and noninterference with US military buildup, effectiveness in 

strengthening recipient military forces, willingness of recipients to contribute to 

their own defenses and to cooperate with allied countries, and effectiveness in 

maintaining peace. 

227 
any commitments already provided. In accordance with 

Western Europe should be granted primacy. Specific 

made to Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Korea. Other countries 

were Canada, Mexico, and Brazil, with which the United 

current national policy, 

commitments had been 

that must be considered 

States had current military understandings, and the signatories of the Rio de Janeiro Treaty. In addition, 

provision should be made for token assistance to Thailand looking toward the 

Western orientation of that country.“’ 

In applying the principles of FACC D-3, the working group designated the 

countries that should receive aid in FY 1950, assigned each to one of three priority categories and indicated in general terms the amount of aid each should 

receive: “substantial,” which was the amount needed to ensure internal security, 

discourage aggression, delay invasion, and make a maximum contribution to an 

allied war effort; “limited,” the amount needed to ensure internal security and to 

perform limited military missions consistent with US plans; and “token,” or 

enough to ensure political orientation 

classification was as follows: 

Group 1 

Western European Union 

Canada 

Denmark (if a member of NATO) 

Italy (if a member of NATO) 

Norway (if a member of NATO) 

Portugal (if a member of NATO) 

Turkey 

Gvollp II 

Austria 

Greece 

Iran 

Saudi Arabia 

Croup Ill 

Korea 

American Republics 

Philippines 

Thailand 

The working group recommended 

toward the United States. The resulting 

Amount of Aid 

Substantial 

Substantial 

Limited 

Limited 

Limited 

Token 

Substantial 

Limited 

Limited 

Token 

Token 

Token 

Token 

Token 

Token 

that, in addition to allocations to specific 

countries, there should be a general contingency fund, to be administered at the 

broad discretion of the President. Any necessary aid for China should come from 

this fund.“* 

On 21 February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary of Defense the 

working group proposals were “generally sound.” They singled out for endorse228 
ble. They likewise concurred strongly with the suggestion in FACC D3/1 that 

funds be programmed for China, in case any opportunities for exploitation 

became evident in that country. But they cautioned against over-extending the 

aid program at the expense of high-priority countries.3” 

The fleshing out of the bare bones of the FACC’s basic principles to form a 

specific and detailed military assistance program for FY 1950 was a task assumed 

by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on their own initiative. On 14 March, they submitted 

an overall foreign military assistance program for FY 1950 to the Secretary of 

Defense for use in preparation of military assistance legislation and budgetary 

planning. Their program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded, was adequate for 

budgetary planning but not for supply action. Military missions or staff conversations should therefore be used to determine detailed requirements as soon as 

possible. The program could be carried out without diminishing the ability to 

implement current emergency plans, although there would be a short-term 

reduction in the capability for carrying out operations envisaged for the later 

stages. The overall capability of the United States and her allies to meet Soviet 

aggression, particularly in the long run, would, however, be enhanced. 

For Western Europe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff incorporated into their worldwide program the recommendations for WEU countries that they had approved 

on 11 February 1949 under the “interim supply plan.“ Then, following the recommendations of FACC, they added programs for Italy, Norway, Denmark, and 

Portugal-all prospective members of NATO-and Austria. They stipulated, 

however, that assistance to prospective NATO members would be reduced or 

eliminated if those countries failed to join the alliance. The JCS program for Western Europe was asshown in the table. 

Prospective 

NATO Amy 

WEU $730,652,000 

Denmark 31,500,000 

Italy 24,000,OOO 

Norway 37,800,000 

Portugal 8,000,000 

Other 

Austria 112,000,000 

Navy 

$113,028,000 

5,000,000 

10,000,000 

5,000,000 

1,000,000 

Air Force Total 

$151,967,000 $995,647,000 

- 36,500,OOO 

26,000,OOO 60,000,000 

6,000,OOO 48,800,000 

- 9,000,000 

$1,149,947,000 

- 112,000,000 

$1,261,947,000 

229 
was as follows: 

Group 1 

Western Union $ 995,647,OOO 

Denmark 

Italy 

Norway 

Portugal 

Turkey 

Group I1 

Austria 

Greece 

Iran 

Group 111 

Korea 

Latin America 

Philippines 

Contingency Fund 

TOTAL 

36,500,OOO 

60,000,OOO 

48,800,OOO 

9,000,000 

1oo,ooo,ooo 

$ 1,249,947,000 

$ 112,000,000 

200,000,000 

12,300,OOO 

$ 324,300,OOO 

$ 20,000,000 

86,060,400 

5,890,OOO 

$ 111,950,400 

$ 1oo,ooo,ooo 

$ 1,786,197,400z4 

The JCS program was forwarded by the Secretary of Defense to FACC, where 

it was used to develop a coordinated interdepartmental program for presentation 

to the Bureau of the Budget and Congress.“5 

The President, on 20 April, fixed the amount to be requested of Congress for 

the FY 1950 military assistance program at $1,450,000,000. This represented a 

reduction of slightly more than $336,000,000, or about 20 percent, in the amount 

recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The FACC adjusted to this cut by eliminating the programs for Latin America and Portugal and making a drastic 

reduction in the amount allocated for Austria. The programs for Atlantic Pact 

countries were only slightly affected. Programs for the Western European Union 

countries and Italy were reduced, but those for Norway and Denmark were 

increased. Details are shown in the following table.?” 

230 
1. Western Union 

2. Denmark 

3. Norway 

4. Italy 

II. Estimated US financing of increased military 

production and indirect impact costs 

Total Atlantic Pact Countries 

B. Other Participating Countries 

5. Turkey 

6. Greece 

7. Austria 

8. Iran 

9. Korea 

10. Philippines 

Sub-total 

Less: Pipeline supplies financed with FY 49 funds 

Total, other participating countries 

C. Emergency Fund 

D. Estimated costs of administration 

Sub-total 

E. Non-reimbursement to NME for surplus equipment 

included in country programs 

Total Program on Obligation Basis 

The Military Assistance Program in Congress 

$ 801.60 

48.92 

79.72 

44.19 

155.00 

$1,129.43 

102.30 

178.16 

11.62 

15.20 

10.98 

5.74 

$ 324.00 

-19.96 

304.04 

50.00 

11.37 

$1,494.84 

-44.84 

$1,450.00 

0 n 25 July, the same day he affixed his signature to the North Atlantic Treaty, 

President Truman informed Congress that there was a need for $1,450,000,000 

for military assistance. Of this sum, $50,000,000 had already been requested for aid 

to Greece and Turkey under existing authorizations, making the request for new 

authorization $1,400,000,000. This sum was needed, the President said, primarily to 

assist the Western European nations in providing themselves with adequate 

231 
should be able to make allocations as circumstances require.” There was also a need, 

he added, for coordinating the various grants of military assistance so as to make 

them “adaptable in. . . administration to the operation of our foreign policy” To this 

end, he proposed to include existing programs for Greece, Turkey, and the Philippines and new ones for Korea and Iran in a single unified program.77 

The President’s decision to request broad discretionary authority to allocate the 

requested funds as he saw fit proved to be a serious tactical blunder. This plan was 

immediately attacked by both Democrats and Republicans. Even such stalwart 

supporters of the President’s foreign policy as Senators Vandenberg and Connally 

opposed the proposed grant of discretionary authority. As a result the administration hastily drafted a substitute and introduced it into Congress on 5 August.“” 

The new bill, HR 5895, specified a division of the $1.4 billion military aid 

authorization into three broad categories. Title I allocated $1,160,990,000 to parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, provided that such grants were consistent with 

the common defense of the treaty area and furthered the defense plans of NATO. 

Title II called for an authorization of $211,370,000 to Greece and Turkey, and Title 

III, of $27,640,000 to Iran, Korea and the Philippines. The discretionary authority 

requested in the original bill survived in the revision in the form of authority for 

the President to use up to five percent of funds under any title for any other title, 

but such a shifting of funds would have to be reported to the Foreign Affairs and 

Armed Services Committees of Congress.“” 

Hearings on the revised legislation took place between 8 and 19 August 

before the combined Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. 

General Bradley, speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assured the senators that, 

on the basis of his recent consultations with European chiefs of staff, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff were convinced that the defense plans of the Western European 

Union were sound. They were in accordance with US strategic thinking and were 

well adapted to serve as a basis for NATO planning. There was an upsurge in 

morale in Western Europe, General Bradley reported, and a determination to 

pursue collective defense planning. Arms aid, however, was essential to make 

this planning a reality. Collective defense was also essential to the United States, 

General Bradley concluded. To continue to seek national security on a unilateral 

basis would exhaust US moral and material resources.4” 

It soon became apparent that Congress had misgivings about the overall size of 

the program as well as the allocation of funds between countries. On 15 August, the 

House Foreign Affairs Committee approved $1,160.9 million for NATO countries of 

Western Europe, but three days later the whole House dealt a blow to administration hopes by cutting this sum in half before passing the bill 238 to 122. Efforts to 

restore the deleted funds in the Senate were partially successful, and on 22 September the House enacted a measure authorizing a total of $1,314,000,000 for all countries. The House accepted the Senate version on 26 September, and President Truman signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 on 6 October. An 

appropriation bill, granting the identical amount in the authorization act, was 

passed by Congress on 20 October and signed by the President on the 28th.41 

232 
(Greece and Turkey), $211,370,000; Title III, $27,640,000 for Iran, Korea, and the 

Philippines, plus $75,000,000 for the “general area” of China. However, the Act 

stipulated that only $100 million of the NATO appropriation could be spent until 

the President approved NATO defense plans.42 

Reprogramming Military Assistance 

A djustment of the administration’s original military assistance program was 

begun even before Congress had completed action on the legislation. Acting 

in anticipation of congressional cuts, the Secretary of Defense directed the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff on 16 September to realign their program according to terms of 

reference prepared by FACC. These terms of reference established a ceiling of 

$900,000,000 for end items of military equipment for Title I countries and 

$100,000,000 for industrial production in Western Europe. The following directions were laid down: No country would be deleted from Title I; as much aid as 

possible was to be retained for France; and the programs for Norway and Denmark were to be reduced less in proportion than those for WEU countries (taken 

as a whole) and for 

The Joint Chiefs 

to the Secretary of 

which $891,500,000 

and $26,090,000 for 

Italy.4” 

of Staff submitted their revised military assistance program 

Defense on 23 September. 44The total was $1,128,760,000, of 

was for Title I countries; $211,170,000 for Title II countries; 

Title III countries. Title I funds were allocated to countries 

and services as indicated in the table. 

JCS Recommendations for Allocation of FY 1950 Map Funds under 

FACC-Directed $900,000,000 Ceiling’ 

(In millions) 

COllf/tr,l/ Arwy I’&WIJ’ Air Force ma/ 

France $504.220 $40.050 $22.290 $566.560 

Belgium 68.432 7.470 ,660 76.562 

Netherlands 16.106 31.570 2.890 50.566 

Denmark 31.258 8.280 6.7604 6.298 

Norway 49.769 15.490 8.940 74.199 

Italy 24.486 7.570 7.470 39.526 

United Kingdom 37.480 37.480 

Luxembourg .309 .309 

$694.580 $110.430 $86.490 $891.500 

I. NJ) Annexes A, B and C to Encl C to JCS 186X/l II, 20 Scp 49, as amended by Dee On, 22 Sep 49, 

ccs OY2 (8-2246) xc 2Y. 

2. Total of this column adjusted by prorating $I .15 million for training, which, in the original, is 

not allocnkd to individual countriw 

233 
replacements for one year’s peacetime attrition. It had also deleted one-half of 

the items programmed as two months’ combat replacements and one-fourth of 

the two month combat supply of ammunition. The resulting savings amounted 

to $93,790,000. The Navy eliminated 12 mine sweepers, 20 landing craft and miscellaneous items for a saving of $15,910,000. The Air Force eliminated vehicles 

and personal flying equipment totaling $210,000. Total savings were thus 

$109,910,000. 

With the reduced funds, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still expected to attain an 

operationally ready ground force of 14 divisions for NATO countries-9 French, 

1 Belgian, 2 Norwegian, and 2 Danish. They also planned to remedy equipment 

deficiencies on minesweepers and to supply training and transport aircraft and 

spaces and maintenance for them.*” 

Presumably the JCS program was approved, although Secretary Johnson’s 

response is not documented in available records. In any case, the establishment 

of an international army for the defense of Western Europe-a task beyond the 

resources of the European countries themselves-was now in prospect. Its creation was to prove slow and difficult, but a beginning had been made by the end 

of 1949. 

234 
13 

The Communist Victory in China 

On 8 December 1949, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the remnants of his 

Nationalist Government fled from mainland China to set up their capital on Taiwan. This event dramatized the victory of Mao Tse-tung’s communists, an occurrence that drastically altered the global balance of power and called for a major 

realignment of US policy. In the three years before the fall of China, officials of 

the US Government, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had been primarily concerned with the danger posed by Soviet expansion in Europe and the Middle 

East.’ They now had to face the consequences of the Communist victory on the 

Chinese mainland. 

Background: US China Policy after World War II 

A fter the defeat of the Japanese in Asia during World War 11,the United States 

had hoped that China could emerge from the chaos of war as a strong, unified, democratic nation and take the place of Japan as a powerful stabilizing force 

in the Far East. In anticipation of the role China was expected to play in the postwar world, the United States had successfully advocated its membership on the 

United Nations Security Council, an action that prematurely conferred major 

power status on the weak Chinese state. 

To support the policy of building China into a major power, the United States 

had continued to supply military aid, begun during World War II, to Chiang Kaishek’s government. The Lend-Lease Program in China was extended beyond 30 

June 1946, the cut-off date for other countries. Supplies were transferred to the 

Chinese to continue the war-time program intended to equip 39 Chinese divisions and 8% air groups. Equipment was also provided to the Chinese Navy, 

while Congress enacted legislation authorizing the transfer of 131 surplus naval 

vessels to Chinese ownership. Other provisions of US military aid to China 

included the sale of excess US Army stocks in west China and the abandonment 

235 
The United States also continued to provide economic assistance to the Chinese Nationalists in the form of grants, credits, and surplus property sales. This 

assistance was furnished directly by extending the Lend-Lease Program of World 

War II and also through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and the Export-Import Bank.? 

The obstacles to the fulfillment of the US vision for China were enormous. 

The people, impoverished by the war, existed on the edge of subsistence, and the 

economy suffered from an accelerating inflation. The Nationalist Government of 

China, headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was inefficient, lacked popular support, and was replete with graft and corruption. It also faced an armed 

insurrection by the Communists. 

This rival party had common origins with the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), but the two parties had split in 1927. During World War II, however, the 

Communists had cooper&cd with the government and the United States in the 

fight against Japan. After the war the Communists retained the areas they had 

recovered from the Japanese. Widely dispersed in guerrilla bands throughout 

northern and central China, they held a geographic advantage over the government, whose control was only secure in the southern part of the country. Also to 

their advantage, the Communists had the popular support of the rural poor, who 

were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the Kuomintang. When the Communists sought to extend the area under their control, their dispute with the 

Kuomintang became a full-fledged civil war.4 

To end this civil strife and bring about the unification of China by peaceful 

and democratic methods, President Truman sent General of the Army George C. 

Marshall to China as his Special Representative. Arriving in China in December 

1945, General Marshall immediately began strenuous efforts to bring about a 

cease-fire and a genuine political settlement. At first it seemed he would succeed. 

In order to help stop the fighting, an embargo on US arms shipments to the 

Kuomintang was put into effect on 29 July 1946. But by the end of the year, General Marshall realized that his efforts were doomed, and he requested his own 

return to the United States. On 28 March 1947,” the embargo on the sale of arms 

to China was lifted. 

In the year and a half following the end of World War II the Nationalist forces 

appeared to be gaining the upper hand in the civil war. By the end of 1946, they 

had made significant gains in north China and had deployed large forces to 

assert control over Manchuria. In these efforts they had been indirectly assisted 

by the United States, which transported Nationalist troops northward to reoccupy areas held by the Japanese and deployed its own Marine forces to north 

China to assist the Nationalist troops in repatriating the Japanese armies. The 

Communists, who were themselves receiving from the USSR Japanese arms captured by Soviet forces in Manchuria, at first made little effort to contest the northward movement of the Nationalists. Early in 1947, however, this situation 

changed. Taking advantage of the overextension of Nationalist forces in 

Manchuria and northern China, the Communists struck successfully at isolated 

236 
It was in these circumstances that the Joint Chiefs of Staff first expressed formal views on the growing Communist strength in China. Addressing the StateWar-Navy Coordinating Committee on 9 June 1947, they warned that Soviet 

domination of China, because it would probably give the USSR hegemony over 

all of Asia, would be a major threat to US security interests. This was a state of 

affairs that could in all probability not be prevented unless the United States 

gave military assistance to the Nationalist government sufficient to enable it to 

resist Communist attack. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conceded that much of the 

aid already sent to China, because it had been given piecemeal, had been 

absorbed by the Nationalist government without any noticeable effect. They 

maintained, however, that “carefully planned, selective and well-supervised 

assistance,“ limited largely to ammunition and spare parts, would “facilitate 

the military development which appears essential for the unification and stabilization of China.” A “relatively small” investment in ammunition and replacement parts for US equipment already supplied the Nationalists would, they 

believed, “enable the National Government to establish control over areas now 

under [Clommunist contro1.“7 

The Wedemeyer Mission 

Secretary of State Marshall agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the situation in China was critical and was rapidly deteriorating. He did not wholly 

accept their conclusions, but agreed that a reexamination of policy was in order. 

To this end, he called in Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, the former 

Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek and Commanding General, US Forces China 

Theater, and asked him to head a fact-finding mission to China. A draft directive 

to General Wedemeyer, bearing the concurrence of the Secretaries of War and 

Navy, was submitted by Secretary Marshall on 8 July to President Truman, who 

approved it the following day. 

By the terms of this directive, General Wedemeyer was to “proceed to China 

without delay for the purpose of making an appraisal of the political, economic, 

psychological and military situations-current and projected.” He was to make 

clear to Chinese leaders that “the United States Government can consider assistance in a program of rehabilitation only if the Chinese Government presents satisfactory evidence of effective measures looking towards Chinese recovery and 

provided further than any aid which may be made available shall be subject to 

the supervision of representatives of the United States Government.“X 

General Wedemeyer and his team, consisting of advisers for military, economic, and political affairs, arrived in Nanking, the Nationalist capital, on 23 

July. They spent a month visiting Nanking, Shanghai, Peking, and other major 

cities from Mukden in the north to Canton in the south. They interviewed Chineseofficials and ordinary citizens, aswell as foreigners living in China.” 

237 
reported, held the tactical initiative in Manchuria and north China, where the 

Nationalist position was growing increasingly precarious. A continuation of this 

trend could lead to establishment of a Soviet satellite government in Manchuria 

and ultimately to a Communist-dominated China. To rectify this situation, unfortunately, the US Government had no choice but to work through the present 

“corrupt, reactionary and inefficient” Chinese Nationalist Government. The 

Nationalists should be offered “moral, advisory and material support,” and 

should be encouraged to improve the internal political situation through reforms. 

China should be allowed to purchase military equipment and supplies from the 

United States. Immediate assistance should be given to the Chinese in obtaining 

ammunition. General Wedemeyer also recommended the prompt completion of 

the 8%Air Group Program, begun during World War II, and the transfer of additional ships to the Chinese Navy as rapidly as personnel could be trained to 

operate them. He also suggested that US military advice and supervision be 

extended below the General Staff level to the combat units, but that US advisers 

be kept outside of actual zones of operation. 

General Wedemeyer stipulated, however, that this assistance be contingent on 

Chinese cooperation. He recommended that: 

China inform the United Nations promptly of her request to the United States 

for increased materiel and advisory assistance. 

China re uest the United Nations to take immediate action to bring about a 

cessation of B ostilities in Manchuria and request that Manchuria be placed under 

a Five-Power Guardianship or, failing that, under a Trusteeship in accordance 

with the United Nations Charter. 

China make effective use of her own resources in a program for economic 

reconstruction and initiate sound fiscal policies leading to reduction of budgetary 

deficits. 

China give continuing evidence that the urgently required political and military reforms are being implemented. 

China accept American advisors as responsible representatives of the United 

States Government in specified military and economic fields to assist China in 

utilizing United States aid in the manner for which it is intended.“’ 

The General’s recommendation regarding Manchuria amounted to a proposal 

that a friendly government be stripped of some of the territory legally under its 

control. The dangers of publicizing such a suggestion were obvious. The circulation of the Wedemeyer report was therefore restricted to the President, the Secretary of State, and a few other officials.” 

238 
T he question of implementing General Wedemeyer’s recommendations was 

taken under advisement by the Department of State, where immediate attention was given to the military and financial proposals. On 2 November Secretaries Forrestal and Marshall, meeting as the Committee of Two, concurred on 

certain interim provisions of military assistance. They agreed that surplus US 

munitions should be transferred to China from the Marianas and perhaps also 

from the Philippines. The 39-division program for the Nationalist army had been 

completed, but the transfer of equipment for the 8% air groups should be expedited. Secretary Marshall promised to study the possibility of further aid. He told 

Secretary Forrestal that 

a parently everyone is in agreement that we wish to revent Soviet domination 

oP China and that we wish to do something to rovi K e for a stable government 

there, but there is no unanimity on the way in w Rich assistance can be rendered.12 

The limited measures approved by the Committee of Two could be taken 

under existing legislative authority. In considering further steps during the ensuing weeks, the administration realized that China’s financial situation had grown 

so desperate that emergency economic aid must take precedence over military 

assistance. On 18 February 1948, President Truman asked Congress to provide 

$570,000,000 in economic assistance for China for a 15-month period ending 30 

June 1949. Of this amount, $510,000,000 would cover the financing of essential 

imports for China, including cereals, cotton, petroleum, fertilizer, tobacco, pharmaceuticals, coal, and repair parts for existing capital equipment. The remaining 

$60,000,000 would finance selected reconstruction projects in areas sheltered from 

military operations. None of this money was to be used for military assistance.‘:’ 

The members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, many of whom 

advocated military as well as economic aid for China, questioned Secretary 

Marshall on the efficacy of the new program. Representatives Lawrence H. 

Smith, from Wisconsin, and Walter H. Judd, from Minnesota, both asked Secretary Marshall specifically if the plan would assist the Chinese military effort. 

Secretary Marshall answered both Representatives in the affirmative and told 

Representative Judd that by eliminating many of the economic burdens, the 

proposed plan gave the Nationalist Government the “capability of purchasing 

things they need for the military effort if they wish to do ~0.“‘~ This assurance, 

however, did not entirely satisfy the Congressmen. In executive session, Secretary Marshall pointed out that considerable aid had already been given to the 

Kuomintang since V-J Day, and that no amount of military assistance, short of 

overt US intervention, would be sufficient to enable Chiang Kai-shek’s forces to 

destroy the Communists.ls 

During March both the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate 

Committee on Foreign Relations drew up substitute legislation to assist China. 

The House measure authorized two sums, one of $420 million for economic aid, 

another of $150 million for military aid to be supervised by a US mission. The 

239 
might decide (presumably including military aid, which, however, was not 

specifically mentioned). A conference bill reconciled the two versions generally 

in favor of the Senate. The compromise measure was passed by both houses of 

Congress and signed by the President on 4 April 1948. Known as the China Aid 

Act of 1948, it authorized $338 million for economic aid and $125 million for special grants to the Chinese Government on such terms as might be determined by 

the President of the United States. It was assumed the special grants would be 

used for the purchase of military supplies. Of the total sum of $463 million 

authorized, however, only $400 million (including the $125 million for special 

grants) was actually appropriated; it was to be available until 2 April 194Y.l” 

The Chinese immediately made it clear that they intended to use the entire 

$125 million for military purposes. The President granted broad authority to the 

Secretary of State to allocate the money. He imposed no restrictions upon the use 

of it, and therefore left it available for the purchase of military supplies.17 

During the evolution of the China Aid Act, the National Military Establishment had favored inclusion of military aid. The question arose when the NSC 

Staff was preparing a position paper on short-term aid to China. Representatives 

of the Department of State and the National Security Resources Board proposed 

that the United States provide only limited economic assistance. The representatives of the Services believed that: 

The United States should furnish limited economic and military assistance to the 

National Government of China on a scale sufficient to retard economic and military deterioration and rovide that Government with an opportunity to stabilize 

its internal political an 1 military situation.lX

At the request of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented 

on the NSC paper. “It would be unwise,” they believed, “to extend economic aid 

to China without the military assistance which will provide the National Government some means with which to improve the present situation of internal conflict.” The views they had submitted on 9 June 1947, in favor of limited and carefully supervised military aid, remained valid. I4 The NSC Staff paper was never 

acted on by the Council; it was overtaken by the passage of the China Aid Act, 

which, as already pointed out, made possible a certain amount of military assistance to China. 

The position of the Nationalist Government, however, continued to detcriorate. As early as 26 July 1948, less than three months after the passage of the 

China Aid Act, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, in a memorandum to 

the NSC, asked whether it was advisable to continue sending military aid to 

China. If present trends continued, he wrote, the Nationalist Government might 

collapse and be replaced by separatist regional regimes. He outlined four possible courses of action the United States might follow. 

240 
2. US aid mi ht be withdrawn, but then the Nationalist Government would 

most certainly faq1. 

3. US aid might be continued on the basis of programs already authorized. 

This would buy time for the Nationalists. 

4. US aid might be shifted from the Nationalist to other regimes. This, however, would be contrary to present US policy. 

Commenting on the Secretary of the Army’s alternatives, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff recommended the third one. They again argued for “carefully planned, 

selective and well-supervised assistance,” which, they emphasized, must include 

military equipment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that no matter how unfavorable the ultimate developments in 

would be to forestall the final outcome 

within reason” would constitute “true 

rity.” The National Security Council took 

als at that time.2’1 

JUSMAGCHINA 

China might be or how impossible it 

indefinitely, the “BUYING OF TIME 

economy in terms of our national secuno action on Secretary Royall’s proposM achinery for administering US military aid to China was already in existence. The US military advisory effort in China had begun during World 

War II. Following the conflict, the United States at first continued to furnish 

advice through the Headquarters, US Forces China Theater. After this headquarters closed down, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the establishment of an 

advisory mission in China. The President approved this recommendation, and in 

February 1946 the War and Navy Departments estabhshed Advisory Groups in 

that country. 

The mission of the Army Advisory Group was to advise and assist the Chinese Ground Forces in providing properly trained, organized, and equipped 

ground forces for combat operations. At first the Group was limited to giving 

advice and assistance relating to the organization and functioning of the Chinese 

Ground Forces Headquarters and to the establishment and operation of schools. 

It could not make recommendations concerning the organization or the equipping of ground forces units, nor could it be directly involved in their training. 

These restrictions were subsequently relaxed to allow Army advisers to furnish 

some advice to ground forces below headquarters level and to participate in various Chinese training centers.21 

The Air Division of the Army Advisory Group was established to assist in the 

modernization of the Chinese Air Force and to provide the Chinese technical 

241 
ernment in naval matters, to train Chinese crews for the US naval vessels transferred to China under the Lend-Lease Program and later under PL 512, and to render technical advice in relation to the operation and maintenance of these ships.22 

Consolidation of the two Groups into a single one to furnish coordinated 

advice was a logical step but was delayed by administrative difficulties. 

Congress enacted a law authorizing the Naval Group, but failed to pass similar 

legislation for the Army or the Air Force, thus leaving the two groups on a different legal basis. Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royal1 suggested on 7 February 

1948 that the two groups be integrated under a “coordinator.” To the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, this step did not go far enough. They consulted the Judge Advocate Generals of the Services, who gave their opinion that the President had authority to 

establish a “joint” advisory group, in the proper sense of the term, under a 

declared state of national emergency (which still existed even though World War 

II had ended). On 11 June 1948, therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary 

Forrestal a draft directive, to be issued by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, for a Joint United States Military Advisory 

Group (JUSMAG) to the Republic of China. 

The mission of this body, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would 

be to 

assist and advise the Chinese Government in the development of modern armed 

forces for the fulfillment of those obligations which may devolve upon China 

under her international agreements, including the United Nations, for the establishment of adequate control over liberated areas in China, including Manchuria, 

and Formosa, and for the maintenance of internal peace and security. 

To achieve this mission, JUSMAG would give technical, but not operational 

advice to the Head of the Chinese Government and would assist and advise all 

Chinese armed forces and logistics organizations in matters pertaining to training, organization, and equipment. Members of JUSMAG were specifically 

enjoined from participation in operations in combat areas.2R 

Secretary Forrestal approved the JCS recommendations, but before he could 

consult with Secretary Marshall on the proposed directive, the nature of the advisory effort in China was discussed in another context. On 11 June, the Secretary 

of State met with Mr. Royall, General Bradley, General Wedemeyer, and other 

State and Army Department officials to consider testimony to be given before the 

Congressional Committees concerning use of the money made available under 

the China Aid Act. Of major concern was how to assure that US aid was effective. 

In this connection, Major General David Barr, Chief of the Army Advisory 

Group, had recommended placing US advisers with selected Chinese Army 

headquarters in the field. Secretary Marshall feared that such a practice would 

result in the United States “getting-sucked in.” General Wedemeyer was inclined 

to agree. He recalled that he had found the Chinese extremely reluctant to take 

advice. Although a year earlier he had recommended putting advisers with Chi242 
the final debacle. The conferees generally agreed that the Advisory Group 

should exert every effort to make certain that supplies were delivered where they 

would do the most good. No attempt should be made, however, to exercise 

supervision below the level of higher Chinese headquarters; to do so would 

expose the US advisers to possible involvement in military operations.24 

Following these discussions, Secretary Marshall approved the draft directive 

for JUSMAGCHINA subject to certain changes. The mission of the new group, as 

stated in the draft, was set forth in language drawn in part from the Presidential 

order of 1946, which was no longer appropriate and might be read as committing 

the United States to intervene in the Chinese civil war. The Department of State 

suggested the following revised statement of mission, which the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff accepted: 

The mission of JUSMAGCHINA will be to assist and advise the Chinese Government in the development of modern armed forces for the purpose of enablin 

China to create a national military establishment in kee ing with its nationa q 

defense needs and to fulfill its obligations as a member of tKe United Nations. 

The Department of State desired that the functions of the various Service Advisory Divisions be limited to advice and assistance in organization and training; 

they should not become involved in the provision of equipment. The Department 

also objected to the implication that the United States would assist in operation 

of procurement in China and recommended that the term “advise” rather than 

“advise and assist” be used in this instance. The Department of State had no 

objection to US Naval officers assisting in the instruction and training of Chinese 

crews at sea or in port.2i 

The directive establishing JUSMAGCHINA was issued on 17 September.2” The 

Group was to have a personnel strength of not more than 1,000, and was to 

include Army, Navy, and Air Force Advisory Divisions, a Joint Advisory Council, a Joint Planning Staff, and a Joint Secretariat. US advisers were specifically 

forbidden to engage in operations in combat areas. JUSMAGCHINA was formally activated on 1 November 1948 under the direction of General Barr, who 

had been nominated for the position by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Barr 

also continued to head the Army Advisory Group (which now became the Army 

Advisory Division).27 

The establishment of JUSMAGCHINA came too late, however, to stave off 

disaster by modernizing Chiang’s crumbling military forces. The steady worsening of the Nationalists’ position allowed JUSMAGCHINA only a few months of 

existence. The well-planned Communist offensive of late 1947 and early 1948 isolated the Nationalist troops in three Manchurian strongholds-Chinchow, Mukden and Changchun. The cities had to be supplied by air and proved impossible 

for the Government to hold. On 14 October 1948 Chinchow fell to the Communists; four days later Changchun was captured; and finally, on 2 November 1948, 

Mukden, the capital of Manchuria, came under Communist control. The failure 

243 
The battle then shifted southward to the vicinity of Hsuchow (Tungshan), an 

important junction of north-south and east-west railway lines. Nationalist forces, 

trapped and surrounded, tried without success to withdraw. The city itself fell to 

the Communists on 15 December 1948. By the time the Hsuchow campaign was 

over a few weeks later, the Nationalists had lost another 200,000 troops. More 

important was the fact that all of China north of the Yangtze was, for practical 

purposes, in Communist hands. The Nationalists held control south of the river, 

but their prospects of retaining it appeared highly uncertain at best.2q 

During the fighting around Hsuchow, the headquarters of JUSMAC at 

Nanking immediately south of the Yangtze, was threatened by the Communist 

forces. On 2 November, the day after JUSMAGCHINA was formally established, 

all members of the Joint Advisory Council and the Ambassador to China agreed 

that no additional military personnel should be moved into the command. US 

personnel earmarked for JUSMAG were diverted to other assignments. Soon the 

need for evacuating JUSMAG personnel became evident, and large numbers of 

advisers were withdrawn to Tokyo. A token group remained in China for a time, 

but by the end of January 1949 it too had been withdrawn. JUSMAGCHINA continued formally in existence until 3 March, when its operations were suspended.?” 

The Withdrawal from Tsingtao 

T he deterioration of the military posture of the Nationalist Government at the 

beginning of 1949 endangered the US Naval and Marine Corps personnel at 

Tsingtao. These US forces served in an advisory capacity to the Chinese naval 

training base and naval installations located there. As a major port and naval 

base, Tsingtao, on the Shantung peninsula, was an alluring objective for the Chinese Communists. By its capture they could push the last contingent of US forces 

out of China. As early as May 1948 the Office of Naval Intelligence concluded 

that the Chinese Communists, who were already threatening the Shantung 

peninsula, were capable of bringing increasing pressure on Tsingtao and probably would do so that summer. 

In view of the serious threat of attack by Communist troops, the Commander, 

Naval Forces Western Pacific (COMNAVWESI’AC), Admiral Oscar C. Badger, 

delineated to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Denfeld, four possible 

courses of action for the defense of Tsingtao. 

A. Assist Nationalist forces in defense of the city and essential suburban facilities. 

B. Defend installations essential to the United States without other local 

participation. 

C. Prompt evacuation of US personnel and forces with covering action by US 

forces only as necessary. 

244 
Admiral Badger did not consider it advisable to withdraw US troops from the 

city at that time. To do so would cause “permanent damage to the U. S. position 

in the Orient and to the Nationalist situation affecting all of North China.” He 

therefore rejected courses C and D. Course B he deemed militarily impractical 

and likely to engender hostility toward the United States. His choice was for 

course A, although it would require (1) negotiations with the Chinese Government, which had the responsibility for protecting foreign lives and interests, and 

(2) an increase in the size of the US garrison at Tsingtao.31 

Acting on the recommendation of Admiral Denfeld, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

advised the Secretary of Defense that US forces in Tsingtao were threatened by an 

imminent attack from Communist forces and that the Chinese Nationalists were 

not able to discharge their responsibilities for defending foreign lives and interests there. Whether or not to withdraw US forces was a question of policy, they 

pointed out, which should be promptly considered by the National Security 

Council. Meanwhile, they had directed COMNAVWESPAC, at his own suggestion, to assist Chinese Nationalist forces in defense of the city if it were attacked.72 

This instruction to Admiral Badger was viewed with alarm in the Department 

of State. Acting Secretary Robert A. Lovett warned Secretary Forrestal that the 

United States might end up assuming unilateral responsibility for defending all 

or part of Tsingtao. He suggested that Admiral Badger at once seek clarification 

of Chiang Kai-shek’s intentions toward the city and make it unmistakably clear 

that the basic responsibility for defending it rested with the Chinese Government. If the Communists evidenced an intent to attack Tsingtao, Mr. Lovett recommended that Admiral Badger evacuate all dependents and withdraw from 

exposed positions. Should it become evident that the Nationalists could not 

defend the city, then US personnel should be entirely withdrawn. He suggested 

that the Joint Chiefs of Staff revise their instructions to COMNAVWESPAC in line 

with the above comments, pending the formulation of a definite policy by the 

National Security Council.3Y 

These views were accepted only in part. On 14 June 1948 the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, with the concurrence of Secretary Forrestal, authorized Admiral Badger to 

evacuate US personnel and forces from Tsingtao if the situation appeared serious 

enough to warrant such action. The rest of Mr. Lovett’s suggestions were laid 

aside to await NSC consideration of the matter.34 

The NSC Staff reviewed the situation of US forces at Tsingtao and submitted a 

split report. The Department of State desired that withdrawal of US forces begin 

at once; the Service representatives wanted it postponed until an attack became 

imminent.“” It does not appear that this report was ever discussed by the NSC. 

However, the Council considered the situation at Tsingtao on 15 July 1948 and 

postponed action on the grounds that any change in the US position at Tsingtao 

might adversely affect the crisis over Berlin, where the Soviet blockade of the 

Western zones was only a few weeks old.3h During the months that followed, the 

Council again failed to act, perhaps because of the State-Defense split. At length 

245 
remain in effect. No change would be made in them without prior consultation 

between Defense and State, pending consideration by the NSC of a forthcoming 

report on the entire question of US policy toward China. Meanwhile, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff would furnish COMNAVWESPAC with any additional units that 

he might need to carry out these instructions.i7 

Fortunately the situation at Tsingtao remained quiet throughout the summer 

of 1948. Chiang Kai-shek in fact seized the opportunity to try to repair his fortunes in Shantung and nearby regions. In August 1948 he requested that arms 

and ammunition, paid for out of the $125 million made available under the 

China Aid Act, to be shipped through Tsingtao to General Fu Tso-yi, who 

remained in command of a large force in Hopeh province, north of Shantung. 

This request was endorsed by the US Ambassador to China, J. Leighton Stuart, as 

well as by General Barr and Admiral Badger.?x 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who received Chiang’s proposal through Admiral 

Denfeld, considered it militarily sound, as well as allowable under the guidelines 

laid down by the President for the use of the $125 million. Secretary Forrestal 

concurred and apparently obtained the President’s approval. However, the 

materiel arrived too late to retrieve the situation in north China. Shipments 

began in November 1948 and continued until March 1949.1y 

In September 1948 the Communists seized Tsinan, the capital of Shantung. 

The Nationalists were left with the city of Tsingtao and its immediate environs, 

and the situation of the US forces there assumed a new urgency. Acting Secretary 

of State Lovett pointed out that this new situation necessitated a revision of 

Admiral Badger’s instructions. The problem now, in Mr. Lovett’s opinion, was to 

extricate the US command while at the same time minimizing the loss of prestige. 

He recommended immediate evacuation of dependents from Tsingtao and transfer of shore-based activities to shipboard, while at the same time strengthening 

US defenses of the city in the hope of deterring an attack.“” 

The matter was referred to President Truman, who decided, on the basis of 

advice from Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) representatives in 

China, that the situation was not yet beyond hope. He “suggested” that the withdrawal from Tsingtao not take place at that time, and that aid to the Nationalist 

forces in northern China be expedited.41 The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly prepared, and Secretary Forrestal approved, new orders to COMNAVWESPAC, 

which were transmitted on 22 October. He was now authorized to use his forces 

for the protection of US interests and for the maintenance of order in connection 

therewith, within the perimeter of Tsingtao. He was to be prepared to evacuate 

dependents and other foreigners at his discretion. US forces, however, would be 

evacuated only on order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.d2 

The latitude allowed Admiral Badger under these instructions alarmed 

Ambassador Stuart, who warned that they appeared to increase the likelihood of 

a clash between US and Communist forces. Acting Secretary Lovett, sharing his 

concern, wished to be “informed promptly” of the actions that Admiral Badger 

planned to takt >.40The Admiral himself interpreted the directive in a restrained 

246 
commander in order to prevent fighting. He would also try to arrange an agreement between the Communists and Nationalists; the outcome of this effort 

would determine whether evacuation would begin.44 

Nevertheless in Washington the situation was considered urgent enough to 

justify a special meeting of the National Security Council, even in the absence of 

the President, who had gone home to Missouri to vote in the election. The Council tentatively approved the course of action that had been recommended by Mr. 

Lovett. COMNAVWESPAC should be instructed to evacuate US dependents and, 

“in so far as practicable,” to liquidate shore-based activities or transfer them to 

shipboard. At the same time, steps should be taken, at the discretion of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, to strengthen the defensive position of the forces at Tsingtao. This 

decision was subsequently approved by the President.4’ 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly instructed Admiral Badger on 6 November to maintain readiness to withdraw from Tsingtao while at the same time continuing to reinforce the defenses there. The garrison would be temporarily reinforced by Marines from Guam, they told him. Dependents should be evacuated, 

and any change in the situation should be reported at once. In the event of a sudden attack or local uprising, Admiral Badger was authorized to use his forces for 

the protection of US lives and property.4h 

A month later Chiang Kai-shek decided to close down the Chinese naval 

installations in Tsingtao and relocated them to Amoy, farther south on the mainland, and Taiwan. Obviously the United States could no longer base its naval 

forces in Tsingtao after the Nationalists left. A potentially dangerous situation 

could therefore be terminated, since US forces could be withdrawn without loss 

of prestige. Acting Secretary Lovett, on learning of Chiang’s decision, recommended to the NSC the following course of action: 

1. Admiral Badger should proceed energetically to evacuate de endents and 

surplus material and to liquidate shore-based activities. l!i e should be 

directed at this time to withdraw his forces when it becomes publicly 

known that Chinese naval training installations will be removed from 

Tsin tao or as soon thereafter as may be feasible without jeopardizing plans 

for tae evacuation of Americans in China. Public intimation of his intention 

should be avoided until the Chinese intention to transfer their installations 

becomes publicly known in order that his withdrawal may be attributed to 

the Chinese move rather than vice versa. 

2. The existing program for training units of the Chinese Navy should be suspended upon the removal of the Chinese naval training base from Tsingtao. 

3. American naval forces should not be established at this time either on Taiwan or at Amoy.17 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with the second and third of Mr. Lovett’s recommendations. With reference to the first, they informed the Secretary of 

Defense that the evacuation of dependents and surplus material and the liquida247 
ing of the withdrawal announcement as proposed by Mr. Lovett. They suggested 

that announcement originate from the Department of State and be a matter of 

decision by that Department and the Department of the Navy.4x 

Mr. Lovett’s conclusions, as supplemented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were 

endorsed by the NSC Staff on 23 December 1948. At the same time, the Staff 

recommended that withdrawal of shore-based activities from Tsingtao not be 

construed as a decision that US naval forces would withdraw from Chinese 

waters. The NSC adopted the Council’s report; the President approved it the 

following day.@’ 

A Policy of Reality for China 

By the end of 1948 the destruction of Nationalist forces in northern China and 

the seizure of the major cities north of the Yangtze had so altered the situation that a reexamination of US policy was clearly necessary. The outcome of this 

reexamination was NSC 34/l, approved by President Truman in February 1949. 

Actually, however, the new policy paper was the culmination of actions initiated 

by Secretary Forrestal more than a year earlier. 

The Secretary of Defense had suggested in January 1948 that the Department of State prepare a report for the NSC on future US policy toward China. 

Accordingly, the Policy Planning Staff of the Department, headed by Mr. 

George Kennan, undertook a comprehensive and scholarly study of all phases 

of the current situation in China, beginning with the history of that country. 

Their voluminous report was completed in October 1948 and turned over to the 

NSC. The general conclusion was that, although traditional US objectives toward 

China were valid, they were not attainable within the foreseeable future. The outcome of the civil war, and hence China’s future, were being decided by forces far 

beyond the control of any foreign country, and no amount of US aid could 

retrieve the fortunes of the Nationalists. The United States should, therefore follow a pragmatic course of action in China, as follows: (1) continue for the present 

to recognize the Nationalist Government as constituted; (2) make the decision 

regarding the recognition of any other government only after the actual fall of the 

Nationalists; and (3) if possible, prevent China from becoming an “adjunct of 

Soviet politico-military power.” 5o 

This draft was intensively discussed within the administration during the 

ensuing two months, apparently at levels higher than the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At 

issue was the nature of the guidance to be drawn from the conclusions implicit in 

the State Department analysis. Secretary Forrestal believed that the NSC should 

approve a paper that would prescribe rather specific guidance for the new Far 

Eastern situation. Officials of the Department of State, especially Mr. Kennan, 

believed that any guidance must be broad and flexible, since the situation was 

fluid and the United States could do little to influence it at the moment.“’ 

248 
objective of a unified, stable, and independent China but recognized that this was 

hardly to be achieved in the present situation. lmmediate US policy, therefore, 

should aim at preventing China from becoming an adjunct of Soviet power. In 

order to do so, the United States should “exploit opportunities in China while 

maintaining flexibility and avoiding irrevocable commitments to any one course 

or to any one faction.” At the same time, the United States should relegate China 

to a relatively low priority-lower than that of other areas “where the benefits to 

U.S. security are more immediately commensurate with the expenditure of U.S. 

resources.” The President approved this statement of policy on 4 February 1949.‘* 

Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who replaced Secretary Marshall in January 1949, was especially eager to extricate the United States from involvement 

in China. Writing later, he thus described the situation in China at the time of 

his accession: 

In Asia the effort to restore a Chinese society and state based upon an amalgamation of Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang and Mao Tse-Tung’s Communists had 

failed, and Chiang was in the last stages of collapse. I arrived just in time to have 

him collapse on me.51 

Shortly after he took office, Secretary of State Acheson presented a new analysis of the Chinese situation to the NSC. It was occasioned by the continuing success of the Communists and the rising influence of the Kremlin in China. Power 

had clearly passed to the Chinese Communists, who would eventually take over 

all or most of China. The Nationalist Government might survive in south China 

or Taiwan, but at best as a local regime. 

Secretary Acheson recommended that the United States continue its traditional 

policies of friendship for the Chinese people and respect for the territorial independence and administrative integrity of China. The United States should continue to 

recognize the Nationalist Government until the situation was further clarified, but 

also maintain, in so far as feasible, official contact with all elements in China. Political and economic measures should be seized upon to exploit any rifts between the 

Chinese Communists and the Soviets. For the most part, however, the United 

States would have to rely on “indigenous Chinese elements” in combatting Kremlin influence; these should be given cautious clandestine support. The NSC 

accepted Secretary Acheson’s recommendations without alteration and forwarded 

them to the President, who directed their implementation on 3 March 1949.‘” 

At the same time, the President and the Council adopted another set of recommendations drafted by the Department of State regarding the use of trade as a 

weapon to minimize Soviet influence over Communist China. The principal conclusion was that, in order to lessen China’s dependence on the Soviet Union, the 

traditional Chinese commerce with Japan should be cautiously encouraged. At 

the same time, it was stressed that nothing of direct military value should be sent 

to Communist China, and that shipments of industrial equipment should be 

carefully screened to make certain that critical items were not transshipped 

through China to other parts of the communist world.55 

249 
I mplicit in the decisions reached by the President and the National Security 

Council early in 1949 was that no further purpose would be served by providing military assistance to the Nationalist Government. Shipments were 

still being made under the China Trade Act under which funds would be 

available until 2 April 1949. Any effort to continue assistance beyond that 

date appeared futile. But the administration’s efforts to terminate the military 

aid program for Chiang encountered determined opposition from the congressional “China Bloc.” 

The advisability of continuing shipments of military materiel to the Nationalists had been questioned by Secretary Forrestal in December 1948. Two 

months earlier, when it appeared that all might not be lost for the Nationalists 

in north China, President Truman had directed that shipments of arms and 

ammunition be expedited. Secretary Forrestal now pointed out that the situation had changed and that new guidance was needed to answer the question: 

Should the National Military Establishment continue to provide assistance to 

Nationalist China?s6 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom Secretary Forrestal’s memorandum had 

been informally referred for comment, answered the Secretary’s first question in 

the negative. In a reversal of their previous position, they now viewed the situation in China as irreparable and doubted that providing further military equipment to the Chinese Nationalist Government would buy any more time. “It 

might, in fact, have the opposite result,” they wrote, “in that such equipment 

might pass into the hands of victorious Communist forces.” On the other hand, 

they did not believe that the Nationalist Government should be deserted “at the 

eleventh hour.” They accordingly recommended that: 

1. The military aid program should be continued for the present. 

2. Emphasis on its priority and tempo should be relaxed. 

3. U on actual collapse of the Chinese Nationalist Government delivery 

should %e suspended. 

4. Resumption of deliver to ap ropriate regional re imes should be subject 

to determination at a later 2 ate an 8. m the light of deve Popments subsequent to 

the collapse of the Chinese National GovernmenLs7 

The NSC withheld a decision on the question and sought the advice of the 

Director, JUSMAGCHINA, and the US Ambassador at Nanking.5x General Barr’s 

view was that the loss of all of China to the Communists appeared to be merely a 

matter of time. “Only a policy of unlimited United States aid, including the immediate employment of United States armed forces to block the southern advance of 

the Communists,” which he “emphatically” did not recommend, “would enable 

the Nationalist Government to maintain a foothold in southern China against a 

250 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he recommended a middle course, as follows: 

1. Military and economic aid to Taiwan and to China south of the Yangtze 

should continue as Ion as any considerable portions of these areas were 

held by the Nationalist 8 overnment. 

2. Every effort should be made to avoid having any considerable stockpile of 

military su plies designated for the Nationalists where they would be 

likely to fal P.mto the hands of the Communists. Specificall , military and 

economic aid sup lies then enroute or at check oints shoul ci”be dispatched 

to Okinawa or ot Ker suitable places for onwar R routing in accordance with 

the situationiq 

On the other hand, Ambassador Stuart warned that the continuing delivery of 

munitions under the China Aid Act was inextricably involved in future US policy toward China. Even to divert shipments to Taiwan was premature, since it 

was expected that Chiang would continue resistance from southern China for 

some time. To stop shipments at that time would inevitably be taken as a confirmation of the belief that the United States was through with Generalissimo Chiang and would discourage those both within and outside the Nationalist Government who desired to continue resisting communism.ho 

The NSC discussed the subject again on 3 February 1949. Secretary Forrestal 

reported that approximately 50 percent of the $125 million worth of supplies 

authorized under the China Aid Act had already reached China, while 15 percent 

were currently being delivered. A decision on the remaining 35 percent, he said, 

was urgently needed.h’ 

The Council agreed that the President, after consulting congressional leaders, 

should suspend further shipments of military supplies to China, since the equipment could no longer be used effectively by the Nationalist and might well fall 

into hostile hands.02 The President accepted this advice and conferred with key 

members of Congress. He found that some of them earnestly desired to help 

Generalissimo Chiang. Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, who was present, 

forcefully opposed the President’s plan to suspend military shipments. If assistance were withdrawn just as the Nationalist Government was about to fall, the 

United States would “never be able to shake the charge that we are the ones who 

gave poor China the final push into disaster.” His opposition, and that of others, 

evidently had some effect. The President decided that shipments should not be 

suspended, but that no effort should be made to expedite them.63 

Even this decision drew criticism from some of Chiang’s supporters in 

Congress and from some elements of the press, who believed that US assistance 

could still be effective. In February 1949, 51 Republican Congressmen asked the 

President to appoint a commission to survey the situation in China. Secretary 

Acheson met with them and sought to make clear the difficulties of charting a 

course of action at that time. “When a great tree falls in the forest,” he said, 

according to his later account, “one cannot see the extent of the damage until the 

251 
A bill introduced by Senator Patrick McCarran of Nevada proposed $1.5 billion in loans to China for military and economic purposes. As spokesman for the 

administration, Secretary Acheson, opposing the bill, informed Senator Tom 

Connally, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that the 

United States had already supplied over $2 billion worth of aid to China since V-J 

Day. Further assistance could not retrieve the situation unless accompanied by 

armed intervention. The Secretary asked only that Congress permit the use of 

any unobligated appropriations left over from the China Aid Act after the expiration date of 2 April 1949. In the end, Congress accepted this request and authorized the President to use the unexpended funds until 15 February 1950 to assist 

those areas of China free from communist domination. The McCarran bill was 

defeated .Oi 

The $2 billion figure mentioned by Secretary Acheson included both military 

and economic aid furnished directly in grants and credits to the Nationalists. It 

did not include assistance provided through the United Nations, or the more 

than $1 billion worth of surplus property sold to the Nationalists at a cost of only 

$232 million. The tableh” on the following pages presents details of assistance furnished by the United States from V-J Day to 31 March 1949. 

Foreign Economic and Military Aid Authorized for China 

from V-J Day to 31 March 

I. US Government Grants and Credits 

(;rflnts: 

Lend-Lease 

Military aid under Sino-American Cooperative 

Organization Agreement 

US contribution to UNRRA China program 

US share of UNRRA contribution to BOTRA 

Ammunition abandoned and transferred by 

US Marines in north China (over 6,500 tons) 

(no estimate of value available) 

Transfer of US Navy vessels (PL 512) (valued 

at procurement cost) 

US foreign relief program 

ECA program 

$125 million grant under China Aid Act of 1948 

Total Grants 

252 

1949 

(millions) 

$513.7 

17.7 

474.0 

3.6 

141.3 

46.4 

275.0 

125.0 

$1,596.7 
Cwdi~s: 

Lend-Lease 

Lend-Lease “pipe line” credit 

Export-Import Bank credits 

Surplus property salesfor credit: 

Sale of excess stocks of US Army 

west China 

Dockyard facilities sales 

(millions) 

$181.0 

51.7 

82.8 

in 

20.0 

4.1 

Civilian surplus property transfers (under 

August 30,1946, bulk sale agreement) 55.0 

Maritime commission ship sales 16.4 

Total Credits $411.o 

Total Grants and Credits $2,007.7 

II. Other Foreign Grants and Credits 

Balance of UNRRA China program $184.4 

Balance of UNRRA contribution to BOTRA 1.4 

Canadian credit 60.0 

Total other Foreign Aid 

Total US Government and Foreign Grants 

and Credits since V-J Day 

III. US Government Surplus Property Sales 

Procurement 

cost 

(millions) 

Salesof excessstocks of US 

Army in west China (Not available) 

Dockyard facilities sales (Not available) 

Civilian surplus property transfers (under 

August 30,1946, bulk sale agreements) $ 900.0 

Maritime commission ship sales 77.3 

Military surplus property transfers 100.8 

Total Surplus Property Sales $1,07&l 

245.8 

$2,253.5 

agreed realization 

to us 

(millions) 

$ 20.0 

4.1 

175.0 

26.2 

6.7 

*$232.0 

*Includes $95.5 million to bc paid on credit terms as indicated in above under Crrdits. 

253 
had its origin in the recommendations of an interdepartmental working group 

known as the Foreign Assistance Correlation Committee (FACC), which drew up 

guidelines for a coordinated military assistance program for FY 1950 and a list of 

proposed recipients. China was not on the list, but the FACC suggested that a 

contingency fund be established from which the President might make an allocation to that country if such action appeared to be in US interests. This suggestion 

was strongly endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They prepared a worldwide 

aid program reflecting the FACC guidelines in which they recommended a contingency fund of $100 million.“7 

The administration’s aid program, based on JCS recommendations and totaling $1.45 billion, was sent to Congress on 25 July 1949 with a request that the 

President be allowed complete discretion in allocating the funds to individual 

countries.hH At once Chiang’s supporters opened their campaign to make certain 

that Nationalist China was included. A proposal to add $200 million for that purpose was defeated in the House of Representatives, along with another that 

would have given $75 million to China and $25 million to Southeast Asia. In the 

Senate, however, Chiang’s cause fared better. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, after considerable debate, amended the President’s program to set aside 

$75 million to be used for the “general area of China.” This amendment was 

included in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 as finally approved by 

Congress in September. The President signed the new law on 6 October-only 

five days after Mao Tse-Tung had proclaimed the establishment of a People’s 

Republic in China.h4 

In anticipation of the congressional action, Major General Lyman Lemnitzer, 

USA, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Military Assistance 

Programs, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to “study the military problems 

involved in aiding China and the determination of a plan and program for that 

aid.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while preparing their reply, had before them a 

request from the Chinese Nationalist Government for military assistance in the 

amount of $287 million along with a military plan of action, which had been submitted to the US Government on 15 August and which had been referred to them 

for comment. The Nationalist plan was to employ their remaining forces 

(amounting to 94 divisions, at least on paper) to hold the western regions of 

China lying beyond mountain barriers and the islands of Taiwan and Hainan, 

while hoping eventually to mount an offensive.7(1 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff saw no more reason to expect US military aid to be 

effective than they had in December 1948. They advised the Secretary of Defense 

that, although the items requested by the Nationalists were available, it would do 

no good to supply them. The Nationalist Government’s plans were wholly 

impractical. The defensive line was much too long, and the Communists had 

now acquired a numerical advantage along with their marked superiority in tactics, logistical support, command arrangements, and morale. The Nationalist 

Government did not have a unified command, an effective overall program of 

defense and attack, or a practical plan of coordinating military action. These JCS 

254 
The Final Collapse of the Nationalists 

The year 1949 saw the final expulsion of the Chiang regime from the mainland 

of China. The Communists’ anticipated invasion of southern China began on 

21 April 1949, when their forces crossed the Yangtze river at several points. Three 

days later they occupied Nanking, the Kuomintang capital. The Nationalist Government fled southward to Canton on the coast. 

The presence of the Nationalists in Canton raised the prospect of a new international crisis. Canton, at the upper end of a broad bay, was flanked by the Portuguese colony of Macao and the British colony of Hong Kong. If the Chinese 

Communists attacked the new Nationalist capital-which appeared very likelythe fighting could easily extend to these foreign colonies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

studied the situation in June 1949 at the suggestion of General Bradley. Their 

opinion was that the United States should not contribute forces for the defense of 

Hong Kong and Macao unless it was willing to accept the risk of a major military 

involvement in China or possibly a world war. The Secretary of Defense forwarded these views to the NSC.72 

The feared attack on Hong Kong did not materialize even after Canton fell to 

the Communists on 16 October. What was left of the Nationalist Government 

moved to Chungking, in the safety of the southwestern mountains. Far to the 

north in Peking, on 1 October 1949, the existence of the People’s Republic of 

China had already been proclaimed by Mao Tse-tung.73 

Meanwhile, the Nationalist Government had announced the establishment of 

a blockade covering most of the Chinese coast. The United States did not recognize the port closure and US ships continued to enter Chinese harbors. Several 

US merchant vessels visited Shanghai and were intercepted and delayed under 

the threat of violence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not wish to commit themselves 

to the military protection of US shipping in Chinese waters. In December 1949 

they recommended to the Secretary of Defense that he draw the attention to the 

awkward position in which the Department of Defense was placed because of 

the lack of policy clarification. This JCS recommendation, however, was overtaken by events. Driven out of Chungking, the Nationalists moved their government to Taipei in December 1949, and their futile “blockade” was lifted in order 

to concentrate on the defense of Taiwan.74 

A final report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by General Barr, Director, JUSMAGCHINA, provided a lengthy epitaph upon the defeat of the Nationalist 

regime. He made it clear that Chiang’s failure was in no way attributable to lack 

of US military assistance. “The Nationalist military collapse,” he wrote, 

“stemmed primarily from a weak and unstable government which was overcentralized; which had little or no popular support; and which had as a primary 

interest the protection of the privileged class.“7i 

255 
formerly held by the Japanese. Also, instead of being content to strengthen their 

hold on north China, they tried to extend their control to Manchuria. Strategically, the Chinese Nationalists had attempted to dig in behind the city walls, 

waiting for relief that never came. Their desire to save face and show valor prevented them from executing strategically necessary retreats. 

There was little cooperation among the Services and the old military men, 

familiar with the Army, had little knowledge of the newly-formed Air Force or 

Navy. The Chinese Air Force, consisting of 8% groups, was far in excess of what 

the Chinese economy could afford. It was looked upon as a prestige symbol and 

such care was taken not to lose men or equipment that military effectiveness 

was sacrificed. 

General Barr listed a number of handicaps that had hampered the US advisory effort. It had lasted little more than two years, during which the civil war 

had greatly intensified and the economic problems of the government (notably 

inflation) had grown increasingly serious. The Chinese military services were 

rivals rather than collaborators. General Barr’s performance as Director of JUSMAG had suffered because he had to serve simultaneously as Chief of the Army 

Advisory Division. Finally, US advisers had been forbidden to enter combat areas 

or to give operational advice. Perhaps the only way that the United States could 

have achieved its goal would have been for its “advisers” to take command of 

Nationalist forces.7h 

In the aftermath of the Nationalist withdrawal from the mainland, Secretary 

of State Acheson sought to impress the public with the fact that the defeat of the 

Nationalists stemmed from inherent military, political, and social weaknesses 

that were beyond the power of the United States to remedy. Discussing the situation in Asia before the National Press Club on 12 January 1950, he described the 

situation of Chiang at the end of World War II, when he had “emerged as the 

undisputed leader of the Chinese People,” with “overwhelming military power, 

greater military power than any ruler had ever had in the entire history of 

China.” His only opposition were the Communists, “up in the hills, ill-equipped, 

ragged, a very small military force.” Four years later, Chiang’s support had 

“melted away,“ and he had become “a refugee on a small island off the coast of 

China with the remnants of his forces.” In his judgment, the Secretary continued: 

What has happened . . is that the almost inexhaustible patience of the Chinese 

people in their miser ended. They did not bother to overthrow this government. There was real y nothin to overthrow. They simply ignored it throughout the country.. They p camp 7etely withdrew their support from this government, and when that support was withdrawn, the whole military establishment 

disintegrated. Added to the grossest incompetence ever experienced by any 

military command was this total lack of sup ort both in the armies and in the 

country, and so the whole matter just simply g isintegrated. . . 

The Communists did not create this.. . . But they were shrewd and cunning to 

mount it, to ride this thing into victory and into power.77 

256 
From his last stronghold on Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek continued to insist that 

the Nationalists constituted the rightful government of all China. But the ability of the Nationalists to maintain themseIves on the island, after an unbroken 

succession of defeats on the mainland, was extremely doubtful. Moreover, the 

exact political status of Taiwan was in doubt. The Cairo Declaration of December 

1943 had provided for the return of the island to China, but the matter had not 

yet been settled by a peace treaty with Japan. Legally, therefore, Taiwan remained 

a part of the Japanese Empire. 

In the latter part of 1948, when the final defeat of the Nationalists could be 

foreseen, Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett had requested that the NSC 

prepare an appraisal of the strategic implications to the security of the United 

States should Taiwan come under an administration “susceptible to exploitation” 

by the USSR. In preparation for their appraisal, the NSC requested that the Secretary of Defense furnish the Council with the JCS views.7x 

On 24 November 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their reply. The control of Taiwan by Kremlin-directed Communists, they concluded, would be “seriously unfavorable.” An enemy on Taiwan could dominate the sea routes from 

Japan to the Malay area and strike at the Ryukyus and the Philippines. Also, Taiwan normally produced a surplus of food and raw materials upon which Japan 

was partially dependent, and the loss of these surpluses might produce instability that would jeopardize the US position in Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged 

that diplomatic and economic measures be undertaken to ensure that Taiwan 

would remain under an administration friendly to the United States. No mention 

was made of military measures. The Secretary of Defense forwarded the JCS 

views to the NSC7” 

A more specific plan for keeping Taiwan out of Communist hands was suggested to the NSC by the Department of the Navy. Since the Nationalist Government was expected to fall very shortly, the only way that US strategic interests 

could be maintained on Taiwan was for the United States to get a foothold on the 

island at the earliest possible moment. Specifically, Admiral Badger, COMNAVWESI’AC, who was then preparing to evacuate Tsingtao, should move to 

Taiwan along with the Chinese Navy. Then the United States would be ready to 

assume control of the island when Chiang’s government finally collapsed. 

United States control over Taiwan would be temporary, pending a UN plebiscite 

to determine the wishes of the Taiwanese.8” 

The Department of State position, furnished to the NSC, accepted the basic 

goal set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, namely, denial of Taiwan to the Communists. Because of the uncertainties of the situation, however, the Department 

did not recommend that the United States support a Chinese Nationalist regime 

on the island as the recognized Government of China. To do so, “would increase 

risks of immediate local instability, provide the most fertile environment for the 

growth of Communism, greatly complicate our position on the mainland and 

hamstring our tactical flexibility toward China proper.” The Department recommended a flexible US attitude toward Taiwan until the situation developed “to 

257 
local non-Communist Chinese regime which will provide at least a modicum of 

decent government for the island.” It should be made clear to this government 

that continuing US support would depend upon its effectiveness and its responsiveness to the needs of the Taiwanese. The Navy suggestion that the United 

States assume control of Taiwan was opposed by the Department. Communist 

domination of the island could best be achieved by isolating it from the mainland, rather than by unilateral US assertion of responsibility.H1 

The policy statement (NSC 37/2) adopted by the National Security Council on 

3 February 1949, and approved by President Truman the following day, was 

based largely on the proposals of the Department of State. While recognizing the 

importance of the island to the United States, the NSC rejected the establishment 

of a US military foothold on the island and recommended an attitude of cautious 

reserve combined with an effort to influence the government of Taiwan. The 

major provisions of the new policy were as follows: 

a. The US has no desire to see chaos on the mainland spread to Formosa and 

the Pescadores; 

b. The US had not been impressed by Chinese administration on the islands 

and believed that if there is continued misrule the Chinese authorities 

would inevitably forfeit the support of world opinion which might be 

expected to swing in favor of Formosan autonomy; 

c. US support for the governing authorities of Formosa will inevitably depend 

in a lar e measure upon the efficiency of their regime and the extent to 

which t i?ey are able to contribute toward the welfare and economic needs of 

the Formosan people and 

tion in position of responsi K 

ermit and encourage active Formosan participaility in Government; 

d. The US cannot remain unconcerned over possible developments arising 

from the influx of large numbers of refugees from the mainland and the 

consequent effects, including the increasing burden on the island’s economy, and is disturbed at the indication of the Chinese belief that the building up of military strength on Formosa will in itself provide an effective 

barrier to Communist penetration; 

e. The U.S. expects that the lessons to be drawn from developments on the 

mainland and from revious Formosan reactions to Chinese rule will not be 

overlooked by the P hinese authorities in dealing with the problems of the 

island and with the Formosan people.x2 

A few days later Secretary Acheson requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

give the NSC their recommendations on the military measures that might be 

employed in the event diplomatic and economic steps proved insufficient to 

achieve US objectives in Taiwan.H” In their response, on 10 February, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff did not recommend the use of any overt military force in Taiwan. 

They did, however, cautiously recommend military support for the objectives set 

258 
employ forces. Available US military strength had to be held in readiness to pro

tect areas more vital to US security.x4 

A specific procedure for implementing NSC 37/2 was suggested by Secretary 

Acheson. He recommended that the United States immediately send a high-ranking official to Taiwan who would explain the US position. He would ask for suitable assurances that the Taiwanese Government would observe the conditions 

stipulated by the United States. On receipt of these assurances, he would at once 

draw up plans (assisted by the ECA) for the promised economic aid program.Hs 

The recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State 

were incorporated by the NSC Staff into a supplement to NSC 37/2, which was 

discussed by the Council on 3 March. Secretary Acheson objected that the JCS 

proposal to station fleet units off Taiwan would hamper the success of US 

diplomatic and economic efforts. Further, any use of military power short of 

“complete blockade and occupation” would not prevent a Communist takeover of Taiwan. Since the situation in Taiwan might change momentarily, however, the possible need to use military force should always be kept in mind. The 

Council adopted Mr. Acheson’s views. It also accepted his recommendation 

that the US send a high-ranking official to Taiwan. The President approved the 

NSC conclusionsxh 

The Secretary of State also told the NSC that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not 

given a clear answer to the Council’s earlier request for an estimate of the strategic consequences of the fall of Taiwan to the Communists. The Council requested 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff to clarify their views and, in particular, to state whether 

or not they recommended military intervention in Taiwanx7 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 22 March that they did not believe 

that the strategic importance of Formosa justifies overt military action at this 

time or in the event that diplomatic and economic steps prove insufficient to 

prevent Communist domination so long as the present disparity between our 

military strength and our global obligations exists. There can be no categorical 

assurance, however, that other future circumstances, extending to war itself, 

might not make overt military action eventually advisable from the over-all 

standpoint of our national security.8N 

After April 1949, when the Communist forces breached the line of the 

Yangtze, the flight of Chiang’s followers to Taiwan increased. On 4 August the 

Department of State, in a memorandum to the NSC, pointed out that the arrival 

of additional Nationalist troops and officials on Taiwan had accelerated inflation 

and threatened to contribute to further economic disintegration and popular 

unrest. The influx of troops had swelled the military establishment, but their 

loyalty was uncertain. There appeared to be a real hazard that Taiwan might 

pass under Communist control as a result of widespread troop mutinies or of 

clandestine agreement between Communist emissaries and some of the Nationalist commanders. The control of the island’s destiny was in the hands of the 

same corrupt and incompetent rulers who had squandered US aid on the main259 
Department of State therefore recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide a new strategic estimate. Specifically, the question to be answered was: 

Assuming that in the absence of military measures Taiwan would sooner or later 

come under Communist control, did the Joint Chiefs of Staff regard the island as 

being of sufficient military importance to the United States to justify its occupation by US military forces?xy 

In reply, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed their previous expressions regarding the strategic importance of Taiwan, but they again declared that military 

action was not justified “so long as the present disparity between our military 

strength and our global obligations exists.” They underscored their comment by 

noting that the disparity might well increase “as a result of budgetary limitations 

and the commitments implicit in the North Atlantic Treaty.” Military action in 

concert with other nations, with or without the approval of the United Nations (a 

possibility that had been suggested by the State Department memorandum), they 

also viewed unfavorably, for the resulting commitment appeared to differ little 

from what would be involved in a unilateral action. Still, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

continued in effect their broader reservation that future circumstances might 

make the dispatch of forces to the Taiwan area advisable.“” 

On 6 October the Department of State presented a reexamination of the US 

position on Taiwan for the approval of the NSC and the President. Accepting an 

estimate by the CIA, the Department expressed the fear that if the United States 

furnished only economic and diplomatic aid, Taiwan would be in Communist 

hands by 1950. Also accepting the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that military 

action was not justified “in view of the disparity between military strength and 

obligations,” the Department concluded that present policy should be continued 

but with modifications to assure a more efficient use of the then existing Nationalist economic and military resources. Additional US aid should be made dependent on the reform of the Nationalist Government, but an enlarged program of 

military and economic aid was rejected, as was the establishment of a US Advisory Group. The Department of State recommended that the US Government 

convey these views to Chiang Kai-shek.“’ 

The Council approved the Department of State’s recommendation with minor 

changes in the suggested statement to Chiang Kai-shek. The revised statement 

made it clear to the Generalissimo that 

the U.S. Government does not intend to commit any of its armed forces to the 

defense of the Island. It is concerned, however, lest the chaos of the mainland 

spread to Taiwan and believes that a higher level of political and economic 

well-being must be rovided if serious unrest is to be avoided.. . The 

resources of the Islan cp, together with the material assets available to the Chinese administration are believed to be sufficient to enable that administration 

substantially to improve conditions through its own efforts. . . While the U.S. 

Government will continue to furnish economic assistance to Taiwan under 

existing legislation, the rovision of any additional aid will depend upon the 

further performance oft K e Chinese administration on Taiwan. 

260 
Although policy toward Taiwan appeared to have been settled, the danger to 

the island continued to trouble the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In December 1949 the 

Chief of Staff of the Army, General J. Lawton Collins, proposed that the Joint 

Strategic Survey Committee consider military measures, short of the dispatch of 

a major force, that might be implemented to enhance the security of the island. 

The JSSC studied the matter and drew up a report which was approved by the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. The salient feature of this report was that the time had come to resume military aid to Chiang’s 

government. The Joint Chiefs of Staff said: 

1. A modest well-directed and closely supervised program of military aid to 

the Chinese Nationalist Government in Taiwan would be in the security 

interest of the United States. 

2. A modest program of military aid to the Chinese. . . Government in Taiwan 

should be integrated with a stepped-up political, economic, and psychological program pursued energetically in extension of present United States 

programs there.. . . 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff went on to point out: 

that the recommended action with respect to Formosa is a art of the overall 

problem of resisting the spread of Communist domination in i ast Asia. It is recognized that this is a iecemeal approach.. . but it is likewise a matter of 

urgency. These separate E ut related rejects point up the necessit 

mination of an overall program for tRe solution of the major prob r"of early deterem.‘” 

These JCS views were considered by the NSC on 30 December 1949 in connection with a review of US policy towards Asia as a whole, which had been undertaken six months earlier. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in commenting on the draft of 

the policy paper, had recommended that the $75 million made available for the 

“general area of China” by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act be programmed 

immediately, although they did not mention the Chinese Nationalists in this connection. The Council accepted this recommendation but rejected the proposal in 

the JCS memorandum to supply military aid to Chiang. The general policy 

approved by the Council called for continued recognition of the Nationalist Government until the situation was further clarified. The Chinese Communist regime 

should not be recognized until it was clearly in the interest of the United States to 

do so. The United States should not provide military or political support to noncommunist elements in China unless they could offer effective resistance to the 

Communists. In addition, the United States should exploit any rift between the 

Soviet Union and Communist China by political and psychological means and 

should prevent the Soviet Union and its satellites from obtaining supplies 

through China.“* 

261 
as they applied to the Chinese Nationalists: 

the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese 

forces on Formosa. In the view of the United States Government, the resources on 

Formosa are adequate to enable them to obtain the items which they might consider necessary for the defense of the Islands. The United States Government proposes to continue under existing legislative authority the present ECA program 

of economic assistance.“5 

The “hands-off” attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists lasted 

until June 1950, when North Korean armored forces crashed across the 38th Parallel and seemed likely to bring about a further alteration of the balance of forces 

in eastern Asia. A new policy toward Taiwan then appeared advisable, as part of 

a general strengthening of the US position in the Far East. The recommendation 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for military aid to Chiang was ultimately approved, 

while the interposition of the US Seventh Fleet in the Straits of Taiwan effectively 

placed the island under US protection.L1h 

262 
14 

Consequences of the Communist Victory 

in China on US Far East Policy 

Reassessment of Policy toward the Far East 

T he fall of mainland China into hostile hands had not been foreseen in 1945. 

The US strategic outlook in Asia at that time had been based on the expectation that a China, friendly to the United States, would become a strong stabilizing influence in the Far East. When it became obvious that this would not happen, US policy toward Asia underwent a change to adapt it to the new reality. 

With the vast land mass of China under Communist rule and Chiang Kai-shek in 

control of only a few of the many islands off the east Asian coast, much greater 

importance was now attached to those places in the Far East where the United 

States still retained a foothold. These places were Japan (with the Ryukyu 

Islands) and the Philippine Islands, where the United States had forces stationed, 

and southern Korea, where a friendly government, established under UN auspices, was receiving US support. 

Japan: Preparations to End the Occupation 

n 1945, following the final conquest of Japan in World War II, the United States 

set about to replace the defeated military dictatorship with a demilitarized 

state that was also a pohtical and economic democracy. The decision to do so had 

been made by the major wartime allies at the Potsdam Conference. To establish 

the semblance of allied control they later created an international administration 

through the Far East Commission (FEC), representing 11 allied nations, and the 

Allied Control Council on which the four major powers were represented. However, the United States, as the power chiefly responsible for the defeat of Japan, 

effectively reserved for itself the control of the vanquished state, which it exer263 

I 
Acting with his customary vigor, General MacArthur proceeded to enact measures designed to root out militarism from Japanese life, to install democratic 

political institutions, and to break up the concentrations of economic power. 

Within two years the occupation authorities had disarmed Japan, tried and convicted a number of leaders of war crimes, “purged” from public life additional 

thousands identified with the aggressions of militarism, abolished the divine status of the Emperor, established a new constitution, held elections for national and 

local governments, begun to break up the great family trusts or Zaibatsu, and 

redistributed vast acreages to the peasants who worked it. 

In March 1947, General MacArthur announced that Japan was now ready for 

a peace treaty. The objectives of the occupation, he said, had been largely 

achieved. Japan’s war-making power and potential had been destroyed, the 

framework of democratic government erected, reforms essential to the reshaping 

of Japanese lives and institutions to conform to democratic ideals instituted, and 

a peacefully inclined and responsible government installed. 

The Department of State, where the question of a Japanese peace treaty had 

been under study for some time, agreed with General MacArthur that an early 

treaty was desirable and, on 11 July, dispatched invitations to the 10 other member governments of the FEC for a peace conference convening on 19 August. 

However, Chinese and Soviet objections on voting procedures put an end to 

plans for an early conference.’ 

Active consideration of a Japanese peace treaty led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 

raise once again the subject of the disposition of formerly Japanese-controlled 

islands. Reiterating views stated on 21 October 1946, they recommended that the 

United States retain control of the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29” north 

(including the important island of Okinawa), the Nanpo Shoto Islands south of 

Sofu Gan (also known as the Bonin and Volcano Islands, containing the island of 

Iwo Jima), and Marcus Island, farther to the east. These islands had belonged to 

Japan before World War II. The United States was administering them, but their 

future status had not yet been determined. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged that 

they be placed under UN strategic trusteeships administered by the United 

States, as had already been done for the former Japanese Mandated Islands in the 

Pacific. Control of these islands was essential, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, 

because control of the Pacific both for defensive and offensive operations, a vital 

element in the ultimate security of the United States, depended upon a suitable 

base system. Okinawa, in particular, was a “key base of primary importance” in 

the US base plan because it was located in a “controlling position in the Northwest Pacific area.” It was the only base, other than Japan proper, from which, in 

the event of war, US forces “could be projected by air into the Asiatic territory of 

our potential enemy.” Conversely, hostile control of the Ryukyus would enable 

an enemy to dominate the Northwestern Pacific and to threaten the US defense 

of the Philippines as well as the US line of communications to China.2 

By October 1947, doubts began to be expressed within the US Government 

concerning the wisdom of concluding an early peace treaty. The result was a 

264 
broad influence exercised on foreign policy by US military governors in the 

defeated Axis countries. What began as an effort by the Department of State to 

reassert its proper role quickly broadened into an examination of the future of 

Japan and of the power position of the United States in the Far East. 

The reevaluation of policy began in the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, when its chief, Mr. George Kennan, became concerned over the 

consequences of an early Japanese peace treaty. In a paper submitted on .I4 October, the Policy Planning Staff concluded that resolution of some of the major 

issues depended upon further information that could be obtained only in Tokyo. 

Nevertheless, it was possible to reach some preliminary conclusions. In particular, the Staff believed that there were “great risks in an early relinquishment of 

Allied control” over a Japan which, it believed, would be politically and economically unstable if “turned loose and left to its own devices” at the present stage. 

Nevertheless, the occupation was, in many ways, entering a period of diminishing returns, and the US Government was committed to peace discussions 

through the invitations it had issued to other nations. But these discussions 

should be kept “exploratory and non-binding” until the US Government had 

reached firm decisions on the basic issues involved.3 

Realizing the need for personal consultation with General MacArthur before 

proceeding with a peace treaty, Secretary of State Marshall sent Mr. Kennan to 

Japan accompanied by Brigadier General C. V. R. Schuyler, USA, representing the 

National Military Establishment. They held a series of conferences at Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), headquarters in Tokyo from March 1 to .ll, 1948. 

General MacArthur, while he readily admitted the difficulties inherent in the 

early achievement of a peace treaty, urged that the United States continue to 

press for it. An acceptable treaty, in General MacArthur’s view, would provide 

for the guarantee of Japan’s continued neutrality and territorial integrity by the 

four major powers adhering to the Moscow communique and for the withdrawal 

of occupation forces as soon as possible after the treaty went into effect. The 

treaty should prohibit Japan from maintaining armed forces except for civil 

police, a small constabulary, and a minimum coast guard. Present US occupation 

forces should remain in Japan until an acceptable treaty became possible. 

Regardless of the terms and timing of a Japanese peace treaty, General 

MacArthur believed, the United States should retain military base rights in the 

Ryukyu Islands. These base rights, particularly on Okinawa, were essential to US 

security interests in the Far East. Development of these bases should proceed on 

an urgent basis. Under no circumstances should the Ryukyus revert to Japan.j 

Upon his return to Washington, Mr. Kennan submitted a report which, after 

minor modification by the NSC Staff, was placed on the Council Agenda as NSC 

13/l. In this document, Mr. Kennan proposed, and the NSC Staff agreed, that the 

United States should not press for a Japanese peace treaty at the present time, 

because of the disagreements on the subject among the interested countries and 

also because of the “serious international situation created by the Soviet Union’s 

policy of aggressive Communist expansion. ” The US Government should, how265 
Until a treaty went into effect, US forces should remain in Japan. A final US 

position on post-treaty security arrangements for Japan should be deferred until 

the peace negotiations were about to begin, and should then be based on the conditions prevailing at the time. 

The retention of military bases in Japan or formerly Japanese-controlled territory was of major importance to the United States. A decision to retain long-term 

control of the Ryukyus south of latitude 29” north should be made now and ultimately confirmed by international sanction in appropriate form. Development of 

bases on Okinawa should proceed at once. Naval base facilities at Yokosuka 

should be developed so as to make it possible to retain them on a commercial 

basis after a peace treaty went into effect. However, final decision as to retention 

of Yokosuka as a US naval base should not be made until the US Government 

determined the ultimate needs for Japanese military security.” 

Prior to consideration by the Council, Mr. John H. Ohly, Special Assistant to 

the Secretary of Defense, referred NSC 13/l to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Responding on 29 September, they addressed two points: the retention of military base 

sites; and the future contribution of Japan to US national security. On the first 

point, they reiterated their recommendation for retention of Marcus Island and 

the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan as well as the Ryukyus south of latitude 29” 

north. This control, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended, should be at least as 

explicit and firm as that obtaining under US trusteeship over the former Japanese 

mandates. On the second point, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the 

policy of Japanese demilitarization be given “careful scrutiny” when negotiations 

for a peace treaty passed beyond the preliminary stages. “The present situation 

and its evident trend,” they wrote, “make it readily predictable that it may well 

become extremely important to our national security for Japan to be capable of 

providing some degree of military assistance to the United States, at least to the 

extent of Japan’s own self-defense.“h 

On 7 October the NSC adopted NSC 13/l with the exclusion of the paragraph 

relating to military base sites, which was deferred for later consideration. The 

Council’s version was approved by the President two days later as NSC 13/2. 

Final decision on policy regarding bases in the Ryukyus and other areas came on 

5 November 1948, when the President approved retention of bases in the 

Ryukyus south of latitude 29” north and, as recommended by the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, of Marcus and the Nanpo Shoto Islands south of Sofu Gan. A new version 

of the paper, incorporating this decision, was then issued as NSC 13/3.7 

The question of a peace treaty with Japan, which had been a major issue dealt 

with in NSC 13 and its several modifications, assumed new importance to the 

Department of State in the spring of 1949. Writing to the Executive Secretary of 

the National Security Council on 23 May, Acting Secretary of State James E. Webb 

said that the question might arise in several ways: friendly allies might press for 

a peace settlement; the Soviet Union might take the initiative and present a draft 

treaty; or it might be in the US interest to move ahead with a peace settlement. A 

reevaluation of the adequacy of NSC 13/3 was therefore desirable. 

266 
uation from the National Military Establishment. Some of the questions to be 

answered were as follows: Was possession of US bases in Japan regarded as 

essential? If so, what bases? If it should prove impracticable or impossible to 

obtain bases on the Japanese main islands, would bases in the Ryukyus, along 

with others in or near the Pacific, meet essential needs?8 

The Executive Secretary of the NSC, Mr. Sydney W. Souers, referred the State 

Department request to the Secretary of Defense, who in turn sent it to the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff for the preparation of a strategic evaluation of US security needs in 

Japan.4 The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 10 June. Their views were forwarded 

to the National Security Council and were circulated as NSC 49. 

In response to Mr. Webb’s specific questions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated the need for the retention of the islands listed in NSC 13/3. They now added 

a positive requirement to retain base rights at Yokosuka, formerly judged in an 

undetermined category, because Okinawa was not entirely suitable for a yeararound naval base. 

Turning to broad strategic questions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ascribed the 

importance of Japan to her manpower and industrial potential, which could be 

exploited by any controlling power; also to her geographic position dominating 

the exits and entrances of the Sea of Japan, the East China and Yellow Seas, and, 

to a lesser degree, the ports of Asia north of the Shanghai-Woosung area. If controlled by the USSR, Japan could be used as a base for aggressive action directly 

against US bases in the Western Pacific, as well as against the Southeast Asia 

region. Conversely, US control of Japan would deny this opportunity to the 

USSR, and, in the event of war, would provide strategic outposts enabling the 

United States to control or neutralize use of the Sea of Japan and the Yellow and 

East China Seas. In addition, Japan would provide staging areas from which to 

project US military power against Soviet territory in Asia. 

The geographic importance of Japan to the United States was enhanced by her 

inclusion in a chain of islands offshore from the Asian mainland. The military 

position of the United States in the Far East with relation to the Soviet Union 

required retention of at least the present degree of control over this island chain. 

In the event of war, it would constitute a strong strategic outpost line, but it 

would lose much of its value and might even prove untenable if any major portion of it, such as Japan, was not available at the beginning of hostilities. 

Recent communist victories in China, where Mao Tse-tung’s forces had 

crossed the Yangtze and captured Nanking, made Japan of even greater strategic 

importance to the United States. The orientation of Japan towards the United 

States was therefore vital. Japanese internal security was more important than 

ever, and a Japanese capability for self-defense must be developed against the 

possibility that the Soviet Union, having exhausted other means, might seek to 

seize the islands by force. 

With these points in mind, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, they were of the opinion that a peace treaty would be premature. The “continuing Soviet policy of 

aggressive communist expansion” made it “essential that Japan’s democracy and 

267 
be included: prior assurance of Japanese stability, democracy, and Western orientation; existence of Japanese security forces capable of maintaining internal order 

and guarding against sabotage; ready plans for limited Japanese armed forces 

that could be implemented before the departure of occupation forces or in war 

emergency; and a gradual withdrawal of occupation forces when conditions permitted and with no deadline set for their departure.“’ 

Reactions by the NSC or any of its members to the JCS views were not forthcoming immediately. The Department of State, where Mr. Kennan’s views apparently no longer prevailed, was now inclined to proceed with a treaty subject to 

resolution of the procedural problems involved: the choice of a suitable negotiating forum (preferably the Far Eastern Commission) and the devising of regulations that would make it impossible for any single participating nation to 

obstruct agreement, while at the same time protecting US interests. Secretary of 

State Acheson, meeting in London on 13 September, discussed with British Foreign Secretary Bevin the problems of negotiating a treaty. The United States 

believed that by seeking prior agreement with the United Kingdom and the other 

Commonwealth nations, procedural problems about a draft treaty would be easier to solve. Mr. Bevin offered the good offices of his government in securing an 

acceptable treaty. If the United States would submit its draft of a treaty, he would 

seek to line up the support of the Commonwealth governments at a conference to 

be held in January 1950.” 

Mr. Acheson briefed President Truman and Mr. Stephen T. Early, Under Secretary of Defense, on these talks on 16 September. At the President’s suggestion, 

it was agreed that, as a first step toward preparation of a peace treaty, the 

Department of State would formally ask the Department of Defense for a statement of the essential security requirements of the United States in a peace settlement with Japan. 

This request was forwarded to Secretary Johnson on 3 October by Acting Secretary of State James Webb. A prompt reply was needed, he indicated, because 

the problem of a Japanese peace treaty was “of considerable urgency.” At the 

same time, to provide “helpful background thinking” on the relation between 

political and military considerations, the Acting Secretary forwarded his Department’s comments on the JCSviews set forth in NSC 49. 

The Department of State, because of its reading of the political factors, was 

not persuaded by the arguments advanced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff against a 

peace treaty with Japan in the near future. More than two years earlier, the State 

Department pointed out, the US Government had decided to proceed with a 

peace treaty with Japan, but efforts by the United States to achieve this objective 

were frustrated by disagreement among the Far Eastern Commission powers on 

procedures for a peace conference. A peace treaty seemed even more desirable 

now. Japan, having benefited from two more years of occupation, had achieved 

greater political and economic freedom and more thorough assimilation of the 

reform programs. 

268 
resented and would inhibit the development of the self-reliance needed to cope 

with serious economic problems under an occupation regime. And almost all 

other countries on the Far East Commission were bringing pressure on the 

United States, as the leading occupying power, to bring about a peace treaty. 

The United States, the Department of State agreed, should not conclude a 

peace treaty to the detriment of its own security interests, but the recent conversations between Mr. Bevin and Secretary Acheson offered a hope that friendly 

FEC countries would assist in the search for a treaty favorable to US strategic 

interests. As to the provisions of such a treaty, State Department personnel were 

in general agreement with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although disagreeing on some 

of the details of implementation. Continued stationing of US forces in Japan after 

a peace treaty entered into force was admittedly desirable, but it should be provided for by a separate bilateral US-Japanese agreement rather than by the peace 

treaty. To assure acceptance of the treaty by the other powers, however, the 

United States should be willing to set a definite date for the withdrawal of US 

forces, provided satisfactory alternative security arrangements had been established for Japan by that date. Constitution of Japanese internal security and 

defense forces also found favor with the Department of State. Provisions for 

defense forces in the treaty, however, would surely lead to its rejection by the 

other powers, who feared a resurgence of Japanese militarism. A preferable tactic 

in these circumstances would be to incorporate Japanese demilitarization in the 

treaty but to provide for reexamination of the matter by the signatories after a 

stipulated period of time.12 

The State Department letter set off a flurry of activity in the Department of 

Defense. Under Secretary of the Army Tracy S. Voorhees, whom the Secretary of 

Defense had named on 3 August 1949 as his deputy for occupied areas, discussed 

the matter with General Bradley and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

officials. He also asked General MacArthur to provide a staff officer familiar with 

his views to take an active part in the preparation of Defense Department positions on a Japanese treaty.‘” 

On 1 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the JSSC to reexamine the 

JCS position on a Japanese treaty, taking into account NSC 49/l and “existing 

and foreseeable world conditions.” The JSSC was also to review the JCS position 

on base requirements in Japan. I4 In the course of its deliberations, the JSSC consulted Colonel C. Stanton Babcock, the liaison officer sent to Washington at Mr. 

Voorhees’ request. Colonel Babcock said that General MacArthur favored a peace 

treaty as the best means for attaining US objectives in Japan. Under a treaty, 

Japan should ideally be given a truly neutral status comparable to Switzerland, 

but if this was not possible, the United States should guarantee Japanese security 

through a separate bilateral agreement, which should also provide for stationing 

US military forces in Japan. With regard to Japanese armed forces, General 

MacArthur favored a constabulary, including a coast guard but not a navy or an 

air force, to maintain internal order.15 

269 
at the present time. The continued communist successes in China, the JSSC 

pointed out, were bringing about a rapidly deteriorating strategic situation in the 

Far East, thereby enhancing the importance of US control of the island bases. The 

Soviet Union could not be expected to agree to a treaty that would allow US control to continue.lh 

In preparing JCS 1380/75, the JSSC had informally consulted Under Secretary 

Voorhees and other officials in the Department of the Army. On 3 December Mr. 

Voorhees’ deputy, Major General Carter B. Magruder, wrote the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff pointing out that even though the JSSC recommendations, if ultimately 

approved, would put the Defense Department on record as opposing a treaty, it 

was still necessary to prepare for the opposite contingency-namely, that the US 

Government would decide to proceed with the treaty.17 General Magruder 

accordingly asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views on military requirements in Japan that should be safeguarded by a treaty. The JSSC was entrusted 

with the preparation of a reply to this request.lx 

On 22 December 1949 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Secretary Johnson a memorandum responsive both to the State Department letter of 3 October 1949 and 

General Magruder’s request of 3 December. They recapitulated their views on 

the inadvisability of a peace treaty and on the nature of US requirements for military forces and bases in Japan. Taking note of the “unsettled political and military 

conditions. . . in the Asian continental areas near Japan” and the “highly unstable 

political and military situation in Taiwan and in southeast Asia,” the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff defined as follows the minimum US requirements in the islands of the 

Japanese Empire: 

a. The United States to be the only foreign ower which would have military 

forces and base rights in any of the Japanese is Pands to the southward of Sakhalin 

and the Kurile Islands; 

h. Arrangements whereby the United States strategic trusteeship over the 

Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands would not be disturbed by any provision of the treaty; 

c. The United States to secure exclusive long-term strategic control of the 

Iiyukyu Islands south of latitude 29” north, Marcus Island, and the Nanpo Shoto 

south of Sofu Gan; and 

d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would expect that the United States forces to be stationed in Japan would be somewhat less than at present and that bases would be 

required: 

(1) On Okinawa, together with such other facilities in the areas delineated 

in subparagraph c above as are deemed essential by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 

(2) At Yokosuka, as a protected naval base (NSC 13/3 and NSC 49); and 

270 
It appeared certain, however, that these requirements could not be met under 

a peace treaty at the present time. No treaty would be acceptable unless the 

Soviet Union and Communist China were parties, and there was little likelihood 

that they would agree to one that met US military requirements. Therefore, the 

Joint Chiefs of Sta ff reaffirmed their view that “negotiations now, leading toward 

a peace treaty with Japan, are still premature. ” Should this view be overruled, 

they asked that they be allowed to collaborate in the formulation of any treaty 

provisions having military implications. Secretary Johnson forwarded this JCS 

statement, with his concurrence, to the Secretary of State and the National Security Council.14 

The question of the treaty thus remained open as 1949 drew to a close. The 

Department of State had in fact completed a draft treaty in 1949 and had twice 

revised it, partly to incorporate the comments of General MacArthur. Under Secretary Voorhees took the draft to Tokyo in December 1949 and showed it to the 

General, who remained of the opinion that the Japanese people had earned the 

right to a peace settlement. 2oSecretary Acheson was nonetheless fully aware of 

the importance of the considerations set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a 

confidential memorandum to the British Ambassador, explaining why the United 

States could not now accept Mr. Bevin’s offer to enlist the help of the Commonwealth Countries in January 1950, he set forth the dilemma: To remove US forces 

from Japan would be most unwise in the present world situation, yet it was 

hardly to be expected that the Soviet Union or Communist China would accept a 

treaty that left them in place. “We intend to continue to work intensively at formulating a definite United States Government position,” was the best that he 

could promise.*’ 

Little progress was made until after the outbreak of the Korean War, when the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff modified their position. Eventually, contrary to US expectations, the Soviet Union did in fact agree to a settlement that allowed the United 

States to retain forces in Japan and the Ryukyus.22 

The Philippines: Base Rights and Military Assistance 

R elations between the United States and the newly established Republic of the 

Philippines were based upon sentimental as well as practical considerations. 

Through more than three decades of rule, the United States had prepared the 

islands for complete independence. As a result, when the Philippines fell under 

Japanesecontrol a few months after Pearl Harbor, the majority of Filipinos firmly 

resisted incorporation into Japan’s “Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Following the US 

reconquest of the islands in 1944-1945, they were granted independence on 

schedule on 4 July 1946. The new Republic could be regarded as evidence of US 

good faith and willingness to eschew imperialism. 

271 
itary presence was therefore in the interests of both countries. By an agreement of 

14 March 1947, the Philippine Government granted the United States the right to 

retain Clark Air Force Base, Fort Stotsenburg, Camp John Hay, and Subic Bay 

Naval Base, together with some minor installations, for 99 years.‘” 

In March 1948 Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royal1 suggested that these 

bases be abandoned. He believed that they were not essential and feared that 

their presence might be exploited by the Philippine Government to make exaggerated claims upon the United States. Besides, he pointed out, there had been 

repeated acts of violence by Filipinos against US military personnel stationed at 

these bases. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, urged that the bases be retained. 

Bases in the Philippines, they said, would be essential so long as US Naval and 

Air Forces operated in the Western Pacific; they were strategically located on 

the southern flank of the western base system and could exert a “decisive 

strategic influence” in Asia and the Southwest Pacific. There were other possible base sites, the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged, but the complete abandonment of those in the Philippines would, in addition to being strategically 

unsound, probably be viewed by the Philippine Government as a step toward 

repudiation of signed agreements and might cause it to turn to another country 

for military assistance and support. Such a development would not, in their 

opinion, be in the security interests of the United States. The JCS views were 

evidently accepted at higher level; the United States made no move to abandon 

its Philippine basesz4 

Some months later, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were afforded an opportunity to 

reiterate and elaborate these views when President Truman directed a study of 

US policy toward the Philippines. On 4 May 1949, in a statement prepared for 

use at a cabinet-level meeting at the White House, they assessed the strategic 

value of the Philippines to the United States primarily in terms of military bases 

needed to assure the control of the Pacific that was so important to the ultimate 

security of the United States. This control, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, 

was dependent upon an adequate base system. Control of the Philippine Islands, 

because of their location on the southern flank of the westernmost primary US 

base system, would, in the event of war, exert great strategic influence in Asia 

and the islands of the Southwest and Western Pacific. 

Recent events on the Asiatic mainland, including the communist victory in 

China and insurrection in Southeast Asia, accentuated the importance of Philippine bases. There was now no prospect for alternative installations in China, and 

there was also a distinct possibility that potential base sites in Southeast Asia 

might be lost as well. If Taiwan, the fate of which was hanging in the balance, 

should pass into hostile hands, the importance of the Philippines would be further enhanced. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded, therefore, that the United 

States should act to maintain its present base rights in the Philippines and should 

do nothing to weaken them.zi 

The White House discussion of policy toward the I’hilippines took place on 13 

May 1949. The only decision reached, apparently, was that the Department of 

272 
cited a growing feeling on the part of Filipinos that the United States was losing 

interest in their country. To remedy this situation, it was proposed that the 

United States continue military assistance to the Philippines and issue a statement reassuring the Philippine Government as to US intentions. Such a statement 

would specifically announce that the US Government planned no further troop 

withdrawals from the islands and would explain the place of the Philippines in 

US strategic planning2” 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly drafted an affirmation that the US military interest in the Philippines was “strong and durable,” that the strategic 

importance of the islands was “not open to question,” and that the United States 

did not intend to withdraw its forces. Whether or not this statement was given to 

the Philippine Government is not indicated in available sources. But its intended 

purposes were in some measure served when President Elpidio Quirino of the 

Philippines visited Washington in August 1949 and received assurance of US economic support. Moreover, tangible evidence of continuing US interest was provided by the US program of military assistance to the islands.27 

Military aid to the Philippines had begun immediately upon the granting of 

independence, having been written into law as a consequence of the special 

responsibility felt by the United States toward the new nation. The “Republic of 

the Philippines Military Assistance Act,” signed by the President on 26 June 

1946, provided for the instruction and training of military and naval personnel 

of the Republic of the Philippines; the maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation of 

military or naval equipment in the possession of the Philippines; and the transfer to the Philippines of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, provided 

that such action was consistent with the military and naval requirements of the 

United States and with the national interest. To administer this aid, smaIl Army 

and Navy advisory and training units were set up in the Philippines. To fund 

this legislation, Congress authorized an amount not to exceed $19,750,000 for 

fiscal year 1947.1H 

Force level recommendations to govern the Philippine military assistance program were laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in March 1946.2’ They were reaffirmed on 12 April 1947, when the program was restudied in connection with a 

reduction in the strength of US forces in the Philippines. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 

recommended a Philippine army of approximately 33,000; an air force of one 

composite group (about 2,000 men), consisting of two fighter squadrons supplemented by one troop carrier, one liaison, and one training squadron; and a navy 

of some 1,800 men equipped with patrol and amphibious craft. The United States 

should furnish equipment for this force, provide training for Philippine military 

personnel at US establishments, and establish an advisory group in the Philippines. These recommendations were approved by SWNCC on 28 May 1947.1” 

Some of the JCS recommendations had already been incorporated into a military assistance agreement signed by the two governments on 21 March 1947. It 

provided that the United States would establish a Joint Military Advisory Group 

in the Philippines and would provide assistance to the Philippine Armed Forces 

273 
The military advisory group called for by this agreement was established by 

the Service Secretaries at the request of Mr. Forrestal on 11 December 1947. Entitled Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) Philippines, it had 

a strength of 58 and was organized into Army, Navy, and Air Force groups. 

Because the Army group was the largest, its chief also served as chief of the JUSMAG, with the chiefs of the other groups as his deputies. This organizational 

arrangement had been recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in response to a 

request from the Secretary of Defense.“2 

When the Truman administration decided upon a coordinated program of 

worldwide military assistance early in 1949, the desirability of including the 

Philippine Republic was never questioned. The Foreign Assistance Coordinating 

Committee (FACC), in its initial recommendations in February 1949, included the 

Philippines among those countries to receive “token” aid (the ambunt needed to 

ensure political orientation toward the United States) in FY 1950.“” 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, responding on 21 February 1949 to a request from 

the Secretary of Defense, stated their general approval of the FACC program. On 

14 March, acting on their own initiative, they recommended $5,890,000 in military aid to the Philippines, divided as follows: Army, $3,340,000; Navy, $750,000; 

and Air Force, $l,SOO,OOO. These amounts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, were 

intended to permit the Philippines to maintain internal security, to encourage 

their orientation toward the United States, and to provide military bases in the 

event of an emergency.34 

On 21 April 1949, President Truman decided that $1,450,000,000 would be 

requested of Congress for military assistance in FY 1950. The FACC allocated this 

amount among prospective recipients, designating $5,740,000 for the Philippines, 

or $150,000 less than the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended. The President 

submitted his request on 25 July, and Congress appropriated $1,314,000,000 on 20 

October. Of this amount, $27,640,000 was allocated under Title III to the Philippines, Iran, and Korea.?” 

To bring programs into line with this reduced congressional appropriation, 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff reduced the military assistance allocation for the Philippines to $5,410,000, divided as follows: Army, $2,940,000; Navy, $930,000; and Air 

Force, $1,540,000. These amounts were approved by the Secretary of Defense.“h 

Korea: Support for a Divided Country 

I n the aftermath of World War II, the former Japanese possession of Korea was 

occupied by US and Soviet troops. The victorious allies had originally agreed 

that Korea would ultimately become a unified and independent country, but the 

rivalries of the Cold War resulted in a permanent division along the 38th parallel into a Soviet-dominated north and a south under US influence. Efforts to 

274 
South Korea within practicable and feasible limits as a means to minimize the 

adverse effects of withdrawal. A South Korean government elected under UN 

auspices took office on 15 August 1948; US occupation forces withdrew on 30 

June 1949.‘7 

An important factor leading to this US withdrawal was the opinion of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, solicited by the Department of State, that the United 

States had little interest in maintaining its present troops and bases in Korea, 

where they would be a liability in the event of war. In this eventuality, they 

could not be maintained there without substantial reinforcement. Moreover, 

any US offensive operations on the Asian mainland would probably bypass 

Korea. The occupation force of approximately 45,000 men in Korea could better be used to remedy military manpower shortages in areas of greater strategic significance.“H 

The policy of limited support for South Korea extended to the provision of a 

degree of assistance for a modest military force. This force was created in 1946 as 

a “constabulary” and ultimately grew into a military establishment of nearly 

100,000 men. Equipment for this force came originally from US surplus stocks 

but later was provided by grant aid provided under Title III of the Mutual 

Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Of the $27,640,000 appropriated by Congress for 

Title III, $10.23 million was made available on JCS recommendation for Korea. 

These funds were to support an army of 84,000, the function of which would be 

to maintain internal security. 1y 

Development of a Regional Policy 

A s the preceding narrative has indicated, US policy in Asia and the Western 

Pacific evolved on a piecemeal basis during 1947-1949, each country being 

dealt with separately. Secretary of Defense Johnson considered this “day-to-day, 

country-by-country approach” to be insufficient in the face of the continuing 

advance of communism throughout the world and particularly in China. United 

States actions in Asia, he believed, should be “part of a carefully considered and 

comprehensive plan” oriented toward the policy of containment. On 10 June 

1949, therefore, he recommended that the NSC reappraise policies toward individual countries and consider courses of action that could be fitted into an overall policy for the entire Far East.4o 

In response, the NSC Staff submitted a report to the Council (NSC 48/l) in 

which they concluded that basic US security objectives with respect to Asia were 

as follows: 

a. Development of the nations and peoples of Asia on a stable and self-sustaining basis in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United 

Nations Charter. 

275 
capable of threatening from that area the security of the United States or its 

friends and that the Soviet Union would encounter serious obstacles should it 

attempt to threaten the peace, national independence and stability of Asiatic 

nations. 

c. Prevention of power relationships in Asia which would enable any other 

nation or alliance to threaten the security of the United States from that area, or 

the peace, national independence and stability of the Asiatic nations. 

In pursuit of these objectives, the NSC Staff concluded, the United States 

should encourage noncommunist forces to take the initiative in Asia by forming 

a regional association and should assist it, if invited, under conditions that would 

serve US interests. 

The United States should also take whatever steps were “practicable” to 

develop and strengthen the area against communist external aggression or internal subversion. One such step should be to strengthen the US military position 

with respect to Japan, the Ryukyus and the Philippines. Others included provision of military assistance to Asiatic countries most directly threatened and 

developing multilateral arrangements to combat internal subversion. The possibility of a regional collective security arrangement should be viewed with sympathy by the United States, although its feasibility appeared doubtful. Meanwhile, however, special arrangements with certain particularly friendly 

countries, notably the Philippines, should be explored; for example, a Joint 

Philippine-United States Defense Board might be established. In South Korea, 

existing military and economic aid programs should be continued, and the 

elected government of the Republic of Korea should be given political support. 

Continuing diplomatic recognition of the Nationalist Chinese Government on 

Taiwan was urged in NSC 48/l. However, the existing disagreement between 

State and Defense over the advisability of military aid to the Nationalists was 

reflected in the paper. 41The question of a peace treaty with Japan was set aside as 

being already under separate consideration. 

For Asia as a whole, according to NSC 48/l, the United States should seek to 

promote political and economic progress and should try to resolve the conflict 

between colonialism and nationalism in such a way as to satisfy nationalist aspirations while minimizing the strain on colonial powers who were also US allies. 

Particular attention should be paid to Indochina, where the French should be 

persuaded to build up the popular following of anticommunist nationalist leaders.42 The problems of the new Republic of Indonesia also demanded attention; 

the object should be to assist it in maintaining its freedom in the face of internal 

and external communist pressures.43 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whom Secretary Johnson had referred the NSC 

Staff paper, advised him on 29 December that, while they agreed generally with 

its statement of basic security objectives, they were of the opinion that they did 

not go far enough. The “initial fundamental objective,” the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

276 
Development of sufficient military power in selected noncommunist nations 

of Asia to maintain internal security and to prevent further encroachment by 

communism. 

The basic steps enumerated by the NSC Staff to attain these objectives, the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff believed, were too general in nature. “The situation in Asia, ” 

they wrote, “has developed to the point where concrete. . . action is required. . . . ” 

To this end they recommended certain changes in wording intended to give the 

paper a more positive ring. Specifically, they proposed that the $75 million 

appropriated under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 for the “general 

area of China” be programmed without delay.44 

Regarding the possibility of collective security arrangements among noncommunist nations of Asia, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were skeptical. Such arrangtments, they said, were premature because of the political, military and economic 

instability of the Asiatic nations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were particularly 

opposed to a special US-Philippine Defense Board. The United States would be 

handicapped by the collaboration in military planning implicit in such an 

arrangement and would also face excessive demands for military assistance. The 

special arrangement with the Philippines would also serve as a precedent for 

other nations to seek similar relationships.4” 

The NSC, meeting on 30 December, accepted these JCS views and incorporated them in a revised policy paper, designated NSC 48/2. President Truman 

approved this the same day. In doing so, however, he withheld judgment on the 

expenditure of the $75 million in aid funds. “A program will be all right,” he 

said, “but whether we implement it depends on circumstances.“4h A few days 

later, in a public statement on the Chinese situation, the President made it clear 

that none of the $75 million would be allotted to the Chinese Nationalists.47 Subsequently, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that this money be allocated as follows: Indochina, $15 million; Indonesia, 

$5 million; Thailand, $10 million; contingency reserve, $45 million. However, 

these funds were never spent.48 

The overall US response to the changed situation in the Far East, as it 

evolved during 1947-1949 and was summed up in NSC 48/2, was to focus its 

strategy on its bases in the western Pacific while attempting to stay clear of military involvement on the maimand. The importance of what was Iater called the 

“offshore island chain”-the principal islands bordering the east coast of Asiahad been pointed out by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and accepted by the President 

and the National Security Council. In these islands, the United States, as a naval 

and air power, had a vital interest, to be defended militarily if necessary. This 

interest had in fact been underwritten in Joint Emergency War Plan OFFTACKLE, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved on 8 December 1949. This 

plan provided that, in the event of general war, the United States, remaining on 

the defensive in the Far East, would attempt to hold Japan, the Ryukyus, the 

277 
The nature of the US interest in the Far East was publicly expounded by Secretary of State Acheson on 12 January 1950, in an address before the National 

Press Club in Washington. He described the US “defensive perimeter” in the 

Pacific as running from the Aleutians to Japan, thence through the Ryukyus to 

the Philippines. He left no doubt that the United States would if necessary fight 

to defend this line. “There is no intention of any sort,” he said, “of abandoning or 

weakening the defenses of Japan.” The Ryukyus “must and will be held,” while 

“an attack on the Philippines could not and would not be tolerated by the United 

States.” He did not include Taiwan in the perimeter, since the United States was 

at that time maintaining a carefully correct position in the Chinese civil war. But 

he did devote some attention to the military security of “other areas in the 

Pacific.” Obviously, he pointed out, these could not be guaranteed against an 

attack. Should such an attack occur, “the initial reliance must be on the people 

attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world 

under the Charter of the United Nations.” 50 

Six months later, when the Republic of Korea was attacked by her northern 

neighbor, Secretary Acheson’s critics read into this speech an implied assurance 

to North Korea that aggression could be undertaken with impunity. Whatever 

the justice of this accusation, the Communist Bloc powers must have been 

aware of the apparent US intention to write off South Korea if it were attacked. 

In fact, however, the United States responded to the Korean crisis in a manner 

wholly in accord with the Secretary’s remarks about “other areas” in the Far 

East. Since it quickly became clear that the South Koreans themselves could not 

withstand the invasion, the United States rallied to their support, acting under 

the UN Charter and with the assistance, materiel or moral, of a large part of 

“the entire civilized world.” The result was three years of bloody conflict in 

Korea. When it was concluded by an armistice in July 1953, the United States 

for all practical purposes withdrew once more to the “offshore island chain,” 

while retaining troops in South Korea as part of a UN force intended to guard 

against a renewal of aggression. 

278 
15 

The Soviet Atomic Explosion 

and Its Consequences 

The Soviet Union Detonates a Nuclear Device 

n 3 September 1949, an Air Force WB-29 weather reconnaissance plane on 

routine patrol from Japan to Alaska picked up signs of radioactivity that 

slightly exceeded the intensity necessary to constitute an official alert. A second 

measurement by the same aircraft recorded a greater level of intensity. On the 

chance that the Soviet Union might have detonated a nuclear device, the Air 

Force dispatched aircraft to sample the air in various parts of the Pacific. Other 

routine flights, meanwhile, were picking up evidence of abnormal radioactivity 

over the Pacific. 

Within four days, laboratory analysis of the samples had revealed that the 

radioactivity was the result of nuclear fission. As additional samples came in, 

radiochemical analysis began to supply more detailed information of the event, 

and by 14 September most of the officials concerned at the Air Force Long Range 

Detection Center and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) were convinced that 

the Soviets had conducted an atomic test. Interpretation of the scientific evidence, 

however, was a highly sophisticated process in which disagreement was possible. 

The Atomic Energy Commission appointed a panel of distinguished scientists 

to review the evidence. This group, under the chairmanship of Dr. Vannevar 

Bush and including Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, Dr. Robert F. Bather, and Admiral 

William L. Parsons, met on 19 September. After a thorough briefing on all the evidence by experts from the Atomic Energy Commission and other government 

laboratories, the committee reached the unanimous conclusion that the observed 

phenomena were “consistent with the view that the origin of the fission products 

was the explosion of an atomic bomb.” 

President Truman was informed of the committee’s findings that evening by 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense Johnson, and Under Secretary 

279 

0 
dation the next day. The President, after a full review of the evidence with the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff on 21 September, agreed that the fact of the Soviet atomic 

explosion should be made public. He briefed Senator Brian McMahon, Chairman 

of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, on 22 September and on 

23 September he issued a statement to the press announcing the Soviet accomplishment. To minimize public alarm, the President stressed the fact that the 

event had been long expected.’ 

The Soviet atomic explosion symbolized the end of the American monoply of 

weapons of mass destruction. Summing up the military implications of Soviet 

possession of atomic weapons for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Intelligence 

Committee pointed out that 

with the growing atomic capabilities of the Soviet Union for attackin the United 

States, the time is fast approachin when both the United States an f the Soviets 

will possess capabilities for in a icting devastating atomic attacks on each

other.. . . A tremendous military advanta e would be gained by the power that 

struck first. Such an attack against the & nited States might well be decisive by 

reducing the atomic offensive capability, possibly to a critical degree, and 

destroying the capability for mobilizing and carrying on offensive warfare.2 

United States officials had long recognized, of course, that the monopoly of 

atomic weapons would eventually be broken, but there had been a tendency to 

postpone actions that would be necessary when the Soviet Union became a 

nuclear power. The test explosion served as a reminder that these decisions could 

not be postponed indefinitely, and that the United States faced the necessity of 

taking positive steps in order to maintain a position of military superiority over 

the Soviet Union. 

Reevaluation of Intelligence Methods 

0 f particular concern with regard to the Soviet atomic explosion of August 

1949 was the fact that it occurred nearly a year earlier than the most pessimistic American intelligence estimate assigned for it. The official estimate of 

Soviet nuclear capability at the time of the Soviet explosion was a statement by 

scientists from the three Service intelligence staffs, which was approved informally by the Joint Intelligence Committee on 22 March 1948. The statement was 

as follows: 

1. It is believed that the Soviet Union does not possess atomic bombs now. 

2. It is estimated that: 

a. The earliest date by which the Soviets may have exploded their first test 

bomb is mid-1950. 

280 
c. Based on a mid-1950 test ex losion, the greatest possible number of bombs 

in the Soviet stockpile in mi x -1955 is about 50. 

d. Based on a mid-1953 test explosion, the probable number of bombs in the 

Soviet stockpile in mid-1955 is about 20.1 

Following the Soviet atomic explosion, the Joint Intelligence Committee 

revised upwards its estimates of the Soviet atomic bomb stockpile. The Committee now believed that the Soviet Union would have 10 to 20 bombs by mid1950, 25 to 45 by mid-1951, 45 to 90 by mid-1952, 70 to 135 by mid-1953, and 

120 to 200 by mid-1954.j 

There was, of course, a valid question whether these revised estimates were 

any more accurate than the ones they superseded, particularly because the intelligence basis for both was essentially the same. The need for better intelligence of 

Soviet atomic developments, therefore, became a matter of major concern to the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Initiated on 17 September 1947 as an Air Force responsibility, the current system of surveillance, designated the Long-Range Detection Program, was limited 

to detection of atomic explosions by radiological means. In August 1948, the Air 

Force proposed to supplement this program during FY 1949 with methods 

intended to detect explosions by their seismic and acoustic effects. These methods, however, were still experimental, and their reliability was a matter of dispute among scientists of the Research and Development Board (RDB).” This 

body sought guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the relative 

importance of the various approaches to detection; the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 

turn, looked to the Board for a technical evaluation of the feasibility of each. Disagreement within the Joint Chiefs of Staff also delayed a decision on the 

expanded Air Force program. At one point, General Bradley contended that the 

Air Force was relying too heavily on the untried seismic and acoustic methods 

at the expense of conventional intelligence. Finally, on 28 March 1949, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff agreed to advise the RDB that, while an adequate intelligence system was of the utmost importance, the research needed to make it effective 

involved technical considerations that they were not competent to judge. It 

would be desirable, they said, to have the system in operation by mid-1950, but 

since they had been informed that this date could no longer be met, then it 

should be put into effect as soon as practicable and should subsequently be 

improved as more reliable methods became available. 

During their deliberations on the atomic surveillance system, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff had also foreseen an eventual need for methods of ascertaining the size of 

the Soviet atomic stockpile. General Vandenberg judged this to be as important 

as detecting a nuclear explosion. General Bradley foresaw that the question of the 

production rate might soon become of “critical” importance. He implied that 

conventional methods of intelligence had more to contribute than the advanced 

281 
to the RDB. After all, there was at that time no reason to believe that the Soviets 

had a “stockpile.” h 

As a result of delays in instituting what the Air Force regarded as a complete 

detection system, there was in operation in August 1949 only an “interim” systern consisting of patrolling aircraft equipped with filters for collecting air samples, plus a handful of acoustic stations operated by the Army Signal Corps. 

Nonetheless, this system sufficed not only to detect the Soviet atomic explosion, 

but to verify that it had involved a weapon (as distinct from an accidental explosion of an atomic pile), to conclude that plutonium had been used, to establish 

within one day the date of origin of the fission products, and to establish a location “somewhere over the northern part of the continent of Asia.“7 

The Soviet accomplishment pointed out the need for much broader and more 

precise information on atomic energy developments within the Soviet Union. The 

initial assignment of responsibility to the Air Force had been limited to the detection of atomic explosions. Since the ability of the USSR to detonate a weapon had 

been proven, the task now was to follow the inevitable unfolding of Soviet 

nuclear development. The Director of Central Intelligence, writing to the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff on 28 October, pointed out that the Soviet nuclear explosion called 

for a reevaluation of the Long-Range Detection Program. He recommended a 

program of technical surveillance that would yield the following types of information (listed in order of importance): the type of weapons tested; the time and 

place of nuclear explosions; and the location of nuclear processing plants. Except 

for the last of these, conventional intelligence methods were likely to yield relatively little information. General Vandenberg informed his colleagues on 2 

November that the Air Force detection program, if suitably expanded, could 

respond effectively to all four of these requirements. He urged that the directive 

to the Air Force be revised accordingly.x 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 20 January 1950, agreed to the necessity for 

improved intelligence of Soviet atomic activities. They singled out the rate of 

weapons production as the most important element of information needed for 

national defense planning. Determining the location of processing plants for target planning was next in importance. Knowledge of the time and place of future 

explosions would be of value in contributing to other elements of intelligence, 

and particularly in detecting the explosion of a thermonuclear (fusion) weapon. 

They accordingly requested the Research and Development Board to determine 

what was needed to create an adequate detection system. Meanwhile the Air 

Force was to continue research and development in this field.q 

The Research and Development Board, at a meeting on 5 April 1950, continued this delegation of authority, making the Department of the Air Force responsible for specific research programs recommended by a panel of the RDB. Results 

from this research were not significant prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, 

but the expanded detection system, using seismic and acoustic as well as radiological means, was ultimately to prove of great value.1o 

282 
A t the time the Soviet atomic test was detected, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee was at work on emergency war plan OFFTACKLE.” The draft current 

in early September stated: “Intelligence estimates indicate that the USSR will 

have no atomic bombs available in fiscal year 1950.” The next draft, circulated on 

25 October, cited intelligence estimates that the Soviets would have a maximum 

of 10 atomic bombs by the beginning of 1950 and 30 by the end of the year. Also, 

the assumption was made, subject to later reappraisal, that atomic weapons 

would be used by both sides in a conflict. 

These passages from the 25 October draft were incorporated into the final version of OFFTACKLE, which otherwise was not affected by the Soviet nuclear 

explosion. The allocation of tasks made no provision for defense against the 

Soviet nuclear capability, and the forces allocated to air defense of North America 

had not been increased as compared with earlier drafts.12 

Expansion of Fission Bomb Production 

T he explosion of an atomic device by the Soviet Union gave new importance 

to the continuing US program for the development and production of atomic 

bombs. Production of atomic weapons was the responsibility of the Atomic 

Energy Commission, created by statute in 1946, which controlled and operated 

all facilities for producing fissionable materials. Requirements for weapons were 

formulated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and transmitted to the AEC through 

another statutory body, the Military Liaison Committee, made up of representatives from all three Services. 

The existing production program dated from a JCS statement of requirements 

of 17 December 1947.” At that time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff foresaw a need for 

atomic bombs of the type dropped on Nagasaki. The SANDSTONE tests, conducted during April and May 1948, added significant advances to atomic 

weapon technology. Three new weapons, designated X-Ray, Yoke, and Zebra, 

were tested. The first two released nearly twice as much energy (41 and 43 KT, 

respectively) as the 22 KT of the Nagasaki model. 

In response to a request from the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff stated their requirements for the new model bombs. The estimates were 

derived from the work of an ad hoc committee appointed for the purpose by the 

Chief of Staff, Air Force, at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and were 

based on a study by the Air Staff of the 70 primary targets of the TROJAN plan.‘” 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 June 1949 submitted a supplemental report to 

the Atomic Energy Commission projecting atomic bomb requirements up to 1 

January 1956. They did not, however, specify a breakdown of this total by types 

of weapons; instead, they set forth requirements in terms of fissionable material 

to allow for technical improvements in weapons design.‘” 

283 
had tailored their requests to production capabilities of the Atomic Energy Commission, but now they presented military requirements based on estimates of 

actual wartime needs. To meet these new requirements, however, was beyond the 

production capability of the Atomic Energy Commission. Expansion of production facilities would, of course, cost money, a matter of major concern under the 

strict budgetary limitations imposed by President Truman. Before making a decision, therefore, the President ordered, on 26 July 1949, a thorough study of plans 

for producing atomic weapons and fissionable materials. To perform this study, 

the President called upon Secretary Johnson, Secretary Acheson, and Mr. David 

Lilienthal, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, appointing them as a 

Special Committee of the National Security Council.lh 

The Special Committee, reporting to the President on 10 October, concluded 

that the accelerated atomic energy program recommended by the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff was “necessary in the interests of national security.” The recent atomic 

explosion by the Soviet Union, the Committee said, “increases the urgency with 

which the proposed program should be undertaken and executed .“ The acceleration, however, was worthy of approval without regard to the Soviet accomplishment. The new program “should be clearly understood,” the Committee 

reported, “to be a projection of previous plans. . . rather than as a counterdevelopment to the Soviet explosion.” 

The “developments, events, and considerations” that had led the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff to recommend the expanded program were set forth by the Committee as 

follows: 

1. Analysis of SANDSTONE results indicating additional operational applications of atomic weapons. 

2. Preliminary estimates that atomic bombs could be used economically 

against small targets. 

3. Expanding supplies of raw materials and more efficient use of them. 

4. Continued international tension, pointing to the need to remove constraints 

imposed by limited numbers of weapons. 

5. The uncertainty of relying on expansion of production after hostilities began. 

6. The failure of UN efforts to control atomic energy, combined with the realization that the US atomic monopoly would soon be lost. 

The Committee went on to observe that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed the 

program necessary to improve US military posture for both deterrence and 

defense, that the Atomic Energy Commission had concluded that the program 

was technically feasible, and that the Department of State had found no reason to 

anticipate an adverse international reaction, particularly in view of the Soviet 

284 
readiness that could be maintained as long as necessary. The casefor accelerated 

production, therefore, was compelling. The Committee added a caution that the 

increased expenditures required for the purpose should not be at the expense of 

other national security programs.‘7 

The report of the Special Committee had been drafted by an interdepartmental working group. The extent of JCS participation in the process is not indicated 

in available records, but the group obviously had accessto the views of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. Secretary Johnson was a vigorous defender of the interests of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff and had successfully contested the right of the other Committee members to review the bases for the JCS estimate of requirements.lx The 

Joint Chiefs of Staff had, in fact, seen the report in draft form and found their 

views so faithfully represented that their formal comments were unnecessary.‘4 

The President, on I9 October, approved the Special Committee’s conclusions 

and ordered the necessary increases in atomic energy production. Paraphrasing 

the views attributed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the report, he summed up the 

advantages of the accelerated program as lower unit cost of weapons, increased 

military effectiveness, decreased logistical and manpower requirements, and 

greater flexibility in military operations. At the same time, he pointed out, these 

benefits would have “far-reaching implications “ in military policy. He therefore 

asked Secretary Johnson to provide information on three points: the changes in 

strategic planning that would result from expanded atomic production; the operational assumptions that underlay the need for the expanded production; and the 

means by which the utilization of the increased quantities of atomic weapons 

would be integrated into the total strategic plan. Secretary Johnson passed this 

request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.2(1 

On 2 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their answers to the President’s questions to the Secretary of Defense. The accelerated atomic energy program would have no effect on the current emergency war plan, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff said, and would not become a factor in US strategy “prior to the period 

envisaged in our present long-range planning” (presumably meaning up to January 1956, the target date for their expansion program). Eventually, accelerated 

production would make possible faster research and development of new 

weapons and would permit some innovation in strategy. But without an 

increased supply of fissionable material, research could only be achieved by 

diverting resources from production of current models of atomic bombs. 

The force requirements for emergency war plans would not be affected by 

accelerated atomic bomb production, the Joint Chiefs of Staff cautioned. These 

requirements were the minimum necessary to support basic undertakings. They 

were already at levels involving serious risks and should not be reduced if lack of 

funds for atomic production forced economies in other areas. 

The operational assumptions underlying the need for an accelerated atomic 

energy program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, were the need to preserve the 

nuclear deterrent now that the Soviets were developing atomic weapons, and the 

desirability of increased flexibility in use of atomic weapons resulting from a 

285 
pal means of delivering the atomic weapon. New military applications of atomic 

energy (such as warheads for guided missiles) might evolve from research and 

would be incorporated into strategic plans as they became available.2’ 

Continental Air Defense 

A larger supply of atomic weapons could be expected to strengthen the 

nuclear deterrent or, if war came, to make possible a much wider and more 

devastating strategic offensive. The accelerated production program was therefore fully in line with the well-known adage, “the best defense is a good offense,” 

to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff subscribed. 22 Indeed, budgetary austerity had 

virtually dictated a strategy built around that principle.2s 

At the same time, it was obviously necessary to prepare for the day when the 

hypothetical enemy would be in position to launch the same sort of attack 

against the United States. Consequently, buildup of conventional air defense was 

listed as a priority task in all the Joint Emergency War Plans approved by the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff since the end of World War II. But in the fall of 1949, the 

means to accomplish this task were practically nonexistent. Only 23 interceptor 

squadrons were assigned to air defenses. The Army had only 30 antiaircraft 

artillery battalions for the continental United States and Alaska. Moreover, there 

was no overall command of antiaircraft artillery, although Air Force defense 

units had all been placed under the Continental Air Command. The aircraft control and warning system, too, was in a rudimentary state, with only a handful of 

radars of World War II type. 24“With the United States defenses against air attack 

in the state they are today,” General Vandenberg informed his colleagues on 16 

November, “almost any number of Soviet bombers could cross our borders and 

fly to most targets in the United States without a shot being fired at them.“25 

Because resources were limited, and because the danger of a Soviet attack was 

not yet serious, the Joint Chiefs of Staff focused their attention on the provision of 

an early warning and control system for the continental United States and Alaska 

and the preparation of a defense plan. 

The attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was first drawn to the early warning 

problem on 1 July 1948, when Secretary Forrestal asked their views on an ambitious proposal on the subject by the Air Force. Termed SUPREMACY, it called for 

the ultimate establishment of 374 land-based radar stations in the United States 

and 37 in Alaska, at a cost of $388 million for the initial installation and $83 million a year for operations and modernization after installations were completed. 

It was designed to provide complete 24-hour per day coverage of the entire 

Alaskan coastline. In the United States, it would provide similar coverage of the 

entire West Coast and the northern boundary, the major portion of the East Coast, 

and all vital interior targets.2h 

286 
following January at the earliest. Before that date, Secretary Forrestal informed 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 July, he wished their views on the proposed legislation because the Navy, as well as the Air Force, would be involved in the program. The Secretary wanted an evaluation of the program in terms of its need, 

cost, effectiveness, and relative importance, together with suggestions for possible modifications that might reduce the costz7 

Responding on 20 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended the installation of a modified warning and control system, sufficient to protect against 

attacks on Alaska and the northeastern United States by Soviet bombers flying 

one-way missions. The cost of installation, spread over a five-year period, would 

average less than 1 percent of the 1949 military budget. It would constitute the 

first step toward the more comprehensive system that would be required by 

1953, when, as a result of the growth of Soviet offensive strength, air defense 

would assume a priority second only to the strategic retaliatory force. 

The revised system prepared by the Air Force and recommended by the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff would establish a warning and control system in increments. It 

called for a first installment that would provide, with equipment on hand or 

under procurement and within the presently authorized troop basis, an 

extremely limited air defense for the Continental United States and Alaska at an 

initial cost of $70 million plus $9.3 million for annual maintenance. The second 

installment, to be initiated in FY 1950, would require new procurement and 

would strengthen the protection of vital areas minimally covered in the initial 

installment. Four Navy radar picket ships, to be used primarily to test equipment, would be included. The initial cost of the second installment would be 

$52.9 million plus $2.15 million for annual maintenance. The completion of both 

installments was necessary to provide minimum coverage for the United States 

and Alaska and to provide a model system for testing new equipment and techniques. Further expansion and improvement of the system could be determined 

in the light of operational experience, technological developments, and additional intelligence.ZH 

Legislation authorizing the initial phase of this program, to include 75 radar 

warning stations, at a cost now revised upward to $85.5 million, was passed by 

Congress and was signed into law by the President on 30 March 1949. The Air 

Force requested a supplemental FY 1949 appropriation to provide these funds, 

but Congress rejected it and authorized instead the utilization of $50 million from 

the total Air Force appropriation for FY 1950. Before these funds could be spent, 

however, the Bureau of the Budget would have to reapportion the Air Force 

funds for FY 1950. Even as late as January 1950, however, the Bureau had not 

approved the reapportionment, and consequently nothing had been accomplished except selection of some radar sites.‘” 

As part of their study of air defense systems the Joint Chiefs of Staff had also 

considered the possibility of a unified command for the forces defending the continental United States. The matter was not deliberated with any degree of 

287 
considered a split report on the subject by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee in 

which the Army and Air Force members recommended the establishment of a 

unified Continental Defense Command, while the Navy member recommended 

that separate air and ground commands be formed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 

19 February 1948, rejected both proposals. They agreed to establish instead a 

Continental United States Defense Planning Group, with its function limited to 

the preparation of plans.“” 

The Planning Group submitted a Basic Defense Plan for the continental 

United States to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 23 November 1949. According to this 

plan, the Soviet Union possessed an immediate capability to make limited 

attacks on the continental United States employing submarines, airborne troops, 

and some 150 Tu4 bombers (comparable to the USAF B-29) making one-way 

flights. From 10 to 30 atomic bombs were expected to be available to the Soviets 

in 1950, as estimated in the current war plan, OFFTACKLE. Key US military and 

industrial facilities to be defended were listed. Missions were assigned in broad 

terms only.“’ 

This was the state of affairs in late November 1949, nearly three months after 

the Soviet atomic explosion had been detected. It was not until 22 November 

that the Joint Chiefs of Staff took steps to appraise the effects of the Soviet 

accomplishment on existing air defenses. On that date they responded to an 

urgent plea by the Air Force Chief of Staff for a project to improve the technical 

capabilities of air defense, comparable to the Manhattan Project that developed 

the atomic bomb during World War II. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt this action 

was premature and, on 20 December, directed instead that the Chief of Staff of 

the Air Force explain current US air defense capabilities, indicate what improvements could be made with present resources and recommend actions for 

increasing them. The Joint Chiefs of Staff aIso informed the Research and Development Board, on 27 December, that air defense was now elevated to the highest 

degree of strategic importance. 

The Air Force presentation, made to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 March 1950, 

was forwarded to the Research and Development Board on 8 March, with a 

request for a determination of “all new actions possible to improve the technology of air defenses.“ The Research and Development Board replied on 3 April 

that they were delaying action on this request pending completion of a study of 

air defense by WSEG. The WSEG study was completed after the outbreak of the 

Korean War and influenced subsequent continental defense planning.X2 

In addition to recommending a speed-up in air defense research and development, General Vandenberg also sought increased funding for the early warning 

system. It will be recalled that Congress had authorized the expenditure of $50 

million out of regular Air Force FY 1950 appropriations in a congressionally 

authorized system estimated to cost $85.5 million by the time of completion in 

1952. On 23 November General Vandenberg recommended to the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff that they approve his request to Congress for the immediate appropriation 

of the remaining $35.5 million required for this program so that it could be com288 
tion requests for FY 1951, which were approved after the outbreak of the Korean 

War.?l 

By making maximum use of its available resources, however, the Air Force 

was able to throw together a temporary radar network known as LASHUP. In 

June 1950 it consisted of 49 stations in the continental United States and Alaska.?” 

One additional effort to strengthen the defenses of the continental United 

States was initiated by General Collins. In reaction to General Vandenberg’s 

gloomy picture of the state of US air defenses, the Army Chief of Staff renewed 

the suggestion that a unified command be established for the defense of the 

United States. His colleagues, however, persuaded General Collins on 30 December 1949 to withdraw his recommendation pending further studies. The Continental Defense Command did not finally come into being until 1954.7s 

Proposals for Development of Fusion Weapons 

T he various steps described above-strengthening of continental air defense, 

stepping up production of fissionable materials, improving intelligence 

methods, and reviewing strategic war plans-were responses to the threat 

implicit in the Soviet nuclear explosion. But these measures seemed inadequate 

to meet the new Soviet challenge. A far more dramatic and substantial response 

seemed to be called for; one that would assure to the United States the continuance of a commanding superiority in nuclear weapons. 

To many, the “super” (thermonuclear or fusion) weapon seemed the answer. 

From the earliest days, nuclear scientists (including the Soviets) had recognized 

that a thermonuclear reaction could produce enormously greater releases of 

energy than a fission reaction. In 1942, a group of physicists led by Dr. Robert 

Oppenheimer had discovered the theoretical possibility of a weapon based on 

the fusion of very light elements. They analyzed the relative advantages of using 

various combinations of the hydrogen isotopes, deuterium and tritium, for this 

purpose. But the temperatures required to initiate such a reaction were so enormous that they could only be generated by a fission bomb. Consequently, the 

thermonuclear project was given a low priority during World War 11.Dr. Edward 

Teller and others, however, continued to study the fusion problem. 

By the autumn of ‘1949, the search for the “super” was still in its infancy, Theoretical physicists and mathematicians had developed a mathematical method for 

describing the interactions of heavy nuclei in the thermonuclear process, but the 

necessary computations awaited the completion of an improved computer then 

under construction. These were important steps towards defining the problem, but 

the scientists were obviously a long way from knowing whether man could produce the thermonuclear reaction, and even farther from knowing how to do it.“” 

In the days following the Soviet nuclear explosion, the possibility of pushing 

development of the new, thermonuclear weapon, and thus achieving a “quantum 

289 
and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. Plans already formulated by the AEC for testing the principle of fusion were described by the general 

manager of the Commission, Mr. Carroll L. Wilson.“7 

It was against this background that a member of the AEC, Mr. Lewis L. 

Strauss, recommended to his colleagues on 5 October that an intensive effort, of 

the magnitude of the original Manhattan Project if necessary, be launched to 

develop the “super.” As a first step, he recommended immediate consultation 

with the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, to 

ascertain the views of the members on how to proceed most expcditiously.,‘X 

Meanwhile Drs. Ernest 0. Lawrence and Luis Alvarez, at the AEC Radiation 

Laboratory of the University of California at Berkeley, had also reached the 

conclusion that the “super” would be an appropriate response to the Soviet 

achievement. They consulted Dr. Edward Teller and others at Los Alamos, 

where the consensus was that the first step should be the construction of a large 

heavy-water reactor for the production of tritium. On a visit to Washington, 

they conferred with Mr. Robert LeBaron, Special Assistant to the Secretary of 

Defense for Atomic Energy, and Senator Brian McMahon, Chairman of the Joint 

Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy. The Senator was particularly 

impressed by the arguments of the scientists and became an outspoken advocate of the fusion weapon.“” 

The General Advisory Committee discussed the proposed new weapon during three days of intensive debate (28 to 30 October), during which the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff were consulted. The members concluded, on technical and moral 

grounds, that they could not approve it. A successful “super,” they believed, 

would probably require large amounts of tritium, which in turn would necessitate enormous reactor capacity. Moreover, development of the weapon was still 

in its infancy; the necessary theoretical design studies had not yet been completed or tested. As for the probability of success, the Committee’s best estimate was that “an imaginative and concerted attack” would have a “better than 

even” chance of producing a weapon of some kind within five years. But even 

assuming that a “super” could be built, the Committee members saw strong 

moral objections. There was no theoretical limit to its size. Clearly such a 

weapon could not be restricted to use against strictly military targets and 

would make possible a policy of exterminating civil populations. Nor was it 

needed for national security. By the time the Soviets attained an atomic attack 

capability, the US stockpile of fission weapons would be sufficient to permit an 

adequate reprisal. 

But was it advisable for the United States to foreswear the development of the 

new weapon without some sort of reciprocal assurance? The Committee members gave different answers to this question. A majority, of whom Drs. James B. 

Conant and J. Robert Oppenheimer were the most prominent members, felt that 

the United States should make a complete, unconditional, and unilateral renunciation of any intention to develop fusion weapons. A minority, consisting of Drs. 

Enrico Fermi and Isidor Rabi, proposed that the United States join in a pledge 

290 
The Atomic Energy Commission, after considering the report of its Advisory 

Committee, found itself unable to reach agreement and, on 9 November, reported 

split views to the President. The report, as background for the recommendations, 

set forth the following conclusions: that the “super” was probably feasible but 

would take three years to develop; that it would have unlimited power; that the 

general principles of the reaction were well known; and that to beat the Soviets in 

a race for the weapon would require an all-out effort that would disrupt existing 

projects and could not be kept secret. On the basis of these considerations, Commissioners David E. Lilienthal, Sumner Pike, and Henry A. Smyth recommended 

against development of the “super” at that time. Commissioner Strauss, joined 

by Commissioner Gordon Dean, favored a secret diplomatic approach to the 

Soviet Union to explore the possibility of international control. If that approach 

failed, the President, with the approval of the Department of Defense, should 

announce his decision to proceed with the fusion weapon. The individual Commissioners elaborated their views in separate letters to the IYesident.qi 

JCS Recommendations for Development of Fusion Weapons 

T he adverse recommendation by the Atomic Energy Commission brought the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff officially into the debate over the “super” for the first 

time. On 10 November, they directed the JSSC to study the question and submit 

recommendations on the subject. Subsequently, a report by members of the Military Liaison Committee was substituted, with the concurrence of the JSSC, and 

submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 17 November.42 

The report was based on the available scientific literature and interviews with 

responsible officials in the atomic energy program. On the basis of this evidence, 

the authors of the study reported a consensus of the scientific community that a 

thermonuclear or fusion weapon was feasible and could be developed in prototype form in three years. The lower limit of energy release for this weapon would 

be somewhere between 1,000 KT and 10,000 KT. There was no theoretical maximum yield. A 1,000 KT weapon, according to available information, would 

destroy an area of 65 square miles, while the area of destruction for a IO,000 KT 

weapon would be 300 square miles. In comparison, the bomb dropped on 

Hiroshima, with its 15 KT yield, had destroyed an area of 4 square miles. At a 

minimum, therefore, the “super” would be the equivalent of nine atom bombs of 

the latter type. Accurate cost figures for the fusion bomb were not available, but 

its development was certain to cost a great deal and to divert facilities and materials from research and development for other military and peacetime applications of atomic energy. The development of a delivery vehicle was also a problem 

but was considered less difficult than the development of the weapon itself. 

Turning to the military applications of the thermonuclear weapon, the authors 

of the study pointed out that, because there were only four Russian cities with an 

291 
gets, waste of fissionable material (through “overkill” by thermonuclear weapons 

too big for the targets) could be avoided. Use of thermonuclear weapons would 

also reduce the delivery effort. 

Defensively, the “super” was primarily a weapon of retaliation. There were, 

however, other defensive factors involved. The United States was far more vulnerable to nuclear attack than the Soviet Union, owing to the fact that there were 

many more cities with areas greater than 65 square miles in the United States 

than in the Soviet Union. To defend all these cities would seriously strain the 

defense capabilities of the United States. 

There was in addition a significant psychological effect to be expected from a 

thermonuclear explosion in war. If the Soviet Union were to develop the weapon 

before the United States, the effect on the American people would be profoundly 

demoralizing and would have “grave political repercussions” that might raise 

serious questions concerning the continued unity of spirit, confidence and determination of the western nations. Such a situation would be intolerable, and the 

need to avoid it far outweighed any social, psychological or moral objection to 

the development of thermonuclear weapons.“? 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, after considering this report, accepted its conclusions. On 23 November 1949 they recommended to the Secretary of Defense that 

the US military position with respect to the proposed thermonuclear weapon be 

as follows: 

1~.Possession of a thermonuclear weapon by the USSR without such possession by the United States would be intolerable. 

h. There is an imperative necessity of determining the feasibility of a thermonuclear ex losion and its characteristics. Such determination is essential for 

US defense p Pannin , reparations for retaliation, and direction of research. It 

will have a profoun JPe feet on policy in the field of international affairs. 

c. If a thermonuclear weapon is determined to be feasible, the followin additional considerations pertaining to military requirements are currently evi cfent: 

(1) Possession of such weapons by the United States may act as a possible 

deterrent to war. 

(2) Possession of such weapon by the United States will provide an offensive weapon of the greatest known power possibilities thereb .r adding tlexibil­ . ity to our planning and to our operations in the event of hosti ities. 

d. The cost in money, materiels, and industrial effort of developing a thermonuclear weapon appears to be within the capabilities of the United States. 

Available information indicates that such a weapon may likewise be within the 

capability of the USSR. 

292 
, ppggy 

to be more efficient in utilization of available ore and pro a uction capacity per 

unit area of damage. 

f. The foregoing considerations decisively outweigh the possible social, psychological and moral objections which may be considered to argue a ainst 

research and development leading to a thermonuclear weapon by the B nited 

States. 

s. Any decision or actions pertaining to the United States’ effort to develop a 

thermonuclear weapon or any determination of its feasibility constitute a military secret of the highest classification. It shouId be ossible to maintain secrecy 

on a subject of such importance to the security of the e nited States. 

lz. A unilateral decision on the part of the United States not to develop a thermonuclear weapon will not prevent the development of such a weapon elsewhere.+ 

President Truman, meanwhile, had reactivated the Special Committee of the 

National Security Council in order to resolve the conflicting recommendations. 

On 19 November he directed Secretaries Johnson and Acheson and Commissioner Lilienthal to “analyze all phases of the question including particularly the 

technical, military, and political factors, and make recommendations as to 

whether and in what manner the United States should undertake the development and possible production of ‘super’ atomic weapons. . .“45 

To prepare the necessary staff studies, a Working Group of representatives of 

the three agencies was convened on 28 November under the direction of Rear 

Admiral Sidney W. Souers, the Executive Secretary of the National Security 

Council. The Defense Department representation consisted of Dr. LeBaron, Lieutenant General Norstad, Major General Kenneth D. Nichols and Rear Admiral 

T.B. Hill, both of the Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not represented on the Working Group, but 

their views, as expressed in the memorandum of 23 November, were accepted 

verbatim as the initial position by the Defense members and introduced into the 

deliberations of the Working Group on 16 December.4h 

The Special Committee met on 22 December in what developed into an inconclusive head-to-head confrontation between Secretary Johnson and Mr. Lilienthal 

on the basic issues referred to the Committee. Mr. Johnson insisted that the issues 

were narrow and technical, having to do only with the value of the “super” 

bomb as a weapon. On this score, he said, all in the Department of Defense were 

agreed that potential military uses justified going ahead with a development program. Only if the Soviet Union agreed to the US plan for international control of 

atomic energy would the Defense Department agree to forego the “super” bomb. 

Mr. Lilienthal insisted on the importance of the moral issue. The “purpose and 

course of mankind” were tied to the decision. It was inconceivable not to consider what Secretary Johnson disparagingly referred to as “philosophy.” The dis293 
meet again except to approve its final report to the President. Its work was conducted instead through individual conferences, with Secretary Acheson taking 

the lead in seeking a compromise of conflicting views.“7 

An important item in these deliberations was an elaboration by the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff of their views on the thermonuclear bomb. The presentation of 

these views was triggered by a further exposition of opposition to the super by 

the General Advisory Committee of the AEC at its regularly scheduled meeting 

held from 1 through 3 December. After a thorough reexamination of the positions 

taken at the previous meeting, all the members were satisfied with their previous 

views on the super bomb; none of them wished to alter the statement of views in 

the report of 30 October. Some of them, however, felt it advisable to forward further comments. These took the form of letters from Drs. Buckley, Rowe, Fermi, 

and DuBridge, and a memorandum by the Secretary, Dr. Manley. 

Dr. Buckley reaffirmed his opposition to the super on the basis of four arguments: we do not know whether we can build it; if successful, it will cost at 

least a billion dollars for a complete weapons system and will divert considerable fissionable material from the production of fission bombs; moreover, it 

would not add very substantially to our military effectiveness; finally, if we can 

build one, so can the Russians. Under these conditions, a “crash” program to 

build the super would be a mistake. Nevertheless Dr. Buckley believed that 

research into thermonuclear reactions should be encouraged. Results of these 

studies should make possible a sound policy decision on future development of 

thermonuclear weapons. 

Dr. Rowe also failed to perceive any military advantages in the super bomb, 

and in addition advanced psychological and moral arguments against it. A crash 

program might foster the delusion that the United States possessed an ultimate 

weapon and lead to neglecting the improvement of existing weapons. A democracy could not be strengthened by possession of a super bomb. 

Dr. Fermi limited his opposition to the super to technological arguments. He 

assumed that with presently available air carriers the practical limit was a bomb 

whose explosive energy was the equivalent of 1,000 present fission bombs (40 

million tons of TNT). It was believed that such a weapon would produce severe 

damage over an area of 10 miles in radius-enough to destroy the largest city in 

the world. However, 30 fission bombs would produce the same result, and in any 

case there were very few Soviet targets large enough to require such destructive 

force. Moreover, each super bomb would require enough fissionable material to 

make about four fission bombs plus an amount of tritium that would make four 

plutonium bombs. Hence the damage inflicted per pound of fissionable material 

was only three to four times greater for a fusion than for a fission bomb. As to the 

military uses, Dr. Fermi admitted a peculiar advantage in destroying heavy 

buildings. Tactical uses were also a possibility-a single explosion could wipe 

out an entire division-but required further exploration. There was also the possibility of offensive use against the United States. This would demand attention 

294 
Dr. Manley attempted to clarify the reasons underlying the Committees rejection of a super bomb development program. The declared national policy of the 

United States, he pointed out, was to eliminate atomic bombs as instruments of 

war, and although this goal had not been achieved, there was no compelling reason to make it more difficult by undertaking to develop fusion bombs. There was 

still an opportunity to “limit the totality of war by refusing to introduce this new 

and more devastating application of nuclear science and in so doing to hold 

some measure of hope before the people of the world that atomic bombs also 

may be removed from the armaments of nations.” 

In support of his view that there was no “military necessity” for the super 

bomb, Dr. Manley contended that fission bombs could achieve much the same 

effects. Taking into account cost factors and the nature of prospective targets, the 

advantage of the fusion over the fission bomb was reduced to a factor of 2-5, 

rather than 100-1000 indicated by their relative energy releases. Further, the 

super would, over a period of time, add only a relatively small increment to the 

total strength represented by the anticipated atomic bomb stockpile. 

Development of super bombs by the United States would also stimulate similar Soviet development, continued Dr. Manley, through the inevitable leaks of 

information, and the encouragement that American successes would give for the 

ultimate success of a rival program. If the Soviets succeeded in developing the 

fusion weapon, possession of the weapon by the United States would provide no 

defense against it. Even the deterrent effect would not be significant in view of 

the expected size of the atomic stockpile, which would be a sufficient deterrent 

by itself by the time the Soviets had acquired a fusion bomb capability. Finally, 

diversion of resources to the super bomb might prevent development of weapons 

showing a greater military potential.“x 

Dr. DuBridge elaborated his views in a letter to Mr. Lilienthal dated 5 December. An American program to develop the super, he thought, would stimulate a 

possible enemy to do the same. Hence, the new weapon would have little value 

unless possession of it “would so greatly increase our retaliatory power that it 

would be a decisive deterrent.” This, according to Dr. DuBridge, was clearly not 

the case, for the reasons already stated by Dr. Fermi and Dr. Manley. A better use 

of resources would therefore be to undertake an “all out” development of 

defenses against the super. Dr. DuBridge also argued at length against the new 

weapon on psychological, diplomatic, and moral grounds.“” 

On 14 December, these views of the General Advisory Committee (GAC) and 

its individual members were referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Dr. Robert 

LeBaron, Deputy to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy Matters. Noting 

that the GAC members had devoted themselves almost exclusively to the military aspects of the weapon, he asked the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for use 

in preparing the Defense Department position in the Special Committee of the 

National Security Council.“” 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied on 13 January. Rather than responding separately to all the individual issues raised by each member of the General Advisory 

295 
The key question was whether the United States should seek to develop a 

super bomb on a “crash” basis. The Joint Chiefs of Staff answered this question in 

the negative, since the technology involved was unproven. At the same time, 

however, they urged that the following “minimum effort” be undertaken for the 

development of a thermonuclear weapon: 

(1) Determination of the technical feasibility of a thermonuclear explosion 

as a matter of top priority. 

(2) Studies of the necessary delivery vehicle and ordinance problems 

would proceed concurrently with (1) above and should not necessarily await 

trial of a thermonuclear assembly. 

(3) Decisions pertaining to the production of thermonuclear wea ons in 

any quantity should be deferred pending further determination of tK e ultimate feasibility of a thermonuclear explosion and the feasibility of an appropriate weapon carrier. 

There were sound military reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, for 

proceeding with this program. Mere knowledge by a potential enemy that the 

United States was developing a thermonuclear weapon would be a deterrent to 

aggression. There was, of course, the danger that knowledge of a US program 

might help a potential enemy to develop a super of its own, but failure of the 

United States to proceed with a super bomb program would not deter a possible 

enemy from seeking its own thermonuclear weapon. “Research in this field will 

continue,” they pointed out, “regardless of United States decision, since such 

research is a normal and logical atomic development.” 

Assuming successful development of a thermonuclear weapon, the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff conceived of it primarily as an offensive weapon that might possibly be decisive if properly used. They denied that it should be considered as 

something more than a strictly military weapon because it could conceivably be 

used to lay waste large areas. They did not intend to “destroy large cities FXEYse; 

rather only to attack such targets as are necessary in war in order to impose the 

national objectives of the United States upon an enemy.” They considered it possible that the new weapon might increase US retaliatory power “to the extent that 

it would be decisive.” However, they added, they did not view the thermonuclear bomb solely as a means of retaliation. 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected the view that resources devoted to the super 

bomb could be better expended on defense. While recognizing a need for balance 

between offensive and defensive forces, they pointed out that “defense alone 

cannot bring about a favorable decision” in modern war. However, the thermonuclear weapon would have a defensive value in the broadest sense, as a 

deterrent to war. It might also have considerable tactical value in certain situations for use against massed enemy forces. The problem of delivery seemed 

unlikely to be substantially more difficult than for the fission bomb. 

296 
materials, and in absorption of technical skills and industrial capacity. However, 

these costs appeared to be within the capability of the United States without 

materially interfering with improvement of existing weapons and other means 

of defense. 

Diplomatic considerations involved in the decision were, as such, outside the 

field of JCS responsibility, but some of these had military implications. National 

policy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out, was a function of military capability 

and would be materially strengthened by adding the fusion weapon to the 

nation’s arsenal. Conversely, the United States would be in an “intolerable position” if it did not possess the weapon while a potential enemy did. Voluntary 

renunciation would be “foolhardy altriusm” and would probably lead to “major 

international realignments” to the disadvantage of the United States. Nor could 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff see any reason for postponing the project while other 

nations were consulted, except perhaps those that had been associated with the 

Manhattan project (i.e., the United Kingdom and Canada). 

The thermonuclear weapon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized, would have 

an important psychological effect. Citizens of a country threatened by the 

weapon would bring great pressure to bear on governments to provide defenses 

for the areas where they lived and worked, with the result that resources would 

be so diverted to defensive requirements as to jeopardize offensive forces. 

Turning finally to the moral question, the Joint Chiefs of Staff denied that possession of the super bomb would be so abhorrent to Americans and other peoples of the world as to undermine US world leadership. On the contrary, those 

who looked to the United States for leadership would expect her government to 

take all necessary steps to preserve it, including development of the thermonuclear bomb. In the final analysis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained, it was “folly 

to argue whether one weapon is more immoral than another. For, in the larger 

sense, it is war itself that is immoral, and the stigma of such immorality must rest 

upon the nation which initiates hostilities.“i’ 

General Bradley briefed the Joint Congressional Committee on this report on 

20 January. The members agreed that possession of the super was so vital to 

national security that the necessary additional facilities should be built even 

before the feasibility tests were under way. A copy of the JCS report was provided to the White House by Secretary Johnson, who had become impatient with 

the inability of the Special Committee of the NSC to reach agreement.‘2 

The decision of thcb Joint Congressional Committee in favor of the thermonuclear weapon was not altered by a meeting of Committee members with the AEC 

on 27 January 1950. By this time, however, the existence of the debate within the 

administration had leaked to the press, and the issue was a matter of public discussion. A number of prominent figures spoke out, urging the nation to go ahead 

with the new weapon. They included Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, a highly regarded 

“elder statesman” who had helped to draft the US plan for international control 

of atomic energy in 1946; Congressman Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House 

Armed Services Committee; Senator I-1. Styles Bridges, a member of the corre297 
Chicago, an internationally known chemist and holder of the Nobel Prize. President Truman was asked about the subject at a press conference on 27 January 

1950. He replied that he was not yet ready to announce a decision, implying that 

he would do so in the near future.“” 

Secretary Acheson meanwhile had continued his efforts to steer the Special 

Committee toward a decision. He succeeded in achieving a compromise between 

Secretary Johnson and Mr. Lilienthal. The AEC Chairman remained convinced that 

a hasty affirmative decision would commit the United States, perhaps irrevocably, 

to an excessive reliance on military power. But he was willing to lend his name to a 

recommendation to investigate the feasibility of a thermonuclear reaction, provided 

that actual production of weapons was postponed pending a far-reaching review of 

military and foreign policies. Such a review should include consideration of the possibility of reopening discussion of international control of atomic energy.s4 

Decision to Develop Fusion Weapons 

T he Special Committee of the National Security Council met on 31 January to 

consider a State Department draft encompassing the understanding already 

reached. In addition to the Committee members, the following were in attendance: the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Stephen Early, and Secretary Johnson’s 

assistant, Major General James H. Burns; Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the NSC, and his assistant, Mr. James S. Lay; Dr. Henry Smyth, 

the scientist member of the AEC; and Mr. Robert LeBaron, Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee to the AEC. The discussion was prolonged and intense, 

despite the preliminary agreement on the general outlines of a compromise. 

The State Department draft contained the following recommendations: 

(a) That the President direct the Atomic Energy Commission to roceed to 

determine the technical feasibilit of a thermonuclear weapon, the seaPe and rate 

of effort to be determined ‘oint Yy by the Atomic Energy Commission and the 

Department of Defense; an d! that the necessary ordnance developments and carrier program be undertaken concurrently; 

(b) That the President defer decision pendin 

(c) as to whether thermonuclear weapons shou Bd be produced beyond the numthe reexamination referred to in 

ber required for a test of feasibility; 

(c) That the President direct the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense 

to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in eace and war and of the effect 

of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the ligK t of the robable fission bomb 

capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability oft Re Soviet Union. 

(d) That the President indicate publicly the intention of this Government to 

continue work to determine the feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon, and that 

no further official information on it be made public without the approval of the 

l’resident.Ss 

298 
thermonuclear explosion. be undertaken at this time. The second, however, 

which reflected Mr. Lilienthal’s views, introduced a new basis for postponing a 

decision on production. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had urged that the decision be 

based entirely on a demonstration of feasibility, and they had indicated in their 

memorandum of 13 January that possession of thermonuclear weapons was 

desirable on strategic grounds. Secretary Johnson shared their views; he proposed that the second recommendation be deleted. Eventually the other two 

Committee members agreed, although Mr. Lilienthal did so with the utmost 

reluctance; he apparently concluded that events had now moved so far that a formal dissent on his part was useless. 

Immediately after finishing their own meeting, the Special Committee members adjourned to the White House to present their report. When they did so, Mr. 

Lilienthal was given an opportunity to make another plea for delay in the decision. President Truman replied that the pressure of public discussion made it 

impossible to put off a decision while the matter was studied at length in the 

Executive Branch.Sh 

The President’s decision was made public the sameday. His brief announcement, 

which gave no hint of the intensive debate that had preceded it, read asfollows: 

It is part of my responsibilit as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces to 

see to it that our country is ab7e to defend itself against any possible aggressor. 

Accordingly, I have directed the Atomic Energy Commission to continue its work 

on all forms of atomic wea ons, including the so-called hydrogen or superbomb. 

Like all other work in the Pield of atomic weapons, it is being and will be carried 

forward on a basisconsistent with the overall objectives of our program for peace 

and security. 

This we shall continue to do until a satisfactory plan for international control 

of atomic energy is achieved. We shall also continue to examine all those factors 

that affect our program for peace and this country’s security.s7 

Simultaneously the President moved to carry out the remainder of the recommendations of the Special Committee. He directed Secretaries Acheson and Johnson to reexamine US national objectives and strategic plans in the light of estimated Soviet capabilities, present and future, to produce fission and fusion 

weapons.sx The result of this reexamination was NSC 68, completed in April 

1950, which cast doubt upon the adequacy of available US military means in relation to commitments and, by implication, challenged the wisdom of the budgetary policies pursued by President Truman for the several years preceding. A 

decision on NSC 68 hung in the balance in June 1950, when the outbreak of the 

Korean War completely altered the assumptions underlying the administration’s 

policies and triggered the expansion of US military forces long considered essential by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.j4 

299 

Actual Military Strength 

30 June 1947-31 December 1949' 

Morint Air 

Total AYrn~/ Nury Corps Force 

30 Jun 47’ 1,565,858 683,837 484,025 92,222 305,774 

31 Dee 472 1,383,125 559,226 401,989 83,242 338,668 

30 Jun 482 1‘424,027 552,239 401,787 83,609 386,392 

31 Dee 48” 1,603,332 677,199 429,031 86,128 410,974 

30 Jun 49” 1,591,232 658,694 430,580 84,471 417,487 

31 Dee 494 1,525,068 638,824 395,997 79,291 410,956 

1. Excludes officer candidates and reserves on active duty in connection with reserve affairs.

2. First Report of the Secretary of Defensr, 1948, p. 141. 

3. S~conll k~port of the Sccwtnr~y (f Dcf~rzse. FY 7949, pp. 318-320. 

4. Semiannual Report of thy Sccwfary of D+wse, 2 /an--30 /un 50, pp. 206-207. 

Appendix II 

Department of Defense, New Obligational 

Authority for Military Purposes, F'Y 1948-1951 

(billions of dollars) 

2948’ 1949’ 7950’ 1957’ 

OSD - .007 .Oll .Oll 

Army 4.562 4.217 4.420 4.018 

Navy 3.935 4.924 4.183 3.881 

Air Force 1.260 4.793 5.309 4.433 

Total 9.757 13.941 13.923 12.343 

1. First Rqmrt of t/w Sccwtary of D+wsc, 1948, p. 36. 

2. Second Report of the Secretar.y of Defense, FY 1949, p. 93. 

3. Hearings, Department of Defmsc~ Appropriations for 1952, Defense Subcom of 1-L. Corn on Appropriations, 81st Gong, 2d sess, pp. 106,2Y3,1313,1769. 

4. Ibid., pp. 106,196, 1216, 1726. These figures are the I’residcnt’s requests. Final congressional action 

on Defense appropriations for M 1951 was not completed during the period covered by this volume. 

301 

Appendix III 

Principal Civilian and Militarv J Officers 

President and Commander in Chief 

Harry S Truman 

Department of State 

Secretary of State 

George C. Marshall 

Dean G. Acheson 

Department of Defense 

Scwctary of Dcfensc 

James Forrestal 

Louis A. Johnson 

Under Secretary of Defcnsc 

Stephen T. Early 

Deputy Secwfary of Defense 

Stephen T. Early 

Secretary of the Arrmy 

Kenneth C. Royal1 

Gordon Gray 

Secretary of the Navy 

John L. Sullivan 

Francis P. Mathews 

Secretary of the Air Force 

W. Stuart Symington 

joint Chiefs of Staff 

Chief of Staff to the Commanderin Chkf 

Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy 

SpecialAdviser to the Presidentand Secretary of Dcfcmc 

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower 

12 Apr 45-20 Jan 53 

21 Jan 47-20 Jan 49 

21 Jan 49-20 Jan 53 

17 Sep 47-27 Mar 49 

28 Mar 49-19 Sep 50 

02 May 49-09 Aug 49 

10Aug 49-30 Sep 50 

17 Sep 47-27 Apr 49 

20 Jun 49-11 Apr 50 

18Sep47-24May49 

25 May 49-30 Jul51 

18 Sep 47-24 Apr 50 

20 Jul42-21 Mar 49 

11Feb 49-14 Aug 49 

303 
Chief of Staff, US Amy 

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower 

General Omar N. Bradley 

General J. Lawton Collins 

Chief of Naval Operations 

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz 

Admiral Louis Denfeld 

Admiral Forrest I’. Sherman 

Chkf of Staff, US Air Force 

General Carl Spaatz 

General Hoyt S. Vandenberg 

Commander in Chief, Alaska 

Major General Howard A. Craig, USAF 

Lieutenant General Nathan F. Twining, USAF 

Cornrrzandev in Chief, Atlantic 

Admiral William H. I’. Blandy, USN 

Cornrnander in Chkf, Caribbean 

Lieutenant General Willis D. Crittenberger, USA 

Lieutenant General Mathew B. Ridgway, USA 

Lieutenant General Horace L. McBride, USA 

Cowrzarrder in Chief, Eurque 

General Lucius D. Clay, USA 

General Thomas T. IHandy, USA 

Commander in Chief, Far East 

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, USA 

Cornrnandcr in Chief, Pacific 

Admiral John H. Towers, USN 

Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, USN 

Admiral Dewitt C. Ramsey, USN 

Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN 

Commander in Ckicf, Stratqic Air Cornrmnd 

General George C. Kenney, USAF 

General Curtis E. LcMay, USAF 

Comnrandru in Chkf, US NazIal Forcrs, 

Easfrrn Atlantic and Mcditevvarwan 

Admiral Robert L. Conolly, USN 

304 

19 Nov 45-07 Feb 48 

07 Feb 48-15 Aug 49 

16 Aug 49-14 Aug 53 

15 Dee 45-15 Dee 47 

15 Dee 47-02 Nov 49 

02 Nov 49-22 Jul51 

01 Mar 46-30 Apr 48 

30 Apr 48-30 Jun 53 

01 Jan 47-17 Ott 47 

17 Ott 47-01 Jul50 

01 Dee 47-01 Feb 50 

01 Nov 47-28 Jun 48 

28 Jun 48-01 Ott 49 

01 Ott 49-01 Apr 52 

15 Mar 47-23 Aug 49 

23 Aug 49-01 Aug 52 

01 Jan 47-11 Apr 51 

01 Jan 47-28 Feb 47 

28 Feb 47-12 Jan 48 

12 Jan 48-30 Apr 49 

30 Apr 49-l 0 Jul53 

14 Dee 46-19 Ott 48 

19 Ott 48-01 Ju157 

23 Sep 46-01 Nov 50 
Appendix IV 

List of Abbreviations 

AEC 

AMAG 

BCS 

BOB 

BOTRA 

CEP 

CIA 

CINCFE 

CINCLANT 

CINCNELM 

CINCI’AC 

CINCSAC 

CNO 

COMINCH 

COMINFORM 

COMNAVWESI’AC 

CSA 

ECA 

ERP 

FACC 

FASC 

FEC 

FY 

GAC 

JCS 

JIG 

JLPC 

and Acronyms 

Atomic Energy Commission 

American Mission for Aid to Greece 

British Chiefs of Staff 

Bureau of the Budget 

Board of Trustees for Rehabilitation Affairs (UN) 

Circular error probability 

Central Intelligence Agency 

Commander in Chief, Far East 

Commander in Chief, Atlantic 

Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic 

and Mediterranean 

Commander in Chief, Pacific 

Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command 

Chief of Naval Operations 

Commander in Chief 

Information Bureau of the Workers and Communist 

Parties 

Commander, Naval Forces Western Pacific 

Chief of Staff, Army 

Economic Cooperation Administration 

European Recovery Program 

Foreign Assistance Coordinating Committee 

Foreign Assistance Steering Committee 

Far East Commission 

Fiscal Year 

General Advisory Committee 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Joint Intelligence Committee 

Joint Logistics Plans Committee 

305 
JSSC 

JUSMAG 

JUSMAPG 

LOCS 

NME 

NSC 

RDB 

ROTC 

SANACC 

SCAl’ 

SWNCC 

UMT 

UN 

UNRRA 

USAGG 

WEU 

WSEG 

306 

Joint Strategic Survey Committee 

Joint United States Military Advisory Group 

Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group in 

Greece 

Lines of Communication 

National Military Establishment 

National Security Council 

Research and Development Board 

Reserve Officer Training Corps 

State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee 

Supreme Commander Allied Powers 

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee 

Univeral Military Training 

United Nations 

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 

US Army Group, Greece 

Western European Union 

Weapons Systems Evaluation Group 
Notes 

Chapter 1. A New Era Begins 

1. 1’1, 253, 80th Congress. 

2. These developments are more fully treated in (U) JCS Hist Div, Major Clzar~gc~:: i/l the Orp~~~n,lizu­

~iUJl uf hi /oint Chiefs uj stujj, 1942-l 969, pp. I-l 8. 

3. Senate Rpt No. 23Y, 21 Apr 47; t-louse Rpt No. 961, 16 Jul 47, both 80th Cong, 1st Sess. 

4. I’L 253, set 211. 

5. I’L 2.53&I see 202. 

6 (C) Memo, ExccSecy to NSC, “Interim Terms of Reference for SANACC,” 3 Jun 49, Encl to (C) 

JCS 1224/s, 6 Jun 49, CCS 334 SANACC (12-19-14) (1) set 5. 

7. Dept of State H~rllctirl, 4 Mar 45, p. 361. 

8. Dean Acheson, I’r~sc~rrf nt 1hr Crtwtim, My Yt~nrs irk t/11, 9ntc Dqmrtmevrt (19hY), p. 1 SO. Stalin’s 

speech is described by Acheson, lot. cit., and by Kcnnnn in msg to &State, 12 Feb 46, in Dept of 

State, Fovr?<qr/ R&tiows of tlrc U~zjkd Slutcjs,ZY4h, vol. VI, Enskrn Europe; Th Sozd him (I 9691, pp. 

694496. The text is in Desp, Moscow 2442 to State, 12 Feb 46, State Dept files. 

9. (U) Msg, Moscow 511 to State, 22 Feb 46, ForQ?~ Rrhhws, 1946, vol. VI, pp. 6Yh-709. 

10. Acheson, Prcsc~rlt ut tlrcl Cwuborr, p. 151. Walter Millis, 7% Fovrcstnl Dinries (1951), p. 140. George 

E Kennan, Mwmirs, 7925~1950 (1967), p. 294. 

Il. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., Tlzc Prizmk I)Rpws of Scvmtor I/l?nr~ch~r~ (19521, pp. 338-339. 

12. Public Puyers of t/w Presidetrts, Hurry S Trwmm, 1947, (1963), pp. 176-179. 

13. Because the Marshall Plan dealt exclusively with economic aid, the Joint Chiefs of Staff played 

no role in its preparation or implementation. For an account of these matters, see Herbert Feis, From 

Trust to error: Tk Onsd of Ike Cold Wnr, 1945P7950 (1970), pp. 227-264, and Harry B. Price, T/I? MurS/?Ul/ IJiull find Its Mmin~ (1955). 

14. Walter Millis, Tk Forrcstal Diark, p. 373. First Rqlort of tlic Srcrchary of Drlfense, 1948, p. 741. 

15. Robert R. Palmer, Bell S. Wiley and William Ii. Keast, The Procurtvmt and Training of Gmrrnd 

Combat Troop (19481, p, 492. Alfred Goldberg, ed., A History of he Unitd Shtes Air Force, 7907-79.57 

(lY57), pp. 105, 112. Hearings, Naay Dqmrtmcrlt Apprqhtions for 1947, Navy Subcom of H. Corn on 

Appropriations, 79th Gong, 2d sess, p. 39. 

16. Atlr?~rul Rqwt of the Secwtury of the Amy, 1948, pp. 19, 35, 52, 65, 66. Goldberg, History of t/w 

Unit& States Air Force, pp. 105, 112. Amuul Rrport of the Srcrrtury of thr Air FWCP, 7948, pp. 4, 131. “Status of Fleet Marine Force Ground as of 31 July 1947,” Hist Br, HQ USMC. M7znl Vessels Rqistcr, 1 July 

1947, NavShips Pub No. 18-l-8. 

17. Budget of the United States Government for the Fiscal Year Ending 30 June 1949, pp. 633-634. 

“Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1948,” 8 Jan 47, text in Public Pnpcrs, Trutflrlrr, 

1947, p. 64. First Rqmrt of t/w Sccwtnry of Dcfensr, 1948, p. 36. 

18. Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to 

the Secretary of War, in T/w Wur Rqmrts of Gerwul of the Army GwrgtZ C. Marsh/l, Gwcrnl of UfcAmy f-1. 

H. Arm&i, F/d Adrtlird Errrcst I. King (1947), p. 292. NY Times, 24 Ott 45, p. 3 (text of Truman statement). 

C. Joseph Bernard0 and Eugene H. Bacon, Amrricur~ Militaq Policy Sincr 1775 (1955), pp. 446-448. 

19. A Proprrr fi)r Natiord Security, rirpor~ of hc Presidr~~t’s Corn~rrissior~ OH U~1i7x~sa/ Truirrir~g (lY47). 

20. Bernardo and Bacon, Atncvicnrr Militnry Policy, p. 450. 

21. (U) Memo, CofS to CINC of the Army and Navy to Secy, JCS, 4 Jan 47, Encl to JCS 1737, 6 Jan 

47; (U) Ltr, I’rcs to Dr. Compton, 17 Jan 47 (derived from JCS 1737/l as amended by JCS 1737/2); CCS 

320.2 (5-l -45) see 1. 

22. (0 JIS 80/26, Y Jul46, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) set 8. 

Chapter 2. Countering Soviet Ex ansion in the Middle East 

and Eastern Me dglterranean 

1. IkD/I’c Papers, Trutnun, 7 947, p. 179. 

2. (U) Dept of State Memo, “Chronological Summary of Correspondence and Exchanges of Views 

Leading up to the Discussions with the British on the Middle East, ,” n.d., Dept of State, Frwipl 

Rdntions of ~11~~Ufritrd Sluks, 1947, vol. V, Tlrc Nmr Eust ~7r1d Africa (1971), pp. 488-496. 

307 
4. Secretary Forrestal had actually begun this practice on 30 October 1947 with regard to NSC 1. 

See below, p. 35. 

5. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Document Resulting from Conversations with the British in Regard 

to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East,” 1Y Nov 47 (derived from JCS 181Y), CCS 381 

EMMEA (11-19-47) set 1. 

8. Forcip R&tiorrs, 1947, vol. V, pp. 202, 21 Y-224; 226-231. 

9. (U) Memo. SecState to I’res. 16 lul 47, Fowiun Rrlutiorrs, 7947, vol. V, ~13. 237-238 

10.’ (U) Meml prepared in D&t of State, n.d:, no originator but drait&i by SccState, ForcQ? /<datiorls, 1947, vol. V, pp. 238-242. Original sent to ADM Leahy, fn 2, p. 242. The author has been unable 

to find any evidence of JCS action on the matter in JCS files. 

11, (U) Note, British Charge d’Affaires to SccState, 30 Jul47, Forci<yn Rdaths, 1947, vol. V, p. 268. 

12. (U) JCS 1801 /l, 30 Aug 47, CCS 092 (X-22-46) see 5. 

13. (U) Msgs, State 3304 and 3305 to London, 1 Aug 47; London 4214 and 4320 to State, 3 Aug 47, 

9 Aug 47; Forei<yrr Rrlations, 1947, vol. V, pp. 273-275, 277-278, 289-290. 

14. (U) Note, UK Foreign Secy to SecState, n.d. but delivered 20 Aug 47, Fowip Relations, 2947, 

vol. V, pp. 301-302. (U) Ltr, ActgSccState to SecWar, 27 Aug 47, App A to JCS 1801, 28 Aug 47, CCS 

092 (8-22-46) set 5. 

15. (TS) CCS Y72,2Y Aug 47, same file. 

16. (TS) CCS 972/l, 3 Sep 47, same file. 

17. (U) Memo, JCS to Sets War and Navy, “Military Implications of Withdrawal of British Troops 

from Greece and Italy,” 2 Sep 47 (derived from JCS 1801/ I ), same file. (U) Ltr, Sets War and Navy to 

ActgSecState, 5 Sep 47, Foreign Rclntims, 1947, vol. V, pp. 327-329. 

18. (U) Msgs, State 3883 to London, 8 Sep 47; London 4892 to State, 10 Sep 47; London 4952 to 

State, 12 Sep 47; State 3988 to London, 13 Sep 47; in Foreign Rrlntiom, 1947, vol. V, pp. 330-332, 

334-335, 337. The full-dress review of US-UK Middle East policies took place in Washington between 

16 and 30 October 1947 and were known as the Pentagon Talks. No common US-UK understanding 

was reached. The US position presented during the talks has been described on p. 15 above. See Fortip Rrlutiorrs, 1947, vol. V, pp. 485-626. 

19. (U) Memo by BG C.V.R. Schuyler, “Meeting with State Department Representatives to Discuss 

the Greek Situation,” 17 Sep 47, Foreign Rdntions, 1947, vol. V, pp. 344-346. Dept of State, First Rqwt 

to Congress orI Assistom~ to Greece ad Turkey, pp. 13-14. 

20. (U) Memo by BC C.V.R. Schuyler, 17 Sep 47, Fowip Rrlutions, 1947, vol. V, pp. 344-346; (TS-GI’ 

3) Rpt, MG S. J. Chamberlin to CSA, “The Creek Situation,” 20 Ott 47, CCS 092 (a-2246) BI’ 1. 

21. (U) Memo, Exe&xv to NSC, “Extension of Operational Advice to the Greek Armed Forces,” 

30 Ott 47, Forcip Rrlntiorrs,‘J947, vol. V, pp. 391-395. I 

22. (U) Memo, ExccSecy to NSC, 4 Nov 47, quoted in ibid., pp. 393, fn 4, (TS) Ltr, SecStatc to 

SecDef, 7 Nov 47; (TS) Me&, SpecAsst to SecDei to DJS, 10 No; ‘47, CCS 092 (s-22-46) set 9. The 

substance of the SecState letter is published in Forcip Rclstions, 7947, vol. V, p. 393, fn 4. 

23. (TS) I’M-604 to CAP7 T. B. Neblett, COL W. I? Greenfield, LTC S. E. Crawford, 29 Ott 47, same 

file, set 8. 

24. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 2 Dee 47, “l’roposed Joint U.S. Military Advisory and Planning 

Group in Greece,” 2 Dee 47 (derived from JCS 1798/3) same file, set 9; (U) Directive, Sets A, AF, N, 

“Directive Governing the Establishment and Operation of theJoint U.S. Military and Advisory Group 

in Greece,” 31 Dee 47, Encl to JCS 1798/5, 7 Jan 48, same file, set 10. 

25. Dept of State, Frwcip Rclutions of tlw Llnitd Stntm, 7 948, vol. IV, Eastwrl Europe; Thr Sovid Uniorr 

(1974), pp. 36-37. 

26. (U) Msgs, State CAMA 379 to Athens, 29 Ott 47; State GAMA 718 to Athens, 30 Dee 47; Forri<yri Rrlatiorx, 7947, vol. V, pp. 390, 478. 

27. PL 472, 3 Apr 48 and 1’1. 7Y3, 2X Jun 48; 80th Gong, 2d sess. 

28. (U) NSC 5, 6 Jan 48, Forhp Rdutions, 1948, vol. IV, pp. 2-7. 

29. (U) JCS 1798/l, 15 Ott 47, CCS 092 (s-22-46) set 8. 

30. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Greecrb,” 6 Jan 48 

(derived from JCS 1826/l), CCS 092 Greece (12-30-47) see 1 (Foreign Rclntions, 2948, vol. IV, pp. 8-Y). 

308 
Respect to Greece” (Policy Planning Staff Redraft, January 10, 1948); Memo, Dir, Policy Planning Staff, 

13 Ian 48; NSC Action No. 22, 13 Jan 48; Fonji,~~ Rrlations, 7948, vol. IV, pp. 24-26, 27-28. 

33. (TS) NSC 5/l, 2 Feb 48, Encl to JCS ld26/3, CCS 092 Greece (12:?037) set l. 

34. (U) Memo, [CS to SecDef, “The Position of the United States with Resuect to Greece,” I1 Feb I 

48 (derived from JdS 1826/4), same file. 

35. NSC 5/2, 12 Feb 48, !%reig~ Relations, 1948, vol. rV, pp. 46-51. 

36. (TS) Memo, ExccSecy NSC to JCS, 24 Feb 48, Encl to JCS 1826/7, CCS 092 Greece (12-30-117) 

set 2. 

37. President Truman, acting on the advice of the JCS, had requested Congress to reinstitute Sclective Service on 17 March. This was in response to the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, which was 

doubtlessly a major aspect of the deterioration of the world situation the JCS were now referring to. 

See Ch. 4 for a discussion of these events, and Ch. 6 for the resumption of Selective Service. 

38. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Position of the United States with Respect to Greece,” 14 Apr 48; 

(TS) Memo, SecDef to NSC, same subj, 19 Apr 48 (both derived from JCS 1826/s); same file. 

39. (TS) NSC 5/3, 25 May 48, same file. (Printed in forc?,yrr Rck~ticms, 2948, vol. IV, pp. 93-95, with 

omission of the CIA comments). 

40. (U) JUSMAI’C Op Rpt 6,25 Mar 48, CCS 092 (s-22-46) BP 2. 

4 I. (U) Ltr, Dir, JUSMAI’C to Dir, P&O USA as Exec Agent for JCS, 31 Mar 48, same file, set 11. 

42. (U) JUSMAPG Op Rpts 10-15, same file. 

43. (U) NSC 5/3, 25 May 48, Foreicyrr Rdntiorrs, 7948, vol. IV, pp. 93-95. 

44. (TS) NSC 5/4,3 Jun 48; (TS) Memo, ExecSecy for NSC, same subj, 21 Jun 48; same file. 

45. (U) JUSMAI’G Rpts Lo JCS: lY,24 Jun 48, CCS 092 (S-22-46) BP 2; 28,27 Aug 48; 35,lS Ott 48; 

36,22 Ott 48; 37,2Y Ott 48; same file, BP 3. 

46. (U) Memo, SecState to ActgSecState, 20 Ott 48, Forc&f liclatiotls, 2948, vol. IV, pp. 162-165. 

47. (U) Memo, ActgSecState to SecDef, 22 Ott 48; (U) Memo, SecDef to ActgSecState, 23 Ott 48; 

(U) Msg, State 1321 to Athens, 31 Oct48; FOYL’~~~IIRclntiorzs 1948, vol. IV, pp. 167-168, 171-172, 178-279. 

48. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy SANACC to Secy, JCS, SANACC 358/7, 15 Ott 48, Att to (TS) JCS 

17Y8/13,15 Ott 48, CCS 092 (B-22-46) set 14. 

49. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Decision on Long-Range U.S. Military Interests in Greece and 

Turkey,” 24 Nov 48 (derived from JCS 1798/14), same file, set 15. 

50. (U) Msg, AMAG 1652 to State, 22 Nov 48, Fort@ Rrhtions, 1948, vol. IV, pp. 187-191. (S) Msg, 

Dept of Army to USACG, WAR 80149,24 Nov 48, CCS OY2 Greece (12-30-47) set 15. 

51. (S) Ltr, Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey to SecDef, IO Dee 48; (S) Memo, OSD (W. J. 

McNeil) to JCS, 14 Dee 48 (App and Encl to JCS 1704/13,16 Dee 48); same file. 

52. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Greek-Turkish Aid for 1950,” 20 Dee 48 (derived from JCS 1704/14) 

same file, set 16. 

53. (U) FACC D-3/1, 7 Feb 49, App B to JCS 1868/57, Y Feb 49, same file, set 18. (U) Memo, JCS to 

SecDef, “Basic Statement of United States Policy Concerning the Foreign Military Assistance l’rogram,” 21 Fcb 49 (derived from JCS 1868/4Y), same file, set 19. See Ch. 12 for a full account of the 

comprehensive military aid program for FY 1950. 

54. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Foreign Military Aid Program,” 14 Mar 49 (derived from JCS 

1868/62), CCS 092 (S-22-46) set 21. 

55. (U) Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef for MilAsst to DJS, et al., 27 Apr 49, Encl to JCS 1868/73, 29 

Apr 4Y, same file, XC 24. 

56. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Reprogramming the FY lY50 Foreign Military Assistance Program,” 23 Sep 49 (derived from JCS 1868/111), CCS 092 (8-2246) set 2Y. 

57. (U) Rpt on Greece by C.I.G.S., n.d., App to Encl B to JCS 1704/19, 3 May 4Y, same file, set 24. 

58. (U) SM-859-49 to Rtps of UK COS, 11 Mav 49 (derived from \CS 1704/1Y), same file, set 25. 

60. (TS) NSC I, 15 Ott 47, Encl to JCS 1808, 16 Ott 47, CCS OYi italy (10-2-47) set I, 

6 I. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy,” 30 Ott 47 

(derived from JCS l808/2), same file. 

62. (TS) NSC l/l, 14 Nov 47, Encl to JCS 1808/4, 19 Nov 47, same file. (TS) NSC Action No. 9, 14 

Nov 47. The Council’s agreement to investigate the question of military equipment is documented in 

(TS) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 9 Feb 48, Encl to JCS 553/14,13 Feb 48, CCS 400 Italy (Y-3033) set 12. 

63. (S) Msg, US Mil Att Rome MAR 345 to SecDef, 7 Dee 47, Ann B to App to JCS 553/14; (TS) 

Msg, Rome 3957 to State, 7 Dee 47, Ann A to App to JCS 553/14; CCS 400 Italy (Y-30-43) set 12. 
Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 13 Feb 48, Encl to JCS 553/17; same file. 

65. (TS) NSC l/2,10 Feb 48, Encl to JCS 1808/9,11 Feb 48, CCS 092 Italy (10-247) XC 1. 

66. (U) Mono, JCS to SecDef, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy,” IY Feb 48 

(derived from JCS 1808/1(l), same file, set 2. On the same day, the JCS expressed these same views 

concerning the delivery date of military equipment to Italy and the need for establishing priorities 

among deliveries to Greece, Turkey and Italy in a memorandum to the SecDef giving views on 

SANACC 360/l; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Provision of U.S. Equipment to the Italian Armed 

Forces,” 19 Feb 48 (derived from JCS 553/l 8), CCS 400 Italy (9-3043) set 12. 

67. (TS) Ltr, USecState to SecDef, 17 Feb 48, same file. 

68. (TS) NSC l/3, 8 Mar 48, Encl to JCS 1808/12, 8 Mar 48, CCS 092 Italy (10-Z-47) set 2. 

69. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy in the Light 

of the Possibility of Communist Participation in the Italian Government by Legal Means,” 10 Mar 48 

(derived from JCS 1808/14), same file. Selective Service was reinstituted on 24 June 1948. See Ch. 6. 

70. (TS) JCS 1808/17, 16 Mar 48; (TS) JCS 1808/15, 15 Mar 48; (TS) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 15 

Mar 48, Encl to JCS 1808/18, 16 Mar 48; same file. 

71, These events are related in Chs. 11 and 12. 

72. (U) SWNCC 3581 I, approved by SWNCC 12 May 47; (U) Msg, State 264 to Ankara, 15 May 47; 

Forcip Rclatiorrs, 1947, vol. V, pp. 153-156, 172-173. 

73. Ibid., pp. 173,193-194. 

74. (U) Rept of the United States Ambassador Concerning Assistance to Turkey, 15 Jul 47, Foreip 

Rclntions, 2947, vol. V, pp. 233~-236. 

75. (U) SWNCC 358/2, approved by SWNCC 23 Jul 47; (U) Msg, State 514 to Ankara, 3 Sep 47; 

Foreip R~latio77s, 7947, vol. V, pp. 2555258, 325-326. 

76. (U) SM-9479 to Coordinator, Armed Forces Groups, COMAT, 16 Jan 48 (derived from JCS 

1704/5), CCS 092 (8-2246) set 9. 

77. (U) Memo, Coordinator, Armed Forces Groups, American Mission for Aid to Turkey to JCS, 19 

Feb 48, Encl to JCS 1704/7, same file, set 10. 

78. (U) SM-11000 to Coordinator, Armed Forces Groups, American Mission for Aid to Turkey, 30 

Sep 48 (derived from JCS 1704/8), same file, set 14. 

79. CC) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 28 Jul 48, Encl to JCS 1876/3, 29 Jul 48; (TSCI’ 3) Memo, JCS to 

SecDef, “Establishment of a Military Communications Control Center in Turkey,” 7 Ott 48 (derived 

from JCS 1876/4 ); (C) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 9 Ott 48, Encl to JCS 1876/6,12 Ott 48; (C) Menlo, JCS to 

SecDef, “Report of On-Site Survey Committee ,” 18 Apr 49 (derived from JCS 1876/s); (IJ) Menlo, 

JCEC to Secy, JCS, 21 Apr 49; CCS 311 Turkey (12-3-47) set 1. 

80. 1X472,3 Apr 48, and I’L 793,28 Jun 48,8&h Gong. 

81. See above, p. 29. 

82. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Decision on Long-Range U.S. Military Interests in Greece and 

Turkey,” 24 Nov 48 (derived from JCS 1798/14), CCS 092 (g-22-46) set 15. 

83. (S) Ltr, Co-ordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey to SecDef, 10 Dee 48, App to JCS 1704/13, 

same file. The request for $100 million for Turkey was to be submitted to the Hureau of the Budget 

(BOB) as part of a single request of $400 million for Greece and Turkey. See above, p. 31. 

84. (S) Memo, OSD (W.J. McNeil) to JCS, 14 Dee 48, Encl to JCS 1704/13, 76 Dee 48, same file; (U) 

JCS 1704/14, 20 Dee 48; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Greek-Turkish Aid for 1950,” 20 Dee 48 (derived 

from JCS 1704/14), same file, set 16. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 23 Dee 48, cited in Fowicyn Rc~latio~rs, 

7948, vol. IV, p. 216, fn 1. 

85. Above, p. 31. 

86. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Reprogramming the FY 1950 Foreign Military Assistance Program,” 23 Sep 49 (derived from JCS 1868/111), CCS 092 (s-22116) set 29. 

87. Dept of State, Fovrigr~ Relutions of t/w U~~itcd Stnks, 7947, vol. VII, T/ZP Near Elzst ~nll Africa 

(lYhY), fn 20, p. 546. Forricq~l Rdntions, 7947, vol. V, Editorial Note, p. Y16. 

88. (U) FACCD-3/l, 7 Feb 49, App B to JCS 1868/57; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Basic Statement 

of United States Policy Concerning the Foreign Military Assistance Program,” 21 Feb 49 (derived 

from JCS 1868/5Y), CCS 092 (8-22-46) set 19. 

8Y. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Programs for Foreign Military Assistance,” 14 Mar 49 (derived 

from [CS 1868/62), same file, set 21. 

310 
opments in Palestine during 1947-1949 has been drawn from the following unclassified works. John 

C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs, 1947-1948 (1949), pp. 305-332; Thr United Status itI 

World Affairs, 7948-7949 (lY49), pp. 375-400; and Dt@~se (f the Middle East (1958), pp. 11-99. Jacob C. 

Hurewitz, Thc~ Strugglcf~~r Palestine (1950); Diplomacy in thr Near and Middle East, vol. II, 1974-7956, pp. 

13-17, 25-26, 106-111, 218-226, 234-235, 281-295, 308-311; and Middle East Politics: Thr Militar!/ 

Dirrrension (1969), pp. 357.-379. George Lenczowski, T/x Middle East in World Affairs (1962), pp. 

372438. Jacob Robinson, Palestine rind thr United Nations (1947). Stebbins, The United States in World 

Affairs, 7949, pp. 39&413. 

2. The “areas of great strategic importance” were not identified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

3. (U) Memo, JCS to SccDef, “The Problem of Palestine,” 10 Ott 47 (derived from JCS 1684/3), 

CCS 092 Palestine (5-346) set 3. 

4. (U,) Memo, Dir NEA to SecState, 22 Sep 47, Forci@ Rt~lations, 7947, vol. V, pp. 1153-1158. 

5. Harry S Truman, Yours of Trial and Hop (1956), pp. 156-157. 

6. Ibid., p. 155. 

7. Depi of State Bulletirl, 19 Ott 47, pp. 761-762. 

8. Millis, The Forrcstal Diaries, pp. 359-360. 

9. (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, 7 Feb 48, Encl to JCS 1684/s, 9 Feb 48; (TS) JCS 1684/9,17 Feb 49, and 

Dee On 26 Feb 49, CCS 092 Palestine (5-346) set 3. 

10. Ycwrbook of the United Nations, 194748 (1949), p. 256. 

11, Dept of State Bulletin, 7 Mar 48, pp. 2944297. United Natiows Ycarhook, 294748, pp. 404407. 

12. Dept of State Bulletirl, 28 Mar 48, pp. 402-408. United Nations &a&ok, 194748, pp. 407411. 

13. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 2 Apr 48, Encl B to JCS 1684/13,4 Apr 48, same file, set 4. 

14. (TS) Draft entry for Mr. Forrestal’s Diary for 4 Apr 48, transcript of Forrestal Diary, JCS Hist Div. 

15. (U) Memo, JCS to I’res, “Provision of US Armed Forces in Palestine,” 4 Apr 48 (derived from 

JCS 1684/13), same file. 

16. Ur/itcd Nations tiarhook, 194748, pp. 412-416. 

17. Truman, Years of Trial and Hop, p. 164. 

18. UnitcJd Nations Yeurbook, 194748, pp. 279-281,429431. 

19. Ibid., pp. 435441. 

20. Dept of State BulWz, 3 Ott 48, pp. 436440. 

21. Yearbook of the United Nations, 194849 (1950), pp. 172-176. 

22. (TS) Msg, USUN 817 to State, 25 Jun 48, App B to JCS 1898, 29 Jun 48, CCS OY2 Palestine 

(S-346), set 5. 

23. (TS) Draft Msg, SecState to USUN, App A to Encl B to JCS 1898,29 Jun 48, same file. 

24. (TS) Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef to JCS, 28 Jun 48, Encl B to JCS 1898, 29 Jun 48, same file. (TS) 

Memo, JCS to SecDef, “United Nations Guards for a Demilitarized Jerusalem,” 6, 7 or 8 Jul 48 

(derived from JCS 1898). This memo, approved by the JCS on 6 JuI48 by the Dee On JCS 1898, cannot 

be located in JCS files. Evidence that it was received by the SecDef no later than 8 Jul is contained in 

the Encl to JCS 1898/2, which is a memo from SecDef to SecState, dated 8 Jul48. It quotes extensively 

from the JCS memo approved on 6 Jul. 

25. (U) Ltr, USecState to SecDef, 20 Jul48, App to JCS 1898/2,26 Jul48, same file, set 6. 

26. (TS) Ltr, ActgSecState to SecDef, 18 Ott 48, App to JCS 1684/21,19 Ott 48, same file, set 7. 

27. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Provision of a Military Police Force for Jerusalem,” 29 Ott 48 

(derived from JCS 1684/22 as amended by JCS 1684/23 and /24), same file. 

28. (TS) NSC 27/3,16 Nov 48, Encl to JCS 1684/26,19 Nov 48; (TS) N/H JCS 1684/26,29 Nov 48, 

same file. 

29. (U) Memo, CSAF to JCS, 16 Jul48, Encl to JCS 1684/16, same date, same file, set 5. 

30. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “US Military Point of View for the Eventuality of United Nations 

Decision to Introduce Military Forces into Palestine,” 19 Aug 48 (derived from JCS 1684/17) same file, 

set 6. The blockade of Berlin is the subject of Ch. 4. 

31. (TS) NSC 27,23 Aug 48; (TS) NSC 27/l, 3 Sep 48; same file. 

32. (U) Msg, Jerusalem 589 to State, 10 Dee 47; Airgram, Jerusalem A-274 to State, 31 Dee 47; Forc&n Relations, 1947, vol. V, pp. 1307-1309, 1322-1328. 

33. (IJ) Memo, CNO to JCS, 25 Apr 48, Encl to JCS 1877, same date, CCS 092 Palestine (5-346) set 4. 

34. (U) Memo, JCS lo SecDef, “Marine Guards for the American Consulate in Jerusalem and Tel 

Aviv,” 13 May 48 (derived from JCS 1877/l), same file. 

311 
; () , , 

and Tel Aviv,” 7 Jul 48 (derived from JCS 1877/5); (TS) Ltr, SecDef to USecState, 8 Jul 48; (U) Memo, 

SpecAsst to SecDef to SecNav, 15 Jul48, Encl to JCS 1877/h, 16 Jul48; CCS 092 Palestine (5-3-46) SK 

5. (TS) Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef to SecNav, 4 Ott 48, Encl to JCS 1877/7, 5 Ott 48, same file, set 7. 

36. (U) Memo, CSAF to JCS, 7 Mar 49, Encl to JCS 1684/27, 8 Mar 49, same file. 

37. (TS) Memo, JCS to Secl>ef, “United States Strategic Interests in Israel,” Y May 49 (derived from 

JCS 1684/28), same file, set 8. 

38. (TS) NSC 47,16 May 49, same file. 

39. (TS) NSC 47/2,17 Ott 49 (Approved by l’res 20 Ott 49), same file. 

40. Ltrs, USecState to SecDef, 30 Apr 49, and ExecSecy to SecDef to USecState, n.d., App and Ann 

to App A to JCS 1892/14,2 May 4Y, same file, set 7. 

41. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Provision of American Technical Assistance in the Organization 

and Training of the Israeli Army,” 20 May 49 (derived from JCS 1892/15); (U) Ltr, SecDef to ActgSecState, 3 Jun 49, Encl to JCS 18YO/16,7 Jun 49, same file, set 8. 

42. (U) Memo, SccState to l’res, 1 Scp 49, App to JCS 1684/33; (U) Memo, ExecSecy to SecDef to 

JCS, 21 Sep 4Y, Encl to JCS 1684/33; same file. 

43. (TS) NSC 47/2, 17 Ott 49 (approved by l’res, 20 Ott 49), same file. 

44. (U) Memo, Staff Director, Mun Bd to JCS, 5 Apr 50, Encl to JCS 1684/39, 11 Apr 50, same file, 

see Y. 

45. (U) SM-959-50 to Chm, Mun Bd, 5 May 50 (derived from JCS 1684/42), same file. 

46. (S) FMD D-3a, 28 Apr 50, Encl B to JCS 2127,2 May 50, same file. 

47. (S) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Near Eastern Security, ” 4 May 50 (derived from JCS 2127), same file. 

48. “Tripartite Declaration Regarding Security in the Near East,” Dept of State Bullrtin, 5 Jun 50, p. 886. 

Chapter 4. The Berlin Crisis 

1. Unless otherwise indicated, information in this chapter regarding political developments is 

taken from Feis, From Trust to E~rror, pp. 275-284; Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of Internationnl Affairs, 

7947-1948 (1952), pp. 238-242; and W. Phillips Davison, 7% Her/in Rlockudr (1958). 

2. The division of Germany into occupation zones is shown in Map 3 (see p. 81). 

3. Dept of State, Cermuny, 7947-7949, T/x Story in Documents (1950), pp. 192-195. Dept of State Bullefin, 28 Dee 47, pp. 1244-1249. 

4. Public Paps efth~ Presidwts, Harry S Truman, 7948 (1964), p. 183. General accounts of the Czech 

crisis may be found in Calvocoressi, Survey of Itrtcrnatiorrnl Affairs, 1947-1948, pp. 153-157; Campbell, 

Tke Utlitcd Sfaks in World Affairs, 7948-2949, pp. 104-105. 

5. Margaret Carlyle, ed., D~~nzents on International Affairs, 1947-1948 (London, 1952), p. 559. 

6. (U) Airgram, US POLAD, Germany A-182 to State, 3 Mar 48, in Dept of State, Furcip Relations 

of the United States, 7948, vol. II, Germany and Austria (1973), pp. 878-879. 

7. (U) Msg, US POLAD, Germany 651 to State, 20 Mar 48, Foreigtf Relations, 1948, vol. II, pp. 

883-884 describes the meeting. The text of a prepared statement by Sokolovsky is in Carlyle, DOCUmmts on Intwnational Affuirs, 1947-1948, pp. 574-575. 

8. (U) Ltr, Soviet DepMilCov Germany to US DepMilCov Germany, 31 Mar 48, Encl to (U) Memo, 

SecA to SecDef, 1 Apr 48, CCS 381 (S-20-43) set 16. 

9. (U) Protocol on Zones of Occupation and Administration of the “Greater Berlin” Area, I2 Sep 

44, and Amendment thereto, 14 Nov 44, in Doc~rmcnts 011 Gerrnutiy, 7944-1961, S. Corn on Foreign 

Relations, 87th Conr, 1st sess, PP. 14. 

10. (U) GEN Lucius D. Clay, Drcision in Germany (1950), pp. 25-26; (U) “Notes of Conference 

between Marshal Zhukov.. , General Clav.. , and General Weeks, June 29,1945,” Dept of State, Forrip /ie/utions, 1945, vol. III, E&pan Advishy Commissiorz; flusha; C&many (1968), pp. 358,159. 

11, (U) Minutes of 13th Mtg, Allied Control Council, 30 Nov 45, Docnmerzts on Germany, pp. 48-49. 

12. (U) Msg, OMGUS Berlin to Army Security Agency, 3112002 Mar 48, CM IN 4565, CCS 381 

(8-2043) set 16. 

13. (U) Record of Telecon, SecA and USCINCEUR, 31 Mar 48, Encl to (U) Memo, SecA to SecDef, 1 

Apr 48, same file. 

14. Clay, Decision iti Germurfy, p. 359. 

15. Dept of State, 7%~ Kcrlin Crisis, p. 3. 

16. Calvocoressi, Sfrrrvy of /ntwrrutiorrnl Affairs, pp. 242-243. Communique, London Six-Power 

Conference, in Carlyle, Docurrrcnts OH ~rrternntionul Affuirs, 7947-7948, pp. 554-574. 

17. Feis, From Trfrst to Tww, pp. 337-338. Calvocoressi, Sway of /r~terr~?tional Affuirs, 7947-7948, p. 243. 

312 
20. Clay, Dcxisiorr in Gcrrrmrr,y, p. 366. 

2 1. Davison, Thr Lkdirr Ulockmf~~, p. 101. Feis, Frurrr 7ixsf fo 73rrrrr, pp. 341,742. NY Tim’s, 26 Jun 48, p. 1. 

22. (TS) Memos, SecA to SecDef, 5 Jan 48; SpecAsst to SecDef to SecA, 12 Jan 48; SecA to SecDef, 

19 Jan 48, and Encl thereto; DA file OSA OYl Germany (l-5-48), National Archives. 

23. Truman, Yeurs of Triul und Hop, p. 123. 

24. (U) Memo for Record, ChDir Central European Affairs, Dept of State, 28 Jun 48, kJr&qTl khfions, 7948, vol. II, pp. 92X-929. 

25. Truman, Years @Triul uruf Hop,, p. 123. 

26. (U) Msg, US POLAD Germany 1487 to State, 26 Jun 48, Fowip Rdrrtions, 1948, vol. 11, pp. 

91%YIY. 

27. (LO Msg, CINCEUR to DA, 25 Jun 48, CC 4875, Forcip Rrlntiom, 7948, vol. II, pp. 917-918. 

28. (U) Msg, London 2822 to State, 26 Jun 48, Forcip Rdnfims, 1948, vol. 11, pp. 921-926. 

2Y. (TS-EYES ONLY) Msg, CINCEUR to DA, 271240% Jun 48, CM IN 5329, CCS 381 (8-2043) set 17. 

30. Millis, 7%~ Ftrrnsfrrl Dimric~s, pp. 4522454. (TS “State-National Defense Meeting for the Purpose 

of Determining the U.S. Position Regarding the Occupation of Berlin,” Encl to Memo, 1’~s to SecA, 29 

Jun 48, DA File OSA (Germany) (62Y-48), National Archives. 

31. (TS) Memo, SecA to CSA, 28 Jun 48, DA files, OSA 091 Germany (8-10-481, National Archives. 

7’1w hwsfa/ Din&s, pp. 454455. 

32. (U) Memo, UK Jt Services Mission to DJS, 30 Jun 48, RDC 5/3, transmitting a msg from BCOS 

to USJCS, CCS 381 (8-20-43) set 17. 

33. (U) Memo, UK Jt Services Mission to DJS, 29 Jun 48; (U) Menlo, UK Jt Services Mission to DJS, 

RDC 5/l, 28 Jun 48; (TS) Memo for Record, RADM C. I). Glover, “U.S. Chiefs of Staff Meeting with 

Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff, ,30 June 1948,” 8 1~148; same file. 

34. (I.0 Msg, SecA to USMG, Germany, 28 Jun 48, Fnwigrl Rclatiorrs, 7948, vol. 11, pp. 929-930. (U) 

Msg, US I’OLAD Germany 309 to Paris, 4 Jul 48, ibid., pp. 948-950, transmitting text of tripartite Mil 

Governors Rpt of Mtg with Sokolovsky. 

35. (Ul Note, Soviet Ambassador to SecState, 14 Jul 48, Fowip Rc~lations, 1948, vol. II, pp. 950-953, 

Y60-Y64. 

36. (TS) Memcon, SecState, USecState, UKAmb, 14 Jul 48, CCS 381 (S-20-43) xc 17. NSC Action 

No. 77, 14 Jul 48, as cited in Fnrr~~gn Rdafiorrs, 7948, vol. II, p. 965, note 4. (TS-RD) R.D. Little, The History of Air Force Participatiori in the Atomic Enqy Propam, 7943-1953, vol. II: Foundations of an Atomic 

Air Force and Opu~?tion Sundsforre, 194667948 (Air University Historical Liaison Office), p. 234. 

37. Truman, Years of Trill/ and Hop, pp. 123-126; Robert Murphy, Dip/mat Ammlg Warriors (lY64), 

pp. 316-378; Clay, Decision in Germnr~y, p. 368; NSC Action No. 84, 22 Jul 48, Fore&w Rrd~~tions, 1948, 

vol. II, p. Y77; (U) Msg, State 2819 to London, 20 Jul48, Foreip Relations, 1948, vol. 11, p. 971. 

38. NSC Action No. 84, Fowiyn Relations, 1948, vol. II, p. 977. 

39. fU1 Msg, CSAF to JCS, 50339,23 Jul48, Encl to JCS 1907/4,27 Jul48, CCS 381 (8-20-43) SW 17. 

Goldberg, Hisf&p of tkr United States Air Forw, pp. 235-237. 

40. (U) JCS 1907,lY Jul48, CCS 3X1 (8-20-43) set 17. 

41. (Ul JCS lYO7/2,lY Jul48; (Ul SM-10514 to JSSC 20 Jul48; VJ) JCS lYO7/3,21 Ju148; same file. 

42. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “U.S. Militarv Courses of Action with Respect to the Situation in 

Berlin,” 22 jul 48 (derived from JCS lYO7/3), same file. 

43. (Ill Memo, SecDef lo NSC, “U.S. Military Courses of Action with Respect to the Situation in 

Berlin,” 26 Jul 48, same file. (TS) NSC Action No. 87, 5 Aug 48. 

44. (U) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 28 Jul 48, Forci‘srr Relnliorrs, 1948, vol. II, p. 9Y4. 

45. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, “Planning for Composite Armed Convoys to Supply Berlin,” 30 Jul 

48, Encl to (TS) JCS 1907/5,2 Aug 48, CCS 38 I (8-2043) SW 18. 

46. (TS) CCS Y83,18 Aug 48, same file. 

47. (U) CCS 983/l, 27 Aug 48; (U) JCS 1907/7,11 Sep 48; (U) Memo, CSA to Secy JCS, “Plan for 

the Supply of Berlin by Armed Convoy,” 28 Sep 48, and Encl thereto: CINCEUR Plan: T F TRUCULENT, 8 Sep 48; same file. 

48. Msg, State 281Y to London, 20 Jul 48, Forrip Rclufions, 1948, vol. 11, pp. Y71-973. The Joint 

Chiefs of Staff did not participate formally in the decision. 

49. T/W &r/in Crisis, pp. 17-42, and Docutwerzts 011 Gerrnarry, pp. 2 10-212. 

50. Th(a I3crlin Crisis, pp. 42-43. (U) Msgs, US I’OLAD Germany to State, 2240, 4 Sep 48, 2251 and 

2254, 7 Sep 48, Forc’i~~t7 Rdnfms, J948, vol. II, pp. 1118-l 122, 113221140. 

51. (TS) NSC Action No. lOY,7 Sep 58. 

52. The Hcrlin Crisis, pp. 44-56. 

313 
54. (TS) NSC Action No. 113 b, 16 Sep 48. (U) Ltr, ActSecState to SecDef, 1 Ott 48; (II) Memo 

SpccAsst to SecDef to JCS, 4 Ott 48; Encls to (U) JCS 1907/X, 5 Ott 48; KS 381 (8-2043) set 18. 

55. (TS) NSC Action No. 125 a, 7 Ott 48. (C) Memo, ExecSecy NSC to JCS, 7 Ott 48, Encl to (Cl JCS 

1907/10,8 Ott 48, CCS 381 (s--2043) set 18. 

56. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Military Implications Involved in Continuing Operation of the 

Berlin Airlift,” 13 Ott 48 (derived from JCS 1907/9, 6 Ott 48); (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Military 

Measures Appropriate in the Event of Soviet Interruption of the Berlin Airlift,” I3 Ott 48 (derived 

from JCS lY(j?/li, I I Ott 48); CCS 381 (8-20-43) set 18’. Because both these memos were subsequently 

recalled and destroved.i the texts cited here are the ones found in K’S 1907/Y and JCS lYO7/11, as 

amended by the respective Decision On. Evidence that the memos were forwarded to the SccDcf is in 

the Decisions On JCS lYO7/9 and JCS IYO7/11. 

57. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Military Measures Appropriate in the Event of Soviet Interruption 

of the Berlin Airlift,” 13 Ott 48, cited in preceding note. 

58. (TS) Memo for Record by General Gruenther, “Meeting of the National Security Council, 1430 

hours, 14 October,” 25 Ott 48, same file, set 19. Mr. Lovett’s remarks were perhaps influenced by the 

fact that the FY 1950 budget was at that time under intensive discussion (see Ch. 7). 

59. (C) NSC Action No. 131, I4 Ott 48; (C) Memo, Pres to ExecSecy NSC, 22 Ott 48, Apps to JCS 

1907/18, 27 Ott 48, same file. 

60. (TS) Memos, JCS to SecDef, “Military Implications Involved in Continuing and Augmenting 

the Operation of Airlift to Berlin” and “Military Measures Appropriate in the Event of Soviet Interruption to the Berlin Airlift,” both dated 20 Ott 48, Enclos “A” and “B” to JCS lYO7/17, 21 Ott 48, 

same file. 

61. Calvocoressi, SI~YW~ of I~~trr~~atior~al Affirirs, 794748, pp. 247-250. 

62. Goldberg, Histoy ojf thr United States Air Forw, pp. 237-241. 

63. Calvocoressi, S~rrq of lntrrnntional Affairs, pp. 25@251. 

64. Feis, From Trust to Terror, pp. 354-356. Davison, 7%~ Hdin Blockudr~, pp. 272-273. 

65. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Phase Out of the Berlin Airlift,” 21 Jul49 (derived from JCS 1907/34, 

20 Jul 49); (C) NSC 24/4, 25 Jul 49, App to JCS 1907/35, 26 Jul 49; (Cl NSC Action No. 236, 28 Jul 49, 

and (C) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 28 Ju149, both Encls to JCS 1907/36,29 Jul49; CCS 381 (s-2043) WC 

22. Dept of State, Foreign Rrlntions of the United States, 3949, vol. 111: Council nf Fowip Ministers; Grrnrnrry 

rind A~rstria (1974), pp. 839-840. Goldberg, Histq/ of the Utlitcd Stntrs Air Forcr, p. 241. 

66. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 131. 

67. Acheson, Pmcnt at the Crcntion, p. 274. 

68. (U) Msg, Paris DELSEC 1784 to State, 22 May 49; (U) JCS 1907/27, 25 May 49, and Encls and 

Apps thereto; (U) SM-990-49 to AsstSecA, 27 May 49; (S) NSC 24/2, I Jun 49; CCS 381 (S-20-43) set 

21, Forsip~ Relations, 1949, vol. 111, pp. 818, 821-824. 

69. (TS) Memo, AsstSecA to JCS, 9 Jun 49, Encl to JCS 1907/29, 10 Jun 49; (U) SM-11234‘) to AsstSecA, 16 Jun 49 (derived from JCS 1907/30), 10 Jun 49; same file. These communications passed to 

and from the Assistant Secretary of the Army, who acted in the matter as deputy for the Secretary of 

Defense. 

70. (S) NSC 24/3, 14 Jun 49; (S) NSC Action No. 225, 16 Jun 49; (S) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 17 

Jun 49; En& to JCS 1907/33, 18 Jun 49, same file, set 22. 

71. The FY 1950 budget is treated in Ch. 7. 

Chapter 5. Key West and Newport: Roles and Missions 

1. (UI Memo, Dep DJS for Strat Plans to DJS, 13 Mar 48. CCS 381 USSR (3-2246) set 12. 

2. PL 253, 80th Gong. 

3. EO 9877, 26 Ju147. 

4. For full discussion of these developments, see MAJ Laurence J. Legere, Jr., USA, “Unification of 

the Armed Forces” (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, lY50), pp. 186-361. 

5. NY Times, 7 Jan 48, p. 1. Text in KS 370 (s-19-45) set 6. 

6. Hearings, Dqmrtment of the Navy Appropriution Bill for 7949, Navy Subcom of H. Corn on Appropriations, 80th Gong, 2d sess, pp. 132, 813. For the later controversy over the construction of this 

“super carrier,” see Ch. 10. 

7. NY Times, 6 Feb 48, p. 46. 

314 
attention on bringing about a reexamination of the roles and missions disagreements, had not undertaken to spell them out or to propose resolutions for them. There were, however, some clues as to the 

nature of these disagreements in the Committee’s report. But as the conflicting views of the Services 

were later aired in great detail, these fragmentary indications have been omitted here. 

10. (U) JCS 1478/22,30 Jan 48, same file. 

II. (U) Dee On JCS 1478/20,4 Feb 48, same file. (C) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Redraft of Executive 

Order 9877,” 6 Feb 48; (C) SM-9563 to LTGs Wedemeyer and Norstad and RADM Styer, 5 Feb 48; 

same file, set 7. 

12. (U) Memo, SecA to SecDef, “Redraft of Executive Order YX77 Pertaining to Roles and Missions 

of the Armed Forces,” 29 Jan 48, DA files, I’&0 320 (29 Jan 48). 

13. (U) Memo, SecAF to SecDef, no subj. 29 Jan 48, same file. The response of the SecN was not 

available to the author. 

14. (C) Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef to DJS, 11 Feb 48, with Encl (Memo, SecDef to Secys of Army, 

Navy, AF, 3 Feb 48), CCS 370 (8-l 9-45) set 7. 

15. Memo, Dir P&O to CSA, “Report of Progress, by the Ad Hoc Committee.. ,” 10 Feb 48, 

same file. 

16. (U) Memo for CEN Wedemeyer, “Divergent Views on Roles and Missions,” 16 Feb. 48, signed 

CVRS (BG Cortlandt Vanlienesselaer Schuyler, Senior Army Member of the Working Group), DA 

files, P&O 320 (n.d.) FW 31/37, National Archives. 

17. (U) “Specific Comments on Important Paragraphs in the Ad Hoc Committee Paper of 27 

February,” 1 Mar 48, no originator or addressee, DA Files, P&O 320 (n.d.) FW 31/37, Encl 2. (C) 

Drafts, “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” 16 Feb and 25 Feb 48, the first in 

DA file P&O 320 (n.d.) FW 31/37, the second (bearing handwritten corrections reflecting intensive 

discussion) in CCS 370 (8-1045) xc 7. 

18. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,” 8 Mar 48, same file. 

1Y. (U) Draft “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” and appended Army, 

Navy and Air Force views thereon, all En& to (C) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Roles and Missions of the 

Armed Forces,” 8 Mar 48, CCS 370 (8-1945) set 7. 

20. Millis, T/x, Forwstd Lliarics, pp. 389,790. 

21. (U) “Notes for Friday-Opening of Meeting,” 11 Mar 48, Encl to (Mins of) “Meeting, Secretary 

of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1500 Hours, 20 March 1948,” CCS 370 (S-1945) set 7. 

22. (LJ) (Mins of) “Meeting, Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1500 Hours, 20 March 

1948”; (U) Draft Memo for Ret, DJS, “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” 26 

Mar 48 (Encl to DM-16 to JCS Members, same date); same file. 

23. (LJ) JCS to SecDef, “Key West Conferences,” 29 Apr 48, same file. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 

“Memorandum for the Record on the Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” 

JCS 1478/24,7 1~148, same file, set 9. 

24. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” 26 

Mar 48, same file, set 7. (U) Ltr, I’rcs to SecDef, 21 Apr 48; (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS and Sets A, N, 

AF, 21 Apr 48, both Atts to JCS 1478/23; same file, set 8. 

25. Millis, TIIC Forn~stnl Dinrirs, pp. 395-396. 

26. (TS) JCS 1854, 23 Mar 48, CCS 471.6 (S-1545) set 9. Richard C. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, 

A History of t/w Urrikd States Atomic Erwrgy Connnission, vol. II, Atorrlic Shiel$, 1947/1952 (1969), pp. 

131-132. On 23 Mar 48, Admiral Leahy criticized the CSAF proposal on the grounds that it ignored 

the fact that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not been authorized to use atomic weapons. GEN Spaatz 

thereupon made minor changes in the wording of his proposal while pointing out that the criticism 

was not relevant to his purposes. 

27. (1‘S) JCS 1854/4, 13 Jul48, CCS 471.6 (8-1545) set Il. The CSA proposed, and CSAF agreed, 

that the change could be made by a simple amendment to the AFSWI’ charter and would not require 

a special directive, such as General Spaatz had originally proposed. (TS) Memo, CSAF to SecDef, n.d., 

Encl to (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Control and Direction of Strategic Atomic Operations,” 28 Jul 48, 

same file. 

28. (7‘S) ICS 1854/5,17 1~148, same file. 

29. (TS).Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Control and Direction of Strategic Atomic Operations,” 28 Jul 48; 

(TS) Memo, SecDef to ICS, same subi, 2 Aup. 48; (TS) Memo, C of S to CinC to SecDef, 7 Aurr 48, Encl 

to DM-58 to SecDef, 9 Aug 48; (Ti) MeGo, CSA to SecDef, “Control and Direction of‘?trategic 

Atomic Operations,” 3 Aug 48, Encl to SM-10621, 4 Aug 48; same file. EWP HALF MOON is discussed in Ch. 9. 

315 
, pp

33. (TS) Memo for Ret, John H. Ohly, 23 Aug 48, summarizing decisions reached at Newport, Forrestal Diary transcripts, JCS 1 list Div (partly quoted in Millis, T11e Forrestul Diuric,s, pp. 476477). (U) 

Supplement to “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff” (the “Newport Agreement”), 21 Aug 48, (U) JCS 1478/26, same date, CCS 370 (g-1945) set 10. Texts of the Key West and 

Newport Agreements were published in /turn!/ lurid Nav!/ /ourna/, 3 Apr 48, pp. 807 ff, and 28 Aug 48, 

p. 1435. 

Chapter 6. The FY 1949 Supplemental Budget: Initial Effort to Rearm 

1, See, for instance, (LJ) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Military Implications Involved in Continuing Operation of the Berlin Airlift,” 13 Ott 48 (derived from JCS lYO7/Y, 6 Ott 48), CCS 381 (S-2043) st’c 18. 

2. NY Tirrrras, 28 Jul 47, p. 10. The distribution of the $8.751 billion was as follows: Army, $4.653 billion; Navy, $3.269 billion; Air Force (not yet separated from the Army), $829 million. For the President’s original budget request, as well as the strength of the Services on 30 June 1947, see Ch. 1, pp. 

11-13. 

3. Arrr~uul Repurb uf the Secr&xry of tk Army, 1948, p. 6. 

4. The manpower situation in the Army was in fact far worse than indicated in this table. The 

administration had evidently cut back the authorized strength to reflect the shortage of men or 

money, or both. The objective considered necessary by the Department of the Army was 667,000, ibid. 

5. Millis, The Forresbxl Diaries, pp. 3744377. For the Air Force unit strength in January 1948, see 

First Rr\xlrt (I/ the Srcwtary of Dcfww, 2948, p. 67. 

6. (U) JCS 1849, 11 Mar 48, CCS 320.2 (5-l-45) set 1, Joint war plans are discussed below (Ch. 9). 

7. Millis, 7%~ Forrmfnl Diurirs, p. 393. On 14 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally approved JCS 

1849 and informed the Secretary of Defense of their decision. This was apparently merely an administrative step to complete action on the paper, because they had already given the Secretary their recommendation on 12 March. 

8. Ibid., p. 394. 

9. /-‘ldllir Papers, Twrmrr, 2948, pp. 185-186. 

10. Millis, The Forrmtal Dinrics, p. 436. 

11. The Budget of fhe Unitrrf Stutcs Gooer~~nmt fur t/w Fiscal Ytw Ending \UUE 30, 3949, pp. 633-636, 

640. Hearings, Milikry Flrnctions, Nntionul Defww Estuh/ishrrrmt Appropriations Hill for 7949, Subcom of 

H. Corn on Appropriations, 80th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 28, 55. Hearings, Dcpartmtwt of the Navy Approprintior~s Bill for 1949, Subcom of H. Corn on Appropriations, 80th Cong, 2d sess, p. 131. 

12. NY T&KS, 26 Mar 48, p. 3. First Report of flue Srcwtq of D+nse, 1948, p. 141. The $500 million for 

UMT was in addition to the $9.803 billion requested for the Services and OSD in the original budget. 

13. Public Pupers, Trrtmun, 7948, p. 198. 

14. (U) Memo, SecDef to ICS, 30 Mar 48, Encl B to ICS 1796/Il, 7 Apr 48, CCS 370 (8-1945) see 8. 

15. (U) Memo for Ret, D;pDJS, no subj., 3 Ott 47, same file, set 6. L 

16. (U) JCS 18UO/l, 23 Ott 47; (U) JCS 1800/2, 17 Nov 47; (U) JCS 18(X1/4, 16 Dee 47; (U) JCS 

1800/5, 7 Jan 48; (U) Dee On JCS 1800/5, 19 Feb 48; same file. 

17. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Allocation of Fiscal Year 1949 Budget Increases,” lh Apr 48 

(derived from JCS 1796/11), CCS 452 US (8-147) xc 5. 

18. Goldberg, History of tk United Strztcs Air Force, p. 106. 

1Y. Surzkal in the Air AYC’, A Report hu the Pwsident’s Air Poticu Commission (1948). DV. 3-36 

20. (U) Memo, JCS to S‘;cL)ef, ‘&es&t and Future Aircraft gequirements of the Aimed Services,” 

11 Dee 47, and Encl “Letter to the President’s Air Policy Commission” (both derived from JCS 1796/6, 

10 Dee 47), CCS 452 US (8-l-47) SK 3. 

21, OSD Press Release, 25 Mar 48, App to JCS 1796/10, CCS 370 (8-1945) set 8. 

22. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 27 Mar 48, Encl to JCS 17Y6/10,1 Apr 48, same file. 

23. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 8 Apr 48, Encl to JCS 1796/12, 9 Apr 48, same file. 

24. Millis, The Forrcstut Dirzrirs, pp. 412416, 418. The testimony by Spaatz and Symington before 

the House Armed Services Committee, which had the appearance of an appeal to Congress over the 

head of their lawful superior, may not have been in direct contradiction of his wishes. See the Diary 

entry for 19 April 1948, where Forrestal records: “I said General Spaatz and Mr. Symington would 

have to decide for themselves later on as to the testimony that they would give on this other subject 

[the $822 million addition to the Supplemental Appropriation bill].” 

316 
27. Millis, 771~ Forrc~td Diarirs, p. 417. 

28. Millis, Tllc Forrrstal Diorics, p, 418. NY ‘T;tncs, 22 Apr 48, p. 13 (text of Forrestal testimony 

before Senate Armed Services Committee). 

29. Millis, Thr Forwstul Durics, PI-~. 429-430. . . 30. Ibid., pp. 435-437. 

31. (U) Ltr, Pres to Speaker of the t louse, Transmitting Supplemental Appropriation Estimates for 

the National Military Establishment, 13 May 4X, I’~~h/ir Paprrs, Trwnnrr, 794#, p. 255. 

32. (U) Srcr~nd Report of the Srcrc~tary of D+wc~, FY 7949, p. 93. 

Chapter 7. The FY 1950 Budget: Rearmament Falls Short 

1. Warner Schilling, “The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950,” in Warner Ii. Schilling, Paul Y. 

1 lammond, and Glenn t 1. Snyder, Strntqy, Politics, rwd Dr~f~nsc HdCyets (1962), is an account of the 

preparation of the FY 1950 budget based entirely on published sources. It is particularly useful for a 

description of prevailing public and congressional opinions against which the budget was shaped, 

and makes it clear that the President’s policy of rigid fiscal limits on defense spending commanded 

widespread approval. 

2. “Luncheon Meeting Called by SecDcf,” 20 Mar 48, CCS 370 (8-lY-45) set 7. 

3. See Ch. 6. 

4. Millis, Tlrcp Fwwstrrl Din&s, pp. 4.75437. See Ch. 6, pp. IOY-110. 

5. (TS) Memo, SecDcf to ExecSecy NSC, “Appraisal of the Degree and Character of Military I’reparcdness Required by the World Situation,” 10 Jul 48; (TS) Ltr, SccDef to Prcs, 10 Jul 48; both circulated as (TS) NSC 20,12 Jul48, and Encl to (TS) JCS 1903, 13 Jul48; CCS 381 (5-13-45) set 3. 

6. (TS) NSC 7,30 Mar 48, Encl to JCS 1860,l Apr 48, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) see 27. 

7. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed 

World Communism,” 16 Apr 48 (derived from JCS 1860/l, as amended by Dee On, and JCS 1860/2, 

3,4), same file. (TS) Memo, SecDcf to ExecSccy NSC, 17 Apr 48, same file, set 28. 

8. See Ch. 1, p. 6. 

9. (George F. Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Fovrign Affuirs, vol. XXV, No. 4 (July 

1947), pp. 566-582. 

10. (TS) Policy Planning Staff, Dept of State, “U.S. Objectives with Respect to Russia,” Encl to NSC 

20/l, 18 Aug 48, Encl to (TS) JCS 1903/l, 27 Aug 48, CCS 381 (5-13-45) see 3. 

11. (TS) Draft Rept by NSC, “U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats 

to U.S. Security,” 2 Nov 48, Encl to (TS) NSC 20/3, 2 Nov 48 (JCS 1903/3, 5 Nov 48), CCS 381 

(5-l 3-45) set 4. 

12. (TS) Memo, lCS to SecDef, “U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet 

Threats to U.S. Security,” 15 Nov 48 (derived’from JCS 1903/4: 8 Nov 48); (TS) Memo, ExecSecy to 

NSC, same subi, 16 Nov 48; same file. (TS) Memo, ICS to SecDef, “Existing International Commitments Involving the Possible USC of Armed Forces,” -2 NW 48 (derived fro; JCS 1881 /I), circulntt~d 

to NSC as NSC 35, CCS 370 (5-25-48) set 2. 

13. (TS) NSC 20/4, 23 Nov 48; (TS) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, “U.S. Objectives with Respect to the 

USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to US. Security,” 26 Nov 48, CCS 381 (5-13-45) set 4. 

14. See Ch. 6, p. 107. 

15. (U) JCS 1800/l, 23 Ott 47; JCS 1800/2,17 Nov 47; JCS 1800/5,7 Jan 48; CCS 370 (S-19-45) set 6. 

16. (TS) JCS 1800/8 and Dee On, 20 and 24 Jul 48; same file. Hearings, Nntiowd Milituq Establisllrrrcrft RpprqJriafions Nil/ fc>v 1950, Subcom of H. Corn. on Appropriations, 81st Gong, 1st sess, Part Ill, 

pp. 3Y-42 (hereafter, H. I Irgs, NME Apppriatrow fiw 1950). 

17. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 17 Jul48, Encl to JCS 1800/7,20 Jul48, CCS 370 (8-19-45) set 9. 

18. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Formulation of the FY 1950 Budget for National Defense,” 24 Jul 48 

(derived from JCS 1800/8 and 1800/9), CCS 370 (S-19-45) set 10. Navy manpower figures represent 

average strengths; those for the other Services a single figure for FY 1950, which the source did not 

identify as “beginning,” “average,” or “end.” 

19. H. Hrgs, NME Al’pr”pYiationsfor 2950, Part I, pp. 16-17; I’art 11, pp. 15-17; Part III, pp. 38-42. 

20. The validity of the ceiling was affirmed in a memo from the Director, BOB, to SecDef on 16 Jul 

48 and in a letter from the President on 26 Jul 48. Hearings, Nutionul Militnry Estnblislnnent &prop+­

tiorrs Hi// for 1950, Subcom of S. Corn on Appropriations, 81st Cong, 1st sess, p. 16; National Security 

Orpuizatiorl, fl kyort with Recommendations, prepared for the Commission on Organization of the 

Executive Branch of the Government (1949), p. 38. 

317 
set 10. 

22. H. Hrgs., NME Appropriations for 7 950, Part I, p. 17. 

23. (U) “Analysis of the Armed Services 1950 Budget, ” nd., no author, CCS 370 (S-19-45) B.l? 2. 

24. This was FLEETWOOD. See Ch. 9. 

25. (TS) JCS Transcript of Mtg, 2 Ott 48, at 0930; (TS) liec of Mtg, 3 Ott 48; CCS 370 (s-19-45) set 

10, pt 1. (TS) “Tentative Allocation Under Special Concept,” Tab to “Secretary of Defense Budget 

Meeting with the Three Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” 4 Ott 48, same file, BP 2. 

26. Admiral Denfeld was evidently referring to FLEETWOOD, but he overlooked the fact that 

that ulan did not envision direct defense of Western Europe. See Ch. 9. 

i7. These Navy views of strategy were to become a matter of public controversy and congressional 

inuuirv during the summer and fall of 1949 in the “B36 versus Suner-Carrier” distxrte. See Ch. 10. 

28. (T’S) “gecretary of Defense Budget Meeting with the Three Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff,” 4 Ott 48, CCS 370 (S-19-45) BP pt 2. 

29. Millis, The Forwstnl Diaries, p. 498. 

30. (TS) Minutes, JCS Mtg, 5 Ott 48, CCS 370 (S-1945) set 10, pt 1. (LJ) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 

“Budget for Fiscal Year 1950,” 6 Ott 48, CCS 370 (S-19-45) set 10. 

31. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, “194950 Budget,” 6 Ott 48, same file. 

32. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Memorandum dated 6 October 1948 from the Secretary of Defense to 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1949-50 Budget,” 7 Ott 48, with Encls (Memos, CSA, CSAF, CNO to 

SecDef, 7 Ott 48) same file. 

33. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, no sub, 8 Ott 48, same file. 

34. (U) Memos, SecDef to Sets Army, Navy, Air Force, no sub, 14 Ott 48, same file. 

35. (TS) SM-110-72 to GE:N McNarney, MG Richards, VADM Carney, 14 Ott 48 (derived from JCS 

1800/12), CCS 370 (S-1945) set 10. 

36. Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 502-506. 

37. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 29 Ott 48, Encl to JCS 1X00/13,30 Ott 48, CCS 370 (8-1945), set 11. 

38. Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Allocation of Funds for 1950 Budget,” 8 Nov 48, Encl to JCS 

1800/14, same file. The only evidence that this memo was actually sent is in the reply thereto cited 

in fn 39, below. 

39. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, “Allocation of Funds for 1950 Budget,” 9 Nov 48, Encl to JCS 

1800/15, same file. 

40. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Allocation of Funds for FY 1950 Budget,” 15 Nov 48 (derived from 

JCS 1800/17), same file. 

41. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 17 Nov 48, Encl to JCS 1800/19,18 Nov 48, same file. 

42. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 31 Ott 48, Dept of State, Foreign Relations, 2948, vol. 1, pp. 644447. 

(TS) Msg, SecState in Paris to ActSecState, 8 Nov 48, Forcigrz Rclutions, 7948, vol. I, p. 655. Millis, The 

Forwstd Diaries, pp. 500-502. 

43. (TS) Ltr, SecDef to Prcs, 1 Dee 48, Fore&w Rdations, 1948, vol. I, pp. 669472. 

44. (TS) Ibid. 

45. Millis, The f’oruestnl Diaries, p. 536. 

46. H. Hrgs, NME Appropriations for 1950, Part 1, pp. 13, 18, 20. 

47. H. Hrgs, NME Appropriations for 2950, Part Ill, p. 43; Part II, pp. 103-105; S. Hrgs, National Milrtnry Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1950, pp. 80, 90. 

48. Hcarinxs, Department of D$vse Appropriations /or 1957, Subcom of H. Corn on Appropriations, 

Slst Cong, 2d sess, pp. 293,1313, 1769. (Hereafter S. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations 3953.) 

Chapter 8. The FY 1951 Military Budget: Rearmament Is Cut Back 

1. Public Papers of thr Presidents of the United State: Harry S Truman, 2949 (1964), p. 56 (hereafter 

cited as Public Paws, Truman, 1949. 

2. S. Hearings, DOD Appropriations 1957, p. 680. GEN Eisenhower’s appointment was officially 

announced on I1 Feb 49, after he had alreadv berun his duties (NY Times, 12 Feb 49, u. 1). From the 

beginning, GEN Eisenhower was referred to, and addressed as, “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff,” though he did not formally bear the title. The former presiding officer, ADM Leahy, Chief of 

Staff to the Commander in Chief (see Ch. l), was no longer an active participant in JCS affairs; his 

health was failing and he retired shortly thereafter. 

3. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 6 Dee 48, Encl B to JCS 1800/24, 13 Dee 48, CCS 370 (S-19-45) set 12. 

318 
6. see Ch. 7, p. 122. 

7. (U) JCS 1800/27, 7 Jan 49; (U) JCS 1800/29, 21 Jan 49; (U) JCS 1800/31, 8 Feb 49; (U) Memo, 

DCOS Ops USAF to DCNO (Ops), DCOS (P&P) USA, 7 Feb 49; CCS 370 (S-19-45) set 13. (U) JCS 

1800/32,11 Feb 49; (U) JCS 1800/36,3 Mar 49; same file, set 14. 

8. GEN Eisenhower was probably referring to the Joint Emergency War Plan TROJAN, which the 

JCS had approved on 28 January 1949. This plan is discussed in Ch. 9. 

9. (U) Memo, D. E. (Dwight Eisenhower) to GEN Bradley, ADM Denfeld, GEN Vandenberg, 28 

Feb 49; (U) Memo, Secy, JCS to DJS, “Highlights of JCS Meeting After Your Departure,” 2 Mar 49; CCS 

370 (8-19-45) set 14. 

10. (U) Table entitled “Recapitulation,” 5 Jul 49 unidentified but evidently prepared (perhaps in 

OSD) as a summary of successive FY 1951 budget proposals, same file, set 18. The estimates summarized above occupy the first three columns of this table. It is not clear whether they were a product of 

the JCS decision of 2 Mar 49 or whether they arc the ones prepared as part of the “Red Brick” system 

described below. 

11. The “Red Brick” estimates are listed in the fourth column of the table cited in the preceding 

note. Additional information about the “Red Brick” system is given in ADM Denfeld’s memo cited in 

the next note. The origin of the nickname “Red Bricks” is not explained in available sources 

12. (U) Memo, CNO to ICS. Ser 00075P03.4 Mav 49, CCS 370 (g-19-45) set 15. 

13. (U) Memo, GEN Eisenhower to SecDef, 14 J&l 49, same file, set 18. 

14. (U) USAF, Office of Comptroller, “Estimates #1, #2, #3, #4,” 21 May 49, same file, set 17. This 

document and the one cited in the following note are attached to the CNO memo of 23 May 49 cited 

in fn 16. 

15. (TS) Dept of Army, “Preliminary Estimates FY 1951,” 23 May 49, same file. 

16. (U) Memo, CNO to SecDef, Ser 0045PO4,23 May 49, same file. 

17. (U) Memo, Chm, BAC to CEN Eisenhower, Ser 30211’04, 15 Jun 49; (U) Handwritten office 

memo, DJS to GEN Eisenhower, 15 Jun 49; (LJ) Memo, Chm, BAC to DJS, Ser 000491’94, 20 Jun 49; 

same file, set 18. 

18. (U) Memo of Understanding, JCS BAC, 18 Jun 49, same file. The relationship of the “Ike I” 

forces to the “four estimates,” and the extent to which they are to be attributed to General Eisenhower 

individually rather than to the Joint Chiefs of Staff collectively, cannot be determined from available 

sources. 

19. (U) Table, “Recapitulation,” 5 Jul49, CCS 370 (s-19-45) set 18. 

20. Ibid. 

21. (U) Memo, Chm, JCS BAC to DJS, Ser 0005OPO4,20 Jun 49, same file. 

22. (U) Memo, GEN Eisenhower to Chm, JCS BAC, 21 Jun 49, same file. 

23. (U) Memo, Chm, BAC to GEN Eisenhower, Ser 0003029l’O4,27 Jun 49, same file. 

24. (U) Memos, Chm, JCS BAC to GEN Eisenhower, Ser 0003029PO4,27 Jun 49; Army Member JCS 

BAC to GEN Eisenhower, “Evaluation of Forces Ike I and Ike II,” 27 Jan 49; Air Force Member JCS 

HAC to DJS, “Air Force Comments on Evaluation of Forces Ike 1 and Ike II,” 27 Jun 49; same file, 

25. Testimony of SecDef and CEN Eisenhower, S. Hrgs, DOD Apyuopvia~iom 1957, pp. 2-3, 

680-681. 

26. (U) Statement by Dir BOB in “Discussion Following Budget Presentation,” 21 Ott 49, CCS 370 

(8-15-45) set 20. 

27. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Military Requirements for Fiscal Year 1951,” 18 May 49, same file, 

set 17; S. Hrgs, DOD Appropriations, 7951, pp. 680-681; Hearings, Military Situation in the Far East, S. 

Corn on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs, 82d Cong, 1st sess, pt 4, pp. 2597-2598. The date when 

the new ceiling was announced is unknown, but it must have been in late June or early July 1949. 

28. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, Secys Army, Navy, Air Force, “l’reparation of Fiscal Year 1951 Budget, 5 Jul 49, same file, set 18. Testimony of GEN Eisenhower, S. Hrgs, DOD Appropriatims for 7957, 

pp. 681-682. 

29. (U) Memo, Secy JCS to SecDef, “Forces for Fiscal Year 1951 I’rogram,” 2 Aug 49, and Encls 

thereto: Memo, CNO to SecDef, 27 Jul 49; Memo, CSA to SecDef, 30 Jul 49; Memo, DCOS, Ops, USAF 

to SecDef, n.d.; CCS 370 (8-19-45) set 18. 

30. (U) Memo, GEN Eisenhower to SecDef, no title, 14 Jul49, same file. 

31. PL 216, 81st Congress. For the background of the law and the JCS role in its formulation, see 

(U) JCS Hist Div, “Major Changes in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” 1942-1969, pp. 

21-27. See also Walter Millis, Arrrrs arid thr State (1958), pp. 233-234. 

319 
34. Harry S Truman, Budget Message to Congress, Pr~hlic Payrrs of lhr, Presidcvlts: Hurry S Trurrfail, 

79.50 (1965), pp. 61-63. Hearings, D+ns~ Deprtrnrnt Appropriatons for 1952, Defense Subcom of H. 

Corn on Appropriations, 81st Gong, 2d sess, pp. 106, 196, 1216,1726. 

35. Figures for December 1949 are taken from Srrninrlrfual Rrport of t/v Sccrrtq o$ D+r~sr, I /nrr+3f) 

/WI 50, p. 206. 

36. These events are fully recounted in Chs. 1 and 2 of 7%~ /oint Chiefs of Stuff anal N~tionnl Polic!/, 

7 950-7 952. 

Chapter 9. Strategic Planning 

1, Quoted in (U) JCS 1800,27 Aug 47, CCS 370 (B-19-45) set 6 

2. (0 1WPC 496,16 1~1147, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) set h. 

3. (C) i’MP573 tc; J WPC, 29 Aug 47, same file. 

4. (TS) JSpC 846/6, 20 Nnv 47, CCS 452 US (8-147) set 1. For the Finletter Commission and the 

JCS response thereto, see Ch. 6. 

5. (TS) JSpC 846/6, 20 No” 47, same file. (TS) JSPC 499/2, 3 Dee 47, same file, set 2. Notices of 

decision, 5 and IO Dee 47, same file. 

6. (TS) JSPC 500/2,8 Mar 48, CCS 381 USSR (3-246) SK 1 I. 

7. (TS) JSPC 496/4, I1 Feb 48, same file, set IO. (TS) JCS 1844,Y Mar 48; (TS) JCS 1844/l, 17 Mar 

48; same file, set 12; (TS) JCS Agenda, 10 Mar 48; (TS) Memo for Record, no subj, 10 Mar 48; Jt Sect 

File, Decisions-JCS, 29 May 1947 thru DK 1949. 

8. (TS) App to Encl to JCS 1844/l, 17 Mar 48, same file, set 12. (TS) JSPG 496/4, 11 Feb 48, same 

file set IO. 

‘4. (TS) Memo for Record, Secy, JCS, “1844/l ,” 5 Apr 48, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) SK 13. 

10. (TS) JCS 1844/2,6 Apr 48, CCS 381 USSR (3-246) set 13. 

11. (TS) JCS 1844/3, 27 Apr 48, same file. General Spaatz was evidently referring to the combined 

US-UK-Canada staff conference that began on 12 April, as described in the ensuing paragraph. 

12. (TS) JSPC 877,22 Apr 48, same file. 

13. (TS) JCS 1844/4,6 May 48 and Dee On, 19 May 48, same file. (TS) JCS 1844/6,13 May 48, same 

file, SK 15. An elaborated but basically unchanged statement of strategy taken from BROILER was 

added to HALFMOON on 28 Jul48 by JCS 1844/10,18 Jun 48 and Dee On, 28 Jul48, same file, set 17. 

14. (TS) JCS 1844/13, 21 Jul 48, and Dee On, 22 Jul 48, same file, set 18. (TS) SMs-10545 to CSA, 

10546 to CNO, 10547 to CSAF, all 24 Jul 48, same file, set 19. (TS) Corrig, to JCS 1844 series, 28 Ott 48, 

same file, set 23. 

15. The major debate over strategic concepts is taken up in Ch. 10. 

16. (TS-KD) JCS 1974, 13 Dee 48 and Dee On, 23 Dee 48, CCS 373.11 (12-1448) set 1. The atomic 

annex to TROJAN was completed before the basic plan. 

17. (TS) App C to JCS 1844/32,29 Dee 48, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) set 26. 

18. (TS) JCS 1844/32, 2Y Dee 48 and Dee On, 28 Jan 4Y, same file, set 26. The establishment of 

Israel and the first Arab-Israeli war are treated in Ch. 3. 

19. (TS) SM-16949 to JSPC, 31 Jan 49 (derived from Dee On JCS 1844/32, 28 Jan 4Y), KS 381 

USSR (3-246) see 28. The FY 1950 Military budget is treated in Ch. 7. 

20. (TS) JSPC 877/3Y, 26 Jan 49, same file, set 27. (TS) JSI’C 877/43, 15 Prb 49; (TS) JSI’C 877/44, 

16 Feb 4Y, same file, SK 29. 

21. GEN Eisenhower’s role is explained in Ch. 8. 

22. (TS) Memo, DJS to CENs Wedemeyer and Norstad and ADM Struble, 25 Feb 49, and Att 

thereto, same file, set 30. 

23. (TS) SM-73449 to JSK, 26 Apr 49 (Encl to JCS 1844/37,27 Apr 49), same file, set 31. 

24. (TS) Memo, CJCS to SecDef, “Split Views on New Emergency War I’lan,” 3 Sep 49; (TS) 

DM-187 to JCS, 6 Sep 49; (TS) Memo, CNO to SecDef, Scr 00048OP30, 8 Sep 49; same file, set 38. (TS) 

JSPC 877/58, 10 May 49; (TS) JSPC X77/59, 26 May 49; same file, set 32. (TS) JSPC 877/61, 10 Jun 4Y, 

same file, set 33. (TS) JSI’C 877/65, 15 Jul49, same file, set 34. (TS) JSPC 877/66, 5 Aug 49, same file, 

set 3h. 

25. (TS) ABC 109, 3 Ott 49, same file, set 39. (TS) JSI’C 877/75, 12 Ott 49; (TS) JSI’C 877/77,25 Ott 

49; same file, xc 40. 

26. (TS) JCS 1844/46,8 Nov 49, and Dee On, 8 Dee 49, same file, set 41. 

27. (TS) NSC 20/4, 23 Nov 48, CCS 381 (5-1345) set 4. This paper is treated in detail in Ch. 7. 

320 
“noted” this conclusion on 1 December lY4Y and thus in effect approved the plan. (TS-RD) Dee On 

JCS 2056,24 Ott 4Y; (TS) jCS 2056/3,23 NW 4Y, and Dee On, 1 Dee 49, same file. 

29. (TS) JCS 1844/46,8 Nov 49, an d Dee On, 8 Dee 49, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) set 41. 

30. For the origin of the JSCI’ and the JSOP, see TIrc joink Chiefs of Staff arid Nntionnl Policy, 

7953-2954, vol. IV, Ch. 6, and vol. V, Ch. 4. 

31. (TS) SM-10701 to Ad Hoc Corn (RADM M. B. Gardner, USN, MC Richard C. Lindsay, USAF, 

and BG Robert M. Bathurst, USA), 16 Aug 48 (derived from JCS 19201, CCS 381 USSR (3-2246) set 20. 

(TS) JCS 1920/l, 31 Jan 49, same file, set 28. SM-X33-4’) to Ad Hoc Corn, 6 Mav 49, same file, set 31. 

(TS)jCS1920/5,19Dec4Y,andN/Hofsame,13Feb51,samefil~,BPpt3. _ 

32. (U) Memo, Chm, Mun Bd to ICS, 12 Nov 47, Encl to ICS 1725/13, 14 NOV 47, CCS 004.04 

(I 1 A-46) WC 7. 

33. (U) Memo, Chm, Mun Bd to JCS, 21 Jan 48, Encl to JCS 1725/14, 23 Jan 48, same file. 

34. (TS) Memo, JCS to Chm, Mun Bd, “Strategic Guidance for Industrial Mobilization Planning,” 

28 Jun 48 (derived from JCS 1725/1Y), same file, set 9. 

35. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 23 JuI 48, Encl to JCS 1909,24 Jul48, same file. 

36. (LJ) JCS 1725/22 and Dee On, 3 Sep 48, CCS 004.04 (11-4-46) set 11. 

37. (LJ) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Completion of Joint War Plan as Basis for Short-Range Mobilization Planning,” 14 Sep 48 (derived from JCS 1725/25), same file, set 12. One CVX “super carrier” was 

already under construction and became a major bone of contention in 1949, as described in Ch. 10. 

38. (LJ) SM-11369 to CSA, CSAF, CNO, Chm, Mun Bd, 6 Dee 48 (derived from JCS 1725/27), CCS 

004.04 (llL4-46) SK 14. 

39. (U) Memo, Chm, Mun Bd to JCS, 17 Feb 49, Encl to JCS 1725/34,1Y Feb 49, same file, set 15. 

40. (U) SM-736649 to CSA, CSAF, CNO, 27 Apr 49, and (U) SM-737-49 to JSPC, 27 Apr 49 (both 

derived from JCS 1725/42, same date), same file, set 16. 

41. (U) Memo, Dir, Statt, Mun Bd to JCS, 6 Jul49, Encl to JCS 1725/45,9 Jul4Y, same file, set 18. 

42. (LJ) JCS 1725/48, Y Aug 48; (U) JCS 1725/53,31 Aug 49, and Dee On, 6 Ott 49, same file, set 19. 

43. (U) JCS 1725/47,2 Aug 49, CCS 004.04 (111146) BP pt 1-B. 

44. (LJ) JCS 1725/62,13 Ott 49, same file, set 20. (U) JCS 1725/68,9 Dee 49; (U) JCS 1725/70,30 

Dee 49, and Dee On, 20 Jan 50; same file, xc 21. (IJ) Dee On JCS 1725/47, 20 Jan SO, same file, BP pt 

1-B. (Cl SM-174-50 to CSA, CNO, and CSAF, 25 Jan 50, same file, set 21. 

45. (LJ) Ltr, Chm, Mun Bd to Secys Army, Navy, Air Force, “Accelerated Production Planning,” 1 

Feb 50, same file. 

46. (TS) JCS 1725/103,19 Jan 51 and Dee On, 29 Jan 51, same file, set 31. 

Chapter 10. Challenges to Strategy 

I. “General Notes on the Question Naval Air-Air Force,” 27 Ott 48, Millis, Thr Forrcstal Dinrics, 

pp. 513-514. 

2. Ibid., p. 493. The war games were never held. 

3. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 23 Ott 48, Encl to JCS 1952, 25 Ott 48; (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 25 

Ott 48, Encl to JCS 1953, same date; CCS 373 (10-23-48) set 1. 

4. (TS) JCS 1952, 25 Ott 48; (TS) JCS lY53, 25 Ott 48, as amended by Corrigendum, 13 Jan 49, 

same file. 

5. The intelligence in question consisted of agreed British-American estimates of Soviet capabilities and intentions, of Soviet economic strength and industrial position provided by the CIA, and of 

target information furnished by the Air Intelligence Division. 

6. (TS) JCS 1953/l, 12 May 49, same file, BP 1. 

7. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Evaluation of Effect on Soviet War Effort Resulting from the Strategic Air Offensive,” 28 Ju149 (derived from Dee On JCS 1953/l), same file, set 4. 

8. (TS) JCS 1952/ 1,21 Dee 48, CCS 373 (10-23-48) set 1. 

9. (TS) JCS 1952/2,11 Jan 49, same file. 

10. (TS) JCS 1952/3,21 Jan 49, same file. 

11. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Evaluation of Current Strategic Air Offensive Plans,” 17 Feb 49, 

(derived from JCS 1952/l), same file. 

321 
13. (TS) JCS 1952/4,3 Mar 49, CCS 373 (10-Z-48) set 2. 

14. (TS) JCS lY52/7, 7 Apr 49, and Dee On, 14 Apr 49, same file. (U) Memo, DJS to Dir, WSEG, 

“Projects for Consideration by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group,” 15 Apr 49, CCS 334 WSEG 

(2448) set 2. 

15. (TS) JCS 1952/s, 25 Aug 49, CCS 373 (10-23-18) set 5. 

16. (U) Ltr, SecDcf to Congressman William E. Hess, 15 May 48, Encl to Ltr, SecDef to GEN Eiscnhower, 15 Apr 49, CCS 561 (5-26-48). Paul Y. Hammond, “Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers, ” in 

Harold Stein, ed., Amerirnw Ciz&Mi/itar!/ Dmisions (1963), pp. 468-470. See also Ch. 5, pp. 94-95. 

17. A table appended with the JCS submission listed four large carriers (designated CVX), of 

which one was indicated as already in commission and the other three as “building.” 

18. (C) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Present and Future Aircraft Requirements of the Armed Services,” 

11 Dee 47 (derived from JCS 17Y6/6); (U) JCS 1796/7, IO Dee 47; CCS 452 U.S. (8-l-47) set 3. The Finletter Commission is discussed in Ch. 6. 

19. (U) Memo for Record, MC Alfred M. Gruenther, “Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff,” 26 Mar 48, CCS 370 (B-19-45) set 7. 

20. Millis, The Forwstul Diark, p. 393. The tonnage of the super carrier was variously given as 

65,000 or 80,000, the two figures presumably representing “standard” and “full load” displacement, 

respectively. 

21. Hammond, Supw Cnrrim md K-36 Bombers, p, 475. 

22. (U) Hearings, Sundry Legislation Affertirrg t/w Navul rrrd Military Es~ablishrncvts, H. Corn on 

Armed Services, 80th Cong, 2d sess, pp. 6860,6892-6893. 

23. Typewritten account of speech by GEN Spaatx, apparently copied from a newspaper or perhaps intended as a press release, Att to office memo, “B” to MG Gruenther, 26 May 48, CCS 561 

(5-26-48). The account of this speech in NY Times, 26 May 48, p. 50, is shorter and devotes most of its 

attention to the remarks of GEN Vandenberg, who spoke at the same meeting. 

24. (IJ) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Construction of 6A Carrier,” 28 May 48, CCS 561 (5-26-48). The 

significance of the designation “6A” is unexplained. On 27 May President Truman told Admiral 

Leahy that he was under the impression that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the super carrier 

in connection with the 1949 Service budgets. He added that “he had recently called in those fellows 

[the Joint Chiefs of Staff] on this business of presenting a united front to these questions and that hc 

expected that that would be done.” (U) Memo, Secy, JCS to DJS, 27 May 48, same file. 

25. Hammond, Super Carriws nrd B-36 Bornkrs, pp. 481-482. Walter Miliis, Arms ard fhc Skztc 

(19.581, p. 240. 

26. Testimony of Louis Johnson, Hearings, Nntio?rul DC@ISC Propm, Urrifimtiorl and Strntqy, t-1. 

Corn on Armed Services, 81st Cong, 1st sess, p. 619. 

27. (U) Ltr, SecDef to GEN Eisenhower, 15 Apr 49, CCS 561 (5-26-48). 

28. (U) Memo, GEN Eisenhower to GEN Bradley, GEN Vandenberg, ADM Denfeld, GEN Gruenther, 20 Apr 49; (U) Memo, CSA to SecDef “Construction of the Super Aircraft Carrier USS Utlikd 

Sfn&,” 22 Apr 49; same file. 

29. (U) Memo, CNO to SecDef, “The USS Unifed St&s,” 22 Apr 49, same file. 

30. KJ) Memo, CSA to SecDef, “Construction of the Super Aircraft Carrier USS Urritcd Strltcs,” 22 

Apr 49, same file. 

31. (U) Memo, CSAF to SecDef, “The CVA-58 Project,” 23 Apr 49, same file. 

32. KJ) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 23 Apr 49, same file. 

33. Johnson Testimony, H. Hrgs, National Defo~se Progrnru, Unificntion rind Sfrntqy, pp. 61YP620. 

(U) Memo, SecDef to SecNav, 23 Apr 49, CCS 561 (5-26-48). 

34. Ltr, SecNav to SecDef, 26 Apr 4Y, in H. Hrgs, Nationnl Dq%nse I’ropm~, Unificutiorl nd Stratq~, 

pp. 622-623. 

35. KJ) Ltr, ActgSecNav to SecDef, 4 May 49, End to (U) Memo, W. J. McNeil to JCS, 16 May 49; 

(U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Modification of Navy Shipbuilding Program for F’Y 1950,” 10 Jan 49; CCS 

561 (5-2648). 

36. KJ) Memo, SecDef to Sets Army, Navy, Air Force, and JCS, “Modification of Navy Shipbuilding Program for Fiscal Year 1950,” 21 Jun 49, same file. 

The War Council, set up by the National Security Act of 1947, consisted of the Secretary of Defense 

as Chairman, the Service Secretaries, and the Service Chiefs. In the 1949 Amendments to the Act, the 

name was changed to Armed Forces Policy Council and the JCS Chairman was added as a member. 

322 
38. (U) H. Hrgs, Immti~~atiorr of fh? B-36 Uomber Prqyrarn, pp. 42-88. 

39. KJ) Memo, SecAir Force to SecDef, 28 fan 4Y, App A to JCS lY79,3 Feb 49, CCS 370 (E-19-45) 

set 13; KJ) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 12 Feb 49, Encl to JC< i979/2, 14 Feb 49; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 

“Release of Funds to the DeDartment of the Air Force,” 21 Feb 49 (derived from YCS 1979/3); same 1 

file, see 14. 

41. H. Hrgs, Inuesfi~~ation of the B-36 Born/w Pro~ymrrr, pp. 88-90, 479. (U) JCS 1979/4, 4 Apr 4Y, and 

Dee on, Y Apr 49, KS 370 (B-19,-45) set 14. 

42. Hammond, Super Carriers and H-36 Bombers, p. 4Y7; House Resolution 234, 81st Gong, 1st sess, 

8 Jun 49. 

43. Report No. ‘l470, “Investigation of the B-36 Bomber Program,” l-1. Corn on Armed Services, 

Blst Gong, 2d sess, p. 2. (Hereafter, B-36 Report.) 

44. B-36 Report, p. 33 

45. (U) Memo, Set, OSD Staff Council to DJS, 13 Jun 49; (U) Memo for Record, DepSecy JCS, 

“Congressional Investigation of the B-36 Program,” 21 Jun 49; CCS 373 (10-23-48) set 2. . 

46.(U) Undated extract of Minutes of War Council, filed under date 17 lune but evidentlv of 

the meeting of 22 June, same file. See (TS) Memo for Record, “Congressional Investigation oi the 

B-36 Bomber Program,” 23 Jun 49, same file, which states that JCS “agreed that General Gruenther 

should prepare a suggested answer to question #7 of the Vinson questionnaire, which the Chiefs 

were directed to prepare following discussion of the overall problem at the War Council meeting 

of 22 June.” 

47. (U) SM-1344-49 to ADM Denfeld, GEN Bradley, GEN Vandenberg, 16 Jul49, same file. For 

evidence that the JCS statement was delivered to the Nouse Armed Services Committee, see H. 

Hrgs, Ifzz~estigntion of B-36 Bomber Program, p. 170, and Nntionnl D@~se Program, Ut@zfion arid 

Strukyy, p. 453. 

48. Hammond, Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers, pp. 498,505-506. 

49. H. Hrgs, The National Defense Pro~~r’mm, Utzificafion and Strategy, pp. 2-3,350. 

50. H. Hrgs, T/w Nntionnl Dcfinse Prqyrm, Un$cation and Sfrutqy, pp. 41112. 

51. For unofficial examples of extreme Air Force partisanship, see a group of three articles by 

William Bradford Huie in Kc&r’s Digest, Dee 48, Jan 49, and Mar 49 (reprinted in H. Hrgs, Irwsti~yntion of B-26 Bornbrr Progrmz, pp. 579-591). On the effect of partisan Service publicity in exacerbating 

the Navy-Air Force disagreement, see Hammond, S~ff~cr Cnrricrs atid B-36 Bonrhcrs, passim, esp. pp. 

491-492. 

52. Testimony of CPT F. M. Trapnell, LCDR E. W. Harrison, CDR W. 1. Martin, CDR W. N. 

Leonard, and Mr. A. Hyatt, H. Hrgs, T/j? National Dt~@zsc~ Progrnm, Unificatiorl and Strategy, pp. 

132-166. 

53. See above, pp. 173-174. 

54. Fl. Hrgs, The Notional D+nsr Prqgrmn, Unificntion arld Stratqqy, p, 42. 

55. Ibid, pp. 166-170. 

56. Ibid., pp. 183-189. 

57. Ibid., pp. 39-349, passim. 

58. Admiral Denfeld’s testimony is given in ibid., pp. 349-364. 

59. H. Hrgs, Nntioml De@m Prqrum, Ut~ification ~7nLi Stratqy, pp. 350-353. ADM Denfeld was 

followed to the witness stand by GEN Clifton B. Cates, Commandant, USMC, who expressed similar views. 

60. GEN Collins also testified, but he devoted his testimony largely to refuting the charge that the 

Army was trying to destroy the Marine Corps. Ibid., pp. 543 ff. 

61. Ibid., pp. 522,523. 

62. Ibid., p. 456. 

63. Ibid., p. 522. 

64. Ibid., p. 457. 

65. Ibid., pp. 456-457. 

66. Ibid., p. 524. 

67. Ibid., p. 528. 

68. Secretary Johnson had, however, seen the memorandum in draft and had discussed the matter 

with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See above, p. 179. 

69. See Ch. 7. 

323 
US Marine Corps, co-equal status with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the consideration of 

matters that directly concerned the Marine Corps. Rotation of the JCS Chairmanship was not made 

the subject of legislation, though it has been generally followed in practice. 

72. Public PU~EYS, Trumnn, 7949, pp. 535-536. 

73. tf. Hrgs, Natiorzul Dcfcwst~ Progrum, Ilrlificntiorr ad Strukgy, p. 614. 

74. (TS) JCS lY52/11,10 Feb 50, CCS 373 (10-23-48) BP 2C. 

75. (1s) JCS IY53/6,6 Mar 50 and Dee On, 24 Apr 50; (TS) JCS 1952/13,30 Ott 50; same file, set 6. 

Chapter 11. Collective Defense of the Atlantic Community 

2. Lord lsmay, NATO, 7%~ First Fizv hw, 1949-1954, p. 7. 

3. (LJ) Memo, Dir, EUR to SecState, 19 Jan 48, quoting Belgian Premier Spaak; (U) Msg, Paris 219 

to State, 1Y Feb 48, quoting Benelux note replying to British-French proposal; (U) Ed. Note summarizing a ltr, French Foreign Min to US SecState, 4 Mar 48, describing effects of Czech coup; Dept of State, 

Foreign Rclulions of hc Unikd States, 1948, vol 111, l&stern Europe (1974), pp. 6-Y, 26-29, 38. lsmay, 

NATO, 7%~ First Five Yours, p, 8. Peter Calvocoressi, Surzq ofl~~kwationul Affairs, 1947-1948 (1952), pp. 

107-I 08. 

4. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Docurrwnts OM Irrtwra~ionnl Affuirs, 1947-1948 (1952), pp. 

225230. 

5. Documcwts on Intrrrfntior~al Af%irs, 1947-1948, pp. 202-210. 

6. (U) Ltr, UK Amb to SecState, 13 Jan 48, and Encl thereto: “Summary of a Memorandum Representing Mr. Bevin’s Views on the Formation of a Western Union, “Foreigrr Rclaliorfs, 1948, vol 111, pp. 3-6. 

7. Truman, Years of Triul und Hopr, p. 243. (U) Ltr, SecState to UK Amb, 20 Jan 48, Fowip Rrlutior~s, 

7948, vol 111, pp. 8-9. 

8. (U) Dcpt of State Memcons, UK Amb and USecState, 27 Jan 48, 6 Feb 48; (LJ) Ltrs, USecState to 

UK Amb, 2 Feb 48, UK Amb to USecState, h Feb 48; ForkgIl Relnths, 1948, vol 111, pp. 12-14, 21-23, 

I7p 18,l Y-20. 

9. Public Pqws, Trumun, 2948, p. 184. 

10. (U) NSC 9, 13 Apr 48, Fore&w Rclntions, 2948, vol. 111, pp. 85-88. 

11. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “The position of the United States with Respect to Support for Western Union and Other Related Free Countries,” 23 Apr 48 (derived from JCS 1868/l); (TS) Encl and 

App to JCS 1868/l, 17 Apr 48 as amended by Dee On, 22 Apr 48; CCS 092 W. Eur. (3-12-48) set 2. 

12. (U) Msg, UK Foreign Secy and French Foreign Min to SecState, 17 Apr 48, Forcip Rrlutions, 

1948, vol 111, p. 91. Acheson had succeeded Marshall as Secretary of State on 21 January 1949. 

13. (U) Dept of State Memcon, Lovett, Marshall, Vandenberg, Dulles, 27 Apr 48, Forcip Relations, 

7948, vol 111, pp. 104-108. 

14. NSC Y/l, an earlier revision, was overtaken by these events and was withdrawn. 

15. (U) NSC Y/Z, 11 May 48, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3-12-48) set 2. 

16. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Support for Western Union and Other Related Free Countries,” 19 May 48 (derived from JCS 1868/h); (U) Encl to JCS 

1868/h, 17 May 48; same file. 

17. (U) Note by ExecSecy to NSC, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Support for 

Western Union. ,” 28 Jun 48, same file, set 3. 

1X. Senate Resolution 239, Con~qrcssionnl Record, vol. 94, pt. 6, 11 Jun 48, p. 7847. 

19. (U) NSC 9/3, 28 Jun 48, App to Encl to JCS 1868/10, 3 1~1148; Fort~i~yn Rdutions, 7948, vol 111, pp. 

140-141. 

20. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 25 Jun 48, Encl to JCS 1868/7, 28 Jun 48; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 

“U.S. Military Representation with the Five-Power Permanent Military Committee,” (derived from 

KS 1868/Y), 1 1~148; (U) N/H, ICS 1868/Y, 7 1~148; (TS) Dee On JCS 1868/11,8 Jul48; CCS 092 W. 

Eur. (3-1248) set 3. 

21. (TS) SM-10447 to US Reps Attending London Five I’ower Militarv Talks on the Western Union 

of Nations (derived from JCS 1868/11), Y Jul48, same file, set 4. 

22. SW Ch. 9. 

23. (TS) MemCon, US JCS to Reps UK COS, I6 Jun 48, CCS OY2 W. Eur. (3-12-48) set 2. 

24. (U) Att to DM-48 to Secy, Br Jt Svcs Mission, 23 Jul48, same file, set 4. 

324 
file, set 6. 

26. (U) Memo for Record, OSD, “Newport Conference-Decisions with Respect to Command,” 23 

Aug 48; (TS) Memo, SecState to I&s, “Western Union Organization of Defensive Forces,” 23 Aug 48; 

(U) Memo, Pres to SecState, 23 Aug 48; (U) SM-10762 to Secy, Br Jt Svcs Mission, 24 Aug 48; CCS 092 

W. Eur. (3-1248) set 5. (U) Telcon DATT 1084, SccA, CSA, USCINCEUR, 25 Aug 48, same file, set 6. 

27. (U) Msgs, DELWU 40 to DA, 5 Sep 48, CM IN 963, same file; DELWU 54 to DA, 25 Sep 48, 

and DELWU 60 to DA, 29 Sep 48, same file, set 8. Calvocoressi, Survey OIL Irrttwrntiord Affairs, 

1947-1948, p. 113. 

28. (U) Msg, DA WARX YO3Y5 to CINCEUR, 0623412 Ott 48, same file, set 9. 

2Y. (1‘S) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 26 Ott 48, w/Encl (Encl and App to JCS 1868/26), same file. (U) 

Memo, JCS to SecDef, “United States Participation in the Permanent Western Union Chiefs of Staff 

Committee,” 13 Dee 48, (derived from JCS 1868/33), same file, set 12. (TS) Ltr, SecStatc to SecDef, 23 

Dee 48, Encl to JCS 1868/43, 3 Jan 49, same file, set 14. 

30. (TS) Army Gen Staff, I’&0 Div, “Brief of Outline of Short-Term Plan (1 July 1949) for Defense 

of Western Europe (WE/HQ/1/147, 25 Jan 49),” Encl to (TS) Memo, OSD (LTC Twitchell) to GEN 

Guenther, “Outline of Short-Term Plan for Defense of Western Europe,” 7 Mar 49, CCS 092 W. Eur. 

(3-1248) set 17. 

31. (TS) JCS 1868/63, 8 Mar 49, same file. (TS) Memo, OSD (LTC Twitchell) to DJS, “Outline of 

Short-Term Plan for Defense of Western Europe,” 18 Apr 49, same file, set 20. 

32. (TS) Memo, ActgSecState to ExecSecy, NSC, “Developments with Respect to Western Union,” 

5 Nov 48 (Encl to JCS 1868/28,10 N ov 48), same file, set 10. For a fuller account of the initial negotiations, see (U) records of “Washington Exploratory Talks on Security,” evidently prepared by DcpSecState, summarizing meetings held on 6-9 Jul 48. Fowign Rdations, 7948, vol 111, pp. 148-160, 163-182; 

also (TS) document, “Washington Exploratory Conversations on Security,” n.d. (filed under date 9 Jul 

48, in same file), which records a general preliminary agreement reached by the delegates. 

33. Two alternative definitions of the “North Atlantic Area” were incorporated into the draft, 

reflecting the unresolved dispute over the inclusion of French North Africa (see text below); according to one definition, the area would include northwestern Africa and the western Mediterranean. 

Both definitions, however, were less inclusive than the one in NSC 9 to which the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

had objected. Neither made any reference to islands, and both specified the Tropic of Cancer as the 

southern limit of the waters and the air of the North Atlantic Area. 

34. (TS) Memo, ActgSecState to ExecSecy, NSC, 5 Nov 48, cited in fn 32. (U) Rpt of Working 

Group on Washington Security Talks, 24 Dee 48, Farc~~~n Relations, 1948, vol. 111, pp. 333-343. 

35. (TS) Ltr, ActgSecState to SecDef, 28 Dee 48, App to Encl B to JCS 1868/40; (TS) Memo, SecDef 

to JCS, 30 Dee 48, Encl B to JCS 1868/40; CCS UY2 W. Eur. (3-1248) set IO. 

36. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “North Atlantic Pact,” 5 Jan 49, (derived from JCS 1868/40), CCS 

092 W. Eur. (3-1248) set 14. 

37. Acheson, I’rmvzt at the Crmtion, pp. 276-277,280-282. 

38. Ibid., pp. 277-279. 

39. Hearings, “North Atlantic Treaty,” S. Corn on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong, 1st sess, pt 1, pp. 

285-295. 

40. Ismay, NATO, The First Five Years, 3949-7954, pp. 12-19. 

41. (U) JCS 1868/53,1 Feb 49, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3-12-48) set 15 A. 

42. (TS) UK CofS C.O.S. (49) 92, 18 Mar 49, Encl to Memo, Secv, Br It Services Mission RDC 5/76 

to DJS, 24 Mar 49, same file, set 18. 

43. (TS) Encl to Memo, Secv, Br It Services Mission RDC 5/85 to DIS, 10 Mav 49, same file, set 21 

44. (U) Memo, JCS to Secdef, “Proposed Military Organization Under the korth Atlantic Treaty,” 

23 Jun 49 (derived from JCS 1868/87), same file, set 23. 

45. (U) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 29 Jun 49, Encl to JCS 1868/89, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3-1248) set 24; 

(TS) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 22 Jul4Y, Encl B to JCS 1868/93; same file, set 25. 

46. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Proposed Military Organization under the North Atlantic Treaty” 

(derived from ICS 1868/93), 2 Aua 49, same file. 

47. The other nation, Iceland, Yhad.no military forces. 

48. (U) JCS 1868/100,18 Aug 49, as amended by Dee On, 19 Aug 49, same file, set 26. 

49. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Proposed Military Organization under the North Atlantic Treaty,” 

22 Aug 49, (derived from JCS 1868/100), same file. 

325 
y, , , p

51. (TS) Extract from Msg, UK CofS to Br Jt Services Mission, 29 Aug 49, CCS 092 W. Eur. 

(3-1248) set 27. 

52. (S) Memo, Secy Br Jt Services Mission to DJS, RDC 5/109, 7 Sep 49, same file. 

53. (S) Memo, ADM Glover to GEN Gruenther, “Atlantic Pact Military Program,” 7 Sep 49, 

same file. 

54. (TS) Dep of State Memcon, Achilles, Unger, Luciolh, “Italian Views on the Pact Organization,” 

23 Aug 49, same file, set 26. 

55. (S) ICI’0 D-5, Draft No. 2, “Report of International Working Group on North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization,” 12 Sep 49, Encl “A” to JCS 1868/ 104,13 Sep 4Y, same file, set 28. 

56. (TS) JCS 1868/104, 13 Sep 59, and Dee On, 16 Sep 49; (S) JCS 1868/109, 17 Sep 49; CCS 092 W. 

Eur. (3-1248) set 28. 

57. (TS) Dept of State Memcon, Bevin, Acheson and others, “Conversation with Mr. Bevin on 

North Atlantic i’act,” 14 Sep 49, same file. 

58. (S) Memo. North Atlantic Treatv Team to ADM Davis, “Extract from Aide Memoire discussed 

with Mr. Achilles Yesterday,” 14 Sep 4Y: same file. 

59. (TS) Dept of State Memcon, Bevin, Acheson, and others, “Conversation with Mr. Bevin on 

North Atlantic Pact,” 14 Sep 49, same file. 

60. (U) NAC Council D-l/l, D-l/2, 11-l /3, all 17 Scp 49, Encls to JCS 1868/ 122, 29 Sep 49, CCS 

092 W. Eur. (3-l 248) set 29. 

61. (U) JCS 1868/135,27 Ott 49, and Dee On, same date, same file, set 33. 

62. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Draft Terms of Reference for North Atlantic Military Production 

and Supply Board” (derived from JCS 1868/127), 4 Ott 49, same file, set 30. (TS) No originator, “Background on North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ” n.d. [ca. 8 Dee 491, same file, set 37. 

63. (TS) Document ca., 8 Dee 49, cited in last note. (U) No originator, “Subjects Proposed for Discussion by the Defense Committee, North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” 2d draft, 26 Sep 49, App and 

Ann to JCS 1868/118; (U) JCS 1868/118, 27 Sep 49 and Dee On, 29 Sep 49, same file, set 29. (C) 

DM-203 to JCS, 30 Sep 49; (U) JCS 1868/128 (Red Band), 3 Ott 49; same file, set 30. 

64. (TS) JCS 1868/130,3 Ott 49, and Dee On, I1 Ott 49, CCS OY2 W. Eur. (3-1248) set 31. (TS) Encl 

B to JCS 1868/136, 15 Ott 4Y; (U) JCS 2073, 18 Ott 49; MC 3, 19 Ott 49, same file; set 32. (TS) JCS 

2073/l, 22 Nov 49, same file, set 35; (U) JCS 2073/2,13 Dee 49, same file, set 37. (TS) NAC, Summary 

Report of 3d Session, 11 Jan 50, same file, set 39. 

65. (TS) JCS 1868/136, 15 Ott 49, and Dee On, 25 Ott 49, same file, set 32. 

66. (TS) DM-226 to GENs Bradley, Vandenberg, Collins, ADM Sherman, 2 Nov 49, CCS 092 W. 

Eur. (3-1248) set 33A. (TS) N/H of JCS 1868/136,8 Nov 49, same file, set 32. 

67. (TS) SG 13, Encl B to JCS 1868/169, 28 Dee 49, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3-1248) set 38. EncI 13 is SG 

13/Y, the revision of SG 13 incorporating national comments. But as these comments are indicated as 

“line-in, line-out” changes on the original text, it is possible to reconstruct SG 13 from it. SC; 13 itself 

cannot now be located. 

68. (TS) SC 13/9, Encl B to JCS 1868/16Y, 28 Dee 4Y, same file. 

69. (TS) SM-2700-49 to US Rep SG, NATO, 30 Dee 49, same file, set 39 (derived from JCS 

1868/ 169, same file, set 38). 

70. (TS) SG 13/16, 4 Jan 50, originally Encl to JCS 2073/3, 16 Jan 50, same file, set 40, but subsequently destroyed. Final changes made by the Standing Group in SG 13/9 are therefore impossible 

to determine. 

71. (U) Msg, JCS to JCS Jt Rep EUR et al., WARX YXYIO, 26 Jan 50 (derived from JCS 2073/4), same 

file, set 40. 

72. (U) Ltr, CNO to AsstSecState (EUR), 21 Ott 49, same file, set 32. 

73. (TS) NATO Medium Term Defense Plan, I lul 54, n.d., Encl to (TS) Memo, LTG Crittenberger 

to DJS, 3 Mar 50, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3-1248) set 42.. 

74. (TS) Memo, JCS to SC, NATO, “North Atlantic Treaty Organization Medium Term Defense 

Plan, 1 July 1954, Parts I and ICI,” 22 Mar 50 (derived from JCS 2073/H), same file, set 43. 

75. (TS) Dept of State Paper, FMD B-2/2, 1 May 50, same file, set 45; (TS) Draft Directive by SG to 

Reg Plan Grps, 3 May 50, App to Encl to JCS 2073/20,8 May 50, same file, set 46. 

76. See Chs. 7-10 of The joint Chiefs of Staffand Nntionnl Policy, 1950-7952. 

326 
Fairchild, “The US Army and the Military Assistance Program,” Ch. 9, pp. 25-28. 

2. Fairchild, “US Army and the Military Assistance Program,” Ch. Y, pp. 23-25. 

3. (U) NSC 14,14 Jun 48, Encl B to JCS 1868/B, CCS 092 (8-2246) set 12. 

4. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, 1 Jr1148 (derived from JCS 1868/B), 30 Jun 48, same file. 

5. (TS) NSC, “Policies of the Government of the United States.. Relating to the National Security, 

vol. I, lY47-1948,” pp. 37-39, CCS 334 NSC (9-25-47) BP 1. 

6. (U) NSC Y/3, 28 Jun 48, Fon~igrr Rrlatiom, 7949, vol III, pp. 140-141. This paper is treated in 

more detail in Ch. 11. 

7. (TS-GE 1) SANACC 360/11,18 Aug 48, Encl to JCS 1925,20 Aug 48, CCS 092 (H-22246) set 13. 

8. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Military Aid Priorities,” 1 Nov 4X (derived from JCS 1925/l) same 

file, xc 14. 

Y. (TS-GI’ 1) SANACC, Decision Amending SANACC 360/11, 15 Mar 49, same file. 

10. (U) JCS 1868/13,12 Jul48, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3-1248) xc 4. 

11. (LJ) JCS 1868/16,5 Aug 48, same file, SK 5. 

12. (LJ) JCS 1868/18,3 Sep 48, same file, set 6. 

13. (U) JCS 1868/20,17 Sep 48, same file. 

14. (U) JCS 1868/2Y, 12 Nov 48, CCS 092 W. Eur. (3-12-48) set 10. For COGWHEEL, see Ch. 9. 

15. (U) JCS 1868/42,31 Dee 48, same file, set 14. 

16. (LJ) Dee on JCS 1868/29, 11 Jan 49, same file, set 10. (TS) SM-79-49 to JMAC and JSPC, 13 Jan 

49, same file, xc 15. 

17. (U) JCS 1868/39,30 Dee 48, and Dee On, 11 Jan 49, same file, SK 13. 

18. (TS) SM-10447, Y Jul48 to US Reps London Five Power Talks (derived from JCS 1868/11); (TS) 

Msg, DELWU 4 to DA, 23 JuI 48, CM IN 4940; CCS BY2 W. Eur. (3-12-48) set 4. (U) Msg DELWU 80 to 

DA, 21 Ott 48, same file, xc 9. 

IY. (U) Msg, DELWU 80 to DA, 21 Ott 48, same file. 

20. (TS) Msg, WAR 91426 to DELWU, 25 Ott 48, same file. 

21. (U) Extract from MC(49111, 17 Jan 49, in App C to Encl A to JCS 1868/58, Y Feb 4Y, CCS 092 

(B-22-46) set 18. MC(49)l was not available to the author. 

22. (IJ) FC(48)23, 23 Nov 48, quoted in App 8, Encl A, JCS 1868/58, same file. FC(48)23 was not 

available to the author. 

23. The “informal list of deficiencies” and the “generalized statement of deficiencies” in MC(49)l 

were likewise unavailable; hence, no description of materiel shortages is possible. 

24. (U) MC(49)5,13 Jan 49, quoted in App A, Encl A, JCS 1868/58, CCS OY2 (S-22-46) set 18. 

25. (U) JCS 1868/58,9 Feb 49, and Dee On, 11 Feb 49, same file. 

26. Fairchild, “US Army and the Military Assistance Program,” p. 45. 

27. (U) Ltr, Pres to SecState, 13 Apr 49, App A to JCS l868/72, CCS 092 (B-2246) set 24. 

28. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS et al., 6 Jan 49, Encl to JCS 1868/47, 7 Jan 49, CCS 092 (B-22-46) set 

16. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Foreign Military and Economic Aid Programs.” 14 Feb 49 (derived 

from JCS 1868/4Y), same file, set 18. 

29. Fairchild, “US Army and the Military Assistance Program,” p. 46. 

30. (IJ) Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef to JCS, et al., 8 Feb 49, Encl to JCS 1868/57, 9 Feb 49, CCS 092 

(B-2246)sec 18. 

31. (U) FACC D-3,7 Feb 49, App A to JCS 1868/57, Y Feb 49, same file. 

32. (U) FACC D-3/1,7 Feb 49, App B to JCS 1868/57,9 Feb 49, same file. 

33. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Basic Statement of Policy Concerning the Foreign Military Assistance Program,” 21 Feb 49, (derived from JCS 1868/59), same file, set 19. 

34. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Foreign Military Aid Program,” 14 Mar 49 (derived from JCS 

1868/62),CCSOY2 (8-2246)sec21. 

35. (S) FACC D-7/1, 5 Mar 49; same file, set 20. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 17 Mar 49, Encl to JCS 

1868/64, same date, same file, see 21. (U) Encl B, JCS 1868/111,20 Sep 49, same file, set 29. 

36. (U) Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef for Mil Asst to DJS, et al., 27 Apr 49, Encl to JCS 1868/73, same 

file, SK 24. 

37. “Special Message to the Congress on the Need for a Military Aid Program,” 25 Jul 49, P~rblic 

Pqws of the Presidents: Truman, 1949 (1964), pp. 395-400. 

38. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 2949, pp. 79-84. 

39. HR 5895,81st Gong, 1st sess, 5 Aug 49. 

40. Hearings, “Military Assistance Programs,” S. Corns on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, 

81st Cong, 1st sess, pp. 88-91. 

327 
() , y , p , , p , 

(S-22-46) set 28. 

44. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Reprogramming the FY 1950 Foreign Military Assistance I’rogram,” 23 Sep 49 (derived from JCS 1868/111), CCS 092 (s-22-46) set 29. 

45. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Reprogramming the FY 1950 Foreign Military Assistance I’rogram,” 23 Sep 49 (derived from JCS 1868/111), same file, set 29. 

Chapter 13. The Communist Victory in China 

I, The events summarized in this section are fully described in ‘T/w /oint Clzic~s of Stuffur7d Noliond 

PO/iC!/, 79457947. 

2. Dcpt of State, Utritcd Stut~s R~~lutiorrs 70ith China (194Y), pp. Y3Y-Y72. 

3. Ibid., pp. 225-226, 360-367. Details of US military and economic aid to China are shown below, 

in the Table on pp. 252-253. 

4. Chih-Pu Liu, A Militar,y ffiskmy o~Modrrr~ Chilm, 7927- 2949 (1956), p. 228. 

5. US Relations with China, p. 356. Tang Tsou, Arnrricu’s kilure in China, 3941L1950 (1963), pp. 428, 453. 

6. US Rclatians with China, pp. 311-317. 

7. (U) Memo, JCS to SWNCC; “United States Policy Towards China,” Y Jun 47 (derived from JCS 

1721/4), CCS 452 China (4-3-45) set 7, pt 1, also in Dept of State, Forci,~n Relations of the United Stutes 

7947, vol. VII, T/w Fur East: Chinu, (1972); pp. 838-848. . 

8. (U) Memo, &State to IJSecState, 2 1~1147; (U) Memo, LTG Wedemever to SecState, 2 1~147; (U) 

Memo, Dir, Off Far Eastern Aff to SecState, 6 Jul 47; (U) Memo, SecState tc>‘Pres, 8 Jul 47; “Dkective to 

General Wedemeyer,” sgd Harry S Truman, Y Jul 47; Forkgf~ Relations,1947, vol. VII, pp. 635441. 

9. US Relations zuith Ckirnl, pp. 764, 824. 

10. (U) Memo, LTG Wedemeyer to Pres, 19 Sep 47, and Encl thereto (“Report to the President”), 

US Relations with China, pp. 764-814. 

11. Acheson, Prrwnt at the Cwution, p. 304; US Relutiorls with Chirm, p. 260. 

12. Fowign Relations, 1947, vol. Vll, pp. 90%Y12. 

13. US Relations with Ckirlu, pp. 371-387, 981-985. Hearings, Foreign Policy for n Post- Wur Rrcowry 

Pro~yrnrn, H. Corn on Foreign Affairs, 80th Gong., 1st sess, pt 2, pp. 154551547. 

14. H. Hrgs, Foreign Policy@ Post-War Rmwq Program, pp. 1562-1569. 

15. US Relntiom with China, pp. 380384. 

16. US Rclntions with China, pp. 387-390, 991-993; Title IV of PL 472; PL 793; 80th Cong. 

17. Ltr, Chinese Amb to SecState, 2 Jun 48, Dept of State, Forc?p Relations of thr United State, 1948, 

vol. Vlll, 7%~ Fur East: China (lY73), pp. 80-83. US Relations z&h China, pp. 946-950. 

18. (TS) NSC 6,26 Mar 48, CCS 452 China (4-345) set 7, pt 1. The italics are those of the author. 

19. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Position of the United States Regarding Short-Term Assistance to 

China,” 1 Apr 48 (derived from JCS 1721/s), same file, set 7 pt 2. 

20. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Possible Courses of Action for the United States with Respect to the 

Critical Situation in China,” 5 Aug 48 (derived from JCS 1721 /l I; circulated as NSC 22/ I, h Aug 4X), 

same file. 

Secy Royall’s memo and the JCS comments were referred to the NSC Staff in connection with the 

problem of US forces in Tsingtao, which is discussed later in this chapter. 

21. Ibid., pp. 346-347. (S) “Final Report of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group to the 

Republic of China,” 27 Feb 49, Annex II, p. 1, CCS 452 China (4-345) BP pt 1. 

22. (S) “Final Report of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of 

China,” Annex III, p. 1, same file. US Relations with Chinu, pp. 341-343. 

23. (U) Ltr, Se&-my to SecDef, 7 Feb 48, Encl to JCS fi30/23, same date, CCS 452 China (4-O-45) 

set 8. (U) ICS 1330/27, 27 Mav 48, same file, set 9. (U) Memo, ICS to SecDef, “Prouosed Directive 

Governini the Establishment kd’operation of the Military Ad-visory Group in C&a,” 11 Jun 48 

(derived from JCS 1330/27) same file, set 10. 

24. Memo of Conversation by SecState, 11 Jun 48, Fowigtf Rclntiom, 1948, vol. Vlll, pp. YO--9Y. 

25. Dept of State, Fowip Rrlntims of the Unitrd Staks, 7946, vol. X, Tire Fur Eust: Chirm, (1972) pp. 

822-823. (S) JCS 1330/32,23 Jun 48, and Dee On, 14 Jul 48, CCS 452 China (4-345) set 10. Memo, Ch, 

Div CA to Dir, OFEA, 15 Jun 48; Memo, BG Carter to DJS, 16 Jun 48; Forcip~ Relations, 1948, vol. VIII, 

pp. 257-259,265-266. 

26. Approval of the President may be assumed but is not documented in available records. 

328 
, y y j, pp

29. Ibid., pp. 260-264. 

30. (TS) Msg, JUSMAGCHINA, CYF 562 OAGB to JCS, 2 Nov 48, CM IN 173, CCS 452 China 

(4-345) set 11. (S) “Final Report of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic 

of China,” Annex VII, pp. 3-6, same file, BP pt 1; (U) Msg Dir, JUSMAGCHINA ZX 42027 to JCS et al., 

3 Mar 49, same file, set 12. 

31. (U) Msg, COMNAVWESPAC to CNO, 03004.52 May 48, Encl A to JCS 1330/25, 11 May 48; 

(TS) Memo for Info, OCNO, “Military Situation in Shantung Province, China,” 5 May 48, Encl C to 

JCS 1330/25; same file, set 9. 

32. (TS) JCS 1330/25, 11 May 48; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Action by US Forces at Tsingtao in 

Defense of US Lines and Property” (derived from JCS 1330/26), became NSC 11,24 May 48; same file. 

33. Ltr, ActgSecState to SecDef, 28 May 48, Forcigtz Relutions, 7948, vol. VIII, pp. 316-317. 

34. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Action by U.S. Forces at Tsingtao in Defense of U.S. Lives and 

Property,” 10 Jun 48 (derived from JCS 1330/2Y); (U) Msg, JCS WAR 83805 to COMNAVWESPAC, 14 

Jun 48; CCS 452 China (4-345) set 10. Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 17 Jun 48, Foreip Relations, 1948, vol. 

Vlll, pp. 319-321. 

35. (TSI NSC Staff Study, undated but attached to draft of “Oral Statement by ExecSecy, NSC,” 13 

Jul48, evidently prepared for NSC meeting of 15 Jul48, CCS 452 China (4-345) set 10. 

36. (TS) NSC Action No. 79,15 Jul48. For the Berlin blockade, see Ch. 4. 

37. (TSI NSC Action No. 127, 7 Ott 48. The Council’s reference was to the study that became NSC 

34/ 1 (see below). 

38. (U) Msg, COMNAVWESPAC to CNO, 2407152 Aug 48, App to Encl to JCS 1721/13, 30 Aug 

48; (U) Msg, COMNAVWESPAC to CNO, 090855 Jul48, Ann A to App to Encl to JCS 1721/13,30 Aug 

48; (U) Msg, COMNAVWESI’AC to CNO, 1606092 Jul 48, Ann B to App to Encl to JCS 1721/13, 30 

Aug 48; (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, “Military Aid for Chinese Armies,” 28 Aug 48, Encl to JCS 1721/13; 

CCS 452 China (4-345) set 7 pt 2. Forefglr Rtdntions, 1948, vol. VIII, pp. 139-142, 169-172. 

39. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Mihtary Aid for Chinese Armies,” 9 Sep 48 (derived from JCS 

1721/14); (LJ) Memo, SecDef to JCS, same subj, 13 Sep 48, Encl to JCS 1721/15,15 Sep 48; (U) Ltr, SccState to SecDef, 17 Sep 48, App to JCS 1721/16, 24 Sep 48; CCS 452 China (4-3-45) set 7 pt 2. Foreip 

Rciatiorrs, 1948, vol. VIII, pp. 167-169, 174. US Relations with C/rim, p. 973. 

40. (TS) NSC 11 /l, 19 Ott 48, CCS 452 China (4-345) set 10. 

41. Memo, Pres to SecDef, 18 Ott 48, Fowip Relations 7948, vol. VIII, p, 181. An informal handwritten record of a meeting of Forrestal, Lovett, and the Service Secretaries, apparently held on 22 Ott 48, 

in CCS 452 China (4-345) set 10, records a statement by Secretary Forrestal, apparently referring to 

this memorandum: “Pres[ident] desires his memo be interpreted as a firm desire to stay in Tsingtao.” 

42. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Proposed Change in Directive to COMNAVWESI’AC,” 20 Ott 48, 

Encl to JCS 1330/38; (U) Msg, JCS to COMNAVWESPAC, 22 Ott 48 (derived from JCS 1330/39), CMOUT Y 1322; CCS 452 China (4-345) set 10. 

43. Foreign Relations, 7948, vol. VIII, pp. 332-334. 

44. (TS) Msg, COMNAVWESPAC to CNO, 0209172 Nov 48, CCS 452 China (4-3-45) set 11. 

45. (TS) NSC Action No. 139, 3 Nov 48. (TS) “Notes on 26th NSC Meeting Held 3 November 

1948,” unsigned, CCS 452 China (4-345) set 11. Millis, The Forvestal Diaries, pp. 517-518. 

46. (TS) Memo, NSC to SecDef, Encl B to JCS 1330/42, 9 Nov 48; (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “The 

Tsingtao Situation,” 6 Nov 48 (derived from JCS 1330/42); (U) Msg, JCS WARX 92155 to COMNAVWESI’AC, 6 Nov 48; CCS 452 China (4-345) set 11. Fwhyn Rrlntiorzs, 1948, vol. VIII, pp. 335-336. 

47. NSC 11/2, 15 Dee 48, in ForQn Rdations, 7948, vol. VIII, pp. 339-342. 

48. (LJ) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “US Armed Forces at Tsingtao,” 20 Dee 48 (derived from JCS 

1330/45), CCS 452 China (4-345) set 11. 

4Y. (TS) NSC 11/3, 23 Dee 48; (TS) Memo, ActgExec Secy to NSC, “NSC 11/3,” 27 Dee 48, same 

file. (1’S) Memo, Se&ate to ExecSecy, NSC, 4 Fcb 49, Encl to JCS 1330/48, 8 Feb 49; (TS) ActgSccState 

to ExecSecy, 6 Jun 49, Encl to JCS 1330/50,9 Jun 49; same file, set 12. 

50. (S) NSC 34, 13 Ott 48, CCS 452 China (4-3-45) set 7 pt 2. The original draft by the Policy Planning Staff (minus the long historical background) is in Fowig/~ Reluticms, 2948, vol. VIII, pp. 146-165. 

51. For evidence of the above two points of view, see Forcip Relntims, 1948, vol. VIII, pp. 185-189, 

208-212,214-215. 

52. (U) NSC 34/l, 11 Jan 49, Fordpr Rdntiorls, 7949, vol. IX, pp. 474-475. (U) Memo, ExecSecy, 

NSC to NSC 4 Feb 49; same file, set 7 pt 3. 

53. Acheson, Prcserft at thr Cwatioll, p. 257. 
55. (U) NSC 41,28 Feb 49; (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 3 Mar 49; same file. 

56. (U) NSC 22/2, 15 Dee 48, same file. 

57. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Current Position of the LJnited States Respecting Delivery of Aid to 

China,” 16 Dee 48 (derived from (TS) JCS 1721/17), 15 Dee 48, same file. 

58. (TS) NSC Action No. 159, 16 Dee 48. 

59. (TS) Msg, JUSMAGCHINA CYF 871 OAGA to DA, CM IN 10376, 18 Dee 48, CCS 452 China 

(4-3-45) set 7 pt 3. 

60. (TS) Msg, AMB Nanking 2575 to SecState, 18 Dee 48, Encl to Memo from Dept of State to ExecSecy, NSC, 24 Dee 48, “Current Position of the U.S. Respecting Delivery of Aid to China,” same file. 

61. (TS) NSC 22/3,2 Feb 49, same file. 

62. (U) NSC Action No. 180, 3 Feb 49, described in Forci,~n Relatior~s, 1949, vol. IX, pp. 482483. 

63. (U) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 8 Feb 49, Fore&w Rrlutions, 1949, vol. IX, pp. 486487. Bradford Westerfield, Foreip Policy and Parfy Politics: Pearl Hurbor to Korea, (1955) p. 346. 

64. Acheson, Present af the Crmtion, p. 306. 

65. US Relations with China, pp. 405409, 1053-1054. Westerfield, Forcip Policy ntd P&y Politics, 

pp. 347-350. 

66. United Stntes Relations with Chinu, pp. 405406. 

67. See Ch. 12, pp. 231-234. 

68. Public Pnpers, 7’ruman, 2949, pp. 395400. 

69. Wcsterfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, pp. 356358. NY Tima, 16 Aug 49, p. 1; 19 Aug 49, 

p. 1; 10 Sep 49, p. 1; 13 Sep 49, p. 1. Dept of State Bulletin, 24 Ott 49, p. 603. 

70. (U) Memo, OSD to JCS, “Military Assistance Bill,” 13 Sep 49, Encl to JCS 1868/107,15 Sep 49; 

(U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, “Military Aid to China,” 8 Sep 49, Encl to JCS 1721/36,10 Sep 49; CCS 452 

China (4-345) set 7 pt 5. 

71. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Military Aid to China,” 6 Ott 49 (derived from (TS) JCS 1721/37); 

(T’S) Memo, SecDef to ExecSecy, NSC, 18 Ott 49, Encl to JCS 1721/38,20 Ott 49; same file. 

72. (U) Memo, CSA to JCS, “Implications of a Possible Chinese Communist Attack on Foreign 

Colonies in South China,” 10 Jun 49, Encl to JCS 1330/51, 13 Jun 49; (U) Memo, CNO to JCS, same 

subj, 30 Jun 49, Encl to JCS 1330/54,28 Jul4Y; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, same subj, 15 Jul4Y (derived 

from JCS 1330/52), circulated as NSC 55,26 Jul49; CCS 452 China (4-345) set 12. 

73. Liu, Miktury History OILModwn Chinn, p. 269. lmmanuel C. Y. Hsii, 7%~ Rise of Modern Chinn 

(19701, p. 731. 

74. (C) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Plans of the American President Lines to Send Passenger Ship to 

Shanghai,” 25 Aug 49 (derived from JCS 1330/55); (LJ) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 27 Aug 49, Encl to JCS 

1330/57,2Y Aug 49; (U) N/H of JCS 1330/57, 22 Sep 49; CCS 425 China (4-345) set 12. (U) Memo, 

CNO to JCS, “Trade with Communist China,” 16 Nov 49, Encl to JCS 2083/l, 23 Nov 49, same file, set 

7 pt 6. (U) Memo, SecNav to SecDef, “US Policy with Respect to Visits by US Merchant Ships into 

Communist-held Areas of China,” 26 Ott 49, App to Encl to JCS 1330/60,21 Nov 49; (U) Draft Memo, 

JCS to SecDef (not sent), Encl to JCS 1330/61,30 Nov 49, and Dee On, 1 Dee 49; same file, set 13. Dept 

of State Bullrtin, 11 Jul49, pp. 34-35. Hsu, Thr Rise o~fModrm China, p. 731. 

75. (TS) “Final Report of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of 

China,” 27 Feb 49, p. 9, CCS 425 China (4-345) BP pt 1. 

76. Ibid., pp. 5,11. 

77. Dept of State Bdlrtin, 23 Jan 50, p. 113. 

78. (S) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to SecDef, “Strategic Importance of Formosa,” 5 Nov 48, App to 

Encl to JCS 1966, Y Nov 48, CCS 381 Formosa (lll8-48) set 1. 

79. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Strategic Importance of Formosa,” 24 Nov 48, (derived from JCS 

1966/ I), same file. Foreign Relations, 2949, vol. IX, pp. 261-262. 

80. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy, NSC to NSC, 5 Jan 49, and Encl thereto, CCS 381 Formosa (11-S-48) set 1. 

81. (U) NSC 37/l, 19 Jan 49, Foreigrr Rrlutions, 7949, vol. IX, pp. 270-275. 

82. (TS) NSC 37/2,3 Feb 49; (TS) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 4 Feb 49; same file. 

83. (U) Memo, SecDef to JCS, “The Strategic Importance of Formosa,” 7 Feb 49, Encl to JCS 

1966/5,7 Feb 49, CCS 381 Formosa (11-R-48) set 1. 

84. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “The Strategic Importance of Formosa,” 10 Feb 49 (derived from JCS 

1966/6), same file. (l-0 NSC 37/3, 11 Feb 49, Foreign Relations, 7949, vol. IX, pp. 284-286. 

85. (IJ) NSC 37/4,18 Feb 49, Foreign Relafiorzs, 1949, vol. IX, pp. 28%289. 

86. KJ) NSC 37/5,1 Mar 49. (U) NSC Action No. 18Y, 3 Mar 49. 

87. (LJ) NSC Action No. 18Y,3 Mar 49. (U) “Statement by the Secretary of State at the 35th Meeting 

of the NSC,” Foreign Relations, 2949, vol. IX, pp. 294-296. 

330 
() g p pp

90. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Formosa,” 17 

Aug 49 (derived from JCS 1966/17), CCS 381 Formosa (11-8481 set 1. Circulated in NSC 37/7, 22 

AUF; 49, Fbrei<q-n R&tions, 1949, vol IX, pp. 3766378. 

91. (U) NSC 37/8, 6 Ott 49, Foreign Rclatiorrs, 7949, vol. IX, pp. 392-397. 

92. (C) Msg, SecState to Consul General at Taipei, 28 Ott 49, Forcip Relations, 1949, vol. IX, pp. 

401-493. 

93. (U) JCS 1966/22, 7 Dee 49, CCS 381 Formosa (11-848) set 2; (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Possible United States Military Action Toward Taiwan Not Involving Major Military Forces,” 23 Dee 49 

(derived from JCS 1966/24, 19 Dee 491, same file, set 3. (U) NSC 37/9, 27 Dee 49, Farcip Rrlatims, 

7949, vol. IX, pp. 460461. 

94. (U) NSC 48/2,30 Dee 49. This paper is discussed in detail in Ch. 14. 

95. (U) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, “The Positions of the United States with Respect to Asia,” 30 Dee 

49, same file. Dept of State Hnlletin, 16 Jan 50, p. 79. The President’s statement apparently precluded 

the possibility of allocating to the Nationalists any of the $75 million made available in the MDAA for 

the “general area” of China. See Ch. 14 for the disposition of this money. 

95. See T/7(, /oint Chic+ of Staff and National Policy, vol. III, The Koran War. 

Chapter 14. Consequences of the Communist Victory in China 

on US Far East Policy 

1. Memo, I’OLAD in Japan to SecState, 21 Mar 47; Memo by GEN MacArthur, “Drafts of Chapter 

V and Chapter VI of a Peace Treaty with Japan. ,” 21 Mar 47; Annex to Dept State Memcon on 

Japanese Peace Treaty, 1 Jul47; Memo, DepDir, FE to US&State, 2 Aug 47; Dept State, Fmip Rchtions 

of tire United States, 1947, vol. VI, The Fnr East (19721, pp. 452456, 467469, 476477. Campbell, The 

United States in Wovkf Affairs, 1947-7948, pp. 1 ho-167. 

2. (U) Memo, JCS to Sets War and Navy, “Review of United States Control Needed over the 

Japanese Islands” (derived from JCS 1619/24), 13 Sep 47, CCS 360 (12-942) set 30. 

3. Kennan, Memirs, 7925-1950, pp. 3699370. Memo, Dir, Planning Staff, Dept State to SecState 14 

Ott 47, and Ann thereto: l’l’S/lO, “Results of Planning Staff Study of Questions Involved in the 

Japanese Peace Settlement,” 14 Ott 47, Forcip R&tions, 7947, vol. VI, pp. 536-543. 

4. (Cl Memo, BGEN C.V.R. Schuyler to SecDef, “Report of the National Military Establishment 

Representative on Conference in Tokyo, March l-11, 1948,” 3 Apr 48, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-151 set 

18. 

5. (TS) NSC 13,2 Jun 48; (U) NSC 13/l, 24 Sep 48; same file, set 19. 

6. (lJ1 Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef to DJS, “NSC 13/l,” 24 Sep 48; (U) Memo, JCS to SccDef, “Recommendations with Respect to United States Policy toward Japan,” 24 Sep 48 (derived from JCS 

1380/44); same file. 

7. (U) NSC 13/2,7 Ott 48, Encl B to JCS 1380/47,20 Ott 48; (U) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 5 Nov 

48, End to JCS 1380/50, 10 Nov 48; (U) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 22 Nov 48, Encl to JCS 1380/51, 24 

Nov 48; same file, set 20. (TS) Memo, ExecSecy to NSC, 4 Feb 49, Encl to JCS 1380/57, 5 Feb 49; (TS) 

NSC 13/3, 6 May 49, Encl to JCS 1380/62, 9 May 49; same file, set 21. 

8. (TS) Memo, ActgSecState to ExecSecy, NSC, 23 May 49, Encl to JCS 1380/63, 25 May 49, CCS 

383.21 Japan (3-1345) set 21. 

9. (TS) Ltr, ExecSecy, OSD, to JCS, 27 May 49, Encl to JCS 1380/64,28 May 49, same file. 

10. (TS) Memo, 1CS to SecDef, “Strategic Evaluation of US Securitv Needs in laoan” (derived from 

JCS 1380/65), 10 Jun 49; (TS) NSC 49,15 j;n 49; same file, set 22. ’ ’ 

11. (TS) Memo of Conversation, &State and others with British Foreign Minister, “Far East,” 13 

Sep 49, CCS 388.1 Japan (Y-147) set 1. 

12. (TS) Ltr, ActgSecState to SecDcf, 3 Ott 49, Encl to JCS 1380/78, 20 Dee 49, CCS 388.1 Japan 

(9-l-47) set 1. Available records do not clearly establish whether this version of the State Department 

view was sent to the NSC. A greatly abbreviated version, labelled as comments on the JCS views on 

the subject, was distributed to the NSC on 4 October 1949 as (TS) NSC 49/l, CCS 383.21 Japan 

(3313451 set 23. This paper disputed the JCS position on a treaty on the ground that Japanese democracy, an expressed goal of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was unattainable without a peace settlement. However, the JCS views regarding the importance of Japanese internal security and of the development of 

Japan’s capacity for self-defense were endorsed. 

331 
(U) So JSSC, o9, sae e

15. (U) Transcript of JSSC Meeting, 10 Nov 49, same file. 

16. (U) JCS 1380/75,30 Nov 49, same file. 

17. (U) Memo, MG C.B. Magruder to JCS, 3 Dee 49, Encl to JCS 1380/76,3 Dee 49, same file 

18. (U) JCS 1380/77,10 Dee 49, CCS 388.1 Japan (Y-147) set 1. 

19. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Japanese Peace Treaty,” 22 Dee 49 (derived from JCS 1380/79); (U) 

Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 23 Dee 49, Encl to Memo, ExecSecy OSD to NSC, same date (Encls A and B to 

ICS 138O/HO); same file, set 2. 

20. (TS) JCS 1380/83, 9 Feb 50, CCS 388.1 Japan (Y--1-47) set 2. (TS) “Summary of General 

MacArthur’s Ouinions on a laoanese I’encc Treatv. i ,” 14 Dee 49, Tab 2 to (TS) Memo, MC Magruder ._ to SecDef, 5 Jun 50, OCJCS File, OY2.2 Japanese Peace Treaty. 

21. (S) “Copy of informal memorandum handed by Secretary Acheson to British Ambassador,” 

marked “Personal and Confidential,” 24 Dee 49, CCS 388.1 Japan (9-l-47) set 2. Attached to (VI 

Memo, MG Burns to DJS, 28 Dee 4Y, which indicates that both Burns and GEN Bradley had approved 

Secretary Acheson’s memo before it was given to the Ambassador. 

22. See Ch. 13 of T/P joitzt Chiefs (if Staff RM~ Nntiorrill Policy, 1950-3952, for the evolution of the 

Japanese peace treaty of September 1951. 

23. Trcwtks ad Otkr Intrrnntionul Acfs Swics No. 1775 (Dept of State Publication 3257, 1948). 

24. (U) Memo, S&Army to SecDef, 4 Mar 48, Encl to Memo, SpecAsst to SecDef to JCS, 7 Apr 48 

(Encl and App to JCS 1027/10, 9 Apr 481, CCS 686.9 Philippines (11-743) set 7. (U) Memo, JCS to 

SecDef, “Retention of US Military Installations in the Philippines,” 13 Jul 48 (derived from JCS 

1027/12), same file, set 8. 

25. (U) Memo, ExecSecy to SecDef to JCS, 27 Apr 49, Encl to JCS 1519/22,28 Apr 49; JCS 1519/23, 

29 Apr 49, and Dee On, 4 May 49; CCS 686.9 Philippine Islands (11-743) set 9. 

26. (S) Ltr, SecState to SecDef, 23 May 4Y, App to JCS 1519/27,10 Jun 49, same file, set 10. 

27. (U) JCS 1519/28, 23 Jun 49, same file. (U) Memo, JCS to SecArmy, “United States Policy 

Toward the Philippines,” 22 Jul49 (derived from JCS 1519/30); (U) Ltr, SecDef to SecState, 16 Scp 49, 

Encl to JCS 1519/32,20 Sep 49; same file, set 11, Dept of State Bulktirr,22 Aug 49, pp. 276-277. 

28. “Republic of the Philippines Military Assistance Act,” 1’1, 454,79th Congress. PI. 663, 79th 

Congress. 

29. (U) SM-5233 to SWNCC, 12 Mar 46 (SWNCC 276, 13 Mar 46), CCS 686.9 Philippine Islands 

(1 l-743) set 4. 

30. (U) SWNCC 340/l, 11 Dee 46, same file. (U) SM-7976 to SWNCC, 12 Apr 17 (derived from JCS 

1519/4); (U) Dee on SWNCC 276/3,14 Apr 47; same file, set 5. 

3.1. “Agreement on Militarv Assistance to the Philippines,” Uffited States Statutes at Lnrp, vol . 1 

61, pt 3, pp‘: 3283-3288. NY Times, 22 Mar 47, p. 8. 

32. (LB Memo, ICS to SecDef, “Establishment and Oucration of the Ioint US Military Advisory 

Group to the Republic of the Philippines,” 3 Nov 47 (derived from JCS 1519/7); (U) Msg, GSUSA 

WARX 92466 to CINCFE, 16 Dee 47; (U) Memo, SecDef to Sets A,N,AF, “Establishment and Operation 

of the Joint US Military Advisory Croup for the Republic of the Philippines,” h Nov 47; CCS 6Xh.Y 

Philippine Islands (11-743) xc 6. 

33. See Ch. 12. 

34. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Basic Statements of Policy Concerning the Foreign Military Assistance Program” (derived from JCS 1868/59), 21 Feb 49, CCS 092 (S-22-46) set 19. (TS-Gp 3) Memo, JCS 

to SecDef, “Foreign Military Aid Program,” 14 Mar 49 (derived from JCS 1868/62), same file, set 21. 

35. “Special Message to the Congress on the Need for a Military Aid Program,” Public Pnpcrs, Trrrmm, 1949, pp. 395-400. PI. 430,Slst Cong. 

36. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Reprogramming the FY 1950 Foreign Military Assistance I’rogram,” 23 Sep 49 (derived from JCS 1868/111), CCS 092 (8--22&I(7) set 29. (U) JCS 1519/34,5 Nov 49, 

CCS 686.9 Philippine Islands (11-7-43) set 11. 

37. Developments concerning Korea during this period are treated in detail in 7‘ho /oirrt Chiefs 

of Stnffand Nutior7al Policy, vol III, T/w Kowan War, Ch. 1. 

38. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Military Importance of Korea” (derived from JCS 1483/44), 25 Sep 

47, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-1945) set 13. 

3Y. EL 430, 81st Cong. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Reprogramming the FY 1950 Foreign Military 

Assistance Program,” 23 Sep 49 (derived from JCS 1868/l ll), CCS 092 (S-2246) see 29. 

40. (U) NSC 48,lO Jun 49, CCS 092 Asia (6-2548) set 1. 

41. See Ch. 13. 

332 
44. See Ch. 12 for the MDAA of 1949. 

45. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia,” 2Y Dee 49 

(derived from JCS lYY2/7), CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) set 2. 

46. (U) NSC 4X/2,30 Dee 49; (U) Memo ExecSecy to NSC same date (Encls A and B to JCS 1992/s, 

5 Jan 50); CCS 092 Asia (6-25-48) set 3. 

47. PubIic Paprrs, Trumarr, 1950, pp. 11-12. See Ch. 13. 

48. (TS) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Program of Assistance for the General Area of China,” 20 Jan 50, 

(derived from JCS 1721/43), CCS 452 China (4-3-45) set 7, pt 7. 

49. OFFTACKLE is discussed in detail in Ch. IO. 

50. Dept of State Bulletin, 23 Jan 50, pp. 111-118. 

Chapter 15. The Soviet Atomic Explosion and Its Consequences 

1. Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, A tfistq of the United States Atomic Emqy Corrmfissiorf, vol II, Atorrfic Shield, 1947/79.52 (1969), pp. 362-368; Truman, Years of Trial md Hope, pp. 3066308. 

David E. Lilienthal, ]ourrza/s, vol II, The Atomic Years, 3945-1950 (1964), pp. 569-572; Public Papers, Truinan, 1949, p. 485. 

2. (TS) JCS 2081 /l, 13 Feb 50 and Dee On, 21 Feb 50, CCS 471.6 USSR (11-B-49) set 2. 

3. (1‘S) App to JCS 1942/3, 31 Dee 48, CCS 471.6 (B-15-45) set 13A. CIA representatives attended 

meetings at which this statement was prepared but did not participate in the decision. 

4. (TS) JCS 2081/l, 1.3 Feb 50, CCS 471.6 USSR (1 I-849) set 2. 

5. The Research and Development Board, created by the National Security Act of 1947, was 

responsible for coordinating research and development among the Military Departments and for recommending an integrated program of military research and development. 

6. (TS-RD) Memo, Dir, RDB to JCS, 28 Sep 48, Encl to JCS 1942, 4 Ott 48, CCS 471.6 (8-1545) see 

12. (TS-RD) JCS 1942/l, 6 Nov 48, same file, set 13. (TS) JCS 1942/3,31 Dee 48; (TS) JCS 1942/4,1 Feb 

49; same file, set 13A. (TS-RD) JCS 1942/h, 23 Mar 49; (TS-RD) JCS 1942/7, 28 Mar 49; (TS-RD) 

SM-545549 to Chm, RDB, 28 Mar 49; same file, set 14. 

7. (TS-RD) FY 49 Ann Rpt, MLC to SecDef, 1 Aug 49, same file, BP 4; (TS-RD) App B to JCS 

1942/14,3 Nov 49, same file, set 17. 

8. (TS) Memo, Dir, CJA to JCS, 28 Ott 49, Encl to JCS 1942/13,31 Ott 49; (TS-RD) JCS 1942/14,3 

Nov 49; CCS 471.6 (8-I 545) xc 17. 

9. (TS-RD) JCS 1942/16, 4 Jan 50 and Dee On, 20 Jan 50; (S-RD) SM-171-50 to CSAF, 25 Jan 50; 

(TS-RD) SM-172-50 to Chm, RDB, 25 Jan 50; same file, set 18. 

10. (S) Memo, RDB to JCS, 18 Apr 50, Encl to JCS 1942/18,21 Apr 50, same file, set 19; (TS-RD) 2d 

Rpt, Jt Panel on Tech. Obj. 10-7, “A Review of the USAF Research and Development Programs on 

Long Range Detection for Fiscal Years 1950 and 1951,” 20 Mar 50, same file, BP 4. 

11. See Ch. 9. 

12. (TS) JSI’C 887/71, 26 Auz 49, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) set 38. (TS) JSPC 887/77,25 Ott 49, same 

file, see 40. (TS) JCS 1844/46,8 Nov 49 and Dee On, 8 Dee 49, same file, set 41. 

13. (TS-RD) Memo, JCS to Chm, AEC, “The Production of Fissionable Material,” 17 Dee 47 

(derived from JCS 1745)s); (TS-RD) JCS 1745/7, 16 Dee 47, and Dee On, 17 Dee 47; CCS 471.6 

(B-15-45) set 8. 

14. (TS-RD) SM-78-49 to Chm, MLC, 13 Jan 49 (derived from JCS 1823/11), same file, set 13A. For 

TROJAN, see Ch. 9. 

15. (TS-RD) SM-1100 to MLC, 14 Jun 49 (derived from JCS 1823/14), same file, set 15. 

16. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, pp. 1822183. Truman, Yews of Trial and Hope, p. 304. 

17. (TS-RD) Rpt, Spec Corn, NSC to I’res, 10 Ott 49, Tab to JCS 1823/16, 28 Ott 49, CCS 471.6 

(B-1545) set 17. For NSC 20/4, see Ch. 7. 

18. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, pp. 365,370. 

19. (TS-RD) Encl B to JCS 1823/19, 8 Nov 49, as amended by Dee On, 1 Dee 49, CCS 471.6 

(8-1545) xc 17A. 

20. (TS-RD) I& Pres to SecDef, 19 Ott 49; (TS-RD) Memo, SecDcf to JCS, 25 Ott 49; App and Encl 

to JCS 1823/16,28 Ott 49; same file, set 17. 

21. (TS-RD) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Implications of the Accelerated Atomic Energy Program,” 2 

Dee 49, (derived from JCS 1823/19), same file, set 18. 

333 
g

24. (S) NORAD b!ist Ref Paper No. 9, “Seventeen Years of Air Defense,” 1 Jun 63, pp. l-5; (U) Srcand Report of the Sccrhwy of Dcfensc, FY 7949, pp. 142-l 43. 

25. (U) JCS 2084, 16 Nov 49, CCS 373.24 US (YYK-49) set 1. 

26. (LJ) Encl B to JCS 1899/2, 29 Sep 48; (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 1 Jul 48, Encl to JCS 1899, 3 Jul 

48; CCS 413.44 (7-l-48) set 1. 

27. (TS) Memo, SecDef to JCS, 1 Jul48, Encl to JCS 18YY, 3 Jul48, same file. 

28. (U) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Radar Fence Program,” 20 Ott 48 (derived from JCS 18YY/2), 

same file. 

29. (U) JCS lY78/2, 6 May 4Y, same file; (U) JCS lXYY/6, 17 Jan 50, same file, set 2. (U) Rpt, CSAF 

to SecAF for FY 49, in Sracor~d Report of tlrc, Srwdwy of Defurse, FY 7 949, p. 270. 

30. (U) JCS 125Y/Sh, 23 Jan 48, and Dee On, 19 Feb 48, CCS 3X1 US (5-23346) set 4. (U) JCS 

1259/62,20 Mar 48, and Dee On, 7 Apr 48, same file, set 6. 

31. (U) JCS 2086, 23 Nov 49, same file, set 6; (TS) Basic Plan for the Defense of the Continental 

United States, 15 Nov 49, same file, BP 1. The plan, as revised, was not approved by the JCS until 26 

Ott 51. (TS) 2086/l, 5 Apr 50, and Dee On, 29 Ott 51, same file, BP 1A. 

32. (U) JCS 2084,lh Nov 49, and N/H, 23 Nov 49; (U) JCS 2084/l, I Dee 49, and Dee On, 20 Dee 

4Y; (U) JCS 2084/3,3 Mar 50; (TS) JCSM-454-50 to Chm, RDB, 8 Mar 50; (U) Memo, Chm, RDB to JCS, 

3 Apr 50, Encl to JCS 2084/7,5 Apr 50; CCS 373.24 US (Y-8-49) set I. (U) JCS 2(X4/12,12 Jul50, same 

file, set 2. 

33. (U) JCS 18YY/4, 23 Nov 49, and Dee On, 24 Jan 50; (U) JCS 18YY/6, 17 Jan 50; CCS 413.44 

(7-l-48) set 2. Semiannual Reoort of the Secretarv of the Air Force, in Seminnnual kpcJrt of/ the Secw 

tary (If Dc~cfzsc, 7 Jnrl-30 @I 50,‘pp. 150-151. ’ 

34. Goldberg, History of the United States Air Force, pp. 130. (S) Srventwn Years of Air Drfuw, pp. 2-5. 

35. (TS) JCS 1259/17Y, 21 Dee 49, and N/H, 30 Dee 49, CCS 381 US (5-23-46) set 12. 

36. Hewlett and Duncan, Atmic Shield, pp. 59, 376. 

37. Ibid., pp. 371-372. 

38. Memo, Strauss to Commissioners, 5 Ott 49, text in Lewis I,. Strauss, Mm ard Dwisiorrs (lY62), 

pp. 216-217. The General Advisory Committee was created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to provide scientific and technical advice to the AEC. The membership in 1949 consisted of Dr. J. Robert 

Oppenheimer (Chairman), Oliver E. Buckley, James B. Conant, Lee A. DuBridge, Enrico Fermi, lsidor I. 

Rabi, Hartley Rowe, Glenn T. Seaborg, and Cyril S. Smith, with John H. Manley as Executive Secretary. 

39. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shield, pp. 375-377. 

40. Ibid., pp. 381-384. 

41. Ibid., pp. 390-391. Truman, Evrs of Triul ad Hop?, p. 308. 

42. (TS) Memo, JSSC to Secy, JCS “Study on the United States Military Position with Respect to 

the Development of the Thermonuclear Bomb,” 14 Nov 49; (TS-RD) SM-2351-49 to CJCS, CSA, CSAF, 

CNO, 17 Nov 49; CCS 471.6 (12-lY-4Y) set 1. 

43. (TS-RD) Rpt to JCS, United States Military Position with Respect to the Development of the 

Thermonuclear Weapon,” nd., Encl to SMP2351-4Y, 17 Nov 49, same file. Because of the highly classified nature of this paper, it was reproduced on buff paper and bore no JCS number. 

44. (TS-RD) Memo, JCS to SecDcf, “The United States Military Position with Respect to the Devc~lopment of the Thermonuclear Weapon,” 23 Nov 49, same file. 

4.5. (TS) Ltr, l’res to SecDef and SecState and Chm, AEC, 19 Nov 49, Dept of State, Forc,i,qrr Rd~~tiorfs ., of thr Urlitcd Stntcs, 7949, vol I, pp. 587-588. Key portions of the text of this letter also appear in Truman, Yours of Trial rind Hope, p. 309. 

46. (TS) Memo, “The Military Implications of Thermonuclear Weapons,” nd., Forricyr~ ReL~tiws, 

794Y, vol I, pp. 604-610. Circulated by the Defense members at a meeting of the Working Group on 16 

Dee 4Y. 

47. Lilienthal, Tllc Atomic Ykars, pp. 613-614. Acheson, Prcwnt nt the Crcwtion, p. 348. 

48 (S) Rpt, GAC to AEC, 3 Dee 49 and annexes thereto: (S) Ltr, O.E. Buckley to J.R. Oppenheimer, 

3 Dee 49; (S) Ltr, H. Buckley to J.R. Oppenheimer, 3 Dee 49; (S) Ltr, E. Fermi to J.R. Oppenheimer, 3 

Dee 49; (S) Working Memo, Set, CAC to GAC, 9 Dee 49; CCS 471.6 (12-l 4449) set 1. 

49. (S) Ltr. LA. DuBridge to 1.1~. Oppenheimer, 5 Dee 49, Encl to AEC 262/Y, 14 Dee 4Y, same file. 

50. (S-RD) Memo, Dep to SecDef(AE) to JCS, 14 Dee 49, Encl B to JCS 2096, Y Jan 50, same file. 

51. (TS-RD) Memo, JCS to SecDef, “Request for Comments on Military Views of Members of Genera1 Advisory Committee,” 13 Jan 50 (derived from JCS 2096), CCS 471.6 (12-1449) set 1. 

52. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic Shirld, pp. 401402. Acheson, Prmnt at t/w Creation., p. 348. 

334 
55. Lilienthal, T/P Atomir Yk~rs, p. 624.   

56. Ibid., pp. 623-632, Achcson, Prrwnt R/ tl~c CWII~~OPI, pp. 348-349. Hewlett and Duncan, Atomic 

Shield, pp. 40&408. Truman, Yrvzvs of Trial nmf Hop, p. 309. 

57. Public Peepers, Trumarl, 1950, p. 138. 

58. (U) Ltr, Pres to SecDef, 31 Ian 50, App to Encl “D” to JCS 2101 /I, CCS 381 US (I-31-50) set I. 

59. For NSC 68, its background, and i&*disposition, see Chs. 1 and 2 of The joint Chiefs of Staff ami 

Nntiomal Policy, IY%-7Y52. 

335 

Bibliographic Note 

This history is based primarily on the official documents contained in the 

master records files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Other sources include the records 

maintained in the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by agencies of 

the Joint Staff. Research also extended to certain records of the Services. The volumes published by the Department of State in the Foreign Relations series were 

invaluable in illuminating diplomatic aspects of national security policy; some of 

these had not been published at the time this volume went to press and are cited 

in galley-proof form. 

During the period of this volume the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were 

organized under a case file system that had been in continuous use since 1942. 

This system is identified by the prefix CCS (for Combined Chiefs of Staff) 

attached to each file folder title. Within each footnote, the file location is the last 

element given. When several documents are cited, all those contained in a single 

footnote “sentence,” closed by a period, are to be found in the records file given 

at the end of the sentence. “Same file,” rather than “Ibid.,” is used for repeated, 

successive references to the same file. 

Some documents are cited without a file reference. These include types that 

are widely distributed and that may be located without reference to the JCS files, 

such as Records of NSC Actions. Documents of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its predecessor, the Western European Union (WEU), are normally procured through the NATO subregistry system. The research for this volume, however, disclosed that some of the important early documents of WEU 

and NATO are apparently no longer in existence. 

337 

Index 

Acheson, Dean: 6,10,57-58,82,202,203, 207, 

210,211,249,251-52,256,258-59,260-61, 

268,269,271,277-78,284,293-94,298,299 

Afghanistan: 156 

Air defenses: 92,104-105,223,283,286-89, 

2Y4-95,297 

Air Force, Soviet: 13 

Air Force, US: 33, 72-73, 87,88, 89, 90, 92, 93,94, 

95%Y6,97-98,125,128 

and air defense: 286-87,288~89 

Air Staff: 103-104,283 

appropriations: 736 

and atomic weapons: 281-82,283 

Chief of Staff: 2,5, 72-73,95,96, 97, 98, 108, 

130,165, 168,175,177,283,288. See also 

Spaatz, General Carl; Vandenberg, General 

Hoyt s. 

Long Range Detection Center: 279 

personnel: 100,101,102,104-105,107,109,123, 

132,133,142,148,150,151 

proposed budgets: 101,102,104,107-109, 110, 

111,124,12Y-30,131,133,135,151 

requirements estimates: 122-24,12&27, 

141-46,148,149-51 

70-group air force: 103-I 06, 107, 108-l 09, 110, 

123,136 

and strategic planning: 158,160, 161, 162, 

164-65,167~8,169,170-71,172-73,174-75, 

178,180,181,182,187,288 

Air National Guard: 104-105 

Air Reserve Corps: 104-105 

Air Transport Service: 72 

Aircraft: II,21 

for Berlin airlift: 67,6&69,7C-71,72-73,79,8&81 

C-47~68, 72 

C-54s:72,73,77,79-81 

for delivery of atomic weapons: 125, 128,131, 

148-49,174-75,286,294.296,298 

naval: 104-105,107, 110, 183 

procurement of: 102, 103,105, 106, 108, 110, 

124,145,152,167-68,176-78,183,185-86 

requirements for: 104-107,154,165,215-16 

Soviet: 13,286, 294,296, 298 

Aircraft (bombers) 

B-17s: 181 

B-29s: 69,70,71-72,158-59,181 

B-36s: 158-59,176-177,178,180,181,183, 

185586,187 

B-50s: 158-59,181 

B-54s: 177 

Aircraft carriers: 89,92,94,95,125,128,142,157, 

158,159,160,164-65,167,170,171-76,183, 

184,185-86 

Aircraft control and warning system: 286-89 

Airlift Task Force (Provisional): 72-73 

Alaska: 131,286,287,289 

Albania: 6,17, 18,24,28,29 

Alexander of ?&is, Field Marshal (UK): 198 

Algeria: 203 

Allied Control Council: 7, 61,63-64,65, 263 

Alvarez, Luis: 290 

American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG): 

18,20,21, 22,23,29 

American Mission for Aid to Turkey: 36 

Amoy, China: 247 

Amphibious warfare: 88,94 

Anglo-American Cabinet Committee: 42 

Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry: 42 

Appropriations 

for air defense: 287-89 

apportioning of: 125,131,136,148-49,175,177, 

1X6,231-32,240,252,254 

for economic aid: 18,23 

military: 79, 83,101-105,110-11,125,173,175 

for military aid: 18,23,29,37-38, 39,231-32, 

240,273,274,275,277 

Arab-Israeli War: 49-51, 55, 57-58 

Arab League Council: 44,49 

Arab nationalism: 4142,43,44,4748,50,54,57 

Armed Forces Special Weapons Project: 97,98 

Armed Services roles and missions: 87-98 

Army, Greek: 19,120, 21, 22,23, 28,ZY 

Army, Israeli: 57 

Army, US: 11, 18, 33,87, 88, 92,93,94, Y5,96, 98, 

9Y,108-109 

appropriations: 136 

Chief of Staff: 2,5,24,61, 108, 130, 165, 175, 

289. See also Bradley, General Omar N.; 

Collins, J. Lawton; Eisenhower, General 

Dwight D. 

General Staff: 67,83 

personnel: 100,101,102,107,109, 123,131,133, 

143,148,150,151 

proposed budgets: 101,102,107-109,110,111, 

124,129-30,131,133,135,151 

requirements estimates: 122-24, 126, 141-146, 

148,149-l 50 

and strategic planning: 160, 164-l 65, 167, 170, 

182,288 

Army Advisory Group, China: 241-43, 256 

339 
290-91, 297, 298, 299 

General Advisory Committee: 290,291,294-Yh 

Military Liaison Committee to the: 97, 98, 182, 

227,283,291,293,298 

Radiation Laboratory: 290 

Atomic weapons: 89,104-105,279-99 

delivery of: 125,128, 131,148-49,174-75,286, 

294,296,298 

fission: 283-86, 290, 294,296-97, 298 

fusion: 289-99 

industrial targets of: 167-69, 171, 188 

international control of: 97-98, 290-91, 293, 

297-99 

moral aspects of: 294-97 

production of: 283-86 

Soviet: 279-99 

and strategic planning: 153-54, 155, 156-59, 

161,167-72,176-77,180-85,188,213-14,223, 

283,284,285-86,298,299 

technology: 283-86 

United Nations and: 284 

Attlee, Clement R.: 42 

Austin, Warren R.: 47 

Austria: 196-97,215,228,229, 230,231 

Aviation, naval: 88, 92,93-96, 102, 104, 105, 172, 

178,183, 184, 186. Sw also Aircraft carriers. 

Azerbaijan: 15,38-39 

Azores: 215 

Babcock, Cal. C. Stanton: 269 

Bather, Robert E: 279 

Badger, Admiral Oscar C., USN: 244115,24&47, 

257 

Baker, George I?: 104 

Balfour Declaration: 42,44 

Barr, Maj. Gen. David: 242,243,246,250-51, 

255-56 

Baruch, Bernard M.: 297-98 

Basic Defense Plan: 288 

Belgium: 48,63,155,156,191,192,198,200,201, 

203, 208,209,210, 211, 221, 233, 234 

Ben Gurion, David: 49 

Berlin, Germany: 61,63 

airlift: 67-74, 76-77, 78-81, 82, 83 

blockade of: 54,66-85,191,245 

possible use of armed convoys for access: 72, 

73,74-75,82 

Bernadette, Folke: 49-50, 51 

Bevin, Ernest: 19,20, 50, 68, 69, 191, 192, 210-11, 

268,269,271 

Blandy, Admiral William H. P., USN: 180 

Bolivia: 45 

Bombardment Groups 

28th: 71-72 

301 st: 71-72 

340 

Bradley, General Omar N., USA: 24,27,65,69, 

71, 73, 81, 82, 93, 96,97,99, 121, 125, 126, 128, 

129,130,132,136,148,149,170,173,174-75, 

178-79,184-85,186,203,204,212-13,223, 

232,242-43,255,269,281-82.297 

Brazil: 221,228 

Bridges, H. Styles: 297-98 

British Chiefs of Staff: 19, 31, 70, 75, 197.-98, 

2044205,208,209-10,212-13 

British Defense Committee: 31 

Brussels Pact: 191-200,202, 204 

Budget estimates: 3, 105, 107-109, 113, 121-24, 

129,134,140-41,144,147,150-51,153 

Budgetary allocations: 140, 142-46 

Budgetary process, JCS participation in: 102-103, 

113,114,120,121-24,140,149 

Bulgaria: 7, 77, 24 

Bunche, Ralph: 50 

Bureau of the Budget: 30,38,102-103,109, 110, 

113, 121, 122, 124, 147, 149-50, 174, 230, 287 

Burke, Capt. Arleigh A., USN: 180 

Burns, Maj. Gen. J. H., USA: 214, 298 

Bush, Vannevar: 279 

Cairo, Egypt: 154, 156, 157, 158-59, 160, 162 

Cairo Declaration: 257 

Camp John Hay, Philippine Islands: 271-72 

Canada: 128,153,156,157,160,191,193,195,197, 

200-201, 203, 205-206,207, 208, 212, 221, 228, 

253,297 

Canada-US Military Cooperation Committee: 

207, 212 

Carney, Vice Adm. Robert B., USN: 124,125,131, 

140,144,146 

Caroline Islands: 270 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 4, 26, 27,260, 

282 

Chamberlin, Maj. Gen. S. J., USA: 20-24 

Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo: 8,235, 236,237, 

239, 245, 246, 247, 249, 250, 251, 254, 255, 256, 

257,259,26041,262,263 

China: 8-9,157,159,235-62,264,271,272 

communist takeover of: 243-48,249,250-56, 

259-61,263,267,269-70 

economic aid to: 239 

military aid to: 221, 228, 229, 233, 239, 278 

Nationalist Government: 235, 236,237, 238, 

23Y-41,24345,248,250, 251, 253,254-56, 

257,259-62,276,277 

People’s Republic of: 254,256, 261-62 

and the USSR: 235,236-37,238,239,248,249, 

257,261-62 

China Aid Act of 1948: 240,242-43,246, 250, 251, 

252 

Chinese military forces: 238,243-34,246-48,256 

air force: 235, 238, 239, 241-42, 256 
Churchill, Winston: 191 

Clark Air Force Base, Philippine Islands: 271-72 

Clay, General Lucius, USA: 18,61,64,65,66,67, 

68, 69, 70, 71,72, 73, 77, 78, 198, 199 

Collins, General J. Lawton, USA: 149,166,261, 

289 

Combined Chiefs of Staff: 1, 68-69,75, 198,205 

Commander in Chief, Chief of Staff to: 2,5 

Commander in Chief, US Air Forces in Europe: 

72,212 

Commander in Chief, US European Command 

(USCINCEUR): 61,73,75,212 

Committee of Two: 239 

Communist insurgents 

in China: 236-37, 243-48, 249, 250-56, 25Y+l, 

263, 267, 269-70 

in the Far East: 275-76 

in Greece: 9-10, 15,17,18, IY-20,21,28-29, 

31-32 

Communist Party 

Chinese: 236-37 

Creek: 17,26 

Italian: 15,32,34,35 

world: 120 

Compton, Karl: 12 

Conant, James B.: 290 

Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic 

Energy: 280,290,297 

Connally, Tom: 202,232,252,297-98 

Conolly, Admiral Richard L., USN: 180 

Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft: 176 

Continental Air Command: 286 

Continental Defense Command: 288,289 

Continental United States Defense Planning 

Group: 288 

Council of Foreign Ministers: 61-62,63, 66, 71, 

75-76,80,81 

Czechoslovakia: 45,62-63,191-92 

Dardanelles: 15 

DC 6/l: 213 

De Tassigny, General Jean Lattre (France): 199 

Dean, Gordon: 291 

Declaration on Liberated Europe: 6 

Denfeld, Admiral Louis, USN: 23-24,47,54,89, 

91,95,97,125,127,128,129,130,132,136, 

142,143,148,155,166,170-71,172-73,174, 

175,176,179,180,183-84,185-86,187-88, 

244‘245,246 

Denmark: 45, 193, 195, 200, 201, 203, 205, 207, 

208,210,211,221,228,229,230,231,233,234 

Department of Defense: 56,58,149,151,246,255, 

268,269,270,293,295,298 

Department of State: 114-15,135 

and atomic warfare: 284-85, 298 

and Berlin crisis: 67, 77, 81 

and China: 239,240,243, 24546,248, 249, 

and Europe: 193,195,196,199,207-209,213, 

214,219,227 

and Greece: 16, 19,20,23, 25, 27, 29,30,36 

and Iran: 38 

and Italy: 33-34 

and Palestine: 44,47,49,51,54-55,56,57-59 

Policy Planning Staff: 23-26,45,47, 116-19, 

248,265 

Department of the Air Force: 4, 30, 36, 67, 193, 

234,282 

Department of the Army: 4,21,23,30,35,36,61, 

7X,193,199,224,234,270 

Department of the Navy: 4,30,36,102-103, 

176-77,193,234,241,248,257-58 

Department of the Treasury: 10 

Douglas, Lewis: 68,69 

Draper, William H., Jr.: 134 

Dratvin, General Mikhail S.: 64, 65 

Dulles, John Foster: 195 

8 l/3 Air Group Program: 235,238,239,241-42, 

256 

Early, Stephen T.: 268,27Y-80,298 

East Germany: 81 

Eastern Europe: 6,7,117 

Economic aid 

to China: 236,23941,251-54,260,262 

to Europe: 10 

to Greece: 17,20,21 

tfl Italy: 33 

to Korea: 276 

to the Philippine Islands: 273 

to Soviet satellite states: 117 

to Taiwan: 259 

Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA): 

30-31,22j, 246,252,259,262 

Ervpt: \,, L 49,50,58,156

Eire: 193, 203 

Eisenhower, General Dwight D., USA: 5,23,24, 

139,140-41,142,143,144,145~6,147, 

148&49,15Y, 160,162,165,173-74,175 

Emergency war plans: 87,97,125-26,128-29, 

140, 1$6-5Y,-160-63, 164, 165,167, 197, 

199-200,215,223,229 

European Command:.68 

European Recovery Program: 34,101,113,115, 

192,219-20 

Executive Order 9877: 87-98 

Export-Import Bank: 236,253 

FACC D-3: 227,228,229 

FACC D-3/1: 227,229 

Far East, US policy toward the: 263-79 

Far East Commission (FEC): 263,264,268,269 

Faroe Islands: 215 

FC (48) 23: 225 

341 
, 

Finletter Commission: 107, 154, 172-73 

Force levels: 11,132-33,134,135,136,14046, 

147,148,149-50,151,186-87 

estimates of: 153, 154,172, 225 

European: 223,224,225-26,234 

and strategic planning: 164, 165, 166, 170,172, 

176-77,215-l 7 

Fowip Affnirs: 116 

Foreign Assistance Coordinating Committee 

(FACC): 30-31,39,227,229,230,233,254, 

274 

Foreign Assistance Steering Committee (FAX): 

30-31,227 

Formosa: 163, 242, 257-58, 262 

Forrestal, James V.: 5,35,38, 100 

and atomic weapons: 90-93, Y5-Y8,286-87 

and Berlin airlift: 67, 68, 69-70, 74-75, 77, 79 

and Brussels Pact: 194,197,199 

and budget requests: lOl-103,105-110,113, 

114-15,116,121,122,123,124,128,129-30, 

131,133,134-35,139,140,186-87 

and China: 239,24243,245,246,248,250 

and Greece: 16,22,23,24,26,30-31 

and military aid to Europe: 219, 227 

and NATO: 201 

and Palestine: 45,47,53,54,55 

and the Philippine Islands: 274 

and rearmament: 100 

and strategic planning: 153,167,168,172, 173, 

177,188-89 

Fort Stotsenburg, Philippine Islands: 271-72 

France: 7, 8,42,48, 58-59,61,63, 64, 69, 70, 73, 

74-75,155,156,191,192,193,194,195,198, 

199,200,201,203,205-206,207,208,209,210, 

211,212-13,221,233,234,276 

French Chiefs of Staff: 207,208,212-13 

Fu Tso-yi, General: 246 

Germany. Scc~ulso Berlin, Germany. 

East/West: 8,81 

occupation forces: 125,126,127, 199-200 

occupation zones: 7,8,61 

proposed defense of: 198 

keGrations demanded of: 7-8 

and the USSR: 7-8,61-85 

Gibraltar: 159, 162-63 

Glover, Rear Adm. Cato D., USN: 87 

Grady, Henry F.: 30 

Greece: 6, 9-10,15P16, 17-32, 34,35,37, 39, 63, 

15Y, 201, 221,228,230,231, 232,233 

Greek National Armv: 21,27-28,2Y 

Greek-Turkish Assisiance Act of 1948: 23,37 

Greenland: 160,215 

Griswold, Dwight I?: 18,20,28 

Gruenther, Maj. Gen. Alfred M., USA: 79,87,92, 

99%100,103,109,121,124,128,167-68,172, 

227 

342 

Hainan: 254 

Halsey, Fleet Admiral William F., USN: 180 

Harmon, Lt. Gen. H. Ii., USAF: 168-69 

Harmon Committee: 168-69,171,184,1X9 

Hayes, Maj. Gen. George P., USA: 64 

Headquarters, US Forces China Theater: 241 

Henderson, Loy: 25, 44 

Herrman, Rear Adm. Ernest E., USN: 36 

Hill, Rear Adm. T. B.: 2Y3 

Hoffman, Paul: 30-31, 227 

Hong Kong: 255 

Huebnrr, Lt. Gen. Clarence R., USA: lYY, 200 

Hungary: 6, 7 

Iceland: 131, 159, 160, 193, 195, 200, 201, 203, 207, 

211,215 

“lke I”: 14445, 146, 148 

“Ike II”: 14546, 148 

India: 221 

Indochina: 276,277 

Indonesia: 276,277 

Industrial mobilization planning: 73, 124-25, 153, 

164,165,194 

lnverchapel, Lord (UK): lY2 

Iran: 15,16,19-20,38-39,43,156,201,221,228, 

230,231,232,233,274 

Iraq: 43, 156 

Ireland: 195,200,201,203 

Israel: 41-59,159 

Italy: 7, 15, 20,32-35, 39,63,159, 193, 195, 200, 

201, 202, 203, 205,207, 208, 210, 211, 212, 214, 

215,221,228,229,230,231,233 

Iwo Jima: 264 

Japan 

and China: 8, 236,249, 257 

defense of: 157, 163,276, 277-78 

occupation of: 125, 126, 263-71 

peace treaty with: 264-71 

and the Philippine Islands: 271 

Japanese Mandated Islands: 264, 266 

JaLjard, Vice Adm. Robert, (France): 199 

TCS 1380/75: 269-70 

jCS 1725/47: 166 

JCS 1907: 73-74 

JCS Joint Representatives, Europe: 212,215 

Jerusalem: 45,49,50,51,53,54-55,57 

Jews: 41,4243,44,45, 4748, 49, 50, 54, 58 

Johnson, Louis: 56,57, 140, 14748, 149-50, 151, 

164,171,173-74,175,176,179,185-87,188, 

234, 268,27(1,271,275,276,279-80,284, 285, 

293-94,298,299 

Joint Advisory and Planning Group: 22 

Joint American Military Advisory Group 

Europe: 212 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Chairman: 149, 186 

duties: 2 

legal status of: I 

membership of: 2 

Joint emergency war plans. See War plans, joint. 

Joint Intelligence Committee: 170-71,280-81 

Joint Logistics Committee: 164 

Joint Logistics Plans Committee: 166, 222,223-24 

Joint Munitions Allocation Committee: 223 

Joint Staff Planners: 13, 153 

Joint Strategic Bombing Survey: 182 

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCI’): 163 

Joint Strategic Objectives Plan: 163 

Joint Strategic Plans Committee: 22, 23, 73, 106, 

153-54, 156, 160,165, 170,204-205, 216,223, 

288 

Joint Strategic Plans Group: 153,154,159 

Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC): 24,47, 

55,73-74,90,222-23,261,269970,291 

Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group 

in Greece (JUSMAPG): 23,28 

Joint United States Military Assistance Group 

Philippines: 273-74 

Joint United States Military Advisory Group to 

the Republic of China (JUSMAGCHINA): 

241-44,250,255,256 

Joint War Plans Committee: 153 

Jordan: 53,156 

Judd, Walter H.: 239 

Juin, Marshal Alphonse, (France): 198 

Karachi, Pakistan: 154-55,156 

Kennan, George F.: 6, 116-l 7, 118, 248, 265-66, 

268 

Key West Agreement: 95-96,97,98, 100, 142, 170, 

172,173,186 

Kimball, Dan A.: 172 

King, Fleet Admiral Ernest J., USN: 180 

Korea: 263 

defense of: 157 

military aid to: 39, 228, 230, 231, 232, 233, 

274-75,276 

occupation of: 9, 274, 275 

Korean War: 262,271,282 

Kuomintang (Nationalist Party of China): 236, 

239,243-44,249 

LASHUI’: 289 

Latin America: 228, 230 

Lawrence, Ernest 0.: 290 

I.ay, James S.: 79, 298 

Leach, W. Barton: 180 

League of Nations: 4142 

Leahy, Fleet Admiral William D., USN: 5, 18, 

70-71, 7Y,Y7, 128-29, 155, 156, 173 

Lebanon: 42,50,156 

Lemnitzer, Maj. Gen. Lyman, USA: 197, 224,227, 

254 

Lend-Lease Program: 235,236,242,252,253 

Leva, Marx: 92 

Lie, Trygve: 51 

Lilienthal, David: 284,291,293-94,295,298,299 

Lines of communication 

enemy: 182-83 

planning for maintenance of: 156, 158,159, 

160,174-75,215,223,225,264 

Livesay, Maj. Gen. William G., USA: 23 

London Conference of the Council of Foreign 

Ministers: 6142,63,66, 71, 75-76 

Long Range Bomber Force (Soviet): 13 

Long Range Detection Program: 281-82 

Lovett, Robert A.: 25-26, 35,45,47,51,55, 65,68, 

69-70,79,134,192,194-95,200-201,245, 

24648,257 

Luxembourg: 63,155,156,191,192,198,200,201, 

203,208,210,211,212,221,233 

MacArthur, General Douglas: 26344,265,269,271 

Macatee, Robert B.: 54 

McBride, Maj. Gen. Horace L., USA: 36-37,38 

McCarran, Patrick: 252 

Macdonald, John: 55 

McMahon, Brian: 280,290 

McNarney, General Joseph T., USAF: 124425,131 

McNarney Board: 124 

McNeil, Wilfred: 103, 110, 121 

Magruder, Maj. Gen. Carter B., USA: 270 

Malta: 159 

Manchuria: 23b-37,238,242,243-44,256 

Mao Tse-tung: X,9,235,249,254,255,267 

Marcus Island: 264, 266,270 

Mariana island s: 270 

Marine Corps, US: 11,33,54-55,88,91,92, Y3-Y4, 

95,96,100,101,102,107,109,123,133,141, 

142,148,151,178,183,187,235-36,244,247, 

252 

Maritime Commission: 253 

Marshall, General George C., USA: 8,9-lO, ll, 

12, 18, 19,20, 22, 23, 25, 29,30-31, 50, 54, 62, 

65,74-75,76,129,134,192,194-95,202,219, 

227,236,237,239,242-43,249,265 

Marshall Islands: 270 

Marshall Plan: 9-l 0,117 

Mathews, Francis I?: 180, 187-88 

MC 49/5: 225 

MC (49) 1: 225 

Mediterranean 

and NATO planning: 205 

role in strategic planning: 159, 160, 162-63 

Mexico: 221, 228 

Middle East: 15539,41-59,154,155,156-57,158, 

160 

Military advisers 

343 
for Israel: 57 

for Italy: 33,34 

for the Philippine Islands: 273-74 

for Turkey: 17, 36 

Military aid: 149, 219, 276 

to Arab states: 57-58 

to China: 235,237,239-41,246,250-54,255, 

260,261,262 

to Greece: 18, 20, 23, 29-32 

to Iran: 38-39 

to Israel: 57-58 

to Italy: 33, 35 

to Korea: 274-75,276 

legislation: 213, 216, 21Y-20,224-25,229,230-33 

to NATO members: 191, lY2, 207-208, 212, 213. 

216,21 Y-34 

to the Philippines: 272-74,276,277 

priorities for: 221, 224-25, 226, 227-28 

to Turkey: 36-38 

Military base rights: 265,266, 267, 269, 270-74, 

275,277 

Military budgets: 11 

for air defense: 287-89 

FY 1948: ll,YY, 104,106, 110-11 

FY 1948 Supplement: 106,108-109,176-77 

FY 1949: 89,101,102,103,104,106,107,110-11, 

171-72,173 

FY 1949 Supplement: 99,101-103,109-10,113, 

114,287 

FY 1950: 113-37,139,140,145,160,170,173, 

175,186,287,288-89 

FY 1951: 139-52,173,28Y 

for military assistance to Greece: 30 

planning for military assistance: 229 

Military intelligence: 4,12-13,170-71,188, 279, 

280-82 

Military manpower: ll-12,99,101-102,113,135 

allocations of: 131 

deficiencies: 100, 275 

requirements: 100-101,102,103,107,123,127, 

130-31,14243,147-48,150-51,165-66 

Military preparedness: 13, 26-27,33,34,35, 

78-79,103,120,122,124,136-37,139,152, 

165,194,226,284-85 

Military production and supply, coordination of: 

lY3-94,195 

Military requirements, estimates of: 122-24, 

126627,224-26 

Military service 

compulsory: 26,35, 115 

universal training for: 12,100-101,102 

Mitscher, Admiral Marc A., USN: 171 

Mobilization planning: 153-54,158,159, 164-66, 

223,225-26 

Molotov, Vyacheslav M.: 62, 76 

Montgomery of Alamein, Field Marshal: lY8, 199 

Moore, Admiral (UK): 70-71 

Morocco: 203 

344 

Murphy, Robert D.: 72 

Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949: 31, 35, 

232-33,254,261,275,277 

Mutual security pacts: 191-217,222,232,276, 

277. See also North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization; Western European Union. 

Nanpo Shoto Islands: 264, 266, 270 

National Defense Council (Greece): 28 

National Defense Establishment: 102-103 

National Guard: 102,107,123,159 

National Military Establishment: 3,4, 26, 29, 35, 

55, 77-78,93, 113, 120, 121, 122, 128, 135, 140, 

146, 149, 165, 170, 194, lY5, 197, 201, 204,219, 

240,250,267 

National Security Act of 1947: 1-5, 13, 15, 67-68, 

83,87-98, 102%103,114,121,122,142,153, 

164,186 

National Security Council: 3,4, 13, 16 

and atomic warfare: 284-85,293 

and Berlin crisis: 67-68, 71-72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 

79%80,81,82,83 

and China: 241,24548,249,250,251,254-55, 

257-60,261,265-68,271,275-78 

and Greece: 22,25-26,28-29,32 

and Italy: 33,34 

and military budgets: 114-15, 117,118, 121, 

123,149 

and NATO: 193,1Y4,196-97,220 

and Palestine: 53,55,56 

Special Committee: 284-85, 293-94, 295, 

297-99 

Staff: 26,27-28,32,33,34,35,115,118,193,220, 

240,245,248,259,265-66,275-78 

and strategic planning: 154, 160-61 

National Security Resources Board: 4,26,27,193, 

240 

Naval Advisory Group, China: 242, 243,244--45, 

24748 

Naval aviation. See Aviation, naval. 

Navy, Soviet: 13 

Navy, US: 11, 18,33,87,88,89-YO, 91,92,93-96, 

Y7-98,99, 108P10Y, 130 

and air defense: 287, 288 

appropriations: 136 

Chief bf Naval Operations: 2,5, 23,47, 89,95, 

96, 108, 130, 16445, 170, 172-73, 175, 177, 

186, 187. Set n/so Denfcld, Admiral Louis; 

Nimitz, Fleet Admiral Chester W.; Sherman, 

Admiral Forrest I? 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations: 180 

personnel: 100,101, 102, 107, 109, 123, 132, 133, 

143,148,150,151,244 

proposed budgets: 101,102,104,107~~109, 110, 

111,124,129-30,131,133,135,151 

requirements estimates: 122-24, 125, 127, 128, 

131,14146,148,149-50,172 
Netherlands, The: 63, 155, 156, 191, 192,198, 200, 

201,203,208,209,211,221,233 

NL’ZU York Times: 90 

Newport, Rhode Island: 198 

Newport Agreement: 97-98,142 

Nichols, Kenneth D.: 293 

Nimitz, Fleet Admiral Chester W., USN: 5,23-24, 

89,180 

Norstad, Lt. Gen. Lauris, USAF: 69,90, 91, 124, 

148,293 

North Africa: 159, 162-63, 201, 202,203 

North Atlantic Alliance: 30-31, 162 

North Atlantic Defense Forces: 216-17 

North Atlantic Treaty: 35,191,200-204,205, 

209-11,212,216,227,231,232,260 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): 149, 

191,204-217 

Defense Committee Executive and Steering 

Group: 206,207,208,209 

military aid to members: 219-34 

Military Committee: 210,211, 212-13, 215, 

216-17 

military organization: 204-12 

Military Supply Board: 207-208 

North Atlantic Council: 206, 207,208, 209,211, 

212,213 

North Atlantic Defense Committee: 206, 207, 

210,211,212,213,215,216-17 

North Atlantic Military Production and 

Supply Board: 212 

regional defense plans: 212, 233 

regional planning groups: 207,208,209,210, 

211-12,213-17 

North China: 236-37,238,244-48,250,252,256 

Norway: 156, 193, 195, 200,201, 203, 205, 207, 

208,211,215,221,228,229,230,231,233,234 

NSC 1: 32,33 

NSC 1 /l: 33 

NSC l/2: 34,35 

NSC l/3: 35 

NSC 5: 24-27 

NSC 5/l: 26 

NSC 5/2: 26,27-28 

NSC 7: 114 

NSC 9: 193,194-95,201 

NSC 9/2: 195,196697,201 

NSC Y/3: 196-97,200,220,222,224 

NSC 13/l: 265-66 

NSC 13/2: 266 

NSC 13/3: 266,267,270 

NSC 14: 220 

NSC 14/l: 220,222,223 

NSC 20/3: 118-21 

NSC 20/4: 121,160-61,284-85 

NSC 24: 74 

NSC 34/l: 248 

NSC 37/2: 258-59 

NSC 47/2: 56-57,58 

NSC 49: 267,268,270 

NSC 4Y/l: 269 

NSC 68: 152,299 

Occupation forces, British: 33 

Occupation forces, US: 11,33,74,125,126,157, 

223,265,266,268 

Occupation zones (Germany): 61, 63-64, 71 

Allied: 66,67, 71,76-77,81 

British: 81 

Soviet: 62, 64-65, 66, 67, 71, 76,80,82 

us: 61 

Odium, Floyd: 176 

Office of Naval Intelligence: 244 

Office of the Secretary of Defense: 90, 101, 135, 

136,146,209,213,214 

Office of Budget: 102,150 

personnel levels: 150 

Ofstie, Rear Adm. Ralph A., USN: 182 

Ohly, John H.: 266 

Oil resources: 156-57, 158, 161-62, 168, 169 

Okinawa: 131,154,157,158-59,162,163,181, 

184,251,264,265,266,267,270 

Oliver, Maj. Cen. Lunsford E., USA: 36 

Operations 

CROWN: 28,29 

DAWN: 28 

Oppenheimer, Robert: 279,289,290 

Pakistan: 156, 221 

Palestine: 9, 41-59, 156 

Palestine Commission: 45,47 

Panama: 45 

Papagos, Field Marshal Alexandros (Greece): 32 

Parsons, Admiral William L., USN: 279 

Peace treaty with Japan: 264-71,276 

“I’entagon’Talks”:- 16 

l’hilipuine Islands: 39,45,15Y, 163,228,230,231, 

%2,233,239,257,263,264,271-74,276, 

277-78 

Pike, Sumner: 291 

PINCHER (Joint Basic Outline War Plan): 153 

“Plan: Task Force Truculent”: 75 

Poland: 6, 7, 63 

Portugal: 159, 193, 195, 200,201, 203,207, 208, 

20’),210,214,215,221,228,229,230 

Potsdam Conference: 7,62,71,263 

President of the United States: 2,4, 13, 22,26,33, 

54, 55, 56,58, 187,213,219, 220-21,228,232, 

233, 240, 242,246, 251,252, 254, 260, 266, 

298-99 

President’s Air Policy Commission: 104-105 

Price, Vice Adm. John D., USN: 89 

Quirino, Elpidio: 273 

345 
177, 180,181,185 

Railways: 64-65,66,67,77 

Rawlings, Lt. Cen. Edwin H., USAF: 140,141 

Rearmament 

European: 222-24,227-28 

US: 222-24,227-28 

Reconstruction Finance Corporation: 18 

Red Army: 6,117 

“Red Bricks System”: 142,145,148 

Refugees, Arab: 49,50-51,57 

Republic of the Philippines Military Assistance 

Act: 273 

Research and Development, funding for: 102, 

124-25,148 

Research and Development Board: 4,227, 

Reserve Corps: 102, 107, 123 

Richards, Maj, Gen. George J., USA: 124, 131 

Rio de Janeiro Treaty: 228 

Robb, Air Marshal James, RAF: 199 

Robertson, General Brian: 68, 70 

Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 1, 3, 4, 6 

Royal Air Force (Britain): 70-71, 198 

Royal Hellenic Air Force: 19, 21, 29 

Royall, Kenneth C.: 65, 67, 68,69%70, 79, 91, 

128-29,240-41,242,272 

Rumania: 6, 7 

Rusk, Dean: 47,48 

Kyukyu Islands: 157, 163, 257, 263, 264,265, 266, 

267,270,271,276,277-78 

St. Laurent, Louis: 191 

SANDSTONE tests: 283,284 

Saudi Arabia: 43,156,221,228, 

Scandinavia: 155,214 

Schuyler, Brig. Gen. C. V. R., USA: 265 

Secretary of Defense: 2,4,5, 13, 90,91, 92,93, 96, 

Y7-Y8,100,102,110,115,121,122,129-30, 

133,142,143,146,147,149,185-86 

and atomic warfare: 277,285,292,298 

and Berlin crisis: 73, 74, 77,80,82,83 

and Brussels Pact: 196,198 

and China: 240,242,245,248,254-55,257,261 

duties: 3 

and military aid to Europe: 220, 227, 229, 230, 

233 

and military aid to Greece: 30,31, 34, 35, 37, 3Y 

and Italy: 38, 39 

and Japan: 266,267 

and NATO: 201,206,207,208,210 

and Palestine: 43,45,47,51,53,54,55,57, 

58-59,65 

and the Philippines: 274 

and strategic planning: 154, 160, 164-65, 169, 

I70,172-74,175-78,187 

Secretary of State: 4,5,18,22,25,36,47,48,51, 

54, 55,56, 73, 74-75, 82, 207, 227, 238, 240, 

346 

227. See also Symington, W. Stuart. 

Secretary of the Army: 4, 23,91, 130, 227. See also 

Gray, Gordon; Royall, Kenneth C. 

Secretary of the Navy: 4,5, 18, 19, 23, Y7, 130, 

172273, 227, 237. See alscr Mathews, Francis 

I?; Sullivan, John L. 

Secretary of War: 18, 19,97, 237 

Selective service: 99,100-101, 102 

Selective Service Act: 12 

Selective Service Act of 1948: 101 

Senate Resolution 239: 196-97,200 

SC I: 212-13 

SC: 13: 214 

SC 13,‘9: 214 

Sherman, Admiral Forrest P., USN: 188 

Ships 

aircraft carriers. Src Aircraft carriers. 

conversion of: 175576 

given to China: 235, 236, 242, 252, 253 

numbers of: 11, 100, 101, 131, 134, 141, 160, 186 

radar picket: 287 

requirements: 107, 123, 127, 131, 141-45, 148, 

150,151,152,178,215-16 

Soviet: 13 

Sine-American Coorperative Organization 

Agreement: 252 

Slim, Field Marshal William J. (UK): 31 

Smith, Lawrence H.: 239 

Smith, Walter Bedell: 75 

Smyth, Henry A.: 291,298 

Sokolovsky, Marshal Vasily D. (USSR): 64, hh, 68, 

70,71,76-77,81 

Souers, Sydney W.: 79,267,293,298 

“Sources of Soviet Conduct, The,” by George 

Kennan: 116 

South Africa: 221 

South Korea: 274-75,276,278 

Spaatz, General Carl, USAF: 5,27,93, 95, Y6,97, 

98,106,155,173 

Spain: 156,163,196-97,200,213,221 

Spruance, Admiral Raymond A., USN: 180 

Stalin, Joseph: 6, 75, 76,81,82 

Standardization of equipment and weapons: 220, 

223-24 

State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating 

Committee (SANACC): 4, 29,34,37,221, 222 

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee 

(SWNCC): 4, 10,36,219,237,273 

Stockpiling, funding for: 114,124P25,144,151 

Strategic Air Command: 11, 157, 167, 177, 183, 

216 

Strategic air operations: 88,92,94, 95-96, 97-98, 

125,126,128,129,131,153-54,156.-57, 

15%59,161-62,164-65,167-69,170-71,172, 

176-77, 178, 180-82, 184-85, 188-89, 197, 2 14, 

215,216 

Strategic bombing: 95, 159, 16 l-62, 167-68, 170, 

178,179,383-85,188~89,213 
272-73,277 

and atomic weapons: 153-55,156-59,161, 

167-72,176-77,180-85.188.213-14.223,283, 

284,285-86 

Congressional investigation of: 177-88 

for defense of Europe: 224-26 

effect of budget estimates on: 159 

and European rearmament: 222-24 

by JCS: 2-3,92,131,153%66,187 

Strategic war plans: 121, 125-26,128,131,140, 

14849,153-66,188-89 

hearings on: 178888 

NATO: 2 13-17 

Strauss, Lewis L.: 290, 291 

Stuart, J. Leighton: 246,251 

Styer, Rear Adm. Charles W., USN: YO-Yl 

Subic Bay Naval Base, Philippine Islands: 271-72 

Sullivan, John L.: 69, 7Y,YO, 128, 175 

SUPREMACY: 286-87 

Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAI’): 

263-64 

Surplus Property Act: 219 

Sweden: lY3,1Y5,201,203,221 

Switzerland: 159 

Symington, W. Stuart: 79, Yl-Y2,106,128, 167-68, 

180 

Syria: 42, 50, 156 

Taber, John: 106 

Taiwan: 235,247,249,251,254,255,257-62,270, 

272,276,277,278 

Tatom, Comdr. Eugene, USN: 181 

Tegel airfield, Germany: 72-73 

Teller, Edward: 289,290 

Tito: 117 

Thailand: 228, 230,277 

Towers, Admiral John H., USN: 98 

Transjordan: 50,156 

Transjordan, Arab Legion of: 4Y,50 

Truman, Harry S: 1,4, 6,8, Y-10,11,13,104,121, 

149,187-88,277 

and atomic weapons: 88,96,98,279-80, 284, 

285,291,293,294,298-99 

and Berlin airlift: 62-63, 65, 68, 69-70, 72, 75, 

76,79-82 

and Brussels Pact: 191,192,193,196-97,198 

and budget requests: YY,lOO,lO2,109-10,113, 

114-15,122,124,127,129,135-37,139,140, 

142,146,147,149,151 

and China: 236-38,239,241,246,247-50,258, 

259,262 

and Greece: 15, 16,17,18,22,23,26,29,34,35, 

38 

and Japan: 268 

and military aid to Europe: 220, 222, 230, 

231-32 

and military manpower: 12,99, 100-101 

and the Philitmine Islands: 272,273.274 

and strategic’planning: 172,175,176 

Truman administration: 10,12, 15, 18, 23,30-31, 

39,47,67-68, 79, 83, 113, 116, 119, 137, 

146-47,152,155,194-95,222,224-25,227, 

274,297-98 

Truman Doctrine: 9-10, 15,36, 38 

Trusteeships, United Nations (Palestine): 42-43, 

45,4748‘ 49 

Tsingtao, China: 24448,257 

Tunisia: 203 

Tunner, Maj. C-en. William H., USAF: 72-73 

Turkey: 6, 9910, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19-20, 23, 29‘30, 

31,34,35,36-38,39,4142,55,156,201,228, 

230,231,232,233 

Inion of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): 6-7, 

10, 55, 125, 147, 148 

ability to attack US: 279,283, 286-89 

aggression by: 1, 5-6, 13, 119, 153, 154, 161, 

191, 192,193,195,196,19Y, 213,214,220,229, 

265-66,26748 

and atomic weapons: 279-99 

and Berlin blockade: 54,64-85 

and China: Y,235,236-37,238,239,248,249, 

257,261-62,275 

and Czechoslovakia: 62-63 

expansionism: 15-39,99,114, 115,116-77,123, 

235,275-76 

foreign policy: 117-19 

and Germanv: 7-8,61-85 

and Greece: Y-10, 16, 17, 18-20,25,26, 27, 28, 

30 

and Iran: 38-39 

and Italy: 32 

and Japan: 264,266,267-68,269-70,271 

and Korea: 9,274 

military capabilities: 169, 170-71, 188 

military forces: 12-13,119,128,199-200 

and Palestine: 41,4345,47,48,50,51,53-54, 

56,59 

planning for war against: 15354,156-66, 

167-68,169,170-71,181,182,185,188-89, 

213-l 7,221,225,229 

and satellite states: 6, 7,117, 120 

and Turkey: 37-38 

United Kingdom: 5-6, 7,8,9, 36, 38,62, 119, 128, 

129,131,143,148,153,154,155,156,157, 

158-59,160,162,163,175,181,188,224-25 

and atomic weapons: 297 

and Brussles Pact: 191,193,194,195,197, 

198-99 

and Germany: 61,63,64,65,68-69,70-72,73, 

74-75 

and Greece: 16,17,18-20,22,24,31 

and Japan: 268,271 

military aid to: 221, 233 

347 
troops: 16,17-20,54-55,157,197,213 

United Nations: 1, 6, 16, 18, 19,4445,47,49,54, 

55, 57, 59, 260, 275, 278 

and atomic energy: 284 

Charter: IO, 53. 193,196, 213 

China and: 8,238,242,243,252,257 

General Assembly: 44,45,47,48,49-51,53 

and Korea: 263,274475 

Mediator: 49,51 

Military Staff Committee: 2-3 

Secretary General: 53 

Special Committee on Palestine: 43 

Sirategic trusteeships: 264 

Trusteeshiu Council: 4243 

United Nat&s Security Council: 38, 45, 47, 48, 

50, 53, 57-58, 76, 77,80 

Chinese membership on: 235 

Palestine Truce Commission: 48,49-50,51 

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 

Administration (UNRRA): 236,252,253 

Unitd States, US!? (carrier): 171-76, 182, 185-86, 

187 

US Army Group, Greece: 18,21,23 

US Army Signal Corps: 282 

US House of Representatives: 2,232,254 

Appropriations Committee: 89,106 

Armed Services Committee: 106,171, 172-73, 

177-88,232 

Foreign Affairs Committee: 219,232, 23940 

US Military Representative for Military 

Assistance in Europe: 212 

“U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to 

Counter Threats to U.S. Security” (NSC 

20/3): 118 

US Senate: 2,232,254 

Appropriations Committee: 147 

Armed Services Committee: 101,105,232 

Foreign Relations Committee: 194-95, 796,202, 

232,23940,252,254 

Universal military training: 12,100-101, IO2 

Urey, Harold C.: 298 

Vafiades, Markos: 17 

Van Fleet, Lt. Gen. James A., USA: 23,28, 29, 30 

Van Zandt, James: 177-78 

Vandenberg, Arthur: IY4-95,196,202,232,251 

Vandenberg, General Hoyt S., USAF: 27,53,55, 

72,73, 74, 97, 126, 129, 130, 132, 136, 148, 166, 

167-68, 169, 170, 171, 173, 175, 179, 180, 

184485,222-23,281-82,286,288-89 

“Vandenberg Resolution”: 196,200 

Vinson, Carl: 106,177,179,180,297-98 

Volcano Islands: 264 

Voorhees, Tracy S.: 26Y-70,271 

War Council: 176, 179 

348 

p, j

BROILER: 153-54,155,156,161 

BUSHWHACKER: 154, 163 

CHARIOTEER: 154,163 

COGWHEEL: 164-66,223 

effect of atomic weapons on: 283, 285,286 

feasibility of: 167-69 

FLEETWOOD: 125-26,156-58,159, 163,183 

FROLIC: 154-55 

HALFMOON: 97,156-58,163,164,183,197 

objectives (of war): 154, 156, 159, 161, 182, 2.13, 

214-15 

OFF-TACKLE: 140,159-63,165,166, 167,188, 

277,283,288 

REAPER: 166 

STRAIGHTEDGE: 166 

TROJAN: 158-59,160,161,162,168,179,183, 

283 

Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG): 

171,184,188-89,288 

Webb, James E.: 109-10,113,266,267,268 

Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C., USA: 68-69, 90, 

91,124,237-38,239,242%43 

Weeks, General Robert, Britain: 64 

West Germany: 66,69, 71, 75,81, 82, 196-97, 199, 

200 

Western European Union: 115,155,192,193-94, 

196,197,198,205,215,220,221,222-23, 

224-25,232 

Chiefs of Staff: 198-99, 200,205,207, 212 

Commanders in Chief Committee: 199,200 

defense policy: 224-26 

military aid to: 220, 221, 222-25, 227-28, 229, 

230,231,233 

Military Committee: 197, 199, 216, 224 

military forces: 224426 

Wilson, Carroll L.: 290 

Wilson, Edwin C.: 36 

World War II: 1,2,4,5, 6,15,38, 61 

bombing of Germany: 185 

and Palestine: 42 

peace treaties: 778,61-62 

Worth, Cedric: 176, 177, 178 

Yalta Conference: 6, 7 

Yemen: 156 

Yokosuka, Japan: 266,267, 270 

Yugoslavia: 6, 17, 18, 24, 2Y,32, 63 

Zhukov, Marshal Georgi (USSR): 64 

Zionist movement: 41,42,48