C O M P U T E R S E C U R I T Y

Recommendation for Block 

Cipher Modes of Operation: 

The CCM Mode for 

Authentication and 

Confidentiality

Morris Dworkin

NIST Special Publication 800-38C

Computer Security Division

Information Technology Laboratory

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930

May 2004

U.S. Department of Commerce

Donald L. Evans, Secretary

Technology Administration

Phillip J. Bond, Under Secretary of Commerce for Technology

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Arden L. Bement, Jr., Director

NIST Special Publication 800-38C Recommendation for Block 

Cipher Modes of Operation: The 

CCM Mode for Authentication 

and Confidentiality

Morris Dworkin

C O M P U T E R S E C U R I T Y
Reports on Information Security Technology

The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and

Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical 

leadership for the Nation’s measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test 

methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the 

development and productive use of information technology. ITL’s responsibilities include the 

development of technical, physical, administrative, and management standards and guidelines for 

the cost-effective security and privacy of sensitive unclassified information in Federal computer 

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efforts in computer security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and

academic organizations.

Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document in order to describe 

an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply

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to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-38C

Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-38C 25 pages (May 2004)

CODEN: NSPUE2
iii

Abstract

This Recommendation defines a mode of operation, called CCM, for a symmetric key block 

cipher algorithm. CCM may be used to provide assurance of the confidentiality and the 

authenticity of computer data by combining the techniques of the Counter (CTR) mode and the 

Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) algorithm.

KEY WORDS: authenticated encryption; authentication; block cipher; confidentiality;

cryptography; encryption; information security; message authentication code; mode of operation.
iv

Table of Contents

1 PURPOSE.............................................................................................................................................................................1

2 AUTHORITY.......................................................................................................................................................................1

3 INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................................................1

4 DEFINITIONS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND SYMBOLS ..........................................................................................2

4.1 DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS.......................................................................................................................... 2

4.2 SYMBOLS...................................................................................................................................................................... 4

4.2.1 Variables.................................................................................................................................................................4

4.2.2 Operations and Functions...................................................................................................................................6

5 PRELIMINARIES ..............................................................................................................................................................6

5.1 UNDERLYING BLOCK CIPHER ALGORITHM............................................................................................................. 6

5.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES.................................................................................................................................... 7

5.3 DATA ELEMENTS......................................................................................................................................................... 7

5.4 INPUT FORMATTING.................................................................................................................................................... 8

5.5 EXAMPLES OF OPERATIONS AND FUNCTIONS......................................................................................................... 8

6 CCM SPECIFICATION ...................................................................................................................................................9

6.1 GENERATION-ENCRYPTION PROCESS ...................................................................................................................... 9

6.2 DECRYPTION-VERIFICATION PROCESS .................................................................................................................. 10

APPENDIX A: EXAMPLE OF A FORMATTING AND COUNTER GENERATION FUNCTION..............12

A.1 LENGTH REQUIREMENTS.......................................................................................................................................... 12

A.2 FORMATTING OF THE INPUT DATA......................................................................................................................... 12

A.2.1 Formatting of the Control Information and the Nonce.................................................................................13

A.2.2 Formatting of the Associated Data..................................................................................................................13

A.2.3 Formatting of the Payload.................................................................................................................................14

A.3 FORMATTING OF THE COUNTER BLOCKS.............................................................................................................. 14

APPENDIX B: LENGTH OF THE MAC ...........................................................................................................................15

B.1 AUTHENTICATION ASSURANCE............................................................................................................................... 15

B.2 SELECTION OF THE MAC LENGTH......................................................................................................................... 16

APPENDIX C: EXAMPLE VECTORS ...............................................................................................................................17

C.1 EXAMPLE 1................................................................................................................................................................. 17

C.2 EXAMPLE 2................................................................................................................................................................. 17

C.3 EXAMPLE 3................................................................................................................................................................. 18

C.4 EXAMPLE 4................................................................................................................................................................. 19

APPENDIX D: REFERENCES ..............................................................................................................................................21

Table of Figures

Table 1: Formatting of the Flags Octet in B0 ............................................................................................................................ 13

Table 2: Formatting of B0 ............................................................................................................................................................. 13

Table 3: Formatting of Ctri.......................................................................................................................................................... 14

Table 4: Formatting of the Flags Field in Ctri.......................................................................................................................... 14
1

1 Purpose

This publication is the third Part in a series of Recommendations regarding modes of operation 

of symmetric key block cipher algorithms. 

2 Authority

This document has been developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology

(NIST) in furtherance of its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security 

Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, Public Law 107-347. 

NIST is responsible for developing standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements, 

for providing adequate information security for all agency operations and assets, but such

standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems. This guideline is consistent 

with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, Section 

8b(3), Securing Agency Information Systems, as analyzed in A-130, Appendix IV: Analysis of 

Key Sections. Supplemental information is provided in A-130, Appendix III.

This guideline has been prepared for use by federal agencies. It may be used by

nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright. (Attribution 

would be appreciated by NIST.) 

Nothing in this document should be taken to contradict standards and guidelines made

mandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory

authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing 

authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the OMB, or any other federal official.

Conformance testing for implementations of the mode of operation that is specified in this Part 

of the Recommendation will be conducted within the framework of the Cryptographic Module 

Validation Program (CMVP), a joint effort of NIST and the Communications Security

Establishment of the Government of Canada. An implementation of a mode of operation must 

adhere to the requirements in this Recommendation in order to be validated under the CMVP. 

The requirements of this Recommendation are indicated by the word “shall.”

3 Introduction 

This Recommendation specifies an algorithm, Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message 

Authentication Code [1], abbreviated CCM, that can provide assurance of the confidentiality and 

authenticity of data. CCM is based on an approved symmetric key block cipher algorithm whose 

block size is 128 bits, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm currently 

specified in Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) Pub. 197 [2]; thus, CCM cannot be 

used with the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm [3], whose block size is 64 bits. CCM can be 

considered a mode of operation of the block cipher algorithm. As with other modes of operation, 
2

a single key to the block cipher must be established beforehand among the parties to the data; 

thus, CCM should be implemented within a well-designed key management structure. The 

security properties of CCM depend, at a minimum, on the secrecy of the key.

CCM is intended for use in a packet environment, i.e., when all of the data is available in storage 

before CCM is applied; CCM is not designed to support partial processing or stream processing. 

The input to CCM includes three elements: 1) data that will be both authenticated and encrypted, 

called the payload; 2) associated data, e.g., a header, that will be authenticated but not encrypted; 

and 3) a unique value, called a nonce, that is assigned to the payload and the associated data. 

CCM consists of two related processes: generation-encryption and decryption-verification, which 

combine two cryptographic primitives: counter mode encryption and cipher block chainingbased authentication. Only the forward cipher function of the block cipher algorithm is used 

within these primitives. 

In generation-encryption, cipher block chaining is applied to the payload, the associated data, 

and the nonce to generate a message authentication code (MAC); then, counter mode encryption 

is applied to the MAC and the payload to transform them into an unreadable form, called the 

ciphertext. Thus, CCM generation-encryption expands the size of the payload by the size of the 

MAC. In decryption-verification, counter mode decryption is applied to the purported ciphertext 

to recover the MAC and the corresponding payload; then, cipher block chaining is applied to the 

payload, the received associated data, and the received nonce to verify the correctness of the 

MAC. Successful verification provides assurance that the payload and the associated data 

originated from a source with access to the key. 

A MAC provides stronger assurance of authenticity than a checksum or an error detecting code. 

The verification of a (non-cryptographic) checksum or an error detecting code is designed to 

detect only accidental modifications of the data, while the verification of a MAC, as occurs in 

CCM, is designed to detect intentional, unauthorized modifications of the data, as well as 

accidental modifications.

This specification of CCM is intended to be compatible with the use of CCM within the draft 

amendment [4] to the IEEE Standard 802.11 for wireless local area networks [5]. 

 

4 Definitions, Abbreviations, and Symbols 

4.1 Definitions and Abbreviations 

Approved FIPS approved or NIST recommended: an algorithm or technique that 

is either 1) specified in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation, or 2) 

adopted in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation.

Associated Data Input data to the CCM generation-encryption process that is

authenticated but not encrypted.
3

Authenticity The property that data originated from its purported source.

Bit A binary digit: 0 or 1.

Bit Length The number of bits in a bit string.

Bit String An ordered sequence of bits.

Block A bit string whose length is the block size of the block cipher

algorithm.

Block Cipher

Algorithm

A family of functions and their inverses that is parameterized by

cryptographic keys; the functions map bit strings of a fixed length to 

bit strings of the same length.

Block Size The bit length of an input (or output) block of the block cipher.

CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code

CCM Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code.

Ciphertext The output of the CCM encryption-generation process.

Cryptographic Key A parameter used in the block cipher algorithm that determines the 

forward cipher function. 

CTR Counter.

Decryption-Verification The process of CCM in which a purported ciphertext is decrypted and 

the authenticity of the resulting payload and the associated data is 

verified.

Exclusive-OR The bitwise addition, modulo 2, of two bit strings of equal length. 

FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard.

Formatting Function The function that transforms the payload, associated data, and nonce 

into a sequence of complete blocks.

Forward Cipher

Function 

One of the two functions of the block cipher algorithm that is

determined by the choice of a cryptographic key. 

Generation-Encryption The process of CCM in which a MAC is generated on the payload 

and the associated data, and encryption is applied to the payload and 

the MAC.
4

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

Inverse Cipher Function The inverse function of the forward cipher function for a given

cryptographic key.

Least Significant Bit(s) The right-most bit(s) of a bit string.

Message

Authentication Code

(MAC)

A cryptographic checksum on data that is designed to reveal both 

accidental errors and intentional modifications of the data.

Mode of Operation

(Mode)

An algorithm for the cryptographic transformation of data that

features a symmetric key block cipher algorithm. 

Most Significant Bit(s) The left-most bit(s) of a bit string.

Nonce A value that is used only once within a specified context.

Octet A string of eight bits.

Octet Length The number of octets in an octet string.

Octet String An ordered sequence of octets.

Payload The input data to the CCM generation-encryption process that is both 

authenticated and encrypted.

Valid Data Element A payload, an associated data string, or a nonce that satisfies the 

restrictions of the formatting function.

4.2 Symbols 

4.2.1 Variables

a The octet length of the associated data.

A The associated data string.

Alen The bit length of the associated data.

Bi The ith block of the formatted input.

C The ciphertext.
5

Clen The bit length of the ciphertext.

Ctri The ith counter block.

K The block cipher key.

Klen The bit length of the block cipher key.

m The number of blocks in the formatted payload.

MaxErrs The maximum number of times that the output of any implementation of the 

decryption-verification process can be INVALID before the key is retired. 

n The octet length of the nonce.

N The nonce.

Nlen The bit length of the nonce.

P The payload.

Plen The bit length of the payload.

q The octet length of the binary representation of the octet length of the payload.

Q A bit string representation of the octet length of P.

r The number of blocks in the formatted input data (N, A, P).

Risk The highest acceptable probability for an inauthentic message to pass the

decryption-verification process.

t The octet length of the MAC.

T The MAC that is generated as an internal variable in the CCM

processes. 

Tlen The bit length of the MAC.
6

4.2.2 Operations and Functions

0x The prefix to a bit string that is represented in hexadecimal characters.

[x]s The binary representation of the non-negative integer x, in s bits, where x<2s.

x The least integer that is not less than the real number x.

X || Y The concatenation of two bit strings X and Y.

X ⊕ Y The bitwise exclusive-OR of two bit strings X and Y of the same length.

CIPHK(X) The output of the forward cipher function of the block cipher algorithm under the 

key K applied to the data block X.

LSBs(X) The bit string consisting of the s right-most bits of the bit string X.

MSBs(X) The bit string consisting of the s left-most bits of the bit string X.

lg(x) The base 2 logarithm of the positive real number x. 

5 Preliminaries

The selection of a block cipher algorithm and secret key are discussed in Section 5.1. The two 

cryptographic primitives that CCM requires for its operation are discussed in Section 5.2. The 

data elements of CCM are discussed in Section 5.3. The formatting of valid data elements is 

discussed in Section 5.4. Examples of operations and functions are given in Section 5.5. 

5.1 Underlying Block Cipher Algorithm 

The CCM algorithm depends on the choice of an underlying symmetric key block cipher 

algorithm. The CCM algorithm is thus a mode of operation (mode, for short) of the symmetric 

key block cipher. The underlying block cipher algorithm shall be approved, and a secret key for 

the block cipher algorithm shall be generated uniformly at random, or close to uniformly at 

random, i.e., so that each possible key is (nearly) equally likely to be generated. Moreover, the 

key should be established for the parties to the information by an approved key establishment 

method. The key shall be kept secret and shall only be used for the CCM mode. The total 

number of invocations of the block cipher algorithm during the lifetime of the key shall be 

limited to 2

61. Key establishment and key management are outside the scope of this

Recommendation. 

For any given key, the underlying block cipher algorithm of the mode consists of two functions 

that are inverses of each other. As part of the choice of the block cipher algorithm, one of the two 
7

functions of the block cipher algorithm is designated as the forward cipher function. ∗ The 

inverse of this process is called the inverse cipher function; however, the CCM mode does not 

require the inverse cipher function. 

The forward cipher function is a function on bit strings of a fixed bit length; the strings are called 

blocks, and their length is called the block size. For CCM, the block size of the block cipher 

algorithm shall be 128 bits; currently, the AES algorithm is the only approved block cipher 

algorithm with this block size. 

The CCM key, denoted K, is the block cipher key; the forward cipher function of the block

cipher with this key is denoted CIPHK. The bit length of K is denoted Klen. 

5.2 Cryptographic Primitives

The CCM specification essentially combines two cryptographic mechanisms that are based on 

the forward cipher function. One mechanism is the Counter (CTR) mode for confidentiality, 

which is specified for general use in the first Part of this Recommendation [6]. The CTR mode 

requires the generation of a sufficiently long sequence of blocks called the counter blocks. The 

counter blocks must be distinct within a single invocation and across all other invocations of the 

CTR mode under any given key, but they need not be secret. This requirement on the counter 

blocks extends to the CCM mode. See [6] for further discussion of the generation of counter 

blocks; see Section 5.4 below for an additional requirement on the counter blocks in CCM. 

The other cryptographic mechanism within CCM is an adaptation of the cipher block chaining 

(CBC) technique from [6] to provide assurance of authenticity. Specifically, the CBC technique 

with an initialization vector of zero is applied to the data to be authenticated; the final block of 

the resulting CBC output, possibly truncated, serves as a message authentication code (MAC) of 

the data. The algorithm for generating a MAC in this fashion is commonly called CBC-MAC. 

This Recommendation does not approve CBC-MAC as an authentication mode outside of the 

context of the CCM specification; however, a variation of CBC-MAC is proposed for general 

use in the second Part of this Recommendation [7]. 

The same key, K, is used for both the CTR and CBC-MAC mechanisms within CCM.

5.3 Data Elements

The data that CCM protects consists of a message, i.e., a bit string, called the payload, denoted P, 

of bit length denoted Plen, and a bit string, called the associated data, denoted A. The associated 

data is optional, i.e., A may be the empty string.** CCM provides assurance of the confidentiality 

of P and assurance of the authenticity of the origin of both A and P; confidentiality is not 

provided for A.

A bit string called the nonce, denoted N, is assigned to the data pair to be protected, i.e., the 

 

∗

 For the AES algorithm, the forward cipher is explicitly identified in [2].

** The payload may also be empty, in which case the specification degenerates to an authentication mode on the 

associated data. 
8

payload and its associated data. The nonce shall be non-repeating in the sense that any two 

distinct data pairs to be protected by CCM during the lifetime of the key shall be assigned 

distinct nonces. In effect, the nonce determines an invocation of CCM. The nonce is not 

required to be random.

The MAC that is generated within CCM is an internal variable, denoted T. The bit length of T, 

denoted Tlen, is a parameter of the mode that shall be fixed for all invocations of CCM with the 

given key. The requirements for the selection of Tlen are discussed in Appendix B. 

5.4 Input Formatting

The CCM data elements N, P, and A shall be formatted into a non-empty sequence of complete 

data blocks, denoted B0, B1, ..., Br for some non-negative integer r, in accordance with a function 

called the formatting function (in [8], the formatting function is called the encoding function, ß). 

The value of r depends on the formatting function and the input elements. For any given key, the 

following three properties shall hold for the formatting function:

1. The first block, B0, uniquely determines the nonce N.

2. The formatted data uniquely determines P and A; moreover, if (N, P, A) and (N, P', A') 

are distinct input triples whose formatting is B0, B1, ..., Br and B0', B1', ..., Br'', then Bi is 

distinct from Bi' for some index i such that i ≤ r and i≤ r '. ∗

3. The first block, B0, is distinct from any counter blocks that are used across all invocations 

of CCM under the key.

The third property suggests that the formatting function and the counter generation function 

should not be selected or constructed independently of each other. 

The formatting function may impose restrictions on the contents and the bit lengths of the input 

data N, P, and A, as well as the parameter Tlen. For example, the bit lengths may be restricted to 

multiples of eight and to a given range of values. Values that satisfy the restrictions of the 

formatting function are called valid. No value of Tlen smaller than 32 shall be valid.

An example of a formatting function and counter generation function that together satisfy these 

requirements is given in Appendix A. Alternative formatting functions may be developed in the 

future.

5.5 Examples of Operations and Functions

Given a positive integer s and a non-negative integer x that is less than 2

s

, the binary

representation of x in s bits is denoted [x]s. For example, for the (base 10) integer 45, the binary 

representation (base 2) is 101101, so [45]8 = 00101101.

The concatenation operation on bit strings is denoted ||; for example, 001 || 10111 = 00110111.

 

∗

 This property deals with the case that a nonce is repeated within two distinct input triples. Although the legitimate 

source/sender of the data is already required to assign distinct nonces to different input triples, the security model in 

[8] takes into account that the recipient of purported ciphertexts might not monitor whether a nonce is repeated. 
9

Given bit strings of equal length, the exclusive-OR operation, denoted ⊕, specifies the addition, 

modulo 2, of the bits in each bit position, i.e., without carries. For example, 10011 ⊕ 10101= 

00110.

The functions LSBs and MSBs return the s least significant (i.e., right-most) bits and the s most 

significant (i.e., left-most) bits of their arguments, respectively. For example, LSB3(111011010) 

= 010, and MSB4(111011010) = 1110.

Given a positive real number x, the base 2 logarithm x is denoted lg(x). For example, lg(2

10)=10.

6 CCM Specification

The two CCM processes are called generation-encryption and decryption-verification. The 

prerequisites, inputs, outputs, steps, and summaries for the execution of the two CCM processes 

are specified in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 below. The prerequisites are inputs that are typically fixed 

across many invocations of CCM. The prerequisites and inputs shall meet the requirements in 

Section 5.

There is some flexibility in the order of the steps of the two processes. For example, the 

generation of the counter blocks can occur at any time before they are used; in fact, the counter 

blocks may be generated in advance and be considered as inputs to the processes.

6.1 Generation-Encryption Process

The following is a specification of the generation-encryption process of CCM: 

Prerequisites:

block cipher algorithm;

key K;

counter generation function;

formatting function;

MAC length Tlen.

Input: 

valid nonce N;

valid payload P of length Plen bits;

valid associated data A; 

Output: 

ciphertext C.

Steps:

1. Apply the formatting function to (N, A, P) to produce the blocks B0, B1, ..., Br. 

2. Set Y0= CIPHK(B0).

3. For i = 1 to r, do Yi = CIPHK(Bi ⊕ Yi-1).
10

4. Set T=MSBTlen(Yr).

5. Apply the counter generation function to generate the counter blocks Ctr0, Ctr1, 

..., Ctrm, where m = Plen 128.

6. For j=0 to m, do Sj = CIPHK(Ctrj). 

7. Set S= S1 || S2 || ...|| Sm.

8. Return C=(P ⊕ MSBPlen(S)) || (T ⊕ MSBTlen(S0)).

The input data to the generation-encryption process are a valid nonce, a valid payload string, and 

a valid associated data string, which are formatted according to the formatting function. The 

CBC-MAC mechanism is applied to the formatted data to generate a MAC, whose length is a 

prerequisite. Counter mode encryption, which requires a sufficiently long sequence of counter 

blocks as input, is applied to the payload string and separately to the MAC. The resulting data, 

called the ciphertext, denoted C, is the output of the generation-encryption process.

6.2 Decryption-Verification Process

Prerequisites:

block cipher algorithm;

key K;

counter generation function;

formatting function;

valid MAC length Tlen.

Input:

nonce N;

associated data A; 

purported ciphertext C of length Clen bits;

Output: 

either the payload P or INVALID.

Steps:

1. If Clen ≤Tlen, then return INVALID.

2. Apply the counter generation function to generate the counter blocks Ctr0, Ctr1, 

..., Ctrm, where m = (Clen −Tlen) 128.

3. For j=0 to m, do Sj = CIPHK(Ctrj). 

4. Set S= S1 || S2 || ...|| Sm.

5. Set P=MSBClen-Tlen(C) ⊕ MSBClen-Tlen(S).

6. Set T=LSBTlen(C) ⊕ MSBTlen(S0).

7. If N, A, or P is not valid, as discussed in Section 5.4, then return INVALID, else 

apply the formatting function to (N, A, P) to produce the blocks B0, B1, ..., Br. 

8. Set Y0= CIPHK(B0).

9. For i = 1 to r, do Yj = CIPHK(Bi ⊕ Yi-1).

10. If T ≠ MSBTlen(Yr), then return INVALID, else return P.
11

The input to the decryption-verification process is a purported ciphertext, an associated data 

string, and the nonce that was purportedly used in the generation of the purported ciphertext. 

Counter mode decryption is applied to the purported ciphertext to produce the corresponding 

MAC and payload. If the nonce, the associated data string, and the payload are valid, as 

discussed in Section 5.4, then these strings are formatted into blocks according to the formatting 

function, and the CBC-MAC mechanism is applied to verify the MAC. If verification succeeds, 

the decryption-verification process returns the payload as output; otherwise, only the error 

message INVALID is returned.

When the error message INVALID is returned, the payload P and the MAC T shall not be 

revealed. Moreover, the implementation shall ensure that an unauthorized party cannot

distinguish whether the error message results from Step 7 or from Step 10, for example, from the 

timing of the error message.
12

Appendix A: Example of a Formatting and Counter Generation Function 

In this appendix, a formatting function for the input data and a counter generation function are 

specified that together satisfy the requirements of Section 5.4. With these functions, this 

specification of CCM is essentially equivalent to the specification of CCM in the draft

amendment [4] to the IEEE Standard 802.11 for wireless local area networks [5].

The requirements that this particular formatting function imposes on the lengths of the variables 

in CCM are given in Section A.1; the formatting of the input data is specified in Section A.2; the 

counter generation function is specified in Section A.3.

A.1 Length Requirements

The bit length of each input string, i.e., N, A, and P, shall be a multiple of 8 bits, i.e., each input 

string shall be an octet string. The octet lengths of these strings are denoted n, a, and p; thus, n, a

and p are integers. Similarly, the parameter t denotes the octet length of T. The octet length of P

(i.e., the integer p) is represented within the first block of the formatted data as an octet string 

denoted Q. The octet length of Q, denoted q, is a parameter of the formatting function. Thus, Q is 

equivalent to [p]8q, the binary representation of p in q octets. For example, if q = 3 and P is a 

string that consists of 4096 bits, i.e., p = 512, then Q is the string 00000000 00000010 00000000.

The formatting in this appendix imposes the following length conditions:

• t is an element of {4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16};

• q is an element of {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8};

• n is an element of {7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13}

• n+q=15;

• a<264.

The parameter q determines the maximum length of the payload: by definition, p<28q, so P

consists of fewer than 28q octets, i.e., fewer than 28q-4 128-bit blocks. The fourth condition 

implies that a choice for q determines the value of n, namely, n=15-q. (Equivalently, the nonce 

length, n, may be considered as the parameter of the formatting function that determines the 

value of q.) The value of n, in turn, determines the maximum number of distinct nonces, namely, 

2

8n

. Thus, the fourth condition amounts to a tradeoff between the maximum number of

invocations of CCM under a given key and the maximum payload length for those invocations. 

A.2 Formatting of the Input Data 

The formatting of the input data (N, A, P) into a sequence of blocks B0, B1, ..., Br is presented in 

the following three sections: in Section A.2.1, the formatting of the nonce and control

information such as length indicators is specified; in Section A.2.2, the formatting of A is 

specified; in Section A.2.3, the formatting of P is specified. 
13

A.2.1 Formatting of the Control Information and the Nonce

The leading octet of the first block of the formatting, B0, contains four flags for control

information: two single bits, called Reserved and Adata, and two strings of three bits, to encode 

the values t and q. The encoding of t is [(t-2)/2]3, and the encoding of q is [q-1]3. Thus, for 

example, if the MAC length is 8 octets, then t is encoded as 011. Note that the encoding 000 in 

both cases does not correspond to a permitted value of t or q. The Reserved bit is reserved to 

enable future extensions of the formatting; it shall be set to ‘0’. The Adata bit is ‘0’ if a=0 and 

‘1’ if a>0. The ordering of the flags within the octet is given in Table 1.

Table 1: Formatting of the Flags Octet in B0

Bit number 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

Contents Reserved Adata [(t-2)/2]3 [q-1]3

The remaining 15 octets of the first block of the formatting are devoted to the nonce and the 

binary representation of the message length in q octets, as given in Table 2.

Table 2: Formatting of B0

Octet number 0 1 ... 15-q 16-q ... 15

Contents Flags N Q

For example, if B0 is 

01101110 00010011 11010100 10100011 01011101 01110001 10100101 00000000

00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 01000100 00000001:

• The associated data will not be empty (because Adata=1). 

• The MAC will consist of 12 octets (because [(t-2)/2]3=101).

• The octet length of Q is 7 (because [q-1]3=110), so Q is 00000000 000000000 00000000 

00000000 00000000 01000100 00000001.

• The payload will consist of 17,409 octets (because Q=[17409]56).

• The octet length of N is 8 (because n=15-q and q=7), so N=00010011 11010100

10100011 01011101 01110001 10100101 00000000 00000000.

A.2.2 Formatting of the Associated Data

If a=0, as indicated by the Adata field in the first octet of B0, then there are no blocks devoted to 

the associated data in the formatted data. If a>0, then a is encoded as described below, and the 

encoding of a is concatenated with the associated data A, followed by the minimum number of 

‘0’ bits, possibly none, such that the resulting string can be partitioned into 16-octet blocks. 

These blocks are denoted in the formatted data as B1, B2, ... Bu for some positive integer u that 

depends on a.

The value a is encoded according to the following three cases:
14

• If 0 < a < 216-2

8

, then a is encoded as [a]16, i.e., two octets.

• If 2

16

-2

8

≤ a < 232, then a is encoded as 0xff || 0xfe || [a]32, i.e., six octets.

• If 2

32 ≤ a < 264

, then a is encoded as 0xff || 0xff || [a]64, i.e., ten octets. 

For example, if a=216, the encoding of a is 11111111 11111110 00000000 00000001 00000000 

00000000.

The formatting of distinct sets of associated data will not overlap, because for distinct values of 

a, the leading bits of the encodings of a are distinct: in the first case, the first octet will not be 

0xff as it will for the second and third cases; the second and third cases can be distinguished by 

the second octet. Encodings that are not specified in these three cases are reserved, e.g., when 

the first two octets are 0x0000, 0xff00, 0xff01, etc. 

A.2.3 Formatting of the Payload

The associated data blocks, if any, are followed in the sequence of formatted blocks by the 

payload blocks. The payload is concatenated with the minimum number of ‘0’ bits, possibly 

none, such that the result can be partitioned into 16-octet blocks. These blocks are denoted in the 

formatted data as Bu+1, Bu+2 ... Br, where r=u+ p 16.

A.3 Formatting of the Counter Blocks

The counter generation function in this section is equivalent to a formatting of the counter index i

into a complete data block. The counter blocks Ctri are formatted as shown in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Formatting of Ctri

Octet number: 0 1 ... 15-q 16-q ... 15

Contents: Flags N [i]8q

Within each block Ctri, the Flags field is formatted as shown in Table 4 below.

Table 4: Formatting of the Flags Field in Ctri

Bit number 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

Contents Reserved Reserved 0 0 0 [q-1]3

The Reserved bits are reserved for future expansions and shall be set to 0. Bits 3, 4, and 5 shall 

also be set to 0, to ensure that all the counter blocks are distinct from B0 (as specified in A.2.1 

above). Bits 0, 1, and 2 contain the same encoding of q as in B0.
15

Appendix B: Length of the MAC 

The length, Tlen, of the MAC within CCM is an important security parameter. The role of this 

parameter in providing authentication assurance is outlined in Section B.1, and guidance in the 

selection of Tlen is given in Section B.2.

B.1 Authentication Assurance

The decryption-verification process determines whether a purported ciphertext input is, in fact, a 

ciphertext, i.e., the output of the generation-encryption process with the given key, associated 

data string, and nonce. The basis of the CCM authentication assurance is the scarcity of

ciphertexts, which suggests that an attacker, i.e., a party without access to the key or to the 

generation-encryption process, cannot easily generate a ciphertext. Therefore, any purported 

ciphertext that passes the decryption-verification process was probably generated legitimately. 

For any purported ciphertext that is at least Tlen bits long, the rightmost Tlen bits correspond to 

an encrypted MAC, and the remaining bits correspond to an encrypted payload. The decryptionverification process checks the correctness of the MAC for the payload, the associated data 

string, and the nonce. Depending on the result, the output is either the error message INVALID 

or the payload. The nature of the authentication assurance, in turn, depends on the output:

• If the output is INVALID, then the payload and the associated data string cannot both be 

authentic, i.e., they cannot have originated from a source that executed the generationencryption process on them with the given nonce to produce the purported ciphertext. 

• If the output is the payload, then the design of the mode provides assurance that the 

payload and the associated data are authentic. This assurance, however, is not absolute: 

an attacker can generate a ciphertext with a certain probability. 

In the second case, the scarcity of ciphertexts and, thus, the expected probability that an attacker 

can guess a ciphertext, is regulated by the size of Tlen. In particular, the probability is no greater 

than 1 in 2Tlen that a single inauthentic purported ciphertext will pass the decryption-verification 

process with a given associated data string and nonce. Of course, an attacker may attempt to 

present many purported ciphertexts to the decryption-verification process and thereby increase 

the probability that at least one of them will turn out to be a true ciphertext. 

Moreover, an attacker may be able to choose the purported ciphertext in such a way as to control 

every bit of the corresponding payload, as described in [9].* Therefore, if the output of the 

 

*

 In particular, given a single valid ciphertext, and the corresponding payload and nonce, the attacker chooses any set 

of bits to flip in the payload and flips the corresponding set of bits in the ciphertext. The attacker then tries to induce 

the decryption-verification process to reuse the associated counter blocks with the altered ciphertext . When the 

counter blocks are generated as in Appendix A, this step is equivalent to inducing the decryption-verification 

process to reuse the nonce. In principle, a system could monitor the nonces that are presented to the decryptionverification process to facilitate some defense against this attack, but such monitoring may not be feasible in 

practice.
16

decryption-verification process is a payload, the contents of the payload do not constitute 

evidence for its authenticity beyond the assurance that the mode already provides.

Also, an attacker may be able to intercept a legitimate ciphertext and “replay” it for verification 

at a later time. To defend against such an event, the controlling protocol or application should 

typically provide the receiver with a means to detect replayed messages, out-of-sequence 

messages, and missing messages, for example, by numbering legitimate messages sequentially. 

B.2 Selection of the MAC Length

Larger values of Tlen provide greater authentication assurance, as described in Section B.1. The 

performance tradeoff is that larger values of Tlen require more bandwidth/storage for the

ciphertext.

Although the formatting function in Appendix A permits Tlen to be any integer multiple of 16 

between 32 and 128, inclusive, a value of Tlen that is less than 64 shall not be used without a 

careful analysis of the risks of accepting inauthentic data as authentic. 

In particular, a value of Tlen smaller than 64 should not be used unless the controlling protocol 

or application environment sufficiently restricts the number of times that the decryptionverification process can return INVALID, across all implementations under any given key. For 

example, the short duration of a session or, more generally, the low bandwidth of the

communication channel may preclude many repeated trials. 

Similarly, for larger values of Tlen, the controlling protocol or the application environment 

should limit the number of inauthentic input sets that may be presented to the decryptionverification process to a number commensurate with the value of the protected data. 

This guidance can be quantified in terms of the following two bounds: 1) the highest acceptable 

probability for an inauthentic message to pass the decryption-verification process, and 2) a limit 

on the number of times that the output is the error message INVALID before the key is retired, 

across all implementations of the decryption-verification process under the key. Given estimates 

of these quantities, denoted Risk and MaxErrs, respectively, Tlen should satisfy the following 

inequality:

Tlen ≥ lg( MaxErrs/ Risk ) .

For example, suppose that a system will not output INVALID for more than 1024 messages 

before retiring the key (i.e., MaxErrs=210), and that the users can tolerate about a one in a million 

chance that the system will accept an inauthentic message (i.e., Risk=2-20). In this case, Tlen may 

be as low as 32. On the other hand, if MaxErrs=232 and Risk=2

-32, then Tlen should be at least 

64.
17

Appendix C: Example Vectors

In this appendix, four examples are provided for the encryption-generation process of CCM with 

the formatting and counter generation functions that are specified in Appendix A. The underlying 

block cipher algorithm is the AES algorithm [2] under a key of 128 bits. The MACs, the nonces, 

the associated data strings, and the payload strings have different lengths in each example, 

including a very long, repetitive string of associated data in Example 4. The bit strings are 

represented in hexadecimal notation.

From each example, a corresponding example of the decryption-verification process of CCM is 

straightforward to construct. 

C.1 Example 1

In the following example, Klen = 128, Tlen=32, Nlen = 56, Alen = 64, and Plen = 32.

K: 40414243 44454647 48494a4b 4c4d4e4f

N: 10111213 141516

A: 00010203 04050607

P: 20212223

B: 4f101112 13141516 00000000 00000004 

 00080001 02030405 06070000 00000000 

 20212223 00000000 00000000 00000000

T: 6084341b

Ctr0: 07101112 13141516 00000000 00000000

S0: 2d281146 10676c26 32bad748 559a679a

Ctr1: 07101112 13141516 00000000 00000001

S1: 51432378 e474b339 71318484 103cddfb

C: 7162015b 4dac255d

C.2 Example 2

In the following example, Klen = 128, Tlen=48, Nlen = 64, Alen = 128, and Plen = 128.

K: 40414243 44454647 48494a4b 4c4d4e4f

N: 10111213 14151617

A: 00010203 04050607 08090a0b 0c0d0e0f

P: 20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f
18

B: 56101112 13141516 17000000 00000010 

 00100001 02030405 06070809 0a0b0c0d 

 0e0f0000 00000000 00000000 00000000 

 20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f

T: 7f479ffc a464

Ctr0: 06101112 13141516 17000000 00000000

S0: 6081d043 08a97dcc 20cdcc60 bf947b78

Ctr1: 06101112 13141516 17000000 00000001

S1: f280d2c3 75cf7945 20335db9 2b107712

C: d2a1f0e0 51ea5f62 081a7792 073d593d

 1fc64fbf accd

C.3 Example 3

In the following example, Klen = 128, Tlen=64, Nlen = 96, Alen = 160, and Plen = 192.

K: 40414243 44454647 48494a4b 4c4d4e4f

N: 10111213 14151617 18191a1b

A: 00010203 04050607 08090a0b 0c0d0e0f 

 10111213

P: 20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f

 30313233 34353637

B: 5a101112 13141516 1718191a 1b000018

 00140001 02030405 06070809 0a0b0c0d

 0e0f1011 12130000 00000000 00000000

 20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f

 30313233 34353637 00000000 00000000

T: 67c99240 c7d51048

Ctr0: 02101112 13141516 1718191a 1b000000

S0: 2f8a00bb 06658919 c3a040a6 eaed1a7f

Ctr1: 02101112 13141516 1718191a 1b000001

S1: c393238a d1923c5d b335c0c7 e1bac924

Ctr2: 02101112 13141516 1718191a 1b000002

S2: 514798ea 9077bc92 6c22ebef 2ac732dc

C: e3b201a9 f5b71a7a 9b1ceaec cd97e70b
19

 6176aad9 a4428aa5 484392fb c1b09951

C.4 Example 4

In the following example, Klen = 128, Tlen=112, Nlen = 104, Alen = 524288, and Plen = 256. 

The associated data string is too large to comfortably present in its entirety; therefore, the given 

string of the first sixteen blocks of the associated data string is concatenated with itself

repeatedly to form a string of 524288 bits. Similarly, only the beginning and the end of the 

resulting formatted data string B are presented. 

K: 40414243 44454647 48494a4b 4c4d4e4f

N: 10111213 14151617 18191a1b 1c

A: 00010203 04050607 08090a0b 0c0d0e0f

 10111213 14151617 18191a1b 1c1d1e1f 

 20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f 

 30313233 34353637 38393a3b 3c3d3e3f 

 40414243 44454647 48494a4b 4c4d4e4f 

 50515253 54555657 58595a5b 5c5d5e5f 

 60616263 64656667 68696a6b 6c6d6e6f 

 70717273 74757677 78797a7b 7c7d7e7f 

 80818283 84858687 88898a8b 8c8d8e8f 

 90919293 94959697 98999a9b 9c9d9e9f 

 a0a1a2a3 a4a5a6a7 a8a9aaab acadaeaf 

 b0b1b2b3 b4b5b6b7 b8b9babb bcbdbebf 

 c0c1c2c3 c4c5c6c7 c8c9cacb cccdcecf 

 d0d1d2d3 d4d5d6d7 d8d9dadb dcdddedf 

 e0e1e2e3 e4e5e6e7 e8e9eaeb ecedeeef 

 f0f1f2f3 f4f5f6f7 f8f9fafb fcfdfeff

...

P: 20212223 24252627 28292a2b 2c2d2e2f 

 30313233 34353637 38393a3b 3c3d3e3f

B: 71101112 13141516 1718191a 1b1c0020 

 fffe0001 00000001 02030405 06070809 

 0a0b0c0d 0e0f1011 12131415 16171819

 1a1b1c1d 1e1f2021 22232425 26272829

...

 dadbdcdd dedfe0e1 e2e3e4e5 e6e7e8e9

 eaebeced eeeff0f1 f2f3f4f5 f6f7f8f9

 fafbfcfd feff0000 00000000 00000000

T: f4dd5d0e e4046172 25ffe34f ce91
20

Ctr0: 01101112 13141516 1718191a 1b1c0000

S0: 407136e2 77ec38fc 5af24ef3 24ca1178

Ctr1: 01101112 13141516 1718191a 1b1c0001 

S1: 49b07f8e 3aa1e010 4241e8bd 5260854e

Ctr2: 01101112 13141516 1718191a 1b1c0002

S2: 6ad1cf2c 9af17af3 bcbbbf12 7a01f14d

C: 69915dad 1e84c637 6a68c296 7e4dab61

 5ae0fd1f aec44cc4 84828529 463ccf72

 b4ac6bec 93e8598e 7f0dadbc ea5b
21

Appendix D: References

[1] D. Whiting, R. Housley, N. Ferguson, Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM). Available at 

http://csrc.nist.gov/ CryptoToolkit/modes/proposedmodes/.

[2] FIPS Publication 197, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). U.S. DoC/NIST, November 

26, 2001. Available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/. 

[3] FIPS Publication 46-3, Data Encryption Standard (DES). U.S. DoC/NIST, October 25, 

1999. Available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/.

[4] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., IEEE Std. 802.11i/D7.0, Draft 

Amendment to Standard for Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between

Systems – LAN/MAN Specific Requirements – Part 11: Wireless Medium Access Control 

(MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications: Medium Access Control (MAC)

Security Enhancements, October 2003.

[5] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., IEEE Std. 802.11-1999, IEEE 

Standard for Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between Systems –

LAN/MAN Specific Requirements – Part 11: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) 

and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications, New York: IEEE Press, 1999.

[6] NIST Special Publication 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of

Operation – Methods and Techniques. U.S. DoC/NIST, December 2001. Available at 

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/.

[7] Draft NIST Special Publication 800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of 

Operation: the CMAC Authentication Mode. U.S. DoC/NIST, October 2003. Available 

at http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/modes.

[8] J. Jonsson, On the Security of CTR + CBC-MAC, in Proceedings of Selected Areas in 

Cryptography – SAC, 2002, K. Nyberg, H. Heys, Eds., Lecture Notes in Computer 

Science, Vol. 2595, pp. 76-93, Berlin: Springer, 2002.

[9] P. Rogaway and D. Wagner, A Critique of CCM. Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 

2003/070, April, 2003. Available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/070/.