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IRAN’S DESTABILIZING ROLE IN

THE MIDDLE EAST

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 16, 2014

Serial No. 113–189

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Ray Takeyh, senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies, Middle East Program, Council on Foreign Relations ................................................................... 6

Mr. Scott Modell, senior associate, Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies .......................................................................... 14

Natan B. Sachs, Ph.D., fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The 

Brookings Institution ........................................................................................... 22

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Ray Takeyh: Prepared statement .................................................................... 8

Mr. Scott Modell: Prepared statement ................................................................... 16

Natan B. Sachs, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ......................................................... 25

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 66

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 67

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 69

Written responses from Mr. Scott Modell to questions submitted for the 

record by the Honorable Alan S. Lowenthal, a Representative in Congress 

from the State of California ................................................................................ 71

(1)

IRAN’S DESTABILIZING ROLE IN

THE MIDDLE EAST 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce (chairman of 

the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. This morning we look at Iran’s considerable efforts to destabilize the Middle East. 

When it comes to Iran, attention has rightly been focused on efforts to stop its nuclear program. But as one witness will explain 

this morning, Iran’s nuclear program is just the tip of the revolutionary sphere that extends across the world and threatens key 

U.S. interests. Iran’s foreign policy, he goes on to say, is subversive, 

sectarian, and set on goals that would come at the expense of U.S. 

interests. 

He is right. Indeed, with Iran’s long support of terrorist groups 

and support of militias and adversarial regimes, the region has 

been feeling the brunt of this revolutionary sphere for quite some 

time. Thanks to Iran, Hamas has rearmed since 2012. Iran is the 

one that rearmed them, and nearly 80 percent of Israel’s citizens 

are fleeing to bomb shelters this week as a result. With Iran’s aid, 

Shi’a militias within Iran are rearming and they are mobilizing. 

The Assad regime, with the Iranian forces—with Quds Forces and 

with Hezbollah—continues to massacre Syrians. With Iran’s aid, 

Hezbollah is able to threaten Israel with over 25,000 rockets and 

I can say that I saw some of this first hand. During the second 

Lebanon war I was on the ground in Haifa as those rockets were 

coming in. This was before the invention of the Iron Dome. There 

were 600 victims in the Rambam Trauma Hospital and they were 

targeting civilian neighborhoods, and Houthi rebels supported by 

Iran are closing in on Yemen’s capital. That is quite a record for 

a regime now sitting across the table from us in Vienna where the 

administration has conceded that this number-one state sponsor of 

terrorism in the world can arguably enrich uranium. My concern 

is that they are conceiving that. I hope it is not conceiving it because that is the pathway to a nuclear weapon. 

Of course, these aren’t random efforts to support terrorism by the 

Iranian regime but concerted actions by this ayatollah-led—and he 

is the key decision maker—this Shi’a-led government to overturn 

what Iran believes is a regional power structure that favors the 

2

United States, that favors Israel and their collaborators and when 

they say collaborators, of course, what they mean is the Sunni 

Muslim governments in the Gulf. 

This is a recipe for disaster for the region. It is a recipe for U.S. 

interests there and today Iran’s work is on full display as hundreds 

of rockets rain down on southern Israel. It is Iran that provides, 

again, the funding, the weapons, the training to Hamas and other 

Palestinian terror groups. Iranian leaders have admitted to providing the missile technology that Hamas used against Israel during the last Gaza conflict in November 2012, and just the other 

week a U.N. panel of experts concluded that rockets and weapons 

concealed on the Klos C including long-range M–302 rockets originated from Iran. Other shipments have gotten through as Hamas 

have fired the recently acquired rockets for the first time and, of 

course, those bring all of Israel within—or nearly all within range, 

certainly, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. These weapons put 8 million 

people into Gaza’s range of fire. One of them struck Hadera, a 

coastal city between Tel Aviv and Haifa, 73 miles north of Gaza. 

In recent years, Iran has come under increasing strain from 

international sanctions aimed at stopping its nuclear program. This 

is what, frankly, got Iran to the table. When we talk about why 

they are at the negotiation table it is because of the sanctions 

passed here and adopted. But even with its economy damaged, Iran 

has managed to provide robust support to extremist proxies as part 

of its broader geopolitical agenda across the region. As one Ambassador from the region shared with me what do we think is going 

to happen if they come out from under those sanctions with respect 

to the capital that they will then have at their disposal for destabilization. Now the United States and other world powers are negotiating a final nuclear agreement with Iran that would lift most of 

the sanctions. Bad deal or good deal, and many of us fear a bad 

deal, any sanctions relief will bolster Iran. 

As one witness notes, Iran stands to gain $100 billion in frozen 

bank accounts and billions as oil exports resume. That is a lot of 

M–302 rockets. How well an Iran unchained by international sanctions treat its neighbors—I hope how it treats its own citizens 

aren’t an indication of how it is going to treat its neighbors. How 

are the United States and her allies positioned to counter Iran’s destabilizing activities in the Middle East? I am afraid we are going 

to hear from one of our witnesses today not well. 

And I will now turn to the ranking member for any opening comments that Mr. Engel of New York has. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

for calling this timely hearing about Iran’s destabilizing role in the 

Middle East. 

As Iran continues waging its charm offensive with the international community, negotiating with the P5+1 over its nuclear 

weapons program, we cannot forget a basic fact: Iran remains the 

most active state sponsor of terrorism in the world and Iran is a 

key driver of regional instability. 

From Syria and Iraq to Yemen and the Palestinian territories, 

understanding Iran’s nefarious behavior is essential to protecting 

the interest of the United States and our allies. 

3

Even as Iran’s economy continues to falter under the weight of 

international sanctions, leaders in Tehran are plowing their scarce 

resources into elements of Iran’s security apparatus that supports 

terrorism, particularly the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and 

its Quds Force. 

Iran also provides funding, weapons and other support to a wide 

range of terrorist groups including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic jihad. All of these groups have been designated as 

foreign terrorist organizations by the United States and we will 

continue to treat them as such no matter what happens in the nuclear negotiations. 

I want to emphasize a point that you made in your opening 

statement, Mr. Chairman, with which I certainly agree and you 

and I have talked about this a great deal. It was sanctions that 

brought Iran to the negotiating table. 

It was sanctions that made Iran think twice about moving forward and I don’t think we should remove those sanctions for any 

situation that is not preventive of Iran being able to have a nuclear 

weapon. 

I don’t think we should willy nilly loosen sanctions on Iran. I 

think we should keep the sanctions until we see that they are dismantling their nuclear program. 

Last week, Chairman Royce and I sent a bipartisan letter to 

President Obama signed by more than 340 House colleagues. That 

is more than three-quarters of the members of the House of Representatives. We asked the President to consult with Congress on 

the scope of any potential sanctions relief. 

The letter noted that U.S. sanctions on Iran are based not only 

on its nuclear weapons program but also on Iran’s ballistic missile 

program, its support for terrorism, its human rights abuses and its 

development of chemical and biological weapons. 

Even if a comprehensive nuclear deal is reached, and it enjoys 

broad support on Capitol Hill, it is safe to say that Congress would 

not lift all sanctions on Iran unless it ceases to be a bad actor in 

the region and dramatically improve its behavior in all of these 

areas. 

With hundreds of Hamas rockets raining down on Israel, we see 

the real impact of Iran’s support for terrorism. In March, the 

Israeli navy intercepted the Klos C, a ship carrying Iranian rockets 

to the Gaza Strip including dozens of Syrian-produced long-range 

M–302 rockets which are capable of reaching high-density Israeli 

population centers such as Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and Haifa. 

By deliberately targeting civilian areas with these deadly weapons, Hamas is committing war crimes aided and abetted by Iran. 

I have to laugh at the crocodile tears coming out of Hamas terrorists in Gaza talking about the civilian population. 

I think yesterday was an eye opener for many people when the 

Egyptian-brokered cease fire was accepted by Israel but rejected by 

Hamas. It is clear to see who wants peace and who refuses to want 

peace. 

And Hamas would not and could not be so bold without all the 

support it has received from Iran. Iran, again, is the number-one 

supporter of terrorism around the world and Hamas is a terrorist 

organization. 

4

So in almost every conflict in the region we see Iranian fingerprints as Tehran seeks to spread its influence and manipulate its 

neighbors. 

Iran’s support for Assad in Syria and for Hezbollah’s intervention 

in the Syrian civil war has given the regime a new lease on life 

and resulted in the deaths of thousands of innocent Syrian civilians. 

Assad would not be winning, potentially, in Syria if it wasn’t for 

Hezbollah, a terrorist organization supported, funded, maintained, 

and controlled by Iran. Iran’s support for Hezbollah has also destabilized Lebanon and allowed the terrorist group to amass tens of 

thousands of rockets on Israel’s northern border. 

Iran’s involvement with the Maliki government and with radical 

Shi’a militias in Iraq have undermined efforts to establish a more 

inclusive government in Baghdad. 

So I don’t think the U.S. should be cooperating with Iran on the 

situation in Iraq and I was pleased to hear Secretary Hagel’s remarks last week confirming that we are not doing so. 

So Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, let me say at this time of great 

instability in the Middle East we need to remain clear-eyed about 

the capabilities and intentions of our adversaries, especially Iran. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony of our distinguished 

panel of witnesses and thank you again for holding this important 

and timely hearing. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Engel. We now go to Ms. 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chair of the Middle East Subcommittee. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. While 

the administration takes unilateral steps to offer concessions to 

Iran as it pursues a weak nuclear agreement, it continues to disregard our calls for congressional oversight and our warnings on 

dealing with Iran while ignoring its destabilizing efforts. 

The regime in Tehran continues to actively and openly work 

against U.S. national security interests across the globe in Iraq and 

Syria. It arms and finances terrorist groups like Hezbollah and 

Hamas. 

Ted Deutch and I just came back from a trip to the region and 

many leaders expressed to us that pushing back Iran’s breakout capability is not as important as dismantling Iran’s nuclear infrastructure would be. 

Iran doesn’t need the bomb to be dangerous. Just having the capability to get the bomb is enough to spark a nuclear arms race in 

the region. 

Instead of offering concessions to the regime, the administration 

should be pressing Iran to dismantle completely its nuclear program; abandon its support for Assad and its terrorist proxies; and 

cease its provocations against the U.S. and our ally, the democratic 

Jewish state of Israel, or else we will impose even stricter sanctions 

that will bring Iran’s economy to its knees. It is the sanctions, stupid. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, and we appreciate you and Mr. 

Ted Deutch’s recent trip to the Middle East. Mr. Deutch is the 

ranking member of the Middle East Subcommittee. We will go to 

Ted Deutch for 1 minute. 

5

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking 

Member Engel, for holding today’s hearing and for your continued 

leadership and attention to Iran not just on the nuclear issue but 

to the whole of Iran’s habitual bad behavior. 

We are just days away from seeing whether Iran is truly committed to finding a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis. But 

even if there is a diplomatic resolution to Iran’s ongoing quest for 

a nuclear weapon, it would not change the fact that Iran would still 

be the largest sponsor of terrorism in the world, it would still be 

assisting the Assad regime in Syria, and it would still be repressing the basic human rights of its citizens. 

I would caution those who think that if a nuclear deal is reached 

that the world will simply ignore Iran’s other violations of international norms including its meddling in regional affairs and attempts to incite instability in other countries. 

In the more likely scenario that a nuclear deal with Iran is not 

reached or if the duration of the deal is not long enough, an Iranian regime that still possesses the capability of developing a nuclear weapon would surely set off a nuclear arms race in the region. 

Mr. Chairman, we will know a lot more about Iran’s intentions 

in the coming days. We must also be making our intentions clear—

deal or no deal. The U.S. will not turn a blind eye to Iran’s attempts to exploit a volatile Middle East. 

I appreciate it and I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. Mr. Brad Sherman of 

California is the ranking member on the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Iran is the number-one state sponsor of terror. 

Hezbollah, Assad—a reach that included the Buenos Aires Jewish 

Community Center, a point on the globe as far from Tehran as one 

can get. 

Now imagine an Iran with the impunity of being a nuclear weapons state. But we should realize that we have limited bargaining 

power. We do not have Iran’s economy completely on the ropes. 

We did not adopt sanctions that were effective 10 or 15 years 

ago. We did it 10 or 15 months ago. We brought them to the table 

but we have not brought them to their knees unless we can imagine Iran with no centrifuges, no terrorism, and no theocracy. 

But I don’t know whether we have rallied public opinion to the 

point where we are willing to, for just an example, ban Chinese imports to the United States as long as Japan maintains—or China 

or any other country maintains an economic relationship with Iran. 

That is the level of sanctions that I think goes beyond what we can 

adopt here in Washington. 

We are wise to have this hearing to illustrate to Americans and 

Europeans why it is so important that all options remain on the 

table. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This morning we are pleased to be joined by a distinguished 

group of experts on this subject. Dr. Ray Takeyh is senior fellow 

for Middle East studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. 

6

Mr. Takeyh was previously a senior advisor on Iran at the Department of State. He was professor at the National Defense University. 

We also have Scott Modell, a senior associate at the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies. He serves as a senior advisor 

to U.S. Special Operations Command on counter threat finance 

issues. He was previously a senior officer in the National Clandestine Service at the Central Intelligence Agency. 

And Dr. Natan Sachs—Natan, as he is known, is currently a fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center for Middle East Policy. 

Previously, Dr. Sachs was a fellow at Stanford Center on Democracy Development and Rule of Law and a Fulbright Fellow in Indonesia. 

So without objection, these witnesses’ full prepared statements 

will be part of the record. We are going to encourage them to summarize and then we will go to questions. Members will have 5 calendar days to submit statements and questions and anything extraneous for the record. 

Dr. Takeyh, if you would like to begin. 

STATEMENT OF MR. RAY TAKEYH, SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, COUNCIL 

ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. TAKEYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a privilege for me 

to be here again as well as with my colleagues Scott and Natan. 

I will just briefly discuss some aspects of my testimony. I think 

the high drama of arms control negotiations and diplomacy in Vienna today dominates our impressions of Iran and defines those. 

In the next couple of weeks the diplomats will debate how much 

centrifuges are to be traded for how much sanctions relief. There 

is already talk that negotiations may be extended past July 20th, 

given the significant gaps that remain between the two powers. 

The nature of the inspection regime and enforcement mechanism 

will also be discussed. Whether a durable agreement can be negotiated with an unreliable partner, as you suggested, such as the Islamic Republic, will be put to a test. 

Hovering over all these technical issues is the challenge of addressing Iranian revisionism in the era of nuclear diplomacy. 

Tehran, as was mentioned, is busy advancing its claims in a contested Middle East, and Washington would be wise to check the 

surge of Iranian power and negate its regional designs. 

The key actors defining Iran’s regional policy are not urbane diplomats mingling with their counterparts in Europe but the Revolutionary Guards, particularly the famed Quds Brigade. For the commander of the Quds Brigade, General Qassem Suleimani, the 

struggle to evict America from the Middle East began in Iraq and 

now has moved to Syria. 

Syria is the front line of that particular resistance. For the 

hardliners in Iran, the Sunni state’s attempt to dislodge Bashar 

Assad from power is really a means of weakening Iran. 

The survival and success of the Assad dynasty today is a central 

element of Iran’s foreign policy. Next door, Iran’s model of operation in Iraq actually draws from its experiences in Lebanon in the 

early 1980s when Iran essentially amalgamated various Shi’i parVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:02 Sep 25, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\071614\88732 SHIRL
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ties into a lethal Hezbollah organization and Hezbollah has remained the instrument of Iran’s foreign policy since then. 

Since the removal of Saddam, Iran has similarly been busy 

strengthening Shi’i forces in Iraq by subsidizing their political activities and arming their militias. Iran hopes that Shi’ites will continue to exploit their demographic majority to solidify their political 

gains. 

But should the political process fail, they must be sufficiently 

armed to win the civil war. The purpose of Iran military dispatches 

to Iraq initially were to evict the United States and now it is to 

maintain the viability of Shi’a forces. 

A certain misapprehension, I think, was born in Kabul and has 

migrated to Baghdad, mainly that we need Iranian assistance to 

stabilize our war-torn charges. The ISIS surge in Iraq is once more 

portrayed as an opportunity for the two powers—United States and 

Iran—to collaborate. 

The stark reality remains that United States launched Iraq with 

much sacrifice on this path of precarious stability despite Iran’s 

harmful interventions and to do so again will require American initiative rather than Iranian benevolence. 

Iran’s fundamental interest in Iraq tends to diverge from those 

of the United States. We ostensibly seek an inclusive Iraq with 

greater participation of Sunni forces in the Shi’i government. 

Iran desires a Shi’i hegemony with the veneer of Sunni participation. Iran essentially desires an Iraq that is estranged from the 

Arab Councils and at odds with the United States. 

Today, as you mentioned, the region is feared and gripped with 

fear that arms control policy will lead to a larger detente between 

the United States and Iran. This concern has some justification in 

history during the heydays of arms limitation talks between the 

United States and the Soviet Union. 

Nuclear accords were often followed by commerce and diplomatic 

recognition. Washington has often been seduced by the notion that 

nuclear agreement can pave the way for other areas of cooperation. 

The challenge that the United States faces today is to defy its 

own history. America must find a way to impose limits on Iran’s 

nuclear ambitions through negotiations while restraining its regional ambitions through pressure. 

This will require rehabilitation of America’s battered alliances in 

the Middle East. Strategic dialogues and military sales are not 

going to be sufficient. Washington can reclaim its allies’ confidence 

but it cannot do so without being an active participant in Syria and 

Iraqi sagas. 

Further attempt to exempt ourself from this conflict will mean 

that our pleasures will ring hollow to a sceptical Arab audience. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Takeyh follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Doctor. 

STATEMENT OF MR. SCOTT MODELL, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, 

BURKE CHAIR IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND 

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. MODELL. Chairman Royce, members of the committee, thank 

you very much for the opportunity to come here today. You have 

read my testimony. I think everybody is sort of in agreement with 

what I have summarized in my testimony. 

There are a few points I wanted to extract from it, expand a bit 

on it and one was the idea that I think has been encapsulated in 

some of the initial comments was basically that Iran, beyond the 

nuclear program, approaches its revolutionary agenda in a whole 

of government approach. 

There is a lot of talk here in the United States about how we do 

things around the world, you know, sort of incorporating a whole 

of government approach currently working in the Pentagon and a 

lot of our time is spent trying to figure out how do we bring together State Department and a variety of agencies to accomplish 

certain foreign policy objectives overseas and it is not easy. 

But if you look at what Iran does from bottom up in terms of trying to project their power and trying to accomplish their agenda 

throughout the Middle East they really do take a whole of government approach, certainly more so than the Arab States that I have 

seen. 

The nuclear deal, I think, one of the things that I am continuously seeing and hearing that really surprises me is the fact that 

people are going to—that they are considering giving a pass on the 

possible military dimensions of the program. I hope that is inaccurate. We have been watching this for over a decade and it is almost astonishing that that could be ignored. 

So in the run-up to a deal and discussions between the administration and Congress on the implementation of a long-term deal I 

really hope that that is addressed. 

I also agree with the chairman that I think the revolutionary 

agenda is going to go on. Years ago I recall in 2011 and 2012 members of the Basij who were posted, you know, into Syria and Iraq 

and elsewhere there were several public interviews and they were 

asking them what they thought about Iran’s agenda in the region. 

And this was—these were public interviews and they were—and 

they said well, we have—our agenda is to create a million-man 

force across the entire region. 

They recently said that again—they are interested in making a 

200,000-man force that is going to spread from Iran all the way to 

Lebanon. I think there is a lot of obstacles in the way of doing that 

but the core objective remains true and you can see they are pushing on that objective constantly. 

The other thing I would say is, just because Iran is involved in 

P5+1 talks and has been for some time, I think there is a quick 

rush to assume that the proliferation activities have stopped. I 

think in the run-up to an agreement or in the aftermath of an 

agreement people are going to start wondering what is this inspection and verification regime going to look like. 

15

And I would posit to you the most—one of the most important 

aspects of it has to be how do we devise a new containment strategy with our allies in the region, not only with the IAEA inside 

looking at facilities to ensure they are not cheating and abiding by 

the terms of the agreement but it is the external part that they 

have built up and done such a good job over the last decade that 

contributes to proliferation and has allowed them to move their 

program so far forward. 

When we start to think about how we are going to work together 

with the GCC more effectively in the future and develop a new containment strategy we have to have that in mind and I have recommended a number of ways in which we should start thinking 

about how the U.S. Government should be using resources overseas 

to that end in my paper. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Modell follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

Dr. Sachs. 

STATEMENT OF NATAN B. SACHS, PH.D., FELLOW, SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 

Mr. SACHS. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce, Ranking 

Member Engel, distinguished members and staff for the opportunity and honor of speaking here today, especially alongside Ray 

and Scott. 

I will speak briefly about Israeli views of this issue. While there 

is considerable good will in Israel toward the Iranian people, the 

Islamic Republic’s regime is viewed very differently, and with good 

reason. Indeed, virtually no one in Israel, including those who 

strive in earnest for peace with their Arab neighbors, expects good 

relations with the Islamic Republic as currently constituted. Nonetheless, important, though limited, variation exists among Israeli 

policy makers on the regional challenges posed by the Iranian regime. 

In my testimony I will touch briefly on the spectrum of Israeli 

views on two such regional challenges—Iran’s nuclear program and 

its involvement in terrorism and conflicts abroad. 

In my written testimony I elaborate further on these issues and 

discuss the related question of an alliance of interest between 

Israel and Saudi Arabia and Iran’s nuclear program. 

It is important to note first that far more unites Israelis on the 

Iranian nuclear issue than divides them. Diversity of opinion exists 

but the spectrum of opinions is narrow and much more limited 

than on other issues, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Virtually no one in Israel’s national security elite, nor for that matter 

in the U.S., doubts Iran’s intention to reach threshold nuclear capabilities. 

Israeli experts and, indeed, the government do not contend that 

Iran has already decided to build a nuclear weapon but they do not 

doubt that Iran intends to have the capability to do so. 

Further, almost all in Israel view the possibility of a nuclear 

threshold Iran as a very negative development, for a variety of reasons. Most mainstream thinkers support the need to project a credible threat to stop Iran’s nuclear program if all else fails, even by 

means of conventional force. 

And yet, there remain meaningful differences among mainstream 

Israeli thinkers. First, not all view the Iranian nuclear threat with 

equal severity or use the term ‘‘existential threat’’ to describe it. 

Some even argue that even if all failed, Israel will be strong 

enough to deter a nuclear Iran. Most people abroad believe Israel 

has a second strike capability—notably, Iran believes this. 

Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons might then entail a grim 

but perhaps stable cold war logic of mutually assured destruction. 

This debate rests, of course, on a related debate about Iran’s rationality, which I will be happy to discuss if asked to. 

Second, there is an important variation among senior Israeli 

thinkers on what might constitute an acceptable deal with Iran. 

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nium enrichment coupled with stringent inspection might leave 

enough time to react to an Iranian breach of an agreement. 

Third and perhaps most dramatically, there are different views 

in Israel on the wisdom of a unilateral strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The Israeli cabinet and security forces have been strongly 

divided on the issue and former security officials have warned publicly against a unilateral strike. 

Polling suggests that the Israeli public too is divided on the issue 

and is skeptical of a unilateral strike without U.S. support, and I 

stress that point. Note that there is considerable difference and 

tension between the need to project readiness to strike if all else 

fails, something which nearly all Israelis support, and actual support for a strike, on which opinion diverges. 

While the credible threat of a strike could help the diplomatic 

track, its credibility can be undermined when these differences 

emerge publicly, as they have. 

In sum, on the threat of Iran’s nuclear program, far more unites 

Israelis than divides them but some differences exist on the extreme severity of a threat, the nuances of remedies, and on the wisdom of unilateral strike. 

By comparison, there is very little debate in Israel on Iran’s involvement in conflicts and in terrorism in the region and abroad. 

In the past, there was some debate over the degree of Iran’s control 

over Hezbollah, its most significant subsidiary abroad. 

Some argue that Hezbollah should be viewed more as a Lebanese 

party than an Iranian proxy. The civil war in Syria has largely 

ended that debate in Israel. At Tehran’s behest, Hezbollah has sacrificed greatly in casualties and in sinking popularity among Arab 

and Lebanese publics, and yet it has done so. 

Beyond the immediate region, Hezbollah, along with the Iranian 

Revolutionary Guard, also carried the threat of global terrorism 

against Israeli and even non-Israeli targets, most famously, the 

bombing of the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires—

AMIA—20 years ago this very week. 

A special concern to Israel—at this very moment—is also Iran’s 

involvement with militant Palestinian groups, most notably the 

Palestinian Islamic Jihad, or PIJ—a close Iranian subsidiary and 

a very violent terrorist group. 

Hamas’ relationship with Iran is more complex. Unlike PIJ, 

Hamas is a large political party as well as a terrorist organization. 

Hamas is also an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and its relation with Shi’a Iran and with Assad’s regime in Syria, once robust, 

have soured. 

Nonetheless, Iran and Syria have been suppliers of weapons for 

militants in the Gaza Strip including Hamas. Syria-produced M–

302 rockets, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, for example, have 

been used against Israeli civilians in the past week. 

Let me conclude by noting a key concern of all Israeli policy makers of the full spectrum I described. Israelis fear that, should a deal 

with Iran be reached, whether before July 20th or after an extension, there will be some in the international community who will 

view the issue as closed—the nuclear issue and other issues. 

24

In reality, the success of any deal will depend completely on the 

monitoring and verification embedded in it. Israelis are therefore 

likely to continue to focus on this issue. 

U.S. interests, which are aligned with, though not identical to 

those of Israel, would be well served if the United States too maintained a vigilant, pragmatic but realistic watch over Iran’s policies 

in the future. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sachs follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. We appreciate your testimony. Thank you, Mr. 

Sachs. 

We go now to a question that I have for Mr. Modell and this goes 

to your testimony that by most accounts you say Iran stands to 

gain access to nearly $100 billion in frozen banks as well as billions 

more as oil export restrictions are lifted as part of any agreement, 

whether that agreement is good or bad. That is the consequence. 

Could you translate that impact of this relief—what that would 

mean? What operational capabilities do you estimate the Iranians 

could develop or acquire as a result of the release of this funding? 

Mr. MODELL. Mr. Chairman, sure. One of the reasons why the 

tempo of Iran’s operational activity over the last year or so since 

sanctions kicked in in earnest has been exactly that. They haven’t 

had the funding to fund all of their units. 

They haven’t had the funding to do certain things, just as if—

the same way with the U.S. Government or any government, for 

that matter. 

In times of financial crisis there are certain things you got to cut 

back and certain things you can’t. In the case of Iran with a surplus—with an influx of $100 billion plus bringing back oil online, 

the IRGC ghost force becomes much more active. 

Funding that goes to proxies in the region goes back up to presanctions levels and you start to see more activity in places like 

Yemen. You start to see more activity in places further outside 

their normal operating areas in the Middle East. 

They have had to cut back activities in Latin America and Africa 

and other places because of the sanctions. Those activities will pick 

up, particularly on the covert side, in my opinion. 

Chairman ROYCE. So the added advantage that what they might 

perceive as a windfall what would that give the regime specifically 

in the region? 

If you were just to look at the Middle East, sort of the low-level 

insurrection that they support in Saudi Arabia and some of these 

other—among the Shi’a population there and some of the other developments; could you maybe specify what that would mean? 

Mr. MODELL. One of the things that I would say is what they 

have been trying to do for a long time now and they did this, and 

Dr. Takeyh had mentioned this, in the 80s they had a number of 

Hezbollah movements outside of Lebanon. They tried to replicate 

the example of Lebanese Hezbollah in Bahrain and Hezbollah 

Hejab in Saudi Arabia and so forth. 

They have been trying to do that again and they are going to 

continue to do that—Kuwait and Bahrain and Saudi. So with extra 

money it is exactly what they would try to do. They are focused on 

eastern Saudi Arabia. They are focused on Kuwait. They are focused again—I mean, they have stated very unequivocally that 

their goal in Bahrain is to empower Shi’ites and to overthrow the 

monarchy there. So those goals become much more attainable with 

money and with extra units that are focusing on those. 

Chairman ROYCE. What surprises me is the sheer amount of 

weaponry. You know, as I mentioned, when I was in Haifa, I mean, 

at that point in time it was tens of thousands of rockets that they 

had at their disposal and now it is maybe five fold that. 

35

So that is over a decade now. Let us just look at Hamas. It is 

giving its funding, its weapons, its training from Iran. We go to 

March 2011. Israel intercepted the Victoria—intercepted that ship 

off its coast. 

There were C–704 cruise missiles—as well as a lot of mortars, 

but cruise missiles capable of targeting Israeli shipping and ports—

that Israel said were bound for Hamas in Gaza. 

Then you have got on March 5th they intercepted a ship in the 

Red Sea that Israel said was carrying Iranian advanced weaponry 

bound for militants in Gaza, possibly via Sudan. You see these M–

302 long-range rockets now are what they are putting their money 

into. 

Why in the middle of these negotiations would they run the risk 

of ramping up with resupply of even longer-range rockets? And this 

is another question I have. 

I listened to this speech that the Ayatollah gave recently in 

which he said it was the duty, as I recall—the duty of every military man to mass produce ICBMs. Why would he, in the middle of 

negotiations, go out and transmit that kind of message through his 

armed services? 

Mr. MODELL. The fundamental difference between the revolutionary agenda he has and the way that we would like them to 

come into the mainstream international community. It is as simple 

as that. 

He separates the nuclear negotiations. Like you said, the only 

reason he has come forth for the nuclear negotiations is out of dire 

economic necessity. That has nothing to do with his revolutionary 

agenda, which they are continuing to push day in day out. 

And that is what they—and that is the message, quite frankly, 

that he plays to his domestic audience and he wanted us to know 

as well. They are looking for—he said it and Foreign Minister Zarif 

has repeatedly said, we are not looking for rapprochement with the 

West. 

We hope that these will lead to common ground and nothing 

more than that. We are going to continue to push forth in our support to militants in Gaza. We are going to continue to push forth 

all of our objectives in the region, which I have stated over and 

over in this paper and you guys have said as well. 

And when you look at the bases of operation that they have that 

are expanding in places like Sudan and Ethiopia and others, all of 

that doesn’t with a nuclear agreement. 

Chairman ROYCE. I am out of time. We will go to Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start with you, 

Dr. Sachs. How is Israel likely to view a comprehensive Iranian nuclear deal? 

Will they see it as one that empowers Iran and allows Iran a 

freer hand on destabilizing activities in the region? 

Mr. SACHS. Thank you, Mr. Engel. 

The question is in part who in Israel. The government and almost everyone would view it with great suspicion. There is very little trust in Iran, in the intentions of the Islamic Republic. 

There is some hope among some that a deal, if it were stringent 

enough, might help delay somewhat the advancement of the nuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:02 Sep 25, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\071614\88732 SHIRL
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clear program, and so in that sense there may be some minor relief. 

But Israel, as I mentioned, will be very concerned that any deal 

will bring about rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran would 

bring about a relief of all the sanctions and would most importantly make others in the international community go to sleep on 

this issue. 

Israel would very much like everyone—itself, the United States 

and everyone else—to remember that this problem will remain. I 

imagine that the reaction in Israel probably will have to a deal 

along the lines that we have been hearing will be negative. 

But the question is on the nuance of a negative. Israel may view 

it as a terrible deal that it cannot live with. If the terms are strict 

enough, it may view it as a step that perhaps will halt something 

that it views as very bad, maybe one that it can live with in the 

meantime. 

Mr. ENGEL. In your testimony, you alluded to Israel commonality 

with some of the Sunni Arab states such as—you didn’t say it but 

such as Saudi Arabia or United Arab Emirates on Iran—similar 

outlooks. 

Could you talk a little bit about that? 

Mr. SACHS. Certainly. There is, as others have noted, there is a 

very common concern with Iran. I do think, though, the reasons are 

quite different. The Arab neighbors of Iran have longstanding challenges with the Islamic Republic and even with Iran itself. 

There is geopolitical issues and there is, of course, the SunniShi’a divide that has really engulfed the Middle East at the moment. All these things are things that Israel is not concerned 

about. 

Israel is first and foremost concerned about the two main issues 

we’ve been talking about today—the nuclear program and Iran’s 

very active destabilizing activity in the rest of the region. And so 

there is room for cooperation which is very important, is room on 

the nuclear issue, is room on closing Iran’s opportunity for activity 

abroad. But it stems from a different cause. I will add one more 

thing, which is that the public aspect of this alliance is very difficult. 

The ‘‘Arab street,’’ or public opinion, is very sensitive to the Palestinian issue and especially these days and this makes it harder 

for Israel and Saudi Arabia to publicly engage, although there have 

been—even despite that there have been public instances of meetings, for example, of former chiefs of intelligence between the two 

countries. 

In other words, there is hope on this, although there, I think, are 

some limitations. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Let me talk a little bit about Iranian 

support for Hamas and perhaps, Dr. Takeyh, I can start with you. 

There have been some differences between Hamas and Iran since 

they take different sides in Syria. 

Iran supports Assad while Hamas opposes him. How do you see 

this playing out? People have said that Hamas is more internationally isolated now than it has been in the past—isolated from Egypt, 

isolated perhaps from Syria. Is there a chance that this might reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:02 Sep 25, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\071614\88732 SHIRL
37

duce Iran—that it would cause Iran to reduce its material and 

moral support for Hamas? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think historically the Palestinian rejectionist 

group that has had more in common with Iran has been the Palestinian Jihad. However, Iran has always had an instrumentalized 

approach to Hamas, namely, whenever Hamas has an agenda that 

is common with Iran, which is essentially intrusion against Israel, 

then they come together. 

The notion of supporting Palestinian rejectionist groups writ 

large has been the central aspect of Iran policy so I don’t necessarily think that there is going to be any adjustment in that, particularly at a time when this has some degree of street popularity. 

Mr. ENGEL. Is it surprising to you—I know Iran has been supporting and supplying Hamas for many years but in doing so it is—

Iran by doing so is crossing the Shi’a-Sunni divide in order to help 

the Palestinians. Is that something that we should be alarmed 

about? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Iran has always suggested that its policy in the region is not a sectarian one—that it will essentially make common 

cause with Sunnis that share its agenda. It is the Sunni street that 

likes to portray Iran mostly as a Shi’ite state but essentially Iran 

has always tried to have a pan-Islamic approach and to essentially 

unite Shi’ites and Sunnis that share the same common objectives. 

Now, that has become very difficult as the region has become 

subject to such sectarian division and Iran at this particular point 

is more closely aligned with Shi’a state but is always open to dealing with radical Sunni groups that share its perspective. 

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Modell, do you have a comment on that? 

Mr. MODELL. The only thing I would say is when you look at 

the—when you look at the trajectory of transnational organized 

crime and Iran’s collaboration with, like, a group like Lebanese 

Hezbollah, for instance, there are a considerable amount of Sunnis 

and Shi’a that are involved in those activities, you know, I don’t 

think Iran has any problem crossing, for political convenience, 

any——

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey. Oh, he is 

going to defer to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. He is a gentleman. Thank you so much, Mr. 

Chairman, as you are. 

Iran agreeing to the weak and easy to live up to interim agreement is just another ploy by the regime to win concessions and buy 

more time, and now that the deadline is quickly approaching an extension must not be given. 

Instead, we need to start reexamining our sanctions program 

against Iran and ways to counter its illicit and destabilizing activities. We have no reason to trust this regime but we have decades 

of proof that shows Iran’s true colors. 

One of the very first acts of terror of this current regime in Iran 

was responsible for, after the ’79 Islamic revolution, the seizure of 

the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Led by a group of students but spiritual followers of Khomeini, these terrorists held 52 American diplomats and citizens hostage for nearly 450 days. 

38

Iran has been a United States-designated state sponsor of terrorism since ’84. It has been repeatedly redesignated by the State 

Department as a country of particular concern for its continued 

and flagrant abuse of religious minorities and the regime has been 

highlighted year after year by our State Department’s country reports on human rights practices for its abysmal human rights 

record. 

Then, of course, we turn to the nuclear issue. Iran was discovered to have been operating a covert nuclear program for decades 

in an attempt to create a nuclear weapon, a program that we did 

not find for years. 

So what confidence do we have that Iran—that we will be able 

to catch Iran cheating again? That is a question. Now, there are 

six U.N. Security Council resolutions against Iran’s nuclear programs, resolutions that demand that Iran not be allowed to enrich 

any uranium at all, and yet Iran continues to be in violation of 

those resolutions. 

It continues to make progress on its nuclear and ballistic missile 

programs. Yet, from the very beginning administration after administration have failed to hold the Iranian regime accountable for 

all of these aggressions—for all of these aggressive acts. 

The hostages of the ’79 crisis have yet to receive their justice. 

Our policy must be to seek justice for our citizens who have been 

victims of terrorism, hold the terrorists such as Iran accountable, 

and appropriately compensate the victims. 

The administration, this one as have many others before it with 

other rogue regimes, believes that a nuclear agreement can open 

up avenues for further cooperation. 

But we saw this with North Korea and others that this is never 

the case. What is the danger in dealing with Iran as if its nuclear 

program exists in a vacuum? This is somehow that it is somehow 

not related to all of Iran’s other illicit and problematic areas. 

In the administration’s continued negotiations with Iran, we 

have managed to alienate and even anger some of our traditional 

partners and allies in the region and our credibility just keeps 

going lower. 

At what cost will this nuclear deal impact our foreign policy and 

objectives in the Middle East in its totality, whether an agreement 

is reached or not? 

And what would be the benefit of alienating all of these countries 

like Saudi Arabia, like the UAE and even Israel, who has a very 

real and existential concern over Iran’s nuclear program, in favor 

of an Iranian nuclear agreement that many believe will not go far 

enough? 

What would be the benefit of alienating all of our allies? Thank 

you, Doc. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Thanks. I will begin this. I think there has always 

been something unusual and peculiar about an arms control approach because it essentially assumes that you can segregate your 

arms control technical disputes with all the other range of disputes. 

So in order to have an arms control approach you have to continuously use the phrase yes, but. Yes, the Supreme Leader is an 

anti-Semite who denies the Holocaust but nevertheless he can be 

a suitable custodian of sensitive nuclear technology. 

39

Yes, Iran is a revisionist state that tends to disrespect international norms but it can nevertheless be a suitable adherent to 

various protocols in terms of—in terms of proliferation. 

So you have to continuously use the phrase yes, but it doesn’t 

matter, and thus has always been very unusual around arms control pressure. The joint plan of action that you mentioned has one 

particularly problematic provision to it, namely, that it suggests 

the final agreement that is negotiated will have a sunset clause. 

It will have an expiration date. Ali Khamenei recently mentioned 

that he wants to build up to 190,000 centrifuges after an expiration 

of the sunset clause, which Iranians wanted to be 5 to 7 years. He 

can build 190,000 centrifuges with impunity. 

He can build a heavy water reactor with impunity. He can build 

1.5 million centrifuges with impunity and he can upgrade those to 

a level of high advancement and high velocity centrifuges. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. TAKEYH. In essence, Iran can become a nuclear weapon state 

with alacrity. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, but—thank you very much. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go now to Mr. Gerry Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

having this hearing. Thank you to our witnesses. 

Picking up on your last statement there, Dr. Takeyh, would it be 

better if the United States simply disengaged and announced we 

are no longer talking to Iran about its nuclear development program? 

Mr. TAKEYH. No, I don’t think that is true at all. I think this 

process of negotiations has been helpful. I think an alternative to 

the deficient arms control agreement——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Could I interrupt you? 

Mr. TAKEYH [continuing]. Is a better arms control agreement. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. Of course, and in a perfect world it is even 

better. But given the fact that our two nations haven’t really even 

talked to each other for a long time, you know, trying to break the 

ice so that we kind of get a little bit comfortable with each other’s 

styles and where we are coming from would kind of make sense in 

a negotiating posture, would it not? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I don’t have any objections to the process. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Do you think that the Phase 1 Interim Agreement suitably meets that need? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think the joint plan of action has some constructive dimensions to it and I think it has some aspects to it which 

were unwise, particularly the sunset clause. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Do we have—you know, Ronald Reagan popularized the Russian phrase ‘‘doveryai no proveryai’’—trust but verify. 

How would you assess that level of trust between the two countries 

and what are the mechanisms we need to have—to be able to have 

sufficient trust to go forward? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Well, I would suggest in terms of arms control we 

should negotiate an agreement whose restrictions are permanent 

and not subject to an expiration clause and that way the program 

can remain limited and therefore subject to intrusive verification 

that can monitor compliance. 

40

Upon expiration of the sunset clause, Iran will have an industrial-sized nuclear program and persistent diversion of nuclear resources from an industrial-sized nuclear program are difficult to 

defect irrespective of inspection modality. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Do you see any kind of cleavage between the 

Rouhani government and the Supreme Leader on the subject and 

how might that affect, you know, the negotiations for a permanent 

agreement? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I have only access to the public commentary, public 

speeches and what they say to their audiences and in that particular sense, Congressman, I don’t know if there are too many 

cleavages between the Supreme Leader and this President on the 

nuclear issue. 

Their style of representation is different but on the nuclear issue 

I have not detected the cleavages that are suggested. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Is there reason to believe that there is an awareness in Tehran in governing circles that this really is a pretty important issue existentially for Iran, that whatever your desire for 

the symbolism and the prestige and all that, this is potentially a 

direct threat to Iran and its future and the stakes are so high that 

you actually have to get serious. I mean, you are going to have to 

weigh just how important nuclear development is to you—that is 

to say the development of fissile material for a bomb versus your 

very future. How would you assess that awareness in Tehran? Because I think that is also key to the posture in a negotiating settlement and how we respond to perceived sincerity or lack thereof. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think during his tenure as Supreme Leader, 

which began in 1989 which makes Ali Khamenei one of the longest 

serving leaders in the Middle East, the tragedy of Ali Khamenei, 

which has become Iran’s tragedy, is that he has persistently subordinated national interest to ideological compulsions and at this particular point I think there are some in the system that recognize 

the necessity of having a nuclear program but also the importance 

of reviving the economy. 

That particular balance doesn’t seem entirely obvious in the way 

he talks about the nuclear issue. What he says in his private councils I have no access to. I only know what he says to his audiences. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. And do you think—some people see Rouhani 

genuinely having evolved and creating some political space, frankly, between the government and the Supreme Leader on this and 

some other issues. I would say it is just illusory. Rouhani comes 

right out of the leadership circles. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Well, he has certainly been part of the leadership 

for a long time and he has been part of the nuclear program for 

a long time. As early as the 1980s he was one of the officials responsible for procuring nuclear material. 

So he has been involved in it for a long time and he has committed himself to nuclear advancement for a long time. I think the 

way he looks at the nuclear program is trying to situate it in the 

larger context of Iranian needs. However, that doesn’t seem to be 

the case with those who he has to interlocutor with. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Dr. Sachs, in the brief time I have left did you 

want to comment? And then I am done. 

41

Mr. SACHS. Thank you, sir. Yes, I just—I think we should point 

out that the very real dangers of the Iranian nuclear program, ones 

that Israelis and others are extremely concerned about, are true 

with a deal to a certain degree. They are certainly true without a 

deal. 

And so the questions of a deal are very important on exactly how 

they are phrased, what kind of modalities there are for inspections 

and others. But the lack of a deal, I would just caution, does not 

solve our problem by any means. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you very much, and Mr. Modell, I didn’t 

mean to discriminate against you. I have just run out of time. 

Mr. MODELL. Okay. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to—certainly. Mr. Chris Smith of New 

Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this 

very important hearing. Dr. Takeyh, let me ask you, on page 2 of 

your testimony you mentioned—and this is your quote:

‘‘In Khamenei’s depiction, America is a crestfallen imperial 

state hastily retreating from the region. Whatever compunctions Tehran may have had about American power 

greatly diminished with the spectacle over Syria where 

Washington’s redlines were erased with the same carelessness that they were initially drawn.’’

Could you elaborate on it? I think that is a very strong statement 

and how much of that do you think might be true? But impression 

or perception sometimes is as important, particularly in the eyes 

of a mischievous actor like Iran. 

Secondly, I would like to ask you, you did point out on page 6 

that human rights would have to assume a high place in our negotiations. Iran must be pressed to honor international norms on 

treatment of its citizens. 

I have raised with Secretary Kerry on several occasions and 

other representatives from the administration my disappointment 

that human rights were not at least in part integrated in the negotiations on the nuclear issue and in mid-June, just June 18th, I 

had a hearing on human rights in North Korea and former Special 

Envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios who is also the co-chairman of the 

Committee for Human Rights in North Korea pointed out that in 

the Six-Party Talks we left it out there and when they collapsed 

in totality we had nothing when it came to human rights. 

And, you know, we have raised Saeed Abedini, Amir Hekmati 

and Robert Levinson time and time again and said make that a 

part. Your thoughts on that and any other who would like to speak 

today. 

Mr. TAKEYH. On the first point, I think the Supreme Leader has 

given two speeches, most recently July 7th that the chairman mentioned where he called for 190,000 centrifuges, potentially, where 

he has discounted the possibility of an American military strike explicitly and directly. 

So he no longer fears the notion that the United States has all 

its options on the table. At least that is what he tells his audiences 

42

and he seems very comfortable with the notion that his state is no 

longer going to be subject to American nuclear military retribution. 

Israelis I can’t speak to because he hasn’t spoken to it. As far as 

human rights, as you recall, Congressman, my colleague, Mark 

Lagon, and I have come and seen you and seen Congressman 

Deutch about establishing a human rights commission to essentially bring greater legislative focus on this issue. 

In previous arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union the 

issue of human rights was brought up. That doesn’t necessarily 

mean that agreement was contingent or linked to that but nevertheless it was brought up by George Shultz and others in negotiating with the Soviet Union. 

Similarly, I think, could be happening. Human rights concerns 

tend to come from the legislative branch. The executive branch 

tends to be very hesitant about incorporating human rights in its 

diplomacy. 

The Human Rights Bureau in the State Department was essentially conceived during Henry Kissinger’s time and there is nobody 

less concerned about human rights than Henry Kissinger, and it 

was essentially because of legislative pressure. 

So if there is going to be human rights discussions in nuclear diplomacy and international diplomacy that initiative has to come 

from the Hill. 

Mr. MODELL. Congressman, if I could just say a word on that. 

When Rouhani was elected, one of the things that he said—and 

this was, of course, in collaboration with the Supreme Leader—was 

he had sort of a three-phased approach. One was the immediate urgency—contending with the immediate urgency of repairing the 

economy. 

I mean, that first and foremost was on the top of agenda of everybody. Once he did that it was about shoring up all the support, 

shoring up the power of the regime itself, and then if they got 

around to it, it was about going and starting to answer some of the 

questions about human rights. 

Now, of course, we have seen a three- or four-fold increase in 

human rights related abuses since Rouhani has taken office. 

The other point I would make too, you know, when you look at 

the type of international inspection and verification and monitoring 

regime that you are going to have to create in the aftermath of an 

agreement, I think people need to keep in mind something that it 

has taken the Iranians maybe 10 or 15 years—particularly, the last 

10 or 15 years—to build up an extremely intricate global apparatus 

for evading sanctions and, you know, the idea that we can sign an 

agreement, think that we are going to be able to figure out all the 

military dimensions, all—figure out every way in which they are 

proliferating, I think is naive and we better start thinking very 

soon about how we are going to—how we are going to actually 

come up with a new containment strategy for doing things like 

that. 

And when we talk about the GCC partners and our allies, you 

know, I think those are enduring bilateral security partnerships. I 

don’t think that there is any jointness to be—you know, to be really 

taken seriously on the part of the GCC countries. 

43

But they are shaken by the fact that they are going to be facing 

a nuclear Iran. The global multilateral containment strategy that 

we need to come up with is critical at this point in time. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I see I am out of time. 

Chairman ROYCE. Without objection. We will go to Mr. David 

Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

witnesses for your very important testimony. I want to just begin, 

Dr. Takeyh, with the statement that you made about, you know, 

a better arms control agreement is preferred over a deficient one, 

which I think everyone agrees with. 

But to focus for a moment on this sunset clause, is it your assessment that the Iranians think at the conclusion of that sunset 

clause that they are likely to be—or before the conclusion of the 

sunset clause there is likely to be an engagement with the United 

States and the other partners about an extension to that agreement or is it your assessment they think once it is over all bets are 

off and they can robustly proceed with their nuclear weapons program? 

Mr. TAKEYH. The notion that once the sunset clause has expired 

and Iran is treated as any other member of the NPT and therefore 

can expand its nuclear resources and installations according to its 

own determination is something that the Supreme Leader has said. 

It is something that Iran’s chief negotiator Abbas Araghchi has 

said as well. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Does anyone have a different view of that? Okay. 

I would like to next turn to the destabilizing impact of Iran in Iraq 

and I apologize if you spoke to this a little bit earlier. 

But I would like any of the witnesses’ comment what you think 

Iran’s goals are in Iraq today and whether or not the Iranian interests are aligned tightly with the Maliki government and what is 

the likely impact of Iran’s ongoing engagement in Iraq over the 

long term. 

Mr. MODELL. Congressman, to answer the question, everything 

that I have seen is that Iran is desperately trying to keep Maliki 

in place. They have benefited tremendously by having him in place 

over the last decade. They don’t want him to go away and if they 

do—because if he does go away what comes next. They are not 

really sure. 

I think that there are certain Iranians—pragmatic-minded Iranians who look at the way Maliki has failed, you know, miserably 

in leading Iraq over the last 10 years and asking themselves why 

Maliki didn’t do a better job of, you know, governing over Sunnis 

and Kurds. 

But they are desperately trying to keep him there. They are desperately trying to keep the Kurds from breaking away but I think 

their long-term interest is stability and its continuing to build the 

base of support that they have. 

But the problem with the base of support that they are building 

is that it is mainly comprised of Shi’a militia forces and those Shi’a 

militia forces, as we know, are not loyal to the government in any 

way whatsoever. 

So if you are ever going to hope for some long-term healing of 

the sectarian divide in that country in the brutal fighting that is 

44

going on, that is not the way to do it. So they are not really part 

of the long-term solution, to be honest. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Dr. Sachs. 

Mr. SACHS. I think this touches on a very severe problem that 

Iran has that Ray raised earlier. Iran as the major Shi’a power 

would very much like to present itself not as a Shi’a power simply 

because the vast majority of Muslims around the world are Sunni. 

And so it would much prefer to present itself as a leading power 

in this part of the world rather than a Shi’a one. The animosity toward Israel is part of that. The best way to curry favor with people 

who disagree with you on the Shi’a-Sunni divide is to adopt the 

same enemy that many Muslims unfortunately perceive in Israel. 

In Iraq and Syria and Lebanon and elsewhere, Iran is finding 

itself, however, on the side of what is becoming more and more a 

sectarian divide, something which the adversaries of Iran—not 

Israel but Saudi Arabia and others—are seeing very much as a sectarian divide. 

I think this is the common theme now of the Middle East and 

really overshadows most of what we are seeing across the region. 

It is not necessarily in Iran’s interest but it is very worrisome. I 

agree with Scott very much, it is very worrisome. It is becoming 

more and more, partly through Iran’s actions, a sectarian divide. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And Dr. Sachs, you mentioned in your testimony 

that if Iran develops a nuclear weapon that you believe that the 

transfer outside of the state or outside of Iran is a long shot. 

Would you explain kind of what you think argues—from Iran’s 

perspective why they are likely to do that or not do that because 

obviously they are developing a nuclear weapon and then the 

transfer to an actor outside of Iran is a further complication. 

Mr. SACHS. I was quoting the views—the common views in 

Israel, not necessarily my own. But I do think that by and large 

it is a long shot. Of course, it is a long shot with huge ramifications. 

So even if the risk of its happening is low, the damage of it happening would be enormous. The main concern with Iran is whether 

it itself would use nuclear weapons and on that many Israelis and 

others believe that since it believes Israel has second strike capabilities, and although its goals seem unreasonable, its manner of 

pursuing them has been rational, and as a rational actor, therefore, 

you would expect it not to use these nuclear weapons in mutually 

assured destruction. 

It is a very grim reality, one which I very much hope we do not 

get to, but it may be stable. The transfer to other parties is tied 

to this as well. 

The question is whether they could believe that they could do 

this without detection, whether they would believe that Israel 

would not think that it is them, whether this kind of transfer 

would get them out of the grim mutually assured destruction logic. 

It is certainly possible that they would try to do it. I think it is 

unlikely because the chances of avoiding this kind of mutually assured destruction logic from the Israeli side is low. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 

back. 

45

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We go now to Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This 

is to the panel—how popular are the mullahs in their own country? 

Are we talking about 10 percent of the people support them? Twenty percent? Fifty percent? 

What is the real level of support that mullahs have in their own 

country? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think that is very difficult to estimate. However, 

I would suggest in the aftermath of the 2009 election—the fraudulent election of 2009—that was really a watershed moment when 

the regime essentially forfeited a considerable amount of its popular legitimacy. 

The Islamic Republic became more Islamic and less republic. So 

whatever the popularity it had which, as you mentioned, was always very marginal, has, in my opinion, diminished considerably 

after that particular election. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Could I prod you a little bit more? How about 

giving me just a guesstimate? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Possibly 10 percent of the population. But it is the 

10 percent of the population that it can mobilize and bring to the 

street and essentially dominate. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. And tacit support another 10 percent or 20 percent? 

Mr. TAKEYH. It is very difficult to judge that. I think at this particular point the regime is quite unpopular because of its performance, because of its ideology and because of the infamy that has 

come because of misconduct. 

I certainly don’t think it can survive a plebiscite or a fair election. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. What about our next——

Mr. MODELL. Congressman, I think that you ask one of the most 

difficult questions. We have spent years in the government trying 

to figure out exactly the answer to that question and part of the 

problem with polling in that country is people are afraid to speak 

their minds, particularly when it is not very delicately done. 

So to be honest with you, I don’t—I don’t know but I can tell you, 

though, a reflection of the fact that you don’t—I mean, you may 

have a significant amount of people there who are unhappy and 

don’t support the mullahs and the regime but that hasn’t translated into a military movement inside that is willing to do what the 

Green Movement did in 2009. 

Mr. SACHS. I am no expert on Iranian internal affairs but I 

would at least point out that Iran has a very smart way of going 

about ruling a country not through democracy, which is to have 

something that looks sometimes like democracy. 

These hybrid regimes where there are meaningful elections that 

have some kind of meaning but are not truly free—the candidates, 

of course, are vetted ahead of time—this actually allows for a lot 

of steam, a lot of vent to go out. It allows people to change some 

of the policies without undermining the fundamental regime. 

So even if the hard core support is very low, we could still find 

a system that is stable both because of some fear and oppression 

46

but also because there is a smart design to it, much smarter than 

extreme totalitarian dictatorship. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So let me note for the record, Mr. Chairman, 

that none of our witnesses were willing to actually put a number 

down in terms of what they think the level of support for the 

mullahs. 

Now, we depend on you guys. You know, this is—you are supposed to be telling us these things. I would suggest that the 

mullahs are very unpopular with about 90 percent of the people 

but I don’t know that—I was hoping you were going to give me 

some guidance on that. 

But we do know that among the people of Iran there are not just 

Persians. What percentage of the population is Persian? 

Mr. MODELL. I think it is—the last time I looked I think it was 

68—67 to 68 percent. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you have about 40 percent or so—30 to 40 

percent——

Mr. MODELL. Thirty to forty percent that are Azeris and I know 

there is Kurds and others. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Kurds, Baloch—people such as that. Is 

there—and the popularity among the mullahs among the minorities I imagine would be even less than among the young Persians. 

Is there any reason why—I mean, frankly, when we talk about 

Iran I hear all kinds of analysis of the power flow and the dynamics of the Iranian regime itself. 

I rarely hear any specific suggestions of how we get rid of it and 

I would suggest, as I have in the past, that we need to be looking 

at the opposition. If it is only at 10 percent, which we don’t know—

we are not even willing to speculate that support level—there 

should be lots of people there including those people who are nonPersian who we might be able to mobilize against the regime. But 

I don’t think we have been doing that, have we? 

Mr. MODELL. No, we have not. Not at all, to be honest with you. 

I would like to make one comment on 2009. So when 2009 came 

and the aftermath of the Presidential elections, as you recall, and 

the Green Movement started and as it grew the Supreme Leader 

and the regime completely underestimated it. And once they did realize the dimension of the problem, the Supreme Leader said okay, 

now we have to come together. 

And when we are talking about a whole of government solution, 

something that is exactly what they did and it cleared out Evin 

Prison and they got everybody together and there is all sort of 

interagency differences over there disappeared as they very effectively dismantled that movement. 

But the key thing is this: It was in 2009 as it started to gain momentum that some of the leaders of that movement, and this is 

publicly known, were reaching out to the United States and saying 

what do we do—where do we go—can you give us any guidance? 

And they weren’t necessarily looking to overthrow the regime. 

That was never their stated goal. But it was a crack in the—it 

was a potential real crack in the foundation that we could have assisted and we did not do that. 

47

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We have been waiting for other people to 

make those cracks. We should start helping making them ourselves. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. We go now to 

Brad Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

panel for sharing your insights and thoughts. Dr. Takeyh, let me 

start with you and I think it was you who said, you know, one of 

the real concerns about any type of negotiation to an agreement 

with Iran is trying to achieve a durable agreement with an unreliable partner and like you I share the concern of discussion of a determined—in particular, the idea of a discussion of a determined 

number of years. I think it should be at the very least generations 

if we can’t get the permanent agreement. 

But more broadly, do you think it is possible for a deal with Iran 

no matter how well structured it is on the document to be effectively enforced? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think you have to kind of think about the importance of nuclear capability within Iran’s larger regional policy. At 

a time when it has an aggressive regional policy it makes sense to 

have nuclear capability. 

In the Gulf today, there is an imbalance of conventional power. 

The Saudis and others have greater conventional strength simply 

because they have access to the American military supplies and 

Iran does not have an access to international military supplies and 

doesn’t have an indigenous arms industry. 

So the way Iranians have tried to affect that imbalance of power 

is by developing unconventional capabilities—missiles and unconventional weapons, chemical weapons. And so nuclear weapons fit 

into that particular equation and so long as Iran has hegemonic aspiration it will make sense for it to have nuclear capability. 

As Hassan Rouhani said in his memoirs—he has published 

four—he is very self-reflective—the last one he said look, there is 

a—he always talks about it as a peaceful nuclear weapon but he 

said the problem with our peaceful nuclear weapon is it got caught 

before it reached its objectives. 

So since then, they have to balance nuclear sophistication and 

enlargement with economic contraction and that has been the 

struggle. During the Ahmadinejad era, of course, they put privilege 

on nuclear enlargement. 

Iran, as a matter of revolutionary ideology—the Islamic Republic 

as a matter of revolutionary ideology tends to suspect international 

norms as unfair and international organizations as conspiring 

against it. 

That includes the IAEA and the U.N. Security Council, whose 

resolutions it has rejected as politically contrived. So it makes it 

less reliable of an arms control partner than the example that is 

often cited, mainly the Soviet Union. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Let me turn to Dr. Sachs, because in the context 

of Iran looking to bolster its capacity—hegemonic capacity with unconventional you talked about the full spectrum of Iranian activity. 

Does the support of Hezbollah—Palestinian Islamic jihad fit within 

the context of that trying to extend their reach? 

48

Mr. SACHS. Well, the problem, of course, with negotiations 

around that is what can you do within the context of negotiations. 

So the problem, I think, for many Israelis is, indeed, as we have 

mentioned before—that these negotiations don’t include all these 

different aspects—the full spectrum, as you say. 

The problem is, of course, whether or not you can get a deal in 

all of that. The question is the capability, even through sanctions, 

which were very stringent, can those sanctions bring about Iranian 

capitulation on everything or is there a chance of bringing it about 

the nuclear issue. 

I don’t know that we can on the nuclear issue and it certainly 

looks like we are not going to have it by July 20th, although never 

say never. But the chances of having it on the full spectrum are 

even lower. 

And so the very difficult dilemma, I think, from a policy perspective is does one opt for trying to go for something which one cannot 

achieve or does one focus very concretely on the specific issues that 

maybe one can. The spectrum remains, though, and this is, I think, 

a very important point. 

Even if there is a deal on the nuclear issue not only will the nuclear issue still be relevant and important the day after—in fact, 

it will be more important to keep a watchful eye—the other issues 

that we have been raising here today will be perhaps even more 

important with Iran freed from sanctions, or most of the sanctions 

at least, and free to do many other things that it can’t do at the 

moment. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I agree with you and I know last month this 

committee passed unanimously the Hezbollah sanctions bill that 

would limit or prohibit their access to international banking and 

thwart some of that relationship. I am hopeful that that full House 

and then the Senate will pass that this month. 

Dr. Modell, as you look at what is happening in the region and 

the threat of holding Iran to account on the full spectrum on their 

nuclear program, and you talked about the inherent need that we 

have to understand their potential military dimension—their 

weaponization, their delivery systems—an agreement that just focusses on enrichment how do you see that—what risks do you see 

that that leaves open, going forward? 

Mr. MODELL. Well, I think the difference—for me, I see risks no 

matter what kind of a deal we strike, to be honest with you, because I think that the time—I think somebody has mentioned it 

here—one of the panel has mentioned it here that time is key. 

Three, five, seven years—it doesn’t matter because when that 

time expires the revolutionary—you know, the conventional agenda 

is not going to stop and if you truly believe that they are after nuclear weapons why can’t they suspend that? 

They have a long-term vision here—why can’t they suspend that 

for 3 to 5 years and pick up where they left off? Another thing I 

would mention too in the context of these negotiations it shouldn’t 

be surprising that they are putting limitations—the Iranians, that 

is—on the breadth of these negotiations. 

They have got their—they very clearly spelled out their own red 

lines. They won’t even talk about ballistic missiles, you know, in 

these—in the context of these negotiations. 

49

Neither will they talk about rapprochement with the West or 

even human rights. So I think regardless of the—I mean, I am hoping for a good—the best deal possible but I think you need at least 

10 to 15 years to build up the trust that is going to be required 

and the ability. And it is not just the trust. 

It is not just, you know, good behavior over time. It is for us to 

build up the mechanisms we need globally to figure out if they are 

cheating and we can’t rely solely on the IAEA to do that. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you. I am out of time. I will just say that 

against a regime that thinks in millennium and carries forward a 

long-term vision, talking about years or decades just doesn’t seem 

sufficient. And with that, I will yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. We go to Mr. Steve Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for holding 

this important hearing this morning. As the recent crisis in Iraq 

began to unfold, the administration initially welcomed Iranian engagement in an effort to quickly resolve the issue, although many 

experts cautioned against such policies and I would put myself in 

that latter category. 

I think it is—we have to be very wary of any involvement with 

Iran. But I would be interested to hear the panel’s take on what 

is—what is Iran’s strategy with respect to Iraq? 

What are they trying to accomplish? What should we be particularly wary of? What dangers are they—either the short or long 

term in rubbing elbows with Iran here? Maybe thinking we are getting something now that we want but long term we have made a 

deal with the devil here. Mr. Takeyh. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think the objectives of the Iranian Government at 

this point and have been since 2003 to consolidate the power of the 

Shi’i majority. 

They are essentially aware that some degree of Sunni participation could help and the civil war is not necessarily in their interest 

because it will have spillover effects. 

In terms of the Maliki government, they probably have their 

dissatisfactions with the way Prime Minister Maliki has ruled but 

overall their approach is in the middle of a crisis you don’t change 

horses. 

That was the case in Assad as well in the sense that they didn’t 

want Assad to be dislodged and replaced with another member of 

the Alawite family. So you go war with the army you have, in essence. And long term essentially to remove Iraq from the Councils 

of Sunni Arab States, have a weakened Iraq—Shi’i dominated 

Iraq—that to some extent relies on Iran for its objectives and commerce. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Would any of the other members like 

to touch—Mr. Modell. 

Mr. MODELL. The only thing I would—the only thing I would add 

to that is I think there—we shouldn’t underestimate how many 

Iraqis are against the idea of Iran’s influence in that country growing. 

So when we are reading reports here that may sound like we are 

sort of dovetailing, you know, in terms of dealing with ISIS, Iranians are working against that cause. We want to work against 

that cause. 

50

But a lot of Iraqis are very wary about the growth of Iran’s role 

in that country. So I would be cautious about saying that it is—

it certainly is—I think it is more divisive over time than anything 

else. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Dr. Sachs, anything you would like to 

add? Okay. Thank you. 

At the recent talks over Iran’s nuclear program in Vienna, Secretary Kerry mentioned that the international community needs 

tangible reassurance that Iran will not move to quickly develop nuclear weapons. 

How can the administration develop an agreement to realistically 

prevent the Iranians from pursuing the weapons program, which I 

think, quite frankly, whatever we do they are bound and determined to accomplish this. But I know the administration continues 

to believe that there is some hope there. 

How do you think a long-term nuclear agreement would affect 

Iran’s interactions with terrorist groups in the region, for example, 

and what impact would a long-term nuclear agreement have on 

Iran’s ability to influence its neighbors in the region? And whoever 

would like to take it is welcome to. 

Mr. MODELL. I would say that they are—I tend to agree with 

you. I think regardless of the type of agreement we see, they have 

got an agenda to cross that threshold and weaponize and I think 

that we are going to, you know, in terms of figuring out what is 

it we need to do to figure out how to build a global apparatus to 

give ourselves the best chance of determining if they are cheating 

or not or if they are going to break out. 

Quite frankly, I think we have had the last decade of realizing—

enough time to realize that it is really hard to do these things. 

There is enough evidence—the U.S. Government has collected 

enough evidence—and its allies—over the years of proliferation networks but they haven’t been criminalized—adequately 

criminalized. 

I think that there is a law enforcement aspect to this and it is 

not only U.S. but I think there is a global law enforcement aspect 

to this that needs to be improved because if you can—if we enable 

ourselves to better pursue law enforcement investigations that are 

related to nuclear proliferation it goes hand in hand with figuring 

out if they are cheating or not. I think that has been a real deficiency. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Let me—go ahead, Dr. Sachs. 

Mr. SACHS. Well, I think on the central issues that might allow 

for a reasonable deal, I don’t think a good deal is possible and I 

agree that there is little chance that it would guarantee no development of nuclear weapons. 

But certainly the plutonium track, the weaponization aspects of 

it and, of course, enrichment, both in terms of stocks of uranium—

the stocks that are already there, but also technology and technology that might advance. 

All these issues are crucial and, of course, are being raised. Another issue that was raised here today and is more problematic is 

the issue of delivery systems of ballistic missiles accurate enough 

and capable of doing this, and that is really important and perhaps 

one that might be deficient. 

51

And, of course, verification is the main issue—the degree to how 

stringent the verification will be of compliance to this agreement 

will be crucial. None of this guarantees at all that Iran won’t pursue it anyway. I would just caution, again, that the lack of a deal 

certainly does not guarantee that either. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. We go to Dr. Ami Bera from California. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think, Dr. Takeyh, you 

touched on that, at present, Iran doesn’t have the military capabilities with conventional arsenals compared to Saudi Arabia and others in the region. 

So, you know, from my perspective I think how they have tried 

to level the playing field and that balance of power is through 

this—you know, through the terror networks and so forth. 

And in essence, you can almost draw a line from Iran to Maliki 

now to Assad to Hezbollah to Hamas as kind of that destabilizing 

force and, you know, if you think about some of the proxies. 

I also—you know, I would be curious on your thought there. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think that is right. In 2006 and 2007, the current 

head of the Revolutionary Guards, General Jafari, before that he 

was kind of a strategic planner and he came up with something 

called mosaic defense, namely, that increasingly the United States 

will not invade another Middle Eastern country so the question is 

how do you adjust your defense posture in order to advance your 

objectives given that? 

And essentially he came out with the ideals of asymmetrical defense, reliance on missile technology, proxy forces, and it was at 

that time that the role of Hezbollah in particular changed in Iranian calculations. 

Hezbollah was no longer a political party with a military apparatus that Iranians try to have a greater say in the Lebanese society, but they essentially became an auxiliary of the Iranian force 

and you see that manifestation particularly in Syria. 

So that is essentially the way they think about their defense and 

unconventional weapons are essentially part of that. 

Mr. BERA. In your words, Khamenei puts the ideologic interest 

ahead of the national interest and I think in your testimony is it 

accurate to say he sees the United States as a country in retreat 

from the region? 

Mr. TAKEYH. That is right. That is what he says. 

Mr. BERA. So if he is looking at things in that way and if we look 

at what has got us to this point, you know, clearly, the sanctions 

have been effective in bringing them to the table. 

Clearly, the sanctions have been effective in creating some unrest 

and, you know, creating some real issues within the Iranian economy. Would now—doesn’t appear to me now is the time for us to 

step back a little bit. Now is the time for us to actually continue 

to exert influence. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I am not disagreeing with that. I think that is 

right. I would say that whatever leverage we have mobilized with 

sanctions and other measures have obviously been insufficient to 

discipline Iran into an agreement should there be an extension past 

July 20th. 

52

As I was trying to suggest to Congressman Connolly, I don’t oppose extension of the talks for another 6 months but I do think the 

administration has to respond to the question of what do you think 

is going to happen in the next 6 months that didn’t happen in the 

previous ones. I think they should answer that question. 

Mr. BERA. Because if we are negotiating with a regime that sees 

us in retreat, from my perspective I don’t think that is the best position to negotiate from, I think. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I would say at this point our coercive leverage has 

not been sufficient to compel an agreement. 

Mr. BERA. Okay. So if—yes, I guess a lot of the others, if you 

would want to expand on that. 

Mr. MODELL. I think I would tend to agree with you on this. The 

time for retreating on sanctions is wrong. I think that I have seen 

a number of Iranian leaders talking about it as a strategic opening 

and if after the biggest and the most effective sanctions regime we 

have ever put together isn’t compelling them now after 6 months 

of negotiations with an economic knife at their throats to actually, 

you know, really be forthcoming about the most—the single most 

complex problem—in other words, the possible military dimensions 

of the program, then the answer is why are we letting up on sanctions now? 

Mr. BERA. I would agree and that is not to be construed that we 

don’t continue talking. But let us talk and negotiate from a place 

of strength. 

Iran also has, you know, its own issues. You know, obviously the 

challenges that it is facing with the struggling al-Maliki government with the ISIL in Iraq and the Sunni uprising with Assad facing his own challenges. 

So, you know, they certainly have to—in this negotiation they 

certainly have to fight a battle on multiple fronts as well and, you 

know, again, from a negotiating perspective I think my message to 

the administration and to—I do think we need to negotiate from 

a place of strength and that doesn’t mean we don’t—we stop talking. 

It does mean we negotiate from strength. So thank you. I will 

yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. The 

gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Kinzinger, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

all for being here today and spending time with us. I just want to 

say off the bat the idea of—and I have heard administration officials talk, Secretary Kerry, and talking about what a potential final 

deal with Iran would look like, and in no way have they ruled out 

some level of enrichment. 

You know, they will argue that well, we will keep it at a very 

low level of enrichment so breakout capability takes a long time 

and, you know, fine argument to make except the neighbors don’t 

see it that way. 

And what I think is also interesting is as we negotiate in onetwo-three agreements around the world, there is a lot of areas we 

have denied our best allies the right to enrich. I think of South 

Korea, I think of the United Arab Emirates—these people that we 

53

say we are committed to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula or Arab 

Peninsula and we don’t give them that right. 

And so to give the biggest enemy of the United States, I would 

argue, the right to do something that we deny to our best and closest allies will send a tragic message that America can’t be trusted 

by its allies and it is not to be feared by its enemies and that is 

something that I fear. 

I also am a veteran of Iraq and as a pilot there and I have noticed that it seems like every engagement, whether it is a war, 

whether it is some low-level engagement in the Middle East, that 

we have been involved in has somehow had the fingerprints of Iran 

all over it and I think of in Iraq it is estimated now that about half 

of the men and women that we lost in Iraq were a direct or indirect 

result of Iran itself. Whether it was their EFPs, the technology that 

they exported to the terrorists in Iraq, or whether it was even in 

some cases direct intervention. And we have seen that Iran continues to destabilize everywhere. 

The other question I have, and I will ask you all to briefly answer this because I have some other questions, when we withdrew 

from Iraq—in 2003 we went in, we invaded, Iran seemed very 

eager to work with the United States at that point. 

When we withdrew after 2011, what message did that send—

pulled all the troops out of Iraq—what message did that send to 

Iran? If you could just very briefly answer. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think 2003 did come from, you know, an existential threat. We know that now and particularly with Rouhani’s 

memoirs. Obviously, the general departure of the United States 

from the region and general hesitancy has emboldened Iran and I 

would actually go back to Syria before that and then Iraq became 

successor and affirmative to Syria. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Okay. 

Mr. MODELL. You know, Congressman, I just second that. I don’t 

have anything to add other than in 2011 I think they viewed it as 

a strategic victory, to be honest with you, and they view U.S. withdrawal out of Afghanistan the same way. 

Mr. SACHS. I think in general there is—the U.S. certainly has a 

problem in the Middle East of a perception of its weakness. It 

rightly or wrongly is perceived that way. Of course, the question 

is what kind of investment is the U.S. willing to do to avoid that, 

and it is a real one. 

Mr. KINZINGER. I think—it is interesting to me. I have been 

studying a little bit recently a lot about the period between World 

War I and World War II where the world was war weary and they 

saw this rising threat in Europe and they did not confront it because of purveying war weariness. 

Now, after World War I, I think the world had a right to be war 

weary. It lost millions of people, economies of scale destroyed. 

Today, I hear a lot of, frankly, my colleagues and talking heads 

talk about a war weariness in the United States of America. 

And while I understand that some people certainly do experience 

war weariness, you know, there was no tax increase to fight the 

wars. Our economy was not changed based on the war in the Middle East, and while we lost too many people it really pales in comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:02 Sep 25, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\071614\88732 SHIRL
54

parison to what was lost at the end of World War II or in World 

War I and World War II. 

At the end of World War II, Harry Truman came in and said—

he didn’t look at the American and say you are world weary—we 

have to leave Europe. 

He looked at the American people and said, I know you are tired 

but the Soviet Union is going to be twice the size as it is today if 

we leave Europe and really motivated the American people. 

My fear today is that we find ourselves in a situation where we 

are so eager to leave a period of conflict and warfare that we will 

do anything to get out and we hasten the day when a bigger war 

is going to happen, whether it is my generation or whether it is 

generations following me. 

Lastly, I want to touch on as the situation in Iraq very tragically 

unfolds, I hear some people say that this is fine. You know, let the 

caliphate figure out that governing is not easy. They don’t see governing like we do. 

But they say that is great—let Iran get pulled into a quagmire 

in Iraq like we did, and I would argue that Iran defines quagmire 

quite differently than us. 

We see losing 100 soldiers a month, as tragic as it is, as a quagmire and Iran does not. What are your all’s thoughts on the idea 

of letting Iran get drug into a quagmire and how that would be? 

Mr. TAKEYH. The same argument was made about Syria. Somehow, Iranians can manage in these convoluted situations with less 

cost and less casualties than we do simply because of their high reliance on proxies. 

Mr. MODELL. I would just reiterate what I said before. I think 

that the longer time goes on with Iran being involved in Iraq, particularly militarily, the worse things get because they are going to 

rely on building up proxy forces there that are not necessarily loved 

by significant amounts of the population. So I think it is a negative 

force over time. 

Mr. SACHS. Just briefly, I think we should also be very worried 

about what happens to these regions whether or not Iran gets 

caught in a quagmire. The ramifications for these countries—Syria, 

Iraq or others—is huge as well. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman 

from California, Mr. Sherman, who is the ranking member of the 

Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do want to just mention something for the record. I think it is absurd to think that the 

American people would be all gung ho for another war in the Middle East if only we had a President with a different personality. 

No one thought that President Bush was a retiring violet but in 

the last year of his presidency I noticed no popular groundswell for 

an American invasion of Iran. I don’t sense that today. I don’t 

think it relates to whether—you know, what the personality of the 

President is. 

I will say that under this administration we have paid a significant economic and diplomatic price for strengthening our sanctions 

on Iran, whereas in the Bush administration we didn’t pass a sinVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:02 Sep 25, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\071614\88732 SHIRL
55

gle law of significance because the President prevented it and we 

didn’t enforce any of the laws we had then. 

So at least this President is willing to cause us to pay a diplomatic and economic price to control Iran, if not a price in the loss 

of American troops on the ground. 

Dr. Sachs, you have got, obviously, the Shi’ite-Sunni split. Can 

Iran, al-Qaeda, and this new Islamic state aspire to be the leaders 

of extremist Islam? Can Iran aspire to that role or are they limited 

to the role of a protector of Shi’ites worldwide? 

Mr. SACHS. They understand that they are very limited and they 

are especially limited in the context of this configuration, so if you 

look in previous years at the Shi’a-Sunni divide, it was not necessarily that salient. 

The differences in identity were not necessarily expressed. Other 

issues, national and other, were much stronger. 

But in the context of the Middle East today where the SunniShi’a divide is so strong, it is hard to see Iran really taking leadership in the Arab world, and this is something that is quite different 

than in the past where they and Hezbollah, for example, held the 

mantle of fighting Israel. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I see that Russia seems more positively disposed 

to Assad and Tehran. Is this because have a very small Shi’ite population in their own country and they are near abroad and so they 

don’t see Iran as an ideological threat but they do see extremist 

Sunni groups as an ideological threat? 

Mr. SACHS. I don’t know, Sir. I doubt it is about a preference between Shi’a and Sunni. I think it is a very strong Russian preference for stability at any cost, almost. 

And so they would rather not have extremist groups, certainly, 

something that they fear in their own periphery and even in their 

own federation. But they also have a strong preference just for stability, and both of these things lead to support for Assad. 

There are other issues as well, but both of these things lead in 

the same direction. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Dr. Takeyh, how bad is the economic situation in 

Iran now and if you could write one more sanctions law what 

would it be, and how dependent is Iran—I will give you a hint on 

the second question with my third—on spare parts from Europe 

and other American allies? If an elevator breaks down in a building 

in Tehran can they fix it without getting a part flown in from Germany? 

Mr. TAKEYH. In terms of the economy, according to the IMF statistics, which they rely on—the Iranian Central Bank so who 

knows how reliable they are—IMF suggested Iran’s economy is 

likely to grow by about 2 percent. 

Mr. SHERMAN. That is better than our growth. And then can you 

also talk about the black market value of their currency because 

that is something the Iranians can’t——

Mr. TAKEYH. Right. They had a liquidity crisis but I think they 

have managed it. They have taken the hits on that. It is a country 

that still relies a great deal on spare parts, as you suggested, but 

increasingly they are beginning to have deficient spare parts from 

China and other—developing alternative sources and alternative 

measures to get their economy going. 

56

But it is very much still a stagnant economy in the sense that 

economic opportunities are having a difficult time keeping up with 

demographics. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And if you could write one additional sanctions 

law that would cripple or at least hurt the Iranian economy over 

the next 5 years what would it be? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Well, the key would be to essentially limit their export of oil and that they only have five or six customers now so 

that is going to be difficult to do with the Chinese but perhaps 

there is more leverage with the North Koreans and——

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, the real question here is not whether we are 

willing to have tens of thousands of Americans die on the ground, 

but whether we are willing to tell the Chinese that they have to 

choose between Iran and the United States as a business partner. 

The toughest adversary we may have in this is Wal-Mart. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Right. I think it will be difficult to get Iranian exports down but that is where the soft spot is. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Gotcha. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman 

from Florida, Mr. DeSantis, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for your comments. Dr. Sachs, you had mentioned how the 

Israelis view the threat of a nuclear Iran and I think that you 

painted a picture that they were a little bit more accepting than 

maybe my understanding was going to be. 

I mean, historian Bernard Lewis, one of the most knowledgeable 

historians of Islamic thinking, said that to people like Ali 

Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, the former President, mutually assured destruction is not a deterrent. It is an inducement for them 

because it serves to essentially hasten the messianic process, the 

return of the 12th Imam. So what kind of purchase does that have 

in Israeli thinking right now as they look at the threat? 

Mr. SACHS. To clarify, I certainly do not mean to suggest that the 

Israeli Government views this in the way that I suggested. The 

Israeli Government’s position is very clear that only zero enrichment—zero enriched uranium stock—only they are acceptable. 

There are some very senior people from the center of the Israeli 

security establishment that view it in a slightly more nuanced way. 

They too though, again, don’t think very differently from the Israeli 

administration. They simply think that if it was very low enrichment levels, and if the verification was very stringent, perhaps it 

would be liveable, perhaps it would be better than a situation with 

no agreement at all. 

But, again, the differences are quite small in Israel. The rifts of 

opinion is quite small. On the issue of rationality, there is quite an 

interesting difference. Some suggest exactly as you quoted Bernard 

Lewis saying that the Islamic Republic is inherently irrational. 

The prime minister of Israel has said this as well, and in that 

case they cannot be deterred by any of these means. But there are 

others, very central, in fact, in the cabinet itself, who have a slightly different view; who say that even the Soviet Union had—not 

messianic in the religious sense but messianic in the utopian 

sense—aspirations for the world and yet they could be deterred. 

57

It is a very grim reality. It is not something we should hope for. 

The Cold War was certainly not a picnic but it may be more stable 

than the alternative. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Yes, I would just say Iran’s behavior to us is, 

clearly, irrational but if you accept some of the premises that the 

regime is based on—for example, Rafsanjani was quoted about a 

decade ago saying, Look, you know, we could wipe out 5 million 

Jews with one bomb and yes, we know that they would respond, 

and he is just doing this calculation kind of matter of factly. 

And it probably would have killed 15 million Iranians but you 

know what? I mean, that is really an acceptable sacrifice. There 

are over 1 billion Muslims. 

And so I think that some of the calculations that he made to us 

would, obviously, be irrational but if you believe in that apocalyptic 

view of Shi’ite Islam then it may be something and that is why I 

think it is so dangerous to allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. 

This is not like the Soviet Union, who was a very hostile regime. 

At the end of the day they were atheist. If they got blown up 

there was nothing at the light at the end of the tunnel for them. 

Let me ask you or I can—actually, any of the panelists. We have 

been talking about on this committee the role of ISIS in Iraq and 

what is happening there. I know Iran is involved. Quds Force is 

there. 

I am trying to get a handle on exactly how involved they are. 

Would we see more Iranian involvement if, say, ISIS was threatening the Shi’ite holy sites? 

I know they have talked about they wanted to actually destroy 

those. I take it that the Iranian regime would view that as a vital 

national interest of their country and that they may be willing to 

do even more than they have. What are the panelists’ views on 

that? 

Mr. MODELL. I think that they have already—that has already 

been in the front of their minds when they are trying to determine 

what is their calculus for involvement, figuring out the extent of 

their involvement in Iraq. 

When they were looking at the—they were looking at the most 

important Shi’ite shrines and protecting them, that has been on 

their minds for a long time. I also think that you are going to see—

if you start to see the ISIS moving further east and further south 

that you are going to continue to see a buildup of more regular Iranian forces. 

Right now, they are relying considerably on proxies and the integration of those proxies into regular military—Iraqi military units 

and——

Mr. DESANTIS. You basically have the Shi’ite militia groups and 

then you have—there is a Quds Force commander, I think, and so 

you have the Quds Force with the kind of Sadrist militia groups 

that are the main source of kind of anti-ISIS opposition at this 

point? 

Mr. MODELL. You have several different variations. You have—

you have Shi’a militia groups fighting on their own. You have Shi’a 

militia groups that are partially integrated into Iraqi regular 

forces. 

58

You have—and what you have, you know, IRGC Quds Forces officers overseeing those Shi’a militia groups in both roles and you 

have Shi’a militia groups integrating into Iraqi regular military 

uniforms. You have others where they are separated out. 

You have stuff—you have joint units with the Kurds. I mean, the 

Iranians are doing everything they can to build up a large proxy 

force but then a lot of—it is a multifaceted effort. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. My time has expired. I would just say 

I think that we are running a very, very serious risk of walking 

into a bad deal here with the administration and what they have 

been doing and, you know, I think Congress really needs to speak 

out. 

A bad deal will be worse than not having any deal at all, and 

I yield back the balance. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman 

from Florida, Mr. Deutch, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the panelists. 

I would like to—I would like to take the conversation a little different direction. 

There has been a lot of talk about the nuclear negotiations, what 

a deal looks like, how much leverage we have and what would happen if Iran—if there is no deal or if, looking ahead if Iran had a 

nuclear weapon, if they went to break out at the expiration of term 

or whatever the deal is, I would actually like to look at it differently. 

What—if you could—if you could talk about what Iran’s goals are 

with respect to its support for terror, what are its priorities and 

with respect to the nuclear deal we spend a lot of time talking 

about how dangerous these terrorist groups supported by Iran 

would be if Iran had nuclear weapons. 

But what could Iran do with the immense amount of resources 

that it would possess if it struck a deal and foreign investment 

came pouring in, the economy turned around, its currency rebounded, inflation was—all the other things that would come from 

a deal for them, what could they do with that in their support of 

terror? Where would they focus and what would that mean for us? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Historically, Iran’s principal strategic arena of concern has been the Persian Gulf. So, in essence, you will see them, 

I think, with additional resources to be much more involved in Iraq 

and the Gulf States at the beginning level, and then there is that 

sort of organic attachment to Hezbollah and to a Palestinian 

rejectionist group—what there would be, essentially, in that sense. 

The regime with additional resources would also have an opportunity to essentially legitimize itself domestically and perhaps craft 

an agreement with its population similar to the Chinese, namely, 

that in response to political acquiescence you get material rewards 

and vulgar nationalism. 

So it might essentially have a new national compact with the 

population that could perhaps contribute to the regime’s longevity. 

Mr. DEUTCH. In other words, population says we can—we can 

live essentially—economically we can live Western lives. You do 

whatever it is you——

Mr. TAKEYH. Separate state from society. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Dr. Sachs. 

59

Mr. SACHS. In terms of what I said before, the Iranians do seem 

to be investing very heavily in Shi’a populations abroad. 

Although they don’t want to present themselves as leaders of the 

Shi’a, when in fact you look at where they invest their resources—

their considerable resources—it tends to be there, probably because 

that is where they can find allies. 

So you would expect that Lebanon, Syria—where not only Shi’a 

but other non-Sunni groups would have vast support, even bigger 

than they do today and that would be very considerable. In the 

Persian Gulf itself, one of the biggest concerns of Saudi Arabia is 

the fact that Saudi Arabia itself has a very sizeable Shi’a minority 

and in fact it is located just in the strategic area of where the oil 

is, and so this would be extremely dangerous, from their perspective. 

Of course, Bahrain is Shi’a majority. From the Israeli perspective, Iranian activity already and even more so if it had more resources, is very low cost to Iran. Iran can fight Israel by proxy. It 

sends Hezbollah to do things. It arms PIJ and Hamas to do things. 

But Iran itself does not suffer the consequences and so it gains two 

things. First, it fights this holy war that it imagines, and the second is it gains a deterrent against Israel for any possible operation. 

The debate I described earlier about Hezbollah, whether it will 

operate on the behest of Iran, is a very serious one from Israel 

thinking that if worst comes to worst and Israel has to act conventionally would Hezbollah get involved? 

Some, at the beginning, thought maybe not and, as I said, the 

Syrian civil war just proved that of course they would—they would 

do so. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I would just—I would like to narrow it down. So 

instead of talking about what Iran would do as the leader of the 

Shi’a around the world be specific. Which terrorist groups that it 

supports would it like to support more and what would those 

groups do with the resources? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I would say certainly Hezbollah. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Right. 

Mr. TAKEYH. Hezbollah has already been a very generous beneficiary of Iran. After 2006 when Hezbollah misadventured into war 

the Iranians essentially helped rebuild much of its infrastructure. 

So it would be—that would be different, and also various Shi’i 

militia groups that Iran would have to use in order to manipulate 

the politics of that country and potentially in Saudi Arabia. 

It is important to recognize, and I know my time is short, in 

many Middle Eastern countries their internal populations are a national security threat. Saudi Arabia views its own citizens of Shi’i 

belief as a national security threat because they can make common 

cause with an external threat. So there is a lot of opportunity for 

mischief. 

Mr. MODELL. I would agree with everything he said. The only 

thing I would add in terms of what specific groups would be—

would be supported in the focus I think it would stay mainly within 

the region. But I would also say it is important to look at the ways 

in which Iran right now is actually doing some of that—preparing 

the ground work for that. 

60

So when you look at Iraq, when you look at Iranian-supported 

forces, particularly proxy forces that it is using in Iraq, you have 

Bahrainian. You have Yemenis. You have Afghans. You have a 

number of others. 

They have been cultivating these relationships for a long time. 

I think it would be an expansion of those relationships, particularly 

when they leave Iraq and they go back home. They are going back 

home and they have stronger foundations of power for the regime. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman 

from Florida, Mr. Yoho, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for 

being here. How does Iran’s involvement with Iraq in dealing with 

the conflict with the Islamic state, how does that affect our negotiation with the nuclear deal with Iraq—I mean, Iran? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Well, at this particular point I don’t think it has an 

impact on it in the sense that Supreme Leader said he doesn’t 

want to negotiate with the United States on this issue and Secretary Hagel has said the same thing. 

I think both parties are trying to keep this segregated from the 

larger regional conflict that they have. 

Mr. YOHO. Mr. Modell. Okay. Same. 

All right. You know, the purpose of this negotiation or our sanctions up to this point was to prevent Iran from having a nuclear 

weapon. 

Sitting in this room right here we have had meeting after meeting after meeting that says Iran is going to get a nuclear weapon. 

I mean, 6 to 8 months—we had meetings they said they are 6 to 

8 months from having four to five nuclear weapons. 

That was a year ago. So I can only assume with the experts sitting here they told us the truth so we should assume they probably 

have that. Yet the sanctions that we had didn’t prevent that. 

So can we realistically think that new sanctions or new negotiations are going to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons, especially if there is a sunset clause? The reports I have read that said 

it is going to be 3 to 5 years from now—when those phase away 

is what Iran wants. 

I mean, are we going to prevent them from ever having a nuclear 

weapon? 

Mr. TAKEYH. Well, I would say in the aftermath of expirational 

sunset clause and I think their 5+1 including United States would 

like to have the longest sunset clause, maybe a decade. 

After that, Iran has a right as any other NPT member to have 

an industrial-sized nuclear program similar to Japan’s and that essentially gives it the ability to manufacture a large arsenal of nuclear weapons on short notice. 

Mr. YOHO. Okay. So if we are going in that direction would it not 

be better for us to prepare for that and the rest of the world to prepare for that instead of wasting all this time trying to prevent 

something that they are going to do regardless if there is an agreement or not? 

Because they have shown that they are not trustworthy and they 

are going to do this anyway so why don’t we prepare for that and 

prepare the rest of the world to negotiate conditions on how another nation acts toward another? And I know we have treaty after 

61

treaty after treaty but yet that day is coming and I think it would 

behoove us to focus on that. 

Mr. TAKEYH. I think that is right. I am not quite sure if it is inevitable for Iran to get nuclear weapons because I think there are 

things that can happen between now and then. 

But I do think one of the reasons why we embrace negotiations 

and the negotiating process is because we don’t want to ask the 

questions that you are asking—what if this issue is not susceptible 

to diplomatic mediation—and once you answer that question what 

does the after look like. 

Mr. YOHO. Well, that is just it. It is like—but yet somebody has 

got to tell the emperor he doesn’t have any clothes on. I mean, we 

all see it. We see it coming. 

So I think it would behoove us as a nation and this—I want to 

bring this up because the subject of this meeting is ‘‘Iran’s Destabilizing Role in the Middle East.’’

How is our foreign policy viewed? I mean, we have had Ambassadors in from all kinds of Middle Eastern countries in the last 2 

weeks. They said the view of America is at the lowest point they 

have ever seen. 

Our credibility is gone. They don’t know what we stand for. It 

is like we have a compass like Jack Sparrow in ‘‘Pirates of the Caribbean.’’

It has got a broken compass and they don’t know what our policies stand for. Our credibility has been lost and you, Dr. Sachs, you 

were talking about—you said the other parts of the world view us 

as weak. 

Explain that. Is that militarily? Is that our foreign policy or is 

that the direction or the will to stand up and do what we view is 

right? 

Mr. SACHS. I think in part it is a pendulum. I think it is very 

strong in the Middle East, perhaps stronger than elsewhere. But 

I think in the Middle East, in particular, it is a bit of a pendulum. 

After the years of the previous administration, where there was 

a very involved U.S. policy with boots on the ground in massive 

numbers, we have seems to have swung in the other direction and 

the reaction in the Middle East has been severe. 

It has been one that America has seemingly lost its resolve. They 

have taken the declinist literature seriously, which is a mistake, I 

think. And the result, of course, is that they now view the United 

States as not as resolved as it was in the past. 

I would just add one point about the possibility of what we might 

do with an international coalition. Sustaining the sanctions, which 

the Congress has been very important in installing, this demands 

also cooperation with the coalition and to keep this coalition going 

there is some utility in these negotiations, even above and beyond 

the possibility of what a deal might bring. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. But yet to have effective sanctions you are 

going to have to tell China what to do and we are not going to be 

able to do that, and as far as boots on the ground the only place 

I want our military’s boots on the ground is in the United States 

of America. 

And I would like at some point for you guys if you could submit 

a reset of our foreign policy of what you think we should be doing 

62

in America as far as dealing with the rest of the world because 

what we have done over the last 30 or 40 years it ain’t working 

real well. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired and I would just 

note for the record this is my 18th year in Congress and I think 

that is the first time that I have heard a pirate Jack Sparrow referred to in the Foreign Affairs Committee. 

So we appreciate Mr. Yoho for injecting that, and I think our 

final questioner this afternoon will be the gentleman from Florida, 

Mr. Vargas, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. VARGAS. California. 

Mr. CHABOT. My bad. California. 

Mr. VARGAS. Mr. Chairman, that is okay but I love California. 

Just want to make sure it didn’t get confused with Florida. I love 

Florida too. 

I guess I would say this. I hope it is not inevitable that Iran 

would get nuclear weapons because, unfortunately, I think that 

they would use them. 

I mean, I think it is one of those regimes that would be willing 

to do that. I have been very sceptical of this interim agreement. I 

think it was a bad deal. I continue to think it is a bad deal because 

of naivete on our side. 

I am even more sceptical of a long-term agreement if it is not a 

permanent agreement and the reason for that is I remember 1970. 

I am old enough to remember that and the hostage taking. 

That was 35 years ago. I mean, certainly, I think the Iranians 

will wait us out if it is only 7 or 10 years and they will have the 

ability then to break out and have a nuclear weapon and I think 

that they would use that in many different ways. 

Even if they didn’t use the weapon itself, which I think they 

probably would, they would use it at least to destabilize the area. 

And so I look at this very sceptically. I did think that the sanctions program was working. I think what we did here in this House 

was the appropriate thing and that was to ratchet them down. 

And then if were going to get to an agreement I think the agreement had to be this: Either you do away with your nuclear program completely—no enrichment, no ability to create a nuclear 

weapon—or we continue down this path of sanctions and you have 

no economy and you probably lose your regime. 

Make them decide that first. Then you can back up and do the 

interim agreements. We didn’t do that, unfortunately, and so I 

think we are in a very difficult situation. 

So now what do we do? I mean, we are in this situation now. I 

think that it is a very dangerous one. What do we do? I mean, you 

are the experts. What should we do? 

Mr. TAKEYH. I would say in the next—given the fact that our 

course of leverage has not been sufficient to compel Iranian compliance, I think it is time for Congress and the White House to sort 

of come together on what they want to see in terms of another 

sanctions bill. 

The White House would have its preferences and equities and 

the Congress would have. But I think it is time for the two 

branches of government to come together. 

63

If our leverage has not been sufficient to get Iranian compliance 

in the last 6 months, why do we think it is going to be sufficient 

to get Iranian agreement in the next 6 months unless we do something different? So that is what I would argue. 

Mr. VARGAS. How about yourself, Mr. Modell? 

Mr. MODELL. The only thing I would add, I think the only reason 

Iran has come to the negotiating table—I mean, this is a point that 

has been stressed over and over—is out of economic necessity and 

it is because we had a strong position on the sanctions that this 

Congress put forth were as strong as they have ever been. 

It is fantastic. I agree with Dr. Takeyh’s guidance that the administration—there has to be better collaboration on this between 

this administration and the Congress on figuring out the way forward. 

The last thing I would do is make sure that we shore up allied 

support on, you know, from the European Union in particular on 

oil sanctions and other things before we lose them. 

Mr. VARGAS. Thank you. Dr. Sachs. 

Mr. SACHS. Finally, just on this point, I think to maintain the 

sanctions, to maintain cooperation from our allies, it is crucial that 

if these talks fail, whether this week or in 6 months, that Iran is 

blamed—that Iran is blamed in the eyes of others and not the 

United States. 

And this entails from us to be slightly more pragmatic in the 

short term but keeping our eye on the long game, and to do that 

we need to make sure—we need to understand, I think, that the 

key to keeping this pressure on Iran is actually our alliance with 

the other P5+1 countries and the EU in particular. And to do that 

we will have to be creative about how we approach this problem. 

Mr. VARGAS. And I guess I would say this. You know, we always 

talk in sort of obfuscating terms. We always say keep all the options on the table. 

Mr. Modell, you kind of broke that taboo today and you actually 

talked about using conventional force, and I would like to talk just 

a second about that because I think that there is this huge hesitation even to think about that other than in this obscure sort of 

way of saying keep all options on the table. 

But what—really what it looked like if we had to do something 

militarily? Let us talk about that for a second because I think that 

we should say what it is and that is not all options on the table 

but military action. 

Mr. MODELL. I am not sure what the context was in which I 

said—that I said I would advocate the use of——

Mr. VARGAS. Not the advocation of it—the possibility of it. That 

might need to be what we do. 

Mr. MODELL. No, actually I think that—listen, as long as the Supreme Leader thinks that that is possible I think it is going to compel him to actually take the fact that we are pushing on this nuclear issue seriously. 

If he doesn’t believe there is—that that threat even exists or is 

credible any longer I think he is going to start trying to figure out 

all the—go to fall back on all the sophisticated ways in which they, 

you know, relied on denial and deception and dissimulation for the 

last 35 years. 

64

I personally agree that we need to go back to what you just suggested, which was a very strong sanctions position before anything 

else. 

Mr. VARGAS. I agree. My time has expired. I thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much and, again, my apologies for 

misidentifying the gentleman’s state. I apologize. 

Mr. VARGAS. No worries, sir. 

Mr. CHABOT. So I think that concludes the questioners this afternoon so—this morning, rather. We—actually we are afternoon, and 

would like to thank the panel for their testimony. 

All members will have 5 days to extend their remarks or submit 

written questions. If there is no further business to come before the 

committee we are adjourned. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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