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i 

87–622 2014

[H.A.S.C. No. 113–90] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE 

AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST 

FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF 

THE AIR FORCE 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 14, 2014 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

RON BARBER, Arizona 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York 

DEREK KILMER, Washington 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois 

PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

MICHELE PEARCE, Counsel 

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2014 

Page 

HEARING: 

Friday, March 14, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Request from the Department of the Air Force .................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Friday, March 14, 2014 ........................................................................................... 59 

FRIDAY, MARCH 14, 2014 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Committee on 

Armed Services ..................................................................................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

James, Hon. Deborah Lee, Secretary of the Air Force ......................................... 3 

Welsh, Gen Mark A., III, USAF, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force .......... 9 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

James, Hon. Deborah Lee, joint with Gen Mark A. Welsh III ..................... 67 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 63 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ..................................................................... 65 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

DOD Policy Memorandum submitted by Secretary James ........................... 100 

List of Keesler Awards ..................................................................................... 98 

New York Times article, ‘‘U.S. Says Russia Tested Missile, Despite Treaty’’ ................................................................................................................... 93 

Table summarizing drawdown of A-10 positions by Air Force Specialty 

Code at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base ...................................................... 102 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 106 

Mr. Bridenstine ................................................................................................. 112 

Mr. Enyart ........................................................................................................ 111 

Dr. Fleming ....................................................................................................... 109 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 106 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 106 

Mrs. Hartzler .................................................................................................... 111 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 108 

Mr. McIntyre ..................................................................................................... 105 
Page

IV 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Nugent ........................................................................................................ 112 

Mr. Palazzo ....................................................................................................... 112 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 111 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 108 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Barber ......................................................................................................... 133 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 123 

Mr. Brooks ......................................................................................................... 140 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 129 

Dr. Fleming ....................................................................................................... 137 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 115 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 124 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 127 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 130 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 132 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 116 

Mr. LoBiondo .................................................................................................... 119 

Mr. Maffei ......................................................................................................... 138 

Mr. McKeon ....................................................................................................... 115 

Mr. Peters ......................................................................................................... 139 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 123 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 140 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 126 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 125 

Mr. Veasey ........................................................................................................ 141 

Mrs. Walorski ................................................................................................... 141 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF 

THE AIR FORCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Friday, March 14, 2014. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:03 a.m., in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

I want to thank you all for joining us here today as we consider 

the fiscal year 2015 budget request for the Department of the Air 

Force. I appreciate our witness testimony, and their support of our 

airmen. 

Joining us today are the Honorable Deborah Lee James, Secretary of the Air Force, and General Mark A. Welsh, Chief of Staff 

of the Air Force. And he has brightened up the room a little bit 

by inviting his wife, Betty, and his daughter, Liz, to be with us. 

Thank you for joining us. 

I want to especially welcome Secretary James, the 23rd Secretary of the Air Force, as this is her first posture hearing before 

our committee. We are also delighted that she is a former HASC 

[House Armed Services Committee] staff member. In fact, we were 

talking just before we came in here, and she pointed out to us 

where one of her offices was in her 10-year tenure on the staff. 

Happy to have you back. Welcome back. 

While this committee and you, General Welsh, have warned 

about the consequences of cuts to our defense budget, I don’t think 

policymakers in Washington or the American people really understand how much has been cut, and what it means. 

For the Air Force, what it means is that although the budget request highlights reinvestments in readiness, the Air Force still cannot meet its readiness needs until 2023. Let me read that again, 

2023; 10 years almost from now. That is how big the readiness deficit is. 

The cuts that we made over the last couple of years are so deep, 

and the budget forecast into the future with—what is our problem? 

Sequestration. How soon we forget. But that has basically flattened 

out into the future, so to try to refill the hole with the limited resources in the future, 10 years just to get us back to where we need 

to be in readiness. 
2 

And second, the Air Force is now faced with making difficult 

force structure tradeoffs. In this year’s budget alone, the Air Force 

is retiring two pretty good aircraft just because we don’t have the 

resources to maintain them. And these aircraft have unique capabilities that the combatant commanders that we have already had 

in the hearing process to this point need that aircraft. It is interesting. 

People before you, General, have said that you were an A–10 

pilot, and then kind of indicated that you suggested getting rid of 

the A–10. It is amazing how things work. But I think the ones that 

we should probably be asking about the A–10s are the ground 

forces that have their lives saved because of the A–10 and the pilots that have flown them; and I understand the dilemma we are 

facing. 

General Welsh, you said it best when you posed the question: Do 

we want a ready force today or a modern force tomorrow? I know 

the Air Force is trying to make the best of a bad situation, as all 

the services are. But I fear that the way we are heading we will 

have neither. 

Our Nation expects our air forces to be superior and to be ready. 

We don’t want to go into any fair fights. Whether to deploy to reassure our eastern European allies, to monitor missile launches 

around the world, to provide close air support and intelligence to 

our troops in Afghanistan, which of those missions would we like 

to eliminate? Yet, our technological superiority is eroding in the 

airspace and cyberspace. Our forces are already strained in just 

meeting the day-to-day requirements, much less crisis or conflict. 

I said this on Wednesday to the Navy and Marine Corps and I 

will say it again today, is this the Air Force we want for our Nation? Lastly, while we continue to debate funding and force structure, we cannot forget the values and standards to which we hold 

our military. Integrity matters, leadership matters. The vast majority of our service members embody those values daily. 

Unfortunately, we have read too many stories recently that reveal behavioral and cultural problems that have permeated the nuclear enterprise. Manning our Nation’s nuclear deterrent is an immense responsibility and I know there are many airmen who bear 

this duty with the utmost skill and professionalism. However, a 

few bad eggs put at risk the mission and taint the record of the 

rest of the Air Force. That cannot be allowed to happen. 

I hope these sobering remarks remind us not to lose sight of our 

shared values and the vital importance of reversing the dangerous 

budget trajectory. And I look forward to your testimony here today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 63.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Sanchez. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and both to the Secretary and to the General, it is a pleasure to have you before us 

today. 
3 

† Ms. Sanchez is referring to the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA). 

General, I often use your speech at USAF † to my leadership 

classes back home, so I am grateful to have you here today. 

I will be submitting Ranking Member Smith’s opening statement 

for the record, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 65.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Before we have the witnesses give their testimonies, I just want to let you know that I am looking for in particular two areas today of discussion. 

The first, I continue to be extremely concerned with respect to 

the leadership and personnel within the ICBM [intercontinental 

ballistic missile] nuclear cases of misconduct, low morale, missileers cheating on tests, air commanders not conducting themselves 

in a manner that lives up to the standards of the Air Force, and 

I think this committee will agree with me that this is totally unacceptable, and that this issue needs to be addressed. So I would like 

to hear what you are doing with respect to that. 

And the second, I have been closely monitoring the lack of competition in the Air Force’s space launch program and unfortunately, 

I just learned in the last day that the Air Force has made a decision to continue this trend by reducing the competitive opportunities by 50 percent. And I think that is a very unfortunate outcome 

because I believe that competition drives down prices and brings 

up talent. And so those are two areas I would like you to address 

as you move forward. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Madam Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DEBORAH LEE JAMES, SECRETARY OF 

THE AIR FORCE 

Secretary JAMES. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, members 

of the committee. 

Congresswoman Sanchez, it truly is an honor for me to be here 

this morning. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your kind opening. As you 

said, this is kind of like coming home for me. And I will admit that 

I had more experience sitting in the chairs in the back of this room 

than sitting in the chairs on this side of the table, but it is great 

to be back here, and it is particularly apropos as a graduate of the 

Military Personnel and Compensation Subcommittee to have this 

be my first posture hearing. 

General Welsh and I do have prepared remarks which I would 

ask be submitted for the record, and we will just summarize, with 

your concurrence. I also just want to take a moment. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, your written statements will 

be totally entered in the record. 

Secretary JAMES. Thank you. 

I would also just like to take a moment to say that there is a 

lot of people who are mourning right now in the Pentagon, Mr. 

Chairman, due to your announcement that you will be retiring 
4 

from the Congress, and so I just want to say, I don’t think it is too 

late to reverse that decision, in case you are interested. I don’t 

know that you will, but we are very grateful for all of the work you 

have done over the years for our men and women in uniform, and 

we will surely miss you a great deal. 

The biggest honor and privilege for me in this new job, and I am 

11 weeks old in this job now, is to be a part of this terrific, very 

best Air Force on the entire planet. And that is 690,000, more or 

less, Active Duty, National Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen 

and women, as well as their families. That is the total team and 

I am part of that team now and it is a huge honor and a privilege. 

During my first 11 weeks I have been very, very busy not only 

studying up on all of these budgetary matters and all of our programs and trying to get on top of that as best as possible, but I 

have also tried to hit the ground running and I have been out and 

about to see our Air Force in action. 

So 18 bases in 13 States, that is where I have been so far and 

they have been quick trips, but they have been enormously helpful. 

And in a nutshell, here are three things that I have noted. First 

of all, I have noted leaders at all levels, and these are our officer 

leaders as well as our enlisted leaders, and they are taking on 

tough issues in a tough budgetary environment, but they are doing 

it with a can-do spirit and they are getting things done, despite difficulties. 

Secondly, I have seen superb total force teamwork and here I am 

talking particularly with our National Guard, Reserve forces operating with our Active Duty Air Force, and this is from headquarters right on down to the unit level. I have seen them get the 

job done. 

And number three, across the board, just amazing, amazing airmen who are enthusiastic about what they are doing in service to 

our Nation. Everywhere I go, I do town hall meetings, but with 

that enthusiasm they also are looking to us, they are looking to 

you, they are looking to our Nation’s leaders for decisions, some 

greater stability, if we can give it to them, and leadership in these 

very challenging times. 

And indeed, these are very challenging times, both in terms of 

our security environment, and the declining budgets that you 

talked about, Mr. Chairman. And in the submission that we have 

before you, we have done our very best to tackle these challenges 

head on, head on, in a thoughtful and deliberate and a very inclusive way. 

In the fiscal year 2015 budget, we do have a strategy-driven 

budget, but let’s face facts, we are severely, severely limited by the 

fiscal choices that are contained in the Budget Control Act, and the 

Bipartisan Budget Act [BBA]. For 2015, as you know, we do hit the 

dollar targets that are in the BBA, but we also have contained 

therein what we call the Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative. This is a $26 billion initiative across DOD [Department of Defense]. For us in the Air Force it is about $7 billion, and we will, 

if we are granted these additional funds, spend them principally on 

readiness and other key investments to get us back closer to where 

we want and need to be. 
5 

I hope we will get a chance to talk more about that during Q and 

A [question and answer]. So that is fiscal year 2015. For 2016 and 

beyond we similarly have difficult choices that we make and we 

will talk a little bit more about that as we get further into it. 

The key thing is that this is a budget in which we are rebalancing, and Mr. Chairman, you said it is readiness, and it is the 

future, and it is really not an either-or, because we very, very 

much, we need to have both. I am pretty sure as we get into this, 

we are not going to make everybody happy. As a matter of fact, I 

am pretty sure there is going to be a fair amount of unhappiness. 

And when we get into Q and A, our preamble to many answers to 

your questions will be: While faced with the difficult choices, and 

the budgetary situation, we made these choices. Don’t mean to 

sound like a broken record on that, but it really is the truth. There 

were no elements of low-hanging fruit in this budget. 

So just a few words on strategy, there are strategy imperatives 

for today. SecDef [Secretary of Defense] has laid it out. This is the 

first budget coming off of 13 years of war where we are beginning 

to transition. We need to defend the homeland against all strategic 

threats. We need to build security globally by protecting U.S. influence and deterring aggression. And we need to remain prepared to 

win decisively against any adversary should deterrence fail. And 

your Air Force is critically important to all of those elements and 

that is today. But there is also tomorrow. There is the strategy imperatives of tomorrow. New technologies, new centers of power, 

particularly the Pacific, a more volatile and unpredictable world, a 

world in which we can no longer accept that American dominance 

of the skies and of space will be preeminent. 

We have to get ready. We have to have abilities to operate in a 

contested environment. Again, your Air Force is critical as well in 

the future. So we have to have both, the today, and the tomorrow 

piece. 

Now, if we turn to the budget realities, we are very grateful for 

the greater stability and the additional bump-up in fiscal year 

2014, the additional stability in fiscal year 2015. It doesn’t solve all 

of the ills, but it was a great help. So we are grateful for the BBA, 

the fiscal year 2014 appropriations, and the many decisions contained in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]. 

But again, even with those bump-ups, there were difficult tradeoffs that had to be made because the 2015 top line and beyond is 

a whole lot less than we ever thought possible just a few short 

years ago. 

So I have been in and around this business as an observer on the 

scene, you might say, for more than 30 years, and I think you all 

will agree with me that there is always a strategy and there is always budgets, and they never match exactly. There is always a certain degree of mismatch and when that happens, that is when you 

have to make these decisions, and the decisions are based on the 

best military judgment and what we think are prudent risks, 

where we can assume those risks. So that is the story this year as 

well, albeit I think this is a more complex and difficult year than 

most. As I said, there was no low-hanging fruit as best as I can 

tell. 
6 

So in general, our decisions reduce capacity in order to gain capability. So that means we chose, when necessary, reductions in 

manpower and force structure to sustain readiness and guarantee 

technological superiority. We slowed the growth in military compensation in order to free up money to plow back into today’s readiness as well as recapitalization. We chose to delay or terminate 

some programs to protect higher priority programs, at least what 

we thought were higher priorities. And we sought cost savings in 

a number of ways, reducing headquarters, putting us on a glide 

path to greater reliance on the Guard and Reserve. We sought reductions in a number of ways in order to try to balance all of this 

out as best as we could. 

Now, I would like to give you some of the key decisions but give 

it to you within the context of the three priorities that I have laid 

out for the Air Force. And those three priorities are taking care of 

people, balancing today’s readiness with tomorrow’s readiness, and 

number three, ensuring that we have the very best Air Force that 

we possibly can have at the best value for the taxpayer. So basically, everything I work on I try to work on the prism of those 

three priorities. 

So taking care of people. That means a lot to me. Everything 

comes down to people as far as I am concerned, and it is a multifaceted area. So taking care of people means recruiting the right 

people, retaining the best people, developing them once we have 

them in the force, having diversity of thought and background at 

the table as we make our decisions, protecting the most important 

family programs. It means dignity and respect for all and making 

sure that everybody is on top of and leading and living our core 

values as you talked about the importance of integrity, Mr. Chairman. 

It means fair compensation going forward. It means a lot of 

things. It is all about taking care of people. And let me zero in on 

two areas in particular, which have some controversy associated 

with them. First of all, based on where we believe we are going, 

we are going to be a smaller Air Force in the future. We will be 

coming down on all of our components, Active, Guard, Reserve, and 

civilians. So we will get smaller. We will rely more on our Guard 

and Reserve but as we get smaller, we also need to shape our Air 

Force. So particularly on the Active Duty side what we have right 

now we have certain imbalances. 

We have certain categories and specialty areas where we have 

too many people, and then we have other categories in specialty 

areas where we have too few people. So in addition to bringing 

numbers down somewhat we need to rebalance and get into sync. 

So we have a series of programs that we are offering, some to retrain people into other categories. Some are voluntary incentives 

for people to leave us going forward. And then if we can’t get the 

numbers and the balance, there are involuntary programs as well. 

So this is very much on the minds of our airmen and I wanted to 

bring it to your attention as well. 

Another area of controversy is compensation, slowing the growth 

in military compensation. This was one of those hard decisions that 

nobody is totally happy with, but we felt that given the fact that 

military compensation has risen quite a bit, particularly in the last 
7 

decade, and as we look at comparability with the civilian sector, we 

felt that somewhat slowing that growth was a reasonable approach 

in the next several years as we attempt to plow money back into 

readiness. So again, hard decisions. Those are two particular areas 

that are on the minds of our people quite a bit now. 

This all leads me to my second priority, and that is balancing the 

readiness of today with the readiness of tomorrow. So as you point 

out, it is going to take us a while to get back to the readiness level, 

quite a while that we wish to have, where we can do the full range 

of capabilities. 

We took a big hit with the sequestration last year, so for fiscal 

year 2015, we need to get back on the glide path to get it up. We 

need to fully fund the flying hours which we have done, and other 

high priority readiness issues, and we will see gradual improvements if we can secure these resources. 

But I have to also say there is the readiness of tomorrow, right? 

There is today and tomorrow. So in addition to the readiness of 

today, we remain committed to our programs of tomorrow. The 

three top ones, of course, are the Joint Strike Fighter F–35, the 

new tanker program, and the Long Range Strike Bomber. 

We also remain committed to the nuclear triad, that is the 

ICBMs and the bombers for the Air Force, and I look forward to 

talking about the ICBMs as we get into Q and A because that I 

have spent a fair amount of time in my first 11 weeks on that 

issue. And there are other things in the budget as well, starting to 

rebuild our combat rescue helicopter force. 

We have moneys in our 5-year plan for next generation JSTARS 

[Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] aircraft, and a replacement for our aging T–38 trainer aircraft. There is $1 billion 

in there for new energy technology, also critical advances in our 

space capabilities. So these are all of the things that we chose to 

invest in, in some cases doubling down in our investments. 

But of course, in order to do the readiness of today and these key 

investments for tomorrow, that is where we came down to, what 

are we going to reduce? Where can we take some of what we think 

are the most prudent risks? So here are some of the highlights of 

some of the reductions that we are proposing to take. 

First of all, the retirement of the A–10 fleet. That is, I know, an 

extremely controversial area. And we will talk about that, I am 

sure, as we get into the Q and A. But I want you to know, we are 

absolutely committed to the close air support mission. We will not 

let it drop. I, too, have tried to talk to commanders on the ground 

from the ground forces. General Welsh knows far more than I do 

about it, but we are going to cover it and we can cover it with other 

aircraft, and we commit that we will. 

Retirement of the U–2 fleet and we will keep the Global Hawk 

Block 30. Having both fleets together would be terrific, but it is not 

affordable that we feel under the circumstances, and there are requirements which when you add those two together, we are above 

the validated requirements for high-altitude reconnaissance. So 

once again in a tough budget environment, this was a choice where 

we felt we could assume some risk. 

We will have limited growth in our combat air patrols [CAPS]. 

This is the Reapers and the Predators. So we had originally said 
8 

a couple of years back we were going to go to 65 of these so-called 

CAPs. Under our proposal we are going to go to 55. By the way, 

today we are at 50, so we are still growing; we are just not growing 

as much. And over time we will retire the MQ–1s, which are the 

Predators, in favor of having an entire fleet of MQ–9s. So we will 

be retiring one in favor of the other. 

By making these tough choices today, again, we think we are 

going to preserve our combat capability and make each taxpayer 

dollar count better for the future, which leads me to the third priority, and that is value for the taxpayer, and how are we going to 

ensure that going forward. There is a whole host of areas here. We 

have got to keep those acquisition programs on budget and on 

schedule. We have got to work toward auditability, and I need to 

join with our Secretary of Defense and ask you please for another 

round of base closure authority beginning in 2017. 

So there are a lot of initiatives that we have got ongoing to make 

every dollar count for the taxpayer. Just to give you a couple, we 

will be cutting our headquarters; SecDef has asked us to cut by 20 

percent. He gave us the goal of getting that done over 5 years, and 

this is 20 percent of the money, by the way. It is not necessarily 

20 percent of the people, but it is 20 percent of the money. And we 

have said, well, we are going to try to get that done more quickly. 

And so I will predict to you we are going to get that done in 1 year, 

not 5, and hopefully we will do even a little bit better than 20 percent, giving us an opportunity to stand back and review how we 

do things, and we are going to do things a little bit differently and 

do better than that 20 percent. So that is one area that I wanted 

to bring to your attention. 

Now, let me also turn and then I will begin to wrap up. Sequestration, if we return to the sequestration levels in fiscal year 2016 

and beyond, first of all, if there is one key takeaway from this hearing is we feel that would not be the way to go. We ask you to not 

go that way in your final decisions. We feel that it would simply 

be too much of a compromise for our national security. But if we 

have to return to those levels, we have tried to think through how 

we would manage. So let me just give you a few of those highlights. 

If we have to return to sequestration, this would mean the retirement of up to 80 more aircraft including the KC–10 tanker fleet. 

We would choose to defer upgrades to the Global Hawk that we 

would need to make otherwise to make it more on parity with the 

U–2. We would have to defer those. 

We would have to retire the Global Hawk Block 40. Now, this is 

a long-endurance look-down radar to detect and track moving targets. We want to do this because it will minimize our risk during 

transition to next gen JSTARS, but we feel we can’t afford it if we 

have to go back to sequestration. 

We would slow the purchases of the F–35. We would have 45 of 

these CAPs with our Reapers and Predators that I told you about, 

rather than 55. We couldn’t do that next generation engine program I told you about. And we would have to probably reevaluate 

the combat rescue helicopter and a whole host of other things. So 

that sequestration level is not a good deal for us. It is not a good 

deal for the country. And we would ask you to please try to support 

those higher areas. 
9 

So in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we are going to be a smaller Air 

Force in the future, but we are committed to making sure that we 

are capable, and innovative, and ready. We are committed to being 

a good value for the taxpayer making every dollar that we spend 

count; able to respond overseas as well as here at home when disaster strikes us. We will be more reliant, not less, but more reliant 

on our National Guard and Reserve and we will be fuelled by the 

very best airmen, airmen on the planet. 

So I thank you so much for what all of you do for all of us, and 

I now will yield to the General Welsh. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary James and General 

Welsh can be found in the Appendix on page 67.] 

The CHAIRMAN. General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN MARK A. WELSH III, USAF, CHIEF OF 

STAFF, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 

General WELSH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished 

members of the committee. 

It is always an honor to be here with you. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you also for introducing my wife and 

daughter. 

I haven’t had the pleasure to introduce Betty to you, but my wife 

is magic. She is just magic. And I am really glad you are getting 

a chance to meet her. And my daughter is just smarter and more 

talented than both of us, so she just embarrasses me. But it is really wonderful to have them here. 

It is also really wonderful to be sitting here next to my new boss, 

who is going to do great things for our Air Force, and I believe you 

will find that this will be a great, great thing for our relationship 

with this committee as well. And so I am looking forward to having 

her school me on the right way to do this job and the right way 

to communicate with this body. 

Chairman McKeon, I would like to add my special thanks for 

your tireless support of our national defense, all of our services, our 

Air Force in particular, and our airmen for your 20-plus years in 

the Congress. You are a remarkable public servant, sir, and we 

thank you for your example. 

Ladies and gentlemen, your Air Force is the finest in the world 

and we need to keep it that way. We built this budget to ensure 

Air Force combat power remains unequalled. That does not mean 

it will remain unaffected. 

Every major decision reflected in our fiscal year 2015 budget proposal hurts. Each of them reduces capability that our combatant 

commanders would love to have and believe they need. There are 

no more easy cuts. That is just where we are. And we cannot ignore the fact that the law says we will return to sequestered funding levels in fiscal year 2016. 

To prepare for that, the Air Force must cut people in force structure now to create a force that is balanced enough that we can afford to train and operate it in 2016 and beyond. We started our 

budget planning by making two significant assumptions. 

First, is that the Air Force must be capable of fighting and winning a full-spectrum fight against a well-armed, well-equipped, 

well-trained enemy. 
10 

Second, is it ready today versus modern tomorrow cannot be an 

either-or decision. We must be both. We also knew the overwhelming majority of reductions in our budget would have to come 

from readiness, force structure, and modernization. That is where 

the money is that we can affect. Understanding that, we tried to 

create the best balance possible between readiness, capability, and 

capacity across our five mission areas. 

The appropriations bill you passed allowed us to fully fund our 

readiness accounts in fiscal year 2015, and I will add my thank you 

to the boss’. But even with continued funding at that level, as the 

chairman mentioned, it will take us 10 years to return to full readiness. It is a complicated equation. There are lots of things we have 

let slide to fund activity over the last 14 years. 

Because we needed to reduce our planned spending in other 

areas by billions of dollars a year, trimming around the edges just 

wasn’t going to get it done. So we looked at cutting fleets of aircraft 

as a way to create the significant savings required. In the air superiority mission area we already had reductions to aircraft in our 

proposal, but eliminating an entire fleet would leave us unable to 

provide air superiority for a full theater of operations. And no other 

service can do that. 

ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] is the number one shortfall our combatant commanders identify year after 

year after year. They would never support even more cuts than we 

have already had to put in our plan. 

We have several fleets in the global mobility mission area. I 

spoke with Chief of Staff of the Army Ray Odierno to ask what he 

thought about reductions in the airlift fleet, for example. His view 

was that a smaller Army would need to be more responsive and be 

able to move more quickly. He did not think further reduction of 

airlift assets was a good idea. 

We looked at air refueling fleets, and we did consider divesting 

the KC–10 as an option, but the analysis showed us that mission 

impact was too significant; at the PB [President’s Budget] rates we 

could afford to keep it. However, as the boss said, if we do return 

to sequestered funding levels in 2016, this option must be back on 

the table. We would have to cut many more KC–135s than KC–10s 

to achieve the same savings; and with that many KC–135s out of 

the fleet, we would not be able to meet our mission requirements. 

In the strike mission area, we looked at cutting the A–10s. We 

also looked at the F–16s, and the F–15Es. As the chairman mentioned, I am an A–10 pilot by trade. That is where I grew up in 

this business. And Betty and I have a son who is a Marine Corps 

infantry officer. Close air support is not an afterthought to me. It 

is not going to be a secondary mission in the United States Air 

Force. But close air support is not an aircraft. It is a mission, and 

we do it very, very well with a number of airplanes today. 

The reason we looked at the A–10 is because we can save $3.7 

billion across the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program] by divesting the fleet, and another $500 million in cost avoidance for 

planned upgrades that wouldn’t be required. To achieve the same 

savings would require a much higher number of either F–16s or F– 

15Es, but we also looked at those options. We ran a detailed operational analysis comparing divestiture of the A–10 fleet to divesti-
11 

ture of the B–1 fleet, reducing the F–16 fleet, deferring procurement of a number of F–35s, or decreasing readiness further by 

standing down a number of fighter squadrons. 

We used the standard DOD planning scenarios, and the results 

showed that cutting the A–10 fleet was the lowest risk operation— 

excuse me, the lowest risk option from an operational perspective. 

And while no one, especially me, is happy about recommending divestiture of this great old friend, it is the right decision from a 

military perspective, and it is representative of the extremely difficult choices that we are being forced to make. 

The funding levels we can reasonably expect over the next 10 

years dictate that for America to have a capable, credible, and viable Air Force in the mid-2020s, we must get smaller now. We must 

modernize parts of our force, but we can’t modernize as much as 

we planned and we must maintain the proper balance across our 

core mission areas. 

Thank you for your continued support of our Air Force, and my 

personal thanks for your unending support of our airmen and their 

families. The Secretary and I look forward to your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Welsh and Secretary 

James can be found in the Appendix on page 67.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Just a little bit on the lay of the land. We understand we are 

going to have votes about 10:15. We will try to get as many questions in before that as we can, and I will watch the time very closely, but we will come back after the votes. 

If the Secretary and General, if you can stay, we would really appreciate it because we have many Members that will have questions. 

So immediately after votes those who can return, please come 

back as quickly as possible. We will get right back to the votes. 

General Welsh, in my statement I acknowledge that the Air 

Force is being forced to choose between a number of bad options. 

It isn’t like we have got a good thing and a bad thing. Those are 

easy choices. Those were made a long time ago. It is between good 

and good, and needed and needed. Divesting force structure to balance readiness and modernization is a tough thing. What elements 

of the force structure proposed for divestiture would you recommend retaining if you had the budget authority to do so? 

For example, ISR is, we all acknowledge, a mission of great concern. What others have similarly impactful consequences? 

General WELSH. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. The greatest shortfalls we have related to the combatant commander requirements 

every year are ISR and fighter squadrons. Those are the two things 

that we can’t meet the demand on more frequently than anything 

else. By the way, in the ISR category, I would include command 

and control platforms like the AWACSs [Airborne Warning and 

Control System] and the JSTARS. The JSTARS, of course, does 

both for us. 

So ISR, I believe, is clearly the first category that I would maintain capability in. We do not meet the combatant commanders’ requirements today and as we divest more, we will not meet them 

by a wider margin. And then we have to be careful about divesting 

our fighter fleet too much because we are at our requirement today. 
12 

We are going to go seven squadrons below our requirement with 

this budget, and anything further just puts us farther away from 

what we have agreed, as a Department, is required to meet the 

standing war plans of our combatant commanders and their standing annual demand. 

The CHAIRMAN. I was talking to General Amos a few months ago 

and he was telling me he was a wing commander during Desert 

Storm, I believe it was, and how many planes we had. 

And then I was talking to General Hostage and how many planes 

we could provide now if we had a similar need. And it is drastic, 

the difference, like 10 percent now compared to what we had then. 

So when we say the Air Force is getting smaller, I think people 

need to understand, it will be the smallest it has been since its inception. 

And Madam Secretary, you made the comment of sequestration 

is a problem. It is a huge problem, but it is the law of the land. 

And while we got a short reprieve with this budget that was arrived at in December, it becomes back in full force in 2016, and I 

think it is incumbent upon us to use those numbers, because until 

there is a change, that will be the law of the land. And I think 

probably everybody on this committee realizes the dangers that we 

are facing because of it, but I think the American people need to 

know that the Air Force will be the smallest it has ever been. 

The Navy is going back to the size it was in World War I. The 

Army and the Marines are going back to—the Army back to smallest it has been since World War II, and the Marines are going 

down to 175,000 force. That is the trajectory we are on right now, 

so these are dire situations that we are dealing with, and I am not 

sure that the American people really understand how serious it is. 

So much of the time when we have talked about cuts back here 

it has really been—we have slowed the growth rate. These are real 

cuts year over year over year. So thank you for the work that you 

are doing. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have two questions. The first is to Secretary James. Welcome 

back, by the way. Maintaining the military flexibility to adequately 

size the nuclear force is crucial to ensure that we have an optimal 

nuclear deterrent, and I hope you agree with that. 

Secretary JAMES. I do. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What is the impact of the Air Force not having 

started the environmental assessment that would allow an evaluation of a reduction of ICBM silos as part of the military decision 

on an optimal nuclear force structure for the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty, and does the Air Force plan 

to initiate that environmental assessment, and if so, why, or why 

not? 

Secretary JAMES. So, of course, the New START Treaty contains 

a variety of numbers that we have to hit in terms of our total nuclear capability over a certain period of time, and it doesn’t tell us 

how to do it. So in other words, there are choices that could be 

made either in the ICBM force, the bomber force, or the submarine 

force, or a combination thereof. So the Department of Defense has 

been looking at this for some time, and I think within a couple of 
13 

weeks, 2 or 3 weeks, we will have a sort of a better feeling of where 

this is headed. 

So at the moment, we have not started an environmental assessment. We have gotten different bodies of law about what to do on 

that environmental assessment, and then of course, within the Department of Defense we have been in discussions about what to do 

about that environmental assessment. 

So again, I think within the next few weeks we will have a better 

path forward and more information to share. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Right. Well, if you could go back and work with 

your people and get some answers as to are you going to do it, 

when do you think you are going to start to do it, et cetera, et 

cetera, I would appreciate it because that is one of the areas where 

I watch quite a bit, and where I think, given all of the problems 

that we have had, and you know, what we really need to do, we 

really need to assess what is going on there. 

Secretary JAMES. We will. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Not to eliminate the triad, but to figure out what 

we really need in order to continue that deterrent that we are capable of having. 

Secretary JAMES. Yes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. My next question for you is about the space launch 

program, which I mentioned earlier. The issue of rising costs in the 

Air Force’s space launch program continues to be of great concern 

to many of us on this committee, and I have always believed that 

one of the ways to get more talent, and to get smarter about this, 

and to get more competitive on this, as you know, we have had a 

one-source situation for a long, long time, is to have competition, 

which is why in 2012 Under Secretary of Defense Frank Kendall 

directed the Air Force to, and I quote, ‘‘Aggressively reintroduce a 

competitive procurement environment.’’ 

So in 2012, the Air Force briefed my office and the Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee that it would be opening 14 opportunities for 

new entrants into the national security space launches. But now, 

the Air Force has indicated that it plans to reduce this to only 

seven, so it has cut it by 50 percent, and that no Air Force mission 

available for competition in fiscal year 2015 aside from just one 

NRO [National Reconnaissance Office] mission. 

So why did you do this? Does it contradict the Air Force’s commitment to reintroducing the competitive procurement process, and 

what will be the impact on sustaining competition? And, you know, 

I am a Californian. There are several companies who are working 

to compete against these sole source, and again, you guys just 

issued another sole source to that company. I am not against that 

company, but I believe that with competition we can bring down 

the cost of these launches significantly; maybe to 50 or 25 percent 

of what it is costing us now. 

So you know, if you could please speak to that. Thank you. 

Secretary JAMES. Yes. No, I will. In one of my visits, I mentioned 

that I had been on certain visits. I have been out to Colorado 

Springs and I did spend some time with the space command out 

there. So first of all, I agree with everything you said on competition, and I am a big believer in competition and I have asked, I 

suspect, some of the same questions that you have been asking. 
14 

Since we all believe in competition, why does it take as long as it 

is taking? 

So here is the way I would describe the current state of play on 

the EELV [Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle] program. Over 

time, it has been a very successful program. Over time it has probably cost our country way more than any of us would have wished 

or dreamed. In recent years, costs have been coming down. They 

are coming more under control, I will say, and even though we 

don’t have that competition yet, I suspect just the threat of competition out there has helped us to bring down these costs. So 

again, good news for the taxpayer, and let’s see if we can speed it 

up. 

Now, why does it take as long as it takes? Well, these launches, 

of course, there is a variety of payloads and satellites that get 

launched and it is technically complex. There are different degrees 

of heaviness, that is one thing, and then there is different payloads. 

Some have almost catastrophic consequences if they weren’t to go 

well. There would be huge military significance. 

So that is sort of one type of satellite launch, and then there is 

other satellite launches which although they are important and you 

wouldn’t want anything to go wrong there, you can, in effect, you 

can take a little bit more of a risk with new entrants and people 

who haven’t quite demonstrated as much as the team who has been 

doing it a long time. 

So, specifically, what has happened here, is the launches that are 

going to go forward in the most immediate years of the 5-year plan, 

these are the really heavy-duty militarily significant launches, and 

that is the contract that you just talked about where those 

launches will be done by the original team of ULA [United Launch 

Alliance] I think it is called. 

The other launches where we hope these new entrants will qualify, those launches were deferred a bit. They are still going to happen. It is just going to happen later in the 5-year plan. And the 

reason for that, actually, again, is a bit of good news. The satellites 

which are referred to in those secondary launches, the existing satellites are doing better than we ever thought possible. They are 

lasting longer, so again, that is kind of a good news for the taxpayer. So we don’t need to get those satellites up into orbit as 

quickly. We could defer. That is why those got deferred. It is actually more that reason than money. 

So they are going to happen, and we do want—I want those new 

entrants qualified as soon as possible for all of the same reasons 

that you pointed out, Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. As you know, this takes quite a bit of money to 

be a new entrant into that field. And so when you close down those 

competitive pieces, those companies have a harder time to outlast 

what you are doing by deferring some of this. So I hope you understand that when I look at the cost, you may think that the numbers have come down with this original launch team, but I can go 

back and I can show you on a graph just how much this is costing 

the taxpayer when I can see a French company that does it for half 

the price. 
15 

By the way, I am not suggesting that this isn’t a core value and 

we shouldn’t hold it here, but we do have competition that has 

proven and will continue to prove if we open up those possibilities. 

And the more competition we have, just by having two companies, will bring down that cost to the American taxpayer. So I will 

continue with you on this theme. Thank you. 

General WELSH. Ma’am, can I clarify one thing? 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Yes, General. 

General WELSH. Over the next 5-year period, there are eight 

qualifying launches, assuming we get new entrants certified, which 

I think we probably will. Seven of those will be competed. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Yes. That is 50 percent of what I was told just a 

year and a half ago. 

General WELSH. Yes, ma’am, for those reasons. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Madam Secretary, 

General, thank you for being here. 

General, it is my understanding from previous discussions we 

have had, that these cuts and all of the budget uncertainty is taking a bit of an impact on your morale and your ability for retention, 

is that accurate? 

General WELSH. Sir, we have not really seen a problem with retention to this point. I am worried about a problem with retention 

over time, especially as the uncertainty continues, and that is why 

we need to have a firm way forward, a number we can count on, 

and then aim toward the Air Force of the end of sequestration, and 

make it the best it can be, starting now. 

Mr. FORBES. And I agree with you because all of the platforms 

we have come down to personnel sometime, and Madam Secretary, 

you are shaking your head. 

Let me tell you an item though that is of major concern to me. 

Recently we read this week where a cadet at the Air Force was 

forced to take a Bible verse off of a private whiteboard in his room. 

The facts that I have received from the Air Force, so these aren’t 

hypotheticals, is that this cadet had no intention to offend anyone 

or any group. Number two, that the private whiteboards have long 

been used to display items reflecting their personality, and from 

which they draw personal inspiration. Number three, they have 

long been used for citing inspirational quotes. And fourth, this is 

perhaps the most offensive, the Air Force said this was a teaching 

moment that the cadet’s action in putting the Bible verse on was 

inappropriate based upon leadership principles. 

General, and Madam Secretary, that cadet’s family, the other cadets who are now putting up Bible verses and verses from the 

Quran, can’t stand in front of you today, but I can. 

And here is the question I have for you. Can you tell me any 

other inspirational quote that cadets have been forced to remove 

from their personal whiteboards other than verses from the Bible, 

one; and second, I want to point out this to you: General, when you 

come in my office, I chair the Seapower Subcommittee, over the 

door you walk through, I have our national motto: In God We 

Trust. 
16 

Mr. McIntyre, the ranking member of this committee has that 

same motto over his door. Mr. Miller, who chairs the VA [Veterans 

Affairs] Committee has ‘‘In God We Trust’’ up in his office; Mr. 

Conaway chairs the Ethics Committee has it up in his office. Mr. 

Wittman who chairs the Readiness Subcommittee has it up in his 

office. Dr. Fleming has it up in his office; the chairman of the Government Reform Committee is putting it up in his office; the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee in his office; the Speaker 

of the House in his office. 

And here is the question I ask for both of you two today: Give 

us that teaching moment of, one, how that is any different than 

this cadet putting his own personal verse on his own personal 

whiteboard; and number two, how is that offensive to leadership 

principles? 

Secretary JAMES. So perhaps I will start if it is all right, Mr. 

Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Sure. 

Secretary JAMES. And Chief, you jump in. 

I read this in the press as well, and I did have a chance to talk 

to General Johnson yesterday to say kind of, what is going on with 

this? So, I want to share with you what she shared with me in 

terms of how this incident actually unfolded. 

So I will get to that in just a second, but first, if I may, I just 

want to read the policy of our Air Force about the religious freedom. ‘‘Leaders at levels must balance constitutional protections for 

an individual’s free exercise of religion and other personal beliefs 

and its prohibition against governmental establishment of religion. 

For example, they must avoid the actual or apparent use of their 

position—’’ 

Mr. FORBES. Madam Secretary, I don’t want to cut you off, but 

I only have 1 minute and 15 seconds. 

Secretary JAMES. Okay. 

Mr. FORBES. Can you answer the question for me, what other 

quotes have been—have cadets been forced to pull off of their 

whiteboards that were not Bible verses? 

Secretary JAMES. So I don’t know, but the real point I wanted to 

just, if I may. Apparently, a cadet went to this other cadet, who— 

and said this makes me uncomfortable. And that cadet voluntarily 

took it down. 

Mr. FORBES. Now, that is not true. By your own facts, Madam 

Secretary, if you will read what your liaison officer has given to 

me, the entire Air Force chain of command in that particular situation—that is what he says. Maybe it was inaccurate—and the Air 

Force Commander, is what I am given by fax from your office, went 

to that cadet, and then they say when all of them come to him, he 

voluntarily did it. 

Can you imagine a young cadet when he is forced with the entire 

chain of command coming in there and telling him basically this 

is inappropriate? That is what your folks are citing to me, that it 

was inappropriate based on leadership principles. 

And at some point in time, Madam Secretary, and General, I am 

just telling you, we need to stand up for these cadets’ rights, too. 

Freedom of religion, and their exercise of that whether they are 

putting it from the Quran or the Bible, is not to make sure no per-
17 

son on the planet is offended. It is to say that cadet ought to have 

the right in their own personal board to put that verse up there. 

And help me with this: Why if he is wrong, are all of us wrong 

in putting ‘‘In God We Trust’’ up in our office? 

Secretary JAMES. So my facts come from General Johnson, so I 

apologize. I have not seen the paper that you are looking at. What 

I just explained is the way that General—— 

Mr. FORBES. My time is up, but I hope you guys will come back 

to us on this and for once, the Air Force starts standing up for 

these cadets and their rights, instead of just constantly saying, if 

anybody at all opposes it, we are going to make them take these 

down. 

And Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 106.] 

General WELSH. Mr. Chairman, may I very briefly answer the 

question? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

General WELSH. I have been a commander of the cadet squadron 

at the Air Force Academy, I have been a Commandant at the Academy, and we remove hundreds of quotes from those boards, because 

they are not in their room, Congressman, they are in the hallway. 

They are used for personal and professional messaging, just to 

make sure we all understand that context. 

What you said is absolutely true. Every cadet has a right to free 

religious expression. But if someone else comes to them and says, 

that bothers me, and they have that discussion, if that is what happened, I would compliment both of them. We have got to get the 

facts straight. General Johnson has been doing that, sir, and I will 

come and make sure—— 

Mr. FORBES. General, my time is up, but I want, since you had 

extra time, first of all, it is different if they just have a one-on-one 

discussion. That is not what happened. It says, the chain of command came to this cadet and, again, I am just going by what your 

office have given me, the facts. If the facts are wrong, I can’t answer that. 

The second thing is, you can’t have it both ways. You can’t say, 

we forced other people to take these quotes off. But yet, this was 

voluntarily done. And I think if you asked this cadet and the other 

cadets, they don’t believe it was voluntarily done, but with that, 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. General Welsh, I am also on the Strategic Forces 

Subcommittee, and I imagine as we have the last couple of years, 

we will have a debate about forward deployed nuclear weapons in 

Europe, and so to kick that off for the subcommittee at some point 

in the future when we have that hearing, can you, first off, discuss 

some of the costs of forward deploying nuclear weapons in Europe, 

and can you discuss what are our contingency plans if one or more 

NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] countries do not procure nuclear-capable aircraft after their own aircraft are retired in 

the 2020s? 

General WELSH. Yes, sir, the forward deployed nuclear force 

takes money to maintain, it takes money to upgrade, it takes 
18 

money to keep secure and to provide security, just like any other 

party of our nuclear enterprise does. You have to pay attention to 

it. It is not an insignificant cost. As you know, the actual specific 

costs are classified. I would be glad to come talk to you in detail 

about those. 

As NATO nations, if they choose not to upgrade their own nuclear aircraft capabilities, then other NATO nations that have 

those capability from an operational perspective will pick up the 

load. That will be a NATO policy decision. The U.S. will be part 

of that discussion. We do have the capacity to pick up the load. 

Mr. LARSEN. And then can you discuss whether the fiscal year 

2015 request includes funds to make the 35–JSF [F–35 Joint Strike 

Fighter] dual capable? 

General WELSH. Sir, the Department has committed to making 

the F–35 dual capable. There is a discussion ongoing now with 

NATO partners; they don’t believe they can afford to do that with 

their own aircraft with without our support in making the airplane 

DCA [dual-capable aircraft] capable, and so that is the ongoing debate right now. That is not happening this year, but there is money 

in the 5-year plan to move us in that direction. 

Mr. LARSEN. In which direction? To support—— 

General WELSH. To ensure that the aircraft can be made dual capable when it needs to be. 

Mr. LARSEN. The 35, or the or NATO countries’ aircraft? 

General WELSH. The F–35 sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. 35. And then did you say in that answer, though, 

that we may be called upon to pay for other countries to upgrade 

their aircraft? 

General WELSH. No, sir. What I was referring to was the other 

NATO countries who will fly the F–35. But they are responsible for 

paying the cost to integrate capability on their own aircraft. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah, thanks. 

With regards to the KC–10, by the way, I am glad to see the KC– 

46, the Pegasus, is moving forward. We are all very pleased about 

that, in Washington State. But on the 10, what other programmatic 

options would you have if Congress either prohibited that retirement, KC–10, because by the way, as you might know, we are famous for telling you all the aircraft you can’t retire and then making you pay for that. 

So hopefully, we can move beyond that this year. But if Congress 

prohibited the retirement of the KC–10, what programmatic options would you have to execute if we did prohibit that retirement? 

Secretary JAMES. So, again, sir, I will start, but I know the chief 

will also jump in. Before coming to the conclusion that the KC–10 

would be retired if we have to go to the sequestration level, KC– 

135s were looked at very, very closely, and doing that operational 

analysis, it would have been far too many of those that would have 

to come out in order to come up with the same cost savings. It is 

about a $2.6 billion savings for us over the 5-year plan if the KC– 

10s were to come out. 

General WELSH. Congressman, all I will tell you is that there are 

no good options. Every decision we are making is going to hurt, so 

wherever we take that $2.3 billion to $2.5 billion is going to come 

out of another mission capability like the ones I described in my 
19 

opening statement. It is going to impact our capability and capacity. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. One last question on this Opportunity, 

Growth, and Security Initiative. I am not quite sure what makes 

it different than just putting dollars into your readiness account 

and not calling it the Opportunity, Security, and Growth Initiative. 

Can you help me understand the difference between this initiative 

and just funding the Air Force? 

Secretary JAMES. So this $26 billion fund, of which the Air Force 

would have $7 billion, is contingent upon coming up with some offset savings, and of course, the President’s budget plan has proposals on how to do that, but if the offsets weren’t there, then presumably the money could not be provided, so that is what makes 

it different. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. Yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Madam Secretary and General Welsh, thank you for being 

here today. I first want to join with Congressman Forbes, and I 

hope you will make every effort to promote and preserve religious 

freedom for our service members, and particularly, it is important 

to me. My dad served in the Flying Tigers, the 14th Air Force in 

India and China. I know of the capabilities and competence of our 

military, and I am very grateful to be the very grateful uncle of a 

person serving in the Air Force today, and I just know of your capabilities. 

Secretary James, the primary U.S. national security launcher for 

satellites uses a Russian-made engine called RD–180. Defense 

Daily this week reported on this engine and stated that, quote, ‘‘It 

is rumored that Russia could cut off supplying the RD–180 to the 

U.S. in response to economic sanctions,’’ end of quote. 

I understand we have 2-year stockpile on these engines, but I 

also know that the Air Force just committed to a 5-year procurement of the Atlas launch vehicle. There are at least three American 

launch vehicles that utilize American-made engines that offer the 

full range of capabilities without relying on Russian components. I 

believe it is in the interest of our national security that we should 

shift to American-made engines. 

What, Madam Secretary, is your counsel on this? 

Secretary JAMES. So, I do want to take a look at that, Congressman. As you said, if there is good news here, and there is some 

good news, we do have this 2-year supply, so we have a little bit 

of breathing room. What I know about this engine association is we 

have had a fairly longstanding good relationship, but it is something we have to keep our eye on, and I do want to review it. 

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate you looking into that because certainly we had all hoped for a much more positive relationship with 

the Russian Federation, but there are consequences to aggression 

in Ukraine, aggression in the Republic of Georgia. 

General Welsh, I understand that the Air Force has decided not 

to fund the Combat Avionics Programmed Extension Suite, CAPES, 

for the F–16s. With the F–35 not expected to be fully operational 

until the mid-2020s, are you concerned about the Air Force suf-
20 

fering from a significantly—significant capability gap in the suppression and destruction of enemy air defense mission? Additionally, without CAPES, how is the Air Force planning to counter the 

growing sophistication of many countries’ integrated air defense 

systems? 

General WELSH. Sir, we have 10 integrated air defense systems 

that we would be concerned about today. We believe that by 2023 

to 2024, that will expand to 25, so by that timeframe, we have to 

have a fleet fielded that can operate with capability to operate in 

and remove those threats if we should ever have to do that. That 

is the F–35. So, we have got to have that platform fielded. Everything that we have in our modernization accounts we went through 

over this past year. We have cut about 50 percent of our plan modernization programs because of the impact of the sequester level 

funding over time. 

What we have done is funded the things that are absolutely required to make aircraft viable in the near- to mid-term against the 

threats that we know are there. Anything that is nice to have or 

should have is off the books for now. We will revisit this every year 

as we look at what the threat is doing and what we have to have 

to keep airplanes like the F–16 viable against the threat as it 

emerges. We simply don’t have the money to do it all. This was a 

prioritization issue, not a desire. 

Mr. WILSON. And I really appreciate you following through on 

this and to advance. 

I want to conclude. In regard, again, I was so offended by what 

Congressman Forbes said, and you know, we can take political correctness to an extraordinary conclusion. As I—General, when I see 

you today, when I see those ribbons, I am inspired. It just—it is 

an inspiration, your service, but there are many places in our country that if they saw you in uniform, they would be repulsed. And 

so we have just got to stand up for what is right, and we need for 

you to stand up for all of—truly for religious freedom, for the 

standards of our country that have made this country great and 

provided for the greatest extension of freedom and democracy in 

the history of the world and with the victory in the Cold War. And 

so we shouldn’t be ashamed, and we should be standing up for 

positive religious principles and push back on political correctness. 

I yield. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary James and General Welsh, thank you for your testimony, and as one of the co-chairs of the Air Force and Long-Range 

Strike Bomber Caucus, I look forward to working with you in the 

future, and I appreciate your commitment to the rebalance of the 

Asia-Pacific region. 

I notice that Secretary James said she has visited Air Force 

bases all over the Nation. I am wondering if she has ever been to 

our significant Air Force base in Guam, Andersen. 

Secretary JAMES. Not yet, but I am looking forward to it. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Good. I was going to extend an invitation to you. 

My first question is for either one of you regarding the longrange strike bomber. The LRS will be vital in providing a bomber 
21 

presence in the Pacific as we work to update an aging B–52 fleet. 

Now, the budget proposes an increase for the LRS to $914 million. 

Is $914 million enough, given the existing aging bomber fleet, and 

also, how critical is a bomber presence? 

Secretary JAMES. So I believe, yes, that $914 million is the right 

amount of funding for this year. Of course, it is a long-term program, but that is the right amount of money for this year, and I 

think a bomber presence, the existence of our bombers is extremely 

important. The range, the persistence, the flexibility that it gives 

our national leaders; time after time in history it has helped to 

deter aggression and to actually control situations that otherwise 

would have escalated. So, very important. 

Ms. BORDALLO. General, do you also feel the same way? 

General WELSH. Yes, ma’am. The United States has used bomber 

presence to send messages since the Berlin blockade. That B–52 

has been a symbol of American power for 60 years, and the B–2 

is that symbol now. Last year, we used both to send a message to 

North Korea. We think it is incredibly important. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

I have a couple of questions, so I am going to have to make this 

quick. When I take CODELs [congressional delegations] out to 

Guam, we meet with the airmen who fly the B–52s. Now, they do 

a great job, as we have seen demonstrated with their quick response to the China ADIZ [Air Defense Identification Zone] issue. 

However, I am concerned about the B–52 radar capability. I understand that the current B–52 radar is experiencing a 20-, 30-hour 

mean time between failures and very expensive to maintain. What 

is the plan, and how can we mitigate the current risk that these 

air crews are experiencing with this 30-year-old radar? 

General WELSH. Congresswoman, as you know, there was a plan 

in place for a radar replacement program. That program went the 

same direction as the F–16 CAPES program we just discussed. It 

fell on the cutting room floor as a result of the requirement to pay 

$12.8 billion a year—to take $12.8 billion a year out of our top line 

over the next 10 years. We just can’t afford it. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you for that. And my third question 

is, I understand that Global Hawks operating out of Guam have 

been performing a number of critical missions in the Pacific. The 

current budget proposes an increase from $120 million to $245 million into reliability and sensor improvements of RQ–4. Can you 

provide us with an update about Global Hawk’s use in the Pacific, 

including plans for expanded basing locations and sales to allied 

nations? Is this increase in funds in the RQ–4 capability sufficient 

to reduce ISR gaps, especially in the Asia-Pacific region? 

Secretary JAMES. So, I would just begin by saying everything I 

know about the Global Hawks which are based in Guam, the Global Hawks in the Pacific, is they are going a great job day in and 

day out in a variety of missions, particularly helpful in the humanitarian assistance program that we helped in the Philippines after 

the major typhoon. 

In terms of international sales, there is nothing absolutely firm 

yet, although I understand the Republic of Korea, we are getting 

close. 

Ms. BORDALLO. General. 
22 

General WELSH. Yes, Congresswoman, we are working—we believe the sale of four Global Hawks to South Korea is imminent. 

We hope that is the case. We will have the first forward deployment of the Global Hawk to Japan later this year, and so I think 

we are doing more and more with our partners. The aircraft is performing very, very well. The money that you mention will be used 

this year to start the sensor transition from the U–2 onto the Global Hawk for some of their specialty sensors, like the SIRE [Synchronous Impulse Reconstruction] sensor and the Optical Bar Camera that is used to support treaty validation and verification in the 

Middle East. 

The problem with that movement going forward will be if—if the 

law remains the law, that funding will not be there to fund those 

upgrades. 

Ms. BORDALLO. And again, I just want to reiterate my second 

question about the B–52s. I am really sorry to see that we are not 

going to be able to do something about the problem they have. 

And I thank you both for the answers to my questions. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to begin by associating myself with Mr. Forbes’ comments 

of great concern about the issues that he has raised with religious 

freedom. 

Secondly, both of you received several questions about—that are 

directed at the issue of disarming the United States nuclear capabilities and degrading them. I would ask the chairman to enter into 

the record the New York Times article that alleges that Russia is 

violating the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] treaty. Certainly any issues with respect to disarming the United States 

should be held in context to the threats that we have. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 93.] 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary James, I have Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in my 

district. Over 12,000 people were furloughed as a result of sequestration, significantly impacting morale. Although we understand 

you are doing a budget that is forcing you into bad decisions and 

into tough constraints, the reality is that the cuts that you are 

doing are devastating to the Air Force. They are wrong. They affect 

morale and capability. And although we have a discussion about 

whether or not you have made the right choices, I would like you 

to take just a minute or so to tell us how, why sequestration really 

is devastating for the Air Force. 

We can’t, as members of this committee, go out to the rest of 

Congress and say, ‘‘This is devastating, we shouldn’t be doing this,’’ 

if we can’t have the leadership of the military articulate it. 

Madam Secretary, will you tell us how this is affecting the Air 

Force negatively. 

Secretary JAMES. So a return to sequestration would have big, 

big consequences on readiness. Not only would we not be able to 

get up to the minimum levels that we say are necessary, we would 
23 

also not be able to take it beyond to be able to practice the myriad 

of tasks which we need to be able to do if we go into a contested 

environment. 

Afghanistan was a noncontested; it was permissive. Nobody was 

shooting at us. Nobody was jamming at us. But in the Pacific, for 

example, or in other scenarios, we would have all kinds of other 

things coming at us. 

Not enough of our pilots have been able to practice it. So we 

would lose more people, we would lose more aircraft if we had to 

get into a situation without having those additional funds for readiness. That is one thing. 

We would also have to retire all of those additional aircraft. That 

goes to real capability to be able to get the job done, and you heard 

the chief say we are already below what the combatant commanders say they want. We are also below the validated requirements. Remember what they say they want, they want to be able 

to do their job with the least amount of risk, and then there are 

validated requirements. In some cases, we go beyond both, and 

again, that puts the whole strategy at risk. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. 

I give the rest of my time to Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Madam Secretary, first of all, I want to thank you 

in your opening statement for reaffirming the nuclear triad and the 

commitment for land-based ICBM capabilities. I heard you correctly with that, right? 

Secretary JAMES. Yes. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. Number two, I want to thank you for following the law, which seems unusual, but in our environment, that 

is something of which to be congratulated. 

Section 1056(e) prohibited you from doing an environmental impact on decommissioning an ICBM wing. Specifically, you followed 

that. I appreciate that. But in your response to Representative 

Sanchez’ question, I do have three specific questions. I would like 

some specific answers. 

One, do you anticipate reducing the ICBM fleet of 450 missiles, 

reducing that? 

Number two, will any of those silos be put in warm status? 

Number three, do you really believe you can conduct an environmental statement without Congress changing the law that prohibits it? 

Can you do those quickly for me? 

Secretary JAMES. So, I am sorry, the numbers, I don’t have 

memorized, but we are shooting for the new START numbers. That 

is what collectively we are shooting for. 

The warm base status, that is something which, again, I think, 

within the next few weeks, we will have more to say about. That 

was the Air Force’s recommendation. 

And I am sorry, the third question, sir, one more time. 

Mr. BISHOP. Do you actually believe you have the authority to do 

an environmental statement without Congress changing the law 

that prohibits it, specifically 1056(e)? 

Secretary JAMES. There are different interpretations. I will just 

say that I am holding. I, as the Secretary of the Air Force, I am 

holding until and unless I get more guidance. 
24 

Mr. BISHOP. Holding for what? 

Secretary JAMES. Holding until and unless I get more guidance, 

and I think in the next couple of weeks, this is going to become 

more clear on which way we are going to go. 

Mr. BISHOP. I would like a follow-up answer for all of those if you 

have something more specific as to those numbers when it becomes 

available. 

In follow-up to my colleague’s questions, can I simply ask the 

question that if I am offended by your budget, will you take it 

down? 

Yield back. 

Secretary JAMES. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Could you please answer back to him as soon as 

you get that, the information on those three specific questions? 

Secretary JAMES. I will. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 106.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for 

being here. 

General Welsh, I particularly want to thank you for your visit to 

Hanscom Air Force Base. It was great to have your wife join you, 

too. It meant a great deal to our commonwealth, to the communities around Hanscom that value so much its presence as well as 

to the many very able and talented people serving at Hanscom. 

I have heard a lot of feedback from how grateful people were for 

you both taking the time to come and visit, and also for us to be 

able to highlight the remarkable work that is being done there. 

And Secretary James, great to have you on board. I, like Congresswoman Bordallo, would love to invite you to come to Hanscom 

when your schedule allows for it. Be great to have you come see 

the great work being done there, but welcome. 

And so as you both have noted, these are just challenging times, 

marked by increasingly capable enemies in an era of very taut financial resources. And as the Department of Defense is adapting 

to these new realities, we in Congress, as you heard today, have 

to scrutinize the changes that you are proposing, but we welcome 

your analysis, your very welcome analysis of the tradeoffs you have 

made as you try to find a way forward. 

I would like to focus on the need to make continued investments 

in research and development efforts in order to maintain our technological edge, given the very dynamic security environment that 

we live in. And coming from Massachusetts, it is something where 

we really take great pride in being part of that because we see that 

it is precisely because of the investments that are being made in 

defense-related R&D [research and development] that our service 

members are better protected, they have access to lifesaving technology, and we, as a country, have peerless technological advantages on the battlefield. Many of these advances also serve as force 

multipliers in the field, and they can lead to significant cost savings. 
25 

So, in a world where we do have to modernize constantly, the Air 

Force has to be well positioned to build and sustain an environment that promotes innovation. It is a reality of our times. 

Such an environment will make sure that we are able to rapidly 

deliver the latest technological advances, and these, in turn, help 

to cut costs and protect our airmen and women. So, while the Department of Defense and Congress have partnered to undertake extensive acquisition reform efforts over the past decades, I am concerned that the unique type of rapid acquisition required to meet 

the needs of the Air Force’s information technology [IT], cyber missions, that these pose unique challenges to the Department of Defense’s acquisition system. 

So, what is the Air Force doing to address the specialized IT and 

cyber acquisition needs of the force, and what are the service’s 

long-term plans to make sure that the Air Force is in a position 

to rapidly assess needs and field systems to meet the renewed requirements? 

Secretary JAMES. So, I will just begin with a philosophical comment. I totally agree with you that we have to focus on more rapidly delivering capability to the field. We did this during the urgency of the wartime environment, and I do not want to see us totally return to the ways of the past, where all of our programs take 

a, you know, a very deliberative and long-term period to get going. 

We have pockets of this within the Department of Defense. These 

pockets have to compete for the scarce resources along with everything else, but I want you to know I am personally very interested 

in working on this issue and trying to get our S&T [science and 

technology] levels as a subset of that back up to where I think it 

is a more acceptable level. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And I think you note a very important issue. 

Given the timeframe that some of this now requires, by the time 

you have gotten to a certain place, it is already obsolete, so it 

doesn’t serve us as a country. 

General Welsh, I don’t know if you want to comment. 

General WELSH. Congresswoman, the Secretary has also started 

a new conversation with industry at the CEO [Chief Executive Officer]-Secretary level to look at issues like this and figure out how 

we can do a better job by talking to people who do a great job of 

it in private industry today. The IT world, as you know, in the military, we have not had great success in developing systems over 

time in this arena. We have a lot to learn, and she will have people 

now advising her quarterly on the best way to look at some of these 

challenges and maybe come up with a better approach than the 

ones we have taken in the past. We have a lot of people working 

it very hard. We just have not been successful, which means I believe we have to change the process. The people are good. The process we are using isn’t working. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I would agree with that. I have seen some remarkably talented people who are really hamstrung by the process, and 

so I encourage you to continue, you know, working very, very diligently on making sure we bring the needed reforms to the effort. 

Thank you both. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Conaway. 
26 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, welcome. 

And General Welsh, welcome as well. 

I also want to associate with Mr. Forbes’ comments. I worry that 

we have at a school that is training leaders to lead men and 

women into combat, that we have individuals who are so insecure 

and unsure of themselves, that they can’t co-exist with the free expression of traditional religious views like that, that their lack of 

self—strength of purpose to be able to—to not be offended by something like that. I wonder if they are the right folks for that business. 

Madam Secretary, in all likelihood, you will be the last Secretary 

of the Air Force for this Administration; 2017 is coming on us with 

an audit standpoint. I appreciate your mentioning audit readiness 

as a point in your opening statements. We finally reached that 

point where we now have the person that we can hold responsible 

for whether the Air Force succeeds or not on this very important 

issue, and I would appreciate your full-throated support for that 

initiative. It is going to be hard with all the other things you are 

trying to deal with, sequestration, uncertainties in budgets, CRs 

[continuing resolutions], all the nonsense that we put you guys 

through. The Air Force has the furthest to go—that is not a badge 

of honor—because the other folks are further ahead. I have got a 

page out of last November’s fire report, which shows the planned 

deadlines for a variety of things that the Air Force needed to get 

done in order to get to audit readiness. Not one of them have been 

met. Every one of those deadlines have been moved to 2014 or further, and all of those deadlines were important to making—getting 

there, getting the Air Force’s ready on time. 

So, can you give us a—and General Welsh, you as well—can you 

give us your current status on where the Air Force is? Are you 

going to make it, and are you continuing the effort? 

Secretary JAMES. So, I am having regular meetings on this, first 

of all. It is a top priority for me. Thank you for pointing out kind 

of we are where we are, and it is a daunting challenge, and I have 

also heard the comparison that we probably have the farthest to go 

of all of the military services. But I want you to know, we are both 

on it and we are both pressing and very aware of the deadlines in 

the law. 

The other thing is, I am sort of also watching the experience of 

others, and it has become apparent to me that sometimes you may 

not feel you are 100 percent ready to go through that auditability, 

but if you are 75 to 80 percent, maybe it is better to try, even if 

you don’t make it, because the following year, you will make it. So 

you learn sometimes, even though you go through it and you don’t 

get it the first time around. So, I am watching that very closely as 

well. So all I can say to you, in my first 11 weeks, I have had several meetings on this already. I am trying to be on top of it. As you 

said, it is a daunting challenge. 

Mr. CONAWAY. General Welsh, how far down the chain of command do you think this importance has been communicated? 

General WELSH. Sir, when I was a commander of the U.S. Air 

Forces in Europe 31⁄2 years ago, I was doing biweekly VTCs [video 

tele-conferencing] with every wing commander in my command to 
27 

talk about audit readiness. We have been working this hard. The 

problem is we don’t have the tools to do it right, and I have seen 

the same sheet you have, sir, so I have nothing to add to what the 

Secretary said. We have got to keep grinding on this. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, Madam Secretary, thank you for those comments about learning from the efforts of others. The Marine Corps 

have finally gotten at least one year of transactions auditable and 

audited, and they learned a lot by going at it and just trying it, 

as opposed to getting ready. So I do appreciate that pivot from getting ready to do it to just doing it and the issues that you will learn 

and make the—this is important stuff to be able to tell the American people that the entity that spends more taxpayer dollars than 

any other each year, each year in and year out is—can in fact audit 

its books and present that statement to the taxpayers. And you 

may very well know where every nickel has gone, but you can’t 

prove it, and so that is really important to us. 

So, again, I want to reiterate, and again, this is a rhetorical 

question, don’t need a response, but if a young airman approached 

the chaplain and said, you know, you are wearing that cross on 

your uniform, that offends me, that makes me uncomfortable. 

So I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Barber. 

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Secretary James and General Welch, for being 

here this morning. Obviously, we all have some very serious concerns about the decisions or the proposals, at least, that you have 

made in response to sequestration and the other budget restrictions. 

I am very concerned, and I think my colleagues here, in particular, are very concerned about the future ability that we have 

to protect the Nation and to secure our borders and to support our 

allies. 

I do want to thank you, Madam Secretary, for—and congratulate 

you for taking on this important assignment and for being so 

hands-on so early. I mentioned to you before we started how impressed I think many of us were with you going out and actually 

meeting in person with our Air Force personnel who are involved 

with our nuclear defense program. 

And General Welsh, I want to thank you also for your service; 

you have given the Nation an incredible number of years of service. 

And also to recognize and thank you for bringing your wife and 

your daughter here today. I think they are a good reminder that 

while you serve in a uniform, they serve, too. Their sacrifices are 

incredible. 

As a young man growing up, a boy growing up in the Air Force, 

Air Force family, I saw firsthand, experienced firsthand the sacrifices that my mother and my sister and myself made to support 

my dad. He was stationed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, so I 

have a particular affection for that base. I lived and grew up there 

as a kid, cut a lot of lawns earning pocket money there actually. 

But I also was there when the Cuban missile crisis struck, and I 

remember the base was locked down and Davis-Monthan Air Force 
28 

Base was right on the front line of the defense of the Nation and 

I believe it will hopefully continue to be so as we go into the future. 

I am concerned, obviously, about the A–10. We have talked about 

in this hearing before. This morning, we have several A–10 pilots, 

former A–10 pilots, including yourself, General, in the room, including, I think she may have left, Colonel—retired Colonel 

McSally, who was an A–10 pilot flying out of Davis-Monthan, and 

I think their presence reminds us that this is not a partisan issue. 

We have 31 colleagues here in the House and in the Senate, both 

parties represented, who have fought from the beginning to say, 

Let’s take another look at this decision or proposal on the A–10s. 

And I hope we can still continue to look at that, even as we consider how we have to make these incredible budget reductions. 

I really want to also point out that the concerns that have been 

raised here today about the American public’s awareness or lack of 

awareness of what these sequestration numbers are doing or potentially doing to our national defense is something we all need to be 

concerned about. We need to educate our colleagues in the House. 

We need to educate the American public. They simply don’t understand that the path we are on is a very grave problem and danger 

to our country. 

With that preamble, I want to ask you this morning about the 

A–10. You know, when I talk to the Army personnel who I also represent at Fort Huachuca, they tell me, when that Warthog is overhead, best day they have had. I know we all agree, and you have 

said it in your statements, that providing close air support to our 

ground troops, combat troops, is a critical mission the Air Force 

should maintain. And I have also heard the argument that the Air 

Force has made that the advancement of guided weapons systems 

allows for many more types of aircraft to provide effective close air 

support, but there are critical elements of the close air support mission that multi-role fighters simply cannot make, cannot perform 

like the A–10. 

So, General Welsh and Madam Secretary, if you could both respond to these questions. 

If the A–10 is retired, what is the Air Force’s plan to support our 

ground troops during the danger and close situations of enemy 

forces within 100 meters, and what plan are the U.S. troops going 

to have when engaging the enemy on the fluid battlefield with 

moving targets below 1,500 feet and weather ceilings. This is what 

the A–10 does best. Could you respond please to both questions? 

Secretary JAMES. So, again, I will start, Mr. Barber, and thank 

you for your comments about me trying to be on top of things early 

on. And I also try to do quite a bit of my own due diligence on the 

matter of the A–10 because I, too, had heard it is a specialty capability and so forth and it does some of these missions in a unique 

way. And what I have learned along the way—by the way, briefings in the Pentagon, I have talked to General Odierno, Dempsey, 

I have been out, I have been to Moody Air Force Base, and I have 

seen the A–10 in a demonstration. I have talked to F–16 pilots at 

Shaw Air Force Base who also have done the A–10 mission. 

What I have learned over time is although it is a great aircraft 

and it does do close air support superbly, these other aircraft can 

do it as well, and 80 percent of what we have done in close air sup-
29 

port in Afghanistan has been by aircraft other than A–10. So, for 

example, the F–16s at Shaw, I talked to some of those pilots, they 

have been doing close air support as well, so 20 percent by the A– 

10s and 80 percent by other aircraft. So, again, the mission would 

be covered. You say, well, if you do away, how would you do these 

missions? It would be covered by other aircraft that might require 

other training for some other pilots, of course, to be able to get good 

at those particular areas, but we feel that it could be covered. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary James, thank you for coming to Colorado Springs last 

week. It was good to see you there, and you both know that the 

Air Force Academy is in my district, and like Representative 

Forbes, I am very disturbed about what happened with this cadet. 

I believe it was a suppression of his religious rights. 

And I am going to ask you in a minute about funding cuts at Air 

Force Academy, and I want to defend the Academy, but my job, 

frankly, has been made a little bit harder because of that. 

Before I get to that, let me talk about a different issue concerning—and this is purely of local interest to the folks who live 

around there—the flight paths. There has been some concern about 

changes in the flight patterns, and we have—I have expressed my 

concern to you and you said that you would work with me and you 

would work with the local residents on that, and I appreciate that. 

I just wanted to call that to your attention. 

Now, on the funding issue, the Air Force Academy is cutting 10 

majors and 100 positions because of budget considerations. Now, I 

don’t see that happening, though, at the U.S. Naval Academy, at 

West Point, or at the Merchant Marine Academy. Why is there 

this, what appears to me, a discrepancy in how the service academies are treating budget cuts? 

General WELSH. Thanks for the question, Congressman. This is 

a really important topic. One of the things I asked General Johnson to do when she first went to be the Superintendent at the 

Academy was to take an objective look at the Air Force Academy. 

After she figured out exactly what the programs were, how they 

were organized, I asked her to form a small group and design in 

private what the Air Force Academy would look like if she was 

building it today. Not architecturally but program-wise. What 

would the content be, what would the academic curriculum be, 

what would the sports program be, what would the military training program be, and then after she watched the way it is today at 

the end of her first year, this coming summer, then I wanted to sit 

down with her and have her tell me if it is different than the way 

we would design it today, where is it different, why is it different, 

and what should we change? 

One of the things she has already done is created a paper called 

‘‘The Essence of the U.S. Air Force Academy,’’ which is her view 

and the view of a group she is working with of what is absolutely 

required for our young men and women to go through at the Academy so that we produce the best responsible lieutenants for the 

United States Air Force and for the Nation. As part of that, she 

is looking at everything from course content, number of majors of-
30 

fered, all those things, and some of this is caught up in that effort. 

It is not all funding cuts. And so I tell you that up front. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you. 

General WELSH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you for that explanation. 

On an entirely different subject, with the 52nd Airlift Squadron 

losing airplanes, a related—an associated unit is the 302nd, and 

they have the—among other missions, the airborne fire fighting 

mission, or MAFFS [Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System], 

which is important in the west for fighting wildfires, being able to 

dump thousands of gallons of retardant and water on a wildfire. 

So, will those cuts in the 52nd Airlift Squadron hurt the capability 

of the 302nd, which is an associated unit, of being able to carry out 

its mission, especially its MAFFS mission, in particular. 

General WELSH. Congressman, I will have to get back with you 

on the specifics after talking to General Frank Grass of the National Guard Bureau and our chief of the International Guard, but 

I guarantee you, General Grass is not interested in cutting MAFFS 

capability anywhere in the U.S. right now. In fact, we have been 

looking to expand it in any way we can, so I can’t imagine we are 

going to impact that dramatically, but let me get the details back. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 108.] 

Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. That is a reassuring answer. I appreciate 

that, and I look forward to getting further specifics from you. 

And lastly, I just want to call to your attention the unfortunate, 

the tragic Aviano F–16 crash last year, where, upon ejection, one 

of our best pilots lost his life, and are you familiar with the 

progress of ejection seats over the years now? Older ones don’t really fit the—best fit the current needs, and what is the Air Force 

going to do to get a newer better generation of ejection seat? Can 

you answer that for me? 

General WELSH. Congressman, there is a study under way now 

about the problems with performance of the airplane versus technological development in the seat. The seat is a very capable seat. 

It meets all the requirements that we set for the seat. The problem 

in the Aviano incident, specifically, when Luke Gruenther was 

killed, was that he ejected at a very high rate of speed, and no seat 

that we have today would protect you in that flight envelope. The 

question is, can we develop one that we can expand and fly in a 

larger flight envelope so it can handle ejection at a higher speed 

and at more G forces? We have a study under way to look at that 

now. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I have a series of questions, but first, let me 

congratulate you, Secretary James and General. The questions— 

and I think I will probably take these for the record because I have 

another issue that I want to take up. The air-launched cruise missile, what is the status of the new version of the long-range strike 

LRSO [long-range stand-off missile]? What is the cost of it? What 

is the cost of the new bomber beyond the $913 million in the fiscal 

year 2015 budget? And could the new LRSO serve the same pur-
31 

poses as the bomber? If not, why not? I would ask that for the 

record, unless you would like to go at it. 

Secondly, if the NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] budget was part of the DOD budget, what reductions or increases would you recommend? The Air Force is now studying the 

next generation of the ICBM. What is the rationale for having the 

existing or future ICBM fleet, and is this part of the study? For the 

ICBM, what is the total all-inclusive cost of the land-based ICBM 

program? And then, when was the most recent comprehensive review or study of the Triad Nuclear Strategy? And given the tight 

budgets in the years ahead, do you believe it is wise and useful to 

conduct such a study? I think we will take those for the record, 

since they are comprehensive. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 106.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. But this is the question I have for now. Russian 

troops mass at the border in the Ukraine rift. What is the status 

of the Air Force in reaction to this situation? 

General WELSH. Congressman, we have deployed 10 F–15s right 

now to Lithuania. They are doing a program called Baltic Air Policing. Usually we do that with four. We plussed it up with six additional ones. They are flying combat air patrol over the three Baltic 

nations. We have also just deployed six F–16s to 4ask airfield in 

Poland to an aviation detachment we have there. We will add 6 

more here in the near future, so there will be 12 U.S. F–16s flying 

in Poland. We are following that in April with a C–130 deployment 

for training with the Polish Air Force to another base in Poland. 

That is the extent of what we have done to this point along with 

flying the normal ISR activity that U.S. European Command manages in the theater. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. 

I will yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary James, General Welsh, thank you so much for joining 

us today, and thanks for your service to our Nation. 

General Welsh, I traveled to the Pacific Command a number of 

times, and as I have gone there and I met with our allies, I have 

talked to our combatant commanders and their staffs and talked 

about the challenges in the region. And one thing that comes up 

consistently is the Chinese threat and specifically A2/AD [antiaccess/area denial]. Can you give me, from the Air Force’s perspective about what you have as being able to counter that, where you 

see Air Force capability needing to go to make sure that we can 

adequately address A2/AD, and specifically in that region of the 

world, and we know the Chinese capability there and what it 

means as a threat to our forces? 

General WELSH. Thank you, Congressman. I can. We started an 

effort awhile back called Air-Sea Battle. It began as Air Force and 

Navy. It now includes Army and Marine Corps. And the intent is 

to get after our future approach to countering this A2/AD, and all 

anti-access/area denial really means is that the enemy’s ability to 

detect us is getting better and better, the ranges of their radar are 
32 

extending, and their ability to shoot things at us is getting longer 

and longer ranges. And so how do we counter that as a military 

force? And how do we do it together, because we will be fighting 

together? That is all this Air-Sea Battle effort is. 

We have been doing exercises. We have been working on different command and control arrangements. We are actually doing 

technology excursions to figure out how do we better link Aegis radars with Air Force aircraft; what kind of data links will require 

us to be able to share situational awareness pictures quicker and 

easier. We have an airborne layer and a spaceborne layer of this 

effort. It applies equally in the Pacific as it would in the Arabian 

Gulf or in the Indian Ocean. It is just about range and information 

sharing and connectivity. And so we are trying to do everything we 

can to move this forward in a very measured and steady way. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. Very good. Are you comfortable then with 

our current state of readiness to be able to counter that threat? 

General WELSH. Congressman, I am not comfortable at our current state of readiness to be able to do anything. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. 

General WELSH. Right now, the United States Air Force’s combat-coded squadrons are about 38 percent ready compared to our 

standard of fully combat ready. To me, that is unacceptable. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you. 

Secretary James, I want to ask about F–35 sustainability. As you 

know, those concerns about affordability and sustainability of the 

F–35 platform itself; looking forward, there are concerns, too, that 

Lockheed has the contract to make sure the functions and services 

going forward are there for the F–35. There is concern, too, about 

a 5-hour lag time on sorties for the aircraft. 

As we look at the challenges ahead, obviously needing that aircraft but also making sure that in this resource challenged environment we are making the right decisions and we have the right capability in that aircraft and we manage costs. And as things tend 

to get out of whack, the problem is costs go up, and we see we are 

back in the same situation we were with the F–22, much fewer aircraft and then not being able to do the things we need to do. Can 

you give me your perspective on both affordability and sustainability for the F–35 and where we are going with that and what 

is being done to make sure that it is indeed cost-effective and sustainable? 

Secretary JAMES. So, I believe we are headed in the right direction, although I am going to concur with what I think you are saying. It is an enormously expensive program. It is enormously complex, a major leap ahead in terms of technology and capability. So, 

again, in my first 11 weeks, not only have I gotten the briefings 

in the Pentagon, I have been out to Eglin, I have been to Edwards 

to see the testing, to see some of the training that we are doing 

with our pilots. I have certainly met with our program manager a 

number of times, Mr. Kendall. I have met with the CEO of Lockheed to sort of report directly on some of what I saw, both at Eglin 

and Edwards, and to try to speed up certain things. 

So I would say to you it is going in the right direction, but it is 

going to take persistent focus, persistent leadership at all the different levels. I think at the moment, we have got the right people 
33 

in the right jobs, and that persistent focus and leadership is happening. So we have got to watchdog it, though, every single day, 

and the sustainability and affordability, over time, is a huge area. 

It is one that is going to require a lot of thought. There might be— 

there is, I am sure, some creative strategies for that as well that 

we have to work on. 

Mr. WITTMAN. This is a critical piece of the modernization of our 

fighter fleet, and the problem is we have everything put here, and 

the difficulty is, is if it continues to go above budget and doesn’t 

get delivered on time, that just exacerbates an already challenging 

situation that is brought on, not just by budgets but by critical mission needs that are out there across our service branches. So I 

want to make sure that we are doing everything we can to address 

sustainability and affordability. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

They just called the votes. We are going to monitor—usually, you 

know, the first vote takes a long time, so we are going to try to 

get as much in as we can before we have to break for the votes. 

Ms. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Secretary James, General Welsh, thank you very much for 

your leadership, for your professionalism. 

I want to talk about personnel issues. They are really the toughest ones we face, and I know that, Secretary James, this is something that you are very familiar with. 

The Air Force is supporting DOD’s effort to slow the rate of 

growth in overall military compensation, a tough issue. We were 

able to really sustain a number of increases over the last number 

of years, and I think we all feel very strongly that we want to support the men and women who serve our country and certainly their 

families, and yet we are faced with this dilemma. It is tough. 

So if you could talk us through a little bit about your own thinking and the extent to which you think it may or may not affect recruitment retention in the future. We are also dealing with perhaps 

cutbacks in housing allowances. We are looking at possible increase 

in commissary prices. And in fact, the Air Force is sort of going 

ahead in what some might describe as a piecemeal fashion, without 

waiting for the commission to come forward with their recommendations. 

Help us understand your thinking on this, and really how we can 

look at those changes that you are suggesting in light of other 

things that we might not be able to do if we don’t move forward 

and do that. 

Secretary JAMES. So you said it, Congresswoman. It is part of the 

package of the tough choices that were made, and of course, the 

compensation changes are DOD-wide. They are for all of our military, and I think it was at its core, it was a tough judgment call, 

but it related to, can we do this for a few years? I don’t think anybody wants to do this kind of thing in perpetuity, but can we get 

by for a few years. So part of the data that everybody looked at 

was, are we competitive now, yes or no, in the aggregate with the 

private sector? And I think people said, yes, we are. 
34 

Then the further judgment call had to do with, you know, would 

we plow the savings back into important readiness and modernization, and of course, we are very much committed to that. 

The other thing is, as you heard the chief say, we are not seeing 

retention problems at the moment. As a matter of fact, we are offering incentives to encourage at least some of our airmen to leave 

the service. So, at the moment, retention is very high. 

Recruitment, again, we are getting high-quality recruits. We are 

having to turn people away at the front door. So, at the moment, 

our numbers are good, and so, it was a judgment call; could we 

slow this growth, watch it, really watchdog it now because we can’t 

let it get out of control, of course, but can we get by a year or two? 

And we are taking this, obviously, kind of a year at a time, and 

I think the judgment call was a hard one, but yes, we can. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Uh-huh. 

General Welsh. 

General WELSH. Ma’am, I guess I would look at it as the United 

States Congress—and I am not blowing smoke at anybody here— 

has been exceptional over the last 12 to 15 years at taking care of 

pay entitlements, benefits for members of the United States military. It has been remarkable. And you have all seen the growth 

curves. Average pay raise scales are up 40 percent. The cost of an 

airman has gone from $60,000 per year total investment cost to 

$90,000 total investment cost because you have done a fantastic job 

of taking care of our people, but that curve is growing like this 

now. We cannot sustain it. The Government can’t sustain it. We 

have to put it onto a path that we can sustain. We are not talking 

about taking money out of people’s pockets. We are slowing growth, 

and I think that is the effort that the Department is making. 

I believe everyone understands that the commission report out 

next year and having a comprehensive look will be of great benefit. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Uh-huh. 

If we ask airmen, certainly, and their families, they would suggest that, you know, they don’t want to see any cuts, but I wonder 

when you assess that, when you query in evaluations or whatever 

tools you use, and I know all the services use some, are we really 

giving them, I think, a true picture of the cost of these cuts versus 

other things that they would not be able to do in terms of even 

training or readiness? How are you kind of really working with 

them to have them prioritize as well what is best for them? 

Secretary JAMES. So, first, I would just say, as I have done my 

beginnings of my tour of the Air Force and walk around workspaces—I do town halls everywhere I go and talk to airmen—the 

number one thing they will bring up to me is, boy, during that period of sequestration, I couldn’t get spare parts, I couldn’t do my 

job, my training got canceled, things like this. And those are the 

things that we would call in this committee readiness types of 

issues. They typically haven’t brought up, believe it or not, the 

compensation issues to me until I bring it up in a town hall, and 

then, of course, as you say, everybody is interested, everybody—you 

know, I haven’t met a person yet that wouldn’t rather be paid a 

little bit more than a little bit less, so, naturally, they feel that 

way, too. But interesting, when they bring up what is on their 

minds, it tends to be their work environment. It tends to be—— 
35 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlelady’s time is expired. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr.—or Dr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to welcome our panel today. 

And Ms. James, you and I recently had a sit-down conversation, 

and it did include religious liberty. Again, a big concern. I join my 

colleagues here as we are all concerned about that, and one of the 

major pieces of this is that we are worried that this idea in the law 

that good order and discipline is now becoming the excuse for political correctness. And I think that is—that very quickly tramples 

the First Amendment rights of our certainly our airmen because it 

seems that we are seeing this in the Air Force far more than the 

other services. 

Now, you heard about the recent incident with the cadet. Well, 

we have another report. Todd Starnes of Fox News says that 2 

weeks ago, it has been reported at Gunter Annex, at Maxwell Air 

Force Base in Alabama, the Gideons came to distribute Bibles to 

anyone who wished to voluntarily have one. As you may recall, 

Gideons have been distributing Bibles at military bases since FDR 

[Franklin Delano Roosevelt], since World War II, so that is a longheld tradition. They were turned away, and as of this time, 2 

weeks later, really this situation has not been resolved. They have 

not been able to do something they have been able to do for decades now. I would love to have your reaction. 

Secretary JAMES. So, I am not familiar with that one at all. We 

will have to get back on those specifics. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 109.] 

Secretary JAMES. My overall reaction is, this is—under the policy, and I apologize if I got a little too wordy about the policy, but 

it is a balancing act. It is balancing that free expression of religion 

with the needs of the military and not giving the appearance or an 

actuality of forcing anything or appearing to force anything. 

Dr. FLEMING. Madam Secretary, this has worked well for centuries since the days of George Washington. We had chaplains. I 

served in the military. This was not an issue then. It has only been 

an issue recently, and so things that have been done, traditions 

that have been long held, where military members have been able 

to express themselves and their religious beliefs, we have a wide 

swath in the First Amendment on this. So what has changed is the 

behavior of the military services, particularly the Air Force in this, 

and that is the reason why, you know, we have had religious people 

long before we had a Nation. Well, what has changed, it appears, 

is the attitude and the behavior of the military services. 

General, would you like to—— 

General WELSH. I would love to, Congressman. 

Dr. FLEMING. Yes. 

General WELSH. My wife and I, when we worked at the Air Force 

Academy in the mid-1980s, and again, when we served there as 

Commandant, we ran the Teens Encounter Christ Program, which 

is a religious retreat program for Catholic and Christian cadets. I 

know all kinds of people at the Air Force Academy then and now 

who would disagree with your assessment of there being a problem 
36 

with religious persecution at the Air Force Academy. I would invite 

you—— 

Dr. FLEMING. General, excuse me for interrupting. Let me just 

ask you this in response to that. So are you saying that people are 

more religious in expressing their religious beliefs more now than 

they did then? 

General WELSH. What I am saying, sir, is that you have to get 

the facts right on every one of these cases and try and stay 

unemotional until you know what happened. I would not believe an 

article from Mr. Starnes, for starters. 

Dr. FLEMING. So you feel like Mr. Starnes is lying? 

General WELSH. Let us get the facts. 

Dr. FLEMING. You feel like Mr. Starnes is lying? 

General WELSH. I know there are cases where he has not had his 

facts right in articles. I will be happy to explain them to you with 

him in the room if you would like. 

Dr. FLEMING. Well, I don’t have the time for you to go through 

all that. What I would ask you to do, sir, is to provide written answers and explanations and examples where Mr. Starnes or others 

have been reporting this inaccurately. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 110.] 

General WELSH. Sir, I would be happy to come talk to you and 

the caucus. I will be happy to do anything you would like, and I 

will tell you what we have been doing on this area since I got into 

the job, the single biggest frustration I have had in this job is the 

perception that somehow there is religious persecution inside the 

United States Air Force. It is not true. We have incidents, like everybody has incidents. We investigate every one of them. We have 

asked every chaplain in our Air Force if they know of these cases. 

They say no. I am telling you, sir, that there is a perception here 

that we are in the middle of a battle because we have two sets of 

advocacy groups. 

Dr. FLEMING. Again, I am running out of time here. I have spoken with your chaplain, and I think he has some of the same concerns I do, and I would invite you to talk with him. Are you familiar with the—— 

General WELSH. Chaplain Stendahl, sir? 

Dr. FLEMING. Yes. 

General WELSH. Okay. Sir, I will bring him to sit with you because I don’t think that is a correct assessment. 

Dr. FLEMING. I would love for you to do that. Are you familiar 

with the ‘‘Clear and Present Danger’’ publication by the FRC [Family Research Council] that suggested this? 

General WELSH. Yes, sir, I have read it. 

Dr. FLEMING. Many, many items have been listed there, and Secretary James and I have talked about Staff Sergeant Monk, and 

apparently the Air Force’s position has changed with him as well. 

So, again, these problems are getting worse, not better. 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman’s time is—— 

Dr. FLEMING. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Expired. There are 4 minutes left on 

the vote; 324 people have not voted yet. I think we have time for 

Mr. Enyart, and then there are two votes. By the time we get there 
37 

for this vote, we should be getting close to the next vote, and you 

can hurry back, and I think we can get everybody that returns very 

quickly having the opportunity to ask their questions. 

Mr. Enyart. 

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And it is unfortunate that so many of our members are leaving. 

I wish they were here to hear some of my questions and your responses. 

Madam Secretary and General Welsh, after having appointed 

some—been honored with being allowed to select some folks for appointment to the Air Force Academy, I believe, as I am sure you 

do, that the Air Force Academy has our very best and our very 

brightest of our Nation, and it encompasses, the folks there encompass the very broad religious diversity of our great Nation. 

Wouldn’t you agree with me on that? 

General WELSH. Yes. 

Mr. ENYART. Thank you. 

You know, also, having served for more than a few years in the 

military, the Air Force Academy for the students is a very, very 

confined and close environment. Isn’t that also true? 

General WELSH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ENYART. Yeah. Thank you. You know, during—during 

my—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Enyart, to get this in the record, probably 

give a verbal response instead of just a nod because it won’t—it 

won’t reflect in the record. Mr. Enyart. 

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The Air Force Academy, as indicated, as you indicated yes to, is 

a very constrained and close environment for the cadets. Is it not? 

General WELSH. Yes, sir, it is. 

Mr. ENYART. All right. Thank you. You know, in my previous career before I had decided to come to Congress, I had the honor of 

commanding 13,000 soldiers and airmen. Of that number, I had 35 

chaplains in my command and 15 chaplain candidates, so 50 folks 

who provided for the spiritual needs of that 13,000 soldiers and airmen. And it appears to me that among our religious freedoms that 

are guaranteed by our constitution is not only the freedom to practice religion but the freedom not to practice if one so chooses. 

And in fact, also, I believe that it is one of our freedoms not to 

be proselytized by one of another faith if one has a different faith 

or no faith at all. Would you agree with me, General, that that is 

your understanding of the Constitution also? 

General WELSH. Yes, sir, the way I tell airmen, the way I would 

explain this to airmen, is that you have every right to your beliefs, 

and to practice your faith freely. If someone asks you about your 

faith, tell them everything about it. If they don’t ask you, don’t assume they want or need to know. 

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, General. So I would really like to see 

this particular issue laid to rest so that we could deal with more 

important issues, frankly, in terms of strategy and tactics. 

Now, the National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force 

has talked about a concept called continuum of service, and as 

someone who has served on Active Duty in the Air Force, and the 

Air Force Reserve, and the Army National Guard and the Army 
38 

Reserve, I am very interested in continuum of service. Now, in that 

concept, airmen have a much greater flexibility to leave and reenter Active and Reserve Components throughout their careers which 

would enable more effective and efficient—excuse me, efficient utilization of an integrated total force. 

Now, I know that some of those barriers are contained in law, 

but others really are more a culture, and regulatory, and policy 

issue for the Air Force. Would you support the concept of continuum of service for airmen? 

General WELSH. Yes, sir, absolutely. We are working hard in 

that direction. 

Mr. ENYART. Great. Great, thank you. 

So in addition to removing the barriers to transitioning between 

components, Congress and the DOD should modify the laws and 

regulations that create these unnecessary limitations. Do you believe that by doing this, it would allow the Air Force to more fully 

capitalize on the costs of training these airmen? 

General WELSH. Sir, I think anything that keeps common sense 

in the discussion and removes burdens to doing things in a way 

that makes common sense, would be helpful. 

Mr. ENYART. Great. General, I look forward to welcoming you to 

Scott Air Force Base next Friday. I understand that you are going 

to be visiting us, and I am really glad to hear that, and I will take 

this answer off the record or in writing, but I would like to get an 

update on the KC–46 alpha program, the new tankers, and how the 

fiscal constraints are impacting the delivery of those aircraft. 

And also, I am particularly interested, since Scott Air Force Base 

houses the 126th Air National Guard Refueling Wing, which currently fly 135s that are older than the young airmen flying them, 

I would like to know where Scott falls in the process and how we 

might ensure that we continue that great mission at Scott Air 

Force Base. 

General WELSH. Sure. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 111.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

I would encourage you to hurry quickly to the floor. 

We will stand adjourned until the end of the votes. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. PALAZZO [presiding]. This hearing will now come back to 

order. 

I recognize Mr. McIntyre for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, I know we spoke briefly as I came back from 

votes, but let me just say as a Carolina graduate from Chapel Hill 

speaking to a Duke graduate, I know we both are excited about the 

ACC [Atlantic Coast Conference] tournament going on as we speak, 

and also March Madness, but let me say congratulations to you on 

your selection as Secretary of the Air Force. We are very proud of 

you and appreciate your commitment and service to our country. 

Let me mention briefly before I ask a specific question about 

something in North Carolina. Let me just say a lot has been said 

today about concerns about religious freedom. As cochairman of the 

Air Force Caucus, I agree with my cochairman Mike Turner who 
39 

spoke earlier, both of whom he and I associated ourselves, and I 

do now, with the remarks by Representative Forbes and the concerns he raised. 

I served for 8 years on the Naval Academy board on behalf of 

this full committee, and never seemed to run into these kinds of 

issues, or intimidation factor that some have referred to about the 

concern of religious freedom. And I think probably what would be 

helpful is, if you and General Welsh, if you all would—would you 

be willing to submit a detailed explanation within the next 10 

days? I think it would help all of us, of the event that occurred, 

regarding this incident, because all I have seen are news reports. 

I would like to hear it straight from you all what the official 

version is. 

Secondly, what the Air Force Academy policy is, and then third, 

how that policy was applied in this situation so each of us can have 

a better understanding in light of our concerns. And they are serious concerns, and we do want, of course, our men and women in 

uniform to have that freedom of expression. So if you could—would 

you be willing to supply that to us in the next 10 days? 

Secretary JAMES. We absolutely will, and I was concerned, too. 

That is why I picked up the phone and called General Johnson. But 

let us provide all of that to you. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Okay, I think that would help all of us and thank 

you. We will look forward to receiving that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 105.] 

Mr. MCINTYRE. An important issue that has drawn concern on a 

bipartisan, bicameral basis in North Carolina, in particular, Senator Burr, Senator Hagan, Representative Ellmers, and Representative Price and myself have all raised questions about the possibility that the Air Force has indicated it may deactivate the 440th 

Airlift Wing at Pope Army Air Field that would send all 11 of its 

C–130s to other bases. 

And here I just want to give credit to and quote from the Raleigh 

News and Observer article. As it says, I think this simplifies it. 

‘‘The 440th provides airlift, air drop and medical support from Fort 

Bragg and all of the airmen training just this past week when the 

newspaper spent time with those airmen and reported on this, all 

of those had been deployed overseas at least once. Last year the 

440th, moved more than 500,000 pounds of cargo, 3,400 passengers, and 13,000 paratroopers working with a combination of active duty and Reserve personnel.’’ 

Of course, the concern there at Pope Army Airfield is that there 

is concern about jobs being lost, but also lost expertise and lost capability. And as the newspaper wrote, if the 440th goes, who will 

fill its role? There has been a stated possibility by a spokeswoman 

for the 440th that new C–130Js would be sent to Pope, but the uncertainty remains. 

Are these C–130s just going to leave and then where is the support factor that we need at Fort Bragg? As you know under BRAC 

[Base Closure and Realignment], Pope Air Force Base became Pope 

Army Airfield, and it is under BRAC’s jurisdiction, yet we have 

both Active Air Force, and Air Force Reserve Components there. 
40 

So it is quite a serious concern, and as I said, it has risen to the 

level of the attention in both Houses of the Congress and we would 

like to see what your response is. 

General WELSH. Congressman, the unit is an Air Force Reserve 

unit that would be leaving. The intent is to take the C–130Js and 

not put them at Fort Bragg, but move them to Little Rock, Arkansas. 

The chief of the Air Force Reserve, Lieutenant General Jackson, 

would tell you that there is a problem with recruiting for that unit 

in that area, in his Reserve unit. He would also tell you, as I said 

before, that every decision we are making right now hurts. They 

have to downsize as well. 

This move would save them about $23 million a year. It would 

save them about 600 bodies, because the wing that leaves would 

become a group at Little Rock. All of the overhead infrastructure 

is already there, and it allows them to save a $10 million a year 

interservice support agreement that he pays to the Army. 

The Active Air Force Component would leave the air mobility operations group there to run the green ramp, to schedule and to 

oversee the airlift that comes in today to help do a lot of the training for the 82nd Airborne. Actually, a higher percentage of the 

training there today, I believe is done by aircraft that come in to 

support the 82nd Airborne as opposed to just the airplanes that are 

stationed there. Especially the larger airplanes that are required to 

train on the C–17s, et cetera. 

So the training will not be affected. We will support it, as we 

have in the past. But this is an effort by the Air Force Reserve to 

save some money, to downsize their people. They have to take cuts 

as do we. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, and I know my time is expired. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. PALAZZO. At this time I recognize Mr. Coffman for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you Secretary James for your relatively new assignment as Secretary of 

the United States Air Force, and General Welsh for your decades 

of service to this country. 

This year the National Commission of the Structure of the Air 

Force released their findings, of their 2-year extensive look at Air 

Force—at force structure in the United States Air Force. The overall thrust of the findings was to shift more components and capabilities to the Guard and Reserves. I agree with many of the commission’s findings including its findings that there are certain core 

capabilities better suited for the Guard and Reserves such as missions in cyber, ISR, in space mission support. 

Now, I realize the final ratio of this shift is still under study, but 

can you tell me where you believe the Air Force and the military 

in general can benefit from shifting these components or capabilities to the Guard and Reserves like those recommended by the 

commission? 

Secretary JAMES. So Congressman, I want to associate myself 

with what you just said. In philosophy I agree with everything you 

just said, and our plan, in fact, does shift more responsibility to the 

Guard and Reserve as we go forward. It is a good deal for the mission, it is a good deal for the taxpayer. The areas of ISR and cyber 
41 

in particular, again, we agree, and we are bolstering that within 

our plan for the National Guard and Reserve. 

So I will say there is much of that commission’s work, the vast 

majority of it is a fine body of work, really good research and it is 

benefiting us and we agree with most of it, particularly the continuum of service, the associations and better integration. So those 

areas we are very much in agreement. 

There is a couple of areas where we don’t agree, at least not yet, 

and the one that I want to highlight to you is the commission calls 

for additional reductions to the Active Duty forces to the tune of 

about, I think, 35,000 or 36,000, and for sure for fiscal year 2015, 

that is more than we think is prudent. 

So what we want to do is continue to deliberately analyze mission by mission how can we shift more to the Guard and Reserve. 

And over the past year I want to give credit to General Welsh and 

the other leaders for doing this in a very collaborative way, thinking it through from an operational perspective, but putting as 

much in the Guard and Reserve as can possibly be done. 

Mr. COFFMAN. And General Welsh. 

General WELSH. Sir, I think you mentioned cyber as an example. 

Right now our percentages are about 60 percent of our cyber work 

is done by the Active Duty, 30 by the Guard, and about 10 percent 

by the Reserve. This is one, clearly, that we have to look at where 

is the right percentage mix? 

We started with zero in the Guard and Reserve here recently. We 

have gone to 30. A great example, though, of how this works is a 

Guard cyber squadron in Washington where a number of the folks 

in that unit work for Google. So they bring skills in the door to the 

Air Force that we can use now on behalf of national security, and 

to support the State in some circumstances. This is an area ripe 

for further exploitation. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, thank you. 

As we have discussed I think and certainly you brought forward 

earlier in this hearing that we have to make difficult decisions, and 

one of those decisions was the—certainly the A–10. 

But I want to commend you to look further into the Guard and 

Reserve. And I want to commend the Air Force for being more forward-thinking than the other branches of service, but there does 

tend to be sort of this institutionalized protection of a culture in 

terms of maintaining the force levels of the Active Duty relative to 

the Reserves, and I just think that whenever we can shift, I think 

there are tremendous opportunities for savings, not simply in the 

airmen-to-airmen cost between Active Duty and Guard and Reserves, but I also think in the legacy costs. 

When you look at savings out of retirement, the fact that, you 

know, somebody on Active Duty for 20 years in the United States 

Air Force, you know, will draw 50 percent of their base pay the day 

after they retire, plus all of the benefits. And that Guard or Reservist will not draw until age 60. And so there are other differences 

besides airmen-to-airmen costs that I think we need to look at. But 

I want to commend you to that. 

The last thing I certainly, the issue of sexual assault which has 

been epidemic in our military. I am very disturbed at what occurred at Lackland Air Force Base, and I just want to make sure, 
42 

I can tell you I went to my own Air Force Base, Buckley Air Force 

Base in Colorado and met with the command there. And they 

briefed me on what they were doing in prevention in terms of sexual assaults, and I was very impressed with what they were doing, 

hoping that is occurring Air Force-wide. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. PALAZZO. At this time I recognize Ms. Speier for 5 minutes. 

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for your service. Secretary, congratulations on 

your new post. 

General Welsh, let me start with you. Last year, there was some 

heinous Web sites posted by members in the military that triggered 

a sweep of various locations for the Air Force. As I understand it, 

it was mostly their lockers, and their living spaces, and maybe 

their cubicles, and they gave everyone a 10-day notice before doing 

it, which I thought was preposterous to begin with. But that is 

what you all did. And then as a result of that sweep, there were 

some 32,000 inappropriate items discovered, some of which were 

pornographic, or just sexually harassing, or creating a hostile workplace. 

At the time when that was reported, I asked the Vice Chief of 

the Air Force what action had been taken against those that were 

responsible for posting those 32,000 inappropriate items. And he 

said he would have to get back to me. He hasn’t gotten back to me. 

It has been over a year. 

Do you know what happened to those airmen who had sexually 

explicit or inappropriate pornographic items placed in their personal spaces and in their cubicles? 

General WELSH. Congresswoman, there were not 32,000 pornographic things found. There were 32,000 things deemed to be inappropriate. It might have been a—— 

Ms. SPEIER. I understand that, but what happened to these people? 

General WELSH. Most of them nothing happened to them. That 

was done not as a result of a Web site or any specific activity. That 

health and welfare was done at my direction after getting approval 

from the Secretary because I wanted the Air Force to have a discussion about respect, inclusion, and the strength of diversity, and 

the things that make our people feel not valued in their workplace. 

Ms. SPEIER. Well, we have a one-star general who is being tried 

right now for having possession of pornographic information. So are 

you saying that those that did have pornographic items were 

not—— 

General WELSH. No, ma’am. I am not saying that. What I am 

saying is that it was—that there wasn’t a particular thing we were 

looking for. We were looking for anything we could find to have the 

discussion. The pornographic items that I know about that were 

found were found in workplace computers. There were a couple of 

examples of that. They were not necessarily connected to an individual. They were found during the search. There was action taken 

against a couple of people as a result of those inspections. I will 

have to get the details. 

Ms. SPEIER. Would you report back to me, please? 
43 

General WELSH. I will and I apologize that we didn’t know we 

owed you that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 108.] 

Ms. SPEIER. Furthermore, I was told that there actually wasn’t 

a sweep of government-issued computers. Is that incorrect? Was 

there a sweep of government-issued computers? 

General WELSH. There was a sweep of all government computers, 

workspace, et cetera. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SPEIER. There was. Okay, I didn’t know that. Thank you. 

General, I don’t know if you have seen The Daily Beast article that 

was recently published called, ‘‘Spies, lies, and rape in the Air 

Force.’’ Are you familiar with this? 

General WELSH. I have not seen that article, no. 

Ms. SPEIER. I would commend it to you for reading. It is an undercover agent’s story. It is very disturbing about the Air Force Office of Special Investigations [OSI] informant program and it seems 

to repeat a pattern at the Air Force Academy of taking vulnerable 

trainees and making them informants, using them and then putting them in jeopardy, and then ending their careers when things 

go wrong. 

In the case that was referenced in this article, the Airman First 

Class claims she was raped as a result of being a snitch for OSI. 

And I have two questions that I hope you can answer. 

How many people are participating in OSI’s informant program, 

and what ranks are the informants that are participating? 

General WELSH. Congresswoman, I don’t know the number who 

are participating or their ranks, but it is a broad—we will find out 

the answer and get it back to you. It changes at any given time, 

obviously. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 109.] 

Ms. SPEIER. And how many people have been separated from the 

Air Force within months of participating in OSI’s informant program? 

General WELSH. I don’t know that answer either. 

Ms. SPEIER. Would you find that out as well? 

General WELSH. Yes, I will. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 109.] 

Ms. SPEIER. Can you give me the rationale of why you would 

take Air Force Academy or young recruits who are trainees, and 

put them in a position of becoming informants for OSI? 

General WELSH. I will give you an example from my time as 

Commandant at the Air Force Academy, ma’am. We had a cadet 

who was selling drugs to other cadets, heavily selling drugs, all 

kinds of drugs. When he was found out and apprehended, he talked 

during his interview to investigators about a connection to a major 

western U.S. drug supplier which the DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration] had been trying to get a link to. So the DEA talked 

to the OSI and asked if they could—if we would allow him to serve 

as a confidential informant to help their investigation in the Rocky 

Mountain region. We did that, which led to a number of arrests. 
44 

Ms. SPEIER. All right, my time is expired, but I am more concerned about cadet or airmen-on-airmen than assisting the DEA in 

another transaction. But maybe we can pursue this offline. Thank 

you. 

Mr. PALAZZO. At this time, I recognize Congressman Scott for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, thank you for your visit to Moody. I enjoyed 

having lunch with you there and thank you for your leadership on 

the combat rescue helicopter. 

You mentioned in your opening statement, if we follow the law, 

meaning if the sequester is not repealed, the additional cuts that 

will have to be made to the F–35 and to other weapon systems that 

are important to national security. And that is one of the reasons 

I have so many questions about the cuts to the A–10, until the sequester would be repealed. 

And if I could, General Welsh, I know I will see you in Georgia 

later this month. I look forward to that as well. And I know you 

are an A–10 pilot. That is not a decision that you have taken lightly. 

I have serious questions about the speed at which the drawdown 

of the A–10 is going to occur prior to another weapon system being 

put in place, and the potential for that weapon system to come in 

in smaller quantities should the sequester not be repealed; and 

whether we like it or not, the sequester is the law and getting it 

repealed is much easier said than done. 

So potentially, we would draw down the 280 or so A–10s based 

on the desire to replace them with newer more advanced weapon 

systems, and then potentially not end up with the weapon systems 

that we were counting on replacing them. The same thing happened with the F–22. We were going to buy 700-plus. We ended up 

cutting that order to less than half. And we are talking about $3.5 

billion here on the A–10s. 

If we assumed that we are going to fly the close air support mission, and as you said we are, and we know that we are going to 

support our men and women on the ground, the other weapon systems cost more to fly than the A–10 does, and have the cost premiums in time per hour been factored into the projected savings 

and if possible, I would like to see the analysis of that when you 

get an opportunity to, sooner rather than later, if possible. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 111.] 

Mr. SCOTT. But we also just made a significant investments in 

the wings on the A–10s, and they do have life expectancy left. 

And I will move on to another issue with the JSTARS, but I 

would appreciate the analysis on the A–10 cost and the consideration of if we draw the A–10 down over the period of 24 months, 

what happens if the sequester is not repealed and we don’t have 

the F–35s that we intend to purchase to replace. 

General WELSH. Sir, I will hold the longer discussion until I can 

sit with you and show you the analysis. But just to be clear, as we 

start to transition the A–10 out, the airplane that will pick up the 

CAS [close air support] load, principally, is the F–16; not the F– 

35 for a while. 
45 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir. But we are drawing down some F–16s, too. 

General WELSH. We will have less capacity in every mission 

area. That is what sequester-level funding does to us, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, sir. I voted against it and I hope that we get it 

repealed and I think it is unfortunate that the men and women in 

the military and the national security is expected to take the size 

of the cut, the percentage of cut that has been pushed down to 

them, and all of our Secretaries have agreed that there were some 

things that we could do, and generals, to reduce spending, but in 

the end, they asked us to do more faster than we had been anticipating. 

The JSTARS, and you mentioned this, General Welsh, earlier, as 

did you, Madam Secretary. The recapitalization is proceeding in 

favor of the plan that we have, the rapid approach to the next generation. I just want to make sure that as we approach this next 

generation of JSTARS that we don’t leave a gap in the capability 

as we start to pull the current ones down as they go in for depot 

maintenance. High demand asset, how do we plan on maintaining 

the capability until the next generation is ready? 

General WELSH. There will be a loss of capability, Congressman, 

back to the theme again. If there is not more funding coming from 

somewhere, and I am not assuming there will be, the only way for 

us to recapitalize JSTARS which I believe everybody thinks we 

have to do, is to somehow take money from programs we have, 

JSTARS being one of them, downsize capability in that area to reinvest and start to recapitalize. It is the only way to do it that we 

can come up with. I would love to have other money to do this 

with, but we don’t have it. And so there will be risk as you start 

that in that mission area. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, thank you both for your service, and look forward to continuing these discussions. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. PALAZZO. I will now recognize Mr. Nugent for 5 minutes. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the 

panel for being here. 

Specifically, though, I want to thank General Welsh. 

I want to go back a little bit, if you think back. One of the cadets 

while you were Commandant was a David Paolello. I don’t know 

if you remember David, but he ultimately had to leave the Academy, then went, got his Air Force through ROTC [Reserve Officers’ 

Training Corps], and is an F–15 Strike Eagle pilot today. But I will 

tell you from his parents and from me, because I remember the 

issues that David had. And you were a strong supporter in personally talking to him. And I think that really goes back to your integrity as a father, but as a leader of those students at the time, and 

those cadets. 

And having two sons that went to a different service academy, 

I am not going to say that, you know, go Army, beat Air Force, but 

it was something like that. My question, though, is to Secretary 

James. And it is in reference to CHAMP [Counter-electronics High 

Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project], and that is, you know, 

a non-lethal weapon that the Air Force developed, I think have 

done an extremely capable job of doing that. I know the Air Force 

would like to deploy that, but they are looking at a reusable air-
46 

frame to deploy CHAMP on. But that is pushing it out to 2025. You 

have the ability today to use a current airframe that is not reusable, but it is certainly one that would work for us, and that is the 

cruise missile delivery system that we have a surplus of. 

I just want to make sure everyone is on the same page though, 

as it relates to CHAMP. You know, we have had this committee, 

we have combatant commanders testify that they want CHAMP, 

that they have a need for it. We have a bipartisan and bicameral 

support of Congress in the last NDAA. Congress wants CHAMP. 

We want to make sure everyone is on the same page, but the only 

element standing in the way of CHAMP on the battlefield, like I 

said, the Air Force has really done an amazing job of developing 

this and actually getting it in a test phase where it worked. And 

it is one that I think, you know, we have talked about that nonlethal capability. It is one that I would love to see us develop more 

of. 

If you look back at some of the infrastructure things that we had 

to do in Iraq, it would have been nice if we had that type of vehicle 

to take out that infrastructure without totally destroying it where 

we have to rebuild it and spend billions of dollars doing it. So what 

I am asking is, you have the political approval. You have the demand for it. The combatant commanders would like it, so it is not 

limited by demand. Would you confirm for me that CHAMP is only 

limited by budget? 

General WELSH. I would love to, Congressman, but you stumped 

me. I have to go find out about CHAMP and talk to you. I don’t 

know the status. 

Mr. NUGENT. Well, General, that is not the intent of my question. 

General WELSH. Well, but I should know. I don’t know the status, but I will have to get back to you on that, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 112.] 

Mr. NUGENT. If you would, and I will just let you know, but from 

what we have, you know, it is basically $10 million. And we can 

field this weapon in well, in 18 months. And it would certainly give 

an added—particularly in the issues that we are facing today, resurgent China, and obviously, resurgent Russia in regards to 

issues. It would be one that I think would be nice to have an inventory, particularly since the combatant commanders have testified 

that they would certainly love to have that. 

And of course, I don’t want to say anything negative about the 

Air Force, having been a member of the Air Force way back when, 

and going through San Antonio, one of my favorite times, I will tell 

you. But you know, I have three sons that currently serve in the 

United States Army. And so just to go back on the A–10, obviously, 

it is a capable platform, but I do understand the budgetary commitments that you have, and why you have to do certain things, and 

probably not wanting to do that. 

But lastly, I do want to touch on religious freedoms because I remember when my sons, two of my sons, the oldest and youngest 

first went to West Point. I don’t know who they got it from, but 

they received a Bible, a pocket version that actually one carried in 

combat in Afghanistan. I would hope that we—and I remember the 
47 

Academy was about faith. I mean, that was a component to keep 

our cadets strong, not only academically, but all the tenets of being 

a cadet, but faith is important. And I recognize that from your 

service at the Academy. 

And so I just want to continue to stress that that is important 

to all of us. So General, thank you so much for your service, and 

thank you from the parents of David Paolello, who is one of your 

pilots. 

And Secretary James, congratulations. 

Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. PALAZZO. At this time I recognize Mr. Bridenstine. Mr. 

Bridenstine, before you begin, do you have time? Because I know 

Ms. Hartzler has an appointment, or would you—— 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. It would be my honor to yield to Ms. Hartzler. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Well, thank you, Mr. Bridenstine. 

Ms. Hartzler, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Well, thank you, gentlemen, I appreciate that, 

and I appreciate the opportunity to get to, first of all, thank you 

for your service and want to invite you to Whiteman Air Force 

Base. I am very much looking forward to you coming and very 

proud of the missions there. 

And certainly, General, I appreciate your comment earlier. I 

wrote it down, and tweeted it, about how the B–2 is now our symbol of valor today. And certainly, we are very proud of that. So I 

look forward to having you come out, but I did want to address the 

A–10s as well because I do believe they are the most effective and 

most cost-efficient platform that we have for close air support. 

And I do not agree that a B–1 is the same, or remotely piloted 

aircraft is the same to the soldiers on the ground. They want to see 

the A–10 coming over that horizon, and General, you mentioned in 

your opening statement that you checked with General Odierno 

about what he thought about airlift, but you did not mention it. I 

know you have heard from General Odierno about what he thinks 

about the A–10 and he is quoted as saying that the A–10 is the 

best close air support platform that we have today. And he has, you 

know, said that publicly. 

It is the most cost-efficient. We have A–10 operational cost per 

flight hour is $17,398. The B–1, $54,218; F–16, $22,954. There is 

a difference in the cost per flying hour. I will welcome the cost 

analysis that you are going to provide for Representative Scott. 

I would like to see that as well. And part of that, I want to ask 

you about today, deals with the wing replacement program that 

has been underway there. And we as tax dollars have invested in 

these aircraft, the best aircraft for close air support that we have, 

and that right now, the Air Force has 173 wings under contract, 

and Congress appropriated funding in fiscal year 2014 for approximately 9 additional wings bringing the total to 182 wings that have 

been replaced. 

Currently 63 new wings have been delivered and by the end of 

the year, over 100 will be delivered. So I guess my first question 

is, how much money has been spent by the taxpayer already on 

this wing replacement? 

General WELSH. Congresswoman, I don’t know the exact numbers that have been spent to date. We do these upgrades on all of 
48 

our aircraft. It is not just the A–10. We do this on all of our fleet’s 

aircraft. But I don’t know how much of it has been spent. We can 

find that out for you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 111.] 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I would like to know that, thank you. So does 

the Air Force plan to fulfill the current A–10 wings under contract? 

General WELSH. Congresswoman, until there is an approval, authorization, and appropriation by the Congress to do any of the 

things we are talking to you about today, we will continue doing 

what is currently in the plan. The issue for the A–10 for us is not 

about cost per flying hour. It is not about the close air support mission. It is about all of the missions we provide to a theater commander. Where we affect a theater fight, the full-spectrum fight I 

mentioned at the beginning, is actually in about four or five different areas. 

One is air superiority, which provides ground forces the ability, 

the freedom to maneuver and the freedom from attack. It saves 

huge number of lives on a heavy battlefield, a high-end battlefield. 

The second thing the Army wants us to do as an Air Force is to 

eliminate the enemy’s will to continue the fight through attack and 

strategic depth, interdiction, stop their ability to move supplies forward, don’t let them resupply the fight, those kind of things. 

The third thing they want us to do is to eliminate the enemy’s 

second echelon forces, especially their operational reserves so they 

can’t commit it at a time and place of their choosing. All of those 

are of huge risk to the ground commander. And then, of course, we 

do close air support when we get troops in contact and we divert 

everything to that when it happens. The A–10 cannot do any of 

those other missions. The other airplanes that we have doing close 

air support today can, and as we look at what we have to cut, we 

have to balance across our mission areas. That is the debate. That 

is why we are looking this way. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. And I certainly understand and certainly appreciate the roles of the other missions that can be done, very important as well. But we are talking $740 million a year, and if there 

was a 6 percent reduction in Air Force civilians through attrition, 

you could achieve that. Have you looked at attrition, natural attrition of the civilian workforce as a possible way to help keep this 

unique capability in our fleet? 

Secretary JAMES. So actually, civilian reductions were looked at, 

and civilian reductions are going to be happening as part of that 

headquarters story I told you about earlier, and it is part of a larger story. So our civilian workforce will be coming down. I think 

when the analysis was done, in order to achieve the same savings 

as the A–10, even though these are completely sort of different 

things, but you would have to take down an additional, I think, 

10,000 civilians to equate to the same amount of money, roughly 

speaking, as the A–10, and what I wanted to say there, is again, 

civilians are already coming down. This would be 10,000 on top of 

what we are already planning, and most of our civilians, by the 

way, are not on staff. They are not, you know, helping augment 

staffs and whatnot. Most of them are doing depot maintenance on 

the planes and so forth so they are doing real mission work. 
49 

Mr. PALAZZO. The gentlelady’s time is expired. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. 

Mr. PALAZZO. I now recognize Mr. Bridenstine for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

visiting with us today. 

General, I just wanted to personally thank you for coming all the 

way to Tulsa, Oklahoma, and visiting with the warfighters in my 

district, and certainly, your words were inspiring, and I am very 

pleased to hear what a great heart you have for the people that 

fight our country’s battles. And you represent them very well here 

on the Hill and we are grateful for that. 

I wanted to start, General, just by asking. I know you used to 

fly airplanes. I wanted to ask which airplanes you used to fly. 

General WELSH. I flew the A–10 and then the F–16 for most of 

my flying time. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And in those aircraft did you have a heads-up 

display? 

General WELSH. I did, in both. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. In both, and in that heads-up display was 

there a velocity vector? 

General WELSH. Not in the A–10. There was in the F–16. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. There was in the F–16. In today’s heads-up 

displays we have got VOR [Very high frequency Omni Directional 

Radio Range], ILS [instrument landing system], TACAN [tactical 

air navigation system], ADF [automatic direction finder], all of the 

avionics integrated with the displays in a very robust way that increases safety and improves performance of the pilots and the crew, 

especially, you know, when they are operating in very fatigued situations. 

Do you think it is important to have this kind of avionics capability in aircraft these days, General? 

General WELSH. I do. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Do you think it is important to have terrain 

awareness and warning systems in a multifunction display for aircraft that fly in areas that sometimes require very low flight and 

dangerous scenarios? 

General WELSH. If it is practical and affordable, absolutely. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And of course, when it comes to, you know, 

threat indications, as C–130s often fly in difficult places, threat indicators are important, and one of the concerns I have especially 

regarding the C–130 fleet, that I dealt with in the Navy, is the various configurations of displays, various configurations of avionics 

systems, and it seems like every aircraft you get in there is certain 

software that is different, different places for switches and buttons. 

And sometimes it creates a difficult—it puts us as aviators in difficult positions where one tiny little item might be different from 

the others which brings me to the C–130H fleet, and the Avionics 

Modernization Program which I think is critical for our C–130H 

fleet. 

The key thing in my experience is this is about safety. And I 

know there are CNS/ATM [Communications, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management], you know, required navigation performance metrics that have to be met. I did acquisitions for the 

Navy. I flew airplanes for the Navy. I have seen this firsthand. 
50 

These need to be met, but on top of it there is a safety piece as 

well. And that safety piece has been really developed with the technology that has come, and what I have seen over and over again 

in the Department of Defense is it seems like airplanes that have 

jet engines get the fancy equipment that makes the pilots more 

safe and airplanes that have propellers don’t. 

And I have flown in the tactical community fighters. I have also 

flown in propeller aircraft in the Department of Defense. And it 

seems like it is across forces, and I would just like to get your take 

on that. Can you briefly in 30 seconds share with me your 

thoughts? 

General WELSH. I think that changed with the C–130J. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay. 

General WELSH. Intentionally. So we are doing that going forward. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Right. 

General WELSH. Upgrading the aircraft we already have is the 

problem. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Right. 

General WELSH. And it falls under the same discussion we have 

been having about cutting half of our modernization programs because that is all we can afford. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Okay, so Madam Secretary, the fiscal year 

2013 and fiscal year 2014 NDAAs prohibited the Air Force from 

canceling or modifying the Avionics Modernization Program [AMP] 

for C–130s. Are you aware of that? 

Secretary JAMES. I am aware of that, Congressman. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Madam Secretary, are you aware that Congress has appropriated funds for AMP, not just authorized, appropriated funds for AMP in fiscal year 2012? 

Secretary JAMES. Yes, I was aware of that. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And in fiscal year 2013. 

Secretary JAMES. Yes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And in fiscal year 2014. 

Secretary JAMES. Yes. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And in each case we have demonstrated congressional intent, and these funds over and over again are not 

being obligated. We are authorizing, we are preventing the program from being canceled, and we are appropriating the funds and 

in each case, they are not being obligated. And I would like to ask 

you, Madam Secretary, do you see this as a way that the Air Force 

is making an attempt to go around clear congressional intent and, 

in fact, go around the law as is required by the NDAA and the appropriations? 

Secretary JAMES. So the part about not being obligated, that is 

the part that is new to me, so I am going to need to look into that. 

My understanding about the C–130 AMP program as a general 

proposition is that, of course, it is a major avionics program as you 

pointed out. The problem is affordability given that we are where 

we are. We do have funded in fiscal year 2015 a portion which 

would go to the issue of airspace compliance, but not the full-ups 

program, and again, our position has changed due to affordability. 

There has also been a couple of studies out there, and I think we 
51 

are awaiting a GAO [Government Accountability Office] report on 

this as well. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. So congressional intent is one thing, and you 

are doing something else. That is the challenge, and I just want to 

be really clear what the congressional intent here is, and has been 

for a number of years, and we see the Department of Defense going 

in opposite direction and these laws are not just passed by Congress, but they are signed by the President. 

Thank you so much. I yield back. 

Mr. PALAZZO. At this time, I yield to myself 5 minutes. Secretary 

James, and General Welsh, thank you for coming in to answer our 

questions and provide testimony. 

I want to focus on the third Air Force proposal to remove missions from Keesler Air Force Base within the past 2 years. I will 

tell you up front, I am going to fight to kill this one just as I fought 

to kill the other two. 

The previous proposal suggested moving the 815th and the 345th 

associated unit first to Dobbins Reserve Base in Georgia, and then 

Pope Army Airfield in North Carolina. First, we explained that 

Dobbins didn’t have the infrastructure for the units and the Air 

Force agreed with us. Then on to Pope, which is now being abandoned as well in favor of closing their units. 

Now Keesler Air Force Base is being told that the C–130s are 

going to be sent to Little Rock. That makes three different bases 

for these airmen in 3 years. It seems like the Air Force is hellbent 

on moving these aircraft out of South Mississippi. 

General Selva claimed just the other day that they can save 600 billets and $100 million over the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program] in reference to a question my colleague, Senator Wicker from 

Mississippi, about moving the planes, and claimed that the move 

itself was budget neutral. Now, can you tell me who is responsible 

for those dollar amounts? Is that an Air Force Reserve number, or 

is that an Active Air Force number? 

General WELSH. The people are Air Force Reserve savings, a little bit of the Active Air Mobility Operations Group at Pope, but the 

plan was put together by General Selva as our Mobility Air Force’s 

lead and Lieutenant General Jackson, the Air Force Reserve. 

Mr. PALAZZO. I am going to ask for all of that in written cost justification as well. 

I have a tremendous amount of respect for General Selva, but I 

think that whoever did the math in this instance is flat wrong. As 

a CPA [certified public accountant] I did the math. We were talking about deactivating the 815th and deactivating the 345th, which 

means about 185 reservists, 145 Active Duty, and 35 civilians. That 

is 365 total; not 600. And that is assuming no one stays in the Air 

Force. I mean, I can line out the so-called savings you will see in 

pay and benefits, but I will provide that for a later time. 

In addition, as I am sure you are aware, since Hurricane 

Katrina, Keesler has been improved and expanded to the tune of 

$58 million to accommodate the C–130J. Add that money, which 

would essentially be wasted, to the $3 to $5 million in permanent 

change of station costs for the Active Duty force, I am failing to see 

where we get anywhere near the $100 million in savings by moving 

these planes to a base that is already stretched way too thin. 
52 

In fact, it is interesting to note that oftentimes the simulators 

and training at Little Rock are so full that the Air Force actually 

sends some of our airmen and our international partners to Keesler 

Air Force Base to do their training. 

The 913th, the unit that was deactivated in 2007, will be reactivated to accept these planes. It was a C–130H unit. My understanding, even if we pull those pilots back in, it is going to take 

an additional 5 to 6 months and plenty of training costs to even 

qualify them to fly the J model aircraft. 

I now ask unanimous consent that the following list of awards 

given to Keesler Air Force Base, as well as the airmen of several 

of the units I am honored to represent, that are currently proposed 

as being decommissioned, be inserted in the record. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 98.] 

Mr. PALAZZO. Secretary James, General Welsh, I am sorry, but 

I am not going to let the Air Force get away with moving families, 

disrupting communities, and moving our airmen around whenever 

they feel like it without justification. I have been closely watching 

these proposals for over 2 years. When Keesler won the Commander in Chief’s Award for the Greatest Base in the Nation, I 

thought no way would our commanders try and take these planes 

from the top-performing base. 

But you can imagine my disappointment when I saw this in the 

most recent news. So General Welsh, and Secretary James, General Selva said this move would be cost neutral. And he said he 

would check into quote, ‘‘The specifics of what might be required 

at Little Rock that wouldn’t be required at Pope or any other location where we would base that unit.’’ End quote. 

Now, I am going to be a little more specific. I don’t care about 

how much it would have cost to move the planes to Pope. I don’t 

care how much it was going to cost to move them to Dobbins. I 

want to know exactly how much it is going to cost in actual dollars, 

fuel, MILCON [military construction], other relocation costs, manpower downtime, for these planes to move to Little Rock Air Force 

Base from Keesler Air Force Base. 

I have been asking for cost justifications for these movements for 

over 2 years now and I am yet to see an answer that shows me 

any cost savings. We are obviously running short on time, so I request that you provide the full cost justification to my office in 

writing as soon as possible. I will be anxiously awaiting it and can 

I get your commitment that you will provide that information to 

me? 

Secretary JAMES. Yes. 

General WELSH. We will get you some answers, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 112.] 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you. Madam Secretary and General Welsh, 

thank you for being here to answer my question, and I look forward 

to hearing from you. I would like to personally extend an invitation 

to you both to come to Keesler to see these units firsthand, the 

community that loves them very much, and the great work that 

they are doing. 
53 

Do you by any chance know when you may have an opportunity 

to do that? 

Secretary JAMES. I do not have a date, but I promise I am coming. I very much want to make a visit. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Well, thank you very much. My time has expired, 

and at this time, I recognize Mr. Gallego for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, General, welcome to the committee. 

As you may know, the district that I represent has a significant 

Air Force presence, and one of the challenges, here in DC we talk 

about sequester, and we use acronyms and different things, but a 

lot of times that doesn’t necessarily translate for the folks who are 

watching at home. And so in a very, you know, basic real sense, 

can you tell us, you know, for folks in San Antonio, or Del Rio, for 

example, what sequester has meant to them, what sequester has 

done to them, because people don’t necessarily feel any different 

today than they did before sequester. 

So how would you explain sequester and its impact on Del Rio 

or San Antonio? 

General WELSH. I think the first year of sequester was probably 

transparent to people in many parts of the country because nothing 

fell out of the sky the day the sequester took effect. 

We are starting to see with this 2015 budget and we will see 

more of it in the 2016 budget and beyond if we stay at sequester 

levels, according to the law, that the impacts will be significant 

over time. Compared to the program we had in place 3 years ago 

in the Air Force and submitted in fiscal year 2012, we will have 

$20 billion less per year in our spending plan and that is going to 

affect things in a big way. 

Mr. GALLEGO. So when you say in a big way, I mean, can you 

give examples of what that would mean so that, you know, for 

someone who is listening, driving down the street on the radio, or 

what, what does that mean? If you tell me it is going to impact me 

in a big way that doesn’t say anything to me. 

General WELSH. In the next 5 years we will cut 500 airplanes 

from our Air Force. We will cut around 20,000 people from our Air 

Force. That is a huge impact on who we are as an institution. It 

will create more facilities that are not fully manned or installations 

that aren’t fully utilized, which will create more of a discussion 

about BRAC for the future. It is going to have an impact. 

Mr. GALLEGO. And what impact does that have on the U.S. readiness in terms of being able to respond? 

Secretary JAMES. You know, if I could jump in. What I wanted 

to say, and I say this as someone who was on the outside and only 

recently on the inside, but the thing that I worry about most going 

back to sequester has to do with the preparedness and the readiness of the airmen and the military at large. Because what all of 

us want, we want to make sure they have the training and the 

equipment so that they can do their job and stay safe if we send 

them into harm’s way. 

And in some ways I think our Air Force has done such a fabulous 

job over the last 25 years, we are the victim a little bit of our own 

success because thank God, we haven’t lost that many people, and 

thank goodness, there haven’t been that many crashes and so forth 
54 

and accidents, but there have been some and I worry that if the 

moneys get tighter, and tighter, and tighter, we may see more fatalities and more lost aircraft, and that is something that you can’t 

capture until it happens and I hope it doesn’t happen. 

Mr. GALLEGO. So two extra questions in the short time that I 

have. So is it your testimony then that the policy of sequester essentially endangers the lives of our sons and daughters in uniform 

over the long-term and that would be question number one. And 

let’s use that one first. Does sequester impact—does it endanger 

the lives of our sons and daughters? 

Secretary JAMES. The way I would put it, it compromises our national security in a way that I sure hope we wouldn’t have to. But 

at the same token, I will say our Air Force no matter what, we will 

always respond, we will always go. They will always be a magnificent Air Force, but I also want to make sure that they are also as 

safe and effective as we can give to them. 

Mr. GALLEGO. So if people ask you, why can’t you just save 

money? Why can’t you just cut and find efficiencies? What is wrong 

with that question? Why can’t you just save money? 

Secretary JAMES. We absolutely must save more money and you 

heard me say that is one of my top three priorities in every way, 

shape, and form. So it takes a while to shift an aircraft carrier and 

I think we are making progress, but we are reducing headquarters. 

We are getting those efficiencies. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Madam Secretary, the point I would like to make 

is that you cannot find enough efficiencies to get over the hump of 

sequester. 

Secretary JAMES. That is correct. 

Mr. GALLEGO. You cannot cut your way out of this hole, is that 

right? 

Secretary JAMES. You’re right. That is correct. 

Mr. GALLEGO. General, do you have any information about how, 

if you found every efficiency you could, you would still be—it 

wouldn’t be enough to meet sequester levels? 

General WELSH. It is not going to be $12.8 billion a year, sir, it 

is just not going to be. And the only way we keep the Air Force 

safe and ready to react at whatever size we can be, is by sizing ourselves to a size we can afford to keep that way, which means we 

must get smaller if the funding stays low. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Well, I thank you both for your presence and your 

testimony, and Texas is an incredibly friendly place and so, San 

Antonio, Del Rio, any time either of you would like to visit, please 

know that you are always welcome. 

Secretary JAMES. I have been, and I am coming back, so thank 

you. 

General WELSH. It is warm there. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay, at this time, we return to Mr. Bridenstine 

for a question. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Madam Secretary, I know you have been on the job for 11 

weeks, and I look forward to working with you on the C–130 AMP 

issue as we go forward. 

But just switching topics, I am interested in the Evolved Expandable Launch Vehicle program. A new 2012 acquisition strategy in-
55 

cluded 14 rocket cores open to competition. Can you say what the 

status of this competition is? 

Secretary JAMES. So there are several new entrants, we are actively trying to get them ready to compete, and that I would guess 

that is going to happen, probably within the next, I don’t know, 

year or so. I am a big believer in competition. I think it is going 

to definitely bring down our costs. I think just having the competition out there on the horizon has already brought down costs for 

that program. 

And I will say that over the next, I believe it is 5 years, those 

new competitors, provided that they go through the wickets and do 

end up being able to compete, they will be competing for, I believe 

it is, seven out of the eight launches that will be happening particularly for our GPS [Global Positioning System] satellites that 

need to be put up some years from now. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. When you think about, you know, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, their occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 

and Georgia. They are, you know, complicit in helping the Assad 

regime in Syria, helping the mullahs in Iran go around the sanctions on Iran. You know, you think about them being involved in 

producing, you know, nuclear centrifuges for Iran, giving Edward 

Snowden asylum. It seems like we are not friends with Moscow. 

Do you see it being a problem that we rely on Moscow for rocket 

engines? 

Secretary JAMES. So it is worrying, I will say that. We are going 

to take a look at that. I will also tell you for the immediate future, 

we have 2 years worth of supply for those engines, so we are okay 

in the short run. I will also say that although it is worrying, it is 

also true that this is a long-standing relationship, and it has 

weathered various storms. So but it is something that we are going 

to take a look at and see where we go in the future. 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. And does our current position violate the current suspension of U.S. military-to-military cooperation with Russia? 

Secretary JAMES. I have to assume the answer is no, that we 

would not be in violation, but let me please check that for the 

record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 112.] 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. Please do that for me. I appreciate it. 

Thank you so much for being here and testifying, General, and 

Madam Secretary. 

I yield back. 

Mr. PALAZZO. All right, thank you. At this time I will yield myself for one last question. 

General Welsh, I am concerned about readiness levels in the Air 

Force, specifically that it will take until 2023 to get healthy. What 

risk level are we assuming as a result? And General, you can answer that and then Secretary James if you would like. 

General WELSH. Congressman, I am worried about readiness in 

the Air Force, too, as is the Secretary. The things that affect readiness are much more complex than just flying-hour money each 

year. 
56 

There are things like investment in training range space and 

threat systems to train against on those ranges. On live virtual 

constructive simulation capabilities, as we get more modern aircraft, where the only place you can recreate a real threat environment is in a simulator because you can’t afford to do it in the real 

world. Those things have not been funded over the last 10 to 15 

years because we have been tied up spending money on operations 

and supporting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

It is time for us to get back to full-spectrum training and readiness. And that is what is going to take us 10 years, to rebuild those 

things that are behind the power curve, especially as we bring on 

an airplanes like the F–35. 

Secretary JAMES. I will just say ditto. I thought that was an excellent answer that the chief just gave, and I just want to associate 

myself with those remarks. 

The top concern is if we would get into a contested environment. 

That is a more complex environment. It is more difficult for the pilots. And that is where practice, what your mother used to tell you, 

practice makes perfect. I think that makes sense. That is why we 

train people and that is the sort of training that we have not been 

able to do enough of. 

Mr. PALAZZO. What do you think will happen if we do not turn 

off sequester in 2016? 

Secretary JAMES. So of course you see what our proposal is, and 

the choices that we would make. It is not what we wish. I feel that 

our national security concerns would be compromised too much, 

and again, realize these are tough budget times, but ask you to 

please try to reverse that sequester. 

General WELSH. And we will not be able to execute the Defense 

Strategic Guidance. The service chiefs all believe that, if we go into 

full sequester funding throughout the FYDP. 

Mr. PALAZZO. I think the majority of this committee would agree 

with you and many Members in Congress. We have to do everything that we possibly can to turn off sequester for our military, 

our national defense spending. You know, it is just not right that 

we are trying to balance our budgets, our Nation’s budgets on the 

backs of our men and women in uniform and their families. 

So we know what to fix. We know what our number one drivers 

of our deficit and our debts are, and we need to address that. And 

it is not defense spending. And as we have seen recently all across 

the world that it is not becoming safer. It is becoming much more 

dangerous and we have—this Congress has an obligation to make 

sure that our men and women in uniform have the tools, the equipment, and the training and the leadership that they deserve, that 

we expect them to have, that the American people expect them to 

have, so they can keep this Nation safe at home and abroad. 

So with that, I want to thank you all for your testimony today. 

I want to thank the Members for their questions. It was a fantastic 

hearing. 

I want to tell Secretary James, for your first appearance in front 

of the House Armed Services Committee, I have to say you probably deserve an A rating. So the bar has definitely been raised. You 

know, you can only slide backwards from here, but I am sure you 

will do a great job. 
57 

Sir, General Welsh, thank you for your service to your Nation 

and just as importantly, thank your beautiful wife Betty and your 

beautiful daughter Liz for their service and their sacrifice, because 

it is just as great, typically, as any member that wears the uniform. 

So with that, this hearing is adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 14, 2014 

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MARCH 14, 2014 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 14, 2014 

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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCINTYRE 

Secretary JAMES and General WELSH. 1) Provide a detailed explanation of events 

at USAFA regarding the whiteboard incident 

—On Monday, March 10 at 1:36 pm, a cadet assigned to Cadet Squadron 21 (CS– 

21) sent an email to their squadron leadership showing what appeared to be a Cadet 

Element Leader’s whiteboard with a Bible verse written on it. 

—Although the verse was written by the Element Leader’s roommate, the 

whiteboard was placed in the hallway outside the cadet’s room and adjacent to the 

sign designating the occupants’ positions (Cadet John Doe, Third Element Leader), 

leading to the assumption it was the Element Leader’s quote. 

—Between that e-mail and 5:00 pm, an unknown person had sent a similar e-mail 

to the Military Religious Freedom Foundation, which then contacted the office of the 

USAFA Superintendent, (speaking only to the Executive Officer), and then to the 

3rd Group Air Officer Commanding (GAOC), an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel, who 

said she would look into the matter. 

—The GAOC contacted the Commandant of Cadets, who directed a ‘‘calm, measured response’’ and suggested consulting with a chaplain to ensure leadership considered the rights of all involved. 

—The Cadet Wing Chaplain provided written and verbal consultation to the members of the chain of command. 

—Approximately an hour later, the CS–21 Air Officer Commanding (AOC), who 

was home sick that day, contacted the Element Leader by phone to gather facts on 

the situation. Although he was not directed to do so at this time, garbled cell phone 

reception led the Element Leader to believe he was to remove the verse, which he 

did by taking down the whiteboard. 

—At 1849, the CS–21 AOC consulted with the chaplain and GAOC, and then 

called the Element Leader once more and requested the verse be removed. 

—The CS–21 AOC also asked the cadet if he had any concerns with this request 

in, order to foster a discussion on balancing freedom of expression with leadership 

responsibilities and perceptions of undue influence. The cadet said he understood 

the rationale and was willing to remove the whiteboard. 

2) What is Air Force Academy policy? Air Force policy is identified in Air Force 

Instruction 1–1 which states: 

2.11. Government Neutrality Regarding Religion. Leaders at all levels must balance constitutional protections for an individual’s free exercise of religion or other 

personal beliefs and the constitutional prohibition against governmental establishment of religion. For example, they must avoid the actual or apparent use of their 

position to promote their personal religious beliefs to their subordinates or to extend 

preferential treatment for any religion. Commanders or supervisors who engage in 

such behavior may cause members to doubt their impartiality and objectivity. The 

potential result is a degradation of the unit’s morale, good order, and discipline. Airmen, especially commanders and supervisors, must ensure that in exercising their 

right of religious free expression, they do not degrade morale, good order, and discipline in the Air Force or degrade the trust and confidence that the public has in 

the United States Air Force. 

2.12. Free Exercise of Religion and Religious Accommodation. Supporting the 

right of free exercise of religion relates directly to the Air Force core values and the 

ability to maintain an effective team. 

2.12.1. All Airmen are able to choose to practice their particular religion, or subscribe to no religious belief at all. You should confidently practice your own beliefs 

while respecting others whose viewpoints differ from your own. 

2.12.2. Your right to practice your religious beliefs does not excuse you from complying with directives, instructions, and lawful orders; however, you may request religious accommodation. Requests can be denied based on military necessity. Commanders and supervisors at all levels are expected to ensure that requests for religious accommodation are dealt with fairly. 

As for Air Force Academy policy, there is no specific guidance on what can be 

written on whiteboards. But in addition to Air Force guidance described above, Cadets receive instruction and training on leadership principles, Equal Opportunity, 
106 

and Human, Cultural and Religious Respect throughout the course of their 4 year 

experience. In the aggregate, these are the tools that cadets use when making decisions. 

3) How was that policy applied in this situation? The leadership response in this 

incident was consistent with Air Force policy outlined in Air Force Instruction 1– 

1, para 2.11. Nothing in AFI 1–1 should be understood to limit the substance of voluntary discussions of religion or the exercise of free expression where is it reasonably clear that the discussions are personal, not official, and they can reasonably 

be free of the potential for, or appearance of, coercion. [See page 39.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Secretary JAMES and General WELSH. USAFA WHITEBOARD INCIDENT 

—On Monday, March 10, at 1:36 pm a cadet assigned to Cadet Squadron 21 (CS– 

21) sent an email to their squadron leadership showing what appeared to be a Cadet 

Element Leader’s whiteboard with a Bible verse written on it. 

—Although the verse was written by the Element Leader’s roommate, the 

whiteboard was placed in the hallway outside the cadet’s room and adjacent to the 

sign designating the occupants’ positions (Cadet John Doe, Third Element Leader), 

leading to the assumption it was the Element Leader’s quote. 

—Between that e-mail and 5:00 pm, an unknown person had sent a similar e-mail 

to the Military Religious Freedom Foundation, who then contacted the office of the 

Superintendent, speaking only to the Exec, and the 3rd Group Air Officer Commanding (GAOC), who said she would look into the matter. 

—The GAOC contacted the Commandant of Cadets, who directed a ‘‘calm, measured response’’ and suggested consulting with a chaplain to ensure leadership considered the rights of all involved. -The Cadet Wing Chaplain provided written and 

verbal consultation to the members of the chain of command. 

—Approximately an hour later, the CS–21 Air Officer Commanding (AOC), who 

was home sick, contacted the Element Leader to gather facts on the situation. Although he was not directed to do so at this time, garbled cell reception led the Element Leader to believe he was to remove the verse, which he did by taking down 

the whiteboard. 

—At 6:49 pm, the CS–21 AOC consulted with the chaplain and GAOC, and then 

called the Element Leader once more and requested the verse be removed. 

—The CS–21 AOC also asked the cadet if he had any concerns with this request 

in order to foster a discussion of balancing freedom of expression with leadership 

responsibilities and perceptions of undue influence. The cadet said he understood 

the rationale and was willing to remove the whiteboard. 

—Leadership response in this incident was consistent with Air Force policy outlined in Air Force Instruction 1–1, para 2.11 where it states: ‘‘Leaders at all levels 

must balance constitutional protections for an individual’s free exercise of religion 

or other personal beliefs and the constitutional prohibition against governmental establishment of religion.’’ [See page 17.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

Secretary JAMES. To meet the New START Treaty-compliant force structure announced by the Department of Defense in April 2014, the Air Force will transition 

50 Minuteman III launch facilities from an operational deployed to an operational 

non-deployed status. This transition will be accomplished by placing 50 ICBM 

launchers into a non-deployed status by removing ICBMs from 50 silos across the 

force. The Air Force will maintain a total of 450 operational Minuteman III ICBMs 

in deployed and non-deployed configurations. This action will not require an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement because no launch facilities or ICBMs will be eliminated. [See page 24.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

General WELSH. [The air launch cruise missile, what is the status of the new 

version of the long-range strike LRSO (long-range stand-off missile)? What is the cost 

of it?] The Long Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon is the follow-on system to the nuclear armed AGM–86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), operational since 

1986. The LRSO program has completed an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) and is 

in the Materiel Solution Analysis Phase of the program’s lifecycle. LRSO funding 

in the FY15 President’s Budget is outlined below. 
107 

LRSO FY15 PB 

(TY$M) FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 Total 

(FYDP) 

LRSO $4.9 $9.9 $19.8 $40.7 $144.9 $220.2 

The FY15 President’s Budget funds Milestone A preparation activities to include 

concept refinement, risk reduction efforts, and acquisition strategy refinement. The 

cost of the missile program will continue to be refined during the Materiel Solution 

Analysis phase as the program progresses toward Milestone A. 

[What is the cost of the new bomber beyond the $913 million in the fiscal year 2015 

budget?] The funding profile for the Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS–B) beyond the 

FY15 President’s Budget is classified. The Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) 

is $550 million in base-year 2010 dollars and is applicable for a 100 aircraft procurement. 

[And could the new LRSO serve the same purposes as the bomber? If not, why not?] 

The LRSO and LRS–B are both components of a larger family of systems for Long 

Range Strike, including Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, electronic attack, communication and other capabilities. Despite upgrades, current bombers are 

increasingly at risk to modern air defenses. The LRS–B provides the President with 

the option to hold any target at risk at any point on the globe. LRS–B’s long range 

and broad mix of stand-off and direct-attack munitions payload, including LRSO, 

will provide operational flexibility to Joint commanders across the range of military 

operations. Initial LRS–B capability will be delivered in the mid-2020s, prior to the 

planned retirement of the B–2 and B–52. 

LRSO will be compatible with LRS–B, B–2, and B–52, and will provide a nuclear 

standoff capability to provide sufficient capacity, protection of forces, and Presidential options spanning the range of conflicts from regional to near-peer states. 

[Secondly, if the NNSA (National Nuclear Security Administration) budget was 

part of the DOD budget, what reductions or increases would you recommend?] If 

given authority over some portion of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s 

(NNSA) budget, the Air Force would work to strengthen focus and resources on programs providing direct support to the sustainment and modernization of the U.S. 

nuclear weapons stockpile. The Air Force would also support efforts to more effectively align NNSA programs with our efforts to recapitalize and modernize nuclear 

delivery platforms. 

[What is the rationale for having the existing or future ICBM fleet, and is this part 

of the study?] The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) affirmed the continued efficacy of a Triad of ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclear-capable heavy bombers in maintaining strategic stability and deterring nuclear attack against the U.S., our allies, and 

partners. The Triad’s three legs offer a diverse set of attributes and capabilities that 

produce synergistic effects vital for central deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance. Additionally, the Triad’s balance of attributes provides the U.S. with highly 

effective risk mitigation against failure of a single warhead or delivery system, targeted adversary investment to counter one or more of the legs, or unpredictable 

changes in the strategic environment or technological developments. 

ICBMs, in particular, are highly stabilizing and responsive. The current ICBM 

basing mode complicates adversary targeting and creates an extraordinarily high 

threshold for attack or coercion. The high readiness posture of the ICBM force combined with the U.S.’s early warning and command and control capabilities maximizes Presidential decision time during times of crisis. Together, these attributes 

contribute to the maintenance of strategic stability by vastly minimizing conditions 

under which an adversary would favor pre-emption. 

Since the 2010 NPR initiated the examination of a Minuteman III follow-on study 

while re-validating the importance and necessity of the Triad, the Air Force did not 

include a ‘‘no-ICBM’’ scenario in its Ground Based Strategic Deterrent analysis. 

[For the ICBM, what is the total all-inclusive cost of the land-based ICBM program?] The 10-Year Cost Estimate for the ICBM land based program is $19B, however this does not include an additional $34.7B 10-Year price tag for the Nation’s 

Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS) which is an integral part of the land 

based deterrent. This additional $34.7B is a shared cost between all three legs of 

the nuclear Triad. 
108 

Table 1: ICBM Program Costs 

(then-year dollars in billions) 

FY 2015–2019 10-Year Cost 

Estimate 

Minuteman III1 $6.7 $11.6 

Follow-on ICBM AoA & Acquisition 

Planning 

$6.0 

ICBM Fuze Modernization $0.7 $1.4 

Total $7.4 $19 

1 Includes ICBM Squadrons, Helicopter Support, and Demonstration/Validation. 

Source: ‘‘Fiscal Year 2015 Report on the Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, Nuclear 

Weapons Complex, Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems, and Nuclear Weapons Command and 

Control System Specified in Section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012’’ 

[And then, when was the most recent comprehensive review or study of the Triad 

Nuclear Strategy? And given the tight budgets in the years ahead, do you believe it 

is wise and useful to conduct such a study?] The most recent, comprehensive review 

was conducted in 2011 when the President directed the Department of Defense 

(DOD), in consultation with other departments and agencies, to conduct in-depth 

analysis as a follow-on to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The results of 

this review were submitted to the Congress pursuant to 10 U.S.C Section 491. The 

Air Force supports the DOD’s position that it is prudent to periodically review our 

nuclear forces and strategy as circumstances dictate. These reviews provide force 

planners with an important opportunity to identify emerging problems in the nuclear portfolio and develop appropriate mitigation strategies, assess changes in geopolitical conditions and their impacts on nuclear forces, or to make adjustments that 

would enhance U.S. national security or that of our allies. [See page 31.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

General WELSH. No, the divestment of the 52nd Airlift Squadron (activated in 

2009) will not affect the ability of the Air Force Reserve’s 302nd Airlift Wing from 

accomplishing its mission, including its MAFFS mission. The C–130 Active Associations were established to meet increased rotational crew demand for OEF/OIF, and 

they’ve successfully fulfilled that purpose. With the drawdown in OEF/OIF, the requirement for post-surge rotational crews has been reduced. Additionally, the FY13 

NDAA/TFP–13 divested the last RegAF C–130H units and used the offset to pay 

a considerable portion of the TFP–13 bills. As a result, the active-duty C–130H force 

associations became unsustainable as AMC no longer has C–130H UE units to feed 

them. In summary, Active Associations such as the 52nd Airlift Squadron have become less affordable and less operationally effective in today’s BCA-level environment. 

The nation’s MAFFS mission, including the AFR’s 302nd Airlift Wing, will remain 

largely unaffected by the divestment of the Active Associations. Each MAFFSequipped unit will maintain 2 MAFFS kits, 8 C–130Hs, and ample qualified personnel. The active-duty aircrew qualified to fly MAFFS missions is a small number—less than 10 personnel—hence the loss of active-duty aircrew will not impact 

the ARC’s MAFFS mission. Nor will the divestment of 4 C–130H aircraft from the 

AFR’s 302 AW negatively impact the ARC’s MAFFS mission. Overall, the small 

number of MAFFS equipment (8 nationwide, 2 per wing) is the limiting factor in 

USAF firefighting augmentation capacity, not crews, aircraft, or maintenance. [See 

page 30.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

General WELSH. Following the Air Force-wide health and welfare inspection, Air 

Force commanders took a total of 11 disciplinary actions. These included five letters 

of reprimand, one letter of counseling, two actions of verbal counseling, two Articles 

15, and one general court-martial. 
109 

The general court-martial charges involved pornography on a government computer, assault and battery, and general disorder. This master sergeant was found 

guilty and sentenced on January 17, 2014, to one year confinement, reduction to E– 

4, and fined. 

It is possible that there are additional disciplinary actions that are not visible to 

the Inspector General or were not reported. Many of the disciplinary actions identified, including letters of reprimand—except for officers—letters of counseling, verbal 

counselings, and Articles 15 (depending on the punishment)) are not mandatory entries in an unfavorable information file per AFI 36–2907. Article 15 and court-martial data are reported in the Automated Military Justice Analysis and Management 

System, the source of the same data above. The Air Force Legal Operations Agency 

received reports of the other actions (i.e., LORs, LOC, and verbal counselings) from 

the field in response to the health and welfare inspection. [See page 43.] 

General WELSH. In CY 2013, AFOSI recruited 431 confidential informants targeted against criminal activities. Airmen of any rank, as well as non-military members, may participate in AFOSI’s informant program. AFOSI has no quotas for particular ranks, though enlisted Airmen provide the preponderance of assistance. With 

regard to the Air Force Academy, the Superintendent has initiated a comprehensive 

review of the employment of cadets as confidential informants. That review is nearly 

complete. [See page 43.] 

General WELSH. The Air Force and AFOSI does not specifically track or retain 

this information. An effort to create a process to assess this correlation would require the involvement of multiple personnel offices and databases. This would require the disclosure of law enforcement sensitive records and personally identifiable 

information restricted by the Privacy Act on former AFOSI confidential informants 

(release of names, dates of birth and social security numbers), including those who 

may still be serving honorably in the Air Force. [See page 43.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. FLEMING 

Secretary JAMES. The United States Military Entrance Processing Command 

(USMEPCOM) operates 65 Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) located 

throughout the United States. The MEPS in question is located on Gunter Annex 

of Maxwell AFB, AL. USMEPCOM is a joint service command under the direction 

of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy, who in 

turn reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 

(USD(P&R)). Although the MEPS is located on the Gunter Annex, it is a tenant organization and the Air Force has no operational authority over the organization. 

Maxwell Air Force Base and Gunter Annex are facilities closed to open public access. In order for any civilian to gain entry, sponsorship is required by either the 

base or the tenant. The individuals seeking access to the base need to (re) establish 

sponsorship for base access. 

Since at least 2008, USMEPCOM policy is that a Non-Federal-Entity, in this case 

the Gideons, may distribute literature to the MEPS, but cannot post members in 

the vicinity of the MEPS to preach, proselytize, or interrupt processing. Also, if 

MEPS allows any Non-Federal-Entity to distribute literature; the MEPS will allow 

all other religious groups to distribute their literature as well. A MEPS Commander 

has the authority to remove all literature if it becomes contentious, adversely impacts the mission, or threaten good order and discipline. 

Thus, based upon USMEPCON policy, the Gideons International may place Bibles 

in a location inside the MEPS as designated by the MEPS commander. The Gideons 

may no longer, however, post members in the MEPS to personally pass out the Bibles or provide spiritual guidance to the applicants. 

The following questions are intended to clarify any public misunderstanding concerning Bible distribution at the MEPS: 

Q. Does USMEPCOM have a policy concerning the ability of Gideons International to distribute Bibles at MEPS? 

A. The Commander, USMEPCOM published Policy Memorandum 11–2, Operation 

of Non-Federal Entity, on November 6, 2008. This policy was renewed on September 

25, 2013 (attached). This policy applies to all non-federal organizations seeking access to the MEPS, to include Gideons International and other groups, both religious 

and secular. Although each new MEPCOM commander endorses this policy, it has 

not changed since originally published in 2008. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 100.] 

Q. What is the policy concerning operation of non-federal entities in MEPS? 

A. Command Policy Memorandum 11–2 provides that a non-federal entity may, 

when authorized in writing by the MEPS commander, place secular or religious lit-
110 

erature in a location inside the MEPS as designated by the commander. The literature may not include any materials that create the impression that the government is sponsoring, endorsing or inhibiting religion generally, or favoring or 

disfavoring a particular religious group. 

Q. Are there any other limitations on the access of non-federal entities to MEPS? 

A. Yes. Command Policy Memorandum 11–2 also prohibits a non-federal entity, 

either religious or secular, from posting or stationing a member within the premises 

of any MEPS, including outdoor areas under the exclusive control of the MEPS, for 

the purpose of distributing literature. In addition, no member of any non-federal entity may proselytize, preach, provide spiritual counseling, solicit donations, or give 

briefings to applicants or other personnel at the MEPS. Similarly, representatives 

of non-federal entities may not perform any rites or ceremonies (e.g., invocations or 

benedictions) on MEPS premises without approval of the MEPS commander and a 

written legal review from the USMEPCOM Office of the Staff Judge Advocate. 

Q. How does Command Policy Memorandum 11–2 apply to the Gideons Bible distribution? 

A. Gideons International may place Bibles in a location inside the MEPS as designated by the MEPS commander. The Gideons may no longer; however, post members in the MEPS to personally pass out the Bibles or provide spiritual guidance 

to the applicants. 

Q. Is distribution of non-government related items regulated at the local level or 

at the DOD level? 

A. Command Policy Memorandum 11–2 is a USMEPCOM policy which applies to 

all USMEPCOM units and personnel, including all 65 MEPS. While all non-federal 

entities must be permitted equal access and opportunity to provide secular or religious literature in the MEPS, a MEPS commander does have the discretion to remove all literature should the presence of literature become contentious, adversely 

impact on mission, or threaten good order and discipline. Also, MEPS located on 

military installations must follow the installation policy on access of non-federal entities, even if it is more restrictive than the USMEPCOM policy. 

Q. Is USMEPCOM’s policy reflective of DOD policy? A. USMEPCOM’s policy was 

not modeled on any specific DOD policy. However, the policy was reviewed by and 

coordinated with the Office of the Department of Defense General Counsel, the Office of the Army General Counsel, and the United States Army Litigation Division. 

[Note: the Army is USMEPCOM’s Executive Agent and USMEPCOM’s legal staff 

is authorized to practice law for USMEPCOM by the Army Judge Advocate General.] 

Q. Has USMEPCOM always followed a similar policy regarding access of the Gideons and other religious groups in the MEPS? 

A. No. Since World War II, non-federal entities have been present in military entrance processing facilities, engaging applicants in a wide range of secular and nonsecular activities. 

Q. Why did USMEPCOM adopt its current policy? 

A. Over the past several years, USMEPCOM has received occasional complaints 

from applicants and family members who were offended by the presence of representatives from religious groups in the MEPS. In August 2007, the American Civil 

Liberties Union (ACLU) formally requested access to several MEPS to ‘‘observe the 

extent to which civilian organizations (religious and non-religious) are permitted to 

distribute literature and conduct briefings with military applicants.’’ In reviewing 

the ACLU’s request, it became evident that the lack of a clear written policy had 

in fact resulted in incidents where it appeared that some MEPS were endorsing or 

sponsoring Christianity in general or the Gideons International specifically. 

Q. Are the Gideons aware of USMEPCOM’s policy? 

A. Yes. A copy of the policy was sent to Gideons International Headquarters on 

December 2, 2008. In addition, the USMEPCOM Staff Judge Advocate had several 

telephonic conversations with Gideons International officials concerning the policy. 

Q. What is the role of the military chaplaincy in this issue? 

A. HQ USMEPCOM is located on Naval Station Great Lakes, and receives chaplain support from that installation. The MEPS, however, do not have assigned chaplains. Concurrent with publishing the policy concerning access of non-federal entities to MEPS, the Commander, USMEPCOM established an understanding with the 

Director, Religious Ministries, Navy Region Midwest, Great Lakes IL, to advise 

MEPS commanders concerning religious accommodations and practice, and to authorize and review applications for appointments of volunteer chaplains at the 

MEPS. [See page 35.] 

General WELSH. Mr. Todd Starnes stated in his article, ‘‘Bible Controversy Hits 

Air Force Base’’ (reported on FoxNews.com, March, 2014), that ‘‘tradition has come 

to an end after volunteers said they were told by the military that they would no 
111 

longer be allowed to personally distribute the pocket-sized Bibles to recruits.’’ In this 

particular article Mr. Starnes was factual; however, journalistic bias is clearly evident. 

The United States Military Entrance Processing Command (USMEPCOM) Public 

Affairs (PA) office provided background information relevant to the Gideon Bible 

complaint. According to PA, the Gideons were the only non-Federal Entity (NFE) 

that provided actual people to hand out anything, in this case Gideon Bibles, at the 

processing station on the Gunter Annex. In the past, they had been permitted to 

physically hand Bibles to those completing processing and discuss religion with anyone interested. However, a new Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy, Policy Memorandum 11–2, Operation of non-Federal Entities, dated 25 September 13, 

forbade any NFE from providing individuals to do so any longer. 

Apparently, this policy was not enforced immediately upon signing. However, with 

the recent arrival of a new commander, a review of the policy determined it was 

not being enforced as required. Thus, the discontinuation of Gideons being allowed 

to man the Military Entrance Processing Command Station (MEPCS) was implemented. 

Mr. Starnes referred to a MEPCS policy in his article, but he used the word ‘‘ouster’’ implying a prejudicial singling out of Gideans, creating an infringement on any 

trainee’s religious freedom. That is not fact. If there had been a dozen NFEs there, 

all would have been expected to adhere to this policy. In truth, the policy seeks uniformity and trainee access to all faiths equally and legally. Gideon Bibles remain 

freely available to any trainee desiring one. [See page 36.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER 

General WELSH. To date, the Air Force has spent approximately $815,335,999 on 

the A–10 Wing Replacement Program. The funding breaks down as follows: 

RDTE: $4,799,935 APAF: $750,536,064 O&M: $60,000,000* Total: $815,335,999 

* A–10 SPO estimates the average install cost at $800,000 per wing. New wings 

are most often installed as part of a larger depot requirement with an aggregated 

total cost. 75 wings have been installed, to date. [See page 48.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

General WELSH. The Air Force plans to save $4.3 billion across the Future Years 

Defense Plan by retiring the A–10. Current budget constraints forced difficult decisions regarding overall fighter force capacity and capability—simply put, in a fiscally restrained Air Force we cannot afford to retain a single-mission tactical aircraft with limited capabilities in an anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) environment. 

Our focus going into the Fiscal Year 2015 budget is on investing in capabilities the 

Air Force uniquely provides to the joint force and the Nation, such as global, long 

range, multi-role platforms capable of operating in highly contested environments 

against a determined, well-armed, and well-trained adversary. Consequently, the 

Air Force made the decision to prioritize new capability and readiness and accept 

near-term risk in capacity in order to ensure a more capable and ready force for 

2023 and beyond. 

While the A–10 is optimized for the close air support mission, these missions are 

also accomplished using multiple aircraft in our current inventory. In the event of 

an A–10 divestiture, the Air Force will organize, train and equip our remaining 

multi-role aircraft to minimize the impact to these missions. Once operational, the 

F–35 will be available to perform these missions across the range of military operations, while also providing additional capability in more challenging A2AD environments. The Air Force remains committed to providing these mission capabilities to 

the Joint Force. [See page 44.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ENYART 

General WELSH. Despite current fiscal constraints, the KC–46A remains one of 

the Air Force’s top acquisition priorities; therefore we expect deliveries will continue 

as planned. However, this schedule could be adversely impacted if sequestration and 

strict Budget Control Act funding caps are continued into Fiscal Year 2016 and beyond. 

Scott AFB will continue to be included in the enterprise of installations considered 

for basing the remaining 123 KC–46A tankers. The Air Force plans on making basing decisions three-years ahead of scheduled aircraft delivery dates. Likewise, we 
112 

anticipate that the criteria used for analyzing each installation will remain largely 

unchanged from what we used to select Main Operating Base #1 (McConnell AFB) 

and Main Operating Base #2 (Pease ANGB). Tanker units that are not selected to 

receive KC–46As will continue to perform their current missions. Installations not 

recapitalized with the KC–46A will likely be recapitalized with follow-on tankers, 

notionally called ‘‘KC–Y’’ and ‘‘KC–Z’’ (post 2028). [See page 38.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO 

General WELSH. The Fiscal Year 2015 President’s Budget (PB) proposes retiring 

47 C–130Hs and redistributing several aircraft and units in an effort to comply with 

the Budget Control Act’s fiscal limitations. Inherent in the PB is the Air Force Total 

Force Proposal (TFP) that directs a number of ‘‘moves’’ to include actions within the 

C–130 fleet to distribute aircraft across existing Air Force Reserve units. Training 

efficiencies are realized through the aircraft consolidation at Little Rock Air Force 

Base (AFB) and the ‘‘moves’’ contribute to the Total Force Integration (TFI) of AF’s 

C–130s. 

Analysis of manpower and financial savings for the transfer of the C–130J aircraft 

to Little Rock AFB indicates a savings of over 600 personnel and over $100M 

through the FYDP. Additional details and background data will be provided to your 

office in coming months. 

In summary, moving the C–130Js from Keesler AFB to Little Rock AFB is part 

of the AF’s effort to right-size the C–130 fleet. The FY15 PB reduces excess C–130 

capacity by adjusting the fleet from 358 to 328 by FY19, consistent with the findings 

of the Mobility Capability Assessment 2018 signed in May 2013. In addition, by 

moving the 10 C–130Js from Keesler AFB to Little Rock AFB, the AF ensures the 

nation possesses an integrated and balanced C–130 enterprise. [See page 52.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. NUGENT 

General WELSH. No. CHAMP was a successful Joint Concept Technology Demonstrator (JCTD) that accomplished its mission and is complete. The results from the 

JCTD tests are informing the Air Force’s way ahead with that type of weapon system. [See page 46.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE 

Secretary JAMES. No, our current position does not violate the current suspension 

of U.S. military-to-military cooperation with Russia. The suspension does not include contact related to the implementation of binding contracts. [See page 55.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 14, 2014 

(115) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON 

Mr. MCKEON. We’ve had many lessons learned from contracting actions during 

contingency operations and there is no doubt we will rely on contract support in future contingencies, be it humanitarian relief or full-spectrum combat operations. 

What are you doing to not only plan for contract support during a contingency, but 

to educate and train your personnel so they are prepared to develop requirements, 

and execute and oversee contracting actions in order to properly respond in a contingency. How are you incorporating lessons learned from contingency contracting in 

Iraq and Afghanistan into the professional military education of your military and 

civilian personnel? 

Secretary JAMES. The Air Force planning and logistical communities continue to 

develop new Air Force instructions and training for Contingency Planning Guidance 

and Formats and will integrate operational contract support ‘‘planning’’ policies into 

these documents and training forums. These instructions include the revision of AFI 

10–401, ‘‘Deployment Planning & Execution’’ and War and Mobilization Planning, 

Volume 1, and the implementation of AFI 13–103, ‘‘AFFOR Staff Operations Readiness and Structures.’’ Further, operational contract support has been integrated into 

the Contingency Wartime Planners Course. The Air Force contracting community is 

actively incorporating operational lessons learned in new contracting execution instructions, guidance, policy, and training in support of warfighter requirements. Additionally the Air Force personnel community curriculum has included operational 

contract support in the professional military education curriculum. Upon publication 

of the draft Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the Air Force will review and revise 

the appropriate guidance, policies, and training. 

Mr. MCKEON. We’ve had many lessons learned from contracting actions during 

contingency operations and there is no doubt we will rely on contract support in future contingencies, be it humanitarian relief or full-spectrum combat operations. 

What are you doing to not only plan for contract support during a contingency, but 

to educate and train your personnel so they are prepared to develop requirements, 

and execute and oversee contracting actions in order to properly respond in a contingency. How are you incorporating lessons learned from contingency contracting in 

Iraq and Afghanistan into the professional military education of your military and 

civilian personnel? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. After years of emphasizing the procurement of weapons and capabilities for counterinsurgency warfare, the Pentagon and the Air Force are shifting 

their emphasis toward funding programs capable of operating effectively in non-permissive, A2/AD environments. However, this leads me to conclude that the DOD 

should be moving to develop a balance of new manned and unmanned vehicles that 

are survivable in A2/AD environments, can operate over the vast distances of the 

Asia-Pacific region, and have the ability to perform strikes and other missions as 

well as serve as ISR sensors. General Welsh, are you comfortable with the Air 

Forces’ planned mix of manned and unmanned capabilities for operating in the A2/ 

AD environments of the future and are there other areas for investment that you 

think we should be considering in the decade ahead? 

General WELSH. We continue to work with our sister-Service partners to achieve 

a Joint portfolio of multi-mission platforms that can perform both strike and ISR 

missions in permissive and non-permissive environments. The Air Force has undertaken a robust development of classified capability in both the air and space portfolios to mitigate A2/AD threats. These types of resources are typically high cost and 

require long lead times for procurement/fielding. Given current fiscal constraints, we 

will have to accept potential risks in some of these areas. Any further discussion 

would result in a higher classification. 

Mr. FORBES. The quantity and quality of our munitions deserve far more attention 

than they normally receive. One witness testified at an earlier HASC hearing that 

‘‘The difference in a peer conflict will be that we won’t have the luxury of time to 
116 

spin up production lines, rush munitions, trade them between theaters, move them 

between ships, move them from ships to airbases and airbases to ships. We need 

to have in place in theater a wide range of munitions.’’ We also heard that it was 

‘‘imperative to invest in our more sophisticated range of munitions—JASSM; 

LRASM; the more sophisticated air-to-air and dual-role air-to-air, air-to-ground munitions that we see coming.’’ What is your assessment of the Air Force’s mix of conventional munitions and how do you believe this budget and the continuation of sequestration beyond 2016 will affect our munitions? 

General WELSH. The Air Force’s portfolio of conventional munitions remains a serious constraint to the Combatant Commanders in the near, mid and far term. Procurement quantities of preferred munitions, such as JASSM, Hellfire, and JDAM, 

have been adversely impacted by sequestration and will remain an area of concern. 

Additionally, procurement reductions in War Reserve Materiel and Test & Training 

Munitions (e.g., bomb bodies, fuzes, countermeasures) are affecting readiness requirements and placing combat capability at increased risk. Most troubling is the 

compounding effect of sequestration funding reductions, making it difficult to maintain an already limited industrial base shared by DOD and our Allies. In fact, our 

Allies often request munitions from our own stockpile due to the current limited industrial capacity. The difference between the President’s Budget Request and Budget Control Act funding levels is significant and the resource constraints are driving 

tough decisions across the munitions portfolio. Continued funding at sequestered 

levels across the FYDP will serve to further diminish an already degraded conventional munitions posture and subsequently increase readiness risk. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. One of the most consistent themes we have heard in the committee’s posture hearings, especially this year, has been the demand for ISR. Can you 

elaborate on the demand signal you are seeing from combatant commanders, the 

types of ISR they are asking for, and roughly what proportion of the needs you have 

been able to fulfill? Given this demand signal, why has the Air Force requested 

elimination of an entire fleet of ISR platforms in each of the last few budgets? 

Secretary JAMES. The demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

(ISR) far exceeds the number of platforms the Air Force and our joint partners can 

provide. The combatant commanders require a wide range of ISR to support their 

needs. The Air Force has been operating its ISR fleet at surge capacity for a number 

of years delivering high fidelity imagery, full motion video, signals intelligence, 

multi-spectral imagery, and others. 

A reduced budget forces difficult decisions and if we could afford to keep all our 

platforms, we would. The Air Force is balancing capability across the range of military operations with limited resources. As we rebalance the ISR portfolio, we do our 

best to maintain our ability to conduct ISR operations in support of the combatant 

commanders. The key to maintaining the ability to operate in both permissive and 

contested environments is finding the appropriate mix of manned and unmanned 

platforms with the requisite capabilities. To achieve this optimal mix, in a budget 

constrained environment, we must rebalance the Air Force ISR portfolio by divesting some platforms and, where possible, reinvesting the savings in other areas of 

the ISR portfolio. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. In General Alexander’s testimony earlier this week in his 

CYBERCOM capacity, he spoke of concerns about the various personnel authorities 

at play for cyber professionals, and the problems associated with creating equitable 

pay and promotion opportunities among those personnel buckets. Is this a concern 

that is on your radar as well, or are you comfortable with your ability to attract 

and retain cyber professionals within the Air Force? 

Secretary JAMES. Yes, we too are concerned with creating equitable pay and promotion opportunities for cyberspace professionals, but we are confident we are taking necessary steps to ensure we recruit, train, retain, and promote cyberspace professionals. The current Total Force Cyberspace Workforce is ∼43,000 comprised of 

officer, enlisted, and civilian authorizations in cyberspace operations and related career fields. The most significant increase in authorizations focuses on new mission 

requirements from USCYBERCOM supporting the Cyber Mission Force (CMF). 

While most career fields are at or near 100% manned across the Total Force, there 

are shortages among the different skill levels within enlisted specialties and within 

some year groups of officers. 

We are short in two enlisted specialties—Cyber Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Cyber Defense Operators—and are using existing force management tools to recruit and retain these specialties. For the highly specialized 
117 

Cyber ISR airmen, we address this early on with an initial enlistment bonus, 6-year 

enlistment for maximum return on training and eligibility for the maximum selective reenlistment bonus the Air Force can offer. Our recruiting numbers as a result 

of CMF teams have grown beyond the upper bound to reach stated requirements 

by the end of FY16. For highly specialized Cyber Defense Operators we select currently serving members who have the appropriate skills and require a 3-year service 

commitment after training is complete. These airmen also earn a sizable selective 

reenlistment bonus. Our ability to meet Cyber Mission Forcer requirements for 

Cyber Defense Operators is currently limited as demand for these Airmen exceeds 

production capacity at our school house. We are executing our plan to increase 

Cyber Defense Operator production by building additional classified classrooms and 

training additional instructors. Additional production will begin in March 2015. Promotion opportunity challenges are not unique to the Cyber community; thus, airmen 

serving in cyber-related specialties have an equal, if not better chance of being promoted through self-study and good job performance. Overall, the Cyber Defense Operator career field promotion rates are at 32%, as compared to the Air Force average 

of 16%. 

Competition for cyberspace talent exists in all quadrants of the corporate, government and military spheres. The Air Force competes with our Sister Services, the 

NSA, FBI, CIA, Google, Microsoft, Adobe, Electronic Arts, Apple, etc. for cyberspace 

talent. Although the Air Force cannot compete with the pay corporate America offers, we, the Services, provide unique opportunities attractive to today’s cyberspace 

talent. We continue to explore options in the current civilian pay system to provide 

compensation commensurate with corporate America. We look to other government 

agencies (FDIC, SEC) that have abandoned the traditional civilian pay system and 

created their own to adopt incentives that would help us attract and retain cyberspace civilian talent. 

The sudden growth in demand levied on all Services based on increased dependence on cyberspace and emerging threat profiles requires cooperation and innovative 

approaches to capitalizing on expertise across the Total Force. Proper balance across 

the Total Force will ensure sustained ability to meet current and future mission requirements. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As we draw out of Afghanistan, we will no longer have, in most 

cases, the luxury of permissive aerial environments that enable staring, persistent 

ISR platforms. We will be changing not just a linear relationship between collection 

and analysis, but also the habits of a generation of airmen that haven’t in many 

cases been able to acquire the depth of experience in multi-source, integrative intelligence analysis that the future will demand. This is especially true in complex intelligence challenges such as counter-proliferation, even more so when you consider 

the likelihood of the reduction or disappearance of traditional proliferation signatures. Can you elaborate on how you will posture and train your airmen to be able 

to tackle these challenges? 

General WELSH. While many Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 

Airmen today have not had access or tasking to analyze a highly technical adversary with advanced air or air-defense capabilities, they have had 14 years of successfully analyzing dynamic counter-terror targets. This focus, along with a high deployment dwell in permissive environments, has degraded competence for air component missions and denied environments. While Air Force ISR leaders believe internal analytic capabilities will continue to meet operational requirements and intelligence needs across the Range of Military Operations, they believe Air Force-wide 

analysis needs to be improved, and assess an overall decline in this core competency. Investing in our ISR analysis personnel, integrating Intelligence Community information architectures to leverage ‘‘Big Data’’ analysis, and designing analysis tools will be our focus areas for the next several years. Efforts such as the recently released Air Force ISR Strategic Vision (Sept 13) are critical in posturing the 

analysis issue to become a more prominent keystone for the future. With this renewed emphasis on analysis, Air Force ISR began several critical revisions to entrylevel training for ISR officers and enlisted, and is pursuing initial skills/advanced 

analysis courses that integrate Intelligence Community standards. With the successful integration of analysis into entry-level courses, implementation of the advanced 

skills course is gaining traction. As analysis is a core competency enhancing collection, targeting, and operations integration, we will continue to emphasize the development of this capability at all levels. A culture of collaboration across the IC and 

proper analytic instruction over time will lead to an environment where fusion can 

further flourish against a wide variety of problem sets, to include counter-proliferation. We are starting to see the fruits of these changes, and are confident we are 

headed in the right direction. 
118 

Mr. LANGEVIN. In addition to continued concerns shared by many on this committee with regard to the increasing cost of space launch services, I note several 

changes to the shape and scope of the procurement plan for launch vehicles. In particular, in FY15, I note that 4 of the 5 programmed opportunities for competitive 

procurement have disappeared, and through FY17 the number of competitive 

launches has declined by fully half. While I am certainly cognizant of the difficulties 

in creating an apples-to-apples comparison of the programs in question and the need 

for continued efforts to make that possible, can you speak to these decisions and 

the reasoning behind them, particularly given ASD Kendall’s directive to, quote, 

‘‘aggressively introduce a competitive procurement environment in the EELV program’’? 

General WELSH. While the Air Force originally planned for up to 14 competitive 

launches in FY2015–2017, five GPS–III satellite missions (GPS III 7/8/9/10/11) were 

re-phased due to our revised forecasted operational need. These five missions have 

been delayed to 2018–2023 and remain available for competition. This was the result of careful sustainment of our on-orbit satellites, allowing us to project additional satellite lifetime without increased risk to the satellite constellations. This results in almost $400M less required for space launch over the FYDP. 

The AFSPC–8 mission was reallocated due to mission requirements. This satellite 

carries a mass uncertainty that exceeds projected Falcon 9 v1.1 launch capability. 

Per the CRADA signed between SpaceX and the Air Force, SpaceX is not pursuing 

certification to this orbit. 

The Air Force continually reassesses constellation health for all its on-orbit assets 

and updates programming accordingly. This process was codified in a memo signed 

by AFSPC Commander August 6, 2012, titled ‘‘Programmatic EELV Launch Forecast’’ which stated, ‘‘Through subsequent POM cycles, AFSPC will annually reassess 

and adjust planned procurements as operational requirements, SV development/production and fiscal realities dictate.’’ 

It is important to note the 36 cores have not ‘‘been assigned to missions.’’ Under 

this contract, the Air Force orders launch vehicle configurations that can support 

multiple missions to enable mission assignment as late as 12 months prior to 

launch. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Can you update us on your progress in reducing the number of 

network enclaves to a more defensible figure on the Air Force network? 

General WELSH. The Air Force is in the final stages of its move to a true Air 

Force-wide Enterprise, centralizing network control under a single organizational 

structure and providing enterprise level security. The Air Force has made progress 

towards this goal through a number of initiatives including the Air Force Network 

(AFNET) Migration efforts; continued migration of NIPRNET and SIPRNET email 

accounts to Defense Enterprise Email (DEE); and the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative (FDCCI). Specifically: 

• In April 2014, the Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) declared completion of 

the AFNET Migration efforts. This initiative migrated over 644,000 Active duty 

and reserve user accounts, 10,905 servers and 275 sites from multiple Air Force 

Major Commands, Field Operating Agencies, and Direct Reporting Unit networks into a single Air Force enclave. AFNET Migration has reduced network 

complexity making it easier to standardize and secure the network. 

• DEE, the first enterprise service under the Joint Information Environment 

(JIE) construct, is a joint enterprise email solution provided by the Defense Information Systems Agency. DEE provides secure, cloud-based email for the 

DOD enterprise, increases operational efficiency, and facilitates collaboration 

across organizational boundaries. Specific DEE accomplishments include the following: 

• Air Force completed DEE NIPRNET migration for the National Capital Region in Jan 2014 

• Air Force is in the process of migrating SIPRNET accounts to DEE 

NIPRNET DEE migrations Outside of the Continental United States 

(OCONUS) are scheduled to begin in late FY14; the remainder of the CONUS 

NIRPNET migrations will begin in FY15. 

• FDCCI is the reduction of Air Force data centers through consolidation efforts. 

FDCCI exploits Joint consolidation opportunities to reduce infrastructure footprint, accelerate movement to the JIE end-state, and ensure integrated capabilities. As of June 2014, the status of Air Force Data Center closures is as follows: 
119 

Reducing the points of presence and consolidating the infrastructure have effectively reduced network attack surfaces. Joint Regional Security Stacks (JRSS) and 

additional DOD JIE initiatives combine to make the Air Force enterprise more defensible. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO 

Mr. LOBIONDO. The EELV program has long faced scrutiny on the lack of transparency when it comes to the costs its sole-source provider charges the Government. 

To this point, the GAO recently issued a report stating that the DOD ‘‘cannot determine an accurate price for a ULA launch.’’ The report’s primary author, Christina 

Chaplain, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing at the GAO, further stated at a Senate Defense Appropriations hearing recently that, even with significant efforts to 

improve insight, the Government still cannot link costs to specific missions, which 

comprise about 70 percent of the funds in the cost-plus ‘‘launch capability’’ line item. 

How does the Air Force explain this? Wouldn’t competition offer lower costs and result in fair and reasonable pricing—versus a sole source environment where, despite 

every effort, costs and pricing still cannot be fully determined? 

Secretary JAMES. United Launch Alliance (ULA) launch services have been procured under various contract terms and acquisition strategies over the life of the 

program. As such, the per launch cost basis of a ULA launch has varied over time 

and has been subject to cost factors, such as the variants in the Atlas and Delta 

families, vehicle configuration, mission-specific integration required, launch location, 

and the number of the same/similar payloads previously flown. The liquid engine 

and solid motor prices were also severely impacted by at the end of the shuttle era 

because of the reduction in business base for those suppliers. Further, EELV launch 

capability includes costs that cover launch operations, mission integration, production factory/subcontract support engineering and launch infrastructure. Launch capability provides operational flexibility and ability to launch the full range of EELV 

operational requirements. Due to this fact, the launch capability costs are not necessarily dependent on number of launches in a particular year and may support 

launch services procured under a previous contract as well as current contracts. 

The Air Force is committed to competition within the EELV program. We are aggressively taking steps to support competition while ensuring our responsibility to 

deploy National Security Space payloads into their orbits safely and with acceptable 

risk. We will compete portions of the launch manifest each year in 2015, 2016, and 

2017 if there is even one New Entrant ready to compete; i.e., they have successful 

launches and have completed the required certification steps. We are working early 

with declared New Entrants to certify their systems as ready as evidenced by our 

Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with SpaceX and we 

have added government team resources to assure timely review of certification products, data and other supporting information throughout the certification process. 

Additionally, on 15 July 2014, the Air Force released a Request for Proposal (RFP) 

to industry for the competitive procurement of a National Security Space (NSS) mission to be launched in 2016. This is the first EELV competitive action in over a decade, and a significant milestone in the Air Force’s efforts to bring competition into 

the EELV program, consistent with Under Secretary of Defense Frank Kendall’s direction to ‘‘aggressively introduce a competitive procurement environment.’’ Competition among certified launch providers will encourage innovation and continued 

cost savings, while ensuring the Air Force will continue its focus on mission success. 

The Air Force looks forward to awarding this contract to a qualified offeror, thus 

maximizing the efficiencies of Space Launch while working to retain strict adherence to quality and mission assurance standards. The Air Force has also requested 

a reprogramming action through the FY14 Omnibus Reprogramming Request to add 

an additional near-term competitive launch. 
120 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Our national security strategy is now centered on what has been 

called the pivot to Asia. Given the importance of this region to U.S. interests I 

would think we would want to maintain the best possible intelligence collection capabilities in the theater. The FY2015 budget proposes to begin retiring the U–2 high 

altitude intelligence and reconnaissance aircraft and relying on other platforms to 

fulfill that mission. 

When the U–2 goes out of service will we still be able to fulfill all of the high 

altitude intelligence collection requirements we have in the Pacific? Will we be able 

to continue monitoring activities in North Korea without regard to weather conditions as we can now with the U–2? Will other assets provide the same sort of flexibility to react in a crisis and the same capabilities as the U–2? 

Secretary JAMES. The requirement for high altitude intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) capability is defined by the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council; per the classified definition of conventional wartime high altitude ISR 

needs, either the U–2 or RQ–4 can meet the requirements for Combat Air Patrols, 

with a narrow classified exception for the RQ–4. PACOM will receive less total ISR 

support than they do today, but still meet the validated requirement. Specific capability questions will be answered by the high altitude intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance briefing that will be provided by the Department of Defense (DOD) 

as directed by the Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act. 

The decision on the U–2 vs. the RQ–4 is based on the fact that over time we believe strongly that the RQ–4 will be more cost effective as we go forward the next 

25–30 years. 

The Fiscal Year 2015 President’s Budget request contains funding to modernize 

the RQ–4 Block 30 which provides targeted investments for improved operational 

reliability including improved adverse weather performance, compliance issues, key 

technical ‘‘refreshes,’’ and improvements to mission effectiveness including the migration of U–2 sensor capabilities. At sequestration levels, migration of the U–2 sensors becomes unaffordable. There will not be a one-for-one transition of U–2 capabilities to another platform but the reduction in any U–2 capabilities will be addressed across the whole of the DOD portfolio as well as accepting increased risk 

in certain areas. 

If the Air Force could afford to keep both the RQ–4 and the U–2, we would. However, that is not a viable option in the current budget environment. The Joint Staff 

and Air Force continue to assess the joint ISR portfolio to reach the optimal balance 

of resources in a fiscally constrained environment. With the remaining resources 

available to Joint Staff to respond to global events, the DOD remains flexible and 

prepared. We remain committed to maturing the RQ–4, space-based resources, and 

other ISR assets to assume the coverage that the U–2 previously provided. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. We know that the Chinese have been developing anti-satellite 

technologies intended to counter our superiority in space. Platforms intended to replace the U–2 rely on satellite links both for guidance and for command and control. 

In a scenario where our space assets may be degraded will other platforms be able 

to provide the same critical intelligence support we now get from the U–2? 

Secretary JAMES. Degradation of space support is a top concern of the Air Force. 

The Air Force, in conjunction with our Joint partners, will continue to utilize a wellplanned combination of airborne, seaborne, terrestrial, and space assets that will deliver the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance required for national decision-makers and warfighting commanders. Additional details can be provided at a 

higher classification if desired. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 prohibits the Air Force from retiring the U–2 Surveillance Aircraft until the ‘‘Secretary 

of Defense certifies to Congress that the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities provided by the U–2 aircraft no longer contribute to mitigating 

any gaps in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities identified in 

the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.’’ 

If the FY15 budget submission effectively retires or begins the process to retire 

the U–2, have the conditions of the FY07 NDAA been met? More importantly, will 

the retirement of the U–2 result in ISR gaps in support to the warfighter? 

Secretary JAMES. The Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, to provide a high altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities briefing to Congress. The classified briefing will address the 

Department’s mitigation plans to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability gaps across the whole of the DOD portfolio as well as accepting increased 

risk in certain areas. It is the Air Force’s opinion that satisfaction of the 2014 

NDAA also satisfies the 2007 NDAA. 
121 

Mr. LOBIONDO. I understand the Global Hawk will be sustained in the FY15 

budget request while the U–2 will be retired despite its continued high operations 

tempo and past support from the Air Force. 

Would you please elaborate on the rationale to retire the U–2 and whether we 

will lose any capability from this proposed action? Once this action is taken, will 

the Global Hawk be able to assume all the missions that the U–2 addresses today? 

Secretary JAMES. Both the U–2 and the RQ–4 are retained at current capacity levels through FY15 as submitted in the FY15 President’s Budget Request. The Air 

Force cannot afford to keep both the RQ–4 and the U–2 in the current budget environment. The lower operating cost of the RQ–4 Block 30, enabled by its greater endurance, became the primary consideration in the decision to retire the U–2. The 

Joint Requirements Oversights Council determined either the U–2 or the RQ–4 can 

meet the force structure requirement. As directed by the Fiscal Year 2014 National 

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Secretary of Defense will provide the high 

altitude Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) report that addresses 

mitigation plans for capability gaps. While there is not a one-for-one transition of 

U–2 capabilities to another platform, the mitigation plans address capabilities 

across the whole of the DOD portfolio as well as accepting increased risk in certain 

areas. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. If the Global Hawk is not currently capable of fulfilling the requirements leveed on the U–2, is there a plan that can bring it up to capability? 

How long will it take and how much will it cost? Once we make that investment 

will the Global have all of the capabilities of the U–2? Does that cost include upgrading he Global Hawk’s communications architecture to allow it disseminate to 

greater quantity and higher quality of imagery produced by the SYERS–2 camera? 

Does that cost include upgrading he Global Hawk’s ground process capability to 

allow for the full exploitation of the sensors that will need to migrate from the U– 

2 to the Global Hawk? Does that investment include the costs of providing a defensive suite to the Global Hawk that is comparable to the U–2? Does that cost include 

a de-icing capability that will allow the Global Hawk to fly in adverse weather conditions? Did any of the Combatant Commanders have input into the decision to retire the U–2s or offer their views? If so, what was their recommendation? If the U– 

2 is retired will we have any high-altitude surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft 

that can operate in an environment where satellite support, either communications 

or GPS, is denied through jamming or other means? If the decision to retire the U– 

2 was, as has been described, based on reduced cost-per-flying hour estimates for 

the Global Hawk, have there been efforts to reduce the cost-per-flying hour of the 

more capable U–2? Are there changes that could be made to the depot maintenance 

schedule for the U–2 that would reduce its costs? Isn’t there an effort to certify a 

new, less costly fuel for the U–2 that would also reduce its operating costs? 

Secretary JAMES. The Fiscal Year 2015 President’s Budget (PB) request invests 

$2.23B to modernize the RQ–4 Block 30 over the next ten years. These investments 

are intended to improve viability, reliability and sensor capability, to include migration of the U–2 sensor capabilities. The initial plan for U–2 sensor migration 

projects an initial operational capability being fielded in Fiscal Year 2019. The sensor transition program is estimated at less than $500M over the next 10 years. 

The RQ–4 is currently capable of utilizing the same high bandwidth communications systems used by the U–2 flying the SYERS–2 camera. The Air Force continues 

to integrate and exploit intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance weapons system sensors within AF Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) processing, exploitations, and dissemination (PED) operations. RQ–4 platform modifications to 

support dissemination and exploitation of sensor data are included in the FY15 PB 

through sensor enhancements. 

While the U–2’s defensive system allows the platform to survive in some contested 

environments, neither platform allows the Department of Defense to meet its longterm ISR strategy for operating in a contested environment; therefore no investment 

is planned to integrate a defensive system into the RQ–4. 

The FY15 PB funds improvements to RQ–4 Block 30 such as weather radar, ice 

shape testing, and engine upgrade investments with the intent to provide better 

weather tolerance for the airframe. An operational reliability study has not been accomplished to quantify the level of improvement based upon planned upgrades. 

Combatant Commanders were consulted during the Department’s program budget 

review process. As General Welsh noted in previous HAC–D testimony in March 

2014, ‘‘ISR constitutes the No. 1 shortfall of the Combatant Commanders year after 

year and they (Combatant Commanders) would never support even more cuts than 

we already have in our budget proposal.’’ However, the specific views and recommendations by each Combatant Command are held with OSD. 
122 

The Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act directs the Secretary of 

Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide 

a high altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance report to Congress. 

The classified report will address Air Force ISR operations in contested environments. The lower operating cost of the RQ–4 Global Hawk, as seen in the reduction 

to the cost per flight hour (CPFH), and its greater endurance became the primary 

rationale for retaining the RQ–4. Although upgrades to the Block 30 will cost more 

in the near-term versus keeping the U–2, the potential long-term cost savings provided a rational basis to retain the RQ–4. The Air Force continues to look for new 

and innovative ways to reduce costs for all programs. The U–2 program is pursuing 

cost reduction efforts by leveraging program efficiencies and smarter acquisition 

strategies to include efficient depot maintenance scheduling, fuel conversions, Contract Logistics Support (CLS) contract modifications, and sensor improvements. 

Both the U–2 and the RQ–4 are retained at current capacity levels through FY15 

as submitted in the FY15 PB. The Air Force cannot retain duplicative capability in 

the current budget environment. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. The EELV program has long faced scrutiny on the lack of transparency when it comes to the costs its sole-source provider charges the Government. 

To this point, the GAO recently issued a report stating that the DOD ‘‘cannot determine an accurate price for a ULA launch.’’ The report’s primary author, Christina 

Chaplain, Director of Acquisition and Sourcing at the GAO, further stated at a Senate Defense Appropriations hearing recently that, even with significant efforts to 

improve insight, the Government still cannot link costs to specific missions, which 

comprise about 70 percent of the funds in the cost-plus ‘‘launch capability’’ line item. 

How does the Air Force explain this? Wouldn’t competition offer lower costs and result in fair and reasonable pricing—versus a sole source environment where, despite 

every effort, costs and pricing still cannot be fully determined? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Our national security strategy is now centered on what has been 

called the pivot to Asia. Given the importance of this region to U.S. interests I 

would think we would want to maintain the best possible intelligence collection capabilities in the theater. The FY2015 budget proposes to begin retiring the U–2 high 

altitude intelligence and reconnaissance aircraft and relying on other platforms to 

fulfill that mission. 

When the U–2 goes out of service will we still be able to fulfill all of the high 

altitude intelligence collection requirements we have in the Pacific? Will we be able 

to continue monitoring activities in North Korea without regard to weather conditions as we can now with the U–2? Will other assets provide the same sort of flexibility to react in a crisis and the same capabilities as the U–2? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LOBIONDO. We know that the Chinese have been developing anti-satellite 

technologies intended to counter our superiority in space. Platforms intended to replace the U–2 rely on satellite links both for guidance and for command and control. 

In a scenario where our space assets may be degraded will other platforms be able 

to provide the same critical intelligence support we now get from the U–2? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LOBIONDO. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 prohibits the Air Force from retiring the U–2 Surveillance Aircraft until the ‘‘Secretary 

of Defense certifies to Congress that the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities provided by the U–2 aircraft no longer contribute to mitigating 

any gaps in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities identified in 

the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.’’ 

If the FY15 budget submission effectively retires or begins the process to retire 

the U–2, have the conditions of the FY07 NDAA been met? More importantly, will 

the retirement of the U–2 result in ISR gaps in support to the warfighter? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LOBIONDO. I understand the Global Hawk will be sustained in the FY15 

budget request while the U–2 will be retired despite its continued high operations 

tempo and past support from the Air Force. 

Would you please elaborate on the rationale to retire the U–2 and whether we 

will lose any capability from this proposed action? Once this action is taken, will 

the Global Hawk be able to assume all the missions that the U–2 addresses today? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LOBIONDO. If the Global Hawk is not currently capable of fulfilling the requirements leveed on the U–2, is there a plan that can bring it up to capability? 

How long will it take and how much will it cost? Once we make that investment 

will the Global have all of the capabilities of the U–2? Does that cost include upgrading he Global Hawk’s communications architecture to allow it disseminate to 
123 

greater quantity and higher quality of imagery produced by the SYERS–2 camera? 

Does that cost include upgrading he Global Hawk’s ground process capability to 

allow for the full exploitation of the sensors that will need to migrate from the U– 

2 to the Global Hawk? Does that investment include the costs of providing a defensive suite to the Global Hawk that is comparable to the U–2? Does that cost include 

a de-icing capability that will allow the Global Hawk to fly in adverse weather conditions? Did any of the Combatant Commanders have input into the decision to retire the U–2s or offer their views? If so, what was their recommendation? If the U– 

2 is retired will we have any high-altitude surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft 

that can operate in an environment where satellite support, either communications 

or GPS, is denied through jamming or other means? If the decision to retire the U– 

2 was, as has been described, based on reduced cost-per-flying hour estimates for 

the Global Hawk, have there been efforts to reduce the cost-per-flying hour of the 

more capable U–2? Are there changes that could be made to the depot maintenance 

schedule for the U–2 that would reduce its costs? Isn’t there an effort to certify a 

new, less costly fuel for the U–2 that would also reduce its operating costs? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

Mr. BISHOP. Do you anticipate reducing the Minuteman III ICBM fleet of 450 missiles in FY15? 

Secretary JAMES. The Air Force will maintain a total of 450 operational Minuteman III ICBMs in deployed and non-deployed configurations. In order to meet the 

New START Treaty-compliant force structure announced by the Department of Defense in April 2014, the Air Force will transition 50 Minuteman III launch facilities 

from an operational deployed to an operational non-deployed status. This transition 

will be accomplished by placing 50 ICBM launchers into a non-deployed status by 

removing ICBMs from 50 silos across the force. The Air Force intends to begin this 

transition in Fiscal Year 2015. 

Mr. BISHOP. Do you anticipate placing any of the land-based Minuteman III silos 

into ‘‘warm’’ status during FY15? 

Secretary JAMES. Yes. In order to meet the New START Treaty-compliant force 

structure announced by the Department of Defense in April 2014, the Air Force will 

transition 50 deployed Minuteman III silos to an operational non-deployed (‘‘warm’’) 

status by removing their ICBMs. The Air Force will spread these 50 non-deployed 

launch facilities across the ICBM force. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Mr. ROGERS. In my role as the subcommittee Chairman on Strategic Forces, I’ve 

come to fully appreciate the significant advantage our space capabilities bring to our 

warfighters. Would you say that adversaries have also recognized this advantage, 

and if so, are there countries that have weaponized or are in the process of 

weaponizing space with systems that threaten our capabilities? 

General WELSH. Yes, many countries, to include potential adversaries, recognize 

the strategic advantage the space domain provides in military operations and are 

currently fielding military satellites. Additionally, some countries have introduced 

a variety of counter-space capabilities such as testing ground-based anti-satellite 

systems. NASIC would welcome the opportunity to have an in-depth conversation 

on this issue with Chairman Rogers at the classified level if interested. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are we committed to defending ourselves and our allies and making 

sure our adversaries know the consequences of attacking us in space? 

General WELSH. The Air Force understands the vital nature of our nation’s space 

capabilities and is committed to assuring those capabilities. Consistent with National Space Policy, the Air Force is addressing how best to defend and improve the 

resilience of its critical space capabilities as threats emerge in the space domain. 

In 2013, the Air Force published an update to its Air Force Space Policy. It implements the 2010 National Space Policy, the 2011 National Security Space Strategy, 

and the 2012 Department of Defense Space Policy. The policy recognizes that Air 

Force space capabilities are vital for the Department of Defense and the Air Force, 

as well as other U.S. government agencies, non-governmental and commercial users, 

civilians, and international partners. One of the principle goals in the policy is to 

protect space capabilities. The Air Force is committed to promoting the peaceful use 

of space, enhancing spaceflight safety and preserving the usability of the space domain. Per stated policy, the Air Force will: 
124 

—Contribute to protection of U.S. space capabilities with a multi-layered approach 

to determine purposeful interference and attacks on U.S. and allied space systems 

—Build military to military relationships to enhance collective security 

—Deny adversaries the benefits of aggression by enhancing the ability of the Air 

Force space capabilities to avoid, withstand, and recover from interference and attacks 

—Ensure Air Force air, cyberspace, and space forces can operate effectively when 

U.S. space-derived capabilities have been degraded 

—Maintain capabilities to rapidly detect, warn, and confidently attribute natural 

and man-made disturbances to U.S. space systems 

—Maintain a full scope of Air Force capabilities, not limited to space, to respond 

to an attack on U.S. or allied space systems. 

Mr. ROGERS. Have we answered all the policy questions and made all the policy 

decisions to ensure the timely and effective defense of our national security space 

systems? 

General WELSH. U.S. and DOD policy is clear regarding the defense of our national security space systems. Specifically, the Secretary of Defense and the Director 

of National Intelligence are responsible for ensuring cost-effective survivability of 

space capabilities commensurate with their planned use, consequences of lost or degraded capability, the threat, and the availability of other means to accomplish the 

mission. The Air Force is working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, other 

Services, the Joint Staff and the Intelligence Community to assess the second-order 

policy implications associated with written National and DOD Policy while addressing mission assurance needs and capability gaps across the Air Force’s space mission portfolio as threats in the space domain grow. In 2013, the Air Force published 

an update to its Air Force Space Policy. The policy recognizes that Air Force space 

capabilities are vital for the Department of Defense and the Air Force, as well as 

other U.S. government agencies, non-governmental and commercial users, civilians, 

and international partners. One of the principle goals in the policy is to protect 

space capabilities. The Air Force is committed to promoting the peaceful use of 

space, enhancing spaceflight safety and preserving the usability of the space domain. Per stated policy, the Air Force will: 

—Contribute to protection of U.S. space capabilities with a multi-layered approach 

to determine purposeful interference and attacks on U.S. and allied space systems 

—Build military to military relationships to enhance collective security 

—Deny adversaries the benefits of aggression by enhancing the ability of the Air 

Force space capabilities to avoid, withstand, and recover from interference and attacks 

—Ensure Air Force air, cyberspace, and space forces can operate effectively when 

U.S. space-derived capabilities have been degraded 

—Maintain capabilities to rapidly detect, warn, and confidently attribute natural 

and man-made disturbances to U.S. space systems 

—Maintain a full scope of Air Force capabilities, not limited to space, to respond 

to an attack on U.S. or allied space systems. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. Secretary James, the Air Force currently relies on the Russian RD– 

180 engine for the majority of its launches. Why do you continue to purchase engines from Russia when the United States already has significant and active domestic propulsion capabilities? Does the United States or its incumbent launch provider 

have requisite licensing approvals from the Russian Federation to manufacture the 

RD–180 domestically? If so, how much would this cost? 

Secretary JAMES. The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program was 

originally developed as a commercial program and the Government does not own the 

design of the launch vehicles. Foreign-sourced engines were allowed. The Russianmade RD–180 engine was proposed by Lockheed Martin for Atlas V as part of the 

1998 EELV competition. The use of the RD–180 was approved by the U.S. Government. The original 1998 plan was to co-produce the RD–180 in the U.S. to comply 

with policy regarding the use of Former Soviet Union (FSU) produced propulsion 

systems. An extension to the policy was granted in 2002 by USD(AT&L) until 2008. 

In September 2007, the USD(AT&L) approved the Air Force plan to eliminate the 

requirement to co-produce the RD–180 in the United States. One of the reasons this 

requirement was eliminated was the availability of the Delta IV family, powered by 

U.S. developed and produced engines, as well as the stockpile of RD–180 engines. 
125 

United Launch Alliance (ULA), acting through Pratt & Whitney and RD Amross, 

has a license until 2022 to produce RD–180 engines in the U.S. and is in discussions 

with NPO Energomash to increase the license period through 2030. 

The Air Force is reviewing the results of a recently completed RD–180 Availability 

Risk Mitigation Study, which has also become known as the ‘‘Mitchell Study.’’ The 

study identified both a domestically produced RD–180 and an entirely new engine 

as potential mitigation options. The Department is evaluating these and other approaches to mitigating reliance on Russian space technology and has made no decisions at this point. Therefore, preliminary rough orders of magnitude have been internally drafted and reflect the stand-up of a full EELV new engine program being 

developed between five and eight years, and costing roughly $1.8B to $2.0B respectively (does not include any LV costs). 

A domestic RD–180 co-production would afford minimal cost and schedule savings 

over a new clean-sheet engine design. Minimal cost/schedule savings is based on the 

lack of an existing U.S. technology base for RD–180-like technology. Co-production 

would require some level of RD–180 critical component technology demonstration 

prior to committing to full-scale production. Important tradeoffs to consider between 

a co-produced RD–180 and a new domestic engine are: 1) less design flexibility in 

reducing engine life cycle cost due to the high performance nature of the RD–180, 

2) potential RD–180 end use restrictions, which may limit the type of future DOD 

missions the RD–180 can support, and 3) the lack of U.S intellectual property rights 

as related to potential RD–180 future technology upgrades (NPO Energomash could 

stipulate that their technical oversight is required) and may have ITAR ramifications as well. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) connects disparate voice and datalink networks to enhance situational awareness. As you know, 

in 2009 BACN was fielded to solve a Joint Urgent Operational Need for increased 

communications capabilities, including voice and data bridges across already fielded 

platforms. Since then, BACN systems have flown over 5,300 missions and over 

58,600 combat hours while maintaining a 98% mission reliability rate. In the Committee Report for the FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, this Committee 

urged the Air Force to transition BACN to a traditional program of record in fiscal 

year 2015. However, I understand that the Air Force plans to continue to fund 

BACN primarily through the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account for 

the foreseeable future. As we wind down OCO funding it is vital that we don’t lose 

the critical capabilities that BACN provides. Consequently, it is important to ensure 

that BACN transitions to a program of record to stabilize funding and ensure that 

BACN is leveraged to meet both current and future needs in several theaters, including the Asia-Pacific, where BACN could provide critical connectivity over an extended operational area, up to and including the Anti-Access/Area-Denial territories 

of potential near-peer adversaries. 

How does the Air Force plan to continue to leveraging the communications capabilities and situational awareness provided by BACN and when does the Air Force 

plan to transition BACN to a traditional program of record? 

Secretary JAMES. The BACN capability remains a requirement for a high-altitude 

communications gateway. In addition, the capability and flexibility of BACN make 

it a possible key component of the Joint Aerial Layer Network (JALN) requirement 

for communications range extension and translation in a joint operations area. 

BACN as part of the JALN may provide valuable command, control, and communications capabilities during future Joint military operations. The Air Force plans 

to continue to operate BACN in Fiscal Year 2015 (FY15) using supplemental Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. As OSD develops the JALN concept 

the BACN platforms will be considered as options for the foundation of an enduring 

capability that meets the specified requirements. The Air Force will continue to explore BACN and other platforms to aggregate voice and data but BACN funding beyond FY15 is contingent upon gaining relief from the fiscal constraints of the Budget Control Act. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) connects disparate voice and datalink networks to enhance situational awareness. As you know, 

in 2009 BACN was fielded to solve a Joint Urgent Operational Need for increased 

communications capabilities, including voice and data bridges across already fielded 

platforms. Since then, BACN systems have flown over 5,300 missions and over 

58,600 combat hours while maintaining a 98% mission reliability rate. In the Committee Report for the FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, this Committee 
126 

urged the Air Force to transition BACN to a traditional program of record in fiscal 

year 2015. However, I understand that the Air Force plans to continue to fund 

BACN primarily through the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account for 

the foreseeable future. As we wind down OCO funding it is vital that we don’t lose 

the critical capabilities that BACN provides. Consequently, it is important to ensure 

that BACN transitions to a program of record to stabilize funding and ensure that 

BACN is leveraged to meet both current and future needs in several theaters, including the Asia-Pacific, where BACN could provide critical connectivity over an extended operational area, up to and including the Anti-Access/Area-Denial territories 

of potential near-peer adversaries. 

How does the Air Force plan to continue to leveraging the communications capabilities and situational awareness provided by BACN and when does the Air Force 

plan to transition BACN to a traditional program of record? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Ms. TSONGAS. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 prohibits the Air Force from retiring the U–2 Surveillance Aircraft until the ‘‘Secretary 

of Defense certifies to Congress that the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities provided by the U–2 aircraft no longer contribute to mitigating any gaps in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities identified in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.’’ 

If the FY15 budget submission effectively retires or begins the process to retire 

the U–2, have the conditions of the FY07 NDAA been met? 

More importantly, will the retirement of the U–2 result in ISR gaps in support 

to the warfighter? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. The Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program has been highlighted as a program where the Government lacks the leverage to negotiate lower 

costs since it only uses one provider—it is in a monopoly environment and, as the 

GAO has said, ‘‘pays the price demanded.’’ I understand that New Entrant launch 

services providers are coming online and will be certified this year, according to 

public statements from General William Shelton, Commander, U.S. Air Force Space 

Command. I understand that while the Air Force had a directive from the Secretary 

of Defense to ‘‘aggressively reintroduce a competitive procurement environment’’ for 

EELV, that the Air Force has recently delayed competition and cut the competitive 

mission opportunities by 50%? Why? Why is the Air Force not doing everything it 

can to achieve competition as quickly as possible? 

Secretary JAMES. The GAO has more recently reported and re-stated in a Joint 

Senate space access hearing on 16 July that the Air Force corrected deficiencies in 

pricing knowledge and reduced the overall EELV budget by over $3B from initial 

proposal estimates in negotiations for the 36 core buy. 

While the Air Force originally planned for up to 14 competitive launches in FY15– 

FY17, Air Force Space Command operators’ efforts to improve the on-orbit performance of our Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite constellation meant we could 

replenish those systems later than previously planned. This made it possible to respond to budget pressures by shifting the procurement of five GPS satellite launches 

outside the first phase of EELV procurements. Although this reduced the total number of competitive missions in FY15–FY17, the Air Force recovered more than $400 

million for space launch across the Future Years Defense Program. The five shifted 

GPS missions will still be competed in future EELV procurements. 

In addition to the deferred GPS missions, two other missions are no longer available for competition. The AFSPC–8 mission was reallocated due to mission requirements. This satellite carries a mass uncertainty that exceeds projected Falcon 9 v1.1 

launch capability. Per the Cooperative Research and Development Agreement 

(CRADA) signed between SpaceX and the Air Force, SpaceX is not pursuing certification to this orbit. The second, a Space-Based Infrared System Geosynchronous 

Earth Orbit (SBIRS–GEO) mission, was reallocated due to changes elsewhere in our 

manifest in order to meet our existing 36-core contractual requirement with United 

Launch Alliance. This contractual commitment enabled the Air Force to obtain significant near-term savings by taking advantage of economies of scale. 

The Air Force is committed to competition within the EELV program. We are aggressively taking steps to support competition while ensuring our responsibility to 

deploy National Security Space payloads into their orbits safely and with acceptable 

risk. We will compete portions of the launch manifest each year in 2015, 2016, and 

2017 if there is even one New Entrant ready to compete; i.e., they have successful 
127 

launches and have completed the required certification steps. We are working early 

with declared New Entrants to certify their systems as ready as evidenced by our 

CRADA with SpaceX and we have added government team resources to assure timely review of certification products, data and other supporting information throughout the certification process. 

Additionally, on July 15, 2014, the Air Force released a Request for Proposal to 

industry for the competitive procurement of a National Security Space mission to 

be launched in 2016. This is the first EELV competitive action in over a decade, 

and a significant milestone in the Air Force’s efforts to bring competition into the 

EELV program, consistent with Under Secretary of Defense Frank Kendall’s direction to ‘‘aggressively introduce a competitive procurement environment.’’ Competition among certified launch providers will encourage innovation and continued cost 

savings, while ensuring the Air Force will continue its focus on mission success. The 

Air Force looks forward to awarding this contract to a qualified offeror, thus maximizing the efficiencies of Space Launch while working to retain strict adherence to 

quality and mission assurance standards. The Air Force has also requested a reprogramming action through the FY14 Omnibus Reprogramming Request to add an 

additional near-term competitive launch. 

Mr. SHUSTER. DOD pays the incumbent provider in the EELV program upwards 

of $1 billion per year as a measure of sustainment. The Air Force determined this 

subsidy was necessary since it only had one provider in the program and could not 

afford to let this company exit the industry. However, with the introduction of competition into the program this year, how, and when, does the Air Force plan to 

phase out this subsidy since it can achieve true assured access with multiple providers? 

Secretary JAMES. We continue to fund EELV Launch Capability (ELC) to perform 

launch operations, maintain launch infrastructure (systems and expertise) and to 

provide the operational flexibility and cost predictability required to launch National 

Security Space (NSS) satellites. There still is only one launch provider in the U.S. 

who can lift the entire manifest for NSS, such as Wideband Global SATCOM, Advanced Extremely High Frequency, Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), and 

many classified payloads. Launch capability provides us the flexibility to meet mission requirements without continual Requests For Equitable Adjustments (REAs) or 

schedule penalties driven by Satellite Vehicle (SV) acquisition/development issues, 

integration delays, range delays, and SV build delays. 

The current contract with United Launch Alliance (ULA) includes ELC scope to 

support missions procured on previous contracts and the configurations procured in 

FY13–FY17. The costs are tracked carefully, and ULA is incentivized to reduce 

them while maintaining mission success. Only NSS missions procured through these 

contracts may be charged to it. 

The Department is developing the Acquisition Strategy for the next phase (FY18– 

FY22) of our long-term strategy. We have not yet decided on the most effective way 

to contract for this scope. Note the NROL–79 Request for Proposal released on July 

15, 2014 requires offerors to price all required scope (rocket hardware and capability) in their proposal. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What is the total/all-inclusive cost of the land based ICBM program? 

Secretary JAMES. The 10-Year Cost Estimate for the ICBM land based program 

is $19 billion; however, this does not include an additional $34.7 billion, 10-Year 

cost for the Nation’s Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS), which is an 

integral part of the land based deterrent. This additional $34.7B is a shared cost 

between all three legs of the nuclear triad. 

Table 1: ICBM Program Costs 

(then-year dollars in billions) 

FY 2015–2019 10-Year Cost 

Estimate 

Minuteman III1 $6.7 $11.6 
128 

Table 1: ICBM Program Costs—Continued 

(then-year dollars in billions) 

FY 2015–2019 10-Year Cost 

Estimate 

Follow-on ICBM AoA & Acquisition 

Planning 

$6.0 

ICBM Fuze Modernization $0.7 $1.4 

Total $7.4 $19.0 

1 Includes ICBM Squadrons, Helicopter Support, and Demonstration/Validation. 

REF: ‘‘Fiscal Year 2015 Report on the Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, Nuclear 

Weapons Complex, Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems, and Nuclear Weapons Command and 

Control System Specified in Section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012’’ 

Mr. GARAMENDI. The Air Force is now studying the next gen of ICBMs. What is 

the rationale for having the existing or future ICBM fleet—is this question a part 

of that study? 

Secretary JAMES. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) affirmed the continued 

efficacy of a Triad of ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclear-capable heavy bombers in maintaining strategic stability and deterring nuclear attack against the U.S., our allies, 

and partners. The Triad’s three legs offer a diverse set of attributes and capabilities 

that produce synergistic effects vital for central deterrence, extended deterrence, 

and assurance. Additionally, the Triad’s balance of attributes provides the U.S. with 

highly effective risk mitigation against failure of a single warhead or delivery system, targeted adversary investment to counter one or more of the legs, or unpredictable changes in the strategic environment or technological developments. 

ICBMs, in particular, are highly stabilizing and responsive. The current ICBM 

basing mode complicates adversary targeting and creates an extraordinarily high 

threshold for attack or coercion. The high readiness posture of the ICBM force combined with the U.S.’s early warning and command and control capabilities maximizes Presidential decision time during times of crisis. Together, these attributes 

contribute to the maintenance of strategic stability by vastly minimizing conditions 

under which an adversary would favor pre-emption. 

Since the 2010 NPR initiated the examination of a Minuteman III follow-on study 

while re-validating the importance and necessity of the Triad, the Air Force did not 

include a ‘‘no-ICBM’’ scenario in its Ground Based Strategic Deterrent analysis. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. When was the most recent comprehensive review/study of the 

nuclear triad strategy? Given the tight budgets in the years ahead do you believe 

it is wise/useful to conduct such a review? 

Secretary JAMES. The most recent, comprehensive review was conducted in 2011 

when the President directed the Department of Defense (DOD), in consultation with 

other departments and agencies, to conduct in-depth analysis as a follow-on to the 

2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The results of this review were submitted to 

the Congress pursuant to 10 U.S.C Section 491. The Air Force supports the DOD’s 

position that it is prudent to periodically review our nuclear forces and strategy as 

circumstances dictate. These reviews provide force planners with an important opportunity to identify emerging problems in the nuclear portfolio and develop appropriate mitigation strategies, assess changes in geopolitical conditions and their impacts on nuclear forces, or to make adjustments that would enhance U.S. national 

security or that of our allies. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. If the NNSA budget was part of the DOD or AF budget what 

reductions/increases would you recommend? 

Secretary JAMES. If given authority over some portion of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) budget, the Air Force would work to strengthen 

focus and resources on programs providing direct support to the sustainment and 

modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. The Air Force would also support efforts to more effectively align NNSA programs with our efforts to recapitalize 

and modernize nuclear delivery platforms. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What is the status of the new version of the LRSO? What is the 

total cost of the LRSO? What is the total projected cost of the LRS–B beyond of the 

FY 15 Budget? Could the LRSO serve the same fundamental purpose as the LRS– 

B and if not, why? 
129 

Secretary JAMES. The Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) weapon is the follow-on system to the nuclear armed Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) AGM–86B, operational since 1986. The LRSO program has completed an Analysis of Alternatives 

(AoA) and is in the Materiel Solution Analysis Phase of the program’s lifecycle. The 

FY15 President’s Budget LRSO funding is outlined below. 

LRSO FY15 PB 

(TY$M) FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 Total 

(FYDP) 

LRSO $4.9 $9.9 $19.8 $40.7 $144.9 $220.2 

The FY15 PB funds Milestone A preparation activities to include concept refinement, risk reduction efforts, and acquisition strategy refinement. The cost of the 

missile program will continue to be refined during the Materiel Solution Analysis 

phase as the program works toward Milestone A. The funding profile for the Long 

Range Strike Bomber (LRS–B) beyond the FY15 President’s Budget is classified. 

The Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) is $550 million in base-year 2010 dollars and is applicable for a 100 aircraft procurement. 

The LRSO and LRS–B are both critical strike components of the Long Range 

Strike family of systems, which also includes Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, electronic attack, communication and other capabilities. Despite upgrades, current bombers are increasingly at risk to modern air defenses. LRSO and 

LRS–B will provide complementary capabilities to provide the President with the 

option to hold any target at risk at any point on the globe. 

LRSO could not be used as a substitute for LRS–B. LRS–B’s long range and significant broad mix of stand-off and direct-attack munitions payload, including 

LRSO, will provide operational flexibility to Joint commanders across the range of 

military operations. Initial LRS–B capability will be delivered in the mid-2020s, before the current fleet goes out of service. 

LRSO will replace the current Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and will be 

compatible with LRS–B, and the B–2 and B–52 to provide critical nuclear standoff 

capabilities. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What is the total/all-inclusive cost of the land based ICBM program? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. The Air Force is now studying the next gen of ICBMs. What is 

the rationale for having the existing or future ICBM fleet—is this question apart 

of that study? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. When was the most recent comprehensive review/study of the 

nuclear triad strategy? Given the tight budgets in the years ahead do you believe 

it is wise/useful to conduct such a review? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. If the NNSA budget was part of the DOD or AF budget what 

reductions/increases would you recommend? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. What is the status of the new version of the LRSO? What is the 

total cost of the LRSO? What is the total projected cost of the LRS–B beyond of the 

FY 15 Budget? Could the LRSO serve the same fundamental purpose as the LRS– 

B and if not, why? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. The U.S. Air Force PB15 Force Structure applies a reduction of 

seven Compass Call aircraft at Davis-Monthan AFB in 2016. What are the reasons 

for the reduction of the Compass Call aircraft? 

Secretary JAMES. Financial constraints imposed by the Budget Control Act and sequestration compelled the Air Force to reduce the Compass Call fleet. 

Mr. CONAWAY. How much money will be saved with the proposed 2016 Compass 

Call fleet reduction? 

Secretary JAMES. Savings will total $315.8 million. 

Mr. CONAWAY. What are the plans for the Compass Call fleet beyond 2016? 

Secretary JAMES. The Air Force will retain and operate eight aircraft. 
130 

Mr. CONAWAY. If cuts to the Compass Call fleet occur, how does the Air Force intend to accomplish the Compass Call electronic warfare mission? 

Secretary JAMES. To prepare for continuing the electronic warfare mission in the 

event fleet reductions are implemented, the Air Force is analyzing requirements and 

available capabilities via the Air Superiority and Global Precision Attack Core Function Support Teams. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Are there identified alternative platforms that deliver the same capability? 

Secretary JAMES. The Air Force is currently in the process of assessing various 

aircraft replacement options. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Will the Compass Call fleet be retired prior to identifying a replacement platform if there is no alternative platform that can assume the Compass 

Call fleet mission? 

Secretary JAMES. The Air Force will attempt to avoid any capability gaps. However, continued fiscal constraints as a result of sequestration will hinder the Air 

Force’s ability to develop and field a replacement platform. 

Mr. CONAWAY. When will the results of the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) to determine follow-on Compass Call capabilities be available for review? 

Secretary JAMES. An AoA is currently under development; however it is too early 

to predict when the results may be available. 

Mr. CONAWAY. How long does the Air Force believe it will take to field follow-on 

a Compass Call capability? 

Secretary JAMES. The Air Force will have a more definitive way ahead once the 

AoA is completed. 

Mr. CONAWAY. The U.S. Air Force PB15 Force Structure applies a reduction of 

seven Compass Call aircraft at Davis-Monthan AFB in 2016. What are the reasons 

for the reduction of the Compass Call aircraft? How much money will be saved with 

the proposed 2016 Compass Call fleet reduction? What are the plans for the Compass Call fleet beyond 2016? If cuts to the Compass Call fleet occur, how does the 

Air Force intend to accomplish the Compass Call electronic warfare mission? Are 

there identified alternative platforms that deliver the same capability? 5. Will the 

Compass Call fleet be retired prior to identifying a replacement platform if there 

is no alternative platform that can assume the Compass Call fleet mission? 6. When 

will the results of the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) to determine follow-on Compass Call capabilities be available for review? 7. How long does the AF believe it 

will take to field follow-on Compass Call capability? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON 

Mr. JOHNSON. The Air Force is starting a major nuclear recapitalization, including 

new bombers, nuclear fighters, new nuclear cruise missiles, a tailkit for B61, and 

new ICBM’s. Does the Air Force have a good understanding of the total costs? What 

are the top priorities for the Air Force, especially between B61 and LRSO? 

Secretary JAMES. The Air Force has a sound understanding of the sustainment 

and modernization costs for Air Force nuclear delivery systems. In accordance with 

Section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, these 

costs were recently reported to the Congress in a report that accompanied the submission of the President’s FY2015 budget request. 

(U) Sustainment and Modernization Costs for Air Force Nuclear Delivery 

Systems1

(then-year dollars in billions) 

FY 2015–20192 10-Year Cost 

Estimate 

ICBM 

Minuteman III3 $6.7 $11.6 

Follow-on ICBM4 AoA & Acquisition 

Planning 

$6.0 

ICBM Fuze Modernization $0.7 $1.4 
131 

(U) Sustainment and Modernization Costs for Air Force Nuclear Delivery 

Systems1—Continued 

(then-year dollars in billions) 

FY 2015–20192 10-Year Cost 

Estimate 

Heavy Bombers 

B–52H5 $7.3 $13.1 

B–2A6 $6.0 $11.3 

Long Range Strike-Bomber $11.4 $33.1 

ALCM $0.3 $0.6 

LRSO missile $0.2 $2.8 

B61–12 TKA $1.2 $1.3 

Dual Capable Aircraft7 $1.2 $2.7 

Total8 $35.0 $83.9 

Source: Section 1043 Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2015, May 7, 2014 

NOTE: Numbers may not add up due to rounding. 

1. Estimated costs include RDT&E; procurement; operations and support; and personnel. 

DOD activities do not include overhead costs such as personnel assigned to higher headquarters who work on nuclear deterrence related issues. 

2. DOD FYDP Fiscal Years 2015–2019. 

3. Includes ICBM Squadrons, Helicopter Support, and Demonstration/Validation. Not included: Common Vertical Life Support Platform (program cancelled June 2013), MEECN, 

and ICBM–EMD. 

4. The GBSD AoA cost through Milestone A is $27 million. Ten-year cost is ROM due to 

AoA activities. 

5. Includes B–52 Active Squadrons and B–52 Reserve Squadrons 

6. Includes B–2 Active Squadrons, B–2 Reserve Squadrons, and B–2 DMS 

7. Includes operations and maintenance funding for the F–16C squadrons at Aviano Air 

Base, Italy, F–15E squadrons at RAF Lakenheath, UK, Nuclear Weapons Storage, and F–35 

DCA RDT&E funds. Ten-year projection computed using inflation rates of 1.8% for 

MILPERS and 2.0% for other appropriations. 

8. Costs shown may include NCCS integration costs. 

Recapitalization and modernization of the Air Force nuclear enterprise is essential 

to sustaining U.S. strategic and extended deterrence commitments in the decades 

to come. The ongoing B61 Life Extension Program and future Long-Range Standoff 

weapon (LRSO) programs are both critical to this effort. The first production unit 

(FPU) delivery date for the B61–12 is in 2020, and the FPU for LRSO is anticipated 

in the 2025–2027 timeframe. These weapon systems are distinct not only in their 

development and production schedules, but also in the operational capabilities they 

will offer. The B61–12 will provide a long-term gravity weapon capability for U.S. 

bomber and fighter aircraft, to include the F–35 and North Atlantic Treaty Organization dual-capable aircraft. The LRSO cruise missile will replace the aging AirLaunched Cruise Missile in providing the nation a credible standoff nuclear weapon 

capable of delivery from current and future bomber aircraft. Together, these programs will provide critical and complementary deterrence capabilities to the U.S. 

and our allies. 

Mr. JOHNSON. The Air Force is starting a major nuclear recapitalization, including 

new bombers, nuclear fighters, new nuclear cruise missiles, a tailkit for B61, and 

new ICBM’s. Does the Air Force have a good understanding of the total costs? What 

are the top priorities for the Air Force, especially between B61 and LRSO? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 
132 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. Air Force is responsible for integrating significant High Consequence Mission Critical (HCMC) IT Services and Solutions like Air And Space Operations Center Weapon System Integrator (AOC WSI LSI), and Distributed Common Ground Support System Sustainment Support (DCGS). The Air Force clearly 

understands that integrating programs like these is a daunting, complex, and challenging endeavor, and that distributing portions of such a projects to multiple lead 

systems integrators, significantly increases complexity, difficulty, and program risk. 

In fact, the Air Force demonstrated a clear understanding of this concept by designating Commander Air Combat Command (COMACC) as the Core Function Lead 

Integrator (CFLI) for Command and Control (C2) and Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (GIISR), vesting all system integrator responsibilities with a single, responsible integrator. 

NETCENTS II, when finally awarded, is a fine contract for commodity IT procurement, but fails to meet the necessary requirements of providing a single systems 

integrator for HCMC IT services and solutions procurement, even though the Air 

Force clearly demonstrates a thorough understanding of the requirement. The very 

nature of any multiple award ID/IQ contract increases the complexity, difficulty, 

and program risk. Will the Air Force consider conducting a single award ID/IQ vehicle acquisition dedicated to HCMC IT procurement to come along side NETCENTS 

II as an effective way to overcome the multiple integrator issue? 

Secretary JAMES. NETCENTS II is a highly flexible suite of contracts which 

serves as an enabling mechanism for the Air Force IT Enterprise transformation. 

These contracts allow procuring organizations to take advantage of IT consolidation 

efforts and the reuse of existing solutions. To support the AF transformation effort, 

NETCENTS II utilizes broadly written requirements at the basic contract level, 

which can be further constrained at the task order level, thus enabling the high consequence IT products and services. The Air Force opted to utilize a suite of contracts, each with a multiple-award ID/IQ contract structure to foster increased competition between vendors, reduce cost, and to provide procuring organizations a 

more focused field of competitors which specialize within the required IT domain. 

This solution further enables a more rapid acquisition of IT services and solutions, 

thereby reducing program risk. Within the NETCENTS suite of contracts, High 

Consequence IT requirements were captured and included in the Services contracts—NetOps and Infrastructure Solutions, and Application Services. 

In a prior response to a similar inquiry [CRR–FY14–AF High Consequence Information Technology Services, Dated: 12 Sep 13], the analysis demonstrated that 

NETCENTS II was fully capable of supporting a full range of HCMC IT services, 

although a mandatory use waiver process was outlined based on a business case and 

other mission needs. Indeed, NETCENTS II can support the full mission capability 

lifecycle from early systems engineering through development, test, operations, and 

sustainment, with mission assurance, security, and rigorous product specification for 

application services, infrastructure, and integration. The contractual vehicle supports not only Core Function Lead Integrator (CFLI) for Command and Control (C2) 

and Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (GIISR), but 

all Air Force CFLIs, and is not limited to commodity IT. 

The contract scope is consistent with 2008 NDAA Sec 802, and updates which further limit/prohibit the Lead System Integrator contracts. Competitive integration is 

a key element of NETCENTS II, combining both traditional military-industrial partners as well as commercial IT partners. Additionally, NETCENTS II is supportive 

of both on premise systems and use of secure cloud capabilities consistent with 2010 

Executive Direction and NDAA 2012, as appropriate, adding significant resiliency 

to the mission environment. 

The AOC WSI and DCGS programs agree that a single integrator will eliminate 

many integration issues and difficulties however this is on a program to program 

basis, and the waiver process may need to be used to provide a flexible acquisition 

strategy to meet specific program requirements. 

So while there exists a policy for waivers through the Air Force CIO and Air Force 

acquisition process, NETCENTS II can currently, and will in the future, support 

HCMC IT services and solutions procurement. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Air Force is responsible for integrating significant High Consequence Mission Critical (HCMC) IT Services and Solutions like Air And Space Operations Center Weapon System Integrator (AOC WSI LSI), and Distributed Common Ground Support System Sustainment Support (DCGS). The Air Force clearly 

understands that integrating programs like these is a daunting, complex, and challenging endeavor, and that distributing portions of such a projects to multiple lead 

systems integrators, significantly increases complexity, difficulty, and program risk. 
133 

In fact, the Air Force demonstrated a clear understanding of this concept by designating Commander Air Combat Command (COMACC) as the Core Function Lead 

Integrator (CFLI) for Command and Control (C2) and Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (GIISR), vesting all system integrator responsibilities with a single, responsible integrator. 

NETCENTS II, when finally awarded, is a fine contract for commodity IT procurement, but fails to meet the necessary requirements of providing a single systems 

integrator for HCMC IT services and solutions procurement, even though the Air 

Force clearly demonstrates a thorough understanding of the requirement. The very 

nature of any multiple award ID/IQ contract increases the complexity, difficulty, 

and program risk. Will the Air Force consider conducting a single award ID/IQ vehicle acquisition dedicated to HCMC IT procurement to come along side NETCENTS 

II as an effective way to overcome the multiple integrator issue? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER 

Mr. BARBER. If the Air Force completely divests of the A–10, which platform will 

become the next premier close air support aircraft? 

Secretary JAMES. The Air Force will have a number of multi-role platforms capable of performing Close Air Support (CAS) if the A–10 is divested. Certain Air Force 

squadrons of different platforms will be tasked with CAS as a primary mission and 

thus specialize in CAS. Other squadrons will have CAS as a secondary mission. 

These platforms include F–15E, F–16, MQ–1/9, B–1, B–52, AC–130, and eventually 

F–35. 

This fleet of multi-mission, CAS-capable platforms will ensure the Combatant 

Commanders maintain the flexibility required to provide CAS when needed in their 

areas of responsibility. 

Mr. BARBER. In making its FY15 budget, has the Air Force considered Ground 

Commanders’ inputs on the capabilities needed to best support troops on the ground 

when they request close air support? If the Air Force has considered Ground Commanders’ inputs on CAS, then what are those considerations and what platform best 

supports that mission? 

Secretary JAMES. The Air Force Fiscal Year 2015 budget includes Ground Commanders’ considerations into the support ground troops need. The Air Force studied 

the future requirements of the ground component commanders as approved in the 

theater OPLANS. We’ve determined there are sufficient aircraft capable of providing 

Close Air Support (CAS). Factors that led to our conclusion included: 1) the type 

and number of potential targets, 2) the nature of the future enemy ground force and 

3) the future threat environment for the air and ground components to operate in. 

These factors indicate that multiple capabilities are necessary to conduct the CAS 

mission and provide effective support to ground forces. Furthermore, it was concluded that no single platform best supports the CAS mission when these factors 

are taken into account. The Air Component Commander retains flexible options to 

employ the best platform for the effects that are requested by the ground commander. 

Mr. BARBER. What is the percentage of all CAS missions in Iraq and Afghanistan 

that the A–10 has executed from 2003 to 2013? What is the percentage of monetary 

costs associated with A–10 CAS missions during this same time period compared 

to all other CAS fixed-wing platforms? 

Secretary JAMES. The Air Force previously submitted a report on ‘‘Close Air Support Requirements’’ to the Congressional Defense Committees in March 2014, which 

shows that A–10 aircraft executed 19 percent of all CAS missions flown by U.S. airframes from 2006 thru October 2013. Data prior to 2006 was not available for this 

analysis. Pre-2006 data was tracked via a different method, which makes direct 

comparisons to post-2006 data difficult. 

The report has an overall classification of SECRET//NOFORN and therefore cannot be reproduced in its entirety here, however, the Air Force would be happy to 

forward a copy through appropriate channels upon request. 

It is difficult to accurately convert the ‘‘missions’’ metric from the report into monetary costs. It is important to note that mission count does not equate to sortie 

count, or a specific number of flying hours. The Air Force utilizes a cost per flying 

hour to determine airframe expense, which does not directly correlate to particular 

missions flown. For example, fighters (A–10, F–16) typically fly a CAS mission with 

two or more aircraft, whereas other CAS-capable aircraft (AC–130, B–52) typically 

fly CAS missions with a single aircraft, and will have to travel different distances 

to conduct their operations. 
134 

Because of these factors, the Air Force cannot accurately convert current mission 

percentage to a definitive cost comparison between airframes and mission set at this 

time. 

Mr. BARBER. If the Air Force divests of the A–10s are, what is the plan for the 

force structure that supports the A–10? 

Secretary JAMES. In the event that the Air Force divests the A–10, the force structure supporting the A–10 will be re-allocated to other mission support areas based 

on prioritized requirements to improve overall force readiness. This includes the 

plan to move over 700 maintenance positions to support the F–35. The Air Force 

will organize, train and equip its remaining multi-role aircraft to minimize the impact created by restricted funding to the missions best suited to meet current and 

future operational requirements. Force structure changes will align with the Defense Strategic Guidance, will balance across the active, reserve, and guard components within the current fiscal constraints, maximizing the balance between capability, capacity and readiness of the Air Force. 

Mr. BARBER. How much money will the United States Air Force save in divestment of the A–10? Please enumerate the specific savings the Air Force believes it 

will achieve and the specific programs and contracts affected with the vertical divestment of the A–10. 

Secretary JAMES. By divesting the A–10, the Air Force expects to save $4.3 billion 

across the Future Years Defense Plan. These savings are maximized through 

‘‘vertical divestment’’ of the entire fleet of A–10. Fleet divestiture eliminates fixed 

costs that cannot be notably reduced when only part of the fleet is divested. Fixed 

cost include, but are not limited to, training (formal training unit [FTU], weapons 

instructor course [WIC], simulators, tech pubs, etc.) and weapons system 

sustainment infrastructure (sustaining engineering/support, pipeline spares, depot 

tooling and test equipment, etc.), as well as, nonrecurring hardware and software 

design, development and test (mods, OFP updates, tech orders, obsolescence, etc.) 

and new weapons integration. 

Mr. BARBER. If the Air Force begins to retire the A–10 in Fiscal Year 2015 and 

units and infrastructure shut down, how much will it cost the Air Force in each fiscal year, beginning with FY15, to fully divest the A–10? 

Secretary JAMES. The costs associated with divesting the A–10 are comprised primarily of induction into the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group for retirement preparation and storage: 

FY15 ($M) FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FYDP 

3.7 1.9 0.8 1.7 1.7 9.8 

The Air Force’s Fiscal Year 2015 Total Force Proposal was developed to minimize 

costs and leverages existing infrastructure and personnel training/expertise at bases 

losing A–10s and transitioning to other aircraft. Consequently, any additional facility and personnel costs at these units will be minimal and are accounted for in normal operating budgets. 

Mr. BARBER. If the Air Force divests the A–10 in Fiscal Year 2015 and Fiscal Year 

2016, what infrastructure changes has the Air Force considered in order to move 

different missions and platforms to bases that would lose the A–10 mission? 

Secretary JAMES. The following timeline illustrates the Air Force’s A–10 retirement plan along with planned backfills: 
135 

Starting in Fiscal Year 2015 (FY15), the Air Force will begin retiring overseasbased active duty A–10s as well as aircraft based at Moody Air Force Base (AFB) 

(GA), Davis-Monthan AFB (AZ), Nellis AFB (NV), and Eglin AFB (FL). The Air National Guard squadron at Boise (ID) will form a Classic Association with the F–15E 

squadron at Mountain Home AFB. The remaining active duty A–10s at Moody AFB 

and Davis-Monthan AFB will be retired in FY16. As part of the Air Force plan to 

retire Air Reserve Component (ARC) A–10s in the latter half of the Future Years 

Defense Plan (FYDP), the aircraft at Selfridge (MI) Air National Guard Base 

(ANGB) will be replaced by eight KC–135 aircraft in FY17. Whiteman (MO) Air Reserve Base (ARB) and Martin State (MD) ANGB A–10s will be replaced by 18 F– 

16 Block 40s and eight C–130Js, respectively, in FY18. The reserve unit at DavisMonthan AFB and Ft Wayne ANGB will gain 18 F–16 Block 40s each once their 

A–10s are retired in FY19. 

Mr. BARBER. What are the proposed numbers and specific positions that will be 

cut at Davis Monthan AFB from Fiscal Years 2015–2019 if the Air Force divests 

of the A–10 mission? Has the Air Force done an analysis of how communities surrounding the installations, including Davis Monthan AFB, that house A–10 missions 

will be affected should divestment occur? 

Secretary JAMES. The FY15 President’s Budget identified a projected total force 

manpower reduction associated with the A–10 divestment at Davis Monthan of approximately ¥700 authorizations from FY14–FY15 ramping to a total of approximately ¥2100 billets by FY19. The attached table summarizes the projected drawdown of A–10 positions by Air Force Specialty Code title. 

[The table referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 102.] 

Representatives from Air Force Air Combat Command, whose purview DavisMonthan AFB falls under, participated in the development of the Air Force’s Fiscal 

Year 2015 (FY15) Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and would take into account any potential impacts to the community around the base as a result of A– 

10 retirements. In light of the budgetary environment the Air Force was forced to 

operate in, our FY15 budget represents the best attempt at balancing economic interests with operational requirements while adhering to strict fiscal guidelines. 

Mr. BARBER. Davis-Monthan Air Force Base has critical capabilities that many 

bases cannot offer including proximity to training ranges, abundant flying weather, 

and large runways. If A–10s are divested, how does the Air Force plan on sustaining 

flight operations at Davis Monthan AFB in order to maintain its ability to support 

future missions? What future missions does the Air Force envision placing at Davis 

Monthan AFB? What is the expected timeline for placing these missions? 

Secretary JAMES. Despite our intention to retire the A–10s at Davis-Monthan 

AFB, the base will remain an integral part of the Air Force’s ability to support Combatant Commander airpower requirements. To this end, the departing A–10s will 

be replaced by a number of F–16s in Fiscal Year 2019. 

Mr. BARBER. Has the Air Force planned any infrastructure changes at Davis 

Monthan AFB between the potential divestment of the A–10 and the placing of future missions, in order to prevent a gap in operations? 

Secretary JAMES. Despite our intention to retire the A–10s at Davis-Monthan 

AFB, the base will remain an integral part of the Air Force’s ability to support Combatant Commander airpower requirements. To this end, the departing A–10s will 

be replaced by a number of F–16s in Fiscal Year 2019. 
136 

Mr. BARBER. What are the Air Force’s plans between Fiscal Years 2015–2019 for 

the F–16s currently based at Luke Air Force Base once the new squadrons of the 

F–35 have been fielded and delivered to the base? 

Secretary JAMES. There are currently 96 Primary Aircraft Authorization (PAA) F– 

16s based at Luke AFB. Between April and September 2014, 25 of these aircraft 

will move to Holloman AFB. During the April-September 2015 period, another 25 

aircraft will move to Holloman AFB bringing that base’s total to 50 PAA F–16s 

(Luke will then have 46 PAA) by October 2015. 

Of the remaining F–16s at Luke AFB, 20 are Block 25 and 26 are Block 42. The 

Block 25 aircraft are expected to remain at Luke AFB until they reach their expected operational life beginning in FY20, at which time they will be retired. The 

Block 42 aircraft are expected to remain at Luke AFB well beyond 2019. The facilities and ramps vacated by the aircraft moving to Holloman AFB will provide room 

for up to five squadrons of F–35s at Luke AFB. 

Mr. BARBER. The Air Force has testified that in Afghanistan and Iraq faster-flying 

fighters and heavy bombers have provided 80 percent of the close air support mission. How has the Air Force come to this percentage? What is the exact breakdown 

by date, air frame, and flight time of each close air support mission during the war 

in Afghanistan? 

Secretary JAMES. The Air Force cited the percentage in a previous report on 

‘‘Close Air Support Requirements’’ submitted to the Congressional Defense Committees in March 2014. This report provides the most current and detailed analysis of 

Iraq and Afghanistan CAS missions. The citation comes from a chart posted on 

subpage 8 of 15. USCENTCOM provided the AOR mission data for this report. 

The report has an overall classification of SECRET//NOFORN and therefore cannot be reproduced in its entirety here, however, the Air Force would be happy to 

forward a copy through appropriate channels upon request. 

The USCENTCOM data used in the report does not contain the level of detail required to break down Afghanistan CAS missions by date, airframe and flight time. 

Additional time would be required to determine if USCENTCOM has data of sufficient detail to answer this request. 

Mr. BARBER. What is the comparison between an A–10 weapons payload that supports close air support (CAS) and other platforms’ weapons payloads that support 

CAS? 

General WELSH. Combat payloads options are fairly similar for most fighter aircraft. Key fighter similarities and differences are listed in the example below. Bomber aircraft have much higher capacity of bomb munitions, but do not have rocket 

or gun capabilities. Remotely piloted aircraft payloads are limited to 500 pound 

class bombs and missiles, but do not carry rocket or guns. 

Fighter CAS payload example: 

Bombs Key similarities: F–16, F–15E, A–10 all carry 500 and 2000 pound class 

precision (GBU10/12/38/31 series) and no-precision munitions (MK82/84 series), as 

well as cluster bomb munitions CBU–103/4/5) 

Key differences: F–16 and F–15E capable of carrying Small Diameter Bomb 

version 1 F–15E capable of carrying Small Diameter Bomb version 2 A–10 while capable, has not been integrated with these weapons at this time 

Rockets F–16, A–10: M151 (High Explosive) rockets, M156 (white phosphorous) 

marking rockets, Maverick missile 

F–15E: no rocket or Maverick missile capability 

Guns A–10: 1150 rounds of 30MM (High Explosive or Armor Penetrating or mix 

of the two) F–16: 510 Rounds of 20MM (High Explosive or Semi Armor Piercing) 

F–15E: 940 rounds of 20MM (High Explosive or Semi Armor Piercing) 

Other A–10: LUU system of illumination flares; illuminate an area in both normal 

& infrared spectrums 

Mr. BARBER. What is the percentage of all CAS missions in Iraq and Afghanistan 

that the A–10 has executed from 2003 to 2013? What is the percentage of monetary 

costs associated with A–10 CAS missions during this same time period compared 

to all other CAS fixed-wing platforms? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BARBER. Can the A–10 perform Forward Air Controller-Airborne (FAC–A), 

Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) and Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance 

(SCAR) missions? 

General WELSH. Yes. The A–10 has FAC–A and CSAR as primary missions, while 

SCAR is a secondary mission. 

Mr. BARBER. If the Air Force divests the A–10 in Fiscal Year 2015 and Fiscal Year 

2016, what infrastructure changes has the Air Force considered in order to move 

different missions and platforms to bases that would lose the A–10 mission? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 
137 

Mr. BARBER. What are the proposed numbers and specific positions that will be 

cut at Davis Monthan AFB from Fiscal Years 2015–2019 if the Air Force divests 

of the A–10 mission? Has the Air Force done an analysis of how communities surrounding the installations, including Davis Monthan AFB, that house A–10 missions 

will be affected should divestment occur? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BARBER. Should the Air Force divest of the A–10, what plan is in place for 

utilizing the expertise and experience of A–10 pilots, including their CAS experience 

and institutional knowledge? 

General WELSH. The specifics of the A–10 divestiture manning plan are still being 

developed. However, the draft framework being considered consists of re-assigning 

A–10 pilots based upon three experience levels. 

A–10 Experience Level Likely Post A–10 Assignment Vector 

Inexperienced (<500 hours in 

A–10) 

New RegAF A–10 pilots will possibly PCS 

to ANG/AFRC A–10 unit until experienced (> 500hrs in A–10). Otherwise they 

will likely be re-trained in another fighter 

system (F–15/16/22) 

Experienced but less than 1st 

Flying Gate complete (<8 years 

in flying assignments) 

Another flying assignment. This assignment may include another fighter platform or instructing new pilots in various 

flying training programs, depending upon 

the needs of the AF 

Experienced and 1st Flying Gate 

complete (>8 years in flying assignments) 

Another flying assignment. However, if no 

other flying positions are open after all 

less experienced A–10 pilots are accounted 

for, these experienced officers will likely 

use their CAS knowledge to develop policy 

and war plans on our severely undermanned fighter staffs. 

Mr. BARBER. Davis-Monthan Air Force Base has critical capabilities that many 

bases cannot offer including proximity to training ranges, abundant flying weather, 

and large runways. If A–10s are divested, how does the Air Force plan on sustaining 

flight operations at Davis Monthan AFB in order to maintain its ability to support 

future missions? What future missions does the Air Force envision placing at Davis 

Monthan AFB? What is the expected timeline for placing these missions? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BARBER. What are the Air Force’s plans between Fiscal Years 2015–2019 for 

the F–16s currently based at Luke Air Force Base once the new squadrons of the 

F–35 have been fielded and delivered to the base? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. FLEMING 

Dr. FLEMING. The Air Force eliminated the 917th Air Force Reserve Fighter 

Group, twenty-four A–10s at Barksdale Air Force Base. A BRAC round put these 

A–10s at Barksdale to support a number of missions, including Green Flag Exercises at Fort Polk. As I examined the A–10 decision, it became clear that there was 

no coordination between the Army and the Air Force when that decision was made. 

The Air Force Reserves will likely increase the number of Reserve equipped squadrons, with F–16s fighters. Will the Air Force consider installations that lost Reserve 

fighter wings in FY14 when it ‘‘pluses up’’ Reserve wings with F–16s? That is, will 

the Air Force look at Barksdale Air Force Base to backfill the A–10s with an F– 

16 or future F–35, to replace the A–10, considering the type of joint support 

Barksdale provides, for example at Green Flag East? Is Air Force coordinating with 

Army in making these decisions? 

Secretary JAMES. The Air Force historically determines the most operationally effective and fiscally efficient posturing of its assets during the development of our 

annual program and budget. Therefore, the establishment of a new flying mission 

at Barksdale AFB may be considered in the years to come. However, the Budget 

Control Act (BCA) and sequestration hampers the Air Force’s ability to distribute 

resources in a manner posing the least risk to our warfighting capabilities. Revert-
138 

ing to strict BCA funding caps in Fiscal Year 2016 and beyond will further hinder 

the Air Force’s ability to replace force structure, and compel us to divest additional 

capabilities and potentially leading to more unit deactivations. 

While there is no formal coordination of force structure movements between the 

Military Services, the Army has been aware of the Air Force’s decision to retire the 

A–10 and was briefed on this action on multiple occasions. We will notify the Army 

in similar fashion if and when the Air Force decides to establish a follow-on mission 

at Barksdale AFB. 

Dr. FLEMING. Given the priority that the Air force places on the nuclear mission, 

please explain why the highest level of oversight, a four-star general, is not responsible for overseeing our most lethal and important weapon and deterrent capability. 

What value could be provided to U.S. Strategic Command with the component leadership of a four-star general over Air Force nuclear operations? 

General WELSH. On May 28, 2014, Air Force Secretary James and I announced 

that we have recommended to the Secretary of Defense to elevate the Air Force 

Global Strike Command position to a four-star general, from its current three-star 

rank. As the Air Force is at the maximum statutory authorization for four-star generals, we recognize we will need to identify a compensatory four-star command for 

downgrade to allow the position of Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command 

to be upgraded from O–9 to O–10. The Secretary and I are actively discussing which 

four-star command will be recommended for downgrade. Once the command is identified, we will develop a timeline and prepare a nomination package for Senate consideration. 

Dr. FLEMING. I understand that the FY14 Air Force Weapons Storage Area Report 

is complete. In it, the Air Force discusses its WSA recapitalization program. The 

2008 Schlesinger Report established that the closure of the Barksdale Air Force 

Base WSA was a mistake that was based solely on cost and that incurs strategic 

risk. Does the Air Force’s timeframe for completing the recapitalization program factor in the deterrent capability provided by an additional operational WSA for nuclear-armed Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs)? 

General WELSH. The Air Force has developed a WSA Recapitalization Plan that 

will ensure ALCM operational requirements are maintained during the construction 

of new Weapons Storage Facilities (WSF). Under this plan, a WSF will be constructed at Barksdale AFB prior to the construction of one at Minot AFB, ensuring 

mission capability is preserved. 

Dr. FLEMING. Did the WSA Report consider the potential cost savings of utilizing 

advanced security surveillance technologies, thus cutting down on personnel costs? 

Are remote monitoring systems that are nuclear certified available to the Air Force? 

General WELSH. As part of the WSA recapitalization initiative, the Air Force intends to leverage advanced technologies that have the potential to reduce personnel 

requirements and their associated costs. Personnel requirements will be determined 

as part of the design and certification process. A number of remote detection, assessment, and denial systems are already being successfully employed today across our 

WSAs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MAFFEI 

Mr. MAFFEI. Secretary James and General Welsh, in a budget constrained environment I believe that it is incumbent upon each of us to ensure that every system 

is as affordable and efficient as possible. Each service can no longer afford to purchase unique solutions that are similar, but only slightly different to what other 

branches may already have. 

I understand that both the Army and the Air Force are in the process of procuring 

single mission ground radars. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps are developing a multimission radar called Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) which was just approved for Milestone C and has been approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council (JROC). 

As you know, there was language in the Senate Defense Appropriations Committee reports for the FY2012 and 2014 that recommended the Air Force and Army 

minimize redundancy and maximize platform commonality while pursuing procurement of new ground radar solutions to reduce development and life-cycle costs. Similarly, both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have included report 

language in the past that encouraged the Services to look at reducing redundancy 

in ground radar programs. 

There has been over $500 million invested in the flexible, scalable, multi-mission 

Marine Corp’s G/ATOR program. I understand that if the Air Force chooses to procure a G/ATOR variant for its Three Dimensional Long Range Radar (3DELRR) pro-
139 

gram that it could generate significant cost-savings at a lower risk and an accelerated schedule. Additionally, I believe that this option could further yield savings to 

the tax payer by lowering the per unit cost to the Marines for each G/ATOR unit. 

How is Air Force incorporating this past congressional guidance encouraging commonality and reducing redundancy into its 3DELRR competition and how does it intend to leverage the significant progress that has been made in G/ATOR to date towards it needs? 

Secretary JAMES. The Air Force has incorporated past Congressional guidance by 

inviting the G/ATOR vendor to participate in the competition. However, because the 

initial Marine Corps radar requirements did not meet Air Force requirements, the 

JROC approved separate Air Force long range radar requirements. The Air Force 

surveyed industry and determined only three vendors could fulfill the Air Force requirements. All three were invited to compete, including the G/ATOR vendor. Source 

selection started in January 2014, and the results are expected by the end of September 2014. The Air Force anticipated the inclusion of the G/ATOR vendor in the 

competition would yield multiple acquisition benefits including capitalizing on previous DOD G/ATOR research and development investment. 3DELRR is also an OSD 

Defense Exportability Features pilot program, incorporating export design features 

to reduce production, operation, and sustainment costs in the long term. Additionally, the Air Force and Marine Corps program offices cooperated for many years on 

3DELRR requirements, development and testing to enhance the 3DELRR program. 

3DELRR remains an option for the Marine Corps to replace its long range TPS– 

59 radar, sometime after 2020. 

Mr. MAFFEI. Secretary James and General Welsh, in a budget constrained environment I believe that it is incumbent upon each of us to ensure that every system 

is as affordable and efficient as possible. Each service can no longer afford to purchase unique solutions that are similar, but only slightly different to what other 

branches may already have. 

I understand that both the Army and the Air Force are in the process of procuring 

single mission ground radars. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps are developing a multimission radar called Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) which was just approved for Milestone C and has been approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council (JROC). 

As you know, there was language in the Senate Defense Appropriations Committee reports for the FY2012 and 2014 that recommended the Air Force and Army 

minimize redundancy and maximize platform commonality while pursuing procurement of new ground radar solutions to reduce development and life-cycle costs. Similarly, both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have included report 

language in the past that encouraged the Services to look at reducing redundancy 

in ground radar programs. 

There has been over $500 million invested in the flexible, scalable, multi-mission 

Marine Corp’s G/ATOR program. I understand that if the Air Force chooses to procure a G/ATOR variant for its Three Dimensional Long Range Radar (3DELRR) program that it could generate significant cost-savings at a lower risk and an accelerated schedule. Additionally, I believe that this option could further yield savings to 

the tax payer by lowering the per unit cost to the Marines for each G/ATOR unit. 

How is Air Force incorporating this past congressional guidance encouraging commonality and reducing redundancy into its 3DELRR competition and how does it intend to leverage the significant progress that has been made in G/ATOR to date towards it needs? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PETERS 

Mr. PETERS. The FY15 budget included a significant investment in next-generation jet engine technology development. How does the Air Force envision the scope 

of the project moving forward and what does it means for industry? Will the technology build on the existing F–135 engine or be a brand new engine? When does 

the Air Force expect to down-select to one competitor? 

Secretary JAMES. The Air Force has invested in adaptive engine technologies 

through the Adaptive Versatile Engine Technology (ADVENT) effort (FY07 to FY13) 

and the Adaptive Engine Technology Development (AETD) effort (FY12 to FY16). 

The acquisition strategy for the new engine technology is still in development; however, the Air Force is working to maintain competition as long as possible in this 

follow-on effort. If DOD is held to sequestration levels for FY16–FY19, there will 

be no funds for the next generation engine technology program. 
140 

All future aircraft engines are likely to benefit from technologies proven through 

this program. In addition, the anticipated fuel savings could free-up funds for the 

Air Force to invest in the modernization of other Air Force warfighter capabilities. 

The next generation engine program, a follow-on to AETD, will further mature 

adaptive engine technologies through extensive ground testing to facilitate integration and flight testing. The emphasis is on proving advanced component and subsystem maturity prior to incorporation into major systems. 

The Air Force is now in the process of developing the acquisition approach, so specific program titles, goals, and milestones are yet to be defined. However, the next 

generation engine program has an objective of reducing specific fuel consumption by 

25% and improving range by 30%, which will be game-changing for the Department’s capability to operate in anti-access/area-denial environments. The program 

will increase performance, durability, and efficiency in jet engines and bolster the 

nation’s engine industrial base for the future. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SCOTT. The savings projection cited from retiring the A–10C’s is $3.7 billion, 

yet it is acknowledged that the A–10 is the most affordable combat aircraft per flying hour. Has the cost premium from flying other CAS capable aircraft been 

factored in to the projected savings? There is also a cost differential when considering the munitions employed by different aircraft. The F–16 other aircraft typically 

have higher munitions costs associated with their use than the A–10. Additionally, 

please detail the impact of additional contract termination costs, new training costs 

associated with transitioning pilots to CAS missions, and other factors associated 

with the A–10’s that would mitigate the projected savings from retiring the A–10 

fleet. 

Secretary JAMES. The FY15 budget constraints forced difficult decisions regarding 

overall fighter force capacity and capability. The decision to divest the A–10 was 

based on prioritizing new capability and readiness above near-term risk in capacity, 

to ensure a more capable and ready force for 2023 and beyond. Subsequently, the 

Air Force is pursuing investments in capabilities the Air Force uniquely provides 

to the joint force and the Nation, such as global, long range, multi-role platforms 

capable of operating in highly contested environments against a determined, wellarmed, and well-trained adversary. Under current fiscal constraints imposed by 

Budget Control Act (BCA), the Air Force cannot afford to retain a single-mission 

tactical aircraft with limited capabilities in such an environment. Furthermore, several other Air Force platforms, including the F–15E, F–16, B–1 and B–52, are capable of conducting the CAS mission and have successfully performed CAS missions 

in combat over the past 12 years. 

Additional data and analysis will be provided to the congressional defense committees in a classified setting. 

Mr. SCOTT. The savings projection cited from retiring the A–10C’s is $3.7 billion, 

yet it is acknowledged that the A–10 is the most affordable combat aircraft per flying hour. Has the cost premium from flying other CAS capable aircraft been 

factored in to the projected savings? There is also a cost differential when considering the munitions employed by different aircraft. The F–16 other aircraft typically 

have higher munitions costs associated with their use than the A–10. Additionally, 

please detail the impact of additional contract termination costs, new training costs 

associated with transitioning pilots to CAS missions, and other factors associated 

with the A–10’s that would mitigate the projected savings from retiring the A–10 

fleet. 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS 

Mr. BROOKS. There has been a lot of discussion recently about the Air Force’s decision to retire its A–10 aircraft, the service’s primary close air support (CAS) platform. It seems to me that an efficient way to counter the increased risk associated 

with divesting the A–10 would be to arm other fixed-wing aircraft like the F–16, 

the F–15E, B–1s and AFSOC platforms with the most precise missiles and guided 

munitions available. 

General Welsh, I understand that the United Kingdom developed, with U.S. and 

UK suppliers, a Dual Mode Brimstone (DMB) missile which the UK has used extensively on Royal Air Force Tornado G4 fighter aircraft in combat CAS operations over 

Afghanistan and Libya. The fully developed DMB is being offered to the U.S. for 

consideration on multiple U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force platforms. 
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In the critical CAS environments in which the USAF will operate do you see the 

DMB missile as a valuable addition to the weapons array needed by Air Force F– 

16s, F–15Es, B–1s and AFSOC for those CAS missions? 

General WELSH. Over the last few years, the Air Force has closely monitored and 

evaluated the Dual Mode Brimstone missile. We agree the weapon’s performance in 

combat is excellent. However, the Air Force is committed to SDB–II because it has 

a Tri-Mode Seeker, greater stand-off distance, can be employed in bad weather, defeats moving targets, and costs less. The Air Force believes SDB–II provides greater 

operational capability and flexibility. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. VEASEY 

Mr. VEASEY. General Welsh, our pivot to Asia in our national security strategy 

will be an important focus of this committee. This is a critical region to U.S. interests and clearly we want to maintain the best possible intelligence collection capabilities in this theater. The FY2015 budget proposes to begin retiring the U–2 high 

altitude intelligence and reconnaissance aircraft and relying on other platforms to 

fulfill that mission. 

When the U–2 goes out of service will we still be able to fulfill all of the high 

altitude intelligence collection requirements we have in the Pacific? 

Will we be able to continue monitoring activities in North Korea without regard 

to weather conditions as we can now with the U–2? 

Will other assets provide the same sort of flexibility to react in a crisis and the 

same capabilities as the U–2? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. VEASEY. General Welsh, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2007 prohibits the Air Force from retiring the U–2 Surveillance Aircraft until 

the ‘‘Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that the intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance capabilities provided by the U–2 aircraft no longer contribute 

to mitigating any gaps in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities 

identified in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.’’ If the FY15 budget submission 

effectively retires or begins the process to retire the U–2, have the conditions of the 

FY07 NDAA been met? More importantly, will the retirement of the U–2 result in 

ISR gaps in support to the warfighter? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. VEASEY. General Welsh and Secretary James, did any of the Combatant Commanders have input into the decision to retire the U–2s or offer their views? If so, 

what was their recommendation? 

General WELSH. During the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD)-led FY15 Program Budget Review process, each Combatant Commander was consulted and had 

an opportunity to offer their respective views to the Secretary of Defense on the 

OSD decision to retire the U–2 in FY16. As General Welsh noted in previous HAC– 

D testimony in March 2014, ‘‘ISR constitutes the No. 1 shortfall of the Combatant 

Commanders year after year and they (Combatant Commanders) would never support even more cuts than we already have in our budget proposal.’’ However, the 

specific views and recommendations by each Combatant Command are held with 

OSD. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. WALORSKI 

Mrs. WALORSKI. The Aerial Refueling mission is an integral part of U.S. airpower, 

significantly expanding deployment, employment, and redeployment options available by increasing the range, payload, and flexibility of our air forces. 

Given the Air Force Commission’s recent recommendation that the Air Force ‘‘entrust as many missions as possible to its Reserve Component forces,’’ which will result in significant cost savings, can you speak to how you will meet air refueling 

requirements from Combatant Commanders and the 2013 National Defense Strategy, and specifically what role Reserve forces do play and will play in this important 

mission? In 2016 and beyond, will the much-needed KC–46 be quickly and equally 

integrated into Reserve forces along with Active forces? 

Secretary JAMES. The Aerial Refueling mission has a long history of significant 

Reserve Component (RC) participation. Today’s force mix ratio—where the Active 

Component (AC) provides forces at a 1:2 deploy-to dwell ratio supported by the RC 

using a mix of volunteerism and mobilization on a 1:5 mobilization-to-dwell ratio— 

ensures the Air Force meets the global air refueling requirements as directed by 

Combatant Commanders and the 2013 National Defense Strategy. Given current 

funding levels, the Air Force expects both the AC and RC air refueling forces to 
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maintain readiness and capability. However, reverting to strict Budget Control Act 

funding caps in Fiscal Year 2016 and beyond will hinder our ability to use the RC 

at its current operational tempo. 

The RC has been involved in the KC–46A program since day one and the Air 

Force is pursuing concurrent fielding of the KC–46 across all components. Additionally, the Air Force is committed to establishing active/reserve associations at all 

CONUS main operating bases to include the Formal Training Unit. Classic Associations with Air Force Reserve Command are programmed for Altus AFB and McConnell AFB, while an Active Association with the Guard is planned for Pease ANGB. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. The Aerial Refueling mission is an integral part of U.S. airpower, 

significantly expanding deployment, employment, and redeployment options available by increasing the range, payload, and flexibility of our air forces. 

Given the Air Force Commission’s recent recommendation that the Air Force ‘‘entrust as many missions as possible to its Reserve Component forces,’’ which will result in significant cost savings, can you speak to how you will meet air refueling 

requirements from Combatant Commanders and the 2013 National Defense Strategy, and specifically what role Reserve forces do play and will play in this important 

mission? In 2016 and beyond, will the much-needed KC–46 be quickly and equally 

integrated into Reserve forces along with Active forces? 

General WELSH. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

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