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HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING: NIGERIA AND BEYOND

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 10, 2014

Serial No. 113–196

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

KAREN BASS, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Ms. Lauren Ploch Blanchard, specialist in African affairs, Congressional Research Service ....................................................................................................... 7

Colonel Peter Aubrey, USA, Retired, president, Strategic Opportunities International ................................................................................................................. 19

Mr. Stephen Rickard, director, Washington Office, Open Society Foundations . 25

Ms. Elisa Massimino, president and chief executive officer, Human Rights 

First ....................................................................................................................... 37

Ms. Sarah Margon, Washington director, Human Rights Watch ........................ 48

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Ms. Lauren Ploch Blanchard: Prepared statement ............................................... 10

Colonel Peter Aubrey, USA, Retired: Prepared statement .................................. 21

Mr. Stephen Rickard: Prepared statement ............................................................ 28

Ms. Elisa Massimino: Prepared statement ............................................................ 40

Ms. Sarah Margon: Prepared statement ................................................................ 51

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 72

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 73

(1)

HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING:

NIGERIA AND BEYOND 

THURSDAY, JULY 10, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Smith 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order, and good afternoon to everyone. 

As we all know, Boko Haram has significantly accelerated its 

acts of mass murder and abduction in Nigeria, requiring a more robust and effective response from the Government of Nigeria and 

friends like the United States. 

According to the most recent report by the Internal Displacement 

Monitoring Centre and the Norwegian Refugee Council, there are 

now some 3.1 million Nigerian internally displaced persons, or 

IDPs, more than every other country in the world except for Syria 

and Colombia. 

The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that there 

are now more than 10,000 Nigerian refugees in Niger and Cameroon. According to the International Rescue Committee, due to 

credible fears of abduction, as many as 1,000 refugees a week, 80 

percent women and girls, are fleeing to the nearby country of Niger 

from Nigeria’s Borno State alone. 

Former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria Robin Renee Sanders testified before this subcommittee on June 11 that the fight against 

Boko Haram will be a ‘‘long war,’’ as she put it, but that the Nigerian military and security forces are insufficiently trained and illequipped to meet the challenge of a savage, relentless violence unleashed by Boko Haram. 

Just this morning she told a Capitol Hill forum on Boko Haram 

that in the vacuum created by delays in training Nigerian forces 

vigilante groups have now been formed. They have been there, but 

now they are growing in number, and are themselves committing 

human rights abuses. 

According to the current State Department human rights report, 

Boko Haram is responsible for the most heinous human rights violations in Nigeria, but that same report tells us that elements of 

the Nigerian Armed Forces and security apparatus have committed 

2

serious human rights abuses as well with little or no accountability. 

Even in the face of serious threats to Nigerian and regional security, the U.S. Government, which has a longstanding alliance with 

the Federal Republic of Nigeria, has experienced some obstacles in 

providing the security assistance necessary to help our ally address 

this dire emergency. 

Laws our Congress created to prevent our alliance with rogue 

military and security forces are being blamed, by some, for making 

our assistance more difficult to provide. But is the law the problem, 

or, rather, is it how the law is being applied? Or is it that the U.S. 

has not attempted to train sufficient numbers of human rights vetted Nigerian forces? Or is it the Nigerians themselves not wanting 

that kind of training? 

What is the targeted number for trained Nigerians? For this year 

and the future, how many trainers have been committed to this 

task? I believe the Leahy laws are a necessary component of a prudent human rights policy, and today’s hearing is in large part intended to find out whether there are legitimate obstacles to their 

implementation. 

At the outset, I would like to make clear that I have long supported human rights vetting to allow for training of those who pass 

muster. One example of many, as chair of the then-Subcommittee 

on International Operations and Human Rights, I chaired a hearing on Indonesia on May 7, 1998, featuring a man by the name of 

Pius Lustrilanang, who was tortured by members of the Indonesian 

military amid deep concerns that those involved may have been 

trained under our Military Education and Training Program, or 

IMET. 

In like manner, I and others were concerned that U.S.-trained 

Indonesian troops may have been complicit in slaughtering people 

in East Timor. On a fact-finding trip to Jakarta, I sought but never 

received the names of specific individuals trained by the U.S., including members of the elite Kopassus unit, who slaughtered dissidents as the Suharto government fell. 

Similar training concerns were expressed by me and others concerning the Joint Combined Exchange Training, or JCET, and the 

Rwandan Patriotic Army during the period when the RPA was engaged in the killing of refugees in Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 

Moreover, in 1999, Congress passed my legislation—and Ms. 

Massimino will remember this well, because she testified at several 

of those hearings that we had—that suspended all U.S. Federal law 

enforcement support and exchanges with the British police force in 

Northern Island, known as the Royal Ulster Constabulary, until 

the new human rights training programs were implemented there, 

and until programs were established to vet out any RUC officers 

who engaged in human rights abuses from benefiting from American training and preparation. 

The vetting legislation worked. Exchanges and training at FBI 

facilities for RUC officers were suspended for more than 2 years, 

until President Bush certified that the British had established a 

system to vet and block anyone who committed or condoned human 

rights violations from the program. 

3

As my colleagues know, according to the current Quadrennial 

Defense Review, we are in a time of increased danger from terrorist forces in foreign nations, while shrinking budgets force our 

military and security forces to become smaller and leaner. 

The QDR states, and I quote in pertinent part, ‘‘The Department 

of Defense will rebalance our counterterrorism efforts toward greater emphasis on building partnership capacity, especially in fragile 

states.’’ One manifestation of that developing policy is the President’s proposal to allocate $5 billion to a new counterterrorism 

partnership fund. 

I have visited Nigeria twice in the past 9 months alone and have 

chaired several hearings on security in Nigeria in the past two 

Congresses alone. Just last month I met with U.S. and Nigerian officials to find out why our security assistance has been so difficult 

to provide when the need is so increasingly great. Is it the process, 

or has the administration not sought to seriously expand training? 

I don’t know. 

You will notice that the Department of State is not testifying 

today. That is partly because Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Tom Malinowski, was unavailable when we invited him to testify. And I know he will come at 

a future date and hopefully very soon. But it may also be partly 

due to an abundance of caution surrounding even a discussion of 

difficulties experienced in implementing the Leahy laws. 

For example, when I was in Abuja last month, I asked our Embassy to provide me with their best recommendations, and I would 

share it with everyone here, for making the Leahy vetting more effective, so that we can provide the much needed aid to the Nigerian 

Government and end the increasing slaughter and kidnapping of 

innocents, such as the Chibok schoolgirls. Despite initial assurances of cooperation, I have yet to receive the information, but I 

will keep asking. 

I understand that not everything can be said publicly or should 

be said publicly, but, again, this law was created with full transparency, passed the Senate at the behest of Senator Leahy, and 

has been renewed year in and year out, often with tweaks and 

changes to it. 

As my colleagues know, we refer to the Leahy laws because there 

are actually two of them, one for the Department of State and one 

for the Department of Defense. Together they cover material assistance, including equipment and training. These laws require investigation of alleged human rights violations by military and security 

forces, including police. 

These investigations performed mostly by the Department of 

State require details on not only individuals but also military 

units. Failure to obtain such information as name and date and 

place of birth can sometimes prevent an investigation and put it 

into limbo. 

National government officials may consider such information an 

invasion of their sovereignty, although we ought to do more to convince them why that is not so, but to avoid aiding and abetting 

rogue elements, we must know if a perpetrator of abuse is a man 

from Jos or a man with the same name from Kano State, as one 

example. 

4

If individuals or elements of a larger force are guilty of human 

rights violations, entire battalions or regimens can be tainted unless the guilty are identified and separated out from those forces 

that are innocent of such crimes. The Leahy laws allow for the 

recreation of clean units. On the surface, it would seem that such 

a policy is clear and possible to implement. Unfortunately, it has 

not been so simple in practice. 

Despite the fact that Sarah Sewall, Under Secretary of State for 

Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights told the full Foreign Affairs Committee on May 21 in this room that at least half 

of the Nigerian military and security forces are clear of allegations 

of human rights violations, we continue to be told that Leahy vetting is at least slowing the provision of security assistance. 

According to Congressional testimony by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Jackson, there are an estimated 187 

Nigerian military units and 173 police units that have been 

cleared, but very few Nigerian units have been trained or are in 

training today. Again, the big question: Why? 

Our Government provides approximately $15 billion in security 

assistance worldwide each year, involving 158 countries, yet there 

are only 13 headquarters staff handling Leahy vetting, in addition 

to Embassy personnel. Is this a sign that these laws are not being 

taken seriously enough by our own Government and is there a requirement for additional spending? 

In the current fiscal year, the Department of State is receiving 

$2.75 million to conduct Leahy vetting. In the newest bill, the Senate has $5 million. Perhaps that will be enough; I don’t know. I 

would hope our distinguished witnesses will shed some light on 

that. 

Of the 158 countries we provided assistance to, 46 had some aid 

withheld in 2011. The typical percentage of global Leahy vettings 

that don’t meet requirements is about 1 to 2 percent, with just 

under 10 percent ‘‘suspended.’’ In Fiscal Year 2012, according to 

testimony from the Congressional Research Service expert, Lauren 

Ploch, the State Department vetted 1,377 members of the Nigerian 

security forces. And of that figure, 85 percent were cleared to receive assistance, with 15 percent rejected or suspended. 

In Colombia, the government rejected the requirements of the 

Leahy laws before changing their minds and accepting the process. 

Now there reportedly are more high-ranking Colombian and military officials and officers behind bars than in any other country 

other than Argentina, and Colombia is cited as a Leahy law success. 

In Nigeria, there have been no disciplinary actions against Nigerian military for scorched earth assaults on populations, and few 

high-ranking Nigerian military officers have been held accountable 

for human rights violations. 

We are here today to examine the questions that these facts 

raise, and other facts, and our witnesses have been asked to walk 

us through the process, tell us what works and what doesn’t, and 

suggest ways to make this process more effective. 

I would like to now turn to my distinguished colleague, Mr. 

Cicilline, for any opening he might have. 

5

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to you 

and Ranking Member Bass for calling this important and timely 

hearing. 

As we all know, the security situation in Nigeria has deteriorated 

seriously in recent months with the expansion of Boko Haram, 

which in April brazenly kidnapped hundreds of young schoolgirls. 

This committee and this Congress passed a resolution condemning 

these kidnappings, and I think we all remain committed to providing as much U.S. assistance and advice as can be effective to 

support the Nigerian Government’s efforts to secure the return of 

these schoolgirls and to stem the violence of this brutal and violent 

terrorist organization. 

Maintaining robust enforcement of the Leahy laws, which serves 

as the primary safeguard, assuring that the United States is not 

contributing to human rights violations through its military foreign 

assistance is, I believe, a necessity if we are to maintain credibility 

with local populations, not to mention do the right thing by ensuring that we are not supporting or assisting those violating basic 

human rights. 

So I look forward to hearing the testimony today, and I am particularly interested in hearing our witnesses address how we can 

move forward in a constructive way to assist the Nigerian Government while ensuring that the units we support honor the most 

basic tenets of human rights and international law. 

With that, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and yield. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I would like to yield to Mr. Pittenger. 

Mr. PITTENGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for allowing me to participate in this important hearing and for your 30 

years of dedicated commitment to the plight of human rights and 

religious liberties and freedoms of conscience throughout the world. 

Thank you, witnesses, for appearing before us today. 

The purpose of this hearing, clearly, is very important, as we 

work to ensure that we are taking appropriate actions to curb 

human rights violations around the world, while at the same time 

not undermining our own national security, the continued attacks 

aimed at the young girls, then kidnapping and selling those girls 

into human trafficking, is the most egregious act and cannot be tolerated. 

In May, I sent a letter to the President, joined by over 170 of my 

colleagues, urging all possible action to find and protect those girls. 

The issue we face, however, is what actions can or should we be 

taking to support a foreign military who has been continually engaged in politically motivated killings, torture, and excessive use of 

force, or that have just been negligent in securing their country 

from those who engage in this egregious abuse. 

I look forward to your testimony as we will be considering the 

issue on the House floor in the coming weeks. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I would like to yield to our ranking member, Karen Bass from California. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for holding this hearing. I look 

forward to the testimony of our witnesses today, and I don’t want 

to take a lot of time. I want to jump right into it. But I am hoping 

that as part of the testimony and looking at the subject of human 

6

rights that someone will address the issue and legislation that is 

occurring in regards to LGBT individuals and the way we have 

seen draconian legislation passed in a variety of places, and hopefully you will comment to that in your testimony. 

Mr. SMITH. I would like to now introduce our distinguished witnesses, beginning with Ms. Lauren Blanchard, who is a specialist 

in African affairs at the Congressional Research Service, where she 

provides analysis on African political, military, and diplomatic affairs, and on U.S. policy in the region, to Members of Congress, 

committees, and staff. 

She has written extensively on security issues and U.S. military 

engagement on the continent, speaks regularly at academic institutions and international policy fora in the United States and abroad, 

and has conducted training in various countries across Africa for 

parliamentarians and other government officials on the policymaking role of the Congress. Previously, she worked at USAID, as 

well as in the United States Senate. 

We will then hear from Colonel Peter Aubrey, who is currently 

the president of Strategic Opportunities International and has 

served in a variety of staff and command assignments during both 

peacetime and war. He served as the initial director of security cooperation for the U.S. Army in Africa, previously served as an 

Army attache in Nigeria and many other countries across Africa, 

including Burundi at the height of its civil war. 

During the Gulf War, Colonel Aubrey advised Saudi troops and 

commanded special forces in combat, and he has been awarded the 

Bronze Star for Valor. Thank you for your distinguished service. 

We will then hear from Mr. Stephen Rickard, who directs the 

Open Society’s Washington office advocates working on both U.S. 

domestic and international issues. He has had a distinguished 

Washington career on Capitol Hill in the State Department and 

with human rights organizations. 

Before joining Open Society, he created and managed the Freedom Investment Project, working to encourage U.S. support for 

international justice. Mr. Rickard served as director of the Robert 

F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights and as Washington 

director for Amnesty International USA. And he, too, is no stranger 

to this committee, and when he was in that position in particular 

often came up on the Hill and advised us and testified. Prior to 

that, he worked at the U.S. Department of State, as well as in the 

U.S. Senate. 

We will then hear from Ms. Elisa Massimino, who has been the 

president and chief executive officer of Human Rights First since 

2008, and she helped established the Washington office in 1991 

and served as the organization’s Washington director from 1997 

through 2008. She has a distinguished record of human rights advocacy in Washington, as a national authority in human rights law 

and policy. 

She has testified before Congress dozens of times, and I think at 

least a dozen before my subcommittee, including this subcommittee, and writes frequently for mainstream publications and 

specialized journals. The Washington newspaper, the Hill, has repeatedly named her as one of the most effective public advocates 

in the country. 

7

And, finally, we will hear from Sarah Margon, who is the Washington director of Human Rights Watch. Prior to joining Human 

Rights Watch, she was associate director of Sustainable Security 

and Peace Building at the Center for American Progress, where she 

researched and wrote on a wide range of issues, including human 

rights, foreign aid, good governance, and global conflicts and crises. 

She also served in the U.S. Senate as staff director of the Senate 

Subcommittee on Africa Affairs, became a senior policy advisor for 

Oxfam America, and worked at the Open Society Institute. 

Ms. Blanchard, if you would begin. 

STATEMENT OF MS. LAUREN PLOCH BLANCHARD, SPECIALIST 

IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Ms. BLANCHARD. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting 

CRS to testify today. In my brief statement this afternoon, I will 

focus on the laws that require human rights vetting and their application in Nigeria. I would ask that my written testimony be submitted for the record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered. 

Ms. BLANCHARD. The State Department vets foreign security 

force units prior to providing U.S. assistance based on policy concerns and to comply with two legal provisions named for their original sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy. They are just two of the many 

laws that Congress has enacted to promote human rights and to 

protect the U.S. image abroad by distancing the United States from 

abusive governments and security forces. 

The first provision is codified in the Foreign Assistance Act and 

applies to foreign aid programs and those authorized under the 

Arms Export Control Act. It prohibits assistance to foreign security 

force units credibly implicated in gross human rights abuses. 

The second provision, which applies to security assistance funded 

through DoD, has appeared in annual defense appropriations acts 

since 1998. Both provisions have been modified over time, as have 

the procedures for human rights vetting. 

The State Department and DoD Leahy provisions are similar, 

but not identical, and in recent years legislation has brought the 

two provisions closer together. The foreign aid provisions apply to 

all forms of assistance. The DoD provision initially applied only to 

training, but was expanded in the past year to include equipment 

and other assistance. 

Some differences remain, notably in the standards for the remediation of units deemed ineligible for assistance, and in the exceptions and existence of a waiver authority in the DoD provision. The 

FAA provision allows no exception from the law except through the 

credible remediation of the tainted unit, although aid could be provided through measures framed in law with notwithstanding provisions. 

The DoD Leahy provision, on the other hand, includes exceptions 

for equipment and other assistance ‘‘necessary to assist in disaster 

relief operations or other humanitarian international emergencies.’’ 

The DoD provision also allows the Secretary of Defense to waive 

the provision in extraordinary circumstances. To date, however, 

DoD has never issued a waiver, suggesting a very high bar for use. 

8

Despite the differences in the two laws, in practice DoD and the 

State Department general implement the Leahy laws similarly. 

Leahy vetting is a multi-stage process that begins at U.S. Embassies abroad and concludes at State Department headquarters. During the process, the names of potential candidates for U.S. assistance are checked against a variety of sources for derogatory information. In the past 2 years, the process has resulted in an approval 

rate for more than 90 percent of candidates and in an outright denial for fewer than 1 percent. 

Growing DoD emphasis on partnering with foreign militaries to 

address threats such as terrorism has brought increased attention 

to the Leahy laws. Some military commanders have implied in 

some cases that the laws have complicated their ability to build foreign counterterrorism and counternarcotics capabilities. Others 

suggest that U.S. training could improve the behavior of abuse of 

forces by imparting U.S. values and respect for human rights and 

the rule of law. 

Attention to Leahy laws may intensify as DoD and the State Department determine what effect the new broader DoD Leahy provision will have on security assistance overseas. The expanded provision is repeated in the House version of the FY15 Defense Appropriations Act, and the Senate Armed Services Committee has proposed to codify the provision this year. 

As recent hearings have highlighted, the United States is currently seeking to balance security and human rights concerns in 

Nigeria. U.S. security assistance to Nigeria has been constrained 

by both law and policy concerns, and the security relationship has 

been hampered at times by a lack of cooperation from Nigerian officials and by systemic problems in the Nigerian military. 

Nigerian security force abuses in the context of operations to 

counter Boko Haram have complicated efforts to pursue greater cooperation despite shared concerns about the group. Political and 

human rights concerns have been a prominent factor in shaping 

U.S.-Nigeria relations for decades. 

State Department reports have continued to highlight serious 

human rights violations by the Nigerian security forces for every 

year since the transition from military rule in 1999. According to 

the State Department, the information on security force abuses 

currently implicates roughly half the units in the Nigerian military, and likely would render those units ineligible for assistance 

if they were submitted for vetting. 

Despite restrictions on some units, U.S. security assistance to Nigeria is sizeable by regional standards, totaling almost $20 million 

in FY2012 State Department funding, and $16 million in FY2013. 

DoD funding for Nigeria has been limited, but appears set to expand under a proposed New Global Security Contingency Fund 

Program. 

Multiple systemic factors constrain the effectiveness of the Nigerian security force response to Boko Haram; notably, security sector corruption and mismanagement. Some of these factors impede 

U.S. support, even for units cleared for assistance. Many soldiers, 

particularly those in the northeast, reportedly suffer from low morale, and they have struggled to keep pace with a foe that is increasingly well armed and well trained. 

9

By many accounts, Nigerian troops are not adequately resourced 

or equipped to counter the insurgency, despite a security budget 

approaching $6 billion. In the assessment of DoD officials, Nigerian 

funding for the military is skimmed off the top. 

DoD officials have assessed the Nigerian forces as ‘‘slow to adapt 

to new strategies, new doctrines, and new tactics,’’ and have described Nigeria as ‘‘an extremely challenging partner to work with.’’ 

U.S. officials have sought to encourage the government to take a 

more comprehensive counterterrorism approach, and one that is, in 

the words of one of DoD official to Congress, less brutal. One of the 

primary aims of DoD engagement is to ‘‘convince the Nigerians to 

change their tactics, techniques, and procedures in the northeast.’’

The State Department suggests that the Leahy laws have provided a strategic tool to encourage reforms in Nigeria, and in Africa 

more broadly. The Nigerian military has sought to develop its own 

civilian protection and human rights monitoring and training in 

the past year, and the Nigerian President recently ordered more 

human rights training for officers. 

Nigerian officials have also made statements suggesting an 

evolving counterterrorism strategy, one that seeks not only security 

but also political and economic solutions. In sum, Nigeria provides 

an example of the challenges U.S. policymakers face in building 

foreign counterterrorism capacities. 

By many accounts, developing countries like Nigeria that are 

struggling with terrorist threats may desperately need the specialized skills and support that U.S. security assistance is designed to 

provide. But when security forces abuse civilians, U.S. engagement 

may risk not only tainting the U.S. image, but also may fuel popular grievances and alienate local populations. 

U.S. officials continue to explore ways to improve the vetting 

process in the dialogue with partner governments to enhance effectiveness in accountability and to mitigate the risk that U.S. partners might not use U.S. assistance responsibly. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Blanchard follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

I would like to now ask Colonel Aubrey if he would present his 

comments to the subcommittee. 

STATEMENT OF COLONEL PETER AUBREY, USA, RETIRED, 

PRESIDENT, STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES INTERNATIONAL 

Colonel AUBREY. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me 

here today. 

As requested, I will focus my remarks today on what are commonly called the Leahy laws, which prohibit the provision of U.S. 

security assistance to foreign security force units that have been 

credibly implicated in violations of human rights. 

I previously submitted written comments to the subcommittee 

and request that they be entered into your record. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, so ordered. And that of all of our 

distinguished witnesses will be made a part of the record, your 

statements and any material you would like attached to it. 

Colonel AUBREY. Thank you. Rather than reading what I had 

previously submitted, I would like to give some observations on security assistance that I have encountered in a 30-plus year career 

that focused on foreign internal defense, security assistance, and 

security cooperation as they affect training in Nigeria. 

Nigeria is a particularly difficult case. During my tour there from 

2006 to 2008, I served with three different Chiefs of Army Staff. 

Two were American-trained, and I enjoyed good access and a large 

degree of cooperation. The third was not U.S.-trained, was uncooperative, and routinely refused to facilitate vetting for U.S. training, claiming it was an unreasonable infringement of Nigerian sovereignty. 

My team and I got the job done. It wasn’t pretty, it wasn’t 

prompt, and it definitely wasn’t easy. Vetting can be near impossible. The standards are not beyond reasonable doubt, but credible. 

A misspelled name can result in unintentional blacklisting, and the 

system does not lend itself to correction. And, more importantly, 

you have to have the host nation cooperating. If they do not cooperate, the system fails. 

There is no simple answer on how to solve vetting, training, and 

access in Nigeria. Corruption, poor leadership, regional differences, 

tribal issues, and religious conflicts plague Nigeria and its armed 

forces. 

Previous sanctions have led to a generation of leadership not enamored with the United States, having been trained, mentored, 

and cultivated by some of our global competitors. Nigeria does not 

have a command and control infrastructure that will allow its commanders in the field to have direct controls of his forces, relying on 

cell phones and in some cases runners to pass messages. 

Training is inadequate. Soldiers receive an inadequate amount of 

ammunition to train with. Officers frequently abuse their authorities, and there is no real professional NCO corps. 

The units that we have focused our attention on, usually those 

earmarked for external U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping missions, perform at a much higher standard, but still suffer from the problems 

I describe. At the same time, the Nigerians are fiercely proud of 

20

their accomplishments. They have West Africa’s War College. They 

offer officer training to their neighbors. 

They have successfully deployed to neighboring countries, and 

they participate in regional exercises and deployments. All of these 

issues help set the stage for the dilemma that is Nigeria and the 

difficulties faced in providing training to help combat the surge of 

Islamic extremism in the northeast and their inability to contain 

the violence. 

Nigeria’s problems of vetting can be found almost everywhere. In 

Liberia, the Liberian Armed Forces, a force recruited, vetted, 

trained, and still mentored by U.S. personnel, still have training 

delayed by vetting requirements, and we know that their force has 

not been accused of human rights violations. 

The rest of Africa has similar stories. In my written testimony, 

I passed a story relayed to me by one of my former subordinates 

that in Uganda a misfire occurred in an attempt to rehabilitate a 

blacklisted unit. The end result was the blacklisting of the officer 

involved in the rehabilitation attempt, rather than the rehabilitation of the blacklisted unit. 

I offer these following recommendations to the committee for consideration. Authorize DoD human rights training in a broad category of subjects similar to the expanded IMET program that we 

executed in the 1990s. Allow engagement that is designed to professionalize those errant forces, teach the law of land for human 

rights, the military role in civil societies, and other such subjects. 

Develop an exit strategy for the bad units and individuals that will 

build for the potential for full engagement. Rehabilitate and professionalize, rather than punish. And, finally, develop some type of 

vetting process for units like the LAF. 

If we don’t engage, our global competitors can and usually will. 

I want to thank this committee for this opportunity, and I stand 

ready to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Colonel Aubrey follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Colonel Aubrey, thank you very much for your testimony. And coming from someone who actually was in the Embassy, 

provided this kind of training and vetting, it is very important that 

we receive your insights. 

Colonel AUBREY. Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. We would like to hear from Mr. Rickard, if you could 

provide your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF MR. STEPHEN RICKARD, DIRECTOR, 

WASHINGTON OFFICE, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS 

Mr. RICKARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you for holding the hearing. And thank you, Ranking Member 

Bass, and the other distinguished members of the committee for 

your commitment to human rights and to Africa, as demonstrated 

by your service on this important subcommittee. And I would be 

very happy to talk about some of the LGBT issues that the ranking 

member raised, which are extremely important. 

I have worked on the Leahy law, in one form or another, for 

nearly 17 years. And I have discussed them with countless State 

Department and Defense officials, as well as human rights experts 

all over the globe. And the Leahy laws are just common sense. 

They prohibit the United States Government from arming and providing military training to security force or police units abroad that 

have been credibly alleged to commit a small list of the very worst 

human rights violations. 

These laws do not prohibit the United States from providing assistance, even in the most violent conflict-wracked countries, like 

Nigeria and Colombia. On the contrary, because the Leahy law involves a unit-by-unit examination of human rights records, the 

Leahy laws provide a formula for the United States to engage in 

countries like Nigeria. They are a formula for success in those 

countries, not a prohibition on engagement. 

Indeed, Colonel Aubrey’s description of the success story in Liberia in his written testimony seems to me a perfect example of what 

can be accomplished when we build human rights vetting and 

training into our system from the ground up. If it can work in Liberia, and it can work in Colombia, it can work in Nigeria and elsewhere. 

I would like the members of the committee to keep in mind four 

numbers when you think about the Leahy law. The first is 530,000. 

That is the number of units that the United States Government 

had considered training in just the last 3 years, 530,000. 

The second number is 90 percent. That is the number of those 

units that got a quick response, a green light to proceed after they 

were vetted, generally within 10 days. There is even a fast track 

procedure for countries that have generally good human rights 

records. 

The third number, which you referred to, Mr. Chairman, is 1 percent. Less than 1 percent of the time a unit is prohibited from receiving assistance under the Leahy law. It is not a burdensome requirement. 

But the final number is 2,516. The Leahy law blocks aid in a tiny 

percentage of cases, but that doesn’t mean it is unimportant. And 

2,516 is the number of vetted units that the U.S. Government 

26

found to be credibly involved in gross atrocities in just the last 3 

years. 

In other words, without the Leahy laws, this hearing wouldn’t be 

about a handful of units that DoD would like to work with but 

can’t because of their atrocious human rights records; this would 

be a hearing about the 2,516 units that we did assist, that we gave 

guns to, that we gave military assistance to, and only later discovered that members of those units had committed murder, rape, and 

torture. The Leahy law stopped that, and it stopped it 2,516 times 

in just the last 3 years. 

Those 2,516 units weren’t being asked to meet a high standard. 

The Leahy law doesn’t require pristine forces. The State Department defines gross human rights violations to cover five gross 

crimes: Murder, torture, rape, disappearances, and other gross violations of life and liberty. That is it. And the Leahy law doesn’t 

even prohibit you from working with those units if the government 

will clean them up. 

So when someone tells you that we can’t work with a unit, I 

would encourage you to ask three questions. The first is, what did 

the unit do that got it on the list? If we can’t work with them, it 

must mean that the United States has determined that that unit 

is one of the worst of the worst. It is in the 1 percent of units that 

the U.S. found credible information that they were committing 

murder, rape, torture, disappearances, or other gross crimes. 

Second question: Why won’t the government clean them up? The 

Leahy law lets you work with a unit if the government will take 

effective action. Maybe the government, as Colonel Aubrey has 

said, doesn’t accept the U.S. commitment or it considers it an infringement on its sovereignty. Maybe it doesn’t want to let the U.S. 

tell it what to do. Maybe the government has no control over the 

units, and it can’t clean up the units, even if it wants to. But ask 

yourself: Why won’t the government or can’t the government clean 

up these units? 

And finally; ask, if we know or believe that these units have committed the worst of the worst offenses, if the government will not 

or cannot clean up the units, why should the U.S. taxpayers pay 

to give those units, those specific units rather than other units, 

guns and military training? 

There are a number of things that could be done to improve the 

Leahy law, and I think there is a lot of common ground here. We 

should increase funding for vetting. And I would note that since 

Colonel Aubrey’s examples in Nigeria, there has already been a 

revolution in Leahy law vetting. An excellent database has been 

created. There are now 13 professional vetters who do this work. 

There is in fact a system to correct mistakes in the document. So 

there has been enormous progress in the last few years. 

Two, we should make remediation and vetting a cost of doing 

business. We should set aside one penny out of every dollar to just 

say, ‘‘This goes to vetting and fixing the bad units.’’ If we want to 

be in Nigeria, that is just a cost of doing business there. 

Three, we should train people. Many of the examples that Colonel Aubrey cites are examples of misunderstandings of the law. 

And if people had simply understood the law better, including the 

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case that he cites in Uganda, that problem would have never arisen. So more training would be better. 

In my written testimony, I respond to many of the common criticisms of the law, and I would be happy to do so in response to 

questions. But I would like to ask people to consider what the 

lower standard would be below the Leahy law. Should we take rape 

off the list of gross human rights violations? Should we take murder off the list? Should we say that if you haven’t murdered anybody in 2 years, or 4 years, that is enough; now we will give you 

guns? Do we have a statute of limitations? This is the rock bottom 

human rights requirement that we should have. 

Mr. Chairman, I am a preacher’s kid, and the Bible tells us 

that—in the Book of Acts—before his conversion on the road to Damascus, the Apostle Paul was a persecutor of the Christian church. 

In fact, according to Acts, he was present at the killing at Saint 

Stephen, my namesake. 

But the Bible tells us that he cast no stones himself at the killing 

of Saint Stephen. What he did was he held the cloaks of the people 

who did. He cast no stones, but he was complicit. He gave support 

to the people who did. 

And when we go to places like Nigeria, shouldn’t we at least ask 

ourselves, whose cloaks are we holding? Who are we handing 

stones to? That is what the Leahy law asks. That is all that it asks. 

Let us not be complicit in the worst human rights abuses in places 

like Nigeria. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rickard follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Mr. Rickard, thank you very much for your testimony. 

We will take a short recess. There are a number of votes occurring on the floor. We have about a minute to get over and vote. So 

we stand in recess. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will continue its hearing. 

And Mr. Pittenger does have to go, but he would like to ask a 

question of the panelists, and then we will go to Ms. Massimino. 

Mr. PITTENGER. Thank you. Really appreciate the good work that 

you all do, and certainly hope that our advocacy can make a difference for the lives of these wonderful people. 

A motto I have lived by is inspect what you expect. So I would 

like to ask you, as we take a little bit more depth in the effectiveness of the Embassies, the DoD, and the State Department, and 

how they are doing in the vetting process. A fundamental piece of 

this discussion is knowing whether we are accurately identifying 

the good actors or if we are misidentifying bad actors as good ones. 

Ms. Blanchard, can we start with you? 

Ms. BLANCHARD. That is a tough question. You know, the Embassies in many of these countries have to rely greatly on groups like 

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International for the reporting. 

I mean, these Embassies are only staffed, particularly in Africa, by 

small staffs. So they are relying on that reporting, and then they 

have to determine whether that reporting is credible or not. 

They also, you know, benefit from local journalists and local 

NGOs, and they have the very difficult task, particularly in countries like Nigeria that are strategically important, that face serious 

threats, in determining whether that information is valid on a security force unit or not. 

So I think that, you know, there is a lot of challenge there. And 

when you have got short-staffed Embassies, it is——

Mr. PITTENGER. Sure. Makes a difference. Anybody else that 

would like to respond to that? 

Ms. MARGON. I would be happy to make a quick response. I think 

the short answer is it depends. It varies very much from Embassy 

to Embassy. In some cases, it is particularly dependent on the Ambassador at the Embassy. We have seen a real overhaul in vetting 

in certain Embassies. I think the U.S. Embassy in Colombia has 

done a very good job of putting human rights vetting to the forefront of its relationship with the security forces there. 

Doesn’t mean the relationship is perfect. It doesn’t mean the security forces themselves are perfect. In fact, they are quite the opposite still. But it has become a central part of the conversation, 

and each side knows what is expected. 

The other piece that I would just add very briefly is that this is 

an important question because it is essential that the executive 

branch embrace the Leahy law and human rights vetting as part 

of its foreign policy, and so that they do a job both at the Foreign 

Service Institute in training officers but also encourage the military to train officers to understand the law, what it means to apply 

it, what the expectations are, and how to clean, if you will, units 

that have been dirty. 

Mr. PITTENGER. Ms. Massimino? 

36

Ms. MASSIMINO. Yes. I am so glad you asked that question, because there is another asset that we have or that we could exploit 

more fully in the Leahy vetting process, and that is, in addition to 

internationally focused NGOs, the local NGOs often have the best, 

most up to date, most reliable information, but a lot of times they 

don’t understand how the process works, what level of detail they 

need, the form that the information needs to be in. 

So it would be worth our while, I think, a good investment in 

reaching out, in having the Embassies reach out to those local 

human rights defenders, explain to them what the Leahy law is, 

solicit their information, develop relationships with them. 

You know, the State Department has issued these human rights 

defender principles, guidance on how Embassies ought to interact 

with human rights activists in-country, and it really is kind of a 

blueprint for how to develop good relationships with those NGOs. 

And if those were fully implemented, I think we would have an additional resource in making sure that the vetting is well done. 

Mr. PITTENGER. Thank you. 

Colonel? 

Colonel AUBREY. The only thing I would add to the discussion is 

the need to do a whole of Embassy approach on that, make sure 

that the defense attache is incorporated in there. 

Part of the problem is, on the identification, is making sure that 

the units are properly identified. That DAT is going to know that 

the unit that came out of Sokuto that had this type of unit patch, 

that had this type of equipment that committed the violation was 

a particular unit. 

And that way, even if the people reporting it don’t understand 

the military order of battle, is that with a whole of Embassy approach—and you actually ask the accurate questions—it can actually be pinpointed properly. 

Mr. PITTENGER. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I have one more question, if that is okay. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, it is. 

Mr. PITTENGER. Thank you. Well, I would like to hear your 

thoughts on the real impact of the Leahy laws, that they have had. 

Do you feel that foreign countries have been impacted by our reluctance to aid security forces engaged in human rights violations? 

And, if so, could you give possible examples of what actions that 

they have taken? 

Ms. BLANCHARD. In terms of effectiveness of the Leahy law, I 

think some of it depends on how much the country wants our assistance, and I think this may be a question in the case of Nigeria. 

In cases that want U.S. assistance, and there are a few on the continent that I think of as an example, countries like Colombia, if 

they want U.S. assistance, then they will generally comply with our 

rules and regulations. 

And often you will see even senior military people switched out 

and units go through this process of remediation. And the clearer 

that the Embassy staff can be with the host country on how that 

remediation process works, the more likely we are to see accountability. 

If a country doesn’t want our assistance, then how effective can 

the vetting be? And that is——

37

Mr. PITTENGER. Sure. Thank you very much for your dedication 

and your good work. 

And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the courtesy——

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Pittenger. 

Mr. PITTENGER [continuing]. Of asking. I appreciate it. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Massimino, if you could proceed. 

STATEMENT OF MS. ELISA MASSIMINO, PRESIDENT AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST 

Ms. MASSIMINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, 

members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to be 

here today to share our views on human rights vetting and the critical role that it plays in advancing human rights and U.S. national 

security. 

I want to also express my profound gratitude to you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership on this and so many important human 

rights issues. You came to Congress about the same time that 

Human Rights First was born, and I feel like we have been working together ever since. There is really nobody in Congress, and 

very few people outside of Congress, who can match your passion 

and persistence. You are a constant reminder to your colleagues 

and to all of us that respect for human rights is not only the right 

to do; it is the smart thing to do. 

And Human Rights First is actually an organization that is built 

on that idea. Our central mission is to foster American leadership 

on human rights, and human rights vetting requirements, the 

Leahy laws, are absolutely critical to that leadership. 

When Secretary Kerry rolled out the human rights country reports this year, he said, ‘‘The places where we face some of the 

greatest national security challenges today are also places where 

governments deny basic human rights to their nation’s peoples, and 

that is no coincidence.’’

As the U.S. expands its partnerships with foreign military and 

security forces to counter new threats, it is important to keep that 

in mind. Respect for human rights is neither a trump that beats 

other national interests, nor is it a soft concern that can be traded 

off or deferred without undermining those very interests. 

Respect for human rights, rather, is the cornerstone. It is a foundation on which to advance other national priorities. 

While the United States serves its national interest when it lives 

up to its ideals, the converse is also true. We have learned from 

years of experience that it is not just our reputation that is degraded when our partners engage in abusive and predatory practices; it is our security as well. Association with these abuses weakens U.S. moral authority, an increasingly, I think, undervalued resource these days, and alienates the civilian populations whose 

support is essential in the struggle against terrorism. And it is 

used by terrorists to validate grievances and to recruit others to 

their cause. 

The Leahy laws are sometimes viewed as an insurance policy to 

minimize the risk that American leaders are seen as collaborators 

with criminals. And that is an important thing, but human rights 

vetting is much more than human rights risk insurance. I would 

38

like to focus on two other strategic objectives of the Leahy laws 

that underscore both its importance and its practicality. 

First is the Leahy law’s role in promoting accountability. In any 

country, real accountability in security services depends on the capacity and the willingness of civilian institutions to act. The Leahy 

laws encourage respect for human rights by providing an incentive 

for foreign governments to bring violators in their security forces 

to justice. 

The Leahy laws by themselves can’t ensure that our security 

partners will hold abusive individuals and units accountable. For 

the law to be effective, the U.S. must embed it in a broader human 

rights strategy. Proper training helps foster a culture of accountability, which is one of the reasons that professionalizing partner 

forces is a key component of our national defense strategy. Properly 

trained security forces understand the negative ramifications of 

human rights abuses, and, thus, are less likely to commit them. 

So the vetting process required by the Leahy laws not only encourages the development of justice mechanisms, but when it is 

paired with robust training and assistance programs, it fosters professionalism with security forces that ultimately makes resort to 

those mechanisms less necessary. 

The other strategic value of the Leahy laws is their contribution 

to the conduct of U.S. counterterrorism operations. By encouraging 

foreign governments to institute counterterrorism policies premised 

on the rule of law and respect for human rights, and by demanding 

accountability for human rights violations, the U.S. creates the legitimacy needed for effective counterterrorism operations and mitigates the conditions that help give rise to extremism. 

Consider Colombia. The U.S. Embassy in Bogota has fully embraced the Leahy laws with two full-time staff positions dedicated 

to vetting 30,000 to 35,000 individuals annually. None of that was 

easy. It wasn’t cheap, and Leahy vetting is not a panacea. But after 

a decade of effort and targeted aid that has spurred improvements, 

the Colombian Government continues to take action against many 

violators of human rights. 

Finally, the Leahy law is just not an obstacle to pursuing our security goals. I know there are some, including in the military, and 

some here in the Congress, who have expressed concerns that the 

Leahy laws create an obstacle to our security goals because they 

bar the U.S. from equipping security forces on the front lines of 

conflicts, such as in Nigeria. 

The logic behind this position is that in some conflicts there just 

are no good options, and that in service of a larger objective, 

against a bigger threat, the U.S. may need to tolerate units that 

have committed abuses. 

But those concerns should be assuaged just by the facts. It is 

really important not to conflate the need to work with governments 

and militaries that have questionable human rights records with 

what the Leahy law is intended to prevent. For our part at Human 

Rights First, we believe that when the U.S. military interacts with 

foreign militaries, it is generally a net plus in terms of effectiveness, professionalism, and governance by the rule of law. 

But no matter what lens you view it through, it is never in 

America’s interest to arm or train or partner with individuals or 

39

units that are credibly believed to have committed torture, rape, or 

other such heinous crimes. 

Now, I have heard, and I understand from the State Department 

and others, that the Leahy laws have never really prevented the 

U.S. from engaging in an essential operation. There has always 

been a more reliable, rights-respecting alternative. 

As you heard from our colleague, Ms. Blanchard, the numbers 

really speak for themselves. If there is a problem getting training 

and assistance to the right people in Nigeria, I am not sure it is 

because of the Leahy laws. Clearly, we don’t want the Leahy laws 

to end up disqualifying good people who share our goals and seek 

our support from getting it. 

Those individuals are not covered under Leahy, and, in fact, it 

is not uncommon for a new unit to be created for the sole purpose 

of excluding abusers and making sure we can help those people 

who share our values and our goals. And not only should we be cooperating with those military forces who share our goals, we also 

should be working with them to help them demand accountability 

for those accused of crimes. 

I suspect that the belief in some quarters that human rights vetting is a hindrance rather than a help in the country’s battle 

against terrorism and other security threats might grow out of a 

failure to recognize its value. We all know that in the face of danger the big picture tends to get lost, and human rights vetting 

comes to seem a little bit like do-goodism that can be disregarded 

in the interest of national security. 

But we should reject the temptation to cut moral and legal corners. The Leahy laws really derive from the bipartisan commitment to our country’s ideals. And those ideals are a national security asset. And when we ally ourselves with those who undermine 

human rights, we are endangering ourselves. 

Now, we have in the written statement several recommendations 

for improving implementation of the human rights vetting process, 

and maybe we can address those in the questions and answers. 

But I thank you for your leadership, again, in holding this hearing, and for digging in as usual on the details of what can make 

human rights real. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Massimino follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Ms. Massimino, thank you very much for your testimony, for your leadership for decades. And we will get to your recommendations as soon as we hear from our next witness, Ms. 

Margon. 

STATEMENT OF MS. SARAH MARGON, WASHINGTON 

DIRECTOR, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 

Ms. MARGON. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting 

me to testify today. I am really pleased this subcommittee is looking at the details of human rights vetting and its application in Nigeria and beyond. 

It is a timely hearing, given the impending U.S. redeployment 

from Afghanistan and the inevitable shift in resources and priorities that will occur. In fact, this shift has already begun with 

President Obama’s recent creation of the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund and other correlated efforts to strengthen the capabilities of foreign military partners. 

It is a renewed and expanded approach to security assistance 

that calls for reinvigorated attention to the Leahy law as a critical 

tool to finding the right balance between incentivizing institutional 

reform and addressing ongoing and systemic abuses that undermine larger U.S. security goals. 

As you have noted, Mr. Chairman, the Leahy laws are an important means to ensure that the U.S. is not complicit in grave human 

rights abuses abroad, and that it upholds its international legal obligations. But it also makes sense within the larger foreign policy 

context, since militaries that commit abuses can also exacerbate 

longstanding grievances, escalate atrocities, foment political instability, and provide abusive armed opposition groups and terrorist 

organizations with a very powerful recruiting tool. 

As examples, I would like to talk a little bit about our research 

in Nigeria, and then move off the continent for a second to talk 

about Iraq, given that it has returned to media pretty heavily. 

Since long before the Chibok abductions, and the Bring Back Our 

Girls campaign captured the world’s attention, Human Rights 

Watch has been reporting on the crisis in northern Nigeria and the 

serious abuses the security forces have perpetrated in responding 

to it. In 2009, we denounced the government’s killing, while in custody, of Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf and many others, 

acts which are widely believed to have spurned further violence by 

the group. 

In October 2012, we released a report that looked not only at 

Boko Haram’s atrocities, but also at the impact of Nigeria’s heavyhanded security response. We found that in an attempt to halt increasing violent attacks between 2010 and 2012, Nigeria’s security 

forces killed hundreds of Boko Haram suspects, along with members of local communities who were apparently attacked at random. 

Our research made clear that the members of the security force 

used excessive force, were physically abusive, detained suspects secretly, stole money, and burned homes. 

In May 2013, Human Rights Watch issued another report examining massive destruction in the northern town of Baga. We used 

satellite imagery and witness evidence to confirm that while Boko 

Haram did attack a military patrol, kill a soldier, and wound five 

49

others, the government’s response was directed at the local community, as government forces burned homes and killed local residents. 

Our satellite images actually indicated high levels of building destruction, but because we were not able to visit the north we 

weren’t able to confirm death figures from witnesses of almost 200 

people. 

Security force abuse in Nigeria is not limited to the Boko Haram 

crisis, as I am sure you know. It is deeply systemic. Over the years, 

we have documented many cases of abuse and apparent indiscriminate or excessive use of force outside of insurgency-related situations, from the oil-producing Niger Delta region, to arbitrary 

killings in response to intercommunal violence in Nigeria’s middle 

belt, to political violence that often accompanies elections at all levels of government, to even small events such as one that occurred 

about a 11⁄2 weeks ago in the city of Lagos, where it appeared soldiers went on a bus-burning rampage, randomly beating and 

harassing city residents after a bus ran over and killed one of their 

fellow fighters earlier that morning. 

This abusive conduct completely undermines the security force’s 

effectiveness and creates strong resentment within the communities they are ostensibly there to protect. In the case of Boko 

Haram, many Nigerians have expressed reluctance to share any information that might help stop the group, because they are afraid 

it will be used against them. 

Worse still, the Nigerian Government has largely failed to undertake any kind of credible investigation in the ongoing and pervasive security force abuses that have repeatedly been brought to 

their attention. More than 10 years on, the government has still 

not held any members of the security forces accountable for a 2001 

massacre of more than 200 people in Benue State. 

If we turn to Iraq very briefly, as another example, where Prime 

Minister al-Maliki’s heavy-handed approach to security has exacerbated security tensions, perpetuated impunity, and undermined the 

rule of law. We see that in January 2013, the Prime Minister 

promised to reform the criminal justice system, but a year later 

had done nothing and the brutal tactics of his security forces remain essentially the same. 

In late May, just before the initial advance of ISIS, Human 

Rights Watch documented how Iraqi security forces were dropping 

barrel bombs on populated areas and attacking hospitals in 

Fallujah as the government intensified its campaign against a 

broadly defined group of insurgents. 

This is not to say that Iraq hasn’t been grappling with some very 

serious security threats. We know this. But the government’s excessive use of force in law enforcement situations and violations of the 

laws of war has hindered rather than helped the country’s counterterrorism efforts. He has terrified hundreds of civilians, killed thousands more, and the government has alienated affected populations, many of which could have been potential allies in the name 

of ‘‘combatting terrorism.’’

A cautious approach to security assistance, combined with robust 

Leahy vetting, is essential given the body of objective evidence in 

both cases implicating security forces in gross human rights 

abuses. The Washington Post editorial board noted earlier this 

50

week, if U.S.-backed forces commit human rights abuses, the damage is twofold. The fight against insurgents is compromised, and so 

is support for the alliance with the United States. 

We also have a number of recommendations, which I will shorten, but very briefly the first is that Human Rights Watch would 

recommend support for the larger $5 million in the Senate appropriation for the Leahy vetting to ensure that Embassies have the 

right staff. 

The second is for the administration, and Congress to press the 

administration, to move much more quickly on developing guidance 

for remediation and accountability. 

And, finally, just to pick up on this last point that you mentioned 

earlier, the administration needs to do a much better job of publicly 

embracing the principles of the Leahy law at extremely senior levels and making clear both the implication and the consequences for 

all partner nations. 

Thank you. I am happy to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Margon follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for your testimony, and for 

your specific recommendations, which will be very helpful to the 

subcommittee. 

All of your comments and testimony I think will be of tremendous nature. We are in an inflection point. We are at a crossroads, 

I think, especially with the President’s proposal and the language 

that you, Ms. Blanchard, pointed out in a June 26 submission to 

Congress with regards—that would seemingly bypass the Leahy 

amendment, the ‘‘notwithstanding’’ language, any limitation in the 

provision of law that would otherwise restrict the amount or recipients of such support or assistance, contingent on notification to 

Congress that it is in the national security interest to do so, as part 

of the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund. And I thank you for 

amplifying that in your testimony. 

So this does come I think at an important point in this debate. 

I would like to ask one general question about Nigeria, and, Colonel Aubrey, you might want to be first to answer it. We tried as 

a committee for approximately 2 years to get the administration to 

designate Boko Haram a foreign terrorist organization. 

Matter of fact, Greg Simpkins and I traveled to Jos and to Abuja 

last September, and the primary reason for going was to try to figure out why that FTO designation was not forthcoming, which, 

again, just like Leahy is not a panacea, nor is FTO, there is no 

panaceas, but there are tools in the toolbox that could help choke 

and stop the flow of funds, or at least figure out where those funds 

are coming from. And sooner is always better than later, rather 

than waiting to a Stage 4 cancer, which Boko Haram has become. 

And so my question is, when we get to training properly vetted, 

Mr. Rickard talked about 530,000 as the number, and you have a 

number of different periods, Ms. Blanchard, in your testimony—but 

large numbers of troops, service members, have been trained pursuant to Leahy. Only a small percentage are excluded. It does take 

some time, of course. 

But the question would be about the small number, the infinitesimal small number, of Nigerians who indeed have been trained, especially since Mr. Jackson had testified on the Senate side that 

roughly half of the Nigerian forces would be eligible for military 

training. And that is especially important in counterinsurgency 

training. 

So your thoughts on, you know, 1,200, 1,300, I don’t know what 

the number is for Fiscal Year 2013. But it is not much when one 

battalion is trained and, you know, the need for five to ten with 

that very special skill-set, human rights-oriented. Your thoughts on 

that. It seems like it is too small. 

Colonel AUBREY. I am not sure that numbers itself really is relevant on that. I have always felt that the Nigerian Army had sufficient strength to protect its borders. What you are talking about 

is national will, Chairman, is do they have the wherewithal and do 

they have the trust of their military to effectively train and arm 

and deploy. And I say that, you know, very cognizant about their 

military history. 

While I was present in Nigeria, we were very confident that the 

amount of ammunition that they would issue out their soldiers was 

usually zero, that we had people going through training in Jaji, the 

58

Infantry Training Center, preparing to deploy to Darfur that had 

been in their unit for 5 years and had never fired their weapon 

once. 

It is incumbent on the National Command Authority to trust its 

elements of defense and security. Unfortunately, the history in Nigeria does not lend the civil administration great confidence of 

that. And that is why my—my current military peers that had 

served in the 1990s probably will curse me for my statement about 

expanded IMET. 

I know that when I had to implement that I was not happy about 

having to do some of the Defense Sector Reform initiatives prior to 

doing regular military training, because that is what, you know, 

the targeted nation wanted. But there is something to be said 

about teaching a military’s proper role in civil society, both on the 

civilian side where the civilians understand how to properly command and control the military, but having the military understand 

the divisions. 

In Nigeria, the incidences that have been talked about, that is 

their own people that they are going into, that it is not enemy combatants on a foreign shore. So understanding that civil-military relationship, taking some of the lessons-learned that we have learned 

from 13 years of combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, and how atrocities make the jobs more difficult. It makes achievement of the mission goals much more hard. 

You know, I don’t have a solution. Just an observation that, you 

know, the problem in Nigeria is trust. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Ms. BLANCHARD. I think Colonel Aubrey has touched on a number of the issues. I think there is certainly an issue of political will, 

and also of follow-through on the part of the Nigerians. 

If you look at the two areas of security cooperation where we 

have had the most success, it has been in peacekeeping training 

and in maritime security and counternarcotics. The Nigerians have 

recently been making the decision to scale back their contributions 

to peacekeeping, and they are dropping further down the list. And 

they were always one of the top five contributors. They are no 

longer. So they are making some different decisions about how they 

allocate their military resources. 

In terms of special forces capabilities, they haven’t prioritized 

that. We started, I believe, in 2010 to try to work with a special 

counterterrorism unit. They didn’t keep the unit together. We are 

facing that challenge now where they are still debating whether a 

unit that has been cleared and trained to do counterterrorism missions will actually have that mission. 

So there have been some challenges I think in follow-through, 

particularly in engagement with us on things that we have offered 

and things that they have taken us up on. So I will leave that. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Ms. MARGON. Just wanted to pick up on those points. I think you 

raised the right question. And in the grand scheme, the small number of units that have been trained are not enough, but it is important to remember a couple of things. 

First is in the specific case of Boko Haram, a military solution 

is not going to fix the problem. And so while it may be that more 

59

clean units need to be engaged, it is not solely a military problem. 

It needs to be engaged in a much wider and more comprehensive 

approach, which requires much greater political will from the government in Abuja. That is the first point. 

The second point——

Mr. SMITH. On that point, if I could——

Ms. MARGON. Sure. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. Is it possible that Boko Haram has gotten to the point where—I mean, we are looking at ISIS every day 

and seeing the gains they are making in Iraq, which seems to have 

caught many people flat-footed, both in Baghdad as well as in 

Washington and other capitals. 

They have built up a critical mass. They weren’t supposed to be 

able to project power on Abuja, and a month before we got there 

they blew up a bus station. It is almost as if they are extending 

with impunity their ability to kill and maim, and of course the 

Chibok schoolgirls’ abduction, followed by other abductions, and 

slaughter of young men as well, and boys, in school. It is as if the 

terror reign has gone to an unprecedented level, and they have gotten stronger, not weaker. 

So just a thought, but your thoughts on that. 

Ms. MARGON. Yes. I wouldn’t disagree. I think we have reached 

a much more violent and expanded version of Boko Haram right 

now. I do think in part that has to do with the heavy-handed approach from the Nigerian security forces in their response, not exclusively,but I do think over the short term what the Nigerians 

need to be looking at is putting together units and putting political 

will behind that to deal with the immediate military and protection 

concerns. 

But then there are also needs to be a much larger response that 

looks at the historical marginalization and disenfranchisement and 

poverty of the north that has enabled Boko Haram to capitalize on 

and move forward with that type of strategy. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. Ms. Massimino? 

Ms. MASSIMINO. I would just reinforce what Colonel Aubrey said, 

because I thought really you crystallized the problem that is often 

faced with human rights vetting and with so many other situations 

where we are faced with kind of a short-term/long-term—you know, 

what appears to be a conflict. 

And I really welcomed your comment that, you know, this is 

not—doesn’t feel as urgent perhaps to establish these mechanisms 

for accountability, buildup, you know, foreign military’s JAG corps, 

educate them about the proper relationships with their civilian 

masters, and all of that. But if we don’t do that, everything else 

is harder. And so holding to the discipline of that is really important, and I think that is exactly what we are facing with implementation of the Leahy laws. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Margon, you have mentioned in your testimony, 

in your recommendations section, that Congress should press the 

administration to develop clear policy guidance on how the diplomats and military officials can support foreign governments, promote accountability. 

And you also point out, ‘‘Finally, the administration should publicly embrace the principles of the Leahy law.’’ Especially with reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:03 Oct 02, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\071014\88627 SHIRL
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gards to Nigeria, has that happened at the highest levels of our 

Government? 

Ms. MARGON. I would say that in the aftermath of the Bring 

Back Our Girls campaign, there has been a very clear understanding at senior levels from this Government, from this administration, about the need to be cautious in engaging with the Nigerian military. The administration is well aware of the problems. 

Has it been embraced prior to that? Not in the way that it should 

have been. It doesn’t mean that any laws are being violated. Of 

course not. But it does mean that engagement at the Ambassador 

level and at the Embassy needs to be much more robust when U.S. 

Government officials, particularly military officials, are going to Nigeria, human rights vetting and security cooperation needs to be a 

top talking point, which, to the best of my knowledge, it has not 

been until very recently. 

Mr. SMITH. Has it been enough of a priority—and, Colonel, you 

might want to speak to this as well—within the administration to 

say Boko Haram is a lethal growing cancer on the body politic of 

Nigeria? Just like al-Shabaab did such unbelievable damage, still 

does, in Somalia and now is projecting that damage to Nigeria, to 

Kenya, and elsewhere. 

My feeling is, and you don’t have to share it, is that there has 

been an underappreciation of the threat, which means we could 

have been accelerating the number. If half of the Nigerian military 

is eligible to be trained, by implication that half are not, pursuant 

to Leahy, why aren’t we training more, and why is there not a 

hurry-up offense to get as many well-vetted but specially trained 

troops to protect the Nigerian people, the largest country in subSaharan Africa? 

Ms. BLANCHARD. If I could speak to that. 

Mr. SMITH. Please do. 

Ms. BLANCHARD. The administration I think has taken very seriously the threat posed by Boko Haram for quite a long time. I 

think one of the challenges—and former Assistant Secretary Carson made it clear that one of the reasons that the deliberations on 

whether or not to designate Boko Haram a foreign terrorist organization took a while, was that there was concern raised by a number 

of NGOs and African studies academics here in the United States 

and elsewhere about actually labeling the group a foreign terrorist 

organization. 

Now, the State Department made several statements labeling 

them a terrorist organization, but on the actual FTO designation. 

The concern was that that might be seen to give a green light to 

the security force abuses that they were seeing in the northeast by 

the Joint Task Force. Those reports went back, obviously, to what 

Sarah talked about back to 2009. 

But particularly as the Joint Task Force stood up, from 2011 onward, we were seeing a lot of very, very serious reporting coming 

out, and there was the concern that the Nigerian Government 

might perceive that designation to give a green light to those operations. 

And on the flip side, there was not clear evidence, from what I 

understand from talking to administration officials, that the implications of the FTO designation, i.e. the ability to freeze funds in 

61

the United States and stop travel of Boko Haram individuals in the 

United States, would have much of an effect. There wasn’t evidence 

to suggest that there was a lot of——

Mr. SMITH. Well, I get your point, but there is a larger issue 

whether or not sufficient personnel are deployed at Treasury, for 

example, even now, that FTO has been so designated to really 

make a difference and to work this 24/7 to try to find out where 

the AK–47s, the IEDs, and everything else is coming from. And I 

have asked those questions, and I have not gotten the kinds of answers that would make one sleep well at night. 

We are not working it, in my opinion, the way we could or 

should. That is even FTO. So I just throw that out. Anybody else 

want to comment on the issue? 

Colonel AUBREY. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I would add is 

that the extremist issue in the trans-Sahel area is not a new one, 

and it isn’t a new one to the Department of State, to Congress, or 

to the Department of Defense. 

I go back to where I sit on national will. Burkina Faso for years 

denied that there were issues in the north, and it was only after 

many years and many discussions that they actually acknowledged. 

The host nation has to request the assistance, you know. And until 

they do, until they recognize the problem, it is hard to help a partner nation develop an effective strategy. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask the question with regards to units 

versus individuals and just get each of, if you would, your thoughts 

on that. You make the point, Colonel, that sometimes the taint is 

forever. And I was talking to Elisa Massimino before we reconvened, and it just struck me that there are a number of units in 

the U.S. military, including the unit that Lieutenant William 

Calley was a part of, the Abu Ghraib deployment, where the bad 

apples were prosecuted. Not enough, obviously, with Lieutenant 

Calley; he is the only one who was convicted as a result of the My 

Lai massacre in Vietnam. 

And it just seems to me that maybe reconstituting or encouraging host governments like—or friendly governments like Nigeria 

to come up with a brand-new unit, as opposed to an old unit that 

has a terrible reputation. 

And as you point out, Ms. Blanchard, you know, there is a tension there, and you do quote Admiral William McRaven in Congressional testimony that while he supported the vetting process, it has 

restricted us to the number of countries and our ability to train 

units that we think need to be trained. Individuals—that is an absolute, that individuals should be vetted to the greatest extent possible. 

But it does become at least problematic about the unit side. Your 

thoughts on that, because it seems to me that it is worth a discussion, and I am sure there will be a little difference of opinion as 

a panel. 

Colonel AUBREY. And I will bring myself back to my—what had 

been my profession for most of my adult life, is we are quite proud 

of those little pieces of cloth, the streamers that hang from our regimental colors, and so forth. Asking someone to rebadge doesn’t 

usually sit very well with a soldier. They are quite proud of their 

unit lineage. 

62

If you look at the battle streamers on the Army colors, they date 

back to Valley Forge. So approaching any other country’s units to 

discuss, you know, reconstitution doesn’t necessarily sit well. 

Whether or not we agree with their lineage, a lot of times they are 

quite proud of their lineage. That on these units they—you know, 

because of their colonial past, they talk about the colonial wars 

they fought, or what they did in the First World War, the Second 

World War, and are quite proud, and rightfully so, of their lineage. 

I think what is even more important is that for the Leahy 

vetters, whether it is in the Embassy or with INVEST, is that they 

understand the order of battle, and understand what the units 

really mean. What is the difference between a section or a platoon, 

a division, a battalion? Who ranks what, the sergeant or the general? And that would be effectively—to understand what the unit 

rotation is, what is the turn of enlistment to the unit? 

Liberia, which had a turn of enlistment, they just—the first 

batch of—they have just brought in their second batch of recruits 

since the LAF was reconstituted. So if you know that they are 

going to do a rotation in 6 years, that if a unit had done something 

10 years ago, the chances of anybody being in that unit, having 

committed that atrocity, is gone. 

That would be much more effective than saying take the 131 that 

committed atrocities in Maiduguri 3 years ago, and we are going 

to rebatch it as the 151, because we won’t know. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Ms. Massimino? 

Ms. MASSIMINO. Yes. So the examples that you gave of U.S. 

units, where there were abuses, you know, those are examples 

where there was investigation, prosecution, and I think in order to 

get the full value of the Leahy laws and human rights vetting, as 

I said in my testimony, you don’t want that viewed in sort of a narrow way where you just kind of rearrange the deck chairs and see 

if you can assemble. 

I mean, that is one way, and it is perfectly permissible under the 

law to create new units and all that. But, really, what we want, 

what we all want, fundamentally, the Leahy law is to prompt better human rights performance, stronger commitment on the part of 

the militaries and the governments to accountability and the rule 

of law. And you don’t get that if you are, you know, just rearranging the deck chairs. 

But, you know, as to these units that, you know, have this sense 

of identity and cohesion and all of that, there is nothing inherently 

wrong with that. But we all know that there are units that are, you 

know, proud and have cohesion around the wrong things. They are 

notorious for being human rights violators. 

And I think there you really have to wonder whether long term 

the interests are going to be served if you are balancing those interests with keeping that band of brothers together when what has 

drawn them together and the identity of the unit is not something 

you want to perpetuate. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Ms. MARGON. Just quickly, I think if you are talking about rogue 

elements or abusive units within an otherwise law abiding military 

in the country, then the units should be disbanded and prosecuted, 

63

the individuals should be prosecuted. This is in fact what we have 

recommended in specific cases in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Afghanistan. But if it goes beyond the rogue elements or the abusive 

units and is a more endemic problem within the security forces, 

then nothing else is going to suffice, as Elisa said, when it—as opposed to accountability or prosecution. 

And there the U.S. can plan a really important role. The State 

Department, USAID, Defense Department, and Justice all have 

really deep and varied experience in helping set up justice mechanisms, technical expertise. Prosecution is a critical component that 

helps with the institutional reform, so it really depends on what 

you are looking at when it comes to the unit. 

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask—oh, yes. Ms. Blanchard? 

Ms. BLANCHARD. Just a final point. Three things. I think, one, 

creating new units demonstrates political will, and we have seen 

a number of important security partners on the continent that do 

that, because there are issues with tainted units, and we have been 

able to move forward, particularly contributors to the mission in 

Somalia. 

A second point is that the vetting process should really ensure 

that they try to identify the smallest unit possible when they have 

evidence of an abuse. We have seen cases in important security 

partners, again, in East Africa, where larger units have been tainted because the NGO reporting on the information wasn’t able to 

get it down. And as a result, we have had important counterterrorism training postponed with very key battalions. 

And then, the third point is the fact that there are differences 

in the laws, and perhaps there are differences in the laws for a reason. The State Department/FAA Leahy provision requires that 

these individuals be taken to justice. The language in the DoD law 

is slightly different, and, as a result, you can have the individual 

taken out and not necessarily go through a court of law system to 

get the unit back to being eligible for training. 

Mr. SMITH. I have a lot of other questions. I will ask them all 

and ask of you, whichever ones you would want to respond to. 

First, starting with—I went on the Web site for the Nigerian 

Army last night, and one of the feature parts of that Web site talks 

about how the International Committee for the Red Cross is collaborating with the NA, the Nigerian Army, and it talks about a 

training the trainers program, law of armed conflict programs. Obviously, I think they are primarily focused on peacekeeping, but I 

guess they might be talking about other good human rights-oriented behavior. 

What is your thought on that kind of collaboration? Because obviously it is front and center, and hopefully, you know, the ICRC 

is conveying some very important principles and best practices with 

regards to human rights. 

Secondly, some of you may know that I am the prime author of 

the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. When we did the reauthorization in 2003, we added a provision that militaries would 

be part of the minimum standards, and I still am concerned that 

when we look at a country’s performance vis-a`-vis the minimum 

standards prescribed in the law, that militaries are not sufficiently 

64

taken into consideration as to the tier ranking, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 

3, or Tier 2 Watch List. 

And I am wondering, with regards to Leahy, how focused are we 

on trafficking with regards to a military? I have tried unsuccessfully for well over a decade to establish an Assistant Secretary 

within DoD’s chain of command that would be focused at an office 

exclusively on trafficking, because I am great believer because I 

talk to generals and armed forces leaders throughout the world 

every time I travel it seems. I always bring up trafficking, and 

when a politician or a lawmaker brings it up, it certainly does not 

have the gravitas that it would have if a colonel or somebody with 

a few stars was talking military to military, training the trainer, 

so to speak, language. 

I know that DoD does a wonderful job in many cases, but I am 

wondering if in the vetting process trafficking, particularly sex trafficking, is included. And we know of the things that Shekau said 

was that he was going to sell the women from the Chibok school, 

and the young girls. No one knows if that has happened, but obviously trafficking is everywhere, and it is a horrific crime. 

Thirdly would be, if somebody is unfairly excluded, say a commander has a platoon or a squad, a number of people that, really, 

are up and comers, they really are wonderful soldiers, and somehow they get excluded in the vetting process, or not enough information is known, what does happen with those people? Do they get 

a second chance? 

Is there an appeal process to—because obviously upward mobility 

even, but also capability in terms of fighting a group like Boko 

Haram is enhanced if your best soldiers are included, and they are 

also human rights-vetted. So the appeals process would be another 

question. 

Also, delays. You mentioned, Colonel, that when you were a commander, U.S. Army Security Systems Training Management Organization (SATMO), ‘‘I was faced with delays in deploying trainers 

due to incomplete vetting.’’ If you could maybe—and others, if you 

would like, but if you could expand upon, what kind of delays are 

we talking about? Is it a week, a month? Is it forever for some? 

How does that work in terms of your ability to match up a trainer 

with a group of soldiers that are in need of that training? 

And the INVEST program, Ms. Margon, your point about the $5 

million being far superior than the just under $3 million for the 

vetting process, and 13 people I think is the number that are at 

DRL. How important is that? Is that really a make or break issue? 

All of you might want to speak to that, but it seems to me that 

if you don’t have the personnel deployed, the job doesn’t get done. 

I know in our Embassy in Nigeria we do have—and I actually 

watched a vetting process happen with the Google search and INVEST, and it was one they had already done, but it was just to 

show me how, because I had never seen it actually done, at least 

at that stage. 

Is there room for improvement there? Is the INVEST program 

database accurate? Is it something that needs improvement, or is 

it just a work in progress, always going from good to getting better? 

So there are a couple of questions. And, again, you might want 

to touch on those policy tensions that, Ms. Blanchard, you have 

65

talked about, between the military and state and human rights 

community, which can be benign tensions. Everyone is looking out 

for—or hopefully striving for the same ultimate goal here, but we 

need to learn from each other. 

But if you could perhaps address some of those questions. 

Ms. BLANCHARD. I will start with the first issue you raised, the 

Nigerian Army engaging with the ICRC, and I think that is a great 

development if it is happening. I think one of the trends that we 

see, not just in Nigeria but in countries like Kenya and elsewhere 

where you have security force abuses, they often can be linked to 

breakdowns in the criminal justice system. You see frustration 

from local police, from the military, that individuals, you know, be 

they Boko Haram or otherwise, are not going through the system. 

And, as a result, particularly in Nigeria, we have seen massive 

detentions. These are not criminal justice detentions, but you are 

seeing thousands of people held in military facilities, particularly 

in the northeast, in Borno, in horrific conditions. So if ICRC can 

engage with the Nigerian military on how to improve those detention facilities, that is fantastic. A much bigger step would be to address the criminal justice system and its ability in countries like 

Nigeria and in East Africa to address processing of terrorism cases. 

On the issue of political tensions, this is a very difficult one, and 

there are a number of different tensions. It is not just between the 

military and the State Department. Often there are different parts 

of the military that see this differently, I think. You might find 

that the regional commands view things differently sometimes than 

special operations commanders who are dealing with these countries on a more episodic basis. 

But there are also political tensions between posts, the Embassy, 

be it both State Department and DoD officials and FBI officials, 

and others who have to manage those day-to-day operations, managing the relationship with the host country, and people back here 

in Washington, DC, who have to establish and implement the policies, including the Leahy laws. So there are tensions in terms of 

what your primary day job is, I guess. 

And in terms of you mentioned Admiral McRaven’s testimony 

last year, as I noted in my written testimony, he followed that up 

and said that there had been subsequently some very constructive 

engagement between DoD and the State Department. 

And I think that as DoD has started to look more deeply at partner capacity-building, they are really having I think some constructive dialogues with the State Department on how to improve the 

process, improve the vetting process, improve the discussion with 

the host governments on how to hold forces accountable, how to 

provide this human rights training. So I think that that is moving 

in a positive direction. 

Colonel AUBREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with Lauren 

about the ICRC. The only thing I would say, if—having dealt with 

the Nigerian Army, if they are putting it on their Web site, I assume it has the blessings from the highest level, and that means 

it is probably being checked. 

As we all know, you know, soldiers do what they know that their 

officers are checking on. If they are taking it seriously, it is a positive movement forward. 

66

Trafficking, I understand what you are saying. I know that any 

military member going into the SOUTHCOM area, one of the 

things that is required for entry is to complete—it is listed under 

force protection, but it really is training on human trafficking. 

It is, once again, things that get checked, people do. If they are 

sitting down there—if that is a standard that becomes across the 

board, you will see a greater emphasis from the military. Obviously, in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, human trafficking 

had been a concern for the SOUTHCOM commander, and he acted 

accordingly. 

INVEST—I understand the State Department has 13 people 

doing it. Mr. Rickard’s number was 530,000 units checked. With 

one boss and 12 workers, that is a horrendous workload. I defer to 

Ms. Margon’s bit about $5 million is much better than the $2 million. Obviously, it is a huge workload when you look at U.S. global 

engagement and having to validate a significant number of military 

units globally. 

And the last comment on vetting, for that particular mission, we 

were able to reschedule. U.S. Army Africa has no dedicated forces 

to it. It is a headquarters. The Army’s solution for that is to implement through—on the global manning process is to earmark what 

they call the regionally aligned force. And every year an Army brigade or a brigade equivalent is designated to the combatant commander to use for engagement opportunities. 

There are finite periods. You know, that brigade commander or 

that unit commander has requirements that he or she has to meet. 

If they cannot deploy because the unit to be trained has not been 

vetted, it—you know, it will depend on what else the United States 

Army has earmarked for that unit the next quarter or the next fiscal year. 

It might not ever recur. It could be an opportunity lost. It is very 

much dependent on the particular training being desired and when 

it is being scheduled. 

Mr. SMITH. Colonel, before going to Ms. Massimino, did you find 

that the names that were tendered to you were more likely to be 

pre-cleared and to be of soldiers who are likely to make it, so in 

a way it is already having a laudatory effect on the Nigerian Army? 

And does it then begin to create a culture where human rights are 

the way forward for a soldier to really make it in the military, particularly if he is career-oriented? 

Colonel AUBREY. The quality of U.S. training is superb. Most foreign nations—much broader than just Nigeria—select their best 

and brightest to come to the United States to go to our schools. So 

it is definitely a career enhancing move to be selected to come to 

the United States under the IMET program. 

For training in theater, our soldiers are good. The quality of 

training that we give is good. Their soldiers benefit. So, yes, it 

would be a career-enhancing move to it. 

As far as pre-clear on vetting, the Nigerians, when I was there, 

they understood what our requirements were. They knew far 

enough in advance because we were talking battalion level training, that we would check the names of every member of that battalion, and they had enough time to do it. And there was the politVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:03 Oct 02, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\071014\88627 SHIRL
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ical will at that time—and it was already addressed as—you know, 

then, peace support operations was very important to Abuja. 

ASO Iraq did what was necessary and had the defense establishment do what was necessary to meet those terms. It is still, what 

is their political will to do so? 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Ms. Massimino? 

Ms. MASSIMINO. Thank you. I don’t have a lot to add to that. I 

want to also say that I don’t know the content of the ICRC training 

for the Nigerian military, but I can’t imagine that that is not a 

huge net plus, to have that happening. So it is good to hear that. 

On trafficking, I am really glad you brought that up. I know that 

Leahy vetting sometimes includes things beyond what the law requires, but I would be also curious to know, and I don’t know, 

whether engagement in trafficking by militaries is part of that. 

I don’t think I have had a chance to talk to you yet about the 

fact that Human Rights First is launching a major campaign on 

anti-trafficking efforts. And at a recent meeting with General 

Kelly, SOUTHCOM, at the human rights roundtable, we had a specific discussion about the concerns that criminal networks engaging 

in human trafficking are diversified and also are, you know, supporting terrorism, and it is becoming one large weapons, people, 

drugs, and terrorism network, profit network. 

And so you could certainly make an argument that it ought to 

be, and I think we are going to be working closely with the U.S. 

military and others to try to ramp up efforts to identify those in 

foreign militaries that are engaging in trafficking. 

And then, on the appeals process, Ms. Blanchard is far more 

knowledgeable about that than I am, but I did want to flag this, 

because it goes back to the importance of the duty to inform. Leahy 

really, again, to get the full benefit, it is not really going to work 

unless we are telling the people who are being excluded why they 

are being excluded, and then start working with them. 

And I think there is sometimes a reluctance to do that, to make 

the relationship awkward, or we don’t want to, or the governments 

aren’t going to like it, and that has bled into sometimes kind of 

putting people in a strategic limbo where there is not a decision 

made. They don’t want to make a negative decision, so they just 

put them in a closet and it never gets made. And that is not helpful 

either. 

So those are things that it would be good to find some ways to 

tackle. 

Ms. MARGON. Just very quickly, you know, I think on the $5 million, my response will speak both to the $5 million in the Senate 

appropriations bill and the tensions. What is very important to remember about Leahy is that there is both an Embassy side of this, 

so the U.S. Embassies are taking care of this, and there is the 

Washington side. That can breed tensions, not just along civ-mil 

lines, but also from posts back to Washington. The $5 million, if you think about it, there is at least $15 billion 

of security assistance globally, the centerpiece of the President’s 

counterterrorism plans as we redeploy from Afghanistan, is going 

to be this Counterterrorism Partnership Fund. Five million dollars 

to do the vetting is, assuming it is legislated correctly with Leahy 

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requirements, we would hope, is that that is what needs to happen. 

It is a basic need to continue to expand the vetting pool that way. 

So it would go to basic things like supporting staff and computers 

in Washington, but also enabling the Embassies, as I understand, 

to be better trained. It is desperately needed, and in the grand 

scheme it is not a lot of money to help move the process forward 

and make it easier, so when defense attaches at post have to do 

this vetting, it doesn’t result in delays, it doesn’t result in a misunderstanding, and names dropped off of people who should be. 

The final thing that I would just mention is on the trafficking. 

As far as I understand, Leahy doesn’t cover trafficking, since we 

are looking at just the gross human rights violations. But what I 

think it is important to note is that Leahy often works hand in 

glove with other conditions that have been put on through various 

bills, appropriations, and otherwise. 

I think what we have seen in Indonesia and the Philippines is 

that Leahy has been the minimal basis along with some other conditions that have helped move those countries in the right direction. And so in considering next steps on trafficking, it may not 

mean Leahy has to change per se, but that there are additional alternative expansions that can be made and other bills that can 

work in a correlated way. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. And just to add for your consideration, 

but I do think section 502(b) and the language clearly would cover 

trafficking. Look at the disappearance of persons, degrading treatment, cruel and inhuman, I mean, it is ready-made for that. 

We will ask the administration, if they haven’t, if they will include it, because it needs to be I think, and get the TIP office to 

weigh in as well, hopefully they will agree. 

I do have one final question, and maybe—Ms. Blanchard, you an- swered it, but the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, the $5 billion proposal which had legislative language—and I read the language and it right from your testimony, which came up on June 26, 

so just a few weeks ago—seems to not include the Leahy amendment. 

I mean, with notwithstanding language red flags go up as soon 

as that language is anywhere, and it says notwithstanding any limitation in the provision of law that would otherwise restrict the 

amount or recipients of such support, does this bypass Leahy? Or 

am I misreading the language? 

Ms. BLANCHARD. It could potentially, if enacted in that way. And 

the difficulty with these notwithstanding provisions, we don’t always know how they are implemented. So it is not always clear 

when the administration makes a policy decision to use that notwithstanding authority or not. 

But, yes, potentially that could, if that makes it into law, leave 

ways to—I don’t want to use the term ‘‘go around Leahy,’’ but potentially. 

If I could make one comment, CRS doesn’t make policy recommendations, but on the issues of resources for vetting the new 

DoD definition of ‘‘assistance,’’ again, significantly broadens the 

amount of security assistance-type activities that the State Department will now have to be vetting for. And DoD is still, to my understanding, working on the definition of what all that includes, but 

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it is significantly larger than the training that they were vetting 

for previously. 

And if you then add on top of this the potential $5 billion new 

counterterrorism capacity-building program, that is a massive potential amount of vetting that needs to be done. 

Ms. MASSIMINO. Yes. I just wanted to underscore that that is also 

in our recommendations about the $4 billion for the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund. And it is a huge red flag, and I think it 

is hard to understand that language in any other way. But Congress has an opportunity. You should not let that go past. 

If there is, you know, any place where the Leahy vetting requirements should really be, you know, doubled down on, it is in this 

new strategy that the United States has for countering terrorism 

through these partnerships. That makes Leahy even more critical 

than it has ever been. And if this goes through with that notwithstanding language in it, it risks really gutting these important 

human rights laws. 

Ms. MARGON. I would second that. It is a huge red flag for us, 

and very, very concerning. And it doesn’t quite align with what the 

President said in his West Point speech. And if you look at the Syrian opposition, nobody in the administration talks about this new 

fund to go to the Syrian opposition unless they are talking about 

the vetted Syrian opposition. 

And so the language that was sent up to Capitol Hill doesn’t 

meet with the rhetoric that we have been hearing out of the administration, so it is very worrisome if it is implemented in that way. 

Mr. SMITH. I do have one final question, because I did ask about 

INVEST. The Google search, INVEST—and thank you for your patience, especially with that very long voting that we had on the 

House floor, but—and then the input that comes in from NGOs and 

the human rights community, does the State Department, and DRL 

in particular, as well as the Embassies, have a sufficiently broad 

net to receive information from whistleblowers and people who—

like a mayor who may know of something that needs to be told 

about what happened in his city, or an NGO that is indigenous in 

Nigeria, are we getting enough by way of a channel of information 

in that third part of the information flow? 

Yes? 

Ms. MARGON. I can talk about that a tiny bit, since we do a lot 

of the work. I think, again, it depends. It is case by case. It depends a lot on both the international and local organizations, the 

contacts that the officers have with the defense attache, and the 

political officers in the Embassy. 

In the case of Nigeria, I think there is a lot of information flow. 

For Human Rights Watch, one of the things we have been trying 

to do a better job on when we do our research and reporting is be 

as clear as we can about the units that we observe and to get the 

information that will enhance Leahy vetting, whether it be the 

name we are told repeatedly from the State Department, date of 

birth, which obviously is very hard to get, but we try to include as 

much specific detailed information as we can to help that, and to 

pass that through both the Embassy channels and then back it up 

here in Washington. 

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And we work with some of the local organizations to do that as 

well, and we encourage the Embassy officers to reach out and to 

hold meetings in as much capacity as they can. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes? 

Ms. MASSIMINO. Again, I would just underscore that there are 

these human rights defender principles that, if they were fully implemented everywhere, there is nothing about them that specifically relates to Leahy, but it would in essence make it the practice 

of the U.S. Government to establish the kinds and depths of relationships with NGOs in these countries that would produce more 

detailed information that would make the Leahy vetting process 

work better. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. Ms. Blanchard? 

Ms. BLANCHARD. One comment on the INVEST system. I think 

this online database is an incredible tool. You mentioned the issue 

of trafficking earlier. From my understanding, the State Department is trying to input a variety of other not necessarily gross 

human rights abuse related information, including on corruption 

and trafficking and other serious concerns on units when they have 

that information. 

But then, of course, that goes back to the issue of time and resources to actually put that information into the system. So, again, 

going back to the 13 people staffing this at headquarters. 

Mr. SMITH. I want to thank all of you for your extraordinarily incisive testimony, the expertise that you have brought to the subcommittee. This will be widely shared with my colleagues, and so 

thank you so very much, because I think it comes at a very, very 

important pivotal point. 

And our hope is that more service members will be trained and 

trained to be effective, but also adequately and robustly vetted for 

human rights abuses, so that these troops are the kind of people 

we can be proud of, and Nigerians and others in other countries 

can be proud of. 

I thank you, and the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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