Page 1 GAO-14-626R Homeland Missile Defense

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

July 17, 2014

Congressional Committees

Missile Defense: DOD’s Report Provides Limited Insight on Improvements to Homeland 

Missile Defense and Acquisition Plans

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is developing the Ground-based Midcourse Defense 

System (GMD) to defend the United States against an intermediate and intercontinental ballistic 

missile attack.1 As part of this system, the Department of Defense (DOD) has already deployed 

30 ground-based interceptors—consisting of a booster with a kill vehicle on top—and a fire 

control system that uses information from sensors to formulate a battle plan. According to DOD, 

GMD is able to protect the United States from a limited ballistic missile attack from North Korea 

and Iran. However, in March 2014, a senior DOD official testified that due to test failures and the 

current ballistic missile threats, one of the highest priorities for the protection of the United 

States is to improve the reliability and effectiveness of the GMD ground-based interceptor. 

According to the DOD Guide for Achieving Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability, reliability 

is an essential element of mission capability and is defined as the probability that an item will 

perform a necessary function when required. Between December 2010 and July 2013, the 

program experienced three consecutive test failures: one failure with GMD’s original interceptor 

configuration called the Capability Enhancement I (CE-I) and two failures with the upgraded 

version called the Capability Enhancement II (CE-II).2 These test failures along with other 

delays and concurrent acquisition activities have raised questions about the reliability of the 

GMD system.

3

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, signed into law on January 2, 

2013, mandated that the Secretary of Defense submit to the congressional defense committees

a report on the status of efforts to improve the homeland ballistic missile defense capability of 

the United States that was required to include, among other things, a description of the results 

of two planned flight tests.

4 While DOD was required to provide the report to the congressional 

defense committees no later than July 2, 2013, it did not submit that report until February 7, 

2014. Additionally, GAO was required to brief the congressional defense committees on our 

views of DOD’s report and submit a report as soon as practicable.

5

 1 Intermediate-range ballistic missiles have a range from 1,864 to 3,418 miles and intercontinental ballistic missiles 

have a range greater than 3,418 miles.

We offered briefings to all 

the congressional defense committees and briefed the Senate and House Armed Services 

2 While a draft of this report was at DOD for comment, MDA conducted Flight Test GMD-06b (FTG-06b) on June 22, 

2014. Initial results indicate that the CE-II EKV intercepted the target however the test analysis is ongoing. 3 Concurrency is broadly defined as the overlap between technology development and product development or 

between product development and production.

4 Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 228(b). The congressional defense committees are the Committee on Armed Services and 

the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 

Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 10 U.S.C. § 101(a) (16). 5 Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 228(c).
Page 2 GAO-14-626R Homeland Missile Defense

Committees in April 2014. We assessed: (1) the extent to which DOD’s report addressed

actions taken or planned to improve the reliability of the GMD system; and (2) the extent to 

which DOD’s report described the results of two flight tests required to restart interceptor 

production by demonstrating the successful correction to the problem that caused the 

December 2010 flight test failure.

To determine the extent to which the DOD report identified actions taken or plans to improve 

GMD, we assessed the actions and plans described in DOD’s report and compared them to 

GMD development efforts. We also examined past DOD reports to Congress on various Ballistic 

Missile Defense efforts and GMD program execution reports to identify program actions and 

plans. Additionally, we assessed available program plans such as their Stockpile Reliability 

Program Plan. We also reviewed missile defense program assessments conducted by the U.S. 

Strategic Command. To determine the extent to which DOD’s report described the flight test 

results, we reviewed the report for test plans and results and then compared it to assessments 

in recent GAO reports, other DOD reports, and GMD program management documents. We 

conducted interviews with DOD officials and contractors to corroborate information found in 

program documentation including officials in the MDA, DOD testing agencies, the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Strategic Command, 

Boeing, Raytheon, and the Orbital Sciences Corporation.

We conducted this performance audit from March 2013 through July 2014 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our objectives.

DOD’s Report Described Actions Taken and Plans but Not their Effect, If Any, or Risks

On February 7, 2014, DOD submitted to Congress a report titled Status of Efforts to Improve the 

Homeland Ballistic Missile Defense Capability of the United States. On the basis of our analysis 

of DOD’s report, we found that it described actions to improve homeland missile defense and 

was generally responsive to the mandate, but it did not detail the effect of these actions, if any, 

on the GMD system. Without an understanding of the effectiveness of these actions and plans, 

Congress may not have the information it needs when making difficult choices on where to 

spend limited funds. For example, the report stated that MDA has upgraded the software of the

entire fleet of CE-I and CE-II interceptors to improve their operational performance, but it did not 

describe the effectiveness of these improvements or whether these improvements have been 

confirmed to work as intended in flight tests. Specific details on the GMD program, such as 

improvements made as a result of software upgrades, are classified. DOD could have provided

such information in a classified annex, which was specifically allowed by the mandate language, 

but it chose not to do so. A DOD policy official stated that the unclassified report met the intent 

of the mandate without the classified annex. In our view, a classified annex with a detailed 

description of the effect of the actions taken would have provided a more comprehensive picture 

of the accomplishments achieved to date, if any, and the benefits of those improvements to 

homeland defense. 

The report also described MDA’s plans to improve GMD reliability, but again without significant 

details. For example, the report mentions that MDA is developing an improved methodology to 

estimate the interceptors’ reliability, the effect of which could provide more confidence in the 

estimates. However, it does not mention how the new methodology will be implemented, or that 

MDA has changed its methodology several times since 2008. According to DOD, these changes
Page 3 GAO-14-626R Homeland Missile Defense

could ultimately improve DOD’s ability to assess reliability, but in the near term frequent 

changes to the methodology have made it difficult to compare reliability estimates to see if any 

progress occurred. Until GMD has fully implemented this methodology and gathered data to 

assess its effectiveness, it is unclear whether the changes are an improvement.

Moreover, several of MDA’s reported reliability improvement plans are not yet final and 

therefore we could not assess their effect on program activities or their potential for improving 

GMD. According to MDA officials, they were not certain when the plans would be finalized. For 

example, DOD’s report stated the following: 

• MDA is developing an acquisition strategy for an interceptor with new components to 

bolster defenses against missile threats to the United States. According to GMD officials, 

the acquisition strategy has not been finalized and they do not have an expected 

completion date. However, these interceptors are expected to be delivered in fiscal year 

2018. 

• MDA is conducting trade studies to determine the most cost-effective approach for 

upgrading existing sensors and adding new types of sensors. The report does not 

provide an expected time frame for completion of this effort.

• MDA’s reliability testing programs include an ongoing effort to identify components that 

require development, procurement, testing, and replacement to improve interceptor

reliability. 

Although the report described MDA’s reliability testing programs, which are intended to identify 

potential interceptor component changes that could improve the interceptor’s reliability, it did not 

describe the expected effects of these testing programs. In addition, the report did not note that 

these programs have existed for several years, but their progress has been hindered by flight 

test failures, which in turn have prolonged the time it will take to gain a full understanding of 

GMD capabilities and limitations.

6

Additionally, the report discusses CE-I retrofits but did not explain that the completed retrofits do 

not fix all known issues and that the effect of these fixes has not been demonstrated through 

flight testing, as we have previously reported.

 According to GMD program officials, they also delayed 

component testing to determine estimated service life, in part due to MDA’s redirection of

resources from reliability testing to flight test failure investigations and mitigations.

7

The need for these retrofits arose in part due to the concurrent activities GMD used to develop, 

produce, and field the CE-I. In 2012, we reported that the GMD program concurrently matured 

technology, designed the system, tested the design, and produced and fielded a system, 

resulting in developmental challenges. The CE-I interceptors were fielded before flight testing 

confirmed the design was reliable. Design problems uncovered during testing led to design 

changes and the ongoing retrofit program to improve the reliability of delivered CE-I 

Nor did it explain the connection between the 

July 2013 flight test failure—which was intended to demonstrate some of those fixes—and 

delayed understanding of retrofit performance. 

 

6 In 2013, we reported that CE-I upgrades were deferred through 2017. See GAO, Missile Defense: Opportunity to 

Refocus on Strengthening Acquisition Management, GAO-13-432 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2013). 7 See GAO, Missile Defense: Mixed Progress in Achieving Acquisition Goals and Improving Accountability, GAO-14-

351 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2014). Additionally, see GAO, Missile Defense: Opportunity Exists to Strengthen 

Acquisitions by Reducing Concurrency, GAO-12-486 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2012).
Page 4 GAO-14-626R Homeland Missile Defense

interceptors. As a result, confidence in the interceptors’ current reliability continues to be 

affected by past GMD concurrent production, fielding, and testing. 

Acquisition Strategy for New Interceptors Overlaps Manufacturing and Testing Leading to 

Increased Acquisition Risk

The DOD report also described plans to develop and deliver 11 interceptors with the same 

design as the initial CE-II exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV), but with changes to certain 

components to address its reliability.8 MDA has given this interceptor configuration its own 

name, the CE-II Block I. We assessed these acquisition plans and determined that they include 

concurrent manufacturing and testing, which puts DOD at high risk for cost growth, schedule 

delays, and performance shortfalls if it discovers issues after manufacture of interceptors 

begins.

9

1. In the near term, MDA is planning to confirm the performance of new components for the 

CE-II Block I in a third quarter fiscal year 2016 flight test—the same year the program 

plans to deliver interceptors with these new components for operational use. However, 

because production must begin at least 2 years before delivery, the program must begin 

manufacturing before that developmental flight test in order to deliver the interceptors for 

operational use beginning in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2016. This developmental

flight test determines if the new EKV and booster components work as intended and, 

according to acquisition best practices, should be conducted before production for 

operational use. As we previously found, GMD intercept tests conducted to date have 

already led to major hardware or software changes to the interceptor. In April 2014, we 

found that the discovery of design issues has increased the cost to demonstrate as well 

as fix the already produced CE-IIs from $236 million to $1.309 billion.

Specifically, we found the following: 

10

2. In the long term, MDA plans to reach an operational fleet of 44 interceptors by 2017 and 

to deliver a robust defense capability in 2019, 3 years before GMD developmental 

testing would be complete. To realize these plans, many concurrent efforts must be 

completed including successful testing, restarting CE-II production, and developing and 

acquiring interceptors with new components. In addition, MDA’s developmental test plan 

for GMD calls for increasing the complexity of the flight testing in order to explore new 

areas of performance. In our view, this approach is high risk because any issues 

discovered in these increasingly complex developmental tests after 2017 could 

significantly affect the fleet and the delivery of additional system capabilities scheduled 

in fiscal year 2019. 

Consequently, in 

our view this approach is high risk because any issues discovered through the 2016 test

could disrupt ongoing manufacturing and require costly post-manufacture retrofits. 

In our view, if MDA continues its past practice of concurrent manufacturing and testing, it risks 

repeating the performance shortfalls, delays, and cost increases it has experienced with the 

deployed interceptor fleet. We have previously made recommendations to the Secretary of 

Defense to reduce concurrency and strengthen MDA’s near- and long-term acquisitions. For 

example, in March 2009, we recommended that MDA synchronize the development, 

manufacturing, and fielding schedules of Ballistic Missile Defense System assets with the 

 

8 This is a similar approach to the one MDA took to initially replace obsolete components on the CE-I EKV resulting in 

the CE-II EKV. 

9 The mandate did not require the DOD report to discuss concurrent activities.

10 See GAO, Missile Defense: DOD’s Report Provides Limited Insight on Testing Options for the Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense System, GAO-14-350R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2014).
Page 5 GAO-14-626R Homeland Missile Defense

testing and validation schedules to ensure that items are not manufactured for fielding before 

their performance has been validated through testing.11

DOD’s Report Is Limited Because It did not Explain That a Key Flight Test was Delayed or 

Provide the Reasons for that Delay

While DOD partially concurred with this 

recommendation, we concluded that it has not yet been fully implemented.

DOD did not explain in its report that a key flight test had been delayed nor did it provide the 

reasons for that delay. DOD was required to describe in its report the test results of two flight 

tests intended to demonstrate the successful correction to the problem that caused a prior flight 

test failure. In December 2010, a CE-II intercept test failed due to a fault in the EKV’s guidance 

system. In response, MDA halted deliveries of new CE-II interceptors, identified the cause of the 

failure, and, over several years, worked to redesign the guidance system component that 

caused it. MDA planned two CE-II flight tests with the redesigned component—a non-intercept, 

diagnostic flight test called Controlled Test Vehicle (CTV)-01 and an intercept flight test called

Flight Test GMD (FTG)-06b—to show it had resolved the cause of the December 2010 failure 

and to allow interceptor deliveries to resume. 

DOD’s report described test results for CTV-01 but only described plans for FTG-06b because 

MDA had not conducted that test.12

DOD’s report was of limited use to congressional decision makers because it did not explain

that FTG-06b had been delayed, nor did it discuss the reasons for the test delay. MDA 

previously planned to conduct FTG-06b in the third quarter of fiscal year 2012 but we found in 

April 2014 that MDA has experienced at least 2 years of delays in conducting FTG-06b because 

resolving the 2010 test failure has proven more difficult than initially expected.

DOD’s report said that in January 2013, CTV-01 was 

successfully completed and that the test had gathered critical flight test data to verify the 

redesigned component. DOD’s report also briefly described plans for FTG-06b and stated the 

test was scheduled for the second or third quarter of fiscal year 2014. 

13

Agency Comments 

For example, 

although MDA successfully achieved all test objectives for CTV-01, we found that subsequent 

ground testing revealed further corrections to the redesigned component were needed. We also 

found that the program experienced further delays in this test while it implemented changes 

based on assessments from an ongoing failure review of a July 2013 flight test. In our view, this 

context would have been beneficial for Congress for oversight of this critical program.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. Although DOD provided 

technical comments for our report and we incorporated them as appropriate, DOD did not 

provide written comments to include in this report.

 

11 See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Production and Fielding of Missile Defense Components Continue with Less 

Testing and Validation Than Planned, GAO-09-338 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2009).

12 While this report was at DOD for comment, MDA conducted FTG-06b on June 22, 2014. To conduct the test, MDA 

launched a CE-II interceptor from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Initial test reports indicate that the CE-II 

interceptor intercepted the target, however, MDA is still analyzing the test data. 13 See GAO-14-351.
Page 6 GAO-14-626R Homeland Missile Defense

- - - - -

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and to the 

Secretary of Defense. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or 

chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to 

this report are: David Best, Assistant Director; Desirée Cunningham; Steven Stern; Robert 

Swierczek; Jay Tallon, Brian Tittle; Hai V. Tran; and Alyssa Weir.

Cristina Chaplain, Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Page 7 GAO-14-626R Homeland Missile Defense

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable James Inhofe

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

(121129)
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, 

GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, and 

correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products, 

go to www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537.

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube.

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov.

Contact:

Website: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations

Public Affairs

Please Print on Recycled Paper.