HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL 

COMMUNITY RESILIENCE TASK FORCE

RECOMMENDATIONS

JUNE 2011
Community Resilience Task Force Report

2

Table of Contents

Community Resilience Task Force ......................................................................................... 3

Executive Summary................................................................................................................ 3

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 6

Resilience in Context: Homeland Security ............................................................................. 8

1.0 Over-Arching Findings and Recommendations...............................................................12

2.0 Individual and Community Resilience .............................................................................19

3.0 Urban Planning for Resilient Communities......................................................................24

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................33

Appendix A..............................................................................................................................34

Community Resilience Task Force: Tasking..........................................................................34

Appendix B..............................................................................................................................35

Community Resilience Task Force Membership....................................................................35

Appendix C..............................................................................................................................37

Subject Matter Experts ..........................................................................................................37

Appendix D..............................................................................................................................38

Selected References on Resilience .......................................................................................38

Appendix E..............................................................................................................................40

Recommendations Specific to NGOs ....................................................................................40

Appendix F ..............................................................................................................................41

City of Fargo and FEMA’s Regulations..................................................................................41

Appendix G..............................................................................................................................48

'Tsunami Warning, Preparedness, and Interagency Cooperation: Lessons Learned'.............48

Appendix H..............................................................................................................................55

DHS Press Release: DHS Announces Grant Guidance for Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 

Preparedness Grants ............................................................................................................55

Appendix I ...............................................................................................................................58

Return on Investment Estimates............................................................................................58
Community Resilience Task Force Report

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Homeland Security Advisory Council

Community Resilience Task Force

Executive Summary

Resilience was identified in the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) Report 

as one of three foundational elements essential to a comprehensive approach to homeland 

security; the report also defines Ensuring Resilience to Disasters as one of five missions of the 

Department. Members of the Community Resilience Task Force (CRTF) view those actions as 

a prescient prelude to the emerging national resilience imperative. The recent Presidential 

Policy Directive on National Preparedness (PPD-8) tasks the Secretary of Homeland Security to 

lead the charge in enhancing national resilience while also making clear the complex nature of 

this responsibility, which is shared with diverse stakeholders across the homeland security 

enterprise.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) clearly has an important role to play in building 

national resilience, but at its core, the resilience charge is about enabling and mobilizing 

American communities. The CRTF acknowledges that many relevant activities are already 

underway, particularly in fostering development of preparedness capabilities, but observes that 

those activities are rarely linked explicitly to resilience. Thus, the Task Force identified an 

urgent need for clear articulation of the relationships and dependencies between resilience and 

other homeland security efforts—particularly preparedness and risk reduction. Clarification of 

these relationships is crucial both to build shared understanding across diverse stakeholder 

communities and to motivate action throughout the Nation. A more integrated approach also 

offers opportunities to identify and leverage synergies across programs, enabling conservation 

of scarce resources. 

The CRTF offers the

conceptual framework shown 

in Figure 1 as a starting point 

for describing the 

relationships between 

resilience, preparedness, and 

risk reduction. The findings 

and recommendations 

provided in this report will be 

most effective if they build 

from a coherent view of these 

interdependent relationships.

The CRTF identified two key 

facets to national resilience 

and therefore formed subpanels to consider separately 

Before

Prevent,

Protect,

Mitigate

Resist

During

Respond

Absorb

After

Recover, 

Mitigate

Recover or 

Adapt

CAPABILITIES

Preparedness

OUTCOME

Resilience

Event Phases

Figure 1. Conceptual relationships between Preparedness, Resilience, 

and Risk Reduction.

Reduce

failure 

probability

Reduce 

time to 

recovery

Reduce consequences from failure

PRIORITIZATION

Risk Reduction
Community Resilience Task Force Report

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resilience stemming from people, their individual and collective actions, and resilience of the 

built environment that delivers essential services to the communities and regions in which 

people live. Primary recommendations are provided below.

Recommendations that apply across the full range of Community Resilience activities include:

Recommendation 1.1: Build a Shared Understanding of the Shared Responsibility. 

DHS should take the lead in working with key stakeholder groups to develop and share 

models for resilience—illustrations of resilience in operational settings—within the context 

of each group. The purpose is to motivate stakeholders to learn from each other and to do 

what they can to enhance resilience without waiting for external intervention.

Recommendation 1.2: Build a Coherent and Synergistic Campaign to Strengthen 

and Sustain National Resilience. DHS should align policies, programs, and investments 

to motivate and operationalize resilience, and should use its leadership charge from PPD-8 

to motivate similar actions across the federal government and throughout the Nation.

Recommendations 1.3: Organize for Effective Execution. DHS should establish a 

National Resilience Office and charge it with building the resilience foundation envisioned 

by the QHSR.

Recommendation 1.4: Build the Knowledge and Talent Base for Resilience. DHS 

should implement a research program to build the intellectual underpinnings for resilience 

training and education programs to be delivered throughout the Nation.

Recommendations related to enhancing individual and societal resilience include:

Recommendation 2.1: Update ready.gov. DHS should establish and execute a plan for 

periodic review and refresh of the content and presentation of information on ready.gov; 

messages should be linked explicitly to resilience outcomes.

Recommendation 2.2: Build Public Awareness. DHS should develop and implement a 

comprehensive and coherent suite of communications strategies in support of a national 

campaign to increase public awareness and motivate individual citizens to build societal 

resilience.

Recommendation 2.3: Motivate and Enable Action. DHS should adapt and implement 

proven incentive and award programs to motivate individual and community engagement 

and action, and further develop mechanisms to facilitate and enable engagement.

Recommendations targeting urban planning for the built environment include:

Recommendation 3.1: Leverage Existing Federal Assets. DHS, in conjunction with the 

General Services Administration and local officials, should develop a Resilient Community 

Initiative (RCI) that leverages federal assets and programs to enable community resilience.

Recommendation 3.2: Align Federal Grant Programs to Promote and Enable 

Resilience Initiatives. DHS should review and align all grant programs related to 

infrastructure or capacity building, and should support development of synchronized 

strategic master plans for improvement of operational resilience throughout the Nation. 
Community Resilience Task Force Report

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Recommendation 3.3: Enable Community-Based Resilient Infrastructure Initiatives. 

DHS should transform its critical infrastructure planning approach to more effectively enable 

and facilitate communities in their efforts to build and sustain resilient critical infrastructures.

Recommendation 3.4: Enable Community-Based Resilience Assessment. DHS 

should coordinate development of a community-based, all-hazards American Resilience 

Assessment (ARA) methodology and toolkit.

Related findings, together with a more complete elaboration of each recommendation, are

provided in sections 1-3. Also included are brief vignettes to illustrate key points of discussion. 

Appendices include a list of relevant references from published literature that may be helpful in 

development of follow-on efforts, as well as a more complete explanation for selected vignettes.

The CRTF believes the time is right for DHS to embrace the PPD-8 mandate, coupling 

resilience explicitly into development of the National Preparedness Goal by using the subelements of resilience to describe target levels of preparedness in terms of desired outcomes in 

addition to outputs (capabilities).
Community Resilience Task Force Report

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Introduction

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, major infrastructure failures like the Northeast 

Blackout of 2003, natural disasters including Hurricane Katrina in 2005, catastrophic accidents 

such as the Gulf of Mexico Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in 2010, and the spate of severe 

weather events in the spring of 2011 vividly demonstrate that America must cope with a diverse

spectrum of adverse events. In the wake of such incidents we must be equipped to mitigate

immediate and cascading effects and sustain, or rapidly restore, essential community

infrastructures and business capacities—doing so with minimum individual, societal, and 

economic consequences. But such resilience does not occur without strategy—embodied in 

operational plans, supported by targeted investment, and tested for effectiveness—together with

appropriate mechanisms to motivate and assess progress.

A growing number of government documents highlight the resilience imperative. The National 

Security Strategy1 notes that “national security draws on the strength and resilience of our 

citizens, communities, and economy...It must also include a commitment to building a more 

secure and resilient nation...” The QHSR Report2

More recently, the Presidential Policy Directive 

on National Preparedness (PPD-8)

identifies resilience as one of three 

foundational elements essential to a 

comprehensive approach to homeland security, 

describing the need to “foster individual, 

community, and system robustness, 

adaptability, and capacity for rapid recovery.” It 

further identifies “Ensuring Resilience to 

Disasters” as one of five DHS missions.

3

And the International Strategy for Cyberspace

released on March 30, 2011 is “aimed at strengthening the 

security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that 

pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber attacks, 

pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters.” While PPD-8 is intended to “galvanize action 

by the Federal Government,” it also acknowledges the “shared responsibility of all levels of 

government, the private and nonprofit sectors, and individual citizens.” PPD-8 tasks the 

Secretary of Homeland Security to “coordinate a comprehensive campaign to build and sustain 

national preparedness, including public outreach and community-based and private-sector 

programs to enhance national resilience, the provision of Federal financial assistance, 

preparedness efforts by the Federal Government, and national research and development 

efforts.”

4

 1 The White House (2010). “National Security Strategy.” p. 10. 

published in May 2011 identifies as a key policy 

priority: “Protecting Our Networks: Enhancing Security, Reliability, and Resiliency.”

www.whitehouse.gov. 2 Department of Homeland Security (2010). “Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic 

Framework for a Secure Homeland,” p. ix. www.dhs.gov.

3 The White House (2011). “Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8: National Preparedness.” www.whitehouse.gov. 4 The White House (2011). “International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a 

Networked World,” P. 18. www.whitehouse.gov. 

Ensuring Resilience to Disasters

Despite ongoing vigilance and efforts to protect 

this country and its citizens, major accidents 

and disasters, as well as deliberate attacks, will 

occur. The challenge is to build the capacity of 

American society to be resilient in the face of 

disruptions, disasters, and other crises.

QHSR Report
Community Resilience Task Force Report

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The federal government plays a vital role in building and sustaining national resilience, as is 

indicated by the growing strategic emphasis noted above. But this is an immense task that 

involves stakeholders throughout every sector of the Nation—public and private. PPD-8 calls 

for DHS leadership as it coordinates a ‘comprehensive campaign’ in cooperation and 

collaboration with other stakeholders as is implied by the ‘shared responsibility’ clause of the 

directive. Both top-down and bottom-up strategies are needed to achieve the envisioned wholeof-Nation resilience; but at its core, the resilience charge is about enabling and mobilizing 

American communities.

Global history includes examples of what were termed resilient societies. The British stiff upper 

lip throughout World War II and, more recently, the resolve British citizens showed after the July 

2005 bombings, evidenced by resuming train service the following day, are often cited as 

exemplars. Israel’s ability to motivate public vigilance and foster individual preparedness 

underpin its societal resilience in the face of ongoing terrorist attacks. Some argue that the U.S.

was resilient in the aftermath of 9/11, although the economic and societal toll extracted from our 

Nation went well beyond the ‘ground zero’ destruction. Recent press cites a number of

examples of Japan’s resilience in the aftermath of the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami.5

The question then becomes: How can we build a more resilient nation—one that proactively 

adapts to change and rapidly recovers from disruption when things do not go as anticipated? 

Moreover, how can we ensure that our citizens, the communities in which they live, and the 

organizations and businesses that deliver essential goods and services—all of which are vital to 

a functioning society—are resilient?

 

And news coverage of the floods and tornados plaguing the Nation in 2011 often spotlights 

examples of individual resilience amidst widespread destruction.

The Homeland Security Advisory Council’s (HSAC) Community Resilience Task Force (CRTF)

was established to provide Secretary Napolitano with recommendations to enable the 

Department to establish and implement community-based resilience policies, programs and 

practices throughout the Nation. Key points from the Secretary’s tasking to the HSAC are 

summarized below:

• How can we increase individual and community engagement and participation in 

resilience capacity building and sustainment?

• How should we build, design, and incorporate security and resilience into urban 

planning?

• How can we better plan and resource acquisition across the federal government in 

support of national, regional, state, tribal, local, and individual resilience efforts?

The full charge to the CRTF is provided in Appendix A.

To those ends, from December 2010 to June 2011, the CRTF conducted a series of conference 

calls, meetings, and deliberations, engaging national Subject Matter Experts to address this 

 5

See, for example: 

“On Northeast Coast, Portraits of Japanese Resilience,” www.npr.org, 26 April 2011; 

“From past tragedies comes Japan’s legacy of resilience,” Kelly Kennedy, USA TODAY, 14 March 2011; 

“Japan’s Resilience,” Steve McCann, American Thinker, 26 April 2011.
Community Resilience Task Force Report

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foundational homeland security challenge. Led by Chairman Governor Martin O’Malley and 

Vice Chairs Dr. Ruth David and Mr. Jeff Moss, the CRTF developed a series of findings and 

recommendations described in this report. CRTF Membership is provided in Appendix B and a 

list of the Subject Matter Experts who briefed the Task Force is provided in Appendix C.

In many of the examples referenced above, resilience stemmed from individual / cultural /

societal behaviors that served to mitigate the effects of disruption / destruction of the ‘built 

environment’

6

The report begins with a discussion of resilience in the context of homeland security to provide a 

backdrop to the CRTF’s recommendations. Over-arching findings and recommendations are 

provided in section 1; findings and recommendations specific to each of the two sub-panels are 

provided in sections 2 and 3. 

. This suggests there are two key facets to national resilience. The CRTF 

therefore formed two sub-panels to consider separately resilience stemming from people, their 

individual and collective actions, and resilience of the built environment that delivers essential 

services to the communities and regions in which people live. 

Resilience in Context: Homeland Security

Resilience is a time-tested goal; its origins date back to the 1620s when it was used to convey 

“to rebound, recoil.”7

 A rich history of research and application of the term within domains 

ranging from ecological sustainability to societal and infrastructure resilience exists in the 

literature; a sampling of relevant publications is provided in Appendix D. Resilience entered the 

homeland security lexicon more recently8

Resilience in homeland security mission 

context is defined in the DHS Risk Lexicon 

as shown in the box at right. The QHSR 

Report identified resilience as a foundational 

element for homeland security but did not 

explicitly connect the term to other aspects 

of the mission. 

, but much of the prior research, particularly work 

conducted in the past two decades, is directly applicable to this mission. 

CRTF members see resilience as a goal—a 

desired outcome—that is relevant across a 

broad spectrum of homeland security 

strategies—from prevention to recovery, 

including preparedness. The resilience subfactors (resist, absorb, recover, adapt) define 

 6 “The term ‘built environment’ refers to the human-made surroundings that provide the setting for human 

activity, ranging in scale from personal shelter and buildings to neighborhoods and cities that can often include 

their supporting infrastructure, such as water supply or energy networks.” Source: Wikipedia.

7 Dictionary.com, "resilience," in Online Etymology Dictionary. Source location: Douglas Harper, Historian. 

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resilience. http://dictionary.reference.com. Accessed: May 24, 2011. 8 Resilience formally entered the Homeland Security lexicon in January 2006 with the public announcement of the 

recommendations contained in the Homeland Security Advisory Council’s Critical Infrastructure Task Force Report, 

which can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSAC_CITF_Report_v2.pdf. Accessed June 1, 2011.

Resilience

Definition: ability to resist, absorb, recover from or 

successfully adapt to adversity or a change in 

conditions.

Extended Definition:

1) Ability of systems, infrastructures, 

government, business and citizenry to resist, 

absorb, recover from, or adapt to an adverse 

occurrence that may cause harm, destruction, 

or loss of national significance

2) Capacity of an organization to recognize 

threats and hazards and make adjustments 

that will improve future protection efforts and 

risk reduction measures

DHS Risk Lexicon, September 2008

www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_risk_lexicon.pdf
Community Resilience Task Force Report

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subordinate objectives that contribute to the overall degree of resilience and provide useful 

targets for measures implemented to enhance resilience. The Critical Infrastructure Task Force 

Report9

The QHSR Report notes that “for the past 7 years, homeland security has rested on four key 

activities—prevention, protection, response, and recovery.”

noted that “strategies based on resilience address all three components of the risk 

equation in an integrated fashion.” Thus, resilience provides a unifying goal for a risk-based 

framework within which individual strategies and activities can be more effectively 

described and prioritized. The task force believes this view is consistent with DHS’s definition

of resilience (as cited above) and adds value by describing relationships between resilience and 

other homeland security strategies.

10

National Preparedness addresses the 

continuum of event phases, providing a

comprehensive approach to building and 

sustaining the capabilities required for 

each activity. It necessarily emphasizes 

actions to be taken ‘before’ an adverse 

event even when the benefits may not be 

realized until the ‘during’ or ‘after’ phases. 

Priorities focus on capabilities needed to 

address “those threats that pose the 

greatest risk to the security of the Nation.” 

 PPD-8, in defining National 

Preparedness, extends this construct to include mitigation as shown in the box below. These 

activities can be mapped to three phases 

in time—before, during, and after an

adverse event (phase boundaries may be 

blurred by the nature of an event). 

Activities before an event emphasize

prevention, protection, and mitigation; as 

an event unfolds attention turns to

response; and post-event activities focus 

on recovery as well as mitigation of 

impacts from future events. 

The relationships between resilience, preparedness, and risk described above were inferred 

from individual documents as cited. The CRTF believes there is value in development of a 

conceptual framework that more clearly describes these relationships and offers the discussion 

that follows as a starting point.

Synthesis of the key concepts described above yields a more holistic framework that enables 

clearer articulation of the ‘what’ (capabilities) and ‘why’ (outcomes) of preparedness within a 

risk-based decision framework (prioritization). Concatenation of the underlying principles yields: 

National Preparedness refers to actions taken to build and sustain capabilities that reduce risk

 9 Ibid. p. 5. [In the report, the three components of risk are defined as threat, vulnerability, and consequence.]

10 Department of Homeland Security (2010). “Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic 

Framework for a Secure Homeland,” p. 14. www.dhs.gov.

“National Preparedness” refers to the actions 

taken to plan, organize, equip, train, and exercise to 

build and sustain the capabilities necessary to 

prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, 

respond to, and recover from those threats that 

pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation.

“Prevention” refers to those capabilities necessary 

to avoid, prevent, or stop a threatened or actual act 

of terrorism.

“Protection” refers to those capabilities necessary 

to secure the homeland against acts of terrorism 

and manmade or natural disasters.

“Mitigation” refers to those capabilities necessary 

to reduce loss of life and property by lessening the 

impact of disasters.

“Response” refers to those capabilities necessary 

to save lives, protect property and the environment, 

and meet basic human needs after an incident has 

occurred.

“Recovery” refers to those capabilities necessary to 

assist communities affected by an incident to

recover effectively.

PPD-8: National Preparedness, Definitions
Community Resilience Task Force Report

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and enable activities (prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, recover) to enhance resilience (ability 

to resist, absorb, and recover or adapt). 

It was observed earlier that preparedness activities can be mapped to three phases—before, 

during, and after an adverse event; this mapping illustrates the employment of preparedness 

capabilities. The sub-factors of resilience defined in the DHS Risk Lexicon—resist, absorb, and 

recover or adapt—can be mapped onto the same three phases and used to describe 

subordinate objectives (outcomes) against which preparedness capabilities (outputs) could be 

measured. Thus, capabilities developed to prevent, protect, and mitigate strengthen our ability 

to resist hazards; response capabilities enable us to absorb impacts; and recovery capabilities 

support a return to normalcy—or adaptation to a new norm which may mitigate future impacts. 

Research on economic resilience offers a related set of risk-based outcomes that also suggest 

useful measures: reduced failure probability, reduced consequences from failure, and reduced 

time to recovery11

Figure 1 illustrates these

conceptual relationships

between preparedness, 

which delivers capabilities

that enable activities;

resilience, which defines 

the outcomes produced 

by those capabilities; and 

risk reduction, which 

supports prioritization of 

capability development.

. These outcomes are analogous to the more general resilience outcomes

and also can be mapped to the three event phases.

Provided below is a brief 

description of how this 

framework could be used 

to help key stakeholders 

better understand their 

roles in enhancing 

national resilience. The discussion is not meant to be comprehensive, but rather to illustrate a 

conceptual approach to integration of activities relating to preparedness, resilience, and risk 

management. 

Activities emphasize prevention of the threat, protection of potential targets 

(which may range from significant national assets to local schools or individual 

homes depending on the stakeholder perspective), and mitigation “to reduce 

loss of life and property by lessening the impact of disasters.”

12

 11 Rose, Adam (2004). “Defining and Measuring Economic Resilience to Disasters.” Disaster Prevention and 

Management: Volume 13, Number 4, pp. 307-314. © Emerald Group Publishing Limited. ISSN 0965-3562.

 The objective is to strengthen

the capacity to ‘resist,’ through strategies to thwart intentional attacks or other man-made 

disasters; through protective measures that reduce the probability of failure, like access controls

12 See PPD-8 definition of Mitigation.

Before

Before

Prevent,

Protect,

Mitigate

Resist

During

Respond

Absorb

After

Recover, 

Mitigate

Recover or 

Adapt

CAPABILITIES

Preparedness

OUTCOME

Resilience

Event Phases

Figure 1. Conceptual relationships between Preparedness, Resilience, 

and Risk Reduction.

Reduce

failure 

probability

Reduce 

time to 

recovery

Reduce consequences from failure

PRIORITIZATION

Risk Reduction
Community Resilience Task Force Report

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or protective barriers; and by taking steps to reduce the consequences of failure, through 

measures such as provision of back-up power or ensuring that critical facilities are not located in 

areas known to be vulnerable to adverse events. Design of protection and mitigation measures, 

in particular, is typically based on assumptions about the level of ‘resistance’ needed (e.g., 

levies that protect against the ‘100-year flood’), but in all practical applications there remains a 

residual risk. Thus, the objective is to implement preventive, protective, and/or mitigation

capabilities that provide sufficient ‘resistance’ to reduce that residual risk to an acceptable level. 

Activities emphasize response “to save lives, protect property and the 

environment, and meet basic human needs after an incident has occurred.”

13

Activities emphasize recovery and/or mitigation of future events, and time 

becomes an important indicator of success. But to make time a useful 

measure, it must be viewed in the context of what constitutes recovery from an 

objective perspective. In the case of critical infrastructure disruptions, recovery may be viewed 

in terms of service levels (e.g., restoration of power to vital facilities like hospitals within a very 

short window of time; power to all homes within a longer window). If a building is destroyed, 

recovery may be viewed either in terms of the time required to relocate and re-establish the 

functionality previously housed there or the time required to rebuild the building. If an entire 

community is destroyed, then recovery often becomes adaptation to a new norm, which may 

include mitigation measures that reduce future risks (e.g., by not rebuilding in flood zones). 

Post-event mitigation activities may stem from lessons-learned from that event or from 

opportunities afforded by the need to rebuild (or both); in either case, such activities serve to 

enhance resilience against future adverse events (and therefore are analogous to mitigation 

activities in the ‘before’ phase).

 

The objective is to build and sustain capabilities that enable the Nation (or 

community, or business, or individual) to ‘absorb’ impacts from an adverse event without 

experiencing serious disruption. Assumptions regarding the magnitude of the event are crucial

in defining preparedness capabilities for response. For example, planners might specify 

hospital capacity to absorb a baseline number of casualties but augment that capacity with more 

flexible arrangements to enable a community to better absorb a larger disaster. Preparedness 

efforts relating to response can be calibrated by specifying desired outcomes in terms of 

absorption capacity required to reduce potential consequences to an acceptable level from a 

risk management perspective.

The CRTF observes that an opportunity exists to adopt such a conceptual approach in 

development of the National Preparedness Goal mandated by PPD-8—using the sub-elements 

of resilience to describe target levels of preparedness in terms of desired outcomes in addition 

to outputs (capabilities). As defined in PPD-8, “National Preparedness refers to the actions 

taken....” In the eyes of the CRTF, those actions will directly impact National Resilience.

 13 See PPD-8 definition of Response.

During

After
Community Resilience Task Force Report

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1.0 Over-Arching Findings and Recommendations

The CRTF identified four top-level findings and recommendations that must be addressed to 

strengthen individual and societal resilience together with that of the built environment. The 

recommendations that follow stem from the fact that resilience is not well understood by key 

homeland security stakeholders; it therefore has not been treated as an integral element of 

plans and programs to date. In addition, the intellectual underpinnings needed to build 

resilience into a true foundational element for homeland security are not yet mature.

The CRTF believes that ‘resilience’ is seen as 

jargon in that it too often is used imprecisely. 

References to resilience are increasingly 

heard from White House and other federal 

officials, but the descriptions of what is meant 

remain both varied and abstract. Regionallyfocused resilience initiatives are gaining

momentum, yet a common understanding and 

standard measures that would enable 

assessment of the current state of resilience 

have not emerged. 

Of particular concern is a perception that resilience relates only to recovery in the aftermath of a 

disaster and therefore need not be considered when planning for preventive, protective, 

mitigation, and response capabilities. The recently released PPD-8 on National Preparedness 

describes resilience as “the ability to adapt to changing conditions and withstand and rapidly 

recover from disruption due to emergencies,” which implies that resilience is not separable from 

protection, mitigation, and response, and therefore must be central to preparedness planning, 

but PPD-8 does not describe those relationships. The CRTF believes that resilience is indeed a 

foundational concept for homeland security and proposed in the previous section a conceptual 

framework that links the various homeland security activities to resilience outcomes. Further, 

task force members believe:

♦ Resilience has deterrent value—making systems/assets/communities resilient makes them 

less attractive targets; it therefore is integral to prevention. 

♦ Resilience has protective value—it improves communities’ abilities to resist blows stemming 

from disruption of infrastructure or other community services.

♦ Resilience planning enables communities to more effectively respond and recover from 

natural and manmade disasters—to absorb impacts and adapt to altered conditions. True 

resilience requires changes in culture; stakeholders at all levels must ask and answer the 

hard questions, such as “what would we do if outside assistance was delayed?”

♦ Resilience must be ‘front-loaded’ into preparedness efforts, not seen as an after-thought 

following an event, when efforts to enhance resilience may be hampered by association with 

failure. CRTF members are concerned that resilience may be unpopular among some 

public safety officials due to the implication that the need is driven by anticipation of failure, 

but the reality is that a manmade or natural disaster will eventually occur. It is myopic not to 

consider ‘the day after’ in preparedness planning.

Finding 1.1: Resilience is not yet 

commonly understood by the diverse 

stakeholder groups upon whom progress 

depends; although PPD-8 calls for shared 

responsibility across all levels of 

government, the private and nonprofit 

sectors, and individual citizens, their 

respective roles and responsibilities 

remain unclear.
Community Resilience Task Force Report

13

In short, the CRTF believes that the high level definition of resilience provided in government 

documents is necessary but insufficient in that it does not describe resilience through the eyes 

of the homeland security stakeholders.

There is no one-size-fits-all approach to 

building and sustaining national resilience. 

The priorities of local governments are 

different from those of small business owners 

even in the face of a common threat. 

Geographically distributed corporations with a 

presence in communities throughout the 

nation have a still different set of priorities, as 

do the operators of our Nation’s critical 

infrastructures. And all of these stakeholder 

groups are dependent—to varying degrees—

on the behaviors and actions of individuals, 

as citizens, employees, and/or customers. 

While every stakeholder group is itself diverse, the CRTF believes there is value in identifying 

the common ground for shared objectives in terms of stakeholder-specific models that illustrate

what constitutes resilience within the operational context of particular groups. Such models 

could build a shared understanding while also facilitating development of common measures of 

resilience. Significant opportunities exist to learn from the experience of other nations as well as 

from local, regional, and private sector 

resilience initiatives already underway. 

The BART vignette in the box at right

provides one example of lessons-learned 

in the aftermath of a disaster that was 

translated into a more robust response 

capability to mitigate future impacts, and 

ultimately into better daily service for 

customers; in this case, the mitigation 

measures yielded benefits well beyond 

preparedness for a future adverse event. 

Sharing of such exemplars with other 

localities as they develop their own 

evacuation plans could help foster 

community resilience while also building an 

awareness of peripheral benefits that might 

accrue from preparedness investments.

DHS should engage existing associations

and organizations (e.g., Chamber of 

Commerce, Boy Scouts of America, Girl 

Scouts of America, Veteran Service 

organizations, faith-based organizations,

San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART)

The attacks of 9/11/01 occurred just as the morning 

rush service in the Bay Area was ending. As news 

was received, workers understandably were anxious 

to leave the downtown work centers and return 

home. BART had to immediately reconfigure transit 

service and provide a reverse commute period.

After this experience the transit agency created a 

notification system reaching all major employers in 

the cities’ business centers that allows immediate 

communication of the service plan, informs

customers what service is available when, and 

better manages the crush loads of people rushing to 

stations during emergencies. This capability helps

reduce the attendant risks of station overcrowding 

and creating another target of opportunity or 

otherwise unsafe conditions for the public. 

Taking this communications objective a bit farther 

and providing direct communication with customers 

wanting to use BART, the agency developed 

several social media communications strategies.

Using both Twitter and Facebook, customers can 

opt in to receive notifications of major service 

changes, disruptions or other current information

about service schedules and on-time performance.

Recommendation 1.1: Build a Shared 

Understanding of the Shared 

Responsibility. DHS should take the lead 

in working with key stakeholder groups to 

develop and share models for resilience—

illustrations of resilience in operational 

settings—within the context of each group. 

The purpose is to motivate stakeholders to 

learn from each other and to do what they 

can to enhance resilience without waiting for 

external intervention.
Community Resilience Task Force Report

14

and other associations with direct reach into various communities) in a collaborative effort to 

develop these stakeholder-specific resilience models. Many such groups have both a local 

presence throughout the nation as well as a national organization that could be enlisted to help 

synthesize shared objectives in support of national resilience initiatives.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) constitute a unique stakeholder group in that they 

sometimes are the most knowledgeable, efficient, operationally-experienced, locally-based, and 

trusted “go-to” entities for disaster response and recovery. But, as with any community-based 

activity, NGO capabilities and capacities are at risk and must be made operationally resilient. 

Collaborative initiatives in partnership with NGOs may provide valuable opportunities to explore, 

test and evaluate, and learn from prototype resilience initiatives—developing models for 

resilience with broad applicability. Appendix E provides more specific recommendations.

The stakeholder-specific models of resilience should be consistent with the umbrella definition

articulated in the National Security Strategy and PPD-8—providing a shared understanding of 

the shared responsibility for national resilience—but should provide sufficient fidelity to enable 

assessment/measurement and motivate progress toward enhancing national resilience. Once 

developed, DHS should ensure that these models are shared through targeted 

awareness/educational campaigns to foster action throughout the Nation and should 

subsequently examine the efficacy of such campaigns; once again, key stakeholder groups

should be enlisted to help promulgate the message. 

Efforts described above will further mature our collective understanding of resilience as it relates 

to other homeland security plans and programs. In parallel with this process, actions are 

needed to more effectively enable and motivate stakeholders to execute their shared 

responsibilities for building national resilience.

Numerous studies14

The federal government is the largest single customer and funder of homeland and national 

security related capabilities. A majority of current DHS grants go toward static 

preventive/protective measures. While a necessary beginning, new grants must empower 

states and local governments to build and sustain certifiably resilient communities—and by 

extension—a more resilient America. Anecdotal feedback to the CRTF indicates that some 

legacy grant programs may actually be working at cross-purposes—impeding rather than 

enabling progress toward national resilience. The Red River Valley vignette provided below

illustrates this concern. A more complete description of this issue is provided in Appendix E.

have been conducted—by 

governmental, non-governmental, and private 

sector organizations—and resilience standards 

have been suggested. Yet there are no policies, 

national objectives, or promulgation of the specific 

means required to actually assess, achieve, or 

sustain resilience. PPD-8 directs the Secretary of 

Homeland Security to develop a national preparedness goal that is “informed by the risk of 

specific threats and vulnerabilities” but makes no mention of national resilience as an outcome.

 14 See Appendix D for selected references.

Finding 1.2: The enhancement and 

sustainment of national resilience is not 

yet uniformly motivated by DHS via 

policies, programs, or investment.
Community Resilience Task Force Report

15

In 2010, DHS incorporated resilience 

engineering considerations for planners in the 

amendments to the DHS Acquisition Planning 

Guide. These amendments, which became 

mandatory on 1 October 2010, demonstrate 

that the Department is committed to adopting 

the goal of resilience in its management of the 

DHS enterprise. The inclusion of resilience 

issues in procurement planning across the 

federal government inter-agency community

provides an opportunity to make more 

efficient use of resources, better serve the 

public, and exemplify DHS leadership in 

building national resilience.

FEMA’s initiative to incorporate a “Whole 

Community Philosophy” into preparedness 

planning for catastrophic events is another 

commendable example of an effort to build 

community resilience, yet that aspect of the 

initiative is not emphasized. 

The CRTF observed that a number of 

initiatives already underway will, over time, 

enhance community resilience, but additional 

work is needed. In particular, most relevant 

activities make little (if any) mention of their 

contribution to building resilience.

Using the stakeholder-specific models described in 

Recommendation 1.1, DHS should foster 

identification of specific resilience objectives for 

key groups to enable integration of their efforts into 

a national resilience framework and strategy. The 

objectives must be action-oriented and 

accompanied by clear measures of effectiveness 

that could feed a ‘resilience dashboard’ at the 

national level to help motivate progress and thwart 

complacency. Development of a common 

lexicon—i.e. a shared understanding—is vital to 

this recommendation. Stakeholders at all levels 

must understand how their individual activities 

contribute to community and national resilience.

Red River Valley Floods

Current FEMA policy does not allow for flood 

mitigation structures to be constructed on 

property acquired under the hazard mitigation 

grant program. In areas of frequent flooding, 

FEMA’s policy results in funding being used 

repeatedly to construct temporary levees. In 

North Dakota alone, temporary levees have 

been constructed year after year, only to be 

removed at the end of flooding season, incurring 

significant costs for FEMA and local 

communities. 

Whole Community

To ensure that our efforts become part of an 

interconnected plan of action, we are focused on 

our “Whole Community” initiative. . .

As the name of the initiative indicates, it is truly 

the whole community that must be prepared to 

respond in ways that extend beyond the normal 

paradigms in which we have traditionally 

operated.

Testimony of Administrator Craig Fugate, FEMA

U.S. House Transportation and Infrastructure 

Committee

Subcommittee on Economic Development, 

Public Buildings, and Emergency Management

March 31, 2011

Recommendation 1.2: Build a 

Coherent and Synergistic 

Campaign to Strengthen and 

Sustain National Resilience. DHS 

should align policies, programs, and 

investments to motivate and 

operationalize resilience, and should 

use its leadership charge from PPD-8 

to motivate similar actions across the 

federal government and throughout 

the Nation.
Community Resilience Task Force Report

16

Research relating to resilience measures can be found in the literature. The Software 

Engineering Institute, for example, is developing a CERT® Resilience Management Model15 to 

guide enterprise planning and development. Work conducted at Pennsylvania State University 

set forth a general resilience framework including performance measures for technical, 

organizational, social, and economic dimensions,16

DHS policies, programs, and investments should then be aligned to drive local progress as 

evidenced by subordinate measures of performance. Specifically, future Federal Grants should 

empower state and local resilience efforts; and existing programs should be carefully scrutinized 

and adjusted as necessary to mitigate unintended consequences stemming from conflicting or 

stove-piped grant guidelines. Additional specifics regarding alignment of grant programs are 

provided in Section III.

and suggests performance criteria for 

resilience attributes defined as robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity for each 

dimension of that framework. DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate is currently funding 

work at the University of California, Irvine intended to develop a quantitative index of 

psychosocial impacts of disasters and terrorism (including measurement of the population’s 

health, social functioning and public trust) using publicly available statistics, archival and 

administrative data. These are only three examples from a vast array of literature that could 

inform development of common objectives and measures to underpin the national resilience 

campaign. DHS should drive convergence of relevant prior work toward a common framework 

and lexicon to enable derivation of standard measures of resilience for the homeland security 

mission.

Further, it is necessary to bring the whole-of-government together to underpin the whole-ofNation campaign to strengthen and sustain national resilience. DHS should ensure that its own 

activities are well-integrated, and then should exercise its leadership role in advocating that all 

federal agencies incorporate resilience considerations into their planning, budgeting, and 

acquisition processes. 

Resilience-related programs and responsibilities 

are distributed throughout headquarters and the 

operational components. As noted above, 

resilience is not separable from efforts targeting

prevention, protection, preparedness, response, 

or recovery, but those relationships and 

interdependencies have not been articulated. 

Strategies and programs remain disconnected; and potential synergies are not being realized. 

DHS must lead by example in bringing coherence to national resilience initiatives.

The CRTF applauds the DHS Policy Office for its formation of the Department-wide Resilience 

Integration Team (RIT), viewing this as a good first step. The RIT has a number of important 

initiatives in progress and others under development, but the CRTF sees the need for a more 

 15 Software Engineering Institute (2010). “CERT® Resilience Management Model, Version 1.0; Process Areas, 

Generic Goals and Practices, and Glossary. © 2010 Carnegie Mellon University. http://www.cert.org/resilience/

16 Rose, Adam (2004). “Defining and Measuring Economic Resilience to Disasters.” Disaster Prevention and 

Management; Volume 13, Number 4, pp. 307-314. © Emerald Group Publishing Limited. ISSN 0965-3562.

Finding 1.3: DHS activities would 

benefit from more effective coordination 

and integration as organizational 

components work to build the resilience 

foundation for homeland security.
Community Resilience Task Force Report

17

comprehensive role in fostering development of the resilience foundation for homeland security 

and does not believe the RIT has sufficient authority or resources to deliver on this mandate.

To successfully engage communities in building 

resilience requires a clear mandate from the top; the 

National Resilience Office would serve as a direct 

conduit to, and representative of, the Secretary of 

DHS for this homeland security foundational element. 

The CRTF also sees a need for strategic and policy 

leadership; the National Resilience Office should be 

charged with providing leadership, coordination, and 

integration across a broad array of activities, including:

♦ Planning: Develop national resilience policies and programs; refine policies and programs 

based on assessment and analysis (as described below); prioritize funding to implement

research-supported policies.

♦ Assessment: Leverage the results from prior recommendations to develop comprehensive 

and consistent resilience metrics (e.g., time to restoration, capacity to absorb) to improve 

shared understanding and sound investment, enabling achievement and sustainment of 

acceptable levels of all-hazards resilience throughout the Nation. Monitor efforts towards 

resilience at all levels of government and within communities.

♦ Analysis: Identify key variables that shape the effectiveness of resilience efforts (e.g., level 

of understanding and resulting action by the public in achieving resilience indicators). 

Evaluate how resilience efforts at the infrastructure, business, community, and individual 

levels could enhance the self-reliance and continuity capacities of these entities and reduce 

the need for more expensive Federal Government response and recovery efforts. Develop 

research-informed policy options. 

♦ Motivate: Develop case studies to illustrate the Resilience Return on Investment (RROI) to 

help communities and businesses understand the advantages of being more resilient, and to 

educate and inform key decision-makers with regard to policy choices. 

♦ Engage: Directly engage Executive Branch departments and agencies, the Congress, 

businesses, communities, non-governmental and faith-based organizations, professional 

associations, and state and local governments throughout the Nation to accelerate national 

resilience efforts. 

♦ Enable: Create a requirement-based information sharing and intelligence capacity to make 

clear the need for key stakeholder resilience to specific threats and hazards. 

As noted earlier, resilience is a mature concept, but its application to homeland security is 

relatively new. While important steps, as recommended above, can be taken immediately, 

additional work is needed to improve the Nation’s understanding of resilience in this context.

Academic programs focused on Homeland Security are maturing in teaching institutions 

throughout the Nation, but an academically rigorous approach to building and sustaining 

resilience as envisioned in the QHSR Report, the National Security Strategy, and PPD-8 has 

not yet emerged.

Recommendations 1.3: Organize 

for Effective Execution. DHS 

should establish a National 

Resilience Office and charge it with 

building the resilience foundation 

envisioned by the QHSR Report. 
Community Resilience Task Force Report

18

Sustaining national resilience over the long term

requires a far deeper understanding of the 

underlying principles and characteristics that 

constitute resilience in highly complex 

environments. This is an inherently multidisciplinary topic that requires engagement of 

diverse communities including physical, social, 

and behavioral sciences; engineering; economics and business; policy and public 

administration; and law and medical practitioners. Additionally, potential synergies exist with 

emerging research and standards focused on sustainability.

Although a great deal of relevant research is underway throughout the U.S. and abroad, the 

CRTF was unable to identify a coherent research agenda that would support development of 

the content needed to underpin an academic program to develop future practitioners. 

A research program is needed to advance the state of practice and to build the talent base 

across the Nation. The research program should 

include a focus on RROI measures to establish

the business case for resilience across the 

diverse stakeholder groups. Significant 

opportunities exist both to learn from and to 

advance the practice of enterprise risk 

management in implementing this program.

DHS also should foster development of

awareness, certification, and degree-producing 

programs for the public, infrastructure operators, businesses, and state and local government 

officials to further their understanding of the resilience culture and profession.

The CRTF believes these over-arching recommendations are essential to improving public 

understanding, empowering stakeholder involvement, and increasing return on investment to 

build community—and by extension—national resilience. Task force members also believe the 

above discussion is fully consistent with Secretary Napolitano’s frequent statement that 

“Homeland security begins with hometown security.”

The sections that follow provide additional findings and recommendations specific to enhancing 

the resilience of the population and improving the resilience of the systems and services that 

support that population.

Recommendation 1.4: Build the 

Knowledge and Talent Base for 

Resilience. DHS should implement a 

research program to build the intellectual 

underpinnings for resilience training and 

education programs to be delivered 

throughout the Nation.

Finding 1.4: The requisite knowledge 

base needed to make resilience a true 

foundational element for homeland 

security does not yet exist.
Community Resilience Task Force Report

19

2.0 Individual and Community Resilience

A key goal of the homeland security mission is to 

develop resilient communities of responsible, 

informed, prepared Americans who are able to 

cope with and adapt in real-time to all-hazards

events, and who actively engage in strengthening 

the resilience of their communities—embracing 

their “shared responsibility” for building and 

sustaining national resilience. The CRTF believes 

shortfalls exist throughout the Nation in awareness 

and understanding of resilience as well as in the 

motivation of individuals and communities to take 

action towards this goal. While DHS has a 

number of relevant activities underway, more 

effort is needed to bring coherence to the 

resilience message and to stimulate progress.

It takes time for police, fire, and other emergency responders to arrive on scene when disaster 

strikes; family members, neighbors, and even strangers are often the first to deliver assistance. 

Furthermore, the demands on emergency responders are more manageable if there are fewer 

‘avoidable victims.’ In the event of a disaster, a resilient public is better equipped to absorb the 

impact and rapidly recover or adapt to the changed environment. This means that individuals 

must be prepared to take immediate steps on their own to help mitigate the consequences.

FEMA implemented www.ready.gov to deliver

information in support of “Ready America. Ready 

Business. Ready Kids.” The site provides a hub for 

various stakeholder groups and includes testimonials 

that illustrate operational preparedness in the 

business context. But a cursory review of the website, 

together with feedback from state and local 

emergency managers, indicates that it does not 

effectively promote individual and community resilience, and it does not integrate resilience

messages with state and local preparedness programs. In addition, while the website has good 

general information for preschool and early elementary school children, it does not include 

interactive information for middle and high school students as would be necessary to build a 

culture of resilience among all Americans. 

CRTF members are also concerned that some information on the ready.gov website is 

inaccurate or does not reflect current scientific standards. Moreover, the disclaimer that appears 

on the ready.gov website may discourage the public from relying on its messages (“We are not 

responsible if information that we make available on this site is not accurate, complete or 

“Resilience begins on the level of 

individuals. A program of resilience would 

promote self-reliance in the face of 

unexpected events, encouraging civilians to 

remain calm when the normal rhythms of life 

get interrupted. It would also teach 

individuals to make themselves aware of the 

risks that may confront them and to be 

resourceful by learning how to react to 

crises. And it would make preparedness a 

civic virtue by instructing civilians to refrain

from requesting professional assistance 

unless absolutely necessary, thus freeing 

up manpower for those in the greatest 

need.”

Stephen Flynn

See Appendix D for citation.

Finding 2.1: The www.ready.gov 

site is a valuable communications 

platform, but shortfalls were noted 

in both content and presentation of 

information. 
Community Resilience Task Force Report

20

current...We reserve the right to modify the contents of the site at any time, but we have no 

obligation to update any information on this site.”)

17

Finally, Task Force members feel that the website has a somewhat sterile/bureaucratic 

presentation that does not grab the attention of the targeted users. In today’s social network /

technology-savvy society, the website would benefit from utilization of other tools to provide 

valuable information in creative and stimulating ways in order to more effectively promote 

resilience / preparedness.

Ready.gov provides a useful array of 

information to its targeted audiences, but it is 

time for a refresh. CRTF members 

encourage a careful review of content to 

ensure that all guidance reflects the latest 

scientific information and recommend that 

the content be reviewed and updated 

regularly. 

Messages should be expanded to include both the ‘what’ and the ‘why’—making clear the 

connection of preparedness to resilience. Task Force members further recommend major 

enhancements to include links to state and territory websites, expansion of the case studies and 

testimonials to include other stakeholder examples, and additional collaborative features to help 

build a shared understanding of resilience. The site also should be adapted to more effectively 

leverage social media technology. The upgraded website should be explicitly tied to the 

national campaign called for in PPD-8 to foster individual and community resilience, which must 

rest on a foundation of national imperative, unity, and shared responsibility—emphasizing 

federal leadership rather than control.

While a more robust ready.gov website will deliver substantial benefits, CRTF members note 

that not all Americans have Internet access. Thus, a more robust array of communications 

strategies is needed, as are measures to assess the effectiveness of those strategies.

DHS has, from its inception, endeavored to raise 

public awareness and motivate individuals to

take basic steps (e.g., stockpiling food and 

medicines, creating emergency plans and kits)

prior to an adverse event. Preparedness efforts 

are rooted in the belief that such actions will 

reduce casualties, amplify the effectiveness of 

existing emergency response capacities, and 

reduce the overall impact of a disaster. Related 

information and communications mechanisms (such as www.ready.gov) continue to mature, but 

the CRTF believes more work is needed in development and communication of clear, actionoriented messages as well as in identification and implementation of new ways to motivate 

individuals to assume personal responsibility.

 17 See http://www.ready.gov/america/other/notices.html).

Finding 2.2: Implementation of the 

PPD-8 mandate to improve societal 

resilience against acts of terrorism and 

natural disasters will require raising the 

level of public awareness to motivate 

individuals to assume personal 

responsibility for preparedness.

Recommendation 2.1: Update ready.gov. 

DHS should establish and execute a plan for 

periodic review and refresh of the content 

and presentation of information on ready.gov; 

messages should be linked explicitly to 

resilience outcomes.
Community Resilience Task Force Report

21

Failure to communicate effectively can 

undermine trust between citizens and 

authorities. Risk communications must reflect 

the best science of that process and assess the 

effects of citizen understanding on societal

resilience. 

Effective communication requires (a) analyzing 

the risks in order to identify the most critical 

information; (b) conveying the information 

comprehensibly to diverse audiences; and (c) providing the resources needed to act on that 

understanding. Communications that are unclear to the intended audience or do not address its 

informational needs may not only fail to help, but also may make matters worse by increasing 

fear or fostering complacency. 

No single message or delivery mechanism works for all audiences. DHS should conduct a 

complete evaluation of the effectiveness of relevant communications programs currently in 

place across DHS and refine as needed. Evaluation of communications effectiveness 

necessitates a review of measures to determine what works and what should be refined (or 

abandoned). Underlying this recommendation is the need to assess and learn from related 

communications efforts at home and abroad. Every disaster provides an opportunity to learn, 

as noted in the vignette at right.

18

Central to this recommendation is the 

need for actionable messages—

individuals must know what they should 

do. If the message targets preparedness, 

which requires ongoing vigilance, it must

be refreshed periodically and associated 

with ‘triggers’ to stimulate action (e.g., 

check your smoke alarm batteries every 

daylight savings time transition, see a 

dentist every six months) to remind 

people to create and maintain their ‘ready 

kits’ or ‘go packs.’ 

The CRTF also believes that a robust television, print, and social media advertising campaign is 

needed to promote the message of individual empowerment and self-reliance, as well as 

infrastructure, business, community, and 

national resilience. Members suggest 

the exploration of novel opportunities to 

promulgate this campaign, particularly on 

broadcast and cable television. 

Television shows and movies have long 

been used to foster new behavioral 

 18 Full text of testimony is provided in Appendix G.

‘Tsunami Warning, Preparedness, and Interagency 

Cooperation: Lessons Learned’

“Another noted phenomenon was that the Hispanic 

community self-evacuated almost to a person. How 

they received the information is unclear, but no 

Hispanic children were in school the day after the 

event, and employers reported very few Hispanic 

workers came to work the day of the event. What 

network they have informally established is 

unclear, but we are looking into it as something 

we may emulate.”

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

Statement of Record; April 14, 2011

Brigadier General Mike Caldwell, Interim Director

Emergency Management Agency, State of Oregon

Novel Ways to Promote Resilience

Content producers of various shows could embed the 

resilience message in the body of their shows, 

reaching the specific demographic of their audience. 

For instance, “Modern Family” or “The Simpsons” 

could feature one member of the family trying to 

convince another family member to be prepared. A

younger demographic could be reached through any of 

the Nickelodeon or Disney series.

Recommendation 2.2: Build Public 

Awareness. DHS should develop and 

implement a comprehensive and coherent 

suite of communications strategies in 

support of a national campaign to increase 

public awareness and motivate individual 

citizens to help build societal resilience.
Community Resilience Task Force Report

22

norms (e.g., by depicting characters not smoking and always putting on their safety belt before 

getting into a car chase); certain resilience behaviors could be similarly modeled.

Additionally, Public Service Announcements (PSAs) featuring actors from the respective shows 

could be produced and aired to promote the national campaign. PSAs tailored to the specific 

(and changing) resilience needs of specific communities should identify shared interests and 

help build trust at all levels of community life. DHS should work collaboratively with content 

creators and network executives to promulgate key messages.

A parallel effort within schools must be initiated to inculcate a renewed sense and mindset of 

personal responsibility. DHS should foster development of community-based resilience 

outreach and education initiatives by supporting school programs that invite firefighters, police 

officers, and other key individuals from local neighborhoods to help deliver the resilience 

message. When and where appropriate, DHS employees should be made available to 

participate in these outreach activities, using such opportunities to elicit community concerns 

and accomplishments in concert with the recommendations in section 1.

The CRTF was pleased to learn that DHS has plans underway to leverage the upcoming 10th

anniversary of 9/11 as an opportunity to promote individual and community resilience and allhazards family preparedness, but has some concerns that the message could get lost in the fray 

of commemorative activities. We therefore recommend that the anniversary events be viewed 

as one phase of a sustained national campaign to increase public awareness regarding the 

resilience imperative.

Instilling and maintaining a state of vigilance is 

extremely difficult when the threat is amorphous or

viewed as unlikely from an individual or local 

perspective; the challenge is to effectively engage 

individuals without creating undue anxiety. 

Recognition and other incentives are commonly used 

by organizations to motivate and reinforce desired

individual behaviors; similar mechanisms are needed 

to promote individual and community resilience.

Even when threats seem both clear and 

imminent, individuals are too often 

unwilling (or unable) to take action. This 

is particularly true for natural disasters 

that often are forecast such that, if 

appropriate actions were taken, 

casualties could be reduced. Motivating 

individuals to heed evacuation mandates 

has proven particularly problematic in 

recent disasters. The counter-example 

in the vignette at right illustrates the 

value of learning how to motivate

individual action.

San Diego Wildfires: Lessons Applied

On October 20, 2007, wildfires erupted in Southern 

California, spanning an area from Santa Barbara 

County to the U.S./Mexican border. 1500 homes were 

destroyed and over 500,000 acres of land were 

burned; 9 people lost their lives and 85 more were 

injured. By October 23, 500,000 people in San Diego 

County had mandatory orders to evacuate. In total, 

945,000 people evacuated into shelters across the 

county. In the aftermath of similar wildfires in 2003, 

both San Diego County and City installed telephone 

reverse call-down emergency warning systems; 

findings indicate that those that received a reverse 

emergency warning call were much more likely to 

evacuate than those who did not receive a call.

Finding 2.3: Complacency is a 

serious threat to building and 

sustaining national resilience; clear 

communications to increase public 

awareness is a necessary first step, 

but individuals must be motivated to 

take action.
Community Resilience Task Force Report

23

In tandem with Recommendations 2.1 and 2.2, 

DHS should assess the effectiveness of its 

communications programs through ongoing 

evaluation of whether individuals take the 

recommended actions, compiling lessons to 

enable refinement of strategies illustrated as in 

the San Diego vignette. Additional activities, 

such as those described below, should be 

initiated to further motivate and enable action. 

DHS should implement a Homeland 

Security Resilience Awards Program to 

recognize individuals who help build and 

sustain operationally resilient communities.

The CRTF believes a DHS-sponsored 

national program would enable the 

Department to spotlight role models for

community resilience, motivating others to 

emulate their efforts, and notes that at least 

one related program already exists, as 

illustrated in the box at right. 

The CRTF believes that DHS should adopt 911 as the universal three-digit national 

security hotline linked to the ‘If You See Something, Say Something’ campaign. At 

present, citizens are asked to “report suspicious activity to local law enforcement or call 911.” 

The use of multiple reporting channels delays (and potentially impedes) the analysis and 

synthesis of related information. A single nationwide number for all security-related calls would 

be beneficial from at least two perspectives. First, it would enable analysis and trending of 

information; second, it would permit formal recognition of individuals who contribute high-value 

information via the ‘See Something, Say Something’ campaign to motivate broader participation 

as suggested below.

Recommendation 2.3: Motivate and 

Enable Action. DHS should adapt

proven incentive and award programs to 

motivate individual and community 

engagement and action; and further 

develop mechanisms to facilitate and 

enable engagement.

Tayloe Murphy Resilience Awards

The Resilience Awards is a statewide competition 

targeting strong, resilient businesses located in 

communities facing tough economic conditions. 

“A finalist or winning business in this competition 

defines Resilience—the ability to bend but not 

break, to weather the storm and come out stronger 

for it, to thrive in the face of adversity.”

Gregory B. Fairchild, Executive Director

Tayloe Murphy Center, Darden School of Business

University of Virginia: www.darden.virginia.edu

SEE SOMETHING...SAY SOMETHING

In May 2010, a New York street vendor happened to see an SUV smoldering in Time Square. He

chose to do something by pointing out the vehicle to an NYPD officer.

In February of this year, workers at Carolina Biological Supply of Burlington, NC happened to notice 

a strange order from Lubbock, TX. They chose to contact the FBI. 

Similarly, employees of Con-Way Freight in Lubbock received a package they deemed suspicious 

and chose to notify their internal security department in Ann Arbor, MI.

These ordinary citizens became local heroes because they did in fact, “See Something, Say 

Something.” No one knows how many lives their actions may have saved or how much property 

damage was averted by following the simple direction of the DHS campaign. Both the individuals and 

the employers enjoyed their “15 minutes of fame.” 

Today most Americans could not name Carolina Biological Supply or Con-Way Freight nor identify 

Lance Orton, the New York street vendor. Their legacies should have been captured, recognized and 

used as models for the program. The President and his Cabinet travel frequently; a stop to present a 

plaque, shake hands and pose for pictures might motivate others to See Something, Say Something. 

These people chose to make a difference; perhaps altering the course of history.
Community Resilience Task Force Report

24

3.0 Urban Planning for Resilient Communities

Urban and regional planners develop long and short-term plans for the use of land and the 

growth and modernization of urban, suburban, and rural communities and the regions in which 

they are located. They help local officials forecast and preempt or alleviate social, economic, 

and environmental problems by recommending locations for roads, schools, and other 

infrastructure and suggesting zoning regulations for private property—to meet existing and 

future community continuity needs.

Urban planners play important roles in supporting new development, in community renewal/ 

revitalization, and also in redevelopment in the aftermath of disasters. Each chance for 

intervention is accompanied by opportunities as well as constraints. 

Urban planners are today confronting the 

need to build more sustainable 

communities; an opening exists to establish 

resilience as an equally important planning 

objective as well as to identify and leverage 

potential synergies between resilience and 

sustainability19

Although urban planning occurs primarily at 

the local / regional level, the federal 

government needs a voice in order to build 

and sustain national resilience. Intervention 

opportunities exist particularly in 

redevelopment in the aftermath of disasters 

since the federal government is often called 

upon to support the recovery process. That 

role can be leveraged, however, through 

resilience-related policies as well as

federally-backed insurance programs and 

grant programs targeting areas such as 

preparedness and critical infrastructure 

resilience. 

objectives. NGOs including 

the Institute for Sustainable Infrastructure, 

described in the box at right, provide 

opportunities for collaboration as well as 

models and measures that may be adapted 

to resilience initiatives.

Most catastrophic events have two things in common: (1) they are relatively localized, but have 

the potential for cascading impacts and consequences; and (2) they are typically unexpected. 

 19 “Sustainability is a set of environmental, economic and social conditions in which all of society has the capacity 

and opportunity to maintain and improve its quality of life indefinitely without degrading the quantity, quality or 

the availability of natural, economic and social resources.” American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) BoardApproved definition, October 28, 2009.

Institute for Sustainable Infrastructure (ISI)

Founded by National Engineering & Public 

Works Associations

A new, independent non-profit organization tasked 

with developing and administering a sustainability 

rating system for North American infrastructure, the 

ISI, is formulating a rating system founded on the 

“triple bottom line” concept of sustainability, which 

includes environmental, economic and social 

considerations. The system, which is designed to 

identify the benefits of sustainable practice for 

owners, regulators and practitioners, will be 

formally launched in the summer of 2011 as a 

voluntary, web-based product. The ISI system will 

include an option for third-party verification, and will 

be applicable to a wide range of infrastructure 

projects, from roads and bridges to energy and 

water systems. Its robust, objective and 

transparent methods will also promote community 

and policy acceptance of sustainable solutions and 

encourage knowledge sharing, innovation and 

collaboration in the design, construction and 

maintenance of infrastructure.

Joint Press Release, February 1, 2011

American Council of Engineering Companies

American Public Works Association

American Society of Civil Engineers 
Community Resilience Task Force Report

25

These realities indicate the need for increased attention to operational resilience. Operational 

resilience demands deliberate, pragmatic, and innovative planning; it is distinguished from 

response and recovery efforts because it precipitates proactive, long-term solutions and must 

be central to future urban planning efforts. In the conceptual framework described in the 

Introduction, such planning is analogous to mitigation activities in the ‘before’ phase in that it is 

intended to increase the capacity to ‘resist’—reducing both the probability of failure and the 

consequences should failure occur (e.g., limitation of cascading effects).

The federal government has an opportunity to lead by example, using existing assets and 

resources to support local and regional operational resilience initiatives. 

Just as the military provides MREs—Meals Ready to Eat—to our soldiers who often find 

themselves in harm’s way, the Federal government could help provide much needed SRGs—

Shelters Ready to Greet—to Americans who find 

themselves in harm’s way on the home front. 

Such an initiative would improve a community’s 

capacity to absorb the impact of an adverse 

event.

The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) 

is the landlord20

The Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995 and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 

dramatically increased GSA’s long-term resilience-based continuity planning for Federal 

facilities. Subsequently, the government established new security standards for its facilities, 

which led to a new set of procurement requirements. All new Federal buildings are designed to 

meet the higher security standards, and in the decade since 9/11, GSA has made great strides 

in hardening its existing real estate portfolio to protect the Federal workforce. 

of the Federal government. GSA 

owns or leases over 354 billion square feet of 

office space in over 8,000 buildings nationwide 

on behalf of numerous Federal departments and agencies. A small percentage of these assets 

are today designated ‘shelters in place,’ capable of providing safe refuge to area residents 

caught in the throes of a local disaster; the CRTF sees great value in increasing that 

percentage.

Every DHS/FEMA plan, assessment tool, and pre-scripted Mission Assignment includes a 

housing/shelter requirement. In a disaster situation, the plans outline the immediate deployment 

of equipment, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ portable generators, fresh-water 

trucks, and portable phone clusters.

If GSA were to require accommodations for common exterior connections for portable 

electricity, water, and communications infrastructure (voice and data) for select Federal 

facilities, the ability of emergency responders to address the needs of the local community 

would increase dramatically. The need for ad-hoc evacuations and communications could be 

greatly reduced, while also minimizing impacts on the continuity of critical community services 

and government operations. Under normal circumstances, government work in the retrofitted 

 20 Attached is a web link that will lead to a complete state-by-state listing of federal facilities. 

www.iolp.gsa.gov/iolp/NationalMap.asp

Finding 3.1: The federal government 

has significant assets that could be 

leveraged to enable community 

resilience at modest additional cost, and 

an opportunity to promulgate standard 

approaches to build operational 

resilience in local communities.
Community Resilience Task Force Report

26

buildings would be unaffected. In the event of a disaster, however, regular government 

operations might be interrupted to support protection of the public (though it is likely that 

operations would suspend regardless). 

With GSA’s extensive real estate portfolio of well-maintained and often fortified buildings, there 

is enormous potential for DHS to partner with GSA to increase the number of shelter in place 

locations in federally owned buildings throughout the Nation. CRTF members believe that by 

using GSA’s purchasing power, the cost to retrofit existing Federal assets to serve as SRGs 

would be reasonable. Likewise, the Federal government could help communities procure 

materials necessary to renovate other local infrastructure, including office buildings, schools, 

and training facilities, to function as safe havens for minimal cost. Over time, Shelters Ready to 

Greet could become the norm rather than the exception among Federal facilities, and in the 

process of creating them, America will build capabilities that better ensure the protection of its 

citizens and the operational resilience of its communities.

Through a series of strategic investments, the DHS/GSA partnership could help jump-start a 

national push for community resilience at a reasonable cost, especially considering that the cost 

to recover from a catastrophic event is likely to be 

substantially greater21

Consistent with local conditions, a Resilient 

Community Initiative (RCI) would develop building 

codes and corresponding procurement requirements to 

accommodate necessary disaster infrastructure in 

select public facilities.

than what it costs to prepare for 

such an occurrence.

The CRTF also believes that DHS and GSA should 

craft requirements for new Federal construction to 

include major renovation projects for new and existing federally-owned facilities with an 

emphasis on building operational resilience. Members perceive an opportunity to leverage the 

approximately $23 billion that FEMA and DHS have provided for state and local projects over 

the past five years to encourage and incentivize communities to adopt similar procurement 

regulations.

DHS and FEMA have begun a "bottom up review" of Public Assistance (PA) under the Stafford 

Act with the intended purpose of making the grant program more flexible to the grantee and sub 

grantee while still ensuring accountability to the 

taxpayer and compliance with Federal statutes and 

requirements. They should be applauded for this effort 

and their interest in making the program more effective 

and responsive.

Throughout this review, creation and sustainment of

community resilience should be a major consideration 

in evaluating the success of the PA Grant Program as 

well as the backdrop for any recommended changes. In addition, other DHS grant programs 

 21 See Appendix I for references providing a spectrum of relevant cost/benefit estimates.

Recommendation 3.1: Leverage 

Existing Federal Assets. DHS, in 

conjunction with the General 

Services Administration and local 

officials, should develop a Resilient 

Community Initiative (RCI) that 

leverages federal assets and 

programs to enable community 

resilience.

Finding 3.2: Legacy grant 

programs do not effectively 

support building and sustaining 

the resilience of the built 

environment in communities 

throughout the Nation.
Community Resilience Task Force Report

27

should be reviewed to assure that statutory language, policies and procedures (including

interpretation of these policies and procedures) enable and promote operational resilience 

initiatives.

For example, current interpretation of the 

Hazard Mitigation Grant Program under the 

Stafford Act only allows the use of mitigation 

funding in the construction of ‘36 hour’ safe 

rooms, which are effective for tornados and 

other disasters that may require 36-hour 

sheltering, but not for disasters such as 

hurricanes where sheltering for longer periods 

of time is often necessary. This interpretation 

limits the ability of communities to build longer 

term shelter capacity as close to the impact 

area as safely possible; such ability would 

enable individuals and families to return to their 

homes and businesses quickly, thereby helping 

their communities recover more rapidly. The 

box at right illustrates the impact of this 

constraint during Hurricane Gustav.

Louisiana’s recovery efforts from the 

infrastructure devastation due to back-to-back 

hurricanes in 2005 have also been constrained 

by legacy grant programs as illustrated in the 

box at right.

Homeland security grant programs provide

myriad other funding mechanisms that could 

be used to enhance the operational resiliency 

of states and local communities throughout the 

Nation. The Homeland Security Grant 

Program (HSGP), consisting of five grant 

programs that include State Homeland 

Security Program (SHSP), Urban Areas 

Security Initiative (UASI), and the Emergency 

Management Performance Grants (EMPG),

are large programs that if better synchronized 

could allow state and local governments to 

develop more comprehensive resilience

requirements and spending plans to make 

community resilience a certifiable and 

sustainable nation-wide reality. These grants, 

and others like the Port Grants, Fire Grants 

Hurricane Gustav

During Hurricane Gustav in 2008, the Federal 

Government spent over $100.0 million dollars 

to evacuate and shelter individuals and families 

needing assistance. This delayed bringing 

communities back on line and was much more 

expensive (and burdensome to the sheltering 

states). The cost to evacuate these citizens

needing assistance by air, rail, and coach bus, 

was significantly more expensive than 

evacuation by school bus and caused greater 

delay in recovery than sheltering closer to or 

even within the impact area. While Louisiana is 

working toward being sheltering independent, 

the "36 hour safe room" interpretation does not 

allow the State to use currently available 

Hazard Mitigation Grant Funding to build new 

or harden existing shelter facilities.

2005 Louisiana Hurricanes

South Louisiana was devastated by 

infrastructure and recovery failures associated 

with two back-to-back hurricanes in 2005 –

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Almost six (6) 

years after the storms, recovery is less than 

40% complete. Louisiana’s experience has 

been that the Public Assistance Grant Program 

is extremely cumbersome because it is based 

on regulations requiring a building by building 

approach to recovery. Communities need a 

new, integrated, and broader approach using 

solid planning support, which in many cases is 

beyond the community’s capability, and a “whole 

of community” approach to empower predictable 

response and recovery. Simply bringing a 

damaged facility back to its pre-storm condition 

does not necessarily restore the community, and 

does not foster the operational resiliency 

necessary to anticipate, prepare for and ensure 

the community can survive and efficiently cope 

with the next event with the attendant human, 

property, economic and social consequences.
Community Resilience Task Force Report

28

and grants administered through the Department of Health and Human Services, tend to be 

departmentally and functionally stove-piped, thus inhibiting a more comprehensive and 

integrated planning and execution process.

The CRTF observes that in the Press 

Release22

DHS should expand the scope of its ‘bottom up’ review of grant programs to encompass the full 

portfolio of relevant programs, ensuring they are not stove-piped and are promoting an 

integrated ‘whole of community’ approach to building operational resilience. The ‘bottom up’

review should assess the need for planning support for communities to help them build local 

‘master plans’ for use by urban planners and others whose activities impact the community’s 

operational resilience. Sustainability considerations should be integrated into the master plans

when feasible. 

announcing grant guidance for 

fiscal year 2011 preparedness grants, 

‘resilience’ was mentioned only three 

times (Transit Security, Freight Rail 

Security, and Intercity Passenger Rail); 

this represents a missed opportunity to 

make the connection between 

preparedness capabilities and resilience 

outcomes.

A model that may provide useful lessons is 

provided by the experience and approach 

adopted by Greensburg, Kansas, which chose 

to rebuild a community markedly different from 

the town destroyed by a tornado in 2007, as 

illustrated in the box at right.

In support of the recommendation for ‘Shelters 

Ready to Greet,’ CRTF members believe the

interpretation of the Hazard Mitigation Grant 

Program should be broadened from safe 

rooms to allow for the construction or 

hardening of operationally resilient mass care 

shelters.

This thorough review of all existing FEMA grant programs is to ensure that they are 

complementary, encourage public-private partnerships, and support community resilience 

efforts throughout the Nation; it is a necessary first step. Subsequently, DHS should exercise its 

leadership role in building national resilience to work with other federal departments and 

agencies (e.g., Health and Human Services) to align and synchronize their relevant grant 

guidelines and procedures such that they also help build and sustain operational resilience

throughout the Nation. 

 22 Press Release text is provided in Appendix H. 

Greensburg, Kansas

On May 4, 2007, Greensburg, Kansas was hit 

by an EF5 tornado, which destroyed 95% of the 

city and severely damaged the remainder. 

Greensburg is working to rebuild in an 

environmentally sustainable way in accordance 

with its “Greensburg Sustainable 

Comprehensive Plan.” The plan introduction 

notes that “this is not about disaster recovery 

but instead a strategy to benefit from an 

opportunity to build replicable systems capable 

of change from the ground up.” 

http://greensburgks.org/recovery-planning

Recommendation 3.2: Align Federal Grant 

Programs to Promote and Enable Resilience 

Initiatives. DHS should review and align all 

grant programs related to infrastructure or 

capacity building, and should support 

development of synchronized strategic master 

plans for improvement of operational resilience

throughout the Nation. 
Community Resilience Task Force Report

29

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) defined U.S. policy for critical 

infrastructure protection and established a framework for stakeholders to identify, prioritize, and 

protect the critical infrastructure in their 

communities, with emphasis on protection from 

terrorist attacks. The directive defined 17 critical 

infrastructure sectors and designated a federal 

Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) to lead protection 

and resilience-building programs and activities 

within each. [DHS established an 18th sector, the 

Critical Manufacturing Sector, in March 2008.] 

Local communities represent nodes at the intersections of multiple critical infrastructure sectors, 

each of which has planning considerations and drivers that extend well beyond the confines of a 

single community. There are, nonetheless, shared interests; communities cannot build 

operational resilience absent resilient infrastructure systems to deliver essential services. At the 

same time, local governments make decisions that could impact the resilience of infrastructure 

systems (e.g., channeling of back-up cables into close proximity to conserve right-of-way but 

creating a single point of vulnerability to disruption). Rather than planning sector-by-sector 

(infrastructure-by-infrastructure), however, urban planners employ a holistic, community-centric 

approach that is not well-matched to the sector-focused methodology of the federal government.

Infrastructure systems are degrading throughout the Nation. Public funding for essential 

systems is at an historic low level, and future funding is uncertain. Communities see a growing 

list of needs absent the resources to address them. Public infrastructure enables modern 

civilization, but all infrastructure systems are not of equal importance; furthermore, an 

infrastructure system that is vital to one community may be far less critical to another. Individual 

communities must identify those systems that are essential to maintain daily life and facilitate 

rapid recovery from disaster, and implement an integrated approach to build and sustain the 

resilience of those infrastructures. The sector-focused approach that is central to federal 

planning for critical infrastructures is of limited value in helping communities analyze and 

prioritize investment options. 

DHS should meld its top-down sectorfocused planning methodology with a 

bottom-up community-based approach to 

facilitate and support urban planning as well 

as other local efforts to enhance operational 

resilience; it also should ensure that 

infrastructure-related grants explicitly 

motivate and support community-based 

operational resilience initiatives.

Communities can enhance operational resilience by taking positive steps to overcome known 

vulnerabilities before a disaster occurs. One good example is the ability to maintain adequate 

electrical power to crucial facilities and emergency responders. Modern society is totally 

dependent on receipt of dependable power, but disasters can destroy or disrupt the electrical 

grid. A community should identify those facilities that must function no matter what happens. 

Recommendation 3.3: Enable 

Community-Based Resilient 

Infrastructure Initiatives. DHS should 

transform its critical infrastructure planning 

approach to more effectively enable and 

facilitate communities in their efforts to build 

and sustain resilient critical infrastructures.

Finding 3.3: The sector-focused 

approach that dominates critical 

infrastructure planning at the federal 

level does not effectively support 

community-based resilience initiatives.
Community Resilience Task Force Report

30

Rather than depending on the electrical grid to survive the disaster, the community could elect 

to provide on-site electrical generators to power critical equipment. By providing on-site power, 

emergency responders never lose communication or the ability to review emergency planning 

actions. Moreover, critical water systems will stay on line and other identified essential systems 

will continue to operate. Positive action ahead of time is a great step towards rapid recovery. 

The CRTF notes that stakeholders are already taking action to improve the operational 

resilience of key infrastructure components. Two examples are highlighted below. 

To increase the number of sites available for use as public shelters during emergencies, 

Maryland’s Interagency Committee on School Construction (IAC) is in the process of 

implementing regulations to require that each project proposing the construction of a new school 

or the upgrade of the electrical system at an existing school include the wiring to accept 

emergency electrical power from mobile generators. Pre-wiring school facilities to receive 

mobile generators as they are built is a cost-effective way to increase the number of public 

shelter sites that have full backup electrical power capabilities and are able to provide the 

FEMA-required Functional Needs Support Services elements for emergency shelters.

Louisiana is developing a Business Emergency Operations Center to facilitate better 

communication and coordination through public-private partnerships. 

Post-Katrina Maryland Legislation

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the State of Maryland passed legislation (House Bill 770, 

“Emergency Plans for Human Services Facilities”) requiring long term care and larger assisted living 

providers with 50 or more residents to develop emergency preparedness plans to address the 

continuity of operations within their facilities in the event of an emergency or disaster. Built upon 

lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, the plans must address: notifications to family and staff; 

notification and consultation with the State government; staff coverage, organization, and assignment 

of responsibilities in an emergency; procurement of essential goods, equipment and services; a 

relocation plan for residents to alternative facilities; and evacuation, transportation, and shelter in 

place plans for residents. Maryland’s Department of Health and Mental Hygiene’s Office of Health 

Care Quality (OHCQ) oversees management and execution of the program, which has included 

providing training on emergency preparedness across the state, an annual survey process to review 

whether facility emergency plans are in compliance, and partnering with the industry to facilitate 

additional training among providers. OHCQ has also established, as best practices, an audit of 

emergency generators to ensure that the facilities are capable of sheltering in place for at least 72 

hours, and developed a checklist template for use by all facilities, which is available on the OHCQ’s 

website to assist in the facilities’ development of Emergency Plans. 

Louisiana Business Emergency Operations Center

Through a Cooperative Endeavour Agreement, Louisiana has used EMPG funds to begin developing 

the Louisiana Business Emergency Operations Center (LABEOC). A stand-alone facility, the 

LABEOC is interconnected with the State EOC in Baton Rouge. It is designed to improve disaster 

preparedness and response by:

1. Improving communications to and from business and industry before, during, and after a disaster;

2. Utilizing a business model when more efficient and cost effective to respond to resource and other 

requests; and 3. Leveraging the critical infrastructure representatives in the LABEOC to help bring 

communities back online while receiving real-time economic impact information important in 

determining level of state and federal assistance.

The LABEOC also facilitates better communication and coordination through the public-private 

partnerships with the requests and needs of nonprofits through national and state VOADs. This 

model has gained the attention of DHS, and neighboring Gulf states, which have expressed interest 

in establishing Business Emergency Operations Centers within their own states.
Community Resilience Task Force Report

31

Examples such as those described above provide valuable models that could be emulated by

other states and local communities; DHS should facilitate the sharing of local initiatives as it 

promotes critical infrastructure resilience throughout the Nation.

No discussion of resilience of critical infrastructure 

is complete without addressing the issue of 

sustainability, bringing economic, environmental, 

and social impacts into the consideration of how 

communities are built. Resilient infrastructures 

need not degrade natural, social, and economic 

resources, as illustrated in the vignette at right. 

DHS should promote the coupling of resilience and 

sustainability initiatives in urban planning and 

redevelopment. 

The Nation is empowered by critical, complex, and 

interdependent cyber and physical infrastructure 

systems. While essential to the conduct of every 

facet of daily life, many of these systems are old, 

overstressed, inconsistently maintained, and 

vulnerable to attack and/or exploitation. Moreover, 

these complex systems may contain ‘single points of failure’ that can lead to costly and 

cascading effects, as was demonstrated by the Northeast Blackout of 2003 (see box below).

While individual communities cannot 

prevent occurrence of catastrophic failures

of critical infrastructures, they must 

understand the likelihood and implement 

strategies to mitigate the potential 

consequences. 

A more localized example is provided by 

the Port of Baltimore. A terrorist attack—or 

a severe accident—at that port could lead 

to a complete port closure and, depending 

on the level of uncertainty surrounding the 

incident, could lead to other port closures 

as well. Such an event could impact

geographically distributed regions of the 

Nation. The result would be to severely 

disrupt supply chains and the flow of critical 

commodities like oil with immediate and 

cascading effects for the entire region and 

perhaps the Nation as a whole. 

Community leaders are today limited in their ability to assess the local implications and

vulnerabilities as a result of failure(s) of some element(s) of the Nation’s critical infrastructure, 

Embedded Sustainability

A major roadway that serves as a critical 

avenue of evacuation, a relief supply 

route, or an emergency responder 

throughway could be designed to include

recycled materials, bio-swales to improve 

stormwater quality, and native landscaping 

to enhance the area while providing for 

critical functionality. 

Finding 3.4: Individual communities 

may be severely impacted by 

infrastructure failures outside their 

local control.

Northeast Blackout of 2003

“On August 14, 2003, large portions of the Midwest 

and Northeast United States and Ontario, Canada, 

experienced an electric power blackout. The 

outage affected an area with an estimated 50 

million people and 61,800 megawatts of electric 

load...power was not restored for 4 days in some 

parts of the United States. Parts of Ontario 

suffered rolling blackouts for more than a week 

before full power was restored. Estimates of total 

costs in the United States range between $4 billion 

and $10 billion (U.S. dollars). In Canada, gross 

domestic product was down 0.7% in August, there 

was a net loss of 18.9 million work hours, and 

manufacturing shipments in Ontario were down 

$2.3 billion (Canadian dollars).”

U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force

Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout

https://reports.energy.gov/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf 
Community Resilience Task Force Report

32

and must therefore work to develop mitigation initiatives to improve operational resilience in the 

aftermath of such system failures. 

The CRTF recommends development of an 

American Resilience Assessment (ARA) 

methodology and toolkit to help communities 

identify risks, develop community resilience 

requirements, and where appropriate, build

adaptive capacities (e.g., alternate logistics 

paths) to mitigate potential impacts from 

critical infrastructure failures. 

The CRTF noted that resilience provides a unifying objective for a risk-based framework within 

which individual initiatives and strategies can be more effectively described and prioritized. The 

ARA should be developed within this context and should establish the relationships between 

threat, vulnerability, and consequence—the basic components of risk—as they relate to 

resilience. Research on economic resilience cited earlier describes risk-based outcomes that 

may also be useful in this regard: reduced failure probability, reduced consequences from 

failure, and reduced time to recovery23

The ARA should be developed in collaboration with the private sector and professional 

associations, and should include a lessons-learned and best practices sharing mechanism to 

help design and build operational resilience into all facets of community planning throughout the 

Nation. It also should serve as an education and awareness tool, enabling urban planners and 

local leaders to better understand their respective roles in building community resilience.

. The ARA must explicitly address probability as it relates 

to the threat assessment and thus impacts the risk equation; important probability 

considerations are highlighted in the box that follows.

The CRTF believes that development of the ARA should be informed by related tools and 

methodologies that can be found in the research literature, but that additional resilience-specific 

research will be required as described in Recommendation 1.4 to develop a methodology that is 

useful across the diverse homeland security enterprise.

 23 Rose, Adam (2004). “Defining and Measuring Economic Resilience to Disasters.” Disaster Prevention and 

Management: Volume 13, Number 4, pp. 307-314. © Emerald Group Publishing Limited. ISSN 0965-3562.

Probability Considerations

In the design of critical infrastructure, the concept of probability as used in design is really another 

name for “probably” when evaluating whether a natural disaster could occur. Creating resilient 

communities will require us to make distinctions between infrastructure that is critical (potable water, 

emergency transportation) and infrastructure that is important (drainage courses, local roadways). 

Designers are tasked with creating facilities that meet published design codes and criteria. Those 

codes may not adequately prepare a community for probable natural disasters. 

For example, levees in the US are routinely designed to protect from the 100-year event. This event 

has a probability of 1% of occurring every year. Engineers and meteorologists will tell you that a 100-

year event will definitely occur at some point. The general public, seeing massive structures, may be

lulled into a false sense of security about their safety. The levees of New Orleans remain a prominent 

example of this problem. Resilient communities may select more stringent design criteria for critical 

infrastructure systems to better protect against disasters and support rapid recovery.

Recommendation 3.4: Enable CommunityBased Resilience Assessment. DHS 

should coordinate development of a

community-based, all-hazards American 

Resilience Assessment (ARA) methodology 

and toolkit.
Community Resilience Task Force Report

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The BART vignette below illustrates several aspects of the envisioned ARA methodology, 

including incorporation of lessons-learned as well as risk-informed design trades. 

A resilient cyber infrastructure is an increasingly important enabler of community resilience. The 

CRTF did not separately consider this highly complex and interdependent infrastructure, but the 

recommendations above are applicable to this domain as well as to physical infrastructures. A 

more targeted study would be needed, however, to identify issues and impediments specifically 

related to the cyber infrastructure contribution to community resilience.

Conclusion

The CRTF commends DHS for identifying resilience as a foundational element for the homeland 

security mission and observes that many relevant activities are underway. At the same time, 

however, the CRTF observes that relevant activities are rarely linked explicitly to resilience 

outcomes; thus, there is little appreciation for the fact that steps are being taken that will, over 

time, enhance national resilience.

The single most urgent action needed is clear articulation of the relationships between 

resilience, preparedness, and risk within the homeland security mission context. This is crucial

both to build shared understanding across diverse stakeholder communities and to motivate 

action throughout the Nation. A more integrated approach also offers opportunities to identify 

and leverage synergies across programs, enabling conservation of scarce resources. The 

CRTF offers a conceptual framework in Figure 1 as a starting point for this effort. The findings 

and recommendations described in sections 1-3 will be most effective if they build from a 

coherent view of these interdependent relationships.

Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) System Lessons-Learned

Using new knowledge developed following the Kobe and Los Angeles earthquakes, BART conducted 

a vulnerability study of the transit system and its performance under a maximum credible event---

occurring on various faults in the service area. A retrofit program was designed to two different 

standards---a life safety non collapse standard and a more robust rapid return to service designed to 

expedite the recovery and return to service following a major event. This $1.3 billion program had to 

be largely "self funded" with funds BART could generate rather than access or rely on existing state 

and federal funding programs which were inadequate to meet this need.

BART embarked on a major voter education campaign to explain the need for and the higher 

reliability results of this investment program. The funding to be used was a renewal of a property tax 

backed General Obligation Bond requiring 2/3rds voter approval. It took two tries to win the 

necessary votes, but the second time was successful. The 10 year construction program is well 

underway, on schedule and ahead of the budget, which is allowing BART to expand the reach of the 

higher standard "rapid return to service" work to cover more territory. 
Community Resilience Task Force Report

34

Appendix A

HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL 

Community Resilience Task Force: Tasking

The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) was integral in providing a framework for 

both building and defining the term “resilience,” which is defined as “the promotion of individual, 

community, and system robustness, adaptability and capacity for rapid recovery.”

Resilience initiatives emerging out of the QHSR provide comprehensive, risk-based, all-hazards 

performance metrics and capacities to prevent or mitigate known hazards. This definition goes 

beyond the historical implication of “disaster preparedness.” Resilience efforts provide cogent 

means of how one can invest in and predictably ensure the provision of critical infrastructure 

services, and by extension, the continuity of essential citizen, business, community, and 

national functions. 

Within this context and over the course of the next year, the Community Resilience Task Force 

will provide the Secretary with recommendations on how the Department can ensure the rapid 

and more effective infusion of resilience in programs and practices throughout the Nation. The 

HSAC will stand up a Task Force to address areas of resilience, focusing on resilience within 

transportation, business, grants, building and design, community preparedness. In particular, 

the Task Force will study and provide the Secretary actionable recommendations addressing 

the following questions on individual and community resilience and the planning and resources 

listed below. 

Individual and Community Resilience

1. How can we increase individual and community engagement and participation in 

resilience capacity building and sustainment?

Planning and Resources

1. How should we build, design, and incorporate security and resilience into urban 

planning?

2. How can we better plan and resource acquisition across the federal government in 

support of national, regional, state, tribal, local, and individual resilience efforts?
Community Resilience Task Force Report

35

Appendix B

Homeland Security Advisory Council

Community Resilience Task Force Membership

Name Title, Organization 

Martin O’Malley Governor, State of Maryland (Chair)

Ruth David President and CEO, Analytic Services, Inc. (Vice Chair)

Jeff Moss Vice President and Chief Security Officer, Internet Corporation for 

Assigned Names and Numbers (Vice Chair)

Ruben Barrales President and CEO, San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce

Sandra Lopez Burke Vice President and Executive Director, City Year

Mark Cooper Director, Louisiana Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and 

Emergency Preparedness 

Darrell Darnell Senior Associate Vice President for Safety and Security, George 

Washington University 

Lynn Davis Director of Washington Office, RAND Corporation

Dorothy Dugger General Manager, Bay Area Regional Transit (BART)

Mohamed Elibiary Founder, Lone Star Intelligence, LLC

Stephen Flynn President, Center for National Policy 

Howard Gordon Writer and Producer, 24

LTG Russel L. Honoré LTG (Ret) US Army, Commander Task Force Katrina

Allen Kay Chairman and CEO, Korey Kay and Partners

D. Wayne Klotz President, Klotz Associates, Inc.

Carie Lemack Co-Founder, Families of September 11

William McDonough Founding Principal, William McDonough + Partners

Roxane Cohen Silver Professor, University of California at Irvine

Dennis Walaker Mayor, City of Fargo, North Dakota 
Community Resilience Task Force Report

36

We’d like to thank the following for their contributions towards the task force’s efforts:

C. WM. Booher, Jr. Executive Vice President & Chief Operating Officer, Council on 

Competiveness

Ken Alston Chief of Staff, William McDonough + Partners, MBDC, 

McDonough Consulting

HSAC STAFF

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Becca Sharp

DIRECTORS

John Minnick

Mike Miron

STAFF

Mihkel Smit
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Appendix C

Subject Matter Experts

Name Title, Organization 

Paulette Aniskoff Director of ICPD/Citizen Corps, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency

Sue Armstrong Deputy Assistant Secretary of Infrastructure Protection, National 

Protection and Programs Directorate 

Jeffrey Dell Senior Vice President, Senior Business Continuity Manager –

Corporate Bank of America/Global Resiliency Management 

Warren C. Edwards Director, Southeast Regional Research Initiative & the Community 

and Regional Resilience Institute, Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Jeffrey Gaynor Founder, American Resilience Consulting, LLC

David K Haygood Partner, IDEO

David Heyman Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy, Department of Homeland 

Security

Mike Kangior Director, Emergency Management Policy, Office of Policy, 

Department of Homeland Security

David J. Kaufman Director, Office of Policy and Program Analysis, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency

Jenny Menna Director, Critical Infrastructure Cyber Protection & Awareness, 

National Protection and Programs Directorate

Karen Marsh Director, Citizen Corps, Federal Emergency Management Agency

Bridger McGaw Director, Private Sector Office, Office of Policy, Department of 

Homeland Security

Suzanne Novak President of Erudyne, LLC

Keith Turi Senior Policy Advisor, Office of Policy & Program Analysis, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Ji Sun Lee Program Manager, Human Factors Division, DHS Science and 

Technology Directorate

Wayne Young Security Specialist (Port) and Assistant Chief, Domestic Ports 

Division, United States Coast Guard
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Appendix D

Selected References on Resilience

Brown, John J. (2011). “Risk Management and Resilience.” Center for Infrastructure Protection and 

Homeland Security, George Mason University. The CIP Report, Volume 9, Number 8. http://cip.gmu.edu 

Davis, Lynn E. et al (2003). “Individual Preparedness and Response to Chemical, Radiological, Nuclear 

and Biological Terrorist Attacks.” Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, MG-1731-SF.

Flynn, Stephen (2011). “Recalibrating Homeland Security.” Foreign Affairs; Published by the Council on 

Foreign Relations, May/June 2011.

Friedland, Nehemia; Arian, Asher; Kirschenbaum, Alan; Amit, Karin; Fleischer, Nicole (2005). “The 

Concept of Social Resilience.” Germany, Samuel Neaman Institute, The Forum of National Security, The 

Society & National Security Program (SNS).

Godschalk, David R. (2003). “Urban Hazard Mitigation: Creating Resilient Cities.” Natural Hazards 

Review © ASCE (American Society of Civil Engineers). 

Homeland Security Advisory Council (2006). “Report of the Critical Infrastructure Task Force.” U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security.

Homeland Security Policy Institute (2011). “Interim Task Force Report on Resilience.” Preparedness, 

Response, and Resilience Task Force. www.homelandsecurity.gwu.edu

Kahan, Jerome H.; Allen, Andrew C.; and George, Justin K. (2009). “An Operational Framework for 

Resilience.” Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press. www.bepress.com

Longstaff, P. H. (2005). “Security, Resilience, and Communication in Unpredictable Environments Such 

as Terrorism, Natural Disasters, and Complex Technology.” Center for Information Policy Research, 

Harvard University. Copyright © 2005 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. ISBN 1-879716-

95-X P-05-3.

Manyena, Siambabala Bernard (2006). “The Concept of Resilience Revisited.” Disasters, 30(4): 433-

450. © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Overseas Development Institute, 2006. Published by 

Blackwell Publishing.

National Research Council (2011). “Building Community Disaster Resilience through Private-Public 

Collaboration.” Committee on Private-Public Sector Collaboration to Enhance Community Disaster 

Resilience, Geographical Science Committee. ISBN: 0-309-16264-5. National Academies Press. 

National Research Council (2009). “Applications of Social Network Analysis for Building Community 

Disaster Resilience: Workshop Summary.” ISBN-10: 0-309-14094-3. National Academies Press.

Norris, Fran H. et al (2008). “Community Resilience as a Metaphor, Theory, Set of Capacities, and 

Strategy for Disaster Readiness.” American Journal of Community Psychology: Volume 41, Numbers 1-

2, 127-150, DOI: 10.1007/s10464-007-9156-6 

O’Rourke, T. D. (2007). “Critical Infrastructure, Interdependencies, and Resilience.” National Academy of 

Engineering: The Bridge, Volume 37, Number 1. www.nae.edu

Parker, Rita (2011). “Mitigating Disruptions through Organisational Resilience.” Center for Infrastructure 

Protection and Homeland Security, George Mason University. The CIP Report, Volume 9, Number 8. 

http://cip.gmu.edu 

Rose, Adam (2004). “Defining and Measuring Economic Resilience to Disasters.” Disaster Prevention 

and Management, Volume 13, Number 4, pp. 307-314. © Emerald Group Publishing Limited. ISSN 0965-

3562.
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The Reform Institute (2008). “Building a Resilient Nation: Enhancing Security, Ensuring a Strong 

Economy.” Project Directors: Mark Delich and Robert Kelly. www.reforminstitute.org

The Infrastructure Security Partnership (2006). “Regional Disaster Resilience: A Guide for Developing 

an Action Plan.” Copyright © 2006 by the American Society of Civil Engineers. All Rights Reserved. 

ISBN 0-7844-088007.

Tierney, Kathleen J. (2003). “Conceptualizing and Measuring Organizational and Community Resilience: 

Lessons From The Emergency Response Following The September 11, 2001 Attack on The World Trade 

Center.” University of Delaware, Disaster Research Center. dspace.udel.edu

Tierney, Kathleen and Bruneau, Michel (2007). “Conceptualizing and Measuring Resilience: A Key to 

Disaster Loss Reduction.” Transportation Research Board of the National Academies: TR News 250 

May-June 2007. www.trb.org

United States Government Accountability Office (2009). “IRS Practices Contribute to Its Resilience, but It 

Would Benefit from Additional Emergency Planning Efforts.” GAO Report to the Committee on Finance, 

U.S. Senate. GAO-09-418.

United States Government Accountability Office (2010). “Update to National Infrastructure Protection 

Plan Includes Increased Emphasis on Risk Management and Resilience.” GAO Report to Congressional 

Requesters; GAO-10-296.

University of Haifa (2004). “The National Resilience Project.” Center for Study of National Security. 

nssc.haifa.ac.il/research.htm

Van Sparrentak, Kenneth J. (2008). “Building School Resilience in an Era of Multiple Threats.” Naval 

Postgraduate School Thesis. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. www.hsdl.org

Walker, Brian and Salt, David (2006). Resilience Thinking: Sustaining Ecosystems and People in a 

Changing World. Island Press (trademark of The Center for Resource Economics). ISBN 1-59726-093-2. 

Wyche, Karen Fraser; Pfefferbaum, Rose L.; Pfefferbaum, Betty; Norris, Fran H.; Wisnieski, Deborah; 

Younger, Hayden (2011). “Exploring Community Resilience in Workforce Communities of First 

Responders Serving Katrina Survivors.” American Journal of Orthopsychiatry: Volume 81, Issue 1, 

pages 18-30. DOI: 10.1111/j.1939-0025.2010.01068.x.
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Appendix E

Recommendations Specific to NGOs

NGOs have the requisite capacities and capabilities (response reliability) to ensure the 

operational resilience of and leverage the strengths of both for-profit and non-profit NGOs, for 

specific phases of disaster preparedness, response, and recovery.

• Develop the assessment tool for determining whether a NGO (or NGO network) has the

infrastructure, operational capacity, and prior experience for adequately responding to 

the needs of community members. The tool would include information to help predict 

which NGOs are most likely to be successful in response and recover operations; and

which have the ability to manage funds and other resources.

• Conduct an NGO capabilities assessment and identify opportunities for funding NGO 

operational resilience requirements from existing federal programs.

• Test the assessment tool in a set of demonstration communities.

Conduct a benefits assessment of NGO involvement, to inform appropriate resource allocation 

and expectations for future involvement.

• Determine the costs associated with national NGO involvement in disaster 

preparedness, response, and recovery.

• Evaluate the financial and non-financial benefits associated with national NGO 

leadership in supporting emergency planning and long-term recovery at the local level. 

Determine whether their NGO activities result in cost savings to other sectors.

Create an incentive system to motivate individual resilience efforts and the movement toward 

community resilience.

• Develop an incentive structure (e.g., monetary, other) to motivate proactive, selfsufficient behaviors (e.g., storing water, food and medicines to ensure their availability 

for a pre-determined period of time) and the movement toward community resilience 

(e.g., community connections and supports for operationally resilient response and 

recovery and infrastructure service provision). Once there is an evidence base to inform 

this incentive structure, funding can be allocated for community-level interventions.

• Test the inventive structure with NGO involvement.

Develop a data system for capturing information from NGOs in disaster response and recovery.

• Develop a pilot system for NGOs to report information on community health indicators 

and assets using handheld technology that quickly feeds into a centralized database or 

scorecard used by local health officials, local government, and other local decision 

makers for, emergency planning and response, and community continuity and 

operational resilience.

• Test the Pilot system with a sub-set of NGOs and validate the data entered to verify its 

accuracy.
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Appendix F

City of Fargo and FEMA’s Regulations 
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Appendix G

Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

2157 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, DC 20515

Statement of Record

April 14, 2011

Brigadier General Mike Caldwell, Interim Director

Emergency Management Agency

State of Oregon

'Tsunami Warning, Preparedness, and Interagency Cooperation: Lessons Learned'

Thank you for the opportunity to submit a written statement for the record on today’s important 

hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations. The 

topic of tsunami preparedness is especially relevant in light of the recent 9.0 M earthquake and resulting 

tsunami on March 10, 2011. The impact of this event was felt all around the Pacific basin, with the 

tsunami reaching, and causing $7 million in damage in Oregon. There was no loss of life in Oregon from 

the tsunami due to previous education and outreach funded by such sources at NOAA through the 

National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, state, and local sources. 

Tsunami hazard in Oregon 

The 9.0 magnitude Japan earthquake on March 10, 2011 created a subsequent tsunami on the U.S. West 

Coast. In most instances, the tsunami impacts were negligible, although there were areas of localized 

damage. One person was killed when swept off a rock near Crescent City, California as he was taking 

photographs of the event. In Oregon, our impact was small except in the Port of Brookings on our 

southern coast. 

At 1035 hours, approximately 3 hours after the tsunami warning center predicted the first wave would 

arrive on the Oregon coast, an 8 to 10 foot wall of water struck the Port of Brookings Harbor and caused 

an estimated $6.7 mil in damage. This is a small port but a very important port for our south coast and 

supports 60 commercial fishing vessels, 342 sport/recreation pleasure craft and it’s recognized as the 

easiest bar crossing on our entire coast. The fishing industry is the number one economic activity in this 

remote part of Oregon and generates $67 million in economic activity annually for this town of 14,000 

residents. It should be noted that our Governors request for Presidential Declaration of this disaster was 

approved and signed by the President in four days. FEMA responded with personnel and expertise 

within 24 hours of the incident. In short, the federal response to this disaster was magnificent! 

As we reviewed the activities of this event we concluded that we were fortunate that the tsunami 

inundation was far smaller than estimated, due in large part to the tide was receding to an extremely 

low level just as the waves were arriving. This acted as a shock absorber which contributed significantly 

we believe to the relatively low impact. However, the lessons learned by all jurisdictions are invaluable 

for our future tsunami response planning. 
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Many valuable lessons were learned during this tsunami event. 

1. The federal tsunami warning system, run by the National Weather Service, worked remarkably well, in 

spite of early technological and IT issues. The alert products were received accurately and in a timely 

fashion. However, in our after action review, it was noted that when the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami 

Warning Center (WCATWC) sends alert products, it also sends premium reports which the counties 

found cumbersome, and in more than one instance, important information was missed due to the 

volume of data being forwarded. This could be rectified in future events by streamlining the verbiage in 

the message products. 

2. The National Weather Service provided excellent data and warnings to the state and local 

governments. A key lesson learned is that the NOAA tone alert radios are an absolute must for public 

buildings, hospitals, schools and all public lodging facilities. Oregon has emphasized the use of alert 

radios in our educational efforts in order to create redundancy in distant tsunami warning systems. 

3. Most tsunami warning sirens worked. However several of these sirens are old and repair parts are no 

longer manufactured and some failed. But those sirens were operated manually. Widespread reliance 

on tsunami warning sirens is misguided and can create a false sense of security in the public. It is vitally 

important that the public understand that they are active participants in the tsunami warning system. 

Oregon’s educational efforts have focused on this personal responsibility in creating a culture of 

awareness. These tsunami warning systems will be unreliable in the event of a locally-generated 

Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake and tsunami. 

4. Local law enforcement, along with volunteer fire fighters and Community Emergency Response Teams 

(CERT) in most cases, effectively conducted evacuations within the forecasted inundation zone. Shelters 

were established and generally worked well. 

5. In some instances, churches and other well-meaning people stood up shelters. Unfortunately, these 

self-activated centers did not report to local emergency management officers and loved ones were 

stressed in attempts to locate mostly elderly family members. More training is needed so that sheltering 

can happen in a more orderly manner. 

6. One trend that was observed was that some decision makers did not fully understand the hazard 

posed by a distant tsunami. In one instance, a small school district superintendent did not take the risk 

seriously and refused to cancel school. Reports indicate that grade school children were waiting on a 

dock for the school bus pick-up in a known and documented inundation zone about 30 minutes past the 

predicted tsunami’s arrival. As we now know, the significant wave that struck Brookings did not occur 

until 3 hours past the prediction of initial wave arrival time. This decision could have been catastrophic. 

7. Situational awareness between counties and the state office of OEM needs improvement. County 

Sheriffs were hampered in communication with adjoining jurisdictions particularly across state lines in 

Crescent City, California. Oregon is working a pilot project with DHS, Washington, Idaho, Alaska & 

Montana to create a North West version of virtual USA. Presently we have developed a web based 

system in Multnomah County that has great potential for local Emergency Managers. Unfortunately, we 

are funding this from already scarce resources, thus its progress is slow. Had this web based system 

been employed in our coastal counties, the situational awareness would have been much better. 

8. Additionally, the state Emergency Coordination Center will develop a more resilient information 

system and push information received from one county to all others. 

9. Critical information was broadcast on local radio stations in an effective and timely manner. The 

locally owned stations provided an invaluable service to the public at large and have an excellent 
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working relationship with local Emergency Managers. One problem discovered in Tillamook County was 

the lack of information being put out to public in Spanish language. This was noted and will be fixed. 

10. FCC digital EAS policies need to be reconsidered. The existing policies mandate the public broadcast 

messages must be received (digitally) by the radio or TV station. However, states struggle to find the 

funding to purchase the equipment and develop the procedures to send the message. 

11. Another noted phenomenon was that the Hispanic community self-evacuated almost to a person. 

How they received the information is unclear, but no Hispanic children were in school the day after the 

event, and employers reported very few Hispanic workers come to work the day of the event. What 

network they have informally established is unclear, but we are looking into it as something we may 

emulate. Translation of public education materials into foreign languages is extremely important in 

making sure that all of our citizenry are safe during tsunami events. 

12. Reverse 911 was used, but reports indicate that it was not 100% successful. Lack of telephone 

switching capacity appears to be the issue and needs to be resolved. This again refers to a lack of 

financial resources in communities most likely to be impacted by damaging tsunami events. Reverse 911 

plays a vital role in providing redundancy is tsunami warning systems, and where it worked well, it 

greatly aided in a positive action by the public. 

This event was an excellent no-notice full-scale exercise. Our systems were tested, and in some 

instances, failed. Federal state and local, first responders and emergency managers gained tremendous 

experience with the benefit of a minimal impact to our citizens. Even though one coastal community 

suffered a serious economic blow, by and large we on the West Coast dodged a bullet!!! The real 

question now is, are we smart enough to take the lessons learned and improve our systems so we can 

save lives and recover from a catastrophic event that will happen.
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Local tsunami hazard from the Cascadia Subduction Zone 

The Cascadia Subduction Zone runs just off our coast and is capable of producing mega-thrust 

earthquakes similar in size and scope of the 2004 Indonesian and 2011 Japanese earthquake and 

tsunami. 

In some areas, the western edge of the fault is less than 75 miles off of the Oregon coast and slants at a 

45 degree angle eastward bringing it under the main continental shelf. The ground shaking from 

estimated mega-thrust earthquake will be felt from northern California to British Columbia, from the 

coast to well past the Cascade Range of mountains. 

The reaction time from the time of the predicted 8 to 9 magnitude earthquake and ensuing tsunami 

could be as few as 6 to 7 min, up to 15 to 20 min before a potential 60 foot (or higher) tsunami strikes 

our coastal communities. We also predict that most, if not all tsunami warning sirens will most likely not 

be operational due to the significant earthquake. Bridges and roadways will be impassable to vehicles. 

Communication systems will probably be damaged and probably not functional. Structures will be 

demolished and injuries and death are a given. 

So what have we learned from the Japan earthquake and tsunami and how do we prepare our citizens 

to survive the coming catastrophic Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake and tsunami? 

Education is a valuable and ongoing need. The public and decision makers need the tools and knowledge 

to plan for and respond to a catastrophic earthquake and tsunami. Financial resources are needed to 

create the culture of awareness that will enable the public to be a full partner in preparedness through 

emergency kits and plans for safety. 
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Infrastructure and the built environment need to be robust to weather the extreme ground shaking and 

liquefaction caused by a catastrophic earthquake. A 2007 study1 by the Oregon Department of Geology 

and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI) shows a high percentage of hospitals, schools and emergency 

responder facilities are at a high or very high susceptibility to collapse in a Cascadia Subduction Zone 

earthquake. Over 300,000 Oregon school children go to school every day in these risky buildings. Oregon 

has authorized $30 million per biennium in bonds to retrofit hospitals, schools, and emergency 

responder facilities. However, only $22.5 mil has been obligated to date due to the difficult state 

economic situation. This has allowed Oregon to retrofit 17 schools out of an estimated 906, and 18 

emergency service facilities out of an estimated 223 needed. 

1 DOGAMI (2007) Statewide Seismic Needs Assessment Using Rapid Visual Screening (RVS). DOGAMI OpenFile Report O-07-02. 

The Portland Metro Area, and the Willamette Valley presents a host of complex problems and 

challenges. This area of Oregon concentrates over 85% of the state’s population. The state’s key 

infrastructure in terms of electric distribution, natural gas and petroleum all terminate and re-distribute 

from the three county Portland Metro Area. The curtailment of these essential commodities will hamper 

response and delay recovery which will have significant social economic impacts on the entire state. 

Increased resources are needed to prepare the public, not just in the coastal regions, but also the highly 

populated Portland Metro Area which most likely will also be greatly impacted. 

The federal agencies, NOAA, USGS, and FEMA, need to continue to fund scientific efforts through 

state/federal partnerships in order to fully understand the seismic hazard posed by the Cascadia 

Subduction Zone and to better define the threat. However the vast majority of federal funding has been 

tied to physical science and at some point it needs to be shifted to preparedness (education, planning, 

equipment (alarms, etc.). 

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 

1. Education of all coastal and inland residents is essential. With the known fact that these citizens may 

only have 6 or 7 minutes between the Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake event and a major tsunami, 

there is no warning system that can be relied on to warn citizens. Educating them to understand that if 

the ground moves, they must move to high ground immediately. They must not wait for some authority 

to tell them to evacuate. 

2. All residents need to have a 72 hour sustainment kit at a minimum. These kits need to be in multiple 

locations, such as in cars as well as houses, as buildings may be destroyed. 

3. Alternative communication means must be employed by local authorities like HAM radios with backup power, satellite phones. Most likely land line and cell systems will not be available. 

4. Funding needs to be enhanced to support state and local efforts to educate and inform citizens. Over 

the past two years, the Oregon Office of Emergency Management has received FEMA National 

Earthquake Hazard Mitigation Program (NEHRP) grant dollars, averaging $81K a year, for earthquake 

and tsunami preparedness. The office has one person assigned to cover over 363 miles of coast line and 

the seventeen counties within the Cascadia Subduction hazard zone. This funding is totally inadequate. 

5. Funding needs to be increased to provide essential facilities seismic upgrades so local responders can 

survive in order to render aide post event. 

6. Additional funding is required to further develop the tsunami inundation zone data. This is critical to 

insure that these areas are identified and known for response by outside agencies. 
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7. Purchase battery back-up tone alert radios for all coastal residents in or near known inundation zones. 

This is a small amount of money that could save thousands of lives. 

Reauthorization of the TSUNAMI WARNING AND EDUCATION ACT (TWEA) 

The State of Oregon strongly recommends the reauthorization of the TSUNAMI WARNING AND 

EDUCATION ACT (TWEA). This key legislation has created a strong tsunami mitigation program 

predicated on robust federal/state partnerships. 

The State of Oregon recommends strong support for the reauthorization of TWEA and limiting the 27% 

of the funds authorized under Section 8 to non-federal partners, as was originally intended. Through the 

National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP), strong state/federal partnerships have greatly 

improved tsunami preparedness and mitigation activities. In Oregon, NTHMP has funded a multi-year 

educational effort that paid dividends during the recent Japan tsunami when the public knew what to do 

when the warning was issued, but even more importantly, took proper action. While there is room for 

improvement, Oregon’s coastal residents did remarkably well during the tsunami evacuation because 

great effort was expended in an NTHMP-funded effort. 

Creation of additional Tsunami Warning Centers (TWC) 

A 2011 National Academy of Science report2 found that the tsunami warning center “mission is critically 

dependent on technical infrastructure and human capital, both of which the committee assessed to be 

insufficiently supported.” Current funding resources do not allow for the needed robustness in the 

existing two TWC. The March 11, 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami event revealed weaknesses in 

both the IT infrastructure and redundancy capability of the existing tsunami warning centers. 

2 National Academy of Science, 2011. Tsunami Warning and Preparedness: An Assessment of the U.S. Tsunami 

Program and the Nation's Preparedness Efforts. WA, DC: National Academies Press. Pg. 164. 

The creation of additional warning centers may in fact jeopardize the ability of the existing TWCs to 

provide their required functions since they continue to have issues with IT infrastructure and other 

systems. Moreover, as identified by the recent NAS report, coordination between the two centers is 

hardly sufficient and adding additional centers will only seek to increase confusion, both in the public 

and emergency management. If messaging issued by the centers is not simple and consistent, we risk 

the public’s loss of faith. 

The argument of a local Caribbean hazard necessitating an additional warning center situated on Puerto 

Rico is not viable as a justification. The tsunami warning system is not designed to warn of a locallysourced tsunami and would not be able to respond quickly enough to provide a timely warning to 

coastal Caribbean communities. The creation of this third center would draw limited funds away from 

improving the two existing centers, thereby risking the lives and property of American citizens. 

Oregon strongly supports increased funding to the two existing tsunami warning centers to improve 

infrastructure and redundancy capabilities. 

Closing Statement 

The Cascadia Subduction Zone is over 100 years beyond its cycle of causing a major 8-9 magnitude 

earthquake. It’s a known major disaster waiting to happen. As a nation we traditionally spend very few 

dollars to prepare for catastrophic events, but spend tremendous amounts of money to respond & 
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recover. As we have seen in Japan, one of the most prepared nations in the world with respect to 

earthquake and tsunami preparation, thousands of lives have been lost. Billions of dollars in 

infrastructure have been destroyed. Yet, there are numerous examples where buildings that did have 

seismic fixes are standing and can be used in short order after the quake. These are the choices we have 

before us. Prepare, or cross our fingers and hope this event happens on someone else’s watch. 

Thank you for this opportunity to submit written testimony.
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Appendix H

Press Office

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Press Release

May 19, 2011

Contact: DHS Press Office, (202) 282-8010

DHS Press Release: DHS Announces Grant Guidance for Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Preparedness Grants

WASHINGTON—Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano today announced the release of FY 

2011 grant guidance and application kits for 12 DHS grant programs totaling $2.1 billion to assist states, 

urban areas, tribal and territorial governments, non-profit agencies, and the private sector in 

strengthening our nation’s ability to prevent, protect, respond to and recover from terrorist attacks, 

major disasters and other emergencies. In FY 2011, DHS grants were reduced by $780 million from the 

FY 2010 enacted level, nearly a quarter of FY 2010 DHS grant funding.

“In today’s tight fiscal environment, we are maximizing limited grant dollars by setting clear priorities 

and focusing on the areas that face the greatest risk,” said Secretary Janet Napolitano. “The FY 2011 

homeland security grants are focused on mitigating and responding to the evolving threats we face.”

The grants announced today focus on the highest risk cities that continue to face the most significant 

threats, while continuing to provide dedicated funding to law enforcement throughout the country to 

prepare for, prevent and respond to pre-operational activity and other crimes that are precursors or 

indicators of terrorist activity. The 9/11 Commission recommended that homeland security funds be 

allocated “based strictly on an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities” to focus limited funding in the 

highest risk areas. 

The grant guidance also incorporates feedback from DHS’ state, local, tribal and territorial and private 

sector partners and includes specific steps undertaken by DHS to improve the ability of state and local 

partners to apply for and utilize grant funding.

Preparedness Grant Program Allocations for Fiscal Year 2011:
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Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP)—$1.2 billion for states or urban areas to build capabilities 

critical to security. HSGP consists of five programs: 

• State Homeland Security Program (SHSP)—more than $526 million to support the 

implementation of state homeland security strategies to build and strengthen preparedness 

capabilities at all levels. The 9/11 Act requires states to dedicate 25 percent of SHSP 

appropriated funds to law enforcement terrorism prevention-oriented planning, organization, 

training, exercise and equipment activities.

• Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI)—more than $662 million to enhance regional 

preparedness and capabilities in 31 high-threat, high-density areas. In order to focus limited 

resources to mitigate and respond to evolving threats, the 11 highest risk areas (Tier 1) will be 

eligible for more than $540 million, while the remaining 20 urban areas, designated Tier II will 

be eligible for more than $121 million. The 9/11 Act requires states to dedicate 25 percent of 

UASI appropriated funds to law enforcement terrorism prevention-oriented activities.

• Operation Stonegarden (OPSG)—more than $54 million to enhance cooperation and 

coordination among federal, state, territorial, tribal and local law enforcement agencies to 

jointly enhance security along the United States land and water borders.

• Metropolitan Medical Response System Program (MMRS)—more than $34 million, to enhance 

and sustain comprehensive regional mass casualty incident response and preparedness 

capabilities, divided evenly among 124 MMRS jurisdictions. 

• Citizen Corps Program (CCP)—more than $9 million to engage citizens in community 

preparedness, planning, mitigation, response and recovery activities. 

Tribal Homeland Security Grant Program (THSGP)—$10 million to eligible tribal applicants to 

implement preparedness initiatives to help strengthen the nation against risk associated with potential 

terrorist attacks and other hazards.

Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP)—more than $18 million to support target-hardening 

activities at non-profit organizations at high risk of a terrorist attack and located within one of the 

FY2011 UASI-eligible urban areas.

Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPGP)—more than $14 million to enhance 

catastrophic incident preparedness in high-risk, high-consequence urban areas and their surrounding 

regions and support coordination of regional all-hazard planning for catastrophic events, including the 

development of plans, protocols and procedures to manage regional planning for terrorist attacks and 

other catastrophic events.

Transit Security Grant Program—more than $200 million to owners and operators of transit systems 

(including intracity bus, commuter bus, ferries, and all forms of passenger rail) to protect critical surface 

transportation and increase the resilience of transit infrastructure. 

Freight Rail Security Grant Program (FRSGP)—$10 million to freight railroad carriers and owners and 

offerors of railroad cars to protect critical surface transportation infrastructure from acts of terrorism 

and increase the resilience of the freight rail system.
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Intercity Passenger Rail (Amtrak) Program—more than $19 million to protect critical surface 

transportation infrastructure and the traveling public from terrorism and increase the resilience of the 

Amtrak rail system.

Intercity Bus Security Grant Program (IBSGP)—more than $4 million to support security measures 

including plans, facility security upgrades and vehicle and driver protection for fixed-route intercity and 

charter bus services that serve UASI jurisdictions.

Port Security Grant Program (PSGP)—more than $235 million to help protect critical port infrastructure 

from terrorism, enhance maritime domain awareness and strengthen risk management capabilities in 

order to protect against improvised explosive devices and other non-conventional weapons. 

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Grant Program—more than $14 million to support the 

construction or renovation of Emergency Operations Centers to improve state, local or tribal emergency 

management and preparedness capabilities to ensure continuity of operations during disasters. 

Driver’s License Security Grant Program (DLSGP)—more than $44 million to help states and territories 

improve security of state-issued driver’s licenses and identification cards in order to prevent terrorism, 

reduce fraud and enhance the reliability and accuracy of personal identification documents. 

Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG) Program—more than $329 million to assist state 

and local governments in enhancing and sustaining all-hazards emergency management capabilities.

Transit Security Grant Program applications are due no later than July 5, 2011. All other preparedness 

grant applications are due no later than June 20, 2011. Final submissions must be made through the 

Non-Disaster Grants (ND Grants) system located at https://portal.fema.gov.

Further information on DHS’s preparedness grant programs is available at www.dhs.gov and 

www.fema.gov/grants.
Community Resilience Task Force Report

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Appendix I

Return on Investment Estimates

In 2005 the Multihazard Mitigation Council under the National Institute of Building Sciences 

produced a report that demonstrated “a dollar spent on mitigation saves society an average of 

$4. The full report can be found at http://www.nibs.org/client/assets/files/mmc/Part1 final.pdf. 

CBO did a similar study in 2007 on mitigation actions that resulted in a return on investment of 

$3 for every dollar spent. The report can be found at 

http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/86xx/doc8653/09-28-Disaster.pdf

During a Workshop on Building Community-Based Risk Management and Responses to Natural 

Disasters that was conducted in Bangkok, Thailand, in 2008 it was estimated that every dollar 

invested in risk reduction can save between two and ten dollars in disaster response and 

recovery cost. See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSF/Resources/395669-

1126194965141/1635383-1207662247174/Karlsson IFRC.pdf

Gail McGovern, President and CEO, Red Cross, noted “Studies indicate that every dollar spent 

on prevention saves at least four dollars on emergency response—a wonderful return on your 

investment.” See http://www.redcross.org/wwwiles/Documents/pdf/international/09ISDreport.pdf

Retired U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Russel L. Honoré, famed for leading the military response in New 

Orleans after Katrina, took part in the kickoff, urging people to get kits for themselves and 

others. Every dollar spent on preparedness, Honoré said, saves $12 in recovery and rebuilding; 

“and you might save your life.” 

http://blogs.palmbeachpost.com/eyeonthestorm/2011/04/23/group-uses-social-networking-topush-storm-preparedness/

"Crediting Preparedness" William G. Raisch - Director & Matt Statler, Ph.D. - Associate 

Director, International Center for Enterprise Preparedness, New York University, 8/2/2006

A compelling illustration of the impact of organizational preparedness can be found in recent 

research by FM Global, the major property and casualty insurance firm. The firm acknowledges 

that business interruption insurance is the last line of defense against business interruption, and 

that the first and most important step is a holistic risk management program that includes all 

aspects of the organization. FM Global provides site-specific, scientifically-based loss 

prevention recommendations as part of its coverage. In the aftermath of last year's hurricanes, 

FM Global compared the loss history of those of its policyholders which implemented its loss 

prevention recommendations versus those that still had recommendations to complete. They 

found that those policyholders that fully implemented the preparedness recommendations had 

on average 75% to 85% lower dollar losses than those policyholders which did not implement 

such measures. As to the cost of physical improvements and preparedness, the research 

indicated a remarkable return on investment. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, across 476 

locations with a total of $42 billion in insured property exposed to the hurricane's impact, FM 

Global clients collectively spent $2.3 million to prevent a projected $480 million in loss, with cost 

of those improvements averaging only $7,400 per facility. That equals a 208 to 1 payback - or in 

other words, for every $1 spent on targeted preparedness measures, $208 in resources were 
Community Resilience Task Force Report

59

saved in one single event." Link to InterCEP's Case Study: 

http://www.nyu.edu/intercep/events/20061009-256.html

Symantec 2011 SMB Disaster Preparedness Survey - Global Results - January 2011

Not being prepared can have a negative impact:

Disasters can have a significant financial impact on SMBs. Downtime costs SMBs a median of 

$12,500 per day. It costs small businesses a median of $3,000 per day and medium businesses 

a median of $23,000 per day. 

Outages also have a considerable effect on SMB customers. SMB customers reported that 

SMB outages cost them $10,000 per day, and 29 percent said they lost “some” or “a lot of” data 

as a result of disasters impacting their SMB vendors. 

Downtime also causes customers to leave with 54 percent of SMB customer respondents 

reporting they have switched SMB vendors due to unreliable computing systems, a 12 percent 

increase compared with last year’s survey. 

For many SMBs, disasters could also put them out of business. Forty-four percent of SMB 

customers stated that their SMB vendors have temporarily shut down due to a disaster.

http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/pdfs/symc_2011_SMB_DP_Survey_Repo

rt_Global.pdf?om_ext_cid=biz_socmed_twitter_facebook_marketwire_linkedin_2011Jan_world

wide_dpsurvey

Shenandoah Valley Project Impact: Shenandoah Valley Project Impact is a disaster 

preparedness and mitigation education program that began through a grant from the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency. Of all businesses that close down following a disaster, more 

than 43percent never reopen and an additional 29 percent close for good within two years. 

Unless you protect your business from natural disasters, you risk losing it all together.”- Open 

For Business by the Institute for Business and Home Safety.

http://www.cspdc.org/programs/disaster/documents/DisasterGuideForBusinesses.pdf

Disaster Preparedness SBA

Getting back to business after a disaster depends on preparedness planning done today. Small 

business owners invest a tremendous amount of time, money and resources to make their 

ventures successful, and yet, while the importance of emergency planning may seem selfevident, it may get put on the back-burner in the face of more immediate concerns. For small 

business owners, being prepared can mean staying in business following a disaster. An 

estimated 25 percent of businesses do not reopen following a major disaster, according to the 

Institute for Business and Home Safety. 

http://www.sbaonline.sba.gov/services/disasterassistance/disasterpreparedness/index.html