NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v. 

BETTE L. OFFRET, Appellant. 

_________________________________ 

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v. 

TODD ERIC HINSON, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0275 

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0284 

(Consolidated) 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. CR2013-000006-001 

No. CR2013-000006-002 

The Honorable Jeffrey A. Rueter, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By Craig W. Soland 

Counsel for Appellee 
2 

Guy Brown PLLC, Phoenix 

By Guy F. Brown 

Counsel for Appellants

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Patricia A. Orozco, delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Peter B. Swann joined. 

O R O Z C O, Judge: 

¶1 Bette L. Offret and Todd Eric Hinson (collectively 

Defendants), appeal from their convictions on one count of trafficking in 

stolen property in the second degree, a class 3 felony; one count of 

trafficking in stolen property in the first degree, a class 2 felony; and one 

count of theft of a means of transportation, a class 3 felony. Defendants 

argue that they are entitled to a new trial because: (1) the trial court erred 

in denying their motions for a mistrial and a new trial based on 

prosecutorial misconduct; (2) prosecutorial vouching; and (3) the trial court 

denied a continuance. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 In July 2011, Dan N. exited the Phoenix restaurant where he 

had just had dinner and discovered that his 1997 Chevrolet truck had been 

stolen. He immediately reported its theft to the Phoenix Police Department. 

On February 9, 2012, Phoenix Police undercover officers Chad Roettjer, Jeff 

Pluta, and Rafael Egea, received “a name and a telephone number” of an 

individual selling a stolen truck and made telephone contact with Hinson, 

who directed them to his location. When they arrived at the location in 

Sunnyslope, they saw Hinson and Offret “stripping” a white 1997 

Chevrolet truck. Hinson was in the bed of the truck, removing a tool box, 

and Offret was inside the truck cab where an “egg crate” replaced the 

driver’s seat. Defendants had neither the title nor keys to the vehicle and 

the steering column was cracked. After some negotiations, Pluta agreed 

with Offret to purchase the truck for $800. Pluta drove the truck to a police 

 

1 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

convictions and resolve all reasonable inferences against defendants. State 

v. Karr, 221 Ariz. 319, 320, ¶ 2 (App. 2008). 
STATE v. OFFRET 

Decision of the Court 

3 

storage facility, and police subsequently determined that it was Dan N.’s 

stolen truck. 

¶3 A few weeks later, Defendants contacted Pluta and informed 

him that they had located a trailer and “would have to go grab it or get it . 

. . and needed to borrow a truck in order to pick it up.” On February 21, 

after receiving a call from Defendants, Roettjer, Pluta, and Egea returned to 

the Sunnyslope location where they observed the two Defendants working 

in their driveway where a large, flatbed, trailer was parked. Hinson 

proceeded to remove an Arizona title and a VIN tag from his left breast 

pocket, which he gave to Pluta.2 Hinson told Pluta that “[the title and VIN 

tag] were clean” and were “included in the price of the trailer” and that he 

also would be willing to grind off the serial number. Pluta negotiated with 

Offret and purchased the trailer for $500. The trailer was also taken to a 

police storage facility, and police later determined that it had been stolen in 

February 2012. 

¶4 In January 2013, the State charged Defendants with Count 1, 

trafficking in stolen property in the second degree (truck); Count 2, 

knowingly trafficking in stolen property in the first degree (trailer); and 

theft of a means of transportation (trailer) knowing or having reason to 

know the property was stolen. Defendants were tried together, and Offret 

testified at trial. She maintained that she and Hinson had bought the truck 

and trailer from third parties in good faith and had no inkling that either 

vehicle was stolen. A jury found Defendants guilty of the offenses as 

charged. The trial court sentenced Hinson to concurrent prison terms of 

ten, fourteen and ten years respectively as to counts 1-3.3 Offret was 

sentenced to concurrent prison terms of two years each as to Counts 1 and 

3 and three years as to Count 2. Defendants timely appealed. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and 

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 12-120.21.A.1, 13-4031 and -

4033.A.1 (West 2015).4

 

2 The title bore neither Defendants’ name but the name of a third 

party, T.B. T.B.’s signature transferring the title bore a date approximately 

two years prior to the date Defendants contacted Pluta and told him they 

had obtained a trailer for sale. 

3 Hinson stipulated to four prior felony convictions. 

4 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred. 
STATE v. OFFRET 

Decision of the Court 

4 

DISCUSSION 

I. Denial of Motion for Mistrial/Motion for New Trial 

¶5 Offret testified that she purchased the truck and trailer from 

two separate individuals neither of whom she could identify or locate. 

Offret testified that they purchased the truck in the parking lot of an 

apartment complex from an unknown male who asked $1000 for the truck. 

They paid him $400 for the truck, and he gave them the keys and allowed 

them to leave, with their promise that they would return the following day 

with the remaining $600. He told them he would provide them with the 

title at that time. When Offret and Hinson returned to the parking lot the 

next day, and several days thereafter, the seller was not there and no one at 

the apartment complex knew anything about him. Offret testified that she 

and Hinson noticed the trailer parked at a house where the residents 

appeared to be moving while they were driving around neighborhoods 

looking for scrap metal. The trailer had some scrap metal on it. They 

approached the people at the house and a man told them that he would “let 

the trailer go” for $100 because he was moving and could not take it with 

him. They purchased the trailer and all the scrap metal on it for that 

amount. The trailer had no license plate, but the man gave them the title 

and VIN plate that they later gave to Pluta. 

¶6 During cross examination, Offret confirmed that she had “no 

idea” who the person was who sold them the trailer. The following 

exchange then occurred: 

[Prosecutor]: And you can’t ask him to come in here and 

testify for you? 

[Offret]: No, I wished I could. 

Prosecutor: Again, that didn’t strike you as suspicious at all? 

[Offret]: No. 

Two questions later, defense counsel asked to approach the bench and 

made an objection off the record. The court suggested that counsel later put 

his objection on the record out of the presence of the jury. 

¶7 At the next trial recess, which occurred at the conclusion of 

Offret’s testimony, the court permitted defense counsel to “re-urge [his] 

objection and make a record.” Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor’s 

questions to Offret concerning the fact that she did not know who sold her 
STATE v. OFFRET 

Decision of the Court 

5 

the trailer and could not bring them to court to testify “violate[d] the burden 

of proof” which was “on the State, not on the defense.” He requested a 

mistrial. The prosecutor contended that defense counsel had not made “a 

timely objection” and that the court could cure “whatever error the defense 

thinks there is” via a limiting instruction. The trial court opined that it was 

“a poorly worded question” but that “the topic was fair game.” It denied 

the motion, finding that the question was not “prejudicial” and that the 

instructions that had been given and would be given clearly explained the 

burden of proof. The court also invited defense counsel to review the final 

instructions and suggest any additions to them or a limiting instruction 

counsel thought necessary. Despite this invitation, defense counsel did not 

propose a limiting instruction. 

¶8 On appeal, Defendants argues that the prosecutor’s question 

amounted to misconduct because it improperly shifted the burden of proof 

and the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the motion for 

mistrial on this basis.5 We disagree. 

¶9 “A declaration of a mistrial . . . is ‘the most dramatic remedy 

for trial error and should be granted only when it appears that justice will 

be thwarted unless the jury is discharged and a new trial granted.’” State v. 

Dann, 205 Ariz. 557, 570, ¶ 43 (2003) (citation omitted). Because the trial 

court is in the best position to assess the impact of a statement on the jury, 

we defer to the trial court’s discretionary determination. Id. We will not 

overturn a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for mistrial unless we find 

an abuse of discretion. Id. 

¶10 The claim that the prosecutor’s question improperly shifted 

the burden of proof is without merit. Our supreme court has long allowed 

prosecutors to discuss a defendant’s failure to produce evidence so long as 

it does not constitute a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. See, 

e.g., State ex. rel. McDougall v. Corcoran, 153 Ariz. 157, 160 (1987) (prosecutor 

may properly comment on defendant’s failure to present exculpatory 

evidence, as long as it does not constitute a comment on defendant’s 

 

5 The State argues that Defendants waived this argument by not 

specifically alleging “prosecutorial misconduct” in their objection at trial. 

Therefore, it contends that our review on appeal is limited to fundamental 

error. We disagree with the State. The obvious import of Defendants’ 

objection was that the prosecutor here improperly shifted the burden of 

proof to Defendants, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct even if 

Defendants did not specifically name it as such. Defendants’ objection 

simply pinpointed the nature of the misconduct for the trial court. 
STATE v. OFFRET 

Decision of the Court 

6 

silence). In State v. Lehr, the court rejected a similar “burden shifting 

argument,” by citing McDougall’s conclusion that “the inference that may 

be drawn from [the defendant’s] failure to produce evidence—that the facts 

were unfavorable to him—is not unreasonable.” 201 Ariz. 509, 522, ¶ 57 

(2000) (citation omitted). Here the prosecutor’s question clearly did not 

refer to either Hinson or Offret’s decision to testify or not. It referred to 

Offret’s testimony that she had no idea who had sold them either vehicle 

and therefore could not ask either seller to testify about the sale. The State’s 

question merely sought to undermine Offret’s contention that she trusted 

the sellers and did not find it “suspicious” that she did not know their 

identities. Given these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. 

¶11 During his closing argument, defense counsel alluded to the 

prosecutor’s question to Offret —“did you try and bring in the guy [to] 

court who sold you the trailer” — by referring to the question as a “no, no” 

to which he had objected. Defense counsel argued that it was “unfortunate 

[Defendants] trusted these two individuals and are paying for it now.” He 

decried the prosecutor’s “tactic” in asking the question, and reminded the 

jury that it was not Defendants’ burden of proof. 

¶12 During his rebuttal closing, the prosecutor agreed with 

defense counsel and reiterated that the State had the responsibility of 

producing evidence Defendants were guilty and the burden of proving that 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; that “the defense doesn’t have to do 

anything;” and that “[t]hey don’t have to prove they’re innocent.” The 

prosecutor argued: 

They don’t have to prove reasonable doubt. They don’t have 

to produce any witnesses. 

* * * 

But what you need to think about is that they have the opportunity. 

They don’t have to. They have no burden at all. It’s 

completely on the State to prove their case but the defense has 

an opportunity to present witnesses. (Emphasis added). 

Defense counsel objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. 

Counsel then moved for a mistrial, and the court called a recess. 

¶13 During the recess, the prosecutor argued that his comments 

were not shifting the burden of proof, and that ample case law permitted 

him to “comment[] on the defense’s failure to produce evidence.” The trial 
STATE v. OFFRET 

Decision of the Court 

7 

court denied the motion for mistrial, stating, “I don’t find there is any 

prejudice to the Defendants that cannot be cured by a curative instruction.” 

When the jury returned, the trial court instructed them as follows: 

I just wanted to clarify and make sure that the jurors — just 

wanted to instruct you to disregard any comments by [the 

prosecutor] concerning [Defendants] having the opportunity 

to present evidence or witnesses in their defense and choosing 

not to. 

The burden of proof is on the State. They must prove each 

element as to each offense, as to each defendant, beyond a 

reasonable doubt with their evidence, and [Defendants] are 

under no obligation to present any evidence or call any 

witnesses whatsoever. 

¶14 Defendants claim on appeal that the prosecutor’s comments 

that they had an “opportunity to present witnesses” also constituted 

misconduct because they shifted the burden of proof. As previously 

discussed, see supra ¶ 10, such comments are permissible and do not shift 

the burden of proof. McDougall, 153 Ariz. at 160; Lehr, 201 Ariz. at 522, ¶ 

57. An exception to this rule applies, however, where it appears that only 

the defendant can explain or contradict the State’s evidence. State v. Bracy, 

145 Ariz. 520, 535 (1985). Here, that exception does not apply because the 

prosecutor’s comment referred to other witnesses who possessed evidence 

that could have supported Defendants’ rendition of events and not to either 

Defendants’ testimony or lack thereof. Because the prosecutor’s comments 

were permissible, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 

motion for mistrial based on the prosecutor’s closing arguments. 

¶15 After the verdicts were in, Defendants filed a motion for new 

trial based on the same arguments regarding the prosecutor’s 

impermissible burden shifting. The court held oral argument on the motion 

after which it denied the motion. Defendants argue on appeal that this was 

also an abuse of the court’s discretion. 

¶16 The trial court denied the motion in a lengthy minute entry 

ruling that reviewed the applicable case law. The trial court specifically 

found that the questions to Offret “were not made with the intent to draw 

the jury’s attention to [] Hinson’s failure to testify,” that they were within 

“a permissible area of inquiry,” and, consequently, that “no burden shifting 

and no prosecutorial misconduct” occurred. The court further found that 

the jury here was fully instructed, through the preliminary and closing 
STATE v. OFFRET 

Decision of the Court 

8 

instructions and by the court’s curative instruction, that the State had the 

burden of proof and that the defense “was not required to produce any 

evidence of its own,” which fully cured any potential for harm done by the 

prosecutor’s comments. See State v. White, 115 Ariz. 199, 204 (1997). 

¶17 “A denial of a motion for new trial will be reversed only when 

there is an affirmative showing that the trial court abused its discretion and 

acted arbitrarily.” State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 432 (1984). “An abuse of 

discretion occurs when ‘the reasons given by the court for its action are 

clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount to a denial of justice.’” State 

v. Arvallo, 232 Ariz. 200, 201, ¶ 7 (App. 2013) (internal citation and 

punctuation omitted). Again, as previously discussed, the trial court’s 

finding that the prosecutor’s comments were permissible and were not 

misconduct is supported by the record. Furthermore, the trial court 

correctly analyzed the applicable law. The trial court consequently did not 

abuse its discretion in also denying the motion for new trial. 

II. Prosecutorial Misconduct/Vouching 

¶18 During closing argument, the prosecutor noted that the three 

officers may not all have remembered all the details, but that the ones they 

remembered were consistent. He argued that the jury should use its 

common sense when considering their memories and contradictory 

testimony: “What incentive do they have to mislead?” 

¶19 During his closing argument, defense counsel made much of 

the fact that only Pluta had written the departmental reports in this case 

and that the reason that was so was because he was seeking appointment 

to the “Career Criminal Squad” and had to establish himself with his 

supervisors, “so those reports better all line up.” He called into question 

the other two officers’ memory of events and the fact that they purported 

to recall things that were not in Pluta’s reports and that some of their 

memories were also contradictory. Defense counsel also pointed out that 

the State had no photos of either vehicle to document the officers’ 

descriptions of the vehicles’ physical condition and that Pluta testified that 

he had a recording device but could not use it to record any of the 

incriminating statements he alleged Defendants had made during their 

negotiations because it malfunctioned. Counsel argued, “it’s convenient 

that the audio didn’t work because if it did work, well, then you guys would 

all be able to listen to it and you would know exactly what was said during 

that time[,] [b]ut it didn’t work.” 
STATE v. OFFRET 

Decision of the Court 

9 

¶20 Consequently, defense counsel argued, “What you have is an 

officer who is incentivized to have his reports read glowingly, because he’s 

going to have to answer questions about this from supervisor.” He also 

argued: 

We wouldn’t be here if the officers did a proper job. And 

what I mean by that, this person is a trained professional. He 

has no interest in the case. If he has no interest, what is he 

doing sitting here? What is the detective, the case agent, 

doing sitting here if he has no interest in the case? Trust me. 

The police have an interest in the case. Trust me. Okay? 

¶21 In rebuttal closing, the State argued : 

Ladies and gentlemen, this case really comes down to one 

thing. Who do you believe? Do you believe the three veteran 

officers, detectives, or do you believe Ms. Offret? Because ... 

if you believe Ms. Offret, and you want to believe the 

testimony, you want to find the [D]efendants not guilty, find 

there’s a reasonable doubt. 

The only way to get to that point is to conclude that Detective 

Egea, Detective Roettjer and Officer Pluta were lying. That 

they purposefully, intentionally, maliciously put in their 

reports and testified about statements [] that [Defendants] 

made, that they knew that they never made. So do you think 

that they did that? 

Because you can all realize what that would mean for those 

officers. If something like that was discovered, it’s fair to 

assume that they would be fired. They’d never work as a 

police officer again. Potential liability, civil and criminally. 

So is that what you think happened, or do you think the 

officers are telling the truth? 

The officers are telling the truth. The evidence supports that 

they’re telling the truth. The evidence supports that both 

[D]efendants [] are guilty of all three charges in this matter. 

And I ask you to find them all guilty. 

¶22 Defendants did not object to these statements at trial. On 

appeal, Defendants maintain that the prosecutor engaged in “vouching for 

police testimony” and the misconduct entitles them to a new trial. Because 

Defendants did not raise this argument before the trial court, they have 
STATE v. OFFRET 

Decision of the Court 

10 

forfeited the right to appellate relief on this issue unless they can establish 

both that fundamental error exists and that it caused them prejudice in their 

case. See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶¶ 19-20 (2005). 

Fundamental error is “error going to the foundation of the case, error that 

that takes from the defendant a right essential to his defense, and error of 

such magnitude that the defendant could not possibly have received a fair 

trial.” Id. at ¶ 19 (citation omitted). Furthermore, defendants must 

affirmatively prove prejudice. State v. Lowery, 230 Ariz. 536, 540, ¶ 9 (App. 

2012). 

¶23 Impermissible vouching exists: (1) when the prosecutor 

places the prestige of the government behind its witnesses, and (2) when 

the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports 

the witness’s testimony. State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 62, ¶ 24 (1998) (citation 

omitted). The first type consists of personal assurances of a witness’s 

truthfulness; the second consists of remarks that bolster a witness’s 

credibility by references to matters outside the record. State v. Dunlap, 187 

Ariz. 441, 462 (App. 1996) (citation omitted). Defendants maintain that the 

prosecutor in this case committed both forms of impermissible vouching. 

They argue that the prosecutor placed the prestige of the government 

behind the officers when he stated, “The officers are telling the truth,” and 

that he alluded to matters outside the record to further bolster their 

credibility when he stated that “they would be fired” and face “civil and 

criminal” liability if they lied in their reports or testimony. 

¶24 “Wide latitude is given in closing arguments and counsel may 

comment on the evidence and argue all reasonable inferences therefrom.” 

State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 171 (1990) (citation omitted). When a 

prosecutor’s characterization of a witness as truthful is “sufficiently linked 

to the evidence,” it has not been deemed to be vouching, even if, out of 

context, it might be interpreted as such. State v. Corona, 188 Ariz. 85, 91 

(App. 1997). See also, State v. Lee, 185 Ariz. 549, 554 (1996) (“she’s been, I 

think, honest” and “I think he was an honest man” not improper vouching 

viewed in context of overall closing argument). 

¶25 The prosecutor’s statements here range from the unwise to 

the improper, but, given their context, none are ultimately so prejudicial or 

so improper that they constitute fundamental error requiring reversal. The 

prosecutor was not giving personal assurances of the officers’ veracity or 

suggesting that information outside the record supported their testimony. 

He was instead addressing defense counsel’s arguments suggesting 

improper motives and reasons for the officers’ rendition of events and 

asking the jurors to weigh those arguments against Offret’s rendition and 
STATE v. OFFRET 

Decision of the Court 

11 

the evidence at trial. The prosecutor prefaced his comments by reminding 

the jurors that it all came down to who they believed. Although the choice 

of wording may have been unfortunate and should more prudently be 

avoided in future, it is clear that the statements were nonetheless aimed at 

addressing the inconsistences in the testimony and not at suggesting that 

the prosecutor had any special knowledge of the truthfulness of the officers. 

As such, they were within the latitude afforded counsel in closing 

argument. Defendants therefore fail to establish any prosecutorial 

misconduct. 

¶26 Furthermore, even assuming error, Defendants have not 

shown actual prejudice. The trial court instructed the jury that counsel’s 

argument was not evidence and that the officers’ testimony was not to be 

granted any greater or lesser importance or believability “merely because 

of the fact that the witness [was] a law enforcement officer.” We presume 

that the jury followed the instructions, State v. Velazquez, 216 Ariz. 300, 312 

¶ 50 (2007), and Defendants have presented nothing that negates that 

presumption. On this record, we find no reversible error. 

III. Denial of Continuance 

¶27 During cross-examination, Pluta testified that the truck and 

the trailer were eventually recovered “at the same time” by Shamrock 

Towing and towed from a “secured federal building” in the area of I-17 and 

Greenway. After the State rested, defense counsel requested a continuance 

to allow the defense to secure the testimony of a Shamrock Towing 

representative as a rebuttal witness. According to defense counsel, 

Shamrock had no record of the truck being towed, only the trailer, and the 

witness was necessary to impeach Pluta. The testimony would “[g]o [to] 

the testimony about the report, the report writing and that being used to 

determine credibility as well as memory.” The trial court granted defense 

counsel’s request. 

¶28 The following morning, defense counsel reported that 

Shamrock Towing had gone out of business in December 2013 and that it 

would take “two to three weeks” to obtain certified copies of any “fullfledged records” about the vehicles towed. In the meanwhile, a defense 

investigator had obtained a “screen shot” of a towing record that showed 

that the truck was towed “from a different location than what [Pluta] had 

testified.” Because of the late disclosure and the fact that the information 

was not authenticated, the State refused to stipulate to admission of the 

screen shot and, despite repeated entreaties by the trial court, the parties 

could not agree to a stipulation that satisfied all sides. Defense counsel 
STATE v. OFFRET 

Decision of the Court 

12 

conceded, absent a stipulation, the screen shot was not admissible under 

the rules of evidence. Counsel asked for “leave of about three weeks in 

order to get these documents and bring in the person who is able to identify 

them as business records back from Texas.” 

¶29 The trial court precluded the admission of the screen shot, 

“not as a discovery violation,” but because it was not admissible under the 

rules of evidence as there was “no custodian of records . . . available today 

to . . . lay the foundation” for its admissibility. On appeal, defendants argue 

that the trial court’s failure to grant them the continuance or admit the 

screen shot denied them their right to confront witnesses. Defendants did 

not raise this argument before the trial court and have waived the right to 

relief on this issue unless they can prove that fundamental error exists. See 

State v. Hamilton, 177 Ariz. 403, 408 (App. 1993) (“A party must make a 

specific and timely objection at trial to the admission of certain evidence in 

order to preserve the issue for appeal.”) Furthermore, an objection to an 

admission of evidence on one ground does not preserve issues relating to 

its admission on other grounds. Id. Because waiver applies to untimely 

objections on constitutional grounds as well, see State v. Spreitz, 190 Ariz. 

129, 145 (1997), we therefore decline to consider Defendants’ constitutional 

claim. 

¶30 Insofar as Defendants claim that the trial court erred in not 

granting the continuance or admitting the screen shot are concerned, we 

find no reversible error. We will not overturn a trial court’s decision to 

admit or exclude evidence absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Murray, 

162 Ariz. 211, 214 (App. 1989). Granting a continuance is also left to the 

sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb the trial court’s 

ruling on the motion unless we find a clear abuse of discretion and that 

prejudice resulted. State v. Amarillas, 141 Ariz. 620, 622 (1984). 

¶31 First, as Defendants conceded at trial, the “screen shot” was 

not admissible under the Arizona Rules of Evidence as it was neither a 

certified nor self-authenticating document. See Ariz. R. Evid. 901, 902. 

Therefore, the trial court did abuse its discretion in finding that it was 

inadmissible on this basis. Nor did the court abuse its discretion in denying 

the motion to continue the trial proceedings for two to three weeks in order 

to permit defendants to secure certified copies of the towing documents or 

a witness who could testify to the towing record. A trial court should grant 

a continuance in the middle of a trial only under the most exigent of 

circumstances. State v. Blodgette, 121 Ariz. 392, 395 (1979). 
STATE v. OFFRET 

Decision of the Court 

13 

¶32 Defendants contend that the records were essential to 

impeaching Pluta’s reports and the officers’ testimony and memory of 

events. However, the trial court noted, “I don’t know that a tow record, 

you know, the day after really accomplishes a whole lot.” We agree. At 

best, any inaccuracy concerning whether the two vehicle were towed 

together or not was a collateral one and had little bearing in whether or not 

they were stolen. Furthermore, the record shows that Defendants were 

more than able to impeach Pluta and the other officers by pointing to 

statements or events that were testified to but not documented in Pluta’s 

reports and to inconsistencies in the officers’ testimony. Under these 

circumstances and finding no evidence of prejudice to Defendants, we find 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance and 

precluding the evidence. 

CONCLUSION 

¶33 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendants’ convictions 

and sentences.