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Strategic Studies Institute

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U.S. Army War College Press

RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN 

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Keir Giles

July 2013

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ii

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ISBN 1-58487-587-9
iii

FOREWORD

Competition for resources, political influence, and 

access to markets will continue to increase among 

global powers as finite resources continue to dwindle.

Russia is fully aware of this and has begun to look 

outside established power centers such as Europe and 

the West toward Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is a hub 

of undeveloped natural resources, a nest of conflict to 

fuel potential arms sales, and an area ripe for cultivation of political support for Russian interests on the 

world stage. 

While Russian interest in Sub-Saharan Africa is 

certainly not new, current economic realities require 

Russia to invest scarce resources into a politically unstable area of the world in order to compete for its benefits, including access to natural resources and other 

business opportunities. Russia is still recovering from 

the global financial crisis and, due to existing obligations and other foreign policy priorities, Moscow’s 

relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa still remains underdeveloped. Largely losing the influence battle to 

the United States and China, Moscow will likely focus 

on political cooperation, arms sales, and targeted investment into urgently needed natural resources with 

Sub-Saharan Africa for the near term. 

This Paper examines the drivers for Moscow’s interest in Sub-Saharan Africa and charts its potential 

development in the near term, including the scope 

for conflict with the United States. Shortly after this 

monograph was finalized for publication, another 

series of high-profile visits by key Russian officials 

confirmed the author’s main conclusions by signaling a further round of seemingly increased interest in 
the region. U.S. policymakers should be aware of the 

implications of increased Russian presence and 

attempts at increased influence in Sub-Saharan Africa.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press
v

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

KEIR GILES is the director of a new Conflict Studies 

Research Centre (CSRC) re-established independently 

of the United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defence but 

continues to provide analysis on both internal Russian political and economic dynamics and security 

relations with Russia’s overseas partners. After beginning his career working with paramilitary aviation in 

the former Soviet Union and Ukraine immediately following the fall of the Soviet Union, he joined the BBC 

Monitoring Service (BBCM) to report on political and 

military affairs in the former Soviet space. While attached to the CSRC, Mr. Giles wrote and briefed for 

UK and North Atlantic Treaty Organization government agencies on a wide range of Russian defense and 

security issues. He is an Associate Fellow of the Royal 

Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in 

London, UK, and a regular contributor to research 

projects on Russian security issues in both the UK 

and Europe.

vii

SUMMARY

An apparent lack of interest by Russia in 

Sub-Saharan Africa over recent years masks persistent 

key strategic drivers for Moscow to reestablish lost influence in the region. A preoccupation with more immediate foreign policy concerns has temporarily interrupted a process of Russia’s reclaiming relationships, 

well-developed in the Soviet period, to secure access 

to mineral and energy resources that are crucial both 

to Russia’s economic and industrial interests and to its 

existing and new markets for military arms contracts. 

Russian policy priorities in Africa provide both 

challenges and opportunities for the U.S. in fields 

such as nuclear nonproliferation, as well as energy 

security for the United States and its European allies. 

These priorities indicate that Russian development of 

key resources in southern Africa should be observed 

closely. Russian trade with the region is significantly 

underdeveloped, with the exception of the arms trade, 

which Russia can be expected to defend vigorously if 

its markets are challenged, including by the prospect 

of regime change or international sanctions. At the 

same time, Russia and the United States have a shared 

interest in restricting the freedom of movement of 

terrorist organizations in ungoverned or lightly governed spaces in Africa, which opens potential for cooperation between U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) 

initiatives and Russian presence in the region. 

Overall, Russian diplomatic and economic activity 

in southern Africa should receive continuing attention 

from U.S. policymakers due to its direct relevance to a 

number of U.S. strategic concerns.

1

RUSSIAN INTERESTS 

IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

What I therefore propose to do here is . . . to illustrate 

the most varied aspects of Russia’s African policy 

down the centuries: alliances, colonisation projects, 

plans for protectorates, religious propaganda, naval 

demonstrations with the object of maintaining the 

status quo, and on the other hand, conspiracy and underground activity with a view to altering the political 

map of Africa. No less varied have been the motives 

which have over and over again brought Africa closer 

to the attention of Russia.

 Sergius Yakobson,

 The Slavonic and East European Review, 19391

Twenty years after World War II, U.S. Secretary of 

State Dean Acheson said that Great Britain had “lost 

an empire and has not yet found a role.” Twenty years 

after the fall of the Soviet Union, the same can be argued of Russia. Since the dissolution of the Union of 

Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Russian Federation has been trying both to establish its place in the 

world and to set formative policies in order to reassert 

itself on the world stage as a major international power. More recently, Russian foreign policy has sought to 

move from reactive to proactive policies to safeguard 

interests abroad, while seeking to preserve this perceived global power status.

Sub-Saharan Africa is a key arena of contest for 

global power influence in the coming decades due not 

only to the region’s disproportionately strong potential for economic growth in the near to medium term,2

but also and especially in order to ensure access to the 
2

wealth of natural resources located there, an essential 

prerequisite for long-term development plans. But, 

while Russia, along with other powers, seeks to establish its interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, laying claim 

to and extracting these resources would require immense investment that, for Russia, could outweigh the 

potential gain in the near term. The Russian Federation seeks to establish a presence in Africa, and more 

than presence, influence; but some of Russia’s efforts 

in this direction can be interpreted as a placeholder 

or stopgap until Russia establishes a coherent overarching policy toward the region. In the meantime, 

Russian businesses and investors are cherry-picking 

resources and investing on a strictly commercial basis 

in sub-Saharan Africa.

In this monograph, the author will assess the resurgent Russian desire to seek economic opportunities in 

Sub-Saharan states, the recent implementation of this 

aim, and overall Russian objectives in the region. The 

extent of penetration of Russian influence in the area 

relative to other powers such as China and the United 

States will be assessed, and the potential implications 

for U.S. interests in the region considered.

HISTORY

As illustrated by the quotation at the beginning 

of this monograph, Russian interests in, and ambitions for, Africa have been many and varied over a 

period dating back to Tsarist times. For the purpose 

of considering Russia’s current engagement with the 

region, we need to consider antecedents in the late 

Soviet period, as relations and attitudes established 

then still govern some aspects of engagement today. 

The relevant period begins following the death of 
3

Josef Stalin in 1953. Until this point, relations between 

the USSR and African states had been insignificant, as 

African states controlled by the colonial powers were 

considered by the USSR to be a part of the capitalist 

system and unsuitable for penetration by Soviet influence. But the change of power in the Soviet Union 

from Stalin to Nikita Khrushchev coincided with the 

burgeoning of independence movements in Africa, 

triggering Soviet interest in the possibilities offered 

by engagement with newly-independent states and 

anti-colonial movements across the continent. As one 

historical study notes: 

In 1955, the Soviet Union made its first major arms 

transfer to an African country, Egypt. Within 10 years, 

the Soviets had established diplomatic ties with newly-independent Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Sudan, 

Morocco, and Libya. These Soviet allies, referred to as 

the “Casablanca Bloc” after they had held their first 

summit in Casablanca, Morocco, were invited to attend the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist 

Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow in 1961.3

A key aim of this Congress in 1961 was to outline 

the vision expressed by Soviet leader Khrushchev of 

how developing African countries could bypass capitalism and advance straight to socialism, fostered by 

the USSR. As with later efforts in Afghanistan, this 

Soviet doctrinal standpoint failed to take into account 

local realities: social disorder, domestic rivalry, and 

political instability, which derailed attempts to attain 

socialist paradise in two easy steps. Attempts to incite 

revolution in a number of states notionally friendly 

toward the USSR damaged Soviet credibility.4

 Counter-coups overthrowing pro-Soviet leaders in Algeria 

(1965), Ghana (1966), and Mali (1968) led Soviet ana-
4

lysts to acknowledge that their initial goals for Africa 

had been unrealistic.5

Following the late 1960s, Soviet policy goals shifted. 

Economic relations with some African countries were 

now aimed at commercial benefits without ideological 

riders, while maintaining the aim of furthering Soviet 

global influence. Simultaneously, Soviet sponsorship 

of military and terrorist confrontation with, first the 

colonial powers, and later, Rhodesia and South Africa, 

absorbed considerable Soviet resources. Following the 

Portuguese revolution in 1974, which gave Communist countries freedom of operation in the newly, and 

unexpectedly, independent Angola and Mozambique, 

the extent of Soviet-backed support for terrorist and 

guerrilla operations against Rhodesia was such that 

a border area opposite Mozambique ironically became known among Rhodesian forces as “the Russian 

Front.”6

 Support on this scale throughout Africa was 

not without direct risk, and casualties were suffered, 

although never avowed at the time—as, in one example, when 11 Soviet secret police (KGB) officers were 

captured and shortly afterwards shot during an insurgent attack on President Kwame Nkrumah’s residence 

in Accra, Ghana, in 1966.7

The Cold War period saw investments of funds, 

manpower, and materiel by the USSR and its allies 

that are at least comparable with U.S. and coalition 

activities overseas today—as is demonstrated by the 

Cuban effort in Angola, which peaked at an estimated 30,000 “advisers” in 1982.8

 As well as sponsoring 

troop and equipment contributions by allies, the USSR 

also directly supplied substantial contingents of KGB 

and military advisers throughout southern Africa.9

This constituted the main source of support and assistance for independence movements in many Afri-
5

can countries, not least to the banned African National 

Congress (ANC) and its military wing, Umkhonto we 

Sizwe, seeking to subvert authority in South Africa. 

This contribution, coupled with the fact that many 

African leaders personally received education and 

support from the USSR, created a generally positive, 

anti-colonialist image of Russia in the region.10 At the 

same time, in a curious parallel, Russian ex-KGB and 

ex-military “combat comrades” who served together 

in Angola and elsewhere in Southern Africa formed 

a coherent mutual support group that needs to be 

considered when examining Russian elite politics11

and may provide a partial explanation for the apparently disproportionate focus of Russian economic 

interests in Angola when compared to other states in 

the region. 

In a precursor of today’s competition for influence 

in Africa between the Russian Federation and China, 

to be discussed in more detail below, there was a division of labor, and sometimes even competition, between the USSR and China on sponsoring revolutionary movements and arming client states. Temporary 

relative dominance by the USSR on the continent followed the pattern of Soviet decline and resurgence of 

interest in the region during the Cold War12—again, 

a pattern repeated more recently with the Russian 

withdrawal from engagement with Africa seen immediately following the demise of the USSR in 1991, also 

to be discussed further below. 

Although support for revolutionary and terrorist 

movements was the most evident form of Soviet engagement in Africa during the Cold War, this support 

was not to the exclusion of pursuing other interests, 

particularly economic ones. South Africa in particular 

became both a locus of ideological confrontation and 
6

a fertile ground for technical espionage in the 1980s.13

South Africa’s rich resource base and direct competition with the USSR, in diamond mining in particular, 

led to a strange ambivalence in bilateral relations. At 

the same time as it was providing substantial and direct ongoing support for the ANC and Umkhonto we 

Sizwe,14 the USSR was engaging in covert cooperation 

with the South African government, which each of 

these groups was striving to overthrow. According to 

Christopher Andrew and Vasiliy Mitrokhin: 

There were deep contradictions at the heart of Soviet 

policy towards southern Africa. Despite its uncompromising denunciation of apartheid, Moscow maintained 

top-secret contacts with Pretoria over the regulation 

of the world market in gold, diamonds, platinum and 

precious metals, in which the Soviet Union and South 

Africa between them had something of a duopoly. Because of the extreme sensitivity of these contacts and 

the outrage which their public disclosure would provoke in black Africa, the KGB took a prominent part 

in arranging them. . . . In the mid-1980s, De Beers Corporation in South Africa was paying the Soviet Union 

almost a billion dollars a year for the supply of high 

quality diamonds. Moscow’s lucrative secret arrangements with Pretoria to keep mineral prices high did 

not prevent it attacking South Africa’s Western business partners for doing business with apartheid.15

Out of Africa.

The years immediately following the collapse of 

the Soviet Union in 1991 saw a dramatic reduction in 

Russia’s involvement in Africa. The legacy of Soviet 

involvement, and the state of bilateral relations between the USSR and African nations at the end of the 

Soviet period, was, in effect, put on ice. 
7

The foreign policy of the new, “independent” 

Russian Federation changed drastically, as the state 

focused on reorganizing at home, facing new challenges, and struggling to find a place in the post-Cold 

War world. Preoccupied with managing dangerous 

domestic chaos, the new government could not formulate a coherent Africa policy and signaled a retreat 

from relations with Africa by closing nine embassies, 

three consulates, and multiple cultural centers16 while 

at the same time exchanging bitter recriminations over 

the prospects for recovery of the huge debt owed to 

the Soviet Union by African states. Amid deep financial crisis, then-President Boris Yeltsin ceased foreign 

aid and persisted in requests for African governments 

to repay the Soviet loans, despite pleas by those governments for reductions or other deferred payment 

options. Russia’s reversal in policy left a number of 

African governments feeling abandoned by Russia 

and presented a significant obstacle for Moscow to 

overcome when Russia eventually regained interest 

and sought to re-establish relations with Sub-Saharan 

Africa. In marked contrast, during precisely the same 

period, China greatly increased its profile throughout 

the continent, with the first wave of the huge Chinese 

investment there that has continued ever since.17

According to leading historian of Soviet involvement in Africa and Deputy Director of the Institute for 

African Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences 

Vladimir Shubin, after December 1991 the Russian policy toward southern Africa was “largely determined 

by personalities or clans, acting either in their own 

narrow interests or blinkered by ‘re-ideologization’, 

and certainly not in Russia’s national interests.”18 This 

included switching allegiance from the ANC to the by 

now short-lived white minority government in South 
8

Africa for, Shubin suggests, short-term commercial 

and often personal interests.19 More recently, however, Russian officials and academics alike have been 

convinced that there are economic and pragmatic foreign policy advantages to re-engagement with Africa. 

Return to Africa.

The hiatus in relations between Russia and Africa 

was replaced in the early 2000s by a determination to 

re-establish a presence in the region, spurred by concern that China, India, Brazil, and especially the United States were intensifying their involvement there in 

order to secure access to natural resources and energy 

reserves. Russian government officials were open and 

explicit as to the benefits of returning to Africa, while 

persistently repeating the theme of Russia’s Sovietera prominence and diligence in support to Africa to 

attempt to re-foster good relationships with African 

nations and rebuild trust. Then-Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov noted in 2001 that 

Our country played the vanguard role in the de-colonization of Africa and helped several countries in 

their independence struggles. Today’s African leaders 

remember that very well.20

Vladimir Putin’s visit to the Republic of South Africa in 2006 was the first ever visit by a Russian leader 

to sub-Saharan Africa, and the highlight of a series 

of bilateral visits at ministerial levels and above with 

South Africa, Angola, and Ethiopia. This gave impetus to a wave of Russian investment by, according to 

the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
9

confirming the presence of real opportunities for the 

Russian business community by relying on stable political contacts to make a breakthrough in the field of 

trade and economic cooperation.21

In June 2009, then-President Dmitry Medvedev, 

along with a delegation of 300 businessmen, took 

a highly publicized tour of the region including Nigeria, Angola, and Namibia. This further high-level 

visit was indicative of Moscow’s intensifying desire to 

foster investment and involvement in the region by 

means of visible government sponsorship. Political 

initiatives included, with South Africa in particular, a 

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation covering joint 

work in healthcare and intellectual property rights.22

According to Africa Economic Brief, these visits and accompanying initiatives on conflict resolution, humanitarian assistance, and debt relief for Africa were an 

attempt to address Russia’s marginal importance as a 

trading partner for African countries when compared 

to the European Union (EU), the United States, China, 

India, and Brazil. Although the volume of trade between Russia and Africa grew ten-fold between 1994 

and 2008, this was from a minuscule starting point 

of just $740 million annually in the immediate postSoviet period.23

The Russian interest in securing access to natural 

resources that are either unobtainable or depleted in 

Russia and in its traditional trading partners, explored 

in more detail below, throws into sharp focus the late 

and slow start Russia has made in this process when 

compared with China. Driven by a more urgent need 

to secure natural resources and availability of copious 

funding, the Chinese presence in the region intensified 

as Russia withdrew from Africa and now dwarfs that 

of Russia. Chinese involvement in Africa also includes 
10

a bilateral trade element largely missing in the case 

of Russia: China has, in addition, cultivated African 

economic markets, with African households purchasing $31 billion more in Chinese consumer goods than 

from Russia.24 Russian media commentary agonizes 

over the growing influence of China in Africa, and in 

particular its prodigious funding,25 but without offering constructive advice on whether this is a problem 

for Russia and, if so, what to do about it.26 Yet Russian 

officials have continuously stated that increased economic and political engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa will be important to securing profitable and easily 

cultivated sources of natural resources.

RUSSIA’S PRESENCE TODAY—

POLITICAL PRIORITIES 

Russian political aspirations in Africa include regaining the leverage once enjoyed by the Soviet Union 

by re-establishing presence as well as by building new 

ties, especially since Medvedev’s flagship 2009 visit. 

Russia’s current strategy to achieve these aims appears 

built around the aim of achieving political gains at low 

financial cost. Talk is cheap, as indeed are promises, 

and with this in mind, Russian officials are endeavoring to keep a Russian presence in the forefront of 

African minds by means of consistent bilateral diplomatic meetings in order to pave the political roads for 

pragmatic, carefully selected economic involvement. 

One of the methods Moscow uses in this attempt 

to regain influence is to keep Russia’s Soviet involvement and role as a noncolonial power prominent in 

media reporting and in official Russian speeches on 

African relations. Russian politicians and academics 

assert that Russia never left Africa, nor were they ever 
11

a colonial power in Africa, maintaining this consistent 

discourse in order to pave the way for a smoother 

re-entry into influence on the continent. Moscow has 

stressed “ideology free” diplomacy during this process, indirectly countering the U.S. policy of stressing 

democracy and human rights, as well as insisting that 

African governments should battle against corruption. 

In 2001, Foreign Minister Ivanov referred to Russia in 

Africa as a “time tested and reliable ally,”27 repeating 

that, unlike many other countries, Russia had assisted 

in decolonization and in achieving independence. Yet 

8 years later, during his 2009 visit to Africa, Medvedev 

told the media: “Frankly, we were almost too late. We 

should have begun working with our African partners 

earlier.”28

Several Russian officials and prominent academics 

have publicly stated that future relations with Africa 

will continue to ensure no signs of neocolonial ambition, thereby attempting to assuage African fears of 

Russian political intent in relations with Sub-Saharan 

Africa. There are limited attempts at exerting soft 

power in the region: as part of a global Russian aspiration to leverage the attraction of Russian language 

and culture, the “Russian Schools Abroad” cultural 

program plans to open “Russian centers of science 

and culture” in Mali, Algeria, Kenya, Guinea, and Sudan.29 Direct aid programs are similarly limited: Russia’s overall aid spending dropped from $785 million 

in 2009 to $472.32 million in 2010—a decrease of 40 

percent. But according to a Russian Ministry of Finance report released in advance of the 2011 G8 summit in Deauville, France, this reflected a temporary 

decrease in Russia’s aid budget in 2009 as a response 

to the global financial and economic crises, with the 

additional assistance particularly targeted at neigh-
12

boring former Soviet republics.30 Meanwhile, a key 

overture to pave the way for Russia’s reinsertion into 

Africa was Moscow’s eventual waiver of a number of 

African states’ Soviet debts, estimated at $20 billion 

in 2009.31 In 2009, the African Coordinating Committee for Economic Cooperation with African Countries 

(AfroCom) was created with the intention of fostering 

increased political and economic cooperation through 

an international business forum “designed to create a 

space for Russian and African businessmen and politicians to network.” Moscow hosted the first RussianAfrican inter-parliamentary summit in June 2009, heralded by Deputy Chairman of AfroCom Petr Fradkov, 

as the “biggest political event of such extent in history 

of Russian-African relations.”32

In purely political terms, Moscow’s continuing 

foreign policy aim of asserting a multipolar international system will encourage it to seek to counter the 

unrestrained influence of global powers in Africa, 

especially the United States and China. Russia’s key 

lever of power in international affairs, a veto in the 

United Nations Security Council (UNSC), could be 

expected to come into play if Moscow feels unable to 

achieve this aim by other means. Russia needs African 

nations, which compose nearly a quarter of the UN, 

to support Moscow-led initiatives in order for Russia to not appear isolated on the international stage 

and, instead, point to a degree of global support for 

Russia’s political position. The political attraction of 

specific initiatives developed by Russia should not be 

underestimated: in the topical field of cyber security, 

for example, the Russian and Chinese proposals for 

regulation of the internet, which are trenchantly opposed by the Euro-Atlantic community, enjoy an often 

overlooked degree of support in Africa and elsewhere. 
13

In return, Moscow supports African nations in the 

UNSC. In 2008, Russia voted against imposing sanctions and arms embargos on Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. Russian UN Ambassador Vitaliy Churkin stated 

that he did not vote to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe 

because there was no threat to international peace 

and security, and that the matter had not spread beyond being a purely domestic issue.33 However, any 

mandate voted would have halted any Russian arms 

sales to Zimbabwe, cutting off future potential arms 

markets. In a similar vein, in August 2012, Russian 

Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Special Presidential Envoy to the Middle East and Africa Mikhail Margelov traveled to Ethiopia, Liberia, 

Madagascar, Uganda, and Zimbabwe to encourage 

political support for Russia’s position on the conflict 

in Syria—another key client for Russian arms sales.34

Special Envoy Margelov in particular is an especially 

experienced Africa expert by Russian standards, gaining his first experience of Africa as a child accompanying his father, Vitaliy, on repeat postings there during 

the latter’s KGB career.35

Russia also provides a limited amount of indirect 

support for the African Union (AU) through involvement in peacekeeping training and missions. As of 

2010, Russia was participating in all UN peacekeeping missions in Africa and training 400 peacekeepers 

from Africa in Russia.36 There is a clear Russian interest in maintenance of peace and regional stability in 

Africa in order to secure access to natural resources 

and protect investments, while at the same time paradoxically ensuring that African demand for Russian 

arms remains strong. However, according to UN statistics, in August 2012, Russia was contributing fewer 

than 100 police, servicemen, and experts overall to all 
14

15 UN peacekeeping missions.37 Despite professed 

support from Moscow for AU aims, in October 2011, 

Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that, while relations with the AU remain strong, bilateral cooperation 

offered more economic opportunity, emphasizing that 

Russia’s trade turnover with African countries south 

of the Sahara is worth some $4 billion, while China enjoys a $120 billion turnover.38 Lavrov also illustrated 

successful bilateral relations by highlighting African 

joint projects with Russia’s Gazprom, RusAl, Renovo, Lukoil, and Alrosa companies, the most active 

Russian companies in Africa.

ECONOMIC AIMS 

According to Vladimir Shubin, as Russia grows 

more confident in its foreign policy objectives, Russia and Africa “need each other” in order to ensure 

the security and sovereignty of 60 percent of the 

world’s natural resources, which lie in Russia and 

Africa combined.39 To this end, the tasks of the Asia 

and Africa department of Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development include developing bilateral 

relations “in accordance with the priorities of the 

Foreign Economic Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020.”40 The Africa section of these priorities, 

drawn up in 2008, is worth quoting, since it gives an 

intriguing overview of Russian strategic aims, while 

at the same time retaining the slight air of detachment 

from reality that habitually accompanies Russian 

strategic aspirations. Section 5.6 is quoted in detail 

as follows: 
15

5.6. Countries of the Middle East and Africa.

The main goal of foreign policy in the region is building sustainable trade and investment relations with the 

leading countries of the Middle and Near East [note 

no mention of Africa] that can grow Russian exports, 

including of machinery and technical products. . . .

Africa, being a swiftly growing region, represents a 

strategic interest to the Russian economy, including as 

a source of natural resources, a market for investment 

projects and a market for exports of machinery and 

technical products exports. . . . 

The priorities of the foreign economic strategy in the 

region are:

• Prospecting, mining, oil, construction and mining, purchasing gas, oil, uranium, and bauxite 

assets (Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, South Africa, 

Namibia, etc.);

• Construction of power facilities—hydroelectric power plants on the River Congo (Angola, 

Zambia, Namibia, and Equatorial Guinea) 

and nuclear power plants (South Africa and 

Nigeria);

• Creating a floating nuclear power plant, and 

South African participation in the international 

project to build a nuclear enrichment center in 

Russia;

• Railway Construction (Nigeria, Guinea, and 

Angola);

• Creation of Russian trade houses for the promotion and maintenance of Russian engineering 

products (Nigeria and South Africa).

As with the regions of the Middle East, an urgent task 

for Africa is the participation of Russian companies in 

the privatization of industrial assets, including those 

created with technical assistance from the former 

Soviet Union (Iran, Turkey, Morocco, Nigeria, Guinea, 

and Angola).41
16

RESOURCE INTERESTS—MINERALS 

It is notable that the first priority shown in the 

list above concerns prospecting and mining and that, 

in terms of access to natural resources, Africa represents a “strategic interest” for Russia. According to 

forecasts, Russia’s economically viable reserves of a 

number of minerals essential for the functioning of a 

modern economy, including zinc, manganese, copper, 

nickel, and platinum, will be depleted within a decade. Although Russia possesses significant untapped 

resource deposits, these are often difficult to access 

and costly to develop. For this reason, and given the 

volatility of world commodity prices, it is in the economic interests of Russia to gain access to sources of 

supply of such strategic minerals in regions where 

costs are lower, in particular in Southern Africa.42 Table 1 shows the estimated depletion date for a range of 

minerals in Russia and their availability in Southern 

Africa, specifically the Southern African Development 

Community (SADC) nations,43 in order to illustrate 

the extent of this complementarity.44

It is partly for this reason that Russian economic 

expansion into Africa has involved primarily those industries in which Russian companies have been most 

active and successful domestically in the post-Soviet 

period, namely extraction of ferrous and nonferrous 

metals, diamonds, and energy. Table 2 from a 2011 

Africa Economic Brief lists major Russian investment 

projects in Africa.45
17

Russia’s Natural Resource Base Complementarities with Southern Africa

Mineral Year in which Russia will deplete SADC countries that possess reserves of the mineral (in alphabetical order) SADC share in the world's total resources of the mineral

economically 

producible 

reserves

all reserves

Lead 2007 Beyond 2025 Namibia / South Africa / Zambia -

Manganese ores 2008 Beyond 2025 DRC / South Africa 83%

Zinc 2011 Beyond 2025 DRC / Namibia / Zambia -

Chromium ores 2013 Beyond 2025 Madagascar / South Africa / Zimbabwe 93%

Diamonds 2013 Beyond 2025 Angola / Botswana / DRC / Lesotho / Namibia / South Africa / Tanzania >50%

Quartz 2013 2013 Madagascar / Mozambique -

Tin 2015 Beyond 2025 DRC / Namibia / South Africa / Tanzania / Zimba- bwe -

Uranium 2015 Beyond 2025 Angola / DRC / Namibia / South Africa / Zambia 12%

Table 1. Mineral Estimated Depletion Dates 

in Russia and Their Availability in Southern Africa.
18

Russia’s Natural Resource Base Complementarities with Southern Africa

Mineral Year in which Russia will deplete SADC countries that possess reserves of the mineral (in alphabetical order) SADC share in the world's total resources of the mineral

economically 

producible 

reserves

all reserves

Gold 2015 Beyond 2025 Angola / DRC / Namibia / South Africa / Tanzania / Zambia / Zimbabwe 53%

Oil 2015 Beyond 2025 Angola / DRC -

Copper 2016 Beyond 2025 Angola / Botswana / DRC / Namibia / South Africa / Zambia / Zimbabwe 8%

Nickel 2016 Beyond 2025 Botswana / South Africa / Tanzania / Zimbabwe 10%

Tungsten 2016 Beyond 2025 Namibia -

Platinumgroup metals 2018 Beyond 2025 South Africa / Zimbabwe 88%

Graphite 2018 Beyond 2025 Madagascar / Mozambique -

Table 1. Mineral Estimated Depletion Dates 

in Russia and Their Availability in Southern Africa. Cont.
19

Russia’s Natural Resource Base Complementarities with Southern Africa

Mineral Year in which Russia will deplete SADC countries that possess reserves of the mineral (in alphabetical order) SADC share in the world's total resources of the mineral

economically 

producible 

reserves

all reserves

Coal Beyond 2025 Beyond 2025 Botswana / DRC / Madagascar / South Africa / Swaziland / Tanzania / Zambia / Zimbabwe 12%

Phosphate Beyond 2025 Beyond 2025 Angola / South Africa / Tanzania 10%

Potash Beyond 2025 Beyond 2025 Botswana -

Bauxite Beyond 2025 Beyond 2025 Angola / Madagascar -

Iron ores Beyond 2025 Beyond 2025 Angola / Botswana / South Africa / Tanzania / Zimbabwe 5%

Natural gas Beyond 2025 Beyond 2025 Angola / DRC / Mozambique / South Africa / Tanzania -

Vanadium Beyond 2025 Beyond 2025 South Africa -

Fluorspar Beyond 2025 Beyond 2025 Angola -

Salt Beyond 2025 Beyond 2025 Botswana / Madagascar / Namibia / South Africa -

Table 1. Mineral Estimated Depletion Dates 

in Russia and Their Availability in Southern Africa. Cont.
20

Major Investments of Russian Companies in Africa

Russian Investor Host Country/ Company Industry Type of Investment Value Year

Norilsk Nickel South Africa Gold Fields Gold mining and processing M&A (acquired 30% of Gold Fields) $1.6 billion 2004

Norilsk Nickel Botswana Tati Nickel Nickel mining and processing M&A (acquisition of Canada Lion Ore Mining gave it 85% stake in Tati Nickel) $2.5 billion 2007

Sintez South Africa, Namibia, Angola Oil, gas, diamonds and copper exploration Greenfield Investment $10-50 million 2006

Lukoil Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana Oil exploration M&A (acquired interest in 10,500 km2 deep water blocks) $900 million 2010

Rusal Nigeria ALSCON Aluminum refining M&A (acquired majority stake in Aluminum Smelter Com- pany - ALSCON of Nigeria) $250 million 2008

Severstal Liberia Iron ore 

M&A (acquired control of iron ore deposit in Putu Range area of Liberia)

$40 million 2008

Gazprom Algeria Sonatrach Natural gas explora- tion Joint exploration and develop- ment projects by debt write-off agreement and arms deal $4.7 billion and $7.5 billion 2006

Alrosa Angola, Namibia, DRC Diamond mining, and hydroelectricity Greenfield Investment $300-400 million 1992

Table 2. Major Russian Investments Projects 

in Africa.
21

A striking feature of this table is the early date for 

the major investment project listed for Angola. Angola 

was one of the Sub-Saharan African countries that enjoyed the most intense and the most recent attentions 

of the USSR, during the armed conflict there and in 

South-West Africa (now Namibia) in the late Cold War 

period. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the quantity of 

arms and materiel supplied by the Soviet Union and 

the large number of KGB and military personnel for 

whom serving there was a highlight of their career,46

trade and other relations with Angola recovered early 

when compared to other southern African states. 

In addition, Russian economic activity there sees 

an unusual diversity. An agreement signed in June 

1998 during an Angolan presidential visit to Moscow 

resolved the Soviet debt issue in exchange for guaranteeing Russian interests in diamond mining in Angola. At the same time, Angola placed a large arms order 

for aircraft and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). This 

was swiftly followed in August 1998, by an agreement 

on repair, maintenance, and upgrade of former Soviet 

military equipment in Angola, signed during an official visit by Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev.47

The deals attracted criticism that suggested they were 

funded by illegal diamond traffic. The Russian diamond mining company, Alrosa, which operates two 

mines in Angola under the 1992 investment noted in 

Table 2, announced expansion into the construction 

sector there during the June 2009 visit by President 

Medvedev.48 In October 2006 Gazprom announced the 

investment of up to $100 million in exploration and 

production of oil and gas in Angola, in conjunction 

with Sonangol, the only state owned oil and gas exploration company.49 In 2012, Russia was scheduled 

to build and launch a $25.6 million telecommunica-
22

tions satellite for Angola, dubbed AngoSat, however, 

the launch of the satellite was postponed until 2014.50

The overall Angosat project is funded to a total of 

$295 million by Vneshekonombank, Roseximbank, 

and others.51

Still, despite these investment plans, by 2007 

Russia was not in the top five major exporters or 

importers of goods from Angola.52 In a similar manner, countries such as Namibia see Russian economic 

involvement as heavily concentrated in the resource 

sector. From 2000 to 2010, Russia was insignificant in 

calculations of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Namibia. Following President Medvedev’s visit in 2009, 

Moscow pledged to invest approximately $1 billion 

in exploiting uranium deposits in Namibia over the 

subsequent 5 years.53 The Russian delegation also expressed its readiness to construct two hydroelectric 

power stations. Expansion of uranium extraction tallies with Russia’s strategic plans, and, as a result, the 

Russian-owned company SWA Uranium Mines is to 

receive Russian government funding to expand its operations.54 But it should be noted that, despite declarations and promises of investment, at the time of this 

writing, none of the specific projects heralded during 

Medvedev’s 2009 visit to Sub-Saharan Africa had yet 

been implemented.

RESOURCE INTERESTS - ENERGY 

In 2009, Russia surpassed Saudi Arabia to become 

the world’s number one exporter of oil. Russia holds 

the world’s largest natural gas reserves.55 Gas, petroleum, and refined oil products account for two-thirds 

of Russian exports.56 Russian oil production is projected to grow by approximately 1.5-2.5 percent in the 

next 2 decades. However, the level of active reserves 
23

is constantly falling, while reserves that are difficult to 

access are rising.57 Therefore, to implement effectively 

Russia’s energy policy and continue to support the annual budget, Russia must secure further oil and gas reserves. Vagit Alekperov, the president of LukOil, one 

of Russia’s leading oil companies actively engaged in 

Africa, has stated that “Russian-African cooperation 

could help in meeting the goals of Russia’s energy 

strategy for the year 2030.”58

Among other high-profile and high-cost Russian 

state projects, Russia’s defense strategy and plans for 

military modernization depend in large part on energy revenue. Yet for Russia, energy and defense are 

tied together in more ways than through budget financing. Russia links energy needs together with debt 

and exports of military equipment to cut beneficial 

deals in Africa. During Putin’s high-profile visit to Algeria in 2006, a $7.5 billion deal was signed for combat 

aircraft, missiles, and tanks, linked to the cancellation 

of $5 billion of Algeria’s Soviet-era debt and, during 

the same visit, Lukoil and Gazprom secured oil and 

gas concessions. Meanwhile, Libya had committed to 

purchase $2.5 billion of Russian arms, also linked to 

cancellation of $4 billion of Soviet debt—a significant 

factor in Russian objections to the course of foreign 

intervention in the Libyan civil war in 2011.59

The attractions of Sub-Saharan African energy reserves for producers from Russia and elsewhere are 

clear. According to the U.S. Department of Energy 

Information Administration, Angola is the secondlargest oil producer in Sub-Saharan Africa behind 

Nigeria, and recent exploration suggests that Angola’s oil and natural gas reserves may be larger than 

initially estimated.60 Four geological provinces along 

the east coast of Africa have recently been assessed 
24

for undiscovered, technically recoverable, oil, natural 

gas, and natural gas liquids resources as part of the 

U.S. Geological Survey’s (USGS) World Oil and Gas 

Assessment. The USGS estimated mean volumes of 

27.6 billion barrels of oil, 441.1 trillion cubic feet of 

natural gas, and 13.77 billion barrels of natural gas 

liquids.61 Industry estimates of proved, probable and 

possible “current producible reserves” are roughly 35 

billion barrels of crude oil and 151 trillion cubic feet 

of gas, and the USGS estimates that the Sub-Saharan 

region as a whole could hold 72 billion barrels of undiscovered resource potential.62 By 2020, Sub-Saharan 

Africa is predicted to account for 15-20 percent of total 

worldwide oil imports at about 2.5 million barrels per 

day.63 This is roughly one-fifth of the Middle East’s undiscovered potential. Although there is little consensus over the date at which Russian oil production will 

peak, lower production costs in Africa are attractive 

for Russian energy majors for short-term commercial 

as well as long-term energy security considerations. 

Significant investment would be required of Russia to explore, extract, and export the mostly untapped 

energy resources in Sub-Saharan Africa. Investment 

in oil and gas exploration, production, and infrastructure development for export also depends on the security and stability of the invested country. In many 

countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, civil wars make investing in energy exploration even more problematic, 

especially over questions of claims to oil and/or gas 

fields, such as in Angola and Sudan. Between 1985 

and 1991, civil war in Sudan forced all foreign oil companies with onshore concessions to either withdraw 

or suspend activity.64 In Sub-Saharan Africa, windfalls created by oil wealth have largely contributed 

to widespread corruption and abuse within African 
25

governments. Oil export revenues account for a large 

proportion of gross domestic product, for example 

40 percent in Nigeria and 85 percent in Equatorial 

Guinea.65 Much of this revenue is not funneled back 

into economies, maintaining poverty and instability 

in Sub-Saharan Africa, and thus creating an unstable 

investment environment. 

This gives rise to potential concern over Russian 

involvement in African energy projects: 

Europe’s increasing consumption of energy and dependence on oil and gas imports from Russia puts 

pressure on the Kremlin to seek alternative sources 

of energy. Africa, with its rich endowment of crude 

oil reserves, natural gas deposits, and other minerals, is exerting a strong attraction for Russian energy 

companies. . . . As Africa’s comparative advantage in 

the scope and frequency of new discoveries is being 

courted by global energy consumption countries such 

as Russia, precautionary measures should be put in 

place to ensure that sustainable economic and social 

benefits accrue from natural resources exploitation.66

While a significant consideration for Western energy companies, these problems have a demonstrably 

smaller deterrent effect for the huge Chinese involvement in energy extraction and production. The Russian approach to the balance between pure commercial 

realpolitik and sensitivity to humanitarian concerns in 

the energy-producing host state seems yet to be coherently determined, but is likely to fall between these 

two poles. As explained by one U.S. analyst: 

Energy security is now being given serious attention. 

. . . A case in point is how Russia and China view energy security. The U.S. debate explicitly incorporates 

environmental objectives and implicitly endorses iso-
26

lationist tendencies, while the Russian and Chinese 

versions explicitly promote expansionist tendencies 

while discounting . . . environmental objectives. For 

Russia, energy security means ‘weaponizing’ energy. 

It is not a philosophy that aims at some future selfsufficient ‘clean energy’ paradise. It is a doctrine for 

today, which takes the world as it is, vulnerable and 

addicted to ‘dirty energy’ such as natural gas, oil, 

and coal, and exploits that dependence to make Russia stronger. With this cynical way of looking at the 

world, much akin to the way Colombian drug lords 

regard cocaine addicts, Russia pursues an energy 

security that is quite alien to what most Americans 

dreamily think it to be.67

There are other features to Russian investment 

bids that could prove attractive to African nations, 

beyond the absence of political or ideological strings 

or of insistence on good behavior. Practical experience 

may also play a role:

Russia’s well-established expertise in extracting energy resources and advanced nuclear know-how presents a value-added opportunity for Africa. It is worth 

noting that Russia is participating in tenders for the 

construction of the first nuclear power plants in Egypt 

and Nigeria, which have significant uranium reserves. 

Also, Russia’s own experience with the problems that 

plagued its energy sector during the 1990s and its 

ability and knowledge to restructure the sector for improved management and higher productivity, could 

provide a salutary lesson to be learned by African 

countries.68

At the same time, Russian investors may not be 

immune to the consequences of local disaffection. In 

2009, The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) carried out an attack on an oil fa-
27

cility and immediately afterwards issued a statement 

directly addressing visiting Russian President Dmitry 

Medvedev, warning that “this is the fate that awaits 

the gas pipelines you plan to invest [in] Nigeria if justice is not factored in the whole process.” The attack 

and statement came shortly after Gazprom had secured a $2.5 billion investment deal in Nigeria, signed 

during the Medvedev visit.69

As noted above, Russia’s energy doctrine is designed to be expansionist, seeking control over resources to meet energy demands. Russia also needs 

to export natural gas and oil in order to support the 

Russian economy and enhance the dependence of 

other states on Russian energy reserves. With Russia 

supplying the EU with one-third of the energy it consumes, this can give rise to immediate concern in consumer countries.70 Given the differing approaches to, 

and even definitions of, energy security between Russia on the one hand and the U.S. and its Euro-Atlantic 

allies on the other, control of African energy resources 

by Russian majors should be observed closely and 

the long-term implications considered with as much 

attention as is given to similar acquisition programs 

by China. 

TRADE 

The importance of Russia as a trading partner to 

African countries is slight when compared to other 

developed countries and emerging markets. Bilateral 

trade between Russia and Africa reached a peak of 

$7.3 billion in 2008. Although this is close to a 10-fold 

increase from the very low trade volume of $740 million in 1994, it is not significant enough to guarantee 

Russian companies a bargaining edge when engag-
28

ing with African countries.71 By comparison, total 

U.S. trade with Africa in 2012 amounted to $93.2 billion,72 and Chinese trade with Africa in 2012 reached 

$163.9 billion in the first 10 months, up 20 percent 

each year, according to the Chinese Ministry of 

Commerce.73

The example of South Africa as a historically 

strong trading partner during Soviet times is indicative. South Africa is still the leading Russian foreign 

trade partner in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2010, annual 

bilateral trade increased by 0.5 percent to $519.1 million, but this figure masked a dramatic collapse in 

export trade from Russia: the volume of exports fell 

by 74.5 percent to $45.8 million from $195.2 million in 2009. In the first half of 2011, the most recent 

figures currently available, bilateral trade turnover amounted to $234 million, showing growth 

of 7.9 percent compared to the same period of the 

previous year.74

Despite this recovery, Russia’s trade with South 

Africa is still significantly below the peak of their 

bilateral trade in 2008 of ZAR4.2 billlion75—and not 

even bearing comparison with bilateral trade between 

South Africa and China, which, in the same year, 

reached ZAR188 billion. Russia’s trade with its most 

important African partner is, in fact, the smallest of all 

of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries, the notional grouping of BRIC and South Africa, 

to be discussed in more detail.76

The growth in trade between Russia and Africa 

after 2000 saw Russian imports of African products 

increasing at a slower pace than Russian exports to 

the continent; furthermore, these imports came overwhelmingly from a small minority of countries, with 

Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, and 
29

South Africa jointly accounting for about 80 percent 

of total volume. Imports from Africa rose overall from 

$350 million in 2000 to $1.6 billion in 2009, while exports from Africa grew from $947 million to $4 billion 

over the same period. Both exports and imports grew 

gradually from 2000 to 2008, after which the impact of 

the world financial and economic crisis led to a slight 

fall. Russia has maintained a trade surplus with Africa, 

standing at $597 million in 2000, rising to $3.3 billion 

in 2008 and falling to $2.3 billion in 2009. According 

to a 2011 study, despite this rapid growth, Africa still 

accounts for only 1 percent of Russia’s world trade,77

compared to the EU, Russia’s biggest trading partner, 

with 46.8 percent of overall trade in 2010.78 At the time 

of this writing, more recent data for trade between 

Russia and the region did not appear to be available: 

it may be a symptom of its relative insignificance that 

Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service, in its reporting of “Foreign Trade of the Russian Federation with 

Countries of the Far Abroad,” did not see fit to include 

data for a single Sub-Saharan nation.79

Russian and African direct trade is therefore significantly underdeveloped, compared to investment in 

resource extraction and cooperation on the associated 

financing—a feature highlighted by the mismatch between investment and bilateral trade noted in the case 

of Angola described above. Andrei Sharonov, managing director of Troika Dialog Group, was a member of 

the high-profile delegation led by Medvedev during 

his visit in 2009. Apparently making no mention of 

trade finance, Sharonov said:

Russian businesses are interested in partnership opportunities in Africa, both in terms of access to mineral 

resources as well as participating in power and infra-
30

structure projects. My trip to Nigeria, Namibia, and 

Angola is meant to introduce members of the Russian 

delegation to [South Africa’s] Standard Bank and to 

explore opportunities for financing Russian companies’ projects on these markets.80

The stated intention to increase Russian business 

and financial integration with Sub-Saharan Africa 

was clear; but as noted above in the cases both of infrastructure and extraction investments and of trade, 

at the time of writing little, if any, concrete progress 

has been made since then-President Medvedev’s 2009 

visit. This lack of performance may be linked to the 

Russian absorption with other regions of the world 

discussed in the introduction to this Paper, but the 

relative inactivity compared to other foreign powers 

in the region risks creating or reinforcing a perception 

of Russia as a partner who makes promises that are 

then not delivered. 

ARMS TRADE

Russia is the second largest arms exporter globally, behind the United States. But according to the 

U.S. Congressional Research Service, U.S. arms exports tripled in 2011 to a total of $66.8 billion, dwarfing Russia’s next-largest total of $4.8 billion.81 Along 

with the United States, Russia’s primary competitor 

in the arms market in Africa since the fall of the USSR 

has been China. Moscow’s main customers include 

India, Syria, Algeria, Myanmar, Venezuela, Sudan, 

and many African states such as Algeria and Ethiopia. However, Russia’s arms industry has been falling behind in key technologies, and it is seeking more 

technologically advanced partners to develop new 
31

technology and new markets for export. According to 

the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 

(SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database, the majority of Russian arms sold to Africa during the 1990s and early 

2000s were anti-tank missiles, artillery, self-propelled 

guns, anti-aircraft artillery, surface to air systems, 

helicopters, and a small number of aircraft with associated munitions.82 Although Sub-Saharan Africa 

(excluding South Africa) accounted for only 1.5 percent of the volume of world imports of major arms in 

2006 to 2010, this should be seen in the context of most 

countries in the region having no domestic arms industry and therefore depending wholly on imports.83

Russia stated an intention to revive substantially 

military cooperation and arms sales to Africa as early 

as 2003. Then chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense Army General Andrei Nikolayev 

announced that: 

Russia has the potential to increase the amount of 

military-technical cooperation [i.e., provision of military equipment] with the Arab world, Latin America, 

and South-East Asia. Russia works very poorly on the 

African continent. And there is considerable potential. 

The delegation of the State Duma Defense Committee which recently returned from South Africa is convinced of this.

South Africa had supposedly shown great interest in Russian armored vehicles and small arms, 

sparking an ambitious Russian aim to supplant the 

United States as the leading supplier of weapons to 

the country.84

Russia has often been accused of supplying arms 

to African countries where internal conflict and ethnic strife end in severe human rights violations. Rus-
32

sia continues to supply helicopter gunships to Sudan, where they have been used to attack civilians 

in Darfur and Southern Kordofan—with little of the 

international opposition that was sparked by a repair 

contract for similar helicopters supplied to the Assad 

regime in Syria. Russia, like China, remains wary of 

any arms control treaty to include binding rules on international human rights, international humanitarian 

law, and socio-economic development. Moscow has 

expressed concern that these treaties could be used as 

tools for the West to restrict the Russian export market 

in order to retain export hegemony. Russian officials 

argue that such rules are interpreted subjectively and 

ideologically,85 and Russia is thus unlikely to commit 

to any conventional arms control treaty that limits 

their current or potential export markets. 

This is particularly the case following the Russian 

experience of losing business with a key trading partner after the change of regime in Libya. Although Libya is not a sub-Saharan nation, the example is worth 

considering, as it predicates the likely future Russian 

response to similar situations that could potentially 

arise in Southern Africa. Sergei V. Chemezov, the director of the Russian state company Rostekhnologia, 

which plays a key role in weapons exports, claimed 

Russia lost a potential $4 billion as a result of the UN 

embargo on Libya.86 The financial setbacks were characterized as “lost opportunity costs,” as open contracts for Libya had not yet been filled when Moscow 

approved UNSC Resolution 1970 in February 2011.87

Russia had mostly shipped spare parts for Libya’s 

Soviet-built weaponry, but in 2008, Russia waived 

Libya’s Soviet-era debt in exchange for new arms 

contracts, suggesting that Russian arms exporters 

may, in fact, have felt the loss of even more potential 
33

orders. Libya was Russia’s primary customer in the 

Middle East and North Africa, along with Algeria and 

Syria, before the UNSC unanimously voted to impose 

sanctions.88

Chemezov also stated Russia could lose as much 

as $10 billion if the UN expanded arms embargoes 

to other Middle Eastern or North African countries,89

making the approval of another arms embargo that 

would incur arms sales losses through the UNSC unlikely. The Russian defense industry stands to lose a 

great deal of money from military contracts should existing regimes collapse, especially in Syria, and Moscow is likely to be highly wary of losing more arms 

markets elsewhere. Africa will thus continue to be of 

interest to Moscow’s defense industry in need of new 

markets and revenue, and, as a result, Russia is likely 

to resist any possible attempts to restrict or restrain 

arms supplies there. 

BRAZIL, RUSSIA, INDIA, CHINA, AND SOUTH 

AFRICA

Russia is attracted by the notion of cooperation in 

Africa between countries making up the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) virtual group 

of nations with supposedly similar economies. Two 

benefits for Russia are an enhanced ability to keep a 

wary eye on the activities of other BRICS states in Africa and the potential creation of a cohesive block of 

states to counter U.S./Western influence there. 

Examples of concrete achievement in cooperation 

between the BRICS states are few. Yet interestingly, 

in Africa, a Southern African company is discussing 

plans with Russia and potential commercial investors, 

including Google, for a $1.5 billion investment in sub-
34

sea cable, linking 21 African countries with Russia and 

the remaining BRICS states.90 The fiber optic cable is 

designed to make direct connections with all BRICS 

countries and to avoid third country dependencies. 

For example, the plan calls for a direct link from China 

to Brazil without having to connect through hubs in 

the West, with the explicit aim of enhancing cyber security for the participating nations by bypassing the 

United States.91

At the same time, seen from southern Africa, Russia’s involvement in these nonregional groupings can 

sometimes appear tangential in real terms. Even the 

notional BRICS grouping has to compete with a number of other acronyms where Russia does not feature 

at all—for instance, IBSA and BASIC.92 Equally tellingly, these nations consider the concept of a “G8 of 

the South”—in which, according to a South African 

study on regional alliances, Russian involvement 

would simply “muddle the picture.”93 It can therefore 

be argued that Russia’s participation in specific activities of this regional grouping will be of limited significance for South Africa, the “S” of the group. 

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

As Russia’s economy increasingly relies on the 

exploitation of natural resources, Moscow’s foreign 

policy will continue to be more aggressive in countering other world powers, including the United States, 

in securing influence over resources abroad in order 

to control their distribution and ensure long-term 

state income. Following perceived Western military 

intervention operations in Libya in 2011, Moscow’s 

foreign policy has grown more aggressive in countering perceived U.S. expansionism and interests around 
35

the globe. The Russian intention to counter the U.S. 

presence in Africa is no different. Competition for resource control and expanded political influence will 

continue in Northern and Western Africa, but is likely 

to intensify in Sub-Saharan Africa within the next 

10 years.

The surge in interest and investment by larger 

powers in Africa has not gone unremarked by African nations, and their relative perceptions of U.S. and 

Russian involvement could have significant impacts 

as the U.S. increases involvement in Africa. This has 

specific implications for U.S. military cooperation 

with African states. 

For U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) purposes, 

Africa’s 54 countries were consolidated under a new 

combatant command, U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), in 2007. AFRICOM now encompasses more 

nations than any other Pentagon regional command. 

General Carter Ham, former commander of AFRICOM, 

explained AFRICOM aims at a conference attended by 

representatives from African nations in June 2012. He 

stated that the United States is carefully expanding efforts to provide intelligence, training, and small numbers of forces to African nations in certain situations 

in order to help counter terrorist activities in the region. He also said that coordinated moves by several 

Africa-based terrorist groups to share their training, 

funding, and explosive device construction materials 

are worrisome and pose a threat to the United States 

and the region. He also briefly mentioned Djibouti, 

where the United States has a military contingent of 

around 2,000 troops, as well as the “small, temporary” 

troop presence in other nations, like Liberia, Morocco, and Cameroon. Altogether, Ham said, the United 

States has trained as many as 200,000 peacekeepers 
36

and enforcement personnel from about 25 different 

African nations.94 Further, former U.S. Army Africa 

commander Major General David Hogg disclosed the 

Army will begin deploying over 3,000 troops to Africa 

at the beginning of 2013, contributing to anti-piracy 

operations in the Mediterranean Sea and off the Horn 

of Africa, as well as in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea. U.S. 

interests in Africa continue to grow, and with them 

the footprint of AFRICOM and the interest in exploring potential future basing options. Given the scope 

for direct competition with Russia, Russia’s presence, 

interests, and allegiances in sub-Saharan Africa will 

become a strategic policy concern for the U.S. Army, 

AFRICOM, the Pentagon, and U.S. policymakers.

However, opportunities exist for cooperation on 

Africa-related issues between the United States and 

Russia. Moscow shares the U.S. concern for global stability, especially in the Middle East and Africa, where 

instability could directly affect Russian business and 

resource investment. According to the AFRICOM 

Commander’s Intent, the most important military task 

in Africa is to “deter or defeat al-Qaida and other violent extremist organizations operating in Africa and 

deny them safe haven.”95 Moscow’s rising alarm over 

terrorist organizations’ global freedom of movement 

and any potential encroachment of terrorist activity 

toward Russian borders is also a fundamental cause 

for concern in Russia’s view of the world, including 

Africa. This was highlighted as a specific issue by 

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in January 

2013, discussing the increased terrorist activity in the 

“vacuum of power” in northern Mali, as well as the increase of illegal weapons trafficking in Libya affecting 

the stability of the region.96 The overlap of interests 

with AFRICOM’s remit is clear. In some ways, there 
37

is a parallel with Russian official attitudes to the U.S. 

reduction in troops in Afghanistan planned for 2014: 

Ambivalent attitudes to the Western military presence 

there have coalesced into distinct concern expressed 

repeatedly by President Vladimir Putin and other 

high ranking officials over the consequences of their 

withdrawal, expected to include uncontained terrorist 

and drug trafficking activity.97

The creation of AFRICOM was a cause for widespread alarm among African nations—to the apparent 

considerable surprise of its creators.98 AFRICOM suffers in particular from a perceived deficit of legitimacy 

owing to persisting post-colonial views held among 

leadership elites in some African states, compounded 

in some cases by more positive fond memories of Soviet connections among the leadership generation. In 

particular, many representatives of this generation 

will recall education provided at Patrice Lumumba 

University in Moscow (Friendship of Peoples University), while even lower-ranking members of former 

terrorist organizations will have had more experience 

of the USSR than of the United States.99

African suspicion of U.S. intentions is reinforced 

by the legacy of support from the USSR for anti-colonial movements—and it is easy enough, given recent 

interventions in Asia led by the United States and supported by a range of European former imperial powers, to read the United States as a neo-colonialist actor. 

As noted in one U.S. study, 

sensing that the main purpose for AFRICOM was to increase control over—or even seize—critical resources 

including oil and minerals, Africans. . . . worried that 

the US would intervene unilaterally. . . . Overwhelmingly negative perceptions of American intent were 

rooted in the past and reinforced by current events.100
38

The view from African capitals is not the same as 

the view from the Pentagon, and it is not axiomatic 

that U.S. military presence is preferable for African 

states to that of Russia and China. Declaratory policy 

on the objectives and rationale for AFRICOM, as well 

as planning for future development of the command, 

should therefore remain sensitive to these perceptions 

and to the attraction—historical or otherwise—of Russia as an alternative. 

Even after the colonial period and the Cold War, 

not all U.S. involvement in the continent has fostered 

a positive attitude to potential military involvement: 

inconsistent levels of foreign assistance undermined 

US credibility, especially in southern Africa. . . . Perhaps this dissatisfaction explains why SADC members 

expressed such hostility toward AFRICOM.101

At the same time, South Africa, the founding 

country of SADC, maintains a close and continuing 

relationship with Russia through a steady history of 

bilateral agreements, and their relationship, in combination with those of several other sub-Saharan countries such as Angola and Namibia, likely contributes 

heavily to these perceptions.

Although Russia’s trade and investment footprint 

in Africa is not as widespread as that of China, Moscow is determined to expand its presence and influence in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in cultivating 

mineral resources and retaining control over sources 

of gas and oil. Gazprom’s interests in the planned 

Trans-Saharan gas pipeline and Russian involvement 

in the Angolan oil sector carry potential implications 

for the energy security of the United States and its 

European allies, particularly in the context of secu-
39

rity of supply. Russian interests in uranium mining 

may also have strategic implications, as U.S. foreign 

policy continues to prioritize nonproliferation of 

nuclear materials.

U.S. actions will also be a driver for the shape of 

Russian involvement in Africa. As U.S. interests and 

presence in Africa expand, Moscow will likely respond 

with an even more assertive policy toward increasing its presence and influence in Africa to counter the 

perceived threat of U.S. expansionism. Activities by 

the United States and NATO, which appear innocent 

from a Euro-Atlantic perspective, can be perceived as 

deeply troubling and even threatening when viewed 

from Moscow, especially when they involve an extension of NATO’s reach and influence. In 2012, NATO’s 

former Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), U.S. 

Navy Admiral James Stavridis, spoke of expanding NATO cooperation around the world, including for the first time “exploring possibilities with . . .

India and Brazil,” two BRICS countries. He also recommended Libya as a candidate for NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue military partnership, an organization that includes every North African nation, Egypt, 

Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria, except Libya. Stavridis 

stated in June 2012:

Today, the Mediterranean Dialogue, we’re in the process of talking, for example, with Libya. Already many 

of the other nations in General Ham’s [AFRICOM’s] 

region are part of this. The nations around the Mediterranean are natural NATO partners.102

Expansion or enhancement of U.S. involvement 

with African states, especially if they carry a military 

dimension as through AFRICOM or NATO, can be 

expected to provoke a defensive response from Rus-
40

sia, and this potential response should be considered 

carefully in order to reduce the transactional cost of 

Russian opposition or obstructionism. 

Overall, the United States has rather unsuccessfully courted sub-Saharan Africa as a strategic partner. 

Countries such as Angola are an important source of 

U.S. oil imports, and sub-Saharan Africa’s collective 

economic growth trajectory makes it a potentially 

powerful and influential continental player. But ambivalent memories of previous U.S. involvement and 

the already strong relationships with China and growing relationships with Russia, neither of which presses 

governments on issues of corruption, human rights, 

or democracy, has caused U.S. efforts to receive a welcome in some sub-Saharan countries that is lukewarm 

at best.103 U.S. policy will be most successful through 

prioritizing interests and consistently heavily investing in top priority areas in order to gain the trust not 

only of the governments currently in power, but also, 

and more importantly, of the next generations of leaders in these nations. Sub-Saharan Africa needs and is 

looking for a dependable ally, not just the highest bidder investor; the highest bid and the greatest investment are currently winning the greatest influence, but 

do not guarantee long-term allegiance. U.S. policy still 

has a foothold to ensure an operable environment for 

the growing U.S. presence in Africa, should it choose 

to use it.

OUTLOOK

At the time of writing, Russian foreign policy is 

preoccupied with a number of immediate concerns, 

including the aftermath of the Arab Spring in the 

Middle East, the conflict in Syria, relations with Eu-
41

rope and NATO, especially in finding a compromise 

on European missile defense, and investing considerable soft power capital in the near abroad. Little obvious attention has therefore been devoted lately to 

sub-Saharan Africa in high-level public diplomacy. 

However, while Africa may not be an immediate policy priority, at a longer-term strategic level, the desire 

remains for Moscow to establish and maintain a more 

clear and defined presence in the region. Russia’s dependency on natural resources to maintain its state 

budget and ensure future reserves for its export-based 

economy will ensure Moscow’s continued interest in 

sub-Saharan Africa, and a visible return to prominence 

on the list of Russia’s foreign policy priorities should 

be expected.

ENDNOTES

1. Sergius Yakobson, “Russia and Africa,” The Slavonic and 

East European Review, Vol. 17, No. 51, April 1939, p. 623.

2. “Bulging in the Middle,” The Economist, October 20, 2012.

3. Jeremy Bervoets, “The Soviet Union in Angola: Soviet and 

African Perspectives on the Failed Socialist Transformation,” 

Vestnik, The Journal Of Russian And Asian Studies, May 11, 2011, 

available from www.sras.org/the_soviet_union_in_angola.

4. Ibid. 

5. Sam Nolutshungu, “Soviet Involvement in Southern Africa,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 

Vol. 481, No. 1, September 1985, pp. 138-146, 142.

6. Personal conversations with author. For a detailed overview of Soviet military and KGB presence and interventions in 

the region, see Vladimir Shubin, The Hot Cold War—The USSR In 

Southern Africa, Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZuluNatal Press, 2008, dedicated to “one of the unsung Soviet heroes.” 
42

7. An event not publicized either in Ghana or the USSR at the 

time, since neither wished to avow the close relationship between 

Nkrumah and his KGB advisors or mentors. See, for example, 

John Barron, KGB, New York: Bantam, 1974. 

8. Roger Faligot and Rémi Kauffer, KGB Objectif Pretoria, 

Paris, France: Favre, 1986, p. 134.

9. Vladimir Shubin, ANC—A View From Moscow, Auckland 

Park, South Africa: Jacana, 2008, p. ix.

10. Ivetta Gerasimchuk, “Re-Think Russian Investment in 

Southern Africa,” WWF’s Trade and Investment Programme Report, 

Moscow, Russia/Johannesburg, South Africa: WWF, 2009, p. 32, 

available from mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15151/ .

11. Reginald Brope, “The $56 Billion Dollar Man: Igor Sechin,” 

forthcoming May 2013.

12. Roger Faligot and Rémi Kauffer, KGB Objectif Pretoria, 

Paris, France: Favre, 1986, pp. 101-104.

13. Ibid., pp. 30-41.

14. See, for instance, Shubin, ANC—A View From Moscow, p. x.

15. The Mitrokhin Archive II—The KGB And The World, London, 

UK: Allen Lane, 2005.

16. Igho Natufe, “A Review of Russia-Africa Relations: New 

Challenges and Opportunities,” August 11, 2011, available from 

myafrica.ru/en/?p=439.

17. Gregory Chin and Anton Malkin, “Russia as a Re-Emerging Donor: Catching Up in Africa,” March 8, 2012, available from 

www.cigionline.org/publications/2012/3/russia-re-emerging-donorcatching-up-africa.

18. Shubin, ANC—A View From Moscow, p. 314.

19. Ibid., pp. 317-318.
43

20. Natufe.

21. Vneshnaya politika Rossii: Otnosheniya Rossii so stranami 

Afriki k Yugu ot Sakhary (Russian Foreign Policy: Relations Between 

Russia and Sub-Saharan Africa, Russian Federation Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs), December 31, 2006, available from rus.rusemb.at/

aussenpolitik/202.

22. Gerasimchuk, p. 33.

23. Habiba Ben Barka and Kupukile Mlambo, “Russia’s Economic Engagement with Africa,” Africa Economic Brief, Vol. 2, 

Issue 7, May 11, 2011.

24. Kester Kenn Klomegah, “Russia and Africa: Economic 

Diplomacy Needs New Strategies,” Russia Beyond The Headlines, August 17, 2011, p.2, available from rbth.ru/articles/2011/08/

17/russia_and_africa_economic_diplomacy_needs_new_strategies_

13260.html.

25. Obmen dollarov na vliyaniye i resursy: kitaytsy v Afrike (Exchanging dollars for influence and resources: the Chinese in Africa), Geneva, Switzerland: International Centre for Sustainable Trade and 

Development, December 2009, available from ictsd.org/i/news%20

/%20bridgesrussian/65199/.

26. Tatyana Deych, “Kitay zavoyovyvayet Afriku” (“China is 

conquering Africa”), Moscow, Russia: Russian Council for International Affairs, June 26, 2012, available from russiancouncil.ru/

inner/?id_4=547.

27. Natufe.

28. Shubin, ANC—A View From Moscow, p. 5.

29. According to Konstantin Kosachev, speaking at a conference of ambassadors and permanent representatives of the Russian Federation, July 11, 2012, available from interaffairs.ru/read.

php?item=8606.
44

30. Claire Provost, “The Rebirth of Russian Foreign Aid,” The 

Guardian, May 25, 2011, available from www.guardian.co.uk/globaldevelopment/2011/may/25/russia-foreign-aid-report-influence-image.

31. Alex Anishyuk, “Government Raises Foreign Aid 4-Fold,” 

St. Petersburg Times, February 19, 2010.

32. “Peter Fradkov Shares His Views About the Current Russian-African Relations,” Russia-Africa Partnership and Success, undated interview, available from rusafr.com/index.php?option=com_

content&view=article&id=203.

33. Daniel Nawsaw, “China and Russia Veto Zimbabwe Sanctions,” The Guardian, July 11, 2008, available from www.guardian.

co.uk/world/2008/jul/11/unitednations.zimbabwe.

34. “Margelov to Meet African Leaders to Discuss ‘Arab 

Spring’, Political Situation,” Interfax, August 27, 2012; “On the 

working trip of Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia M. L. 

Bogdanov to Zimbabwe,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, August 22, 2012.

35. “Les soutiens du médiateur russe dans le conflit libyen” 

(“The Concerns of the Russian Mediator in the Libyan Conflict”), 

Le monde du renseignement blog, June 21, 2011, available from lemondedurenseignement.hautetfort.com/archive/2011/06/21/les-soutiensde-mikhail-margelov.html.

36. Vladimir Shubin, “Russia and Africa: Coming Back?” 

Russian Analytical Digest, No. 83, Septembeer 24, 2010, p. 6.

37. “UN Mission’s Summary detailed by Country,” available 

from www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2012/august12_3.pdf.

38. “Russia-African Union ties have great potential - Lavrov,” Voice of Russia, October 21, 2011, available from english.ruvr.

ru/2011/10/21/59136129.html.

39. Ibid.
45

40. “About the Ministry of Economic Development of the 

Russian Federation,” in Russian, available from www.economy.

gov.ru/minec/about/structure/depAsiaAfrica/.

41. “Foreign Economic Strategy of the Russian Federation to 

2020,” December 2008, in Russian, available from www.economy.

gov.ru/minec/activity/sections/foreigneconomicactivity/vec2020.

42. Gerasimchuk, p. 32.

43. SADC includes Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic 

of Congo, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United 

Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See www.sadc.int.

44. Table extracted from Gerasimchuk, p. 31.

45. Habiba Ben Barka, “Russia’s Economic Engagement with 

Africa,” Africa Economic Brief, Vol. 2, Issue 7, May 11, 2011.

46. See also discussion in Brope, “Sechin.” 

47. Voyenno-tekhnicheskoye sotrudnichestvo s almazodobyvayushchimi stranami Afriki (Military-Technical Cooperation with Diamond 

Extracting Countries of Africa), Moscow, Russia: Civil Centre for 

Applied Research, September 2005, available from www.civilresearch.ru/pdf/10.pdf.

48. “Alrosa to Invest $500 mln in Angola Building Sector,” Reuters, August 19, 2009, available from www.reuters.com/

article/2009/08/19/angola-russia-alrosa-idUSB61034520090819.

49. “Gazprom to Invest $100 mln in Angola Oil & Gas Projects,” RIA Novosti, October 31, 2006, available from en.rian.ru/russia/20061031/55268264.html.

50. “Launch of Angola’s First Satellite Postponed until 2014,” 

Macauhub, Macau, November 30, 2012, available from www.macauhub.com.mo/en/2012/11/30/launch-of-angolas-first-satellite-postponed-until-2014/.
46

51. “Angola to Spend U.S.$25.6 Million in 2011 to Begin 

Construction of Angosat Satellite,” Macauhub, Macau, March 18, 

2011, available from www.macauhub.com.mo/en/2011/03/18/angolato-spend-us25-6-million-in-2011-to-begin-construction-of-angosatsatellite/.

52. Hamet Aguemon, Isaac Mireles, and Shelly Ogilvie, “Angola Financial Systems,” undated, available from fic.wharton.

upenn.edu/fic/africa/angola%20final-final.pdf.

53. “Russia to Invest $1 bln in Namibia Uranium Deposits,” RIA Novosti, May 20, 2010, available from en.rian.ru/

world/20100520/159091599.html.

54. Fantu Cheru, “NAI to Initiate Research on BRIC-Africa 

Relations; Russia’s New Resource Diplomacy in Africa,” Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, undated, available from www.nai.uu.se/ReportBRICsSummitMoscow.pdf.

55. Energy Info Admin, “Russia Energy Profile,” Petroleum, Washington, DC: U.S. Departmentt of Energy, September 

16, 2009.

56. Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Catherin Yusupov, Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications, Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, April 1, 2009, p. 52.

57. Dmitry Mikhailov, “Key Elements of Oil Production,” 

Oil of Russia, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2009, available from www.oilru.com/

or/39/784.

58. Natufe.

59. Vivienne Watt, “Russia Rearms,” Time, April 27, 2009, 

available from www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1891681,00.html.

60. “Country Analysis Brief; Angola,” Washington, DC: U.S. 

Energy Information Administration, October 16, 2012, available 

at www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=AO.

61. “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of 

Four East Africa Geologic Provinces,” World Petroleum Resourc-
47

es Project, New Cumberland, PA: U.S. Geological Survey, April 

2012, available from pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2012/3039/.

62. T. Hemsted, “Second and Third Millennium Reserves 

Development in African Basins,” T. Arthur, D. S. MacGregor, 

and N. R. Cameron, eds., Petroleum Geology of Africa: New Themes 

and Developing Technologies, London, UK: Geological Society, 

2003, p. 241.

63. Ibid. 

64. Paul F Hueper, “Sub-Saharan Africa,” David L. David 

and Jan H. Kalicki, eds., Energy and Security: Toward a New Foreign 

Policy Strategy, Baltimore, PA: John Hopkins University Press, 

2005, p. 251. 

65. Ibid., p. 249.

66. Barka and Mlambo.

67. Article by Michael Frodl, National Defense Industrial 

Association (NDIA), Business and Technology Magazine, cited in 

Oliker et al., p. 52.

68. Barka and Mlambo.

69. “After Shell pipeline blast in Nigeria, MEND threatens 

Russia,” Montreal, Canada: Global Research, Center for Research 

on Globalization, June 25, 2009, available from www.globalresearch.

ca/after-shell-pipeline-blast-in-nigeria-mend-threatens-russia/.

70. See, for example, Luke Harding and David Hearst. “Europe Fears Winter Energy Crisis as Russia Tightens Grip on Oil 

Supplies,” The Observer, September 13, 2009, available from www.

guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/13/russia-oil-exports-eu/print.

71. Barka and Mlambo.

72. United States Census Bureau, “2012: US Trade in Goods 

with Africa,” Foreign Trade, Washington, DC: U.S. Department 

of Trade, available from www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/

c0013.html.
48

73. “China-Africa Trade Likely to Hit Record High,” Forum 

on China Africa Cooperation, December 28, 2012, available from 

www.focac.org/eng/zfgx/jmhz/t1001387.htm.

74. “Russian-South African Economic Cooperation,” available from www.russianembassy.org.za/economic/Coop.html.

75. Quoted in South African Rand, since wide fluctuations in 

the exchange rate with the U.S. dollar make direct comparisons 

with the dollar figures cited previously unhelpful. 

76. “Steady Growth in SA Trade With BRICS Members,” 

South African Government News Agency, August 29, 2012. 

77. Barka and Mlambo.

78. “Russia Trade, Exports and Imports,” EconomyWatch, 

March 17, 2010, available from www.economywatch.com/world_

economy/russia/export-import.html.

79. “Vneshnyaya torgovlya Rossiyskoy Federatsii so stranami 

dal’nego zarubezh’ya” (“Foreign Trade of the Russian Federation 

with Countries of the Far Abroad”), available from www.gks.ru/

wps/wcm/connect/rosstat/rosstatsite/main/trade/. 

80. “Stanbic Partners With Russian Investment Group,” Buziness Africa, October 6, 2009, available from www.buzinessafrica.

com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=232:stanbicpartners-with-russian-investment-group&catid=5:investment&Itemid

=7&lang=fr.

81. “Do We Have Statistics on China’s Africa ‘Land Grab’?” 

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82. SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, available from www.sipri.

org/databases/armstransfers.

83. Pieter D; Wezeman, T. Siemon, Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, 

Arms Flow to Sub-Saharan Africa, Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, December 2011, available from books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP30.pdf.
49

84. “Novosti VPK i voyenno-tekhnicheskogo sotrudnichestva” 

(“Military Industrial Complex and Military-Technical Cooperation News”), Military Industrial Complex and Military-Technical Cooperation News, July 19-25, 2003, available from mfit.ru/defensive/

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June 11, 2012, available from www.amnesty.org/en/news/big-sixarms-exporters-2012-06-11.

86. Andrew E. Kramer, “Unrest in Libya and the Middle 

East Is Costing the Russian Arms Industry,” New York Times, 

March 4, 2011, available from www.nytimes.com/2011/03/05/world/

europe/05russia.html?_r=1.

87. “Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Libyan Authorities in Bid to Stem Violent Repression,” UN News Center, 

February 26, 2011, available from www.un.org/apps/news/story.

asp?NewsID=37633#.UEyNTiJTYTA.

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East Is Costing the Russian Arms Industry,” New York Times, 

March 4, 2011, available from www.nytimes.com/2011/03/05/world/

europe/05russia.html?_r=1.

90. “Braziliyu, Rossiyu, Indiyu, Kitay, Afriku i SShA 

soyedinyet magistralyu” (“Brazil, Russia, India, China, Africa 

and USA To Be Linked by Main Line”), Telekomza, June 5, 2012, 

available from telekomza.ru/2012/06/05/braziliyu-rossiyu-indiyukitaj-afriku-i-ssha-soedinyat-magistralyu/. See also “Investors Mull 

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Cash” Security Bulletin, April 17, 2012, available from www.zdnet.

com/i3-africa-calls-for-brics-submarine-cable-cash-4010025904/.
50

92. India, Brazil, South Africa; and Brazil, Brazil, South Africa, 

India, China. 

93. “From BRIC To BRICS: Report On The Proceedings Of The 

International Workshop On South Africa’s Emerging Power Alliances: IBSA, BRICS, BASIC,” Johannesburg, South Africa, Institute for Global Dialogue, 2011. 

94. Boris Volkhonsky, U.S. Military Expansion in Africa Aimed 

at China, Montreal, Canada: Global Research: Center for Research 

on Globalization, June 28, 2012, available from www.globalresearch.

ca/u-s-military-expansion-in-africa-aimed-at-china/.

95. Available from www.africom.mil/what-we-do.

96. “Moscow Concerned over Mali Terror Surge,” Voice of Russia, January 14, 2013, available from english.ruvr.ru/2013_01_14/

Moscow-concerned-over-Mali-terror-surge/.

97. “Putin Reiterates Support for NATO Afghan Operation,” Ria Novosti, August 1, 2012, available from en.rian.ru/

russia/20120801/174911173.html.

98. El-Rayah A. Osman, “More Than Good Intentions: 

AFRICOM, between American Ambition and African Suspicion,” Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, January-March 

2012, pp. 21-26. 

99. Resulting not only from extensive military training programs in the USSR, but also from unplanned events like the mass 

evacuation of Umkhonto we Sizwe from Tanzania to the USSR in 

1969. See Shubin, ANC - A View From Moscow, p. 78.

100. Diana B Putnam, “Addressing African Questions About 

the Legitimacy of the U.S. Africa Command, AFRICOM,” in Amy 

Krakowka and Laurel Hummel, eds., Understanding Africa—

A Geographic Approach, West Point, NY: United States Military 

Academy, 2009, pp. 128-129.

101. Ibid., p. 131.
51

102. Rick Rozoff, Libya: New AFRICOM and NATO Beachhead 

in Africa, Montreal, Canada: Global Research: Center for Research 

on Globalization, June 17, 2012, available from www.globalresearch.

ca/libya-new-africom-and-nato-beachhead-in-africa/.

103. Jennifer G. Cooke, “Angola’s Elections: Watershed Moment or More of the Same?” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, August 31, 2012, available from csis.org/

publication/angolas-elections-watershed-moment-or-more-same.
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