RD-A152 112 INTELLIGENCE INDOCHINA MONOGRAPHS<U> flRMV CENTER OF 1/2

MILITARV HISTORV WASHINGTON DC H N LUNG 1982

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Indochina Monographs

(7)1

CO

£5 Intelligence

by

Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung

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SEP 2 1983 3 : m

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U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

£

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pgnuBunow STATEMENT A

Approved for public teleasoj

Distribution Unlimited 88 08 03 118

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E.V.V.VVV,'".'-"'•"'- ' •- r "T—i—»—•—•—-r-—t •—w—» —. T —i,—•—

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Indochina Monographs

Intelligence

Col Hoang Ngoc Lung

• '• .•• :

S

DTIC

ELECTE

SEP 2 1983

t -rm

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U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved fox public release!

Distribution Unlimited

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^.- >^>v.'.v.v:v i
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This book is not copyrighted and may be reproduced in

whole or in part without consulting the publisher

First printing 1982 Accession For

NTIS GRA&I

DTIC TAB

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•+- •

D

distribution/

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Lung, Hoang Ngoc.

Intelligence.

(Indochina monographs)

Distributed free to government and academic research

libraries.

1. Military intelligence—Vietnam. 2. Military

intelligence—United States. I. Title. II. Series.

UB251.V5L86 959.70U'38 81-108UU

AACR2

- - - - - — -• - ^ -- - k. -- • -
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iii

Indochina Monographs

This is one of a series published by the U.S. Array Center

of Military History. They were written by officers who held

responsible positions in the Cambodian, Laotian, and South

Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. The General

Research Corporation provided writing facilities and other necessa-

•r.

ry support under an Army contract with the Center of Military History. The monographs were not edited or altered and reflect the

views of their authors—not necessarily those of the U.S. Army or

the Department of Defense. The authors were not attempting to write -.-•.

definitive accounts but to set down how they saw the war in South- [•'-'• .*-.'

east Asia. t_ ^

Colonel William E. Le Gro, U.S. Army, retired, has written a

monograph (1981) allied with this series, Vietnam; From Cease-Fire

*• * •

to Capitulation. Another book, The Final Collapse by General Cao

Van Vien, the last chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint General .. '

Staff, will be formally published and sold by the Superintendent •-,-•-

• • • of Documents. V-V

Taken together these works should provide useful source V/V

materials for serious historians pending publication of the more de- ~„_;

finitive series, the U.S. Army in Vietnam. !-' -

JAMES L. COLLINS, JR.

Brigadier General, USA

Chief of Military History

"*—-*-—^-:*—'-*-—^—-*—:~-^ • - - - - - - -" - - •-•-•-••- -. •• . •. • - . . i - >- - - - ..-.•••. . . , . . . ,_ . __. . . ,
•

11,1,1 , • :~ -r- ••.— .•.-.-.•..•-- - - .- . • • • • - • • • ••-

1 ^-

1 TITLES IS TEE SERIES

ftitle—author/s—LC Catalog Card)

J

Cambodian Incursion—Brig. Gen. Tran DInh Tho —

79-21722

—

[ The Easter Offensive of 3 972—Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang

Truong —79-20551

. -

;: The

1

General Offensives of 1968-69--Col. Hoang Ngoc

Lung—80-607931

.-;•

Intelligence —Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung — 81-10844/AACR2

The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse--

Lt. Gen. Sak Sutsakhan—79-607776

Lam Son 719—Maj . Gen. Nguyen Duy Hinh — 79-607101

Leadership—General Cao Van Vien —80-6079A1

Pacification—Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho--79-607913

RLG Military Operations and Activities in the

Laotian Panhandle--Brig. Gen. Soutchay

Vongsavanh—81-10934/AACR2

The RVNAF—Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen—79-607963

RVNAF and U.S. Operational Cooperation and

Coordination—Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong--"

79-607170

RVNAF Logistics—Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen—

80-607117

Reflections on the Vietnam War—General Cao Van Vien

and Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen—79-607979

The Royal Lao Army and U.S. Army Advice and Support—

Maj. Gen. Oudone Sananikone—79-607054

The South Vietnamese Society--K&i. Gen. Nguyen

Duy Hinh and Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho—79-17694

Strategy and Tactics--Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung—79-607102

Territorial Forces—Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong— 9— tÄi

80-15131

The U.S. Adviser--General Cao Van Vien, Lt. Gen. Ngo

Quang Truong, Lt. Gen. Dong Van Khuyen, Maj. Gen.

Nguyen Duy Hinh, Brig. Gen. Tran Dinh Tho, Col.

Hoang Ngoc Lung, and Lt. Col. Chu Xuan Vien— ^ _

80-607108

•..

Vietnamization and the Cease-Fire--Mal . Gen. Nguyen

Duy Hinh—79-607982

** *

» - . *

iv

1
.•.•„•.".».»,• « .» • « ",• •'•'••.*•»'•' L »•.' . »; » . •', • • • t ;' ;•• • • , -j i • l ••• -i - •, ••% i i

1

"• ."'P» "-

Preface

The war in Vietnam was often called an intelligence war. The

challenges and responsibilities placed on the South Vietnam—United

States—Free World intelligence community were great and constant.

During this long war the entire intelligence program improved

each day as our data base expanded, as more was learned about the

elusive enemy, personnel were trained, and new procedures and techniques were tested and found effective.

The most rewarding experience in intelligence activities during

the Vietnam war was the very close cooperation and coordination between

American and Vietnamese military intelligence personnel and systems.

It was this cooperation that helped RVNAF military intelligence upgrade

and become self-reliant during the post-cease-fire period.

This monograph attempts to record all the facts concerning intelligence activities, its organizations and coordination procedures, its

successes and failures during the period from 1965 to the final days

of the Republic of Vietnam. In this attempt, one of the difficulties

I faced was the lack of documentation to help make my work more accurate

and more substantial. To overcome this shortcoming, I have interviewed

several former colleagues of mine, American and Vietnamese, all of them

highly experienced with intelligence activities in Vietnam. Apart from

their invaluable contributions, most of the writing was based on my

personal knowledge and experience.

I am indebted to General Cao Van Vien, Chairman of the Joint General Staff, Lieutenant General Dong Van Khuyen, Chief of Staff—under

whom I served several years as Assistant Chief of Staff J2, JGS—, and

—• • - •' « « ,J - M -• • • - . a . M

, ciuu . ~4|

*- > *•. 3

-. •.

'••'• '-••":

• •••."'

- .'i

! ..-ftj

. ... .
•••• !•••.'.» : i*. ••: " .-..-..

Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho, Assistant Chief of Staff J-3, JGS,

for their valuable comments. Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong,

Commanding General of I Corps and Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh, Commander of the 3d Infantry Division, contributed thoughtful remarks and

the practical view of field commanders.

Finally, I am particularly indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Chu Xuan

Vien and Ms. Pham Thi Bong. Lt. Colonel Vien, the last Army Attache

serving at the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, D.C., has done a

highly professional job of translating and editing. Ms. Bong, a former

Captain in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and also a former member

of the Vietnamese Embassy staff, spent long hours typing, editing and

in the administrative preparation of my manuscript in final form.

- -

McLean, Virginia

31 October 1976

Hoang Ngoc Lung

Colonel, ARVN

•

. . .

•

w-- •;

.-.-i

•."

., 1

-.-;- .'-•

vi

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' • • . • I I 1 • I • I i •••» 1 • t IL • 1 • . » -t • J •.'••'••• . »U • •••.-!•• •••-»•••••••» • • » • • • m • • •. i • i • i. ..j . I

I -"

Contents

Chapter Page

I. INTRODUCTION 1

Nature of The Vietnam War 2

Role of Intelligence in the Vietnam War 10

II. INTELLIGENCE, CULTURE, AND LANGUAGE \ 18

Characteristics of Vietnamese Culture and Language 18

Communist Culture and Language 22

South Vietnamese Culture and Language 26

Language, Translation and Cultural Interpretation 31

III. REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE

ORGANIZATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM • 37

The RVN National and Local Intelligence Coordination Commi ttees 37

Vietnamese Civilian Intelligence Agencies .... 46

Vietnamese Military Intelligence Organizations 54

United States Intelligence Organizations

in Vietnam before the Paris Agreement .... 76

IV. INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION' AND COORDINATION 79

Concepts and Problems 79

Combined Intelligence A.ctivities 81

Intelligence Cooperation and Coordination at

The Field Level 109

Military Intelligence Detachments (MID) \\\

Cooperation and Coordination in Human Intelligence 112

Cooperation and Coordination in Aerial Photo

Reconnaissance 118

Signal Intelligence 123

Intelligence Training 126

V. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

IN VIETNAM FOLLOWING UNITED STATES MILITARY

DISENGAGEMENT 129

Defense Attache Office, Intelligence Branch . . . 129

Difficulties Encountered 131

United States-AJtVN Intelligence Cooperation and

Coordination In the Face of New Difficulties . . 136

Conclusions 143

VI 1

. .--. - .

........ . -•. •-• f-'~-- .......... _^.. .......
••-.--.-• -•r^rrrrrTTyr - • .-•• *-•••- • • - ••- - •- - • •• -

£-*>\ /•'••. •"/-•'•! -\ •!"••'-•'. -• ' !-'\ • • .

.i- •—•—'- J—• »'.•»•."• '• '. i. ', :—: 1 i 1 i : : :—^-i 1 1 =-1^ • ' L,' i ' '—*.: ' • •

•

Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho, Assistant Chief of Staff J-3, JGS,

for their valuable comments. Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong,

Commanding General of I Corps and Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh, Con

mander of the 3d Infantry Division, contributed thoughtful remarks z

the practical view of field commanders.

Finally, I am particularly indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Chu J

Vien and Ms. Pham Thi Bong. Lt. Colonel Vien, the last Army Attach«

serving at the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, D.C., has done a

highly professional job of translating and editing. Ms. Bong, a fo

Captain in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and also a former m

... No.

of the Vietnamese Embassy staff, spent long hours typing, editing a ^

in the administrative preparation of my manuscript in final form.

McLean, Virginia Hoang Ngoc Lung

31 October 1976 Colonel, ARVN

k.

5-

6.

7.

8.

9-

10.

11.

12.

13.

1U.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

vi
Preface

The war in Vietnam was often called an intelligence war. The

challenges and responsibilities placed on the South Vietnam—United

States—Free World intelligence community were great and constant.

During this long war the entire intelligence program improved

each day as our data base expanded, as more was learned about the

elusive enemy, personnel were trained, and new procedures and techniques were tested and found effective.

The most rewarding experience in intelligence activities during

the Vietnam war was the very close cooperation and coordination between

American and Vietnamese military intelligence personnel and systems.

It was this cooperation that helped RVNAF military intelligence upgrade

and become self-reliant during the post-cease-fire period.

This monograph attempts to record all the facts concerning intelligence activities, its organizations and coordination procedures, its

successes and failures during the period from 1965 to the final days

of the Republic of Vietnam. In this attempt, one of the difficulties

I faced was the lack of documentation to help make my work more accurate

and more substantial. To overcome this shortcoming, I have interviewed

several former colleagues of mine, American and Vietnamese, all of them

highly experienced with intelligence activities in Vietnam. Apart from

their invaluable contributions, most of the writing was based on my

personal knowledge and experience.

I am indebted to General Cao Van Vien, Chairman of the Joint General Staff, Lieutenant General Dong Van Khuyen, Chief of Staff—under

whom I served several years as Assistant Chief of Staff J2, JGS—, and
w .-.-..-..-.---.---• - • - • . • - - -- -.-.-. -ir-T. -»-.« «-T *.r;j>—• • r - -- - ~ ' • •- -•••-•--• . - --.-.-.

CHAPTER I

Introduction

During the Vietnam war, there was a constant improvement of

intelligence as each day passed. It is usually recognized that

during the final years of cooperation between the Republic of Vietnam and United States combat forces, the commanders at most echelons

were better informed about the enemy than in any war in the histories

of these two nations.

This was made possible because of the close coordination and

cooperation between RVN and US Military Intelligence personnel and

activities. This cooperation of joint planning, execution and exchange of information was essential because the RVN and the US

were faced with an elusive enemy who, justifiably enough, earned

such rhetorical qualifications as "unknown" or "mythical". Knowledge

about the enemy, as we confronted him in Vietnam, was not an easy

proposition. But it was not an unattainable goal, nor did it elude

our success altogether.

There is general agreement that the Vietnam war was a complex

venture. It was this complexity that heavily influenced intelligence

activities and subjected them to unprecedented challenges. As a result, an examination of intelligence, its organizations, its successes

and failures must be made in the context of the war and preceded by

an insight into its nature, its historical perspective and the opposing views that each side held with regard to its basic goals in this

war.

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11 • m i ' ,i l • . ' • •_• « 7 • • * . • -»-••'•-• . - T - I '

Nature of the Vietnam War

A recent popular Vietnamese folk song about the war laments:

"A thousand years of domination by the Chinese

invaders, A hundred years of domination by the

French invaders, Twenty years of internecine

fighting, day in day out ..1

In just a few phrases, the song eloquently sums up the long

history of Vietnam, the history of a small nation constantly plagued

by wars. Through many invasions from the North, the Chinese repeatedly attempted to annex the tiny Viet nation, and to subjugate and assimilate the Viet people. During the ten centuries of Chinese domination,

from 111 B.C. to 938 A.D., numerous Vietnamese heroes rose up against

the invaders to wrest back their independence. No Vietnamese can

forget the story of Trieu Quang Phuc, the first Vietnamese military

leader who employed guerrilla tactics to defeat the invaders of the

Liang kingdom (7th century), or Emoeror Quang Trung who. by a surprise

2

blitzkrieg, annihilated the Ching corps at the end of the 18th century.

Then came the French who created a colony out of Vietnam for nearly a century from 1858 to 1945. The history of Vietnam under French

suzerainty abounds in heroic uprisings and resistance movements, ^11

of them waged with the sole purpose of reclaiming national identity and

independence. Not until 1945 was this independence finally restored and

precariously maintained before the whole nation was plunged into war

against the French who sought again to impose their rule. It was unfortunate that this anti-colonialist war, although fought by the whole

people, was led by hard line Communist cadres. This was gradually to

f •

"Mother's Legacy", composed by Trinh Cong Son.

2

The given name of Emperor Quang Trung is Nguyen Hue. The communists

chose Nguyen Hue as code name for their 19 72 Easter Offensive because

they were greatly impressed by the blitzkrieg tactic used by the Emperor

to annihilate 200,000 Ching invaders in 1789.

<_^. ^^ - • - - • -••.-..-. .»A.»,!,..—,%.„ .m** . —;———.aC—m*„.,•• r- mi»
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t'.''Ht".'Li ,T. m\r.v J-. v .»•••'..- '•-»-.» •» •.'—". '«• ",•';• .•_•! •» "„l "Jl •——rr« ' T—I'J'.'l ".^ -•-••- •- • m. • •; -.-.-.-.•

change the nature of the war when it became apparent that the Viet Minh

regime was leaning toward socialism through the "agrarian reform" of

1950.

Up until that time, the Viet Minh had not revealed the future

direction of their regime. The people believed they fought a sacrosanct war for national independence, no one anticipated that the cause

they were fighting for was to serve the Communist leaders' own purpose.

In 1950, the Viet Minh leaders launched a country-wide "Agrarian

Reform" campaign, the first step toward creating an egalitarian society.

This proved to be their biggest mistake because the excesses and brutality of zealous cadres completely alienated the land-owners and, by ex3

tension, most of the educated "petite bourgeoise." It was a turning

point and the seed of ideological difference, heretofore submerged

beneath the patriotic fervor, began to take roots. "

But the real turnabout came when the Republic of Vietnam became an

independent nation south of the 17th parallel. For the first time since •'.-'.•'•

1945, a sense of national identity prevailed —which emboldened the :• -"

Vietnamese of the South to defy and oppose the Communist regime in the F'

North. Now that they were able to live under a regime of their choice,

they were willing to defend it when it came under threat.

It was not the first time though that the Vietnamese fought among

themselves. During its long history, Vietnam had been the theater of

many fratricidal wars, the longest and hardest of which lasted over a

century,from 1627 to 1774. This was the contest between the Trinh dynasty in the North and the Nguyen dynasty in the South. Within a period

of forty-five years, large-scale warfare broke out six times in the Dong

Hoi area (16th parallel) between the feuding dynasties. In the end,

both sides were exhausted and neither was powerful enough to dominate

3

The Agrarian Reform campaign gave rise to many resentments among

the Vietnamese population, and even among Communist cadres and troops.

Truong Chinh who was responsible for this campaign, was then released

from his poat as secretary general of the Labor Party in 1956 by order

of Ho Chi Minh.

---••> •• ^ . . _* •. , . -
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the other. So they reconciled their difference and agreed to coexist

on either side of the 16th parallel until 1774 when the Tay Son dynasty

defeated both of them and reunified the country.

The remarkable thing about all these civil wars was that no matter

which dynasty came to power, the regime remained basically the same

and monarchy was maintained. The people by and large hardly felt any

difference in their lives.

However, as early as in 1945, when the national purpose focused on

reclaiming independence, first from the Japanese and later from the

French, a new and most difficult question arose concerning what kind

of regime was in store for Vietnam in the immediate future. For although the people would readily accept any government within a definite

regime, they would not readily consent to any regime. As a result, a

shift in national purpose gradually took hold and the struggle for

independence gradually gave way to a conflict whose objective became

the search for an appropriate political system. This polarization of

political convictions among the Vietnamese turned the conflict into an

ideological war fought between the Communists on one side and the

Nationalists on the other.

For twenty years, this war dragged on. Its duration was a measure

of its complexity because, in contrast with the Trinh-Nguyen contest

which was local in nature, the war between the North and the South of

Vietnam today was fought under the influence and with the implications

of an international conflict.

Communist Viewpoint

To the North Vietnamese, their war aimed at achieving a socialist

regime for Vietnam. In their view, the war was a just war led by the

Communist Party on behalf of the working class. Their duty lay not only

with the national cause but also with the international Communist movement, because the history of international proletarian revolution greatly

influenced the way North Vietnam conducted the war. For them, the 1917

• •.

•

~ - -- - - - - - •
r •- .-, • • •'—.T .-•." .,- .-—r --. '-. •-. .- - -". -". -T?.—" ;" """. •"

;" •' •'. •' •" •" " • .- - - .• -

Russian Revolution and the Chinese Communist take-over of 1949 had

invaluable lessons to be applied to the Vietnam war. As a matter of

fact, the North Vietnamese conduct of the war almost exactly duplicated the pattern used by the Chinese Communists. The handbook entitled "Out Enduring Resistance Certainly Wins" by Truong-Chinh who is

considered as North Vietnam's foremost theoretician, contains arguments

drawn from Mao Tse Tung's work, "Yu Chi Chan" (Protracted War). According to Truong-Chinh, the Vietnam war and the war in China bear remarkable resemblance in that they were both fought against much larger and

more powerful enemies. Consequently, success must depend upon the time

factor. Time was necessary, Truong-Chinh argued, to create a balance

of forces which would increasingly favor the underdog.

Oriental philosophy is at the source of this concept of time.

Whereas the Western world thinks of time in the short term (time is

money), and favors the military concept of lightning war (blitzkrieg)

and speedy victory, the Orientals believe they have all the time they

need to achieve their goals. To them, perseverance is the key to

success. As a result, the guiding principle in China as well as in

Vietnam is to "give up space in order to gain time". Hence, the fundamental approach to conflict is the conduct of protracted war. The

Communists theorized that a protracted war of resistance would progress

4

through three military phases:

First stage: Strategy — defensive; tactics — attack

Second stage: Strategy — stiff resistance (preparing for offensive);

tactics — attack

Third stage: Strategy and tactics — counter-offensive

In more descriptive terms, Phase 1 aims at organizing, consolidating

and preserving forces; Phase 2 aims at progressively expanding the forces

and Phase 3 is the decisive phase whose aim is the destruction of the

enemy. The transition from one phase to the next was discussed by Ho Chi

Minh, "It is possible to examine the general situation in order to divide

it into big stages, but it is not possible to cut off completely one stage

4

t~+ Truong Chinh, Primer for Revolt (Praeger, New York, London 1963),

:':• P. 154.

.

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from the other like cutting bread. The length of each stage depends

on the situation in the home country and in the world, and on the

changes between the enemy forces and ours."

Truong-Chinh follows in Mao's steps when he asserts that Phase 3

can be extended because of the possibility of negotiations. The customary concepts of reciprocation, of give and take, are not included in

Truong-Chinh's idea of negotiation. The Revolution's goal excludes

compromise. Negotiations are conducted with the sole purpose of

gaining time, the time necessary to consolidate friendly forces and at

the same time to attrite and wear down the enemy. In his work, "People's

War, People's Army," Vo Nguyen Giap reasserts that the concept of protracted resistance and the three-phase strategy are the most correct

military conduct to confront the enemy's military strategy of lightning

attack and lightning success. According to Giap, protracted war will

evolve from guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare and a war of movement coordinated with attacks against enemy's strongholds. Guerrilla

warfare is the kind of war fought by an armed force which is technically

inferior and lesser-equipped, but which prevails because it has the

morale and spirit to challenge and overcome advanced weapons and technique. However, as Mao observes, guerrilla warfare cannot achieve victory

because it can only be likened to the mud which bogs down an enemy but

can never destroy him. Hence, guerrilla warfare ought to be closely coordinated with a war of movement and the relative importance of its

role depends on the situation pertaining to each phase.

Protracted war, however, cannot be conducted if all the people,

all ages and both sexes, do not participate in it, and the people in

the rear of the battlefield must support the front. Lenin wrote, "In

order to wage a real war, there must be a solid and well organized rear."

The concept of people's war includes the concept of participation and

contribution. Truong Chinh emphasized, "Wealthy people should contribute

their wealth, strong people should contribute their strength, talented

people should contribute their talents to the Resistance," for war is not

fought only on the military front, it is also fought in all other areas:

'.••

. • . • .—. • . . . —: ^ —1 •-. ^i • : ^_. L- -± ! , _._-'._._.. . _ . - - - . ' - --• .- » . • .. - - . • - -
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North Vietnam Resolution Mo. 13, 1967.

political, economic and cultural. Political warfare seeks to unite the

entire people, while diplomatic activities gain the sympathy of all the

'.- "* world and isolate the enemy.

_ —

The economic struggle strives to achieve a self-sufficient economy

]--..':! and at the same time to "encircle" the enemy's economy by sabotaging all

instruments of production and preventing the enemy from "using the war

to feed the war." The cultural struggle must forge thoughts in order to

^^ create in the people the spirit and endurance required for a long war. •

Various forms of traditional propaganda like folk songs, group singing,

and plays are used to inflame the people's spirit with new thought and

dedication.

BW The three elements: "protracted^1 "all people" and "total" are the

three principal elements for the conduct of the people's war, as Mao Tse

'- ,-.' Tung laid them down. However, the Vietnamese Communists have applied

'"""v

this concept of the people's war with creativeness of their own in order •-.

/^. to fit the circumstances and exploit the situation in Vietnam. The

i *. • ••

"•'•"•" situation changed radically after the Geneva Agreement in 1954 which

created two political regimes, one in the North and one in the South. In

1960, when North Vietnam became seriously intent on conquering the South, i'

its strategy in South Vietnam still bore the specific imprint of the

"people's war." Nevertheless, the term "people's war" apparently was no

longer deemed expedient by the North because it would imply the aggressive *

character of the war. As a result, another label was chosen for the war

being waged in the South, a "revolutionary war," which implied that it

/\v\ was generated by the people of South Vietnam who revolted to overthrow ..«*

the government of South Vietnam. The goal of the Revolution was to estab-

--' lish a people's "democratic" regime before crossing over to socialism.

But whether "people's war"or "revolutionary war," the strategy still called for a protracted struggle to be conducted in three phases. But the

concept of protracted war has undergone some change. While maintaining

that their strategy was still a protracted war, the North Vietnamese argued

£' 5 —

that they could achieve their goal in a relatively short time. It is noteworthy that this change in concept could have taken place at the time when

there were strong indications that the United States would soon become

. «-_• . • - • - •- . - - - - ' * »_— J i A .t • • -_ - - .»- - . ,-•-.- i- • ,
-.-.-..- •I • i •.-.•. -—•—• - • . •—w—•—^T~*—•"T-1 • •

UJ • * ' 1 1 ... * r" ^T-—:r—- • .- T "

directly involved in the Vietnam war. The fear that the people and

cadre might loose heart at the prospects of a prolonged war against a

great power impelled Le Duan, the Party's secretary general, to this

argument. He emphasized that North Vietnam, having learned from

experiences of the 1945-54 war, could achieve an early victory. In

order to achieve this early victory, the Communists launched the

general offensive, general uprising of 1968, or in conceptual terms,

passed on to Phase 3.

After the offensive failed, there was an animated debate among the

Communist cadres over the validity of the three-phase strategy. If

the strategy were still valid, it implied that the Communists had admitted to the failure of Phase 3 and a retrogression to Phase 2. In

effect, through COSVN Resolution No. 9 issued in July 1969 the

Communists directed a reversion to the earlier phase through "small

attacks but assured successes." They presented a new argument for it,

advocating abandonment of the three-phase strategy and instituting a

single phase, the offensive. They insisted that the "revolutionary

war" of the South had become a total "people's war" involving all the

people of Vietnam, North and South, and all aspects of their lives,

and that the North had always been the "great rear area of the great

front-line area."

South Vietnam Viewpoint

While the Communists always developed and expounded a clearly

defined concept of the conduct of the war, the Republic of Vietnam

never had a unified concept. To South Vietnam, the war was a defense

against Communist aggression from the North. South Vietnam was an

advanced outpost of the anti-Communist front in Southeast Asia. As

such, it was entitled to help, to receive substantial aid for as long

as it was necessary from the Free World, represented by the United

States. Since it was a defensive war, its military strategy was to

Captured enemy document, corroborated by POW's and ralliers.

7Ibid.

- > * * i -•-'-•-•<- -... • * - ^ . m- • 4
• »,».».».».•.• l.l » •. I . I ,'«•.,•'. ».».•••.•.». * . ' • " ••.•» •-»-••."•• T' . •

push ahead with the pacification of the territory and the population,

to free them from the influence and threat of the Communists. To confront

guerrilla warfare, the Army of South Vietnam had been organized and

trained along the lines of a conventional army heavily dependent on fire

power and mobility. Military tactics were based on conventional techniques and modern weapons. This was the inevitable by-product of the

political circumstances prevailing in South Vietnam. The political instability in South Vietnam resulting from skirmishes between the various

religious sects, the "revolution" of 1 November 1963, and the subsequent developments compelled total reliance on the US strategy in the conduct of the war from 1965 to 1969. The strategy called for the expansion

of the RVN Armed Forces, from 400,000 to 1,100,000 men and their gradual

o

take-over of combat responsibilities. Following the 8 June 1969 Midway

Conference a new program was initiated called Vietnamization. The armed

forces of the Republic of Vietnam would gradually accept full responsibility for ground combat operations in place of US forces which along

with other Allied forces, would be withdrawn from South Vietnam battlefields. After the Paris Agreement of 1973, and faced with the new military situation and the prospect of diminishing aid, a new concept was

conceived for the conduct of the war, "fighting a poor man's war." A

lesson was learned from this attempt, however. It is easier for an

armed force to upgrade from guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare than

the other way around.

Comparisons

In the Vietnam war, both North and South Vietnam depended heavily

on foreign aid for every rifle, every cartridge, every drop of fuel and

even every grain of rice. The major difference between the two sides resided in the fact that while receiving military and economic assistance,

North Vietnam consistently conditioned their population and army psychologically to achieve self-sufficiency, relying primarily on their own

Lieutenant General John H. Hay, Jr., Tactical and Materiel Innovations (Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.: 1974), p. 172.

9

-*-'-«---^-^-- •-- -.--•-•-•^•-•-'-•-'- - -'---•---'- . > - • -,T ^. • ^:.^-.,.i ._-. •..•... ; ^ I ..- ^J-^.X^t. m : ;.•
• •»••«, ••• ••j'i"t-i I )"f.'t«j".> »• •. i"j»l''-'.*.«.'l'i"l • • • i • i • i •—• - m

resources and regarding aid as simply supplemental. This was not the

case with South Vietnam for which foreign aid was a way of life. To

the government as well as to the population, it was always expected

that this abundant US aid would not terminate for as long as it was

needed.

In addition, during the whole course of the war, North Vietnam

enjoyed a continuity of leadership. From the start to the end, the

same leaders directed the war effort and so there was consistency and

continuity in the planning and conduct of the war. Furthermore, the

institution had a memory and learned from experience. In contrast,

political instability in South Vietnam denied it these advantages of

leadership.

The war in Vietnam was an ideological war and also a war of mass

psychology. For the North Vietnamese, who knew how to use their ideology

to influence and take advantage of mass psychology, their war had proceeded in accordance with the rules they had laid out or projected. In contrast, not only was South Vietnam unable to employ mass psychology to

support its ideological purpose, it had let mass psychology act on the

rules of its war to the extent that, in the final months, a mere tactical

blunder had turned into an uncontrollable event that set in motion the

rapid deterioration of the situation. Perhaps this was a peculiarity of

the Vietnam war. *>•*•-'

Role of Intelligence in the Vietnam War -"-"'

The importance of intelligence, as it influences political and mili- t -4

tary activities, is no matter of dispute. But while there exists universal

agreement as to its importance, different concepts exist concerning the ••'."--'•

role of intelligence in decision-making, different subjective biases have

influenced objective analysis of intelligence information, and differing . .

technological capabilities have determined, to a large extent, the priorities adopted by nations in the employment of intelligence collection systems. Thus, national ideology and characteristics have greatly influenced

the development of concepts and techniques of intelligence collection,

10

i - • «__• . - — ».»---•- -• .. _. —.-.-• -.-•---•.-. ^ - - - * - • - _%__
_• _• ,•' ^" .•'".* V* ' *"• ",- "^ ^"- * '» " - **• * - *"• *'•' * . " ' ",''V". *

p

". * * *• »T. • '- *"

mmT • 1 * • '

'.-.v.

analysis and exploitation. So when an examination is made of the

intelligence effort of each of the parties involved in the Vietnam

war, all the characteristics, strengths, and weaknesses of each participant can be found reflected in the way he organized and employed his •

intelligence systems.

North Vietnam placed great emphasis on intelligence. Its intelligence was organized and operated to achieve the political

and military objectives of the war. Its intelligence structure was

unified at the top, but the universal rule of compartmentalization was

observed in the operation of human intelligence collection. North

Vietnam placed greatest emphasis on human intelligence and included in

this category was the institution of people's intelligence, conforming

to the "all people" and "total" character of the people's war.

The US intelligence apparatus in Vietnam was part of and within

the framework of the total US intelligence establishment. Thus, it relied primarily on advancements in science and technology. It reflected

the characteristics of a great power which could afford a multiplicity of

big organizations, each having its own collection apparatus and often

competing with one another in collection, analysis and production of knowledge about the enemy. The contributions made by US intelligence, particularly in collection, were so effective that they created an abnormal reliance on US intelligence. The reliance was so great that many Vietnamese

officials, including some military commanders, took it for granted that

every piece of information coming from an American agency was valid regardless of the professional competence of the reporter or the authority

of the source. Others even believed that no enemy move or scheme could

ever go undetected by US collection networks and that if it did it was

only because the US, for political reasons, wanted it to happen that way.

Brief History of RVN Intelligence

This over-reliance on US intelligence stemmed in part from the relative infancy of South Vietnamese intelligence. Small elements of the

National Army of Vietnam were created as early as May 1950 but its general

11

: -J

-'»-•*-«-•-•-•-• - . -._.*.'..... . . »_„ . .
i ••.«'.••».-,».«.»••« .. » ,'«',••• •• . « • » • « .» ./»..» . « •' -

1

» ./ ..' •," •; •''•'• • •'• -.•----•.-•.--••

staff was not organized until two years later. By this time the army's

9

strength had reached 120,000. The first coherent South Vietnamese

military intelligence organization was the J-2 element of the General

Staff, with 32 men commanded by a Vietnamese captain. The Military

Security Service (counterintelligence) activated at about the same

time, was commanded by a Vietnamese major. In early 1953, a counterintelligence element was added to the General Staff as a separate

staff component designated J-6. By July 1955, the authorized strength

of J-2, General Staff, had been augmented to 46 with the activation

of the Imagery Interpretation Center. But up until the day the

Geneva Accords were signed in 1954, South Vietnamese military intelligence activities were performed by the French Forces' "Deuxieme Bureau"

which functioned as a separate organization and acted on its own

initiative. Unfortunately, but characteristically, when the French

Forces withdrew from Vietnam they took with them all their experience

and systems of collection as well as their intelligence files.

The Vietnamese officers who manned the J-2 section of the General

Staff at that time were not career intelligence men. Only a handful

of them had taken a basic, battalion-level intelligence course conducted

by a French Officer at the Thu Due Reserve Officer School. As required

by the activation of new units, or the upgrading of existing ones, there

was an urgent need to train intelligence officers. In September 1955, a

number of English-speaking officers were selected to attend a Military

Intelligence Course in the Philippines. They became the first instructors of the newly created Intelligence School. The incipient character

of Vietnamese military intelligence was reflected by the original training materials prepared for the school. For example, in a training text

on the subject "Importance of Intelligence in Combat," there was the

following passage: "A newly commissioned Second Lieutenant was assigned

to a unit. When he reported to the unit commander, the latter said, I

will make you Intelligence Officer of the Battalion." "Consequently,"

QLVNCH Trong Giai Doan Hinh Thanh, 1945 - 1954 (The RVNAF During

Their Formative Years: 1945 - 1954 (Military History, Vol. 4, J-5/JGS,

Saigon: 1972).

12

_.-•--. -•_ .- . . ^-. . . . - - - -=--• ......•.•,.•. -.•. .A' •-'.:
.'•*•"• -" I [ ' '. »' ' • • . • •"••. » L • > ' I" I'.'I'M' • I • ». ». » • • L ^ i »• • ' ^—»•»•••,. i.

the text went on, "intelligence is very important." It is possible

that the instructor may have thought that he was adequately illustrating

the point that intelligence was important enough to be considered on a

par with other staff functions.

Politics and Intelligence

From 1954 to 1963, military intelligence efforts were largely

oriented toward collecting domestic political intelligence. It was the

period of political turmoil during which leaders of the First Republic

were faced with armed rebellions of religious sects in 1955-1956 and

later with the Buddhist opposition movement in 1963. The South Vietnamese

intelligence structure durin» that time was an agglomeration of separate

agencies each directly or indirectly controlled by the Presidency, but - '*•

all serving the same political goal of consolidating the new regime.

Under the Presidency, the Service of Social and Political S-tudies was X"--.

responsible for domestic political intelligence c->llection,»while the

Service of Liaison was charged with foreign intelligence, directed •• *

primarily toward North Vietnam, and later on — with security protection

for the President and his closest advisers, Mr. and Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu. '/•'."

When the Buddhist opposition movement reached its climax in 1963 with .•;.-*"

the active participation of students, all intelligence agencies, both on

the civilian side and the military side, focused their activities on -y-V

gathering domestic political information. The J-2 of the Joint General , -';.•'

Staff thus found himself performing a task that went beyond his intended

mission and authority.

The November Revolution of 1963 brought about a complete reversal

of the process by decentralizing the intelligence structure and making

its constituent organizations separate and responsible to various

authorities. Thus, from a situation of complete centralization in the

office of the Presidency, the national organization for intelligence went

to the opposite extreme. The interplay of politics and competition for

power never permitted intelligence to achieve one of its basic operating

principles, unification of effort. The Service of Liaison found itself

13

- . . .,.-,* .- . , .. .—.- .--._...- . . . ..._._.....• . , „
^i, ,t ,^ 1.11 \ n»y «. '• *. »,•"'_'t • u- j »»•- j- . • . ' > ' . • .• • . »•. '«•. r' r w, rm .-5- •• •• •—p p .- • .- " .* :-":•'

placed under the Coramander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the 300th

Special Group, the strategic intelligence organization, was detached

from J-2 and made responsible to the Office of the Chief of Staff,

Joint General Staff. The Signal Intelligence Unit was attached to the

Central Intelligence Office which reported directly to the Chief of

State. Despite this subordination signal intelligence was often fed

directly to field units without reference to or coordination with OACS,

J-2. In 1964, when the government was turned over to civilians, the

signal intelligence organization became an independent agency and was

initially placed under the Ministry of Defense. Later, it was formed

into a staff division and placed under the control of the Chief of

Staff, JGS, with the designation J-7. Next the Military Security

Service was transferred. It was placed under the General Directorate

of Political Warfare insteadof under the Ministry of Defense. This

organizational concept was patterned after the Republic of China.

The domestic political situation made its impact on military

intelligence. Lacking centralization and unified guidance, intelligence efforts became diffused and of little value. Adding to the problems, during this embryonic stage intelligence facilities were woefully

inadequate and intelligence personnel still lacked technical know-how

and professional experience. The military intelligence organizations

operated independently of each other and the collection effort was

limited geographically to South Vietnam. Intelligence pertaining to

North Vietnam or Eastern Laos was produced only occasionally and did

not constitute a systematic effort under centralized planning and

direction. On the civilian side, the Central Intelligence Office was

in theory responsible for gathering domestic political intelligence

and foreign intelligence, both military and political. In practice,

however, due to the political upheavals of the period, it concentrated

its efforts on domestic politics, almost totally neglecting foreign

intelligence. The General Directorate of National Police, which came

under the Office of the Prime Minister, was responsible for public

security and order, as well as intelligence concerning Communist

infrastructure activities.

-

14

>-' ^-• -- - -- '- - - . ~ - - - _.. > ~ - - - > m > . •_— «— * > ^-i_ • J-- •-• - -.---- . — -• —• i^ E 1 •- • •» 1 -nl
V "> "> '

4.""*" '~T .- :-. •»'.».».• .'• - ". "v • •• • • i —i 1—•—'"•,*", /,''•«••*•*'" •'».".'i » ••^•.•"•^w.»- j", t- .- J..JP...I.» • »——j

Commanders and Intelligence

South Vietnamese military intelligence came of age in 1965 when,

as a result of the increased tempo of war, the national leadership

began to appreciate its importance. The active participation of United

States forces in the war brought about close intelligence coordination

with RVN forces» and it was this coordination that gave the greatest

impetus to Vietnamese military intelligence. The most remarkable progress

was achieved in combat intelligence. A tremendous amount of information

was collected about the enemy. However remarkable the progress, the sxploitation of new opportunities for collection and the tactical use of

the intelligence produced were not developed to their full potential.

Because of their lack of intelligence training and experience, most Vietnamese commanders did not understand that intelligence was theirs to direct

and use and not the exclusive property and responsibility of their intelligence officer. As a consequence, no effective efforts were made to

improve intelligence collection or exploitation. To these commanders,

there was but one estimate, that of his intelligence officer. The commander's estimate was something seldom found. Most military operations were

conducted for the purpose of destroying the enemy and very rarely indeed

were they attempted for the sake of gathering intelligence.

Military intelligence resources were frequently misused or even abused.

It became a widespread practice for Intelligence and Security Teams at

District level ^ind Intelligence and Security Sections at Province level to

be used more often in VIP escort and protection duties than in intelligence gathering. Reconnaissance companies organic to division and regimental units were primarily deployed as shock units or reinforcements. A

tragic example of this occurred in the battle of Phuoc Long in Dec-Tiber

1974. While Communist forces included two infantry divisions supported by

artillery and armor units, the defense of the city was assigned I

reconnaissance companies detached from their respective divisions, Che

5th, 18th,and 25th Infantry Divisions. The result was that all three

companies were totally destroyed, and the three divisions of MR-3 were without

15

- - - - . , I . - -' - - -L - -
I t • • • .••.•••g"l'« !'• • •• •'• •-•.•*• I !• • "* '' •••-.- u- P • • • • • _• • P -

reconnaissance capabilities when serious fighting broke out later. • .

Some commanders even went so far as to require their intelligence

officers to produce es"'.mates that befitted the commander's own view of

the situation. If the commander's report on progress of pacification

and development had been filled with good results, his intelligence

officer was certainly not allowed to divulge any contradictory information, such as the increased activities of the enemy infrastructure,

the enemy's success in collecting rice and taxes, etc. As an example,

no effort had been made to report information contained in a captured

enemy document indicating that during the first three months of 1973,

the enemy in Dinh Tuong province had succeeded in collecting 40% of its

586-million piaster tax goal for 1973. Apparently, if such a report

had ever been made the province chief's good standing with the central

government would have suffered, and he had to make sure this never

happened. On the contrary, if friendly losses in any important operation

surpassed the normally acceptable figure, reports might list the enemy's

capabilities as including a great number of units whose identities

were yet to be confirmed. This falsification of facts ostensibly justified the losses incurred and covered up any deficiency which might have

caused them. Furthermore, it established the basis for obtaining more

•

operational support. '**"

Besides this widespread practice, there was also a dangerous tendency

among commanders to show off the extent of their knowledge about the

enemy. Many vital sources of information that should have been kept

secret, either because of their origin or importance, were unfortunately

made public.

The war in Vietnam, as mentioned earlier, was an ideological conflict in which politics strongly influenced military policies and dictated

the conduct of the war. While North Vietnam successfully used its

dictatorial regime as a solid basis for the effective organization and

operation of its intelligence system, South Vietnam suffered from

political instability and from the interference between factional and

transitional politics and military intelligence affairs. To become

16

-«-•'- »'- »'— »"- •'-;.-»- »*- • - -^- • - - - -'- •• - • .-••.=•.-•» - i > ' * - • «. _ «... » .^.....w."..^-^.^.....»-....^-..,..- . JU. ••>..•.1...-Y.a.,.1.,*..,',.m.L*^a
—• m i—

efficient and productive, an intelligence organization must be in

effective command of time and space, because these two elements interweave and make up the intelligence coverage network. The larger

the loops of the net, the greater the chance for the prey to escape.

Time is necessary to provide continuity for intelligence operations.

Space is needed to make knowledge thorough and complete. Knowledge |

about the enemy on the front line must be complemented by knowledge

-• -

about the situation in his rear. In the case of the war in Vietnam,

the enemy rear not only covered North Vietnam, it included by extension the whole Communist bloc, particularly the USSR and Red fc

China.

Denied the capability to collect adequate information about the

enemy outside South Vietnam and forced by internal political circum- £%:*-.

stances to operate a fragmented intelligence apparatus, South Vietnam

intelligence agencies were ill equipped to perform their crucial tasks.

In fact one might wonder, as in the other aspects of the war, whether '-'.••:

internal rather than external factors most influenced the course of

the war and brought about its tragic conclusion.

17

•

•

. -. •. . . . . ,
• .• r ^ » .' w , • ' > ' • . i <»;»•,».» i »'.».»•,»',' «•".'''»' i" ••'•*'•*. V-* '-*. V

CHAPTER II

Intelligence, Culture, and Language t—'

Characteristics of Vietnamese Culture and Language . -

Vietnam, because of its position in Southeast Asia, was initially •

a crossroads of two major civilizations that reacted vigorously with

each other: the Chinese civilization and the Hindu civilization. The •_?-

Chinese civilization finally prevailed and profoundly affected Vietnamese culture mainly because, in addition to the geographical proximity M

of the two countries, Vietnam had been politically subjugated by China •'.'.;

for over a thousand years. During this long period of domination the

Chinese attempted to absorb the Vietnamese people into their mass by

direct assimilation. They imposed their philosophy, education, customs

and manners, but the Vietnamese persistently resisted and endeavored to

maintain their own culture and language. Although the Vietnamese

borrowed their writing system from the Chinese for over ten centuries,

they made a conscious effort to replace it gradually by a system of

their own. Not until the 17th century (1627), however, was a romanized

writing system created and officially adopted as the national script

(Quoc Ngu). Chinese characters, as a result, were used only in traditional

rites until recently. During the protracted struggle for survival and

national independence, several Vietnamese generals of historical fame made

use of cultural actions to win battles against Chinese invaders. General

Ly Thuong Kiet of the Ly dynasty (10th century), for example, skillfully

took advantage of the popular belief in mythology. In 1077, he planted

one of his men in the Truong Hat temple to act as a demigod. To the

accompaniment of bell tones, the man incanted a poem written in Chinese

18

V

- -

» .!_- ~ • ^ ' ^-' ». »-L-« •!_» *._ _^ . _• -. i^
P'^ :^.' .'•f :• • :*• '••.' '• .'•"*•'•'• '••".''• .'• .*• .'•.'-'.'•'.^'••''.'• .'• .'• ' •'-'•*-.• •*• •-*•'•••*•*•' ••'•':—7"-;A;—^v~—•"-'• -.--.-- ..

characters that aroused the morale of Vietnamese troops and upon which

TO»am Dinh Viet Su, 1960, p. 101. The original text reads:

.

the Chinese invaders recoiled in utter confusion: {

The Emperor of the South rules over the land '.••'.•:

of the Southern Country; '•['•'• This destiny has been indelibly registered in

the Heavenly Book;

If you dare, rebellious savages, come violate it;

You shall undoubtedly witness your own and complete defeat. *•

Confronting the powerful Mongolian army in 1284, the great Vietnamese national hero, Marshal Tran Hung Dao, appealed to his troops

through a resounding proclamation that bolstered their confidence and

determination to fight. Emboldened by the proclamation, his troops

tatooed the words "Sat Dat" on their arms, meaning they were resolved

2

to kill the Mongolians. Then, after defeating the Ming invaders in

1424, General Nguyen Trai issued the famous "Great Proclamation upon 7?-.

the Pacification of Wu", intended as a declaration of independence

for the Vietnamese people and as an affirmation of viability of a separate

national culture:

Our nation, Greater Vietnam,

Is founded on an ancient civilization.

Its land and boundaries have changed,

But its customs are always different -.\-

from the North.3

?§

• :;'

.••*.•• "_."•.

. -."•'.

•

. • -

-.--. •••"•;'

. . •'

'

f •am

Nam Quoc Son Ha, Nam De Cu

Tiet Nhien Dinh Menh Tai Thien Thu

Nhu Ha Nghich Lo Lai Xam Pham t

Nhu Dang Hanh Khan Thu Bai Hu

2

This practice was imitated by several ARVN troops after the 1968

general offensive. Instead of "Sat Dat", they tatooed "Sat Cong" (Kill

Communists) on their arms.

Excerpt from the original text which is written in Chinese characters.

The Vietnamese translation of this passage reads:

Nuoc Dai Viet ta

Nen van hien cu

Non nuoc coi bo da khac

Bac, Nam, phong tue van rieng .

19

^•;:

-

• _ -. •_""-. . . . - '•" "-"- -'-' •--.••-' - . . - >' .-, -• - -: ~L _. . . ... .—^— •— »- _ - -. ^
•^ •„••.•»• •„• • ' • ' • • i • *•- r--.-«-!.— »— .-!••-•. " . • - •" w •

J

To Che Vietnamese people, national independence was a subject of

utmost importance. If the nation came under foreign domination, the

Vietnamese believed that this domination would only be short-lived as

long as they maintained a separate culture and a separate language. In

the beginning of the 20th century when Vietnam had come under French

colonial rule, Nguyen Ba Hoc, a famous scholar, commented prophetically:

"If the Vietnamese language survives,

Vietnam will survive."

His words are praised and venerated by every living Vietnamese.

Vietnamese culture nevertheless bears a profound imprint of Chinese

civilization and culture. Until recently, this influence was most conspicuously reflected in politics, economy, culture, and education. The

traditional Vietnamese concepts of nationalism, national organization,

public administration, laws and regulations were all patterned after

Chinese institutions. Divisions of work, production, commerce, and

the Vietnamese writing system, textbook, examination, etc. were either

Chinese-introduced or borrowed from the Chinese. Before the introduction

of Western culture, Confucius had been regarded by the Vietnamese as a

saint and sage whose classics and moral teachings were accepted as intellectual criteria and behavioral rules. Among other things, Confucius

professed the theory of "true expression" which says that "it's important

to use words with accuracy; if words are not accurate, our expressions

will be erroneous and our undertakings will fail." While not intended

as a linguistic rule, the Confucian theory of true expression is in

essence a philosophy which promotes social order, an order based on

society's hierarchy and stratification. Confucian philosophy in many respects does not befit the basic tenets of Communism and represents a

major challenge to Communist ideology, especially in backward societies

like traditional China and Vietnam. Because of its popularity, however,

North Vietnam Communists cunningly avoided attacking it publicly and

chose instead to take advantage of it for their own purposes. For example,

the war they waged in South Vietnam was called a war of liberation, a war

of just cause because it was the Confucian "true expression" of the Vietnamese people's aspirations. For all its merits, Chinese culture made its

20

- ' - - - - ' •- -»--- - - - - _ •- —i m • ^.i a • • * m—*...m..+ m.M*A il.t.i. »-••,*- »— • * . • - • »• - - . —
t^^^y^fT—• ' II • « • »• • . » »' «' . » ' ' ' » . «'.'•'. ' '. ' . • .»,«,.»- » * ' • » . • . • • » • •_• •_• I,

impact felt only among the Vietnamese mandarinate and literates who •':•'•'

. •

made up the minority elite. The great majority of the populace, how-

'•

ever, displayed and fostered its own kind of culture, a culture purely m

Vietnamese by nature. Throughout the generations, this culture has •/*•;

been expressed, recorded and propagated in the form of simple, short •-' " •"•

[ • popular literary pieces such as proverbs, folk songs, lyrical poems

cad ritual chants. The composition of these songs and poems is simple, -•%

the language used plain and pleasant. When sung or incanted, their

• •.-•'.

rhythm and tones create gracious and gay music sounds that express the

ingenuous but emotional nature of a people who earnestly cling to their •"•"--'•!

• "• •

own way of life. This national character still exists today, and during •

the war both sides, North Vietnam and South Vietnam, made conscious

efforts to employ these literary forms with a goal to win over, mobilize,

and incite the people into working and fighting for a cause each side V'- -'

claimed as right. jL *•

Vietnam began to assimilate Western culture when the French occupied .-.'-.'•

it in the middle of the 19th century. With its appealing novelties, the

newly introduced Western civilization considerably altered the traditional

Vietnamese way of life, which still had maintained ties with Chinese

culture.

By 1945, under French colonial design, Vietnam was administratively

divided into three separate regions: North, Center and South (Tonkin,

Annam and Cochin-China, respectively). Although they speak the same

language, the Vietnamese living in different regions have different phonetic

pronunciations, several different terms and expressions, and a few highly

localized accents. When two Vietnamese from different regions meet for the

first time, they are usually conscious of the difference in their speech

habits. This creates interesting difficulties but never prevents them

from understanding each other. Apart from the Vietnamese, there also exist

about two dozen ethnic groups, each of which speaks a different language.

The 1954 Geneva Accords partitioned Vietnam into two regions: North

and South. Over 800,000 northerners chose to migrate South while nearly

4

80,000 southerners were regrouped to the North. As a result, Vietnamese

4

Latter figure based on Communist documents. RVN official reports

estimated the number of southerner regroupees at 100,000.

21

Y-.-VL_-
•v-v^^^—r-w—r—TOI"• • IM-I<|II-I-I .

speech gradually became more unified than ever before. However, with

the new demarcation line holding North and South incommunicado, with

opposing political regimes, and under different foreign cultural influences, there gradually developed profound differences between North

and South Vietnam in terms of culture and language, including military

terminology.

Communist Culture and Language

In North Vietnam, efforts were made by the Communist regime to

eliminate the lingering influence of Chinese classical education and

Confucian — Mencian philosophy, which are considered as expressions of

a feudalistic and backward heritage still deeply ingrained in Vietnamese

culture. Emphasis has equally been placed on the elimination of French

cultural influence which has been criticized as an instrument for invasion, and the genesis of a romantic, "petit bourgeois" literature.

North Vietnam wanted to find a way toward a new culture consistent with

its regime, and having the effect of popular attraction. This, the

Communists found in a complete return to the age-old popular culture

but they had to go through a transitional period. Initially, from

1948 to 1954, North Vietnam seemed to prefer the use of classical Chinese

vocabulary even in daily conversation. The language used by Communist

political cadre sounded especially pedantic and conceited, burdened as

it was by formal, archaic expressions that were no longer of popular

usage. It was the period during which Communist Chinese were taking over _ _

mainland China. Their complete victory in 1949 spurred the North Vietnamese political cadre into a passionate study of Red Chinese revolutionary

methods, from theory to practice. It was also the period during which

North Vietnamese cadre were sent to China for training. Chinese training

materials were subsequently translated into Vietnamese. The use of

classical Chinese vocabulary became therefore widespread and fashionable.

Political slogans during this period used a mixture of Vietnamese and

classical Chinese terms, such as "Solidarity, Solidarity, greater Solidarity."

22

.'•.

.-

JL_ AJ

- • - - -- - - ..-.-•-• •_:!_._» _. . „ * A = ^ •_. .__.._» i^^i^ - • - - - . - • . .
-T"»"-

ir-i-Trr"*—«T- ' l • :- J• . ' . • . • . - ' .-—•—-——

Ho Chi Minh himself usually quoted Chinese classics. His favorite

phrase was "Progress must be made each day, every day, again and

• „5 again.

After North Vietnam became a separate nation above the 17th

parallel in 1954 and after the first Indochina war had ended, it made

a deliberate effort to build and restructure the Vietnamese culture

and language after its political outlook. The first visible change

was the disappearance of classical Chinese in language and terminology.

More emphasis was placed on the use of simple, plain Vietnamese language

with a view to make it easy to understand and memorize by the populace.

For example, "true thang" (helicopter), a term borrowed from classical

Chinese, is now called "may bay len thang" (aircraft which rises

vertically); "thuy quan luc chien" (Marines), also a term of Chinese

origin, is called "linn thuy danh bo" (naval troops fighting on land).

Several other terms, mostly military, went through the same transformation. Foreign geographical names which had heretofore been transcribed

into Vietnamese through Chinese pronunciation and accepted in daily usage

were discarded in favor of direct transliteration. Thus, "Hoa Thinh Don"

(Washington), becomes "Oa-Sinh-Ton"; "Mac Tu Khoa" (Moscow) becomes

"Mot-cu", etc. Another new feature of North Vietnamese Communist

language was the enrichment of Vietnamese vocabulary by compounding

common words. This compounding process is similar to the Communist technique of devising abbreviations. It can be understood only by those

Vietnamese familiar with their usage. A common word like "ba" (three)

for example, can be the root for over one hundred compounds, such as "ba

cung" (three together), "ba khoan" (three postponements), "ba mat" (three

aspects), etc.; the list is inexhaustible.

Translation of the original Chinese phrase "Nhat Tan, Nhat Nhat

Tan, Huu Nhat Tan".

Each compound in fact expresses a political slogan or policy in

abbreviated form. "Ba Cung" (Three Together) stands for "Cung An, Cung

0, Cung Lam" (Eat Together, Live Together, Work Together). "Ba Khoan"

(Three Postponements) stands for "Khoan Yeu, Khoan Cuoi, Khoan De" (Postpone Love, Postpone Marriage, Postpone Babies). "Ba Mat" (Three Aspects

or Efforts) stands for "Binh Van, Quan Su, Chinh Tri" (Enemy Troop

Proselyting, Military Effort, Political Effort).

23

• •-•-• - - i • •---•• » - - - - . * , ' fc '•*-*'-•* • «• ' » • ^^i . -'• -• -'- -
-.5» •"•• ." ;•• r r ».»'.». « • . - . • ,_"•» • • • i—•. «. ". - - -. - -—t—'.»•.•—• - - .—7—»—•—»——.' y J—i—•—•—•——i—

In their efforts to broaden a popular culture and language, the

North Vietnamese Communists fully exploited the merits of traditionally

popular literature such as plainness, simplicity, flexibility, lyricality,

and images. Careful studies of rules governing the composition of folk

songs, lyrical poems and ritual chants helped sharpen the Communist

propaganda technique to the point that every piece of propaganda became easily accepted and widely propagated among the populace. This was

the reason why the Communists were so successful in the areas of information and propaganda. Every emulation campaign, every official holiday,

every economic or military campaign were accompanied by psychological

actions. To stimulate production, for example, the Communists advanced

the slogan "Each Person Works Like Two." During the period of the 1972

Summer offensive, the slogan used was "Let's Make Each Day Count As

Twenty Years." Ho Chi Minn himself was fully cognizant of the important

role played by popular literature and poetry in the war effort. When

North Vietnam was preparing to launch its general offensive against cities

in South Vietnam during the Tet holidays of 1968, it gave the order for

preparation and attack under the form of a "Happy Tet" poem by Ho Chi Minh.

This poem was broadcast by Radio Hanoi, intended for Communist troops in

the South:

This Spring will be much different from previous springs

Because every household will enjoy news of victory

North and South will now forever reunite

Forward! Total victory will be ours.^

This was Ho's second "Happy Tet" poem ever published. The first one

dated back in 1945 when the Viet Minh took over governmental power in

Vietnam. The Vietnamese text of the 1968 poem reads:

Xuan nay khac han may Xuan qua

Thang loi tin vui khap moi nha

Nam, Bac tu nay xum hop mai

Tien len, thang loi se ve ta.

In Vietnamese, Xuan(Spring) also connotes Tet.

24

,

-•-•'--'- . - - • - - . - - ---... -•-•,
[»-; • . r t— -. .-. - ."—.T - • ."—T~~r—T—-- .- • . • i ••. •- • ;.-•;»-;••. ••: W-»T • —•—•

Despite its effort to gain independence in culture and language,

North Vietnam was heavily influenced by modern Chinese martial music.

Most musical songs were composed for choral, not personal presentation.

This was perhaps a deliberate Communist effort aimed at stimulating

collective activities and work which were deemed more vital to socialism

than individual entertainment. As a result, North Vietnamese Communist-style

music, although given equal emphasis as other branches of art, did not serve

well its propaganda purpose. Many captured NVA soldiers disclosed, however,

that they usually furtively tuned in to South Vietnamese radio broadcasts

for the simple reason that they wanted to listen to music, the kind of

languorous and romanticized music to which human nature feels closer.

Aside from music, North Vietnam also took interest in drama and

painting. But as was the case with other arts, drama and painting were

also devoted to the objective of promoting Communism and the war of

liberation.

In general, over the years of partition, North Vietnam created a

culture and a language that specifically befitted its own world and

were committed to the service of its own goal. The cultural and linguistic

gap between North and South Vietnam gradually widened to the point.of

transforming them into quasi-foreign countries. The North Vietnamese

press once carried a story about a South Vietnamese spy operating in

the north being apprehended on a bus. A companion traveller detected

oddities in his language which sounded strange to the North Vietnamese

and reported the fact to the security police. Without being conscious

about it, our operator had given himself away, just by speaking his

own languagef being himself a native of North Vietnam.

To North Vietnam, the Paris Agreement of 29 January 1973 came into

being as an immediate victory in psychological warfare. For one thing,

the kind of language written in it was specifically North Vietnamese.

This fact could be detected by every Vietnamese. As a matter of fact,

North Vietnamese language had become quite an obstacle for the allied

effort of intelligence collection. The task of analyzing it was particularly painful for it was not always easy to understand the true

semantical meaning cf the information collected. To facilitate intelligence analysis, effort was made by South Vietnamese military intelligence

25

•

t • ' - . __,_.._.-- - . _ •- - _ . .
* *"•«,

to publish a lexicon of North Vietnamese terminology whose third edition

in 1973 contained twice as much content as the previous edition of 1968

and five times as much as the first edition in 1961.

The language used by North Vietnam is indeed a language of its own.

Its phraseology is also radically different from traditional Vietnamese,

influenced as it has been by propaganda technique. The most remarkable

feature is repetition. The same idea can be repeated many times in a text;

it is presumably intended to be ingrained in the reader's subconsciousness by its repetition. Every year, the leaders of North Vietnam write

articles and essays assessing North Vietnamese conduct of the military

effort. The same ideas are again and again presented every year in these

articles. Only through inquisitive reading and analysis can the reader

detect anything novel, but something novel almost invariably is indicative of a significant change. This is because Communists are usually

very cautious in expressing themselves and only competent leaders can

advance new ideas. In December 1974, for example, North Vietnam's

Premier Pham Van Dong declared that during 1975 the South Vietnamese

people would witness many events of particular significance. This was

immediately interpreted by our intelligence analysts as indicative of a

new North Vietnamese military effort during the year.

South Vietnamese Culture and Language

Vietnamese culture and language went through significant transformation in South Vietnam as well as in North Vietnam. As of 1954, the

growing American involvement in South Vietnam brought about some cultural

influence that outshone and eventually overshadowed the impact of Chinese

and French culture. South Vietnamese culture during this period was an

amalgamation of traditional and modern tendencies, particularly under

the influence of the interplay between modern tendencies and traditional

values. Its resulting characteristics were a certain libertarianism

verging on permissiveness and a predilection for change.

It was on the cultural front that one could see a real conflict take

place, a conflict that diametrically opposed North against South in terms

of cultural outlook. Nowhere else did this conflict manifest itself in a

26

v-:-.

'.-->• ;•

_li - - - • . ^_._._^ - •_ . : - „^_.__« , ^_
i n • p • •••... i •».., i.,.,.,. i , i , , i , ., .i ,, ^—-—.—^ >i _ i i "u \

-

more representative way than in music. In South Vietnam, music blossomed

in total freedom and diversity, inclined toward romanticism and

languorous lyricism. War was also an important subject for musical

composition, but more often than not it was represented as a cause for

separation and sorrowful laments. Only very rarely was it made the subject of epic music intended to foster heroism and gallantry. There were

indeed such works but they were all produced by governmental propaganda

and information agencies or the RVNAF psychological warfare department.

Thus, in music, all liberties were permitted, even anti-war songs. The :'~-.:j

line was drawn only at making propaganda for promoting Communism. Strange '

as it may have seemed, the proliferation of anti-war songs lamenting the .-."-

sorrows of war occurred at about the same time as the progress of the

Communist general offensive campaign in 1968. Simple coincidence or

deliberateness, the fashionable anti-war songs were certainly detrimental

to the cause of the RVN war effort. • •'/;.

Such permissive libertarianism led to the free introduction of

Chinese-style knight-errantry novels from Hong Kong, particularly those -.••'.

written by Kim Dung (Chin Yun). These were serialized in leading newpapers

and passionately read by the public. The impact of these outlandish, ./.'.•"

mythical stories on the lives of the populace and the war in South Vietnam •.''-."'

was far-reaching. Several main characters of these stories were so idolized

-I that their thoughts and actions were imitated in daily life. Some people,

including a few Vietnamese national leaders, even went as far as calling '•:-•'.

themselves by nicknames or pseudonyms taken at least in part if not in full . "-/-

from the names of the most famous characters. This fashion for imitating

the feats and personalities of knight-errant stories could be found in

many instances, for example, in the conference room of the Two-Party •'< -

Joint Military Commission. A leading character in this series of novels

is Lenh Ho Xung. When engaging an adversary in a fight, he uses his own ""*"'-

martial style, an unorthodox style which cannot be found in any regular

martial textbook and consists of quick-changing variations, and always

wins. The RVN military delegation at the JMC applied the same selfstyled flexible approach in negotiations which was not based on any official

27

*•-•--•- .-•--.-»••--. . • , . - -'• .'•-•-
.1 l.l.l.I I I

o

This refers to the column "Ao Tha Vit" (The Duck-T nd) carried by

the "Song" (Live) daily newspaper whose publisher and e .tor was Chu Tu, a

satirist, now deceased. "The Vietnamese word "vit" (duck) derives its

figurative meaning of "false report" from the French word "canard" from

which it is directly translated. Many newspapers later carried a similar

column.

28

• •

directive or procedure. Its members, as a matter of fact, deliberately

contradicted each other when addressing the conference and sometimes

talked pure nonsense, just for the fun of confusing their monolithic

adversaries. The Communists were greatly surprised and became confused,

not knowing exactly what points the other side wanted to make, where the

other side's major interest lay, or how the other side proposed to solve

a certain problem. But the Communists, too, took advantage of this popular

passion for knight-errant novels which were on display and sale almost

everywhere. They found the proliferation of these novels an excellent

modality to quietly push their propaganda materials by substituting them

for the contents, leaving the covers and the first few pages as intact and

as appealing as they were.

This widely popular attraction resulted in a competition between

newspapers to carry more and more of those stories in serialized form.

As a matter of fact, the newspaper with the largest circulation during

this period was always one that carried the newest and longest install- -1--

ment of the most appealing knight-errantry story to-date. Another device

used by newspapers to achieve wide circulation was a special column devoted to rumors. The stories or anecdotes contained in this column were

mostly about current news which might be true or fabricated or a mixture

of both, but they were always sensational and mystifying and invariably v

became subjects of speculation and conjecture. Unknowingly, however,

it was those stories that created suspicions and gave rise to rumors to _-

which the South Vietnamese populace were particularly sensitive.

In general, there was an effort to return to the traditional Vietnamese •

culture in South Vietnam as well as in North Vietnam. It was correctly

m

v.- «j

.^. . ^ J
——" -• • .• - . '

surmised by most South Vietnamese intellectuals that the only way to

achieve national independence and true identity was through the reinstatement of time-honored traditions and values which had been eroded

or debased by war and disorder. Several cultural conventions were

held during which it was agreed that contemporary Vietnamese culture

should be oriented toward "science, people, and mass." By and large,

this effort existed only in form and nothing substantial was achieved

over the years. As a result, South Vietnamese culture continued to

flourish in libertarianism and even in absurdity.

In contrast to North Vietnam which generally forbids every

form of superstition, South Vietnam condoned it. Fortune tellers, astrologers, and mediums conducted a thriving business and their numerous

clients included more than a few high-ranking officials. This belief in

the supernatural seemed to indicate a certain feeling of insecurity among

the populace. There were stories that some field commanders even consulted astrologers for the most appropriate date and time to launch an

operation or to go on a combat inspection tour. While North Vietnamese

society quietly subsisted along the lines prescribed by the Communist

Party,South Vietnamese society was frequently turned upside down by

political upheavals and economic misfortunes. This was perhaps the

reason why people in South Vietnam were more inclined to search into the

supernatural for their own destiny.

Religions in South Vietnam exerted a particularly important influence

on politics. Apart from Buddhism and Roman Catholicism which have been

established throughout Vietnam, Caodaism and Hoa Hao Buddhism are the

two sects that came into being only at the turn of the century, and their

influence is limited to the Mekong Delta. Cao Dai and Hoa Hao followers

were persistently anti-Communist throughout the war. Their holy lands,

located in Tay Ninh and An Giang provinces were bulwarks of resistance

against Communist infiltration and attacks. In general, Roman Catholicism

always exerted some influence on leading personalities and the elite while

Buddhism was the religion of the popular majority. It was the Buddhist

struggle movement in 1963 that led up to the overthrow of the First Republic government. Because of the popularity of religion, the Communists

29

>

•-•-•--- - - - - • - - • — . - - - . . _ _ . • . . . -
••< • • • » w •

always sought to exploit it by using a religious screen for their underground activities or by utilizing the spiritual power of religious

leaders as a means to penetrate governmental ranks. Communist agents

usually enjoyed relative immunity under the cover of religion. In

the aftermath of the Buddhist uprising in 1963, security forces and the

national police in particular were especially chary about meddling into

religious affairs, and generally chose to stay away from anything related

to religion.

Linguistically, the Vietnamese language as it was spoken and written

in South Vietnam became more and more enriched and innovative as a result

of contributions made by Western culture. The introduction of American subcultural expressions and beliefs, displayed by the "flower children"

generation, came to affect Vietnamese young people in particular and gave

rise to much sophisticated slang which were subsequently accepted as

common usage. In mid-1967, for example, "sue may", meaning "no way",

became very popular slang. This apparently harmless expression enjoyed

widest acceptance among carefree youths because it connoted playfulness,

indolence, and a certain defiance. It was the period of improved security,

stabilized politics, and economic prosperity made possible by the presence

of US combat troops. Everybody seemed to enjoy the new situation and it

was as if the prospect of a bright future was just around the corner.

People were carefree and became incredulous of anything that sounded like

danger or misfortune, hence the increased popularity of the slang "no way"

which was meant to express disagreement or disbelief. In time, the slang

became so ingrained into subconsciousness that people were seldom aware

of its intended meaning because it was used indiscriminately for almost

everything. Unfortunately, the same expression was also used indifferently

by intelligence officers when they discussed the validity of certain indicators pointing toward an enemy general offensive in early 1968. Of

course, they all thought there was "no way" the enemy would be able to

launch such an offensive. That was their first reaction when confronted by

hard intelligence, and the slang expression did its job splendidly.

30
.' >IT' " . • • '—'—••''". " '. -" • '-- .-—>—-—^—P^

Language, Translation and Cultural Interpretation

Over the years, the culture and language of North and South Vietnamese became separate entities and the gap kept widening. Knowledge

about South Vietnam does not necessarily imply the same kind of knowledge about North Vietnam. This is important because people tend to

see things through their own perspective and interpret facts according

to their own experience. This is a pitfall that was common among the

majority of Americans in South Vietnam. Most of them were not aware

of the cultural and linguistic difference, and kept inferring their

knowledge about North Vietnam from what they knew about the South.

Another major obstacle that seriously hampered the American effort to

collect data on the enemy was the fact that these data had to go through

the distorting lens of translation. If one is to believe the wisdom of

the axiom "translating is betraying," then one can always expect a

certain amount of distortion at best. There were of course some Americans

who had a complete command of the Vietnamese language and in fact spoke

it as well as a native, or even better in terms of metaphors and proverbs,

but they were a tiny minority. In addition, intelligence as it was

practiced in South Vietnam had a special jargon and a methodology of its

own that outsiders could hardly understand. The widely admitted reasoning was that not all Vietnamese who were proficient in general English

could become good interpreters or translators in intelligence, for aside

from a good command of intelligence terminology in both languages, they

were also required to have a thorough familiarity with the kind of

language used by the Communists. Not very many had this double knowledge.

The English language, for example, includes the term "general uprising"

which is used to translate the Communist term "Tong Noi Day" (general uprising, literally), But it was found that the same English term was

used, indiscriminately, for two other Communist forms of general upri

"dong khoi" (uprising in unison, literally), and "Tong Khoi Nghia"

(general uprising for a cause, literally). As a matter of fact, each of

these terms has special connotations that are difficult to include into

31

. *

•- •

-. ;

' i

. - . • ,

. - - *

. - -'<

- 1

M

tj

- " • " * ,

~~ --

""*•". '

•

.

•-'

ii. 1 • 1 . •, - T . f ..- . -.. - • . i . • . 1 . | . , - , -.-.-.-•-.- _-_.....-••. . ... - • - _ - - - ._-_ „ .. ^ _ . . ._ . „ » , ..-..". .\
• • • *. •. '—«:- • • v • • *- — —.—. .-i .-_.-• ;.-..-• .-- - .- - . • . • - •

a ready-made, concise English term. Each of them was also used by

the Communists in a discriminating manner for each connoted a I

certain historical time frame. "Tong Khoi Nghia", for example, ••/.•[ '.'•

referred to the revolution of August 1945, in which the people,

at the instigation of the Viet Minh, participated in the seizure

of governmental power. In 1968, the Communists called their offensive *

campaign "Tong Tan Cong, Tong Khoi Nghia" (general offensive , general .-.--. j~j

uprising — for a cause), because they conceived it as a repeat of the

August Revolution of 1945,--and expected the same kind of popular

participation throughout the country. An "Dong Khoi" (uprising in unison)

was a term intended only for natives of South Vietnam to incite them

to rise up against local governments, an allegorical reminiscence of

the first Communist revolt in Kien Hoa province in 1960. Both of these

terms referred to specific historical events and if they had been used

repetitively, their meanings and psychological impact would have

certainly become lost. As a result, in 1972 and again in 1975, the

Communists chose a different term, "Tong Noi Day" (general uprising) to

replace the previous ones which had apparently become anachronistic.

General uprising, as an English term, renders quite adequately the

literal meaning of each of these events but for a deeper and more accurate assessment of the event itself, it was not enough for the inquisitive intelligence analyst.

Much has been said about another critical pitfall that occurred

during the translation of the Paris Agreement text. The Agreement, which

was drafted some time in October 1973, originally intended the National

Council of Reconciliation and Concord to be just an administrative body.

That was what had been agreed upon by the negotiators. But "administration"

when rendered in Vietnamese, can have two meanings and equivalents; one

is "chinh quyen" (government) and the other is "hanh chanh" (administration

body). The North Vietnamese, by their deliberate choice, opted for the

Vietnamese term which means government, and by doing this in all apparent

innocence transformed the Council into a form of coalition government.

•\-

J

This wickedness was finally detected by a comparison of both English and

Vietnamese texts. * . ""- *

-

32

"-•

^

L .-.\-u' ^-V-
• • • ". • . • I •'. »I •-•'.»•. —V •- » '. *\ •.•', ••.•'.•'! »T ».»•••.' m\! • i ••!•! »<.'•»». »f X "'I •!•••«• 1 « • 1 •«

. |

In intelligence as well as in certain other fields, the text of a

document does not always reflect the true intent of the writer. Sometimes it is necessary also to read between the lines. This it particularly important in intelligence analysis. As far as Communist documents

are concerned, the inveterate analyst can always detect something hidden

behind the literal meaning of the text. Some call this special ability

the sixth sense, or intuition, which is an invaluable asset of the

talented analyst. But if the text is translated into another language,

this hidden or implied meaning will be difficult to detect, if not entirely lost. Apart from translation, which can be acceptable for intelli- -»••*•:

gence purposes if professionally done, special attention must be given

to instantaneous interpreting of speech. In general, our disposition c?%*\

toward interpreting tends to be more tolerant, and bilingual interpreters

are not required to meet exacting qualifications. The need for interpreters

in South Vietnam became vital when US combat troops were introduced, and

it kept growing. Attempts were made to meet this urgent requirement by

recruiting civilians with some English knowledge into military service.

These interpreters proved to be useful for general- work, but their proficiency in English was rather poor and unsuited for specialized work.

Humans, being human, never want to expose their weaknesses and deficiencies.

The same is true with interpreters who, even though they sometimes don't

quite understand what is being said, always try to render it by ad-libbing

or inventing things which may be far from the truth. This is one of the

pitfalls that plagued the combined intelligence effort in South Vietnam

at first. Later, reliance on interpreters was greatly reduced as direct

communication between American and Vietnamese counterparts increased and

as combined working became an established procedure. The possibility of

misunderstanding still remained, but it was more a matter of degree.

Apart from difficulties created by the language barrier, the American

intelligence collection effort was also apt to run into some obstacles due

to inadequate understanding of Vietnamese psychological customs and

manners, expecially those found in local communities. In the Central

Highlands of MR-2 for example, there exist many ethnic Montagnard tribes

33

"* a * .*

• ' '• •'••'^ '• • »—«-J. .J-L. »'•'- . .- . • - •- -. I <-. _• ..J.._. .-._
w •• • f '•• ,• ~—T

—.—.„.^^-^—.

r

whose matriarchal social organization gives ruling power to the women.

Any contact made with male members of the tribe inevitably brings about

little result. In the Mekong Delta, particularly in the Ca Mau area

many people made a living by producing charcoal. They built earthen

furnaces in open fields to burn trees and these were registered on

infra-red tapes as thermal spots that initially American specialists

were unable to interpret correctly. This was of course an instance of unfamiliarity with local customs. In imagery interpretation also, several

American specialists at first mistook certain isolated tombs scattered

among rice fields as crew-served weapon positions because on aerial

photos, the configuration of their structures looked almost the same.

Knowledge about traditional Vietnamese architecture can be helpful

in intelligence work in case orientation must be ascertained. As a rule,

most pagodas face the southwest, a market place front always faces north

and a tomb generally lies with its head toward the west. National character

also varies by region or by ethnic group. Vietnamese living in the delta,

for example, are generally shrewd and cunning while Montagnards are ingenuous; southerners are sincere but short-tempered; northerners are

usually tactful and subtle, and most people living in central Vietnam are

incisive and ceremonious. Thorough knowledge about a nation is not always

easy to learn since there are many regional peculiarities that confuse even

local people. The most important feature of the Vietnam war is that it was

a conflict between North Vietnam and South Vietnam, hence a civil war in

some of its aspects. What people usually failed to recognize or took rather

lightly was the deep-seated cultural and linguistic difference between

the warring adversaries, and this was precisely what caused so many failures

and setbacks. A Communist plan of attack which was coordinated with actions

by traitors within our ranks was defeated simply because of the difference

in launching time. The Communist planners apparently failed to realize

that their own official time, aligned on Hanoi time, was one hour later than

Saigon time. When the traitors started firing one hour too soon, they

i I

In some tribes, such as the Bahnar and the Jarai, although a woman is

usually the "decision-maker" in the family, she has to seek advice from her

older brother for important decisions.

34

"

r_--.-. . . ...... • . • - • .. . , - - - - - - - - ... ....... -- . - . .. %• 1 : i~-
!" ."'.' ' W •.".' -T "".,' r

- *"•' »••"•".*-.*'•'*'*'. 1 * *- 7* .*•'• .''.' .','','.•—'y •-; r * • 1 • i • • •

exposed themselves and were all arrested. The attack from the outside

never materialized because of this initial setback. Another case of

failure occurred when a Communist cadre was arrested while visiting his

family who lived in a government-controlled rural area. To neighbors

who dropped in to see him, he was introduced by his parents as a citydwelling visitor. While they were chatting a jet fighter happened to

fly by at low altitude and creating supersonic booms. Through conditioned reflex the Communist cadre sought cover by crawling under the

bed. This took everybody present aback. He had unknowningly given himself away simply by failing to adapt to a new cultural environment.

When they chose the Tet holidays to launch their 1968 general

offensive campaign, the Communists were primarily interested in its

surprise and totally disregarded its adverse psychological effect. This

was understandable because to North Vietnam Tet was merely a custom that

needed to be changed because it was both the manifestation of a feudalistic

heritage and an occasion for wasteful, luxurious spending. Accordingly,

the traditional importance of Tet in North Vietnam was downplayed by

Communist authorities. But to South Vietnam, which revered traditions,

Tet was as sacred as always because people regarded Tet less as a celebration than a spiritual tie between man and the universe, between the

living and the dead, and also between the living people themselves. As

a result, the South Vietnamese troops were angrily determined to eliminate

the violators of sacred Tet and in the aftermath of the offensive, recruiting was never so successful.

South Vietnam's basic weakness in the war was taking too lightly the

enemy's will to carry out his plans. We tended to liken our adversaries

to ourselves and assess them according to our subjective thinking. For

example, if a Communist plan was disclosed, we usually believed that our

enemy would discard it since we always considered everything that had been

leaked as too risky. But to the Communists, it was not always so because

their goal always outweighed the risks to be incurred, and if the political

requirement so dictated, a plan once worked out was usually implemented

regardless of the risks caused by disclosure.

35

. *

•.

"«-'_-."

• -•- - i .-.•... -,. --- - - -•-.... - - - - - h. > • - -
"V "."-•-.' —7—T- -- V -• •• ^ 7 ~

In the history of intelligence, there is an abundance of examples

of successes in very difficult intelligence and counterintelligence

operations. The key to these successes almost always is special

attention to minute details. Besides, planners usually consider that

any operational scheme is prone to omissions and leaks and accordingly

they take extra precautions through contingency planning. In the Vietnam War, such fundamentals were observed in principle but detail was

something that usually escaped the planner's mind. The usual contention

was that culture, language, customs, manners, and traditions never really

constituted true obstacles because both sides were Vietnamese. To

intelligence personnel, however, these are precisely, the factors of

considerable importance that could spell the difference between success

and failure.

- •

••!

ft

•A

-. \ :

36

• - - - . »_. • -1 -1 • - - - * •» . . . __
r.-w^v.v •", ^".".".•." v••'•? ".*".' •• ••.• 7 ".' "> v- '•""";•'. ••"- "• • •• "• •. •. •-•-!•« •'.• •

.. •

&*> a

,-

v

•

kp *

•"• ."-

r> *

• ,

- . •

1 • - . 1

m

K>\ " «

LV- •

* • A

• "• • !

•'/-"/•'."•

*"-"••

kar CHAPTER in J '-.'•;.: a

Sir Robert Thompson, Phoenix, Myths and Relevances of the Viet

Nam War,(Lugano Review LR 4) James (Paddy) Fitzsimmons, April 1975, p.61.

2

This organization existed only in name, not in substance.

37

'•

Republic of Vietnam and United States Intelligence

Organizations in South Vietnam

The RVN National and Local Intelligence Coordination Committees

Robert Thompson, a Vietnam specialist, wrote that in 1966, in

Saigon, he had been able to identify seventeen different united States

and Republic of Vietnam intelligence agencies. He did not name them.

However, if we were to take into account all intelligence agencies in the

entire Republic, Vietnamese agencies alone actually exceeded this number

but fluctuated with time. As of 1965, on the civilian side, there were

at one time or another:

1. The Central Intelligence Office (CIO);

2. The National Police (NP);

3. The Directorate of North Vietnamese Affairs of the Office of

the Chairman, Central Executive Committee;

4. The Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs;2

5. The Directorate General of Administrative Security;

6. The Rural Development (RD) cadre group;

7. The Civil Affairs cadre group;

8. Armed propaganda teams of the "Chieu Hoi" (Open Arms) Ministry;
^^^r^^^^^^^ m •' ••^•"^^^^-P^"^^^^^^* •. i- • f • '. ' ' i - • I'll1

» • • -. in • .

9. Census and grievance teams.

Military intelligence agencies included the following:

1. The Military Security Directorate (better known as MSS);

2. J-7 of the Joint General Staff (J-7, JGS);

3. The Strategic Technical Directorate (STRATDAT);

4. The Liaison Service;

5. The Research and Documentation Office of the National Defense

Ministry;

6. G-2, Special Forces;

7. The Intelligence Directorate of the General Political

Warfare Department;

8. J-2, JGS, and subordinate service intelligence staff and units

such as A-2 of the Vietnam Air Force (A2/VNAF); N-2 of the

Vietnam Navy (VNN); Special Collection Detachment/VNAF;

Special Collection Detachment/VNN (Unit 701); G-2's of Army

corps, infantry divisions and general reserve divisions; corps

and division military intelligence detachments; division longrange reconnaissance companies; S2's of sectors and subsectors

with their respective intelligence/security platoons and squads;

and the 924th Support Group, J-2, JGS (later renamed Unit 101).

There were also two kinds of Vietnamese intelligence units which

came under direct US operational control: the Provincial Reconnaissance

Units (PRU) and the Kit Carson Scouts (units made up of Communist defec-

» 3

tors).

Though some of the intelligence organizations were later disbanded

(North Vietnamese Affairs Directorate, civil affairs cadre, G-2/Special

Forces), or merged (the Liaison Service became subordinated to STRATDAT)

or disappeared with the withdrawal of US forces (Kit Carson Scouts),

there remained a significant number of them.

As an effort to give intelligence a more unified structure, the

Social and Political Research Department was established during the First

3

The PRU's were initially created and controlled by CORDS, US

Embassy. As of 31 March 1969, they were transferred to the National

Police. Each PRU operated under the control of the province chief.

38

. . ...
............. . . >c. 4 • [ _ -T T « • » -I T~p—T-TT-T]

Republic as an agency of the President's Office. It was chartered to

control both civilian and military intelligence activities, but its

authority was limited to the CIO, NP, MSS and J-2, JGS.

The Social and Political Research Department was disbanded after

the 1 November 1963 revolution and the CIO took over control of intelligence organizations in the country. To ensure smooth coordination of

operations, a standing committee was established which included representatives of all the agencies involved.

In 1966 the cabinet was augmented with a new department known as

the Security Ministry and the Security Minister subsequently took on

the additional position of Director, CIO, to control intelligence operations in the country.

Later, the Security Ministry was disbanded, but the CIO remained

the highest intelligence agency in the country. Considerations were

given to making the Defense Minister or the Interior Minister concurrently Director, CIO, which would shift authority from the President's Office

to the cabinet. However, in the end a National Intelligence Coordination

Committee (NICC) was established and chaired by the Presidential Assistant for Military and Intelligence Affairs. (Chart 1) The office of

the chairman of the National Intelligence Coordination Committee was not

staffed by representatives of member agencies. Its personnel came from

the CIO whose director became secretary general of the NICC. Members of

the NICC included the NP, MSS, J-7, JGS, J-2, JGS, and STRATDAT, but the

latter was not considered to be a permanent member.

Chart 1 — Organization, National Intelligence

Coordination Committee

Chairman, NICC

Secretary General

Director, Central

Intelligence Office

CIO National

Police

Military

Security

Service

J-7, Joint

General Staff

J-2, Joint

General Staff

Strategic

Technical

Directorate

39

-. , .. .
P—-^ ; f—; : --. * '—- \ V r b ' ^—*—•• ,v r-—r-»^ —-: 7»—•—• \"—:»—< ""T* "• •—-W-~T—-a •—* •—•—r—T: . - 1 - T - . - . •

The NICC was supposed to meet once a month. In reality, it met

only when needed, once every three to six months, with all member agencies

represented. In addition to these meetings, the Chairman's Office worked

directly with the CIO, NP, or MSS. Member agencies had to provide the

Chairman's Office with copies of all intelligence reports or suramaries

distributed. Information was extracted from these materials and presented

as NICC reports to the President's Office and occasionally to the Premier's

Office.

This procedure shows that the NICC Chairman's Office wanted to

keep up with intelligence information, both civilian and military, down

to the tactical level, when it should have concentrated solely on matters

of national concern. This excess led to its being swamped with reports

from the member agencies, making evaluation Impossible and negating

timeliness.

Throughout the years of its existence, the NICC failed to perform

its role properly as required. It was unable to establish national

intelligence plans and requirements; nor was it capable of arriving at a

strategically comprehensive assessment of the military and political situation that the GVN required to face eventualities with confidence.

In addition to the NICC, there were intelligence coordination

committees at military region level, but those were established according to the region commanders' individual concepts. They usually included

a representative of the region commander (deputy commander or chief of

staff) as chairman; the G-2 of the Military Region (G-2, MR) as secretary

general; and the chief of the regional MSS and his counterpart at the NP,

both serving as members of the committee.

There are no representatives of the CIO, J-7, or STRATDAT on the

regional committees. These regional committees did not meet periodically.

Their primary purpose was to ensure effective and timely exchange of

information which otherwise would have been more difficult, given intelligence agencies' tendency to disregard lateral dissemination for the

benefit of their own headquarters. While at military region level, the

organization of an intelligence coordination committee was somewhat

40

• •-•--- .... - _. . ... ..
-^^^PT^^^W • •.«.•.

optional, such organizations at sector and sub-sector levels were mandated by government decrees, beginning in 1964 with a Premier's decree

establishing provincial intelligence coordination committees, followed

by later directives concerning district intelligence coordination

committees. At provincial level, the province chief/sector commander

was chairman of the intelligence coordination committee, the sector S-2

was its secretary general; the chief of MSS and his counterpart at the

NP were permanent members of the committee. Non-permanent committee

members included representatives of the CIO; Unit 101; the Chief,

"Chieu Hoi" Service; Chief, Information Service; intelligence officers

of US units stationed in the area; US advisors to sector S-2, etc. At

district level, the district chief/sub-sector commander was the chairman

and the sub-sector S-2 was the secretary general. Committee members

included the chiefs of MSS, NP, "Chieu Hoi" and Information sub-services,

and representatives of rural development and civil affairs cadre groups.

In addition to providing the mechanics for coordination and exchange of information, the intelligence coordination committee acted as

a source control center where agents' reports were screened for validity.

At this center, agents' files were maintained in a standardized format

that provided for distinctive sections dealing with personal data,

collection qualifications, and area of operation, respectively. When

there were grounds for suspecting a certain agent, collection agencies

compared various parts of the agent's biography and, upon preliminary

verification, proceeded toward a complete exchange of biographical information. Upon identifying a fabricator or a contaminated agent, the

agency concerned took appropriate action and notified all other collection agencies.

Still another purpose of the coordination committee was to ensure

that sources who were available to one member agency, but whose knowledgeability or access was not consistent with the line of priorities

handled by that one agency, would be directed to the appropriate agencies or organizations. Members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI)

were the responsibility of the NP, military proselyting cadre were

handled by MSS, and military prisoners of war were processed by military

-I

. .

41

- • - • - •• - m . • •-•-.-•-» ^M^M-. ..:_ .i.« _.._»• -* -- '-• -• -- .
T_w__,____r^... ._..-.-. ... . - - - - - _ -

T*T"" • *•

intelligence. This operational procedure was designed to provide clearcut division of responsibilities and delimitation of each organization's

collection scope, with no one duplicating the efforts of another, and

with each organization having its own distinct targets.

Nevertheless, in 1967 it was realized for the first time that intelligence in Vietnam focused solely on enemy military forces and ignored

a no less important force, the Communist political force, also known

as Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). As a result, a new effort was

initiated on a national scale to root out the VCI and the NP was allowed

to expand in order to cope with this extensive task.

The need for a concerted intelligence effort led to the establishment of the Phoenix Program in 1968 (Decree 280a/TT/SL, 1 July 1968).

This program, originally being an American idea endorsed by the GVN,

was administered through existing Provincial and District Intelligence

and Operations Coordination Committees (PIOCC and DIOCC respectively).

The organizational structure of these committees is shown in Charts 2

and 3. The Phoenix Program sought further coordination than was effected

at the old intelligence coordination committees. It provided for coordination between intelligence and tactical operations with the aim of permitting

Immediate tactical response that would lead to destruction of the VCI.

Many government officials felt that this program, though upgraded

to a national policy and enjoying total US support from its inception

to cease-fire day, did not live up to expectations. In organization

the program's shortcoming was that, while theoretically the concept of

entrusting eradication of the VCI to police forces was sound, in reality

police personnel in charge of the program at provincial and district

levels did not have the qualifications, prestige or experience for such

an assignment. Chiefs of NP services and sub-services were all fresh

out of training. They were second lieutenants at provincial level and

noncommissioned officers at district level while their counterparts in

military intelligence or military security were captains or first lieutenants at provincial level and warrant officers or second lieutenants

at district level. The military officers were also better qualified

and more experienced than their police counterparts.

_•• _

42

. - . «_J- - . . . . ,.--..-«-
. • . • I • I • •••'•.•'.• '••:•.»• ' . » "i i - 'v—^~~"—•%'-.-. -..' • ,^ ^ .. ;•* •• *

Chart 2 — Organization, Provincial Intelligence and

Operations Coordination Committee

Message Center

PIOCC

1

1st Deputy

Deputy Sector Commander

2d Deputy

Provincial NP Chief

Situation Section

S-2

Political Sub-Section

Police Special Branch Chief

Operations Section

S-3

Military Sub-Section

S-2

. *<

Chart 3 — Organization, District Intelligence

and Operations Coordination Committee

DIOCC

1st Deputy

Deputy Sub-Sector Commander

2d Deputy

District Police Chief

Message Center S-2 S-3

Political Sub-Section

1

Military Sub-Section

43

• - > •—4 m £ . m • » - • - - A : - • 1— . - . . J _ - . . -
- - - " - • ---•..-«-•-•-.--- . - . .- •

The role of the DIOCC or PIOCC 2d Deputy Chairman called for him

to replace the chairman in controlling and guiding intelligence operations in the district or province, coordinating civilian and military

intelligence activities, verifying and controlling intelligence sources,

maintaining source control files, and advising the sector or sub-sector

commander on intelligence operations and the enemy situation. These

duties far exceeded what might have been reasonably expected, in qualifications and prestige, of the chief of a police service or sub-service.

For this very reason, an inter-ministerial directive was originated which

allowed sector and sub-sector commanders to fill the position of 2d

deputy chairman of the PIOCC or DIOCC as the local situation warranted,

no longer making it a police prerogative. Generally speaking, however,

the above situation remained a basic cause of unsuccessful coordination

despite the great efforts invested. When the NP became a command in

1971 and its strength was increased to 121,000, it filled 13,000 slots

with Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) personnel who had volunteered to transfer to police status. A number of high-ranking military

intelligence and military security officers were also detached to the

NP Command to take over key positions and facilitate coordination between

this civilian authority and the armed forces. This greatly enhanced the

spirit of cooperation between the civilians and the armed forces on the

one hand and improved the NP collection capabilities on the other.

In summary, having numerous intelligence agencies does not necessarily guarantee good intelligence. It has been known to produce adverse

results. Collection activities may be entrusted to two organizations: a

civilian organization specializing in political intelligence and a military organization specializing in military intelligence. These two

organizations would support and complement each other. Since each had

its own distinct field of activity, there should be no duplication or

undue competition. Internally, each organization would be structured

with an equally clear-cut division of responsibilities. The relationship between the operational elements and the staff elements would be

clearly defined, as would be the interrelation between the various

collection areas. Consequently, when weaknesses are identified in a

specific field or a specific target area, supplemental plans may be made

but no additional agencies would be established. This would help avoid

44

-

.-__•_._ . ^ ...__. . • • a i . . -- - . - . - - - . -• • • l~—s I—i . ', 1 • • - « • ,
1 I • I • •

total reliance on higher headquarters and disregard of lateral agencies,

or vice-versa. There would be no room for those intelligence agencies

which could not collect a single item of interest and spent all their

time and efforts doctoring up friendly agencies' reports for dissemination within their own channels.

Vietnamese intelligence agencies which operated jointly with US

intelligence organizations were somewhat influenced by the latter.

United States military intelligence includes Intelligence agencies of

the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. These agencies are independent from one another. This was not feasible in the RVNAF because

VNAF and VNN were but small services. Because they were directly supported by their US counterpart agencies and were able to observe the

independence enjoyed by the latter, A-2, VNAF, and N-2, VNN, during

1965-67 wanted to demonstrate their own independence from other Vietnamese services by having their own concepts of organization and operations, their own training programs, their own collection plans and

operations, etc.

The organizational concept as applied to Vietnamese intelligence

reflected an indiscriminate combination of US, French and Chinese concepts, whereas only the strong points of each system should have been

selected and reconciled with the others in keeping with the context of

the Vietnam situation. This would have been the best way to arrive at

an appropriate organizational concept. Unfortunately, it was not the

case with Vietnamese intelligence. Consequently, collection efforts

were weakened and resources misused or even squandered. While everyone

expected good coordination to provide the solution to all problems,

this very same coordination—be it in intelligence or in other fields—

remained but a "state of mind."

45

.- . ..- - .- .- .- . .-_ _ . . _-. _ . j - .- . .
1'- »•_ > ... _, _w _. _• .• • •'"..". "7 «• • ."' T"; . •_ J". »' ... . -" .'. ..•."_•.••.•».'"." . " • • • »7" : • " •.- •*

Vietnamese Civilian Intelligence Agencies

1. The Central Intelligence Office (CIO)

The CIO was established in May 1961. It was given authority to

control and coordinate the operation of intelligence organizations in

the country to ensure that requirements for intelligence of national

scope would be adequately met.^ This included military and non-military

organizations as well as the NP. It had by then become evident that

the various intelligence agencies in Vietnam were too self-centered and

no agency had access to another's resources. The stated objectives of

the CIO were never reached because of the ever-changing internal

political situation and the complex nature of the intelligence agencies

involved.

The ClO's ultimate missions were: to satisfy requirements for

strategic intelligence (primarily political); to conduct counterespionage (security of the regime); and to satisfy special intelligence requirements of the President's Office.

It was last organized as follows (Chart 4):

Chart 4 — Organization, Central Intelligence Office

:-•>-.-.

-

•••

.--.-•.

Director, CIO

Deputy for Operations

Inspector General

Foreign

Intelligence

Counterespionage

Deputy for Plans

Headquarters Staff

Support Training Interrogation

Center

^First Twelve-Month Report of Chief, MAAG, Vietnam, September

1961, p. 12.

46

- .-. - ~ • - ^ '-* -^ ' -~ t - • ~ - _^ ^_ . - - - . ^ »
•EW.*-. i». •• • v v -. •. v -. • "" r» • - •/-•—•;---: --..-.- .... . ^ .

\ •--

CIO personnel numbered 1,400, 60% of them high-ranking cadre.

Intermediate-level cadre made up 20% of the force and the remaining 20%

were junior cadre. Personnel of the CIO enjoyed special status .and such

privileges as draft deferment or military discharge.

The foreign intelligence division operated numerous stations.

These stations were the eyes and ears of the CIO in foreign countries.

They collected intelligence on both North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

They were positioned in friendly countries where there were reasonable

prospects for developing collection activities. Among these countries

were France, Hong Kong, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos. In Laos alone

there were two stations, one in Vientiane and the other in Pakse. Plans

had been made to establish stations in the US and Singapore as well, but

favorable circumstances did not materialize. Each station had three to

five men operating under cover of Republic of Vietnam (RVN) embassy or

consular staff. These stations were not successful in their efforts to

collect information on North Vietnam because of tight control exercised

by its regime over activities of overseas Vietnamese visiting home.

Personnel of the embassies of East European countries, some of them

indirect CIO sources, were subjected to similar controls in North Vietnam.

At home, the CIO's primary effort was counterespionage. Counterespionage by the CIO differed from counterespionage by the NP or MSS in

scope, nature and sensitivity, and mostly involved cases over which

neither of the latter two had jurisdiction. Those were cases involving

constitutional institutions like the Upper House and Lower House of the

National Assembly, the Inspectorate, and the Supreme Court; executive

institutions like the President's Office and the Premier's Office; or

influential personalities of domestic political movements and parties.

The support division, in addition to its regular functions,

operated radio systems which enabled the CIO to communicate with its

elements in the country and those stationed in nearby foreign countries.

Its communications branch also handled cryptographic materials for RVN

embassies abroad. Communications personnel of these embassies were

detached from the CIO. The Foreign Affairs Ministry originally intended

for CIO participation in its communications to be limited to specialized

47

... .

.•*•'» "..••'•. •'.-.•- • - .
«y^^» ii i ; • • i • i i • • • •, • • • •. • ' , • • • . • • • •» « ' • .» .•—T—:—•—•—•—•—'i—<—•—• - -.—. . '.•••-. - -

training of Foreign Service personnel, but this concept was not accepted.

CIO personnel were trained domestically although training materials and

instructors were US-supplied.

The interrogation division of the CIO worked with sources of information considered to be of a strategic nature, politically and militarily. In principle, military prisoners of war were first interrogated

by military intelligence personnel, then transferred to CIO control upon

request by the latter. However, beginning in 1971, the CIO obtained

first choice over all sources of strategic intelligence, even if their

knowledge was limited to purely military matters. Those selected were

evacuated immediately for CIO interrogation and no military agency,

even J-2, JGS, was allowed access to these sources. The concept of

concentrating all strategic resources into the hands of the CIO was once

again evident in 1972 when a presidential directive specified that copies

of dispatches sent from Vietnam by foreign correspondents were not to be

made available to J-2, JGS, because such distribution was deemed unnecessary.

The CIO's real responsibility remained a political one. In particular, it was responsible for ensuring the security of the regime by

watching out for plots against it from within or without. The CIO produced daily information reports and special reports as warranted.

Because of its sensitive nature, under certain circumstances it received

instructions directly from the President and reported directly to him,

bypassing the chairman of the NICC. In these instances, it was not

required to inform the Prime Minister.

Consequently, as the CIO effectively turned into the intelligence

agency of the President's Office, the NP also became the intelligence

agency directly controlled by the Minister of Interior who was also

Prime Minister.

By order of the Chairman, National Intelligence Coordination

Committee.

48

-j --• -' .">-
k • 1 "."•.»•. • •-•-•.•.••«•: . »•.IT • -. • 1 V .-»••»•• .• . •» .•» ."»yi

•-•

2. The National Police and Other Civilian Agencies

Police forces experienced several organizational changes between

the time they were under control of the Binh Xuyen and 1956; they were

subsequently reorganized as a single force in June 1962 and known as

the National Police (NP) under the control of a General Directorate

which finally became a Command in June 1971. NP personnel strength was

increased from 17,000 to 72,000 in 1966 and finally to 121,000 in 1971.

The NP force consisted of three major components: (1) Uniformed Police,

(2) Police Special Branch (PSB), and (3) Police Field Forces (PFF).

While the uniformed police performed the same duties as uniformed

police everywhere in the world, the PSB received special consideration.

This special consideration began in 1961 following recommendations from

a British advisory group that PSB be effectively organized to cope with

the activities of the VCI.

The PSB deployed intelligence nets to collect information on the

VCI. The Police Field Forces conducted raids or operations against VCI

personnel or targets identified by the PSB. The PFF also served as a

reserve for the NP for intervention where needed, such as to quell antigovernment demonstrations. The NP Command.was organized as follows.

(Chart 5) .

In the fields of intelligence and security, the NP Command was the

principal agency responsible for identifying and detaining VCI personnel.

This program was known as "Protection of the People Against Terrorism."

Police operations center (POC) patterned after military tactical operations centers (TOC) were established at provincial and district levels.

The NP also operated provincial interrogation centers.

In its efforts to identify VCI personnel, the NP relied on policeorganized informants' nets, information provided by volunteers, and by

such forces or groups as the Popular Self-Defense Forces (PSDF), information disclosed by VCI prisoners, information acquired from human or

document sources by uniformed police or the PFF, and on information

received from friendly sources such as civilian groups, rural development cadre, or civil affairs cadre.

-.j

49

L_^

• • - . . . . • . - .
y«w

l • . , •, •• •. i#

i - .•.'-. • '••• • • • -- •-» •' -• -•'' " • ~ . - - w - ........ .....

Chart 5 — Organization, National Police Command

Commander

National Planning

Committee

Deputy Commander

Inspector

General

Interpol I

Assistant

for Security

Assistant for

Security

Development

Assistant for

Operations

(Chief of Staff)

Criminal

Division

Operations

Division

Logistics

Division

Technical

Directorate

Traffic

Control

Directorate

Immigration

Service

I

Assistant for

Discipline

Personnel

Division

I

Training

Division

Special

Division

Psywar

Directorate

iCommunicat ions

Directorate

ADP

Center

Budget and

Finance

Directorate

Headquarters

Co

Capital

National

Police Hq

Region 1

National

Police Hq

Region 2

National

Police Hq

Uniformed

Police

" Region ^3

National

Police Hq

Police

Special Branch

50

Region 4

National

Police Hq

Police

Field Force

a

V>''

.». .•.

• -

. «w*.»-*r*. * _ 1 • . • \ • 'm. , - ..... . • ..... ._...-. _=_j «~ _ ._
^^^mw^^w. ii.•. • .••».'•'.ifi •i'*p

".' '."••'••,' -*.'•'

F • ' 'rr'i'i' J» !••••• •.'•'•••- •• •——i—•—

. :<

Each rural development cadre team strength varied from 30 to 59

men, depending upon the population of the target hamlet or village.

In the initial phase of the pacification effort, these cadre were

responsible for population census and classification. The census led

to classification of the population into: Communists, Communist sympathizers, Communist defectors, families with relatives in Communist ranks,

uncommitted, and nationalists or government sympathizers. Civil affairs

cadre were in fact rural development cadre on long-term assignments in

specific areas to develop information complementing the above project.

Information thus acquired was recorded in charts with appropriate codes

and symbols which were in turn forwarded to NP centers. •-';•:•

The next phase of the pacification effort saw the NP proceed to

control the population by issuing individual identification cards and ^

establishing family registers which detailed each household's composition by members' names and relationship to one another. In some areas -.'•-':••

the police went as far as requiring all members of a household to be •/->'

photographed together for the purpose of identification. -jg

The VCI, already deemed to be a large and effective Communist force

which provided supplies, hiding places, guides and propaganda resources, .>".y2

was thought by many to be made up of fanatics with something undefinable '-V-,

in them. In reality, there were two categories: the real VCI personnel t^Htk

imbued with Communist ideology, and those who had been persuaded, bought -."•.•

or coerced into working for the former. The second category consisted !-"v"\

of civilians that were like other civilians except that most of them

were indigent. Many became part of the VCI out of greed. For example, , j$

they purchased drugs and other necessities in government-controlled /\vl" •

areas and resold them to the Communists. Some made a living out of

this; others did it because of Communist pressure.

People caught in police raids or military tactical operations fell

under three categories: the innocent, whom the police commissioner, the

district chief, or the province chief were empowered to release; the

truly guilty, who were turned over to court-martials; and those who

were considered harmful but without enough evidence to warrant legal

proceedings. The latter were processed by a provincial security

51

r. .".

. . . . . . • . . . . • • . • . . - . . • - _^ . . •
- -• • .- -;• - - • "7- - « —- .» • •* -••—«"•—Ti • ••- • •- ••.-• •••••:•, ••-•••-••;•--••• • i - • --i - • • i. • • - i • »—r. TT»1

committee which consisted of the province chief, deputy chief for internal

security, public prosecutor or presiding judge of the local court, chief

of the police service, military security representative, S-2 representative, and a representative of the operational forces or Regional-Popular

Forces (RF-PF). This committee was empowered to release, assign residence or detain without due legal proceedings. In the latter case, the

terms of detention ranged from a minimum of three months to a maximum

of two years. The committee met once a month to review its cases. The

police chief presented the charges in each case and, if there were no

objections, the committee decided on the spot as to disposition of the

case. This trial process was subjected to frequent criticism and opposition as it was an administrative procedure rather than a due process

of law, and in most cases the defendant was either not allowed to stand

for trial or denied the right to legal counsel.

This method of disposing of the VCI dealt with the branches, not

with the roots, of the problem. Sentencing was done mechanically and

based solely on effects as recorded in the files; it ignored causes

such as weak minds, coercion, or false accusations by people seeking

personal revenge, etc. It left indicted people with no way out. In

most cases, the suspects were originally not VCI at heart, but in the

course of detention they might have been approached and indoctrinated

by other detainees who happened to be hard-core Communist cadre; in

time they all became real Communist agents. Also the indignation of

their relatives at the injustice was readily exploited by the Communists

in their recruitment efforts.

The VCI suffered a devastating blow in 1968 when its forces came

out in the open during the Tet general offensive. The resulting losses

were such that it never again matched the magnitude and performances

of the past.

In large cities and suburban areas VCI agents were difficult to

identify because they blended with the masses and infiltrated all the

heterogeneous elements of society. This prompted the individual

policeman to keep away for fear of treading on touchy grounds or touching

off a personal vendetta, either because there was no personal gain in

52

.^-

''»'""• »—»—•—• . » : . , .—-*-•-•-•---.-- - - . - _. .
im^'i''.T "v «.".•• J'. s»".-,'.•.••T";»-^'•'/.*.•-.':' '•'•»*> •>."•'.W*•• *•. '•-- T* ~" —.---•-••-••-••

sight for him or because he had been bribed to look the other way. In

some cases, the police reacted only because they had no choice. The

lack of aggressiveness on the part of the police caused people to think

it would be foolish to get involved. This was a severe drawback because

no one was better informed on what was happening in a city block or ward

than the people who lived there. Popular Self-Defense Forces (PSDF)

were available everywhere and, though they were not intelligence collection units in the true sense of the term, they were designed in part to

serve as a source of information to the NP. In each PSDF combat team,

one to three men had received a week of general intelligence training.

However, as the designation Popular Self-Defense Forces indicates,

these were people's organizations, commanded by city block or ward

chiefs, and were loosely structured. The objective in establishing the

PSDF was to make it mandatory for those citizens who were not in the

service or in the police to participate in security and defense of their

own blocks or wards. Because in large cities certain people avoided

PSDF guard duty by hiring others to substitute for them, society saw

the birth of a new occupation: professional PSDF.

The NP kept tabs on all citizens and reviewed applications for

civil service jobs, for which no special security clearance was required. In order to control the ranks of the administration, particularly in the wake of the Huynh Van Trong espionage case in 1971, a new

security organization was established which became known as the Directorate General for Administrative Security. Civil servants, too, were

cadre of the state and played an equally important role in the conduct

of the state. However, their political loyalties had never been

questioned and naturally they had never been subjected to security

clearances, except when considered for such high positions as cabinet

minister or under secretary or directors of important departments. In

these cases required clearance by the CIO was based on data furnished

by the NP or MSS. In addition to weaknesses in personnel security,

6

See Chapter VII for details on the Huynh Van Trong case.

hy*

53

... .. . . .. --.._,._-%- , _^ ^^ ,:'r>.:l*r.*.*i..:'i.y _. ,i — ...... _._•_. J
Vietnamese Military Intelligence Organizations

54

' . -

the civil service suffered from its personnel's ignorance of fundamental

security measures required to protect documents and work premises.

Classified documents could be lost without being detected, and people

who did come upon lost documents usually did not bother to report them.

The Directorate General for Administrative Security was designed to fill

these gaps but achieved no positive results. Its very first step of ^ i"

establishing personnel files for security purposes met with a negative

attitude, if not resistance, from the civil servants who generally

objected to preparing detailed personal history statements.

The Directorate General for Administrative Security failed to 9 wi,

become an MSS counterpart of the administration although it was patterned

after the MSS mission and concept of organization.

-_•-

v'->, •"•"

When attempting to define responsibility for military intelligence

operations in the RVN armed forces, attention is always directed at the

role of J-2, JGS, thought by many to be the highest authority in military intelligence and enjoying the sole prerogative for planning, coordinating and controlling all intelligence efforts in the armed forces.

Nothing is farther from the truth. This misconception of the role of

J-2, JGS, apparently derives from knowledge of the organization and

mission of the earlier French "Deuxieme Bureau" and of American military intelligence.

In reality, J-2, JGS, was but a military intelligence agency among

others. With regard to authority, it was on a par with MSS; J-7, JGS; ^—' Ä

and STRATDAT. MSS was responsible for counterintelligence (CI), while

J-7, JGS, was responsible for signal intelligence and communications

security. STRATDAT, however, was more of an operational unit than an

intelligence agency.

The organization of military intelligence in the RVN armed forces

lacked a principal agency which would normally prepare a common military intelligence plan, establish common intelligence requirements, and

act as the only authority responsible for reporting on the enemy situation.

•v•;-.•

v.v:•:-:•••:-:-.•:•• <•: ...••. . ;•, v . . ••.•.-.••.:,
•I-1

—». •. ••. _•- •.•- .".'•'.••,:•."•"-—« ,• .• • .• r. r.' •,•».'». "^ • i-• -T———i—i—. ..... .. ••„/. *—«—'**,"** » * ' ••••'*•»'• -v .

The intricacies of internal politics had defeated efforts to unify

military intelligence organizations. As a result, coordination and

cooperation among these agencies were based on personal concepts and

convenience of the agency heads involved rather than on established

staff policies. i

1. The Military Security Department

Contrary to US organizational policies, responsibility for counterintelligence in the Vietnamese armed forces was entrusted to the Mili- "~^H

tary Security Department (better known as Military Security Service or

MSS), not to J-2, JGS. The Republic of China's influence was evident

in the subordination of MSS to the General Political Warfare Department

(GPWD) which came under JGS. However, this subordination was only ^j

theoretical because for all practical purposes the MSS usually reported

directly to the President or the Premier from whom it received its '-•!",•

directives. -"\-!\

• •

While other Vietnamese intelligence agencies were patterned after »• -$

US intelligence, the organization of the MSS was entirely the product

of self-formulated concepts. Though counterintelligence was its avowed V-V

mission, one of the MSS unofficial but most critical efforts—which was

performed only at headquarters level—was to detect and prevent military ., -|

coups against the regime. With such a politically-oriented real mission, v.'."'

MSS was organized to become an agency vested with power, authority and -'".•'.•

influence. It was fully funded by the national budget without need for -V-V

-

US assistance. MSS was the only military agency empowered to apprehend, n ~^

detain, and investigate civilians and military personnel alike without •_•"-/"

due legal process. MSS commented on appointments within the armed forces, \>!v

granted security clearances, cleared applications for exit visas or !>V_"

overseas training, and was the key member of annual military promotion j [Jj

boards.

Added to political influence derived from its association with

national leaders, this power enabled MSS to organize itself the way it

saw fit and to fear no competition or opposition from other agencies. E '~*

55

*__ ^«_ __- _*_^ . ' -* . .*' . a_ • . . .
-',••••«•• 1 • <•• l'l •. ' • '». ». — «. ». •• • ••• • -• ........... j ., •

For instance, MSS was allowed to have its own signal communications

system which made intra-agency communications totally free of outside

control. The Military Security Department was organized as follows:

(Chart 6)

Chart 6 — Organization, Military Security Department

Director, MSS

Deputy

Chief, Naval

Security

Administration

and Files Division

Training

Division

MR 1

MSS

MR 2

MSS

Chief, Air

Force Security

Security

and Clearance

Division

MR 3

MSS

Provincial

MSS

District

MSS

Counterintelligence

Division

MR 4

MSS

Logistic:

Division

Capital

Military

District

MSS

fei J

•••- .

- - - - operational control

56

- *

-------- .----. -- -*'-.»-•*'-»-•- •Jj - - - ^ 1 » , •-_ ••_.,• •_.•.. .-^ . _
•."••'-«•>. TT< '•'^'^•T- ^ '." .".*-• '*•'". *. '•»."*—»••'-•''—'.- - - '." <•." -."-.' *-" r

'." -.••"•" "."."._".» •".•".•."—• . • ."—»—•—•—• . • . •—»-

Military Security was 4,328-men strong. MSS headquarters in Saigon

had 657 men. The Capital Military District (CMD) MSS had 221 men. Each

military region (MR) MSS had 50 men, each province 30, each district 6,

each corps 20, and each division 25.

Military Security personnel fell into two categories: the professionals trained and appointed by MSS, and those appointed by the regiments and battalions to serve as security officers or non-commissioned

officers.

Military Security's counterintelligence mission called for countering sabotage, subversion, and espionage. Its duties included personnel

security, installation security, and document security. Another mission,

which was more of a psychological nature, was to safeguard and maintain

the morale of troops and prevent desertion.

MSS prepared daily and special reports. Those of <* political

nature were sent directly to the President's Office and to a Premier's

Office. In times of political crises, MSS headquarters staff concentrated maximum efforts on collecting information concerning the opposition. The only bilateral activities involving US elements were those

operations which were conducted in coordination with the US 525th Military Intelligence Group against Communist targets in MR 1 and MR 2. MSS

supported US forces by conducting security clearances for Vietnamese

employees of US agencies, issuing gate passes, etc. Military Security

personnel were trained both at home and abroad. Although its organization and mission were different in nature, Vietnamese military security

generally operated on the basis of US principles.

MSS did not confine itself to counterintelligence activities.

Whenever the occasion presented itself, it also sought intelligence

information from counterintelligence nets or through interrogation of

prisoners of war.

In summary, MSS was well and strongly organized and was able to

retain its independence. It was credited with many successful counterintelligence feats. Had all Vietnamese military intelligence agencies

been organized like the MSS, military intelligence as a whole would have

earned more respect and consideration.

57

}

•

•- -.; -

- - • , - " <

**--.'

•

- " •

K -•

-'••• -"- -"• -"• '• ••-..- •- •- .:. i_; :.;. • • . -.-.-..-.•. -.--.- . . . . . ___._,. ...
• f .• •• w • I I. I" I rrrrv.

2. J-7, JGS and the Special Technical and Security Branch

J-7 was a general staff division of the JGS responsible for planning, supervising and controlling signal intelligence and communications

security activities performed by units and organizations making up the

"Special Technical and Security Branch." In addition to J-7, JGS, the

"Special Technical and Security Branch" consisted of Unit 15, Unit 16,

Unit 17, and field organizations and units such as signal intelligence

centers assigned to corps and divisional technical detachments.

The mission of the Special Technical and Security Branch was to

collect and produce signal intelligence and communications-electronics

intelligence and ensure communications security for the entire RVNAF

and certain key governmental agencies.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, J-7, JGS, was chief of the Special

Technical and Security Branch (STS) whose total strength was 3,500 men.

The STS Branch was organized as follows: (Chart 7)

Chart 7 — Organization, Special Technical

and Security Branch

Sect

1

ACS, J-7, JGS

Division I

•Sect

2

Sect

3

Sect

4

rsicT

Unit 15 Unit 16

Military Region I

Signal Intell.

Center

Military Region II

Signal Intell.

Center

716th VNAF Sqdn

718th VNAF Sqdn

Division II Division III

Sect Sect

7

I

Sect

8

Sect

_2_

Sect

_lfl_

2.

Unit 17

Saigon Signal

Intell. Center;

Military Region IV

Signal Intell.

Center

Division Technical

Detachment

58

v.-

.. T " .if ' * • * »-*'».-•»•
•• •. .

,

-**-* *•*•.''-' '''.'*.* '."'''•', i; »' ' • i '.'.'•. L i . 11 • i • i 11 a • ! • »i • . i • i • i. i • . j. i. i. ,

J-7, JGS, was organized into three principal staff divisions, in

addition to Sections 1 and 2 which were responsible for administration

and personnel. Division I had three sections: 3, 4 and 5. Section 3

maintained liaison with J-2 and J-3, JGS, to obtain updated information

on the enemy situation and prepared and distributed technical intelligence reports. Section 4 prepared ARDF (Airborne Radio Direction Finding) information reports, monitored flights, and reported technical

changes in enemy radio stations. Section 5 processed enemy defectors'

and prisoners of war interrogation reports related to signal intelligence, interrogated these sources when necessary, processed news bulletins from enemy and friendly (BBC, VOA) radio broadcasts to prepare daily

information reports, and maintained liaison with civilian and military

security agencies in matters related to counterintelligence planning.

Division II was responsible for communications security. It

consisted of two sections: 6 and 7. Section 6 processed technical data

and prepared communications security reports recommending corrective

action. Section 7 studied friendly cryptographic security methods,

maintained liaison and coordinated with J-6, JGS, for cryptographic

inspections within the armed forces.

Division III was responsible for research, improvement, and coordination of support and training. It was made up of three sections:

8, 9 and 10. Section 8 handled organization, recruitment, operations,

support, maintenance and transportation. Section 9 conducted inspections

of short-range operational plans. Section 10 trained specialists,

monitored training, and prepared training materials.

During the period from 1961 to 1970, Unit 15 was the basic unit

responsible for radio intercept. Later this mission was turned over to

the four regional/corps signal intelligence centers and the unit became

a special unit in charge of code-breaking or decrypting enemy messages.

Unit 16 provided communications security to the RVNAF and a

number of key governmental agencies, established reports of communications security violations, inspected cryptographic facilities and

classified technical documents, and coordinated with J-6, JGS, to review

cryptographic procedures applied in the RVNAF.

59

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%" . " • »

Unit 17 was established in 1970 to coordinate with the VNAF

716th and 718th Squadrons in preparing flight plans for signal intelligence missions. Four phases were involved in this preparation: mission

analysis, briefing, debriefing, and reporting.

The 716th and 718th Squadrons were subordinate to the 33d Wing

of VNAF 5th Air Division. The 716th Squadron had five U-6A aircraft

and the 718th had thirty-three EC-47 aircraft.

Of the four signal intelligence centers, three were established

at I, II and IV Corps Headquarters in Da Nang, Pleiku and Can Tho respectively, and the fourth was established in Saigon to support III

Corps. (Map 1) Each center collected information through radio intercept, radio direction finding and transcribing. To provide support for

these centers, there were, in addition, four fixed radio intercept

stations located at Phu Bai (MR-1), Song Mao (MR-2), Vung Tau (MR-3)

and Con Son island.

Infantry divisions, to include general reserve divisions, were

each assigned a Technical Detachment to provide direct support in communications intelligence.(Map 2) Each Division Technical Detachment

was capable of collecting information through radio intercept and radio

direction finding, to include CW,Voice(AM) and low-power Voice (FM).

Each Divisional Technical Detachment was organized as follows (Chart 8):

Chart 8— Organization, Divisional Technical Detachment

,N>";

CO, Divisional

Technical Detachment

CW - Voice

Intercept

Radio

Direction

Finding

Trancription

Commo

Liaison

Low-Power Voice

60

/.—

- •-' *- * •• - - - - - --in--*-•-«•-•*-»-»---- — --.. _-..--.
m '•".'

DEMARCATION LINE

IQUANG TRI

MAP 1

LOCATION OF J7

CENTERS AND

STATIONS

I

DAO

PHU QUOC

(KIENGIANG)

s

Cam Ranh

*A

CON SON

LEGEND:

A DIRECTION FINDING

STATION

O INTERCEPT STATION

• TRANSCRIBING

STATION

fcr,;^

61

• •••• 1. ..-;v

-:-. -*— * i
• - - « -_« - - ' •v.- \ T"? •-• v"-.-"v^:^.-"-:^;"-':::-"-_">.-"-.••.-••.:••. '-'•••.---^7W7Tw^"r

^T^""^:"^^~"^ ------ ' r .-• -•-.-• .-• -•.--.^7

DEMARCATION LINE

MARINE OIV

AIRBORNE DIV.

1ST DIV

3RD DIV

MAP 2

LOCATIONS OF

DIVISION TECHNICAL DETACHMENTS

OAQ

PHU QUOC

IKIENGIANG)s

2ND OIV

22ND OIV

23RO OIV

5TH DIV

18TH DIV

".•• r

-';- • •;

62

••• •.-••-•••- - ........
'i'ML;t'j'.»j»j»,», *'„ w. r ; I .- .- p» .» '.- ." •• J» .» .' ' • • • « -i • i . • • • i » • t •••••••.•'.".».•—-•• • •—•-. -i r—-rV\-

Signal Intelligence Centers and Divisional Technical Detachments

'-V;.' reported directly to Corps and Division commanders (or their Chiefs of

Staff) respectively. Their reporting channel did not go through Corps

-•V;: or Division G-2's. However, copies of their special reports were always

made available to G-2. The major shortcoming of this direct reporting

^^ system lies in the fact that intelligence data submitted to field commanders were usually raw and not interpreted. This shortcoming became

a real danger when communications specialists tried to analyze and interpret data by themselves as they sometimes did. The Signal Intelligence

^^ Center at Da Nang, for example, once submitted a report predicting that

^^ an enemy military "high point" was going to occur at a certain precise

date. But the expected event never materialized. An investigation later

v"•'-•-.' revealed that a communications specialist had taken the liberty to analyze

and interpret the raw data collected all by himself.

,.-. • Techniques employed and controlled by J-7, JGS can be summarized

as to include: 1) high-frequency radio direction finding (CW and AM);

, ' 2) airborne radio direction finding; 3) ground-based radio direction

'— finding; 4) medium-range radio direction finding; 5) short range radio

direction finding; and radio intercept (CW, AM and FM).

'•'-"•"• High-frequency radio direction finding was not very effective in

Vietnam because the length and narrowness of the country did not lend

M themselves to accurate cross-bearings. This technique only helped

determine target areas for ARDF. Airborne communications intercept was

[',-:'• performed in conjunction with ground intercept to produce communications

"•"--•"

intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) data. This

C*lL technique was very effective in providing accurate and timely information.

However, J-7, JGS only had EC-47 aircraft at its service while US forces

used sophisticated aircraft such as C-130F, RC-135, RU-21D, JU-21A, etc.

Information provided by communications intelligence at the beginning of

0- the US direct participation in the Vietnam war enraptured ARVN unit commanders with its accuracy and timeliness. Beginning in 1970, as US

forces phased out, the STS Branch expanded in an attempt to replace th

in this field but the gap was not too obvious because US resources and

capabilities, though reduced, were still adequate in relation to the

63

**»-*- _, , > » . , -._ m. - -.
.. ...1.1,1... • - '• - • •—•-«.•'- •--••--• • • - -.-.-.-.-

•

needs. Following the 28 January 1973 Paris Agreement, the most significant loss was in ARDF resources as EC-47 aircraft were unable to operate over areas heavily defended by enemy anti-aircraft artillery; they

were confined, therefore, to operating over the lowlands and coastal

areas. Still, with the expansion of SIGINT and COMINT efforts, signal

and communications intelligence contributed substantially to supplementing

combat intelligence collected from other sources.

3. J-2, JGS and the RVNAF Military Intelligence Branch

J-2, JGS, as a general staff division of the JGS and command body

of the Military Intelligence Branch, was primarily responsible for mili- mT"

tary intelligence activities in the RVNAF. Its duties were generally

limited to combat intelligence, and its span of control, confined to

South Vietnam. J-2, JGS exercised no control over foreign intelligence

activities which were performed by Vietnamese military attaches under

the direct control of the Minister of Defense; nor had J-2, JGS any

connection with political warfare intelligence activities which were

under direct control of the General Political Varfare Department

(GrWD). Since war was the primary national effort, the role of J-2, JGS

and the military intelligence branch by extension became more and more

pre-eminent over the years. Its position and authority with regard to

other intelligence agencies, however, remained unchanged. The chain

of command of the Military Intelligence Branch ran from J-2, JGS down

to corps and divisions, G-2's and regiments and battalions S-2's, in

the tactical structure and down to sectors and sub-sectors S-2's in the

territorial structure.(Chart Q ) The principal human intelligence

(HUMINT) collection agency of J-2, JGS was Unit 101. In addition, the

Military Intelligence Center under J-2, JGS control provided technical

support in the areas of imagery interpretation, order of battle, tar-

•

geting, documents, interrogation of prisoners of war and defectors,

and exploitation of enemy weapons and equipment. Corps and division £

G-2's were supported by their respective military intelligence detachments.

J-2, JGS also exercised operational control over the operation of A-2,

VNAF, N-2, VNN and the RVNAF Military Intelligence School.

64

•

•

>>.-••.-••.•--.-•-• •.:-.->: : •--•'•--'-•- -i •-• -• •-• •- •••-•-••
rV^" .'• «_" .,- • ' -\m

r"i,'"u. •. I I . • . • . •".. ••.".••!• „-' .— W.'IF, I

Chart 9 —Organization, RVNAF Military Intelligence

..\-

A-2, VNAF

N-2, VNN

ACS J-2, JGS

RVNAF

MI School

Deputy

Unit 101

I

MI Center

(Unit 306)

G-2, Corps

and MR

G-2, Inf Div

I

1

G-2

CMD

S-2,Sector

S-2, Regt

I

S-2, Bn

I

S-2,

Sub-Sector

1

G-2, General

Reserve Division

Operational control

The Military Intelligence Branch had 4,328 men. This did not

include divisional and regimental reconnaissance companies or the Sector

security/intelligence platoons and sub-sectors security/intelligence

squads. The Military Intelligence Branch received its charter in 1971.

Those who held positions in military intelligence organizations and had

received military intelligence training or had operated in this field

for at least a year were considered members of the Military Intelligence

Branch. Military intelligence personnel at all levels were appointed

by authority of the Assistant Chief of Staff J-2, JGS, who was also commander of the Military Intelligence Branch, or upon recommendation by

tactical commanders subject to ratification by the ACS J-2, JGS. Most

appointments fell in the second case. Until the charter of the Military

.

E :

. •

..-.-.

••-•4

65

•

••*.••

. . .- : :
•?• f

•»•!.-••• '.'.'•• •••.'!.»• •••••»••-• •.•-•••

Intelligence Branch was promulgated, MI staff at all levels were usually

subject to full control by tactical commanders and were required to

comply with the latter's directives no matter how they conflicted with

intelligence standing operating procedures in the armed forces. Some

commanders of large units went so far as directing their G-2's not to

report significant information on the enemy or tactical situation to

J-2, JGS. In some cases liaison officers detached to Corps from J-2,

JGS were even denied access to daily briefings or the use of local communications facilities to transmit information to their central headquarters. This snubbing occurred at a time when excessive military and

civilian powers were given to field commanders, who usually reported

directly to the President's office. Because of the lack of real powers

over subordinate levels and the lack of a sole-user communications system,

intelligence information.collected by Vietnamese agencies and units

during this period were routed to J-2, JGS through MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) channels rather than through local communication facilities. Information sent through RVNAF channels came in very

late. This situation was gradually improved as more operational responsibilities were shifted to the RVNAF and JGS intelligence support to

the local levels became more effective. From the time of the 1972 Summer

General Offensive onward, military intelligence operational activities

proved to be very effective and the only obstacles encountered were

caused by insufficient resources. J-2, JGS was organized as shown in

Chart 10.

During the period from 1967 to the cease-fire, J-2, JGS exercised

operational control over four combined US-Vietnamese intelligence centers

in addition to Unit 101 and the MI Center. Depending on its functions,

each staff division of J-2, JGS was responsible for coordinating and

supervising the activities of one or many centers and/or agencies as

shown in Chart 11.

In its responsibility for preparing military maps, J-2, JGS received

technical support from the National Geographic Directorate in Dalat and

the Military Topography Company in Saigon. The situation room was not

66

, • . . _• ,
. "i •» • .• .". • ' *:* ••. •." ". ••'.».•.' »'•. m w< v -^"—." \m ^m >m • • * • • • • i J I ••*. •-. » •: I

Chart 10—Organization, J-2, JGS

Assistant

Chief of Staff J-2

Deputy *

Administration Situation Room

I

Plan

Organization

Training

Training/Organization

Planning/

Budgeting

Personnel/

Maps

In-Country Foreign

Areas North Vietnam

Strategic

Studies

Squth

East Asia

Collection MI Center

(Unit 306)

Air Support

Priorities Studies

Area

Analysis

Foreign

Liaison

Air Reconnaissance

Source Control

Collection

Coordination

-I

•:>•:••

T^ j

•''.. -'

:;;:.;: *

.•-v.v.*

Also commander of Unit 306 (MI Center).

--*

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f- * 67

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." »." * •." *T -. .-- -- .-- .-• -- - , - . "_ '• ,••.''.••, "•». • '.. -• - •—r- .-. f: •-;•*•.• r.

Chart 11—Coordination and Supervision of

Combined Intelligence Centers

I

Plan

Training

Organization

Division

MI School

National

Geographic

Directorate

Topo Company

MI Center

Combined

Military

Interrogation

Center

Combined

Document

Exploitation Center

Combined

Materiel

Exploitation Center

Unit 101

In-Country

Intel Div.

Foreign Intel

Division

Combined

Intelligence

Center Vietnam

-Operational control

68

-..-

I _ • .. . . , ^u -* - "• A * M^ E_ • _
l i —r"—."- '- • :—:—T :- r—IT ----- - -

authorized in the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) but was

created out of necessity. This room was equipped with hot lines for

direct communications with corps and division G-2's when the situation

was serious. It operated around the clock and was staffed with fieldgrade officers who performed liaison duties for the purpose of exchanging

intelligence information and tactical information, recording information

requirements and support requirements of each MR; processing requests for

aerial photographic reconnaissance, answering questions related to the

identification of enemy units and infiltration groups. The situation

room served as an operations center for J-2, JGS. Important tactical

information was always reported Immediately by subordinate G-2s.

Situation developments were thus reported as they happened. For instance,

information on enemy tanks moving into Ban Me Thuot city at 0330 hours

on 10 March 1973 was reported and received as the action was in progress.

Everyday, whenever the enemy attacked or clashes occurred, enemy unit

identification was provided within the day upon processing of captured

enemy documents or prisoners of war. These data enabled J-2, JGS daily

situational reports to be accurate and timely. In addition to daily

reports, J-2, JGS compiled weekly and monthly reports, semiannual reports,

and annual recapitulative reports. Occasionally, J-2, JGS was also

required to produce intelligence estimates, situational assessments, and

special studies. Though entrusted with such an encompassing responsibility

as monitoring the enemy situation, J-2 was only vested with the authority

of a staff agency, and most people were unaware of its material limitations.

4. . ARVN Combat and Territorial Intelligence Organization

G-2's of corps and military regions operated the combat and territorial intelligence.systems. At this level, each G-2 was directly supported by a military intelligence detachment and a prisoner interrogation

center, whose strength was authorized by separate TO&Es. Their aggregated

strength was 164 men of whom 27 were assigned to corps G-2. G-2, Corps

was organized as follows {Chart 12):

69

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."V '.".'".' i.^*^-.»^»^« »• ••- •.-'.•, --,>,'• .• •»*.v"** i ">•:».•. «—»i

•-•' . •.-•«

Chart 12—Organization, G-2/Corps

G-2, Corps

Unit 101

Detachment

r

OB Sec

T

Inter Ctr

Tech Sec.

Operational control

Administration

MI Det

Documents

Section

Order of

Battle Sec.

Imagery

Section

Technical

Section

Interrogation

Section

-•.-'•

•. . !

. • -

A corps military intelligence detachment had an authorized strength

of 62 men and was usually commanded by the deputy corps G-2. Its interrogation section became part of the corps interrogation center when the

latter was established. The Intelligence Section's mission was two-fold:

collection and production. To carry out its collection mission, G-2,

Corps organized agent nets and penetration/reconnaissance teams. Penetration/reconnaissance teams were made up of former Communist defectors

or prisoners of war. In the highlands, penetration/reconnaissance teams

consisted of Montagnard personnel trained and dispatched according to

V

s

.-.

-

70

•>•

i m i i •* 1 •*• • 11 i * ^. • . . .
". " " • . - - " •.-."'.'

specific operations plan. Agents operating for corps G-2 were very

limited in numbers. Being carefully screened and trained, they proved

reliable. Corps did not have long-range reconnaissance or special reconnaissance companies like divisions and regiments. Its penetration/reconnaissance teams consisted entirely of volunteers from subordinate combat

units. G-2, Corps was responsible for monitoring the enemy situation in

its related military region and providing guidance and control over all

combat and territorial intelligence collection activities. Thus it

played a very important role, particularly after the deactivation of

division tactical areas (DTA) in 1970.

A Division G-2 had an intelligence section, an air support section

and an order-of-battle section; it was directly supported by a division

military intelligence detachment. Each Division G-2 had 19 men whereas

the military intelligence detachment had 46. Until 1970, G-2, Division

was also G-2, Division Tactical Area. After being released from territorial responsibility, it was able to concentrate exclusively on combat

intelligence. As an additional tool for intelligence collection, G-2

Division was attached a long-range reconnaissance or special reconnaissance

company whose main mission was to carry out intelligence plans prepared

by G-2. The tactical conduct of these intelligence operations was planned

by G-3. Reconnaissance companies received special training at the Ranger

Training Center in Due My and proved to be daring, combat-experienced

units. Because of their combat audacity they were gradually used more

as a reserve or reaction unit for special combat situations rather than

for intelligence gathering purposes. Division G-2 was the key level in

combat intelligence, constantly monitoring the situation, pressing the

units to report and turn in captured documents, new weapons, and preliminary information from interrogation of prisoners of war and defectors.

The main obstacle that hampered its effectiveness remained the lack of

facilities to ensure expeditious movement of materials from the field

to base camp and from there on to corps and above. At the regiment level,

the S-2 staff was composed of two officers and two NCOs. i'hey operated

an OB section, an IPW/DOC section, and Agent Nets Section and a longrange reconnaissance section. At battalion level, there was only one

71

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I . -'.»'. ' «.•.«..•_«.. ».

officer, the S-2, and one NCO, his assistant. The primary mission of

the S-2 at battalion level was the interrogation of POW1s and the exploitation of captured documents. Sector and sub-sector S-2s were responsible

for territorial intelligence. Their collection targets were enemy provincial and district units, guerrillas arid infrastructure. S-2 personnel

were limited to Regional Force (RF) status. A sector S-2 had ten men

and a sub-sector S-2 had only four (one officer, two noncommissioned

officers and one enlisted man). Because territorial intelligence personnel were selected from RF ranks, there was no way of reinforcing S-2

staffs as desired nor was it possible for the territorial S-2's to share

some of the Regular Army's intelligence personnel. Meanwhile, the S-2

responsibility was a very heavy one, with a vast territory to cover yet

without adequate collection means to provide the coverage except for a

security/intelligence (SJ) platoon for sector level and a SJ squad for

sub-sector level. These units had the mission of collecting and verifying

intelligence information. Each platoon had 28 men organized as follows

(Chart 13):

Chart -13—Organization, Sector Security/Intelligence Platoon

•-

Platoon Leader

Platoon Command

Section

Agents Net

Squad

Special Reconnaissance Squad

A sub-sector security/intelligence squad had

"L

1?. men divided

o

into

three teams: one agenc team of two men and two special reconnaissance

teams totalling seven men. Despite their organizational purpose, SI

platoons and squads were usually assigned escort and guard duties instead

of intelligence collection.

The sector and sub-sector S-2's lacked everything for their operation, even office supplies. There was a time when each S-2 was given

72

---'-^»------ -'«-'-'- -- ft^i
TT1' • • • I ^ • m m w* -.'•-•'•

a duplicating machine but those were not used for long because they

usually ran out of printing ink and paper. Sources in a province who

were in a position to provide information on the VCI came under NP

jurisdiction and agents nets were not effective because they were short

of means. As a result, only information derived from the processing of

defectors, documents, and prisoners of war captured by the RF/PF was

available, and that also was scarce. The S-2's were also employed by

the province and district chiefs in miscellaneous duties unrelated to

their intelligence mission.

It may be said that tactical intelligence at sector and sub-sector

levels was very inadequate but corrective action or improvement could

hardly be expected when basic equipment needs could not be met. In

Vietnam, priority for improving intelligence capabilities at the lower

levels was given to the NP rather than to the RF. This practice proved

effective at an earlier stage but gradually deteriorated as supporting

means were reduced and eventually terminated with the advent of the

cease-fire agreement on 28 January 1973.

5. Vietnamese Air Force Intelligence Organization

A-2's mission was to collect information on the organization, equipment and capabilities of the North Vietnamese Air Force, the conditions

of airfields in North Vietnam and of those in South Vietnam susceptible

to use by the Communists, and North Vietnam's air defense and radar

systems. A-2 was also responsible for providing bomb damage assessments

(BDA).

A-2 had a collection section, a targeting section, an imagery interpretation center and a special collection detachment. (Chart 14) Its

authorized strength was 638 men.

Chart 14—Organization, Air Intelligence

;

L

Collection

Section

A-2/VNAF

Special Collection

Detachment

Targeting

Section

Imagery

Center

.--".

73

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The collection section assigned collection missions and monitored

the enemy situation nationwide, with special emphasis on locations of

friendly airbases and areas of intense enemy air defense activities.

The collection section also kept track of the various types of air

defense armament used by the enemy, with special priority being given

to such weapons as the heat-seeking SA-7 missile. The special collection

detachment had 168 men assigned to a headquarters in Saigon and six

collection teams, 17 men to a team.

The targeting section conducted briefings and debriefings for bombing

missions whose targets were designated at the national level, and coordinated with air support squadrons in the conduct of photographic or

observation flights. Once a photo mission was completed, films were

delivered to the Imagery Center for processing and interpretation.

Results were then forwarded to the users, J-2, JGS, and the air division

concerned. This process took three days and therefore on many occasions

results were no longer consistent with tactical developments. Air reconnaissance support was limited to military regions 2, 3 and 4. In MR-1,

the highlands of MR-2 and the joint boundary area of MR-2 and MR-3, air

reconnaissance support could not be provided due to the intensity of

enemy air defenses. As a result, VNAF had to depend on the US "Buffalo

Hunter" program for air reconnaissance over these areas.

The Imagery Center was capable of producing selected prints and

duplicating positives of aerial photos provided by the USAF as well as

making mosaics of photos obtained by VNAF RC-47's despite the obsolescence

of its equipment and the scarcity of print paper. In June 19 74, a fire

broke out at the center because of deteriorating electrical wiring and

its activities were subsequently curtailed. Because of the extremely

limited number of photo reconnaissance aircraft at its disposal (four

RF-5's and four RC-47's), the inadequacy and obsolescence of camera

equipment, the threat of enemy air defenses, the Vietnamese Air Force

had to depend on US support for 95% of in-country aerial photographs

during the period following the cease-fire.

74

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1"." • •-*• •• "- ". I . I . ! <^*T^T~*~ • | • | • - |

6. Vietnamese Navy Intelligence Organization

The VNN's primary mission was to detect Communist seaborne infiltration. This infiltration took on more magnitude and significance

beginning in March 1970, after Sihanoukville had ceased to be an entry

point for logistical supplies shipped from North Vietnam. After the

Paris Agreement, the US Navy discontinued its patrolling off Vietnamese

territorial waters while VNN was only capable of coastal patrols and

interception and riverine missions. N-2 scope of activity was subjected

to the same limitations. N-2, VNN was organized as follows (Chart IS):

Chart 15—Organization, Naval Intelligence

N-2, VNN

Admin/Personnel

-LNaval Maps/Charts

J

Intelligence

N-2, Coastal

Zone

Special Collection

Detachment

(Unit 701)

Exploitation

"I

N-2, Riverine

Zone

Liaison Teams undercover Teams

i -

N-2 had a mobile interrrogation team which provided interrogation

support to naval intelligence units when needed, as in the case of

interception of North Vietnamese fishermen lost in MR-1, or foreign

fishing vessels violating Vietnamese territorial waters.

The VNN special collection detachment was strongly developed after

the cease-fire. Although its authorized strength was 124 men, the Chief

of Naval Operations increased it to 230 to step up naval intelligence

activities. The special collection detachment conducted both covert and

overt operations. Covert operations were conducted by six teams which

organized agents nets to operate in coastal and riverine zones. Overt

75

. > ..« - ..•.. . .».. —^»,,-^-i^.,. *.. * -— *..* * .-. . . •-*-•• .. . . . . ' .-.\
". • • I .»'••••••- ".,'..*.'•-•-•.- •. -- --

operations were conducted by the Naval Intelligence Liaison Officers

(NILO) who were assigned to 28 stations located, throughout the country

with the mission to collect and exchange information. These officers

also functioned as case officers. The collection teams communicated

with the detachment headquarters through single side-band, and FM radios.

In July 1970, the special collection detachment was redesignated

Unit 701. Its collection operations were also reorganized to involve

personnel of the unit disguised as civilians who operated fishing craft

or in fishing villages to monitor Communist seaborne infiltration and

smuggling activities.

In general, both VNN and VNAF were not capable of conducting sea

reconnaissance either by air or by naval craft; nor were they equipped

with telephoto cameras to photograph and identify the various types of

vessels. Naval craft at sea provided information on Soviet or Chicom

ships loaded with bulky cargoes. VNN repeatedly reported sightings of

Soviet ships in territorial waters off MR-1 and MR-2 after the cease-fire

but no infiltrations' were detected. Apparently, since expanded logistical

roadways in-country and in lower Laos more than adequately supported the.

ueeds of Communist units, sea infiltration was no longer as much needed

as before.

United States Intelligence Organizations in Vietnam

Before The Paris Agreement

There were too many Vietnamese intelligence organizations, as was

commonly observed. Each of those usually coordinated with a counterpart

US intelligence agency, which proves that the latter were just as numerous.

These agencies were either under civilian control or military control.

The civilian control was exerted by one of two agencies: the Office of

the Special Assistant to the Ambassador (OSA), or the Civil Operations

and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).

OSA collection efforts were directed at internal RVN politics and

the Communists and closely coordinated with Vietnamese intelligence agencies

such as the CIO, NP and J-7, JGS.

CORDS focused on intelligence coordination for the purpose of rooting

out the VCI. This effort was also known as ehe Phoenix Program which

76

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was operated from national to district levels. US personnel assigned

to CORDS were OSA or military officers. At sector level they were also

intelligence advisors to the province chief.

The military control was exercised by MACV, J-2. Under MACV, J-2

there were three service intelligence organizations: G-2, US Army,

Vietnam (USARV), the Office of Special Intelligence (OSI), 7th Air Force,

and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), US Naval Forces, Vietnam.

US Army Intelligence in South Vietnam consisted of the following

organizations: G-2, USARV; G-2, III MAF, I FFV, II FFV; G-2, Divisions;

S-2, Brigades and 5th Special Forces Group; and S-2 Battalions.

Also under MACV, J-2 were the 525th Military Intelligence Group,

the 509th Radio Research Group; and the 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Reconnaissance Support). In the beginning, the 525th

Military Intelligence Group consisted of the 519th Military Intelligence

Battalion, the 135th Military Intelligence Group, the 149th Military Intelligence Group, and military intelligence advisors. The 519th Military

Intelligence Battalion was organized into four companies, each coordinating

with a combined US/RVNAF intelligence center. Later, military intelligence advisors were organized into a company under control of the 519th

instead of being directly subordinate to the 525th. This team had been

established to provide intelligence advisors to four corps, 12 divisions,

43 sectors, totalling 622 men.

The 135th Military Intelligence Group supported MACV J-2 and United

States Army, Vietnam, in counterintelligence. This unit also provided

advisors to and coordinated activities with the Vietnamese Military

Security Department (MSS). The 149th Military Intelligence Group

provided advisors to and coordinated bilateral collection operations

Major General Joseph A. McChristian, The Role of Military Intel

ligence, 1965 - 1967, (Vietnam Studies, Department of the Army,

Washington, D.C.: 1974).

77

- hi* "• • •'-•• •-- .... .-.-.- . *. - 1 N- •-* ' ' ' • * • . ... _" v." »_1
•.'•.' •_ •. ;•- .*• ."-—- .T . •'.' '•• -i. '•- -^ -~^~7 ~* ' '~'~-* '^-.~~ '-". ~-J". •" ' •"• ' ." " -.-.-.-•-- - -. --

with the 924th Support Group (Unit 101). The 509th Radio Research Group

operated the intelligence communications system between MACV and subordinate units. The 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Reconnaissance Support) provided imagery interpretation of aerial photos taken

in-country. It was composed of: Detachment A stationed in Bien Hoa,

Detachment B in Da Nang, Detachment C in Can Tho, Detachment D in Nha

Trang, and the 45th Military Intelligence Detachment in Hue and Phu Bai.

By the time of the cease-fire, the 525th MI Group had been reorganized to include: the 571st Military Intelligence Detachment in MR-1,

the 572d Military Intelligence Detachment in MR-2, the 573d Military

Intelligence Detachment in MR-3, the 574th Military Intelligence Detachment in MR-4, the 575th Military Intelligence Detachment in charge of

counterintelligence, the 358th Aviation Detachment, and the 504th Signal

Detachment.

US intelligence organizations in Vietnam played a dual role:

advisory and coordinating. With sophisticated equipment, substantial

resources, expertise, and modern operating methods, US intelligence

helped Vietnamese intelligence improve gradually and move into real

professional ism.

.•-.

y

OPORD 215, After Action Report, COUNTDOWN (DA: 4 June 1973)

78

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I* !• T • • • • • « » .• ".» ——» m

CHAPTER IV

Intelligence Cooperation And Coordination

Concepts And Problems

There is general agreement that, in the Vietnam war, though US-Vietnamese cooperation and coordination existed in every field and sector,

they were nowhere as concrete and distinctive as in the area of Intelligence. A common mission, common objectives, common efforts, and similarity in organization and operational procedures, all contributed to

this cooperation and coordination. United States and Vietnamese intelligence organizations had their own assets and liabilities. The United

States had sophisticated equipment, lavish means, effective techniques

and management, and large-scale organizations. However, they lacked

basic knowledge of the enemy, the language and the culture; furthermore,

personnel were often replaced after a year's tour of duty. Vietnam

didn't have sophisticated assets but Vietnamese intelligence personnel

were more experienced and knowledgeable about the Vietnam war, about the

enemy and his psychology and techniques, and especially important, they

shared a common language with* the enemy.

Bilateral cooperation and coordination increased the eff

or% iveness

of intelligence activities and joint operation helped each siv>t to overcome its own limitations. However, the spirit of cooperation was the

prime factor in determining success or failure of the intelligence program.

This spirit was perceived by a high-ranking US intelligence official to

be one of "mutual sincerity, openness, confidence and respect."

McChristian Military Intelligence, Department of the Army,

Washington, D.C. 1974, p.p. 11 - 142.

79

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^^^•»»^•yppq» I» VI ,1 •»• • I •••,«• • • I •! « 1 II •'«• - »t ' •• •! ' , »_• ' . ' . • . • «•*."• "• '• '•• ""' ."."

Cooperation and coordination must be based on joint agreements.

These agreements must lead to clearcut directives for each side to

follow, thereby precluding difficulties, misunderstandings, and loss

of timeliness. When US forces were committed in Vietnam other problems arose, among them disputes over sovereignty and status of forces.

Within the intelligence field, there were difficulties in exchanging

information because restrictions imposed by national defense and security laws conflicted with the need to make information available

to those concerned. However, all foreseeable difficulties were resolved officially with agreements that were either signed by both

parties or were tacit. The foundations for these agreements were laid

by the 27 September 1965 agreement between Commander, United States

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and the Chief, Joint General

Staff, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.

Weapons and equipment were classified as either common or sophisticated, with sophisticated weapons being those seized for the first time

in the Vietnam theater. The common types were resolved according to

status-of-force agreements which provided for the capturing forces to

keep what they had captured. The sophisticated weapons, that is those

captured for the first time in the Vietnam theater, were Vietnamese

property. On the second capture, these items might go to the US side.

On subsequent captures either side might keep the items. In reality,

the Vietnamese side did not have the capability to test really sophisticated pieces of equipment and the US side was allowed to keep them for

testing before returning or transferring them to Vietnamese custody. To

facilitate the testing process no time limits were set. Test results

were to be made available to the Vietnamese side. Actually, the agreement was carried out in a looser manner, as in the case of the SA-T heatseeking missile used for the first time in the Vietnam war during the

1972 general attack. Because of testing needs all captured SA-7s were

turned over to the US side, and the Vietnamese had only a plastic mockup of the weapon.

There were no problems in the area of captured documents because

they were easily reproduced. All handwritten, printed, typewritten, drawn

80

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." • ' •" *.' • " '.' '." • " "

. *

or engraved materials; tape recordings; photographs; films and seals were

considered to be documents.

The US side transferred all prisoners of war and "Hoi Chanh" (defectors) -V

to Vietnamese control. Though the US never officially declared war

on the Vietnamese Communists, the 1949 Geneva Convention on Prisoners _\_

of War provided for a country to be allowed to entrust custody of its

PW to another country as long as both fulfilled their obligations

concerning good treatment of these prisoners. Consequently, PW of US

or Free World Military Assistance Forces (US/FWMAF) were evacuated __

through US channels to the central Combined Military Interrogation

Center (CMIC) in Saigon or CMICs at corps or division level, or Republic y.

of Vietnam (RVN) operated PW camps.

On the RVN side, the difficulty was not in making Secret or Top

Secret documents available to the US. Problems were frequently occasioned

by US requests to downgrade materials, mostly Communist documents, for

distribution to US information agencies or the US press corps. Vietnamese laws prohibited the distribution of Communist documents. Once

downgraded the documents were exploited by the US press and were eventually published by the Vietnamese newspapers as translations, which

frequently led to criticism of the Vietnamese press and US journalistic

privileges.

Combined Intelligence Activities

In Military Intelligence, cooperation and coordination were conducted

in one of two modes. The first mode provided for US personnel to function

both as advisers and colleagues. The second mode gave them a strictly

advisory capacity. The first type of relationship was established at

Joint General Staff (JGS) level, the four combined intelligence centers,

Collection Unit 101, J-7, JGS and subordinate elements, and the Military

Security Department (better known as MSS). The second type of relationship existed at corps and division G-2s, sector and sub-sector S-2s and

local MSS services.

81

- I

• -"• -"* -"» -"« -** - »* - • - -*"-»--»'*- -* '-* - „ _ - •--*--*•-*-»'-- TiTTi if ITl * -"•»'•Wri'i- r.n' n i'ri ^II'III-. " fn'.i^ii Etr'll •*- - *""• *— -*- — *- ^ ^ - '— *.-
'•

Among combat units, Intelligence cooperation and coordination were

effected by detaching Vietnamese Military Intelligence Detachments (MIDs)

to US/FWMAF corps, divisions and separate brigades. Sector S-2s assigned

intelligence personnel to cooperate with US units conducting mobile

operations on their respective territories. Division Tactical Area (DTA)

G-2s assigned personnel to US units involved in interprovincial operations

to assist in exploiting "human sources and documents. Operational units

2

also enjoyed support from "go-teams" of the combined US/Vietnamese intelligence centers which were dispatched upon clearance by J-2/USMACV and

J-2, JGS.

J-2, JGS And J-2, USMACV

During the initial period of US participation in the Vietnam war,

cooperation and coordination between J-2, MACV and J-2, JGS were performed

through a US liaison team permanently installed at J-2, JGS and consisting

of four officers (two Army and one each from the Navy and Air Force) and

a noncommissioned officer. The task of Lais liaison team was more

administrative than professional, and little was accomplished in terms

of information exchange or situation estimates. This situation improved

during the next period when Major General Joseph A. McChristian was

assigned as Chief J-2, MACV. For the first time, there were initiated

weekly intelligence briefings conducted by US and ARVN staff officers.

During these briefings, both parties compared and exchanged information

received during the week and presented their respective assessments and

estimates concerning enemy capabilities for the following week. Still,

coordination was generally limited to staff officers. There were occasional consultations between the two J-2 chiefs but these meetings were

not part of any established procedure nor did they relate to anything

Team of US and Vietnamese specialists dispatched from Saigon

to support combat units when required.

82

•3

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other Chan work policies and administration. As a matter of fact, the

Chief J-2, JGS and his US counterpart met only when needed and generally

with the purpose of acquainting themselves with organization, operation

and training of each side. The exchange of information, as a result,

lacked spontaneity and timeliness. But it was also during this period

that the idea of combined activities took shape and was implemented with

the activation of combined intelligence centers whose operations were

intended to benefit both MACV and the JGS.

Not until 1969, however, did intelligence cooperation and coordination between MACV and the JGS become really close and effective. This

was due to the professional interest given to the combined intelligence

effort by the Chief J-2, MACV, Major General William E. Potts. In addition to weekly combined staff meetings, the Chief J-2, MACV also took

the unprecedented step of discussing the situation and exchanging professional viewpoints with his counterpart and generally made himself

available for every worthy discussion. It was also due to his dedicated

and untiring effort that combined intelligence activities were greatly

enhanced and became instrumental in improving the effectiveness of

Vietnamese military intelligence.

At the combined intelligence centers and Collection Unit 101, coordination and collaboration materialized in the form of bilateral US/

Vietnamese activities. There were four combined intelligence centers:

Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV); Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC); Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC);

and Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC).

Each center had two elements, one Vietnamese, the other US, each

with its own director. These two elements shared the same installations

and facilities. Personnel were integrated in individual sections.

Documents were compiled bilingually. There were a few differences such

3

as in organization and strength.

3

The organization of the four Combined Intelligence Centers is

described here at the initial stage of operation in 1967.

83

I-

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1 i • I ' i- - -

Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV)

This center was conceived in 1965 and its building inaugurated on

17 January 1967 although the various US/Vietnamese sections of the

center had previously and individually initiated coordination of activities. The center operated around the clock with permanent and rotating

teams.

The mission of CICV was to compile and provide intelligence data

to the J-2s. These data were related to: terrain, weather, lines of

communication (LOCs), bridges and culverts, and local area features;

Vietnamese Communist order of battle (OB), Communist base areas, infiltration corridors, bombing targets, bomb damage assessment (BDA);

imagery interpretation (II). CICV was organized as shown in Chart 16.

The center had six major operating sections. However, the RVNAF

element did not staff the Technical Intelligence and Research Analysis

sections because RVNAF had a separate center for technical intelligence

and its research analysis' function was carried out by the Studies Section

of J-2, JGS. The Area Analysis Section, though an organic element of

J-2, JGS, was integrated into CICV's organization in order to match the

US structure. The US Operations Section functioned in a production

capacity which involved assigning priorities, editing, and distributing

documents and messages. It also had a communications center which enabled

it to communicate by teletype with major US units and senior US advisers

for the purpose of timely dissemination of intelligence information

needed for tactical operations. The RVNAF Operations Section's only

duties were to receive and/or dispatch correspondence and documents. It

was consequently given the additional assignment of handling supplies.

The Vietnamese element did not establish a Liaison Section because there

already was one at J-2, JGS. Nor was there a Collection Requirements

Section on the Vietnamese side because each specialized section handled

its own requirements. The Automated Data Processing (ADP) Section

provided intelligence data from Intelligence Data Handling Systems (IDHS),

using IBM 360-30 computers. Because this was a very new technique, the

Vietnamese side did not have specialists to staff the section among its

two officers, six noncommissioned officers and enlisted man. Later, the

two officers were sent to the US for training in the operation of the

360-30 computer while the noncommissioned officers received on-the-job

»U

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-i —« - s • *—jr- - -

Chart 16— Organization, Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam

. .

J-2, USMACV J-2, JGS

US Director VN Director

Deputy Deputy

Operations Support

Liaison 1 ADP 1

1

Order Of

Battle

Collection

Requirements

Terrain Research

Analysis

: . -I

The US element had 651 men and the RVNAF 164.

85

..----. -•---. «•^^^^^^,fc^,; , . i |
*. rrr*

4Li

; -

:"-

!-;

"I training. Intelligence Data Handling Systems thus proved to be more

v' useful to i j

the US side than to the Vietnamese.

The Order of Battle (OB) Section of each side had thiree elements.

R The first element handled military OB and consisteii of fi</e ieams: four

86

•

for the four military regions of the republic and one providing coverage -

of North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The second element studied and

monitored infiltration routes and units. The third element was in charge

of political OF; and information on the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).

j In the area of OB, though close bilateral coordination was effected right ^~"

on the spot, the two sides differed on enemy strength figures, with

RVN-computed figures always the higher. The reason for the discrepancy

was that authority to accept enemy strength and forces rested on J-2, JGS . ">

on the Vietnamese side, while on the US side acceptance had to come from

Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), the DIA, and the acceptance procedure,

on the RVN side almost proved, in a few instances, more flexible. In OB

considerations, strength figures on guerrilla and VCI forces were usually

not very accurate, especially after the general offensive of Tet 1968,

when most of the heavy losses sustained by the enemy were actually borne

by the guerrillas and the VCI. Efforts to keep a close count of the

VCI ran into difficulties because sectors and sub-sectors did not have

accurate figures or did not report them objectively. This reporting

depended on each commander's personal appraisal of the local situation.

A sector maintained a steady 100 in its count of the local VCI while

submitting monthly reports on the number put out of action. In reality,

even the Communists did not have these figures. This was precisely why

in 1969 they sent inspection groups to each locality to conduct an onthe-spot census. Communist documents admitted that even their own

provincial and district officials were unable to keep count of their

membership.

As regards enemy units, it was conceived that they must be categorized into Main Force, Local Force, guerrillas or VCI and identified

as Viet Cong (VC) or North Vietnam Army (NVA). This second classification

•* -- '- - - ~ - ------- . - - • • - - - • - * - . . -. _-
fiD-A132 112 INTELLIGENCE INDOCHINA flONOGRRPHS(U) ARMY CENTER OF

MILITARY HISTORY WASHINGTON DC H N LUNG 1982

UNCLASSIFIED F/G 15/4

2/2

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDAROS-1963-A

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was very important because on the one hand North'Vietnam always denied

it had any forces in the South, and on the other RVN was endeavoring

to prove that the war efforts originated in the North. Classification

4

was based upon the following definitions:

North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Units: a unit formed, trained and

designated by North Vietnam as an NVA unit and composed completely or

primarily of North Vietnamese. Depending upon their subordination, these

units may be categorized as Local Force or Main Force.

Viet Cong (VC) Units: a unit formed and trained In South Vietnam

(or in some instances Cambodia and Laos) whose original composition

consisted primarily of people residing in South Vietnam. Depending upon

their subordination, these units may be categorized as guerrilla, Local

Force, or Main Force.

Main Force (MF) Units: those VC or NVA military units which are

directly subordinate to the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN), a

Viet Cong military region, military subregion or front.

Local Force (LF) Units: those VC or NVA military units which are

directly subordinate to province and district party committees and

normally operating within the territorial jurisdiction of their respective control headquarters.

Guerrillas: guerrillas are fighting forces usually organized into

platoons and squads, directly subordinate to the party apparatus at

village and hamlet level. Although they form a full-time part of the

enemy's offensive threat, the amount of time devoted to guerrilla duties

by the individual guerrilla varies. At times guerrillas operate outside

their home villages and hamlets, often with LF and MF units. Typical

missions include limited offensive operations, harassment, sabotage,

propaganda, protection of party committees, collection of taxes, and

also security and reconnaissance for MF and LF units.

Vietnamese Communist Infrastructure (VCI): the VCI is the political and administrative organization through which the VC seek control

of the people of the RVN. It embodies the Communist party control

structure and the leadership and administration of front organizations

from the national through the hamlet level.

4

MACV Directives No 381-4 issued on Nov. 19, 1968 and July 4, 1972.

87

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The VCI includes individuals who are members or probationary members

of the Vietnamese Communist Party,.also known as the People's Revolutionary Party, and those non-Communist members who perform an enemy

cadre function described in the "Current Breakout of VCI Executive and

Significant Cadre" (also known as the "Green Book"), published by the

Government of Vietnam (GVN). The VCI does not include members of the

enemy military forces who would qualify as PW according to the Geneva

Convention rules.

Another aspect of the OB problem was that, when referring to enemy

strength and forces, everyone usually implied those physically present

on South Vietnam (SVN) territory with no consideration given to those

positioned in border areas of Cambodia, Laos or North Vietnam (NVN).

Such limited thinking led to misconceptions as to the status of conflicting forces. For instance, it was believed that the Communists had

only 300,000 men against the combined 1,500,000 US/RVNAF troops. These

300,000 Communist troops in the South were trained, supplied and replenished by units stationed across the border. In Laos, Rear Service

Group 559 alone had 50,000 men to move supplies from NVN to SVN by way

of the Ho Chi Minn trail.

In 1970, when ehe tactical situation compelled major Communist units

in Military Regions 3 and 4 (MR-3 and MR-4) of the RVN to seek refuge in

Cambodia, the overall Communist strength in SVN dropped, but this very

same fact created an illusory situation as Communist divisions could

reinfiltrate within a day or two, with their combat capabilities reinforced through rest, training, and replenishment received while on

Cambodian territory. Misconceptions could not be dispelled despite the

fact that these units were carried in 0B holdings as "units in border

areas".

Disagreements over enemy strength and forces --ccurred right within

the RVNAF, between J-2, JGS and the corps, divisions and sectors, though \ -

authority for acceptance of enemy units had been clearly defined, with

the JGS level handling units of battalion-size and higher, and military -i_

regions/corps assuming responsibility for companies and smaller units.

Quarterly OB discussions with the various units involved accomplished

nothing more than reducing the discrepancies.

86

-• - •.•.'•.-.•••.'•.•»••-•-• _,"-.".._ .
"'."•" '". •- •"- ."•"".^- i,"* 1"' •• " • •'."»"» • .• .« .". ' I . » . •. •i»i-r".-.»«>

In late 1972, as the drafting of the Paris Agreement was nearing

completion, the RVN side felt the need to demonstrate the presence of the

NVA in the South and subsequently insisted that an OB book be compiled

that would identify by composition all NVA units in the South. The need

was justified but realization was not that easy. Finally, based on all

information gathered over a period of three years, from 1970 through

1972, rosters of NVA personnel in each unit were compiled and those thus

identified numbered up to 115,000.

The Area Analysis Section on the Vietnamese side was an old organic

element of J-2, JGS. Its activities were strictly based on reporting

from local agencies as to the status of the population, LOCs, bridges and

culverts, etc., and this reporting was generally late. One of the important

assignments of the section was to prepare area geographical studies and

gazetteers. The area geographical studies described geographical features

of the areas studied while the gazetteers listed place-names along with

details on each place such as description, grid coordinates, other __

known names, etc. Another assignment was to update friendly maps and

study enemy maps. Following an operation that yielded 127 Communist map

sheets related to SVN territory and scaled 1:100,000, the Area Analysis

»•V

sections of the US and Vietnamese elements coordinated closely to ;!-

publish a new gazetteer and a study of Communist military symbols. "~

Thanks to lavish equipment and new techniques available to the US element,

the VN element learned to establish a data base and conduct area analyses,

which were produced at an area scale of 1:250,000 and were referred to

as encyclopaedia of intelligence. Thanks to adequate supplies of aerial

photographs, map revising and updating of information on the conditions

of LOCs took less time than before. In particular, studies on ricegrowing areas were undertaken by the Area Analysis Section in coordination with the II Section for the purpose of estimating rice production _

potentials and monitoring rice-growing in both government and Communist

areas. The resulting documents proved essential to the Ministry of

Land Reform. In addition to its regular assignments, the Area Analysis

section responded to special assignments such as preparing area geographical studies on Cambodia and Laos for cross-border operations. These

studies were completed in two weeks.

The Imagery Interpretation (II) Section was the largest Vietnamese

section of CICV because it was a division of the Military Intelligence

(MI) Center of J-2, JGS prior to becoming an organic element of CICV.

89

.

-------- | -- • -- - -- - — ' -• -J -J . . . . .1 _J . _i - ' -• s ^ '-* -» t
—*—- • . .—••m :. —- .• .•—I—|-l 1- I .•".»• •—» . - a • •••-a.»iat.. ...,,.. .,.,.. a. a • —• :—' -» -m = »».».- —"T"

A difference in Interpretation scope was that the US side's imagery

interpretation extended to infrared photographs and Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) resolution while the VN side's was limited to aerial

photographs. The II Section consisted of two elements: interpretation

and studies. The Interpretation element had five teams, four in charge

of the in-country military regions (MRs) and one in charge of NVN, Laos

and Cambodia. It also had a support team with a film library and a

photo laboratory. Coordination with its US counterpart gave the VN

element the opportunity to use sophisticated equipment such as the 85-

view computer, Itek rear projection viewer and the CAF model 910 Ugalid

printmaster. Among these the Itek rear projection viewer was the most

popular as it was capable of magnifying an aerial photo 30 times.

Aerial photos were one of the favorite sources of intelligence for

briefings, debriefings and intelligence studies. Around June 1972,

after Quang Tri City had fallen, enemy 130 and 122-mm field guns continually pounded on Hue City. Enemy gun positions had to be located but

direction-finding radars could not help determine these positions. Aircraft were finally called in to continually photograph the suspected

positions in an attempt to catch the guns as they were being pulled out

of their camouflaged positions or when they opened fire. Films taken

by aircraft from the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing were processed

for immediate photo readouts and Hot and Immediate Photo Interpretation

Reports (HüPIRs and IPIRs). Results were immediately relayed to the

Tactical Air Command and the artillery for firing on them before the

enemy was able to move the guns out of the identified positions. This

procedure proved more effective in reducing enemy attacks by fire than

B-52 strikes.

In imagery interpretation, the US side usually provided preliminary

reports to US units and US advisors to RVNAF units. The VN II element

at CICV made prints from negatives with Vietnamese captions and sent

them to RVNAF units, verified earlier readouts or conducted interpretation

phases 2 and 3, i.e. supplemental photo interpretation reports or SUPIRs,

When interpretation differed because of translation or the quality of

the prints, other photos were taken for verification. Differences

frequently occurred in identification of armored vehicles and tanks which

came in increasing numbers and types. The US-compiled interpretation

keys proved very useful to the Vietnamese specialists who were not familiar

with this type of enemy equipment.

90

• -..•-._.-•-«_._•-._•-...••_•_._•_ ... _;_ - • - . . . -••••••-• • - a • • . • . a . I". T a •'. I . ,_•_.__
•> »« • . • V • I »". • »". » • k !.. I'H '. <• '.". ". '" ".". ••."•'••.' • • ' I " I • I ".-."". - • . • I • " . • • • » • • » • • •—«

The Targets Section provided targets to both Tactical and Strategic

Air Commands (TAC and SAC); this mission was carried out exclusively by

the US side. On the VN side targets were the responsibility of corps

and division G-2s working in coordination with the combat units. At JGS

level the Targets Section was only required to establish target folders

for follow-up purposes, particularly on B-52 missions. The VN Targets

Section focused mainly on observing the status of enemy base areas and

infiltration routes. Each base area (BA) was given a three-digit numeral

designation for identification purposes, as opposed to the Communists'

own designations. Base areas in MR-1 were given a 100 series, MR-2 a

200 series, MR-3 a 300 series and MR-4 a 400 series. Base areas in Laos

received a 600 series and those in Cambodia a 700 series. Factors considered in observing and determining the status of an enemy BA were USestablished. The same technique was used in conducting pattern analyses.

Vietnamese corps and division commanders appreciated this technique very

much because the thorough recapitulation of information on a specific

area (with up to 30 different types of information) was in itself a

factual assessment and needed no further explanations. This information

was categorized and normally presented in eight different overlays placed

on a master map and with the following information plotted: enemy units

and their movements in the areas as indicated in ARDF reports; information

obtained by 3LAR or Red Haze; information derived from aerial photos and

aerial reconnaissance; information derived from PWs, "Hoi Chanh" and

documents; information reported by agents; types of incidents recorded

in the area; enemy air defenses, and information resulting from intelligence studies of the area. These overlays were updated every three

months. Data for the pattern analyses were provided to the Targets

Section on an as-soon-as-possible basis. The Targets Section notified

the units or agencies concerned. To the corps and divisions, this

notification only served to verify information provided by US intelligence

advisers, which in mos cases meant 12 or 48 hours before.

Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC)

This center was organized on 1 October 1965. Prior to that the US

had a liaison element and a team of Vietnamese civilian translators. As

* combined MI center, it had both VN and US elements, each with its own

91

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director. United States personnel numbered 101. In addition, there

were an estimated 100 Vietnamese civilian employees of the US element

who performed as translators or typists. On the VN side, the Table of

Organization and Equipment (TOE) strength was 69 men. The CDEC was

organized as follow: {.Chart 17)

Chart 17 — Organization, Combined Document Exploitation Center

US Director

Filing Storage

&

Retrieval Branch

Evaluation

Branch

Translation

Branch

VN Director

Operations

Branch

Administration

Branch

The VN element did not have a translation team but the US element

had the capability to translate Vietnamese, English, French, Chinese,

Cambodian and Japanese. Documents were always considered to be a very

valuable source of information. However, prior to the establishment of

CDEC the evacuation of documents from the capturing unit to the Document

Exploitation Section sometimes took up to six months. During this time

documents were exploited at numerous levels prior to reaching the national

level. This caused delays, inability to verify circumstances of acquisition, losses or mix-ups, and inconsistencies. Also analysts along the

way tampered with the originals. After exploitation, the results were

late in reaching the affected areas or the capturing units because they

were forwarded through military postal channels and the recipient units

might have been on tactical operations in remote areas. In this case the

mail ended up at their rear base camps.

RVNAF document evacuation channel is shown as follows: (Chart 18)

J-2, JGS Directive No 170-1 issued in 1969.

92

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p ••••.».• i. '.»'•'-*.'f ."» :"v:^ .*.* ."Jr* .*• *—"• •"• "—-• .-• •-- - ••-• - .-• "- "• •—

w

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Chart 18 — RVNAF, Document Evacuation Channel

[•:,

I

Regiment

CDEC/JGS

CORPS

Division

Tactical

Area

Division

Sector

Sub-Sector

Territorial

Unit

General Reserves

Territorial

Unit

-•

I'

To overcome this problem, intelligence advisers to RVNAF units and

J-2, JGS met the TOE needs of corps and divisions by providing each

with a document copier, but after a while difficulties occurred because

the machines broke down and there were no qualified personnel to repair

them, or the units had no funds to purchase the fluid and paper necessary for the copying process. Coordination with US agencies to whom

lavish means were available helped solve the problem. When there were

important documents to examine, go-teams were dispatched to do the job

right on the spot or photograph the documents for the units while the

- . * - -

93

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i.i i" * "i" v . ••• i^ '

r-r-, 1 . • . • m—. a • •—^

originals would be taken back to CDEC for exploitation. At the center,

information was exploited within 12 to 24 hours and the units received

feedback within 48 hours thanks to daily or special flights. Routine

documents were forwarded to CDEC in the same, timely manner. Expeditious

and professional exploitation boosted the unit commanders' confidence

and made them more willing to urge their subordinates to send the

documents in instead of keeping them for a long time as they had previously done.

Storage of documents became easier through the use of 35mm microfilm

and/or the ADP systems of CICV. Research was made easier through retrieval by filing systems which projected the documents on an 8 x 10 in.

screen and reproduced them within five seconds per page for hard copies.

Copying document exploitation reports was made easy and quick thanks to

Xerox machines which reproduced, photographed, and made enlargements or

reductions.

In 1968, captured documents numbered 900,000 pages, Exploitation

results showed that only an estimated 10% had intelligence value. This

center was restricted to exploiting documents captured in the field and

thus did not have access to reference or Communist publications commercially available in such countries as France or Hong Kong. This latter

type of material was processed by the US Document Exploitation Center

in Japan. This arrangement was detrimental in terms of timeliness and

essential elements of information (EEI). Also, in exploitation and interpretation of documents the US and VN elements worked independently of

each other. However, results were later communicated to the counterpart

element.

On many occasions exploitation results differed because most of the

documents were handwritten and hard to read, and abbreviations were

frequently found. The US side was handicapped in that it was difficult

for US specialists to resolve such conflicts when they were totally

dependent on their Vietnamese employees to process the materials. On

the VN side, however, when there were important documents or documents

which generated differing interpretations, they were immediately retyped

into many copies for distribution to the most experienced intelligence

94

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-Tf--. • . - . - .- • " -". • - - - .- "

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•

officers of J-2, JGS who would each prepare his own interpretation and

comments. This method proved very effective.

Most available documents had been captured by US Forces, primarily

because in the first years of their involvement they were responsible

for tactical operations while RVNAF units worked in pacification. Moreover, the US military were trained to focus maximum attention on documents.

The documents were all in the Vietnamese language and since US personnel

could not tell the value of each, they turned in all captured documents.

The routing of Communist documents captured by US and allied forces

is shown as follows: (Chart 19)

Chart 19— Routing of Communist Documents

Captured by FWMAF

JGS (CDEC) _ USMACV (CDEC)

Military Region

*

Field Force

7K

Division Tactical

Area

Special Zone

*

Sector

Special Sector

Division

~7K

Brigade

Division

15 days

Symbols;

Routing of documents through intelligence channels

or directly to CDEC

^ Information exchange channels.

RVNAF units paid minimum attention to capturing documents and

immediately discarded those they came upon which they considered to be

95

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•..«« ".A.M* '

•»•»•^•^v—T^—^TT—r—r—rpropaganda. In 1971, a unit of the 7th Infantry Division, RVNAF, staged

an ambush in My Tho. The reported results were that two enemy junks had

been sunk, five enemy troops killed in action (KIA) and seven K54 pistols

captured. When the guns arrived at division headquarters, the division

G-2 observed they were of the latest model and that the holsters bore

a gold star, all indicative of the high ranks of ehe users. However,

no documents were found. Preliminary investigations showed that the

ambushing unit did capture a number of documents but did not give them

any consideration because they were too busy searching for additional

weapons in the river. Finally, the 7th Division's G-2 had the unit

return to the site and a few remaining documents were found. These

indicated the Communist team ambushed was made up of battalion and provincial unit cadre.

In this particular case the psychology of the troops was such that

they believed capturing documents was not as important as other combat

achievements and would cause the operation to be prolonged, pending the

exploitation of the documents. Therefore they were not too eager to

turn in documents. Still, the Vietnam war did demonstrate that knowledge

of Communist strategic courses of action was gained through captured

documents. Through lavish means of communication, transportation and

operation, and through expeditious and professional exploitation, CDEC

made documents an abundant and accurate source of information, and the

most trusted in the area of combat intelligence.

Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC)

From 1959 to 1965 Interrogation was an organic section of the MI

Center/ J-2, JGS. In 1961 the US appointed an officer and an NCO to be

advisers to this section. By 1964 the number of US advisers had increased

to 50 men. On 31 January 1967 CMIC was officially activated to perform

the mission of interrrogating important PW and "Hoi Chanh", who were

selected for their strategic knowledgeability. These "selected" and

"strategic knowledgeability" factors were set forth because, in addition

to CMIC in Saigon, there were CMIC of the corps, interrogation sections

of the corps and division Military Intelligence Detachements, and inter-

%

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rogators of the sectors. The central CMIC was designed to accommodate

up to 63 sources and had 28 interrogation rooms. The Interrogation

Center compound was divided into three areas: VN area, US area and

joint areas (organizational outlays shown in Chart 20}.

The US element had two divisions: support and operations, while

the VN element had three: operations, exploitation and editing. The

VN exploitation division had two sections: requirements and interrogation.

Requirements levied EEI on each PW or "hoi chanh". These EEI were based

on general requirements of G-2, JGS or friendly units. The Interrogation

Section had several teams, some in charge of geographical areas such as

MRs 1, 2, 3 and 4; others specializing in political, military or economic

affairs, or infiltration, etc. Reports prepared by the interrrogation

teams were forwarded to the Editing Division which synthesized them for

clarity, prepared sketch maps of bases from the information obtained, etc.

Technical information was submitted to specialists from the engineer,

signal, artillery, ordnance, etc. corps for review. This activity on the

US side was the responsibility of its Reporting Section. This section

also translated Vietnamese interrogation reports into English.

The US element of CMIC had a TOE strength of 98 men plus 40 Vietnamese civilian employees and 12 Vietnamese Military translators (two men

and ten women). It was organized as follows: (Chart 21)

•••I

"

Chart 21 — US Element, Combined Interrogation Center

-."-. • -.

Operations

Division

Interrogation

Reporting

Director

Operations &

Document Storage

Support

Division

1

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dminisration Logistics

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The VN element had 97 men excluding a Regional Force (RF) company

detached from Gia Dinh Sector to assume guard and defense duties at the

compound. The VN element of CMIC was organized as follows: (Chart 22)

Chart 22 —ARVN Element Combined Interrogation Center

Operations

Security

Guard

Company

Admin.

Personnel Spt

Director

Deputy

Director

Exploitation Editing

Requirements

Interrogation

Editing Tech.

Team

The interrogation process normally proceeded as indicated in Table 1.

When sources arrived at CMIC they were divided into two groups.

One group was interrogated by the VN element, the other by the US element.

If there were only one source, the VN element usually interrogated him

on the first day, and the US element had access to him on the second day

This procedure was changed in April 1971 after it had been determined

that a day was not sufficient for any one side to complete its assignment.

Subsequently, the Vietnamese were given three days and the Americans two.

If the source was deemed to have information which responded to the special

needs of the VN or the US element, that element was given priority for

interrogation. Interrogation results were exchanged for corroboration

and complementing.

Originally, US personnel selected for interrogation assignments were

those who could speak Vietnamese, of whom there were very few. Those

99

---•-• -1 - • • - -• •• -•.-.. i • . • «
• •

• «.••'- -. '.•.'!'. * • •!•-»•. • I • I »ll •-» •

Table 1 — Interrogation Process

Interrogation

Section

Requirements

Section

Editing/Operations

Sections

Source arrives CMIC

Preliminary contact,

Actual interrogation

Interrogation report ^

prepared

^ Preliminary report

prepared

EEI prepared

Interrogation

requested __

•Interrogator -^-

notified

Additional contact

made with interrogator

Results reported

Adaitional

questions,

guidance

-£» Interrogation —

report reviewed

^Contact

coordinated

• Source received

Reports reviewed

& corrected

Reports printed

& published

100

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who spoke fluently enough to debate with the sources were even fewer.

Gradually, US element interrogation had to be conducted through Vietnamese male or female interpreters, all noncommissioned officers, and

could not be as effective as the VN element interrogation. The VN

element had interrogation specialists who were all officers with longexperience, in interrogation, with facility in the Communists language,

and with knowledge of Communist organization and OB. Thus these VN

interrogators were able to immediately detect any attempts to make

false statements. Many of the sources did lie because the common

psychology of PW and "hoi chanh" was a mixture of suspicion, fear, and

a desire to receive better treatment. It prompted some to lie about

their positions or ranks or to exaggerate in their reporting. All

sources who came to CMIC were subjected to fingerprinting, photographing

and haircutting, and received a towel, soap, toothbrush, toothpaste,

mat, and a blue uniform. Each source received a daily food ration

worth VN$36.50, later increased to VN$49.00, which was equivalent to

the daily ration of an RVNAF enlisted man. There were daily sick calls,

a physician to care for them, and a dispensary with medics on duty 24

hours a day. The more seriously ill were hospitalized. The international Red Cross occasionally requested to visit or contact the PW, and

the requests were granted. Reports made upon completion of these visits

were very positive.

Prior to their selection for evacuation to CMIC the PW were

subjected to tactical interrogation at the units. Evacuation of PW

captured by the RVNAF operational units proceeded as shown in Chart 23.

PW captured by US Forces were moved as indicated in Chart 24.

In addition to the central CMIC in Saigon there were MR/Corps CMICs

in Da Nang, Pleiku, Bien Hoa and Can Tho respectively. Interrogation

coordination was effected at division level but the procedures were not

as clearly defined as at corps level. At this latter level, an

6

J-2, JGS Directive No 170-1- issued in 1969

101

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Chart 23 — RVNAF, POW Evacuation Channel

MR PW Camp ^

DTA/Division

General Reserve

1 week

Sector

Symbols: v^ Evacuation channels

••^> Coordination channels

Chart 24 — US Forces, POW Evacuation Channel

JGS

CMIC

USMACV

CMIC

Corps &

Military

Region

Field Force

DTA

Snecial Zone

Division

Sector Brigade

Regiment

Symbols: Evacuation channels

-=> Channels for exchanging information

102

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agreement signed in April 1969 established the following coordination

principles: commanders involved had equal rights to the PW; the

operation of the center was Vietnamese responsibility; PW were not to

be kept past six months unless specifically authorized by J-2, JGS and

J-2, USMACV; logistics were a Vietnamese responsibility. In cases of

shortage or lack of logistical supplies, the US side would help, upon

joint agreement.

PW were kept at CKEC up to two months, then might be transferred

to other national agencies such as National Interrogation Center/Central

Intelligence Office (NIC/CIO), MSS or the National Police (NP), or be

turned over to the PW camps of the military regions.

When speaking of interrogation matters, it was often believed, and

more so by the PW, that they involved torture and inhumane punishment.

These conditions existed only in the remote past. The Vietnam war was

determined to be a war for the hearts and minds, a war of ideologies,

and this concept extended to interrogation activities. The interrogator

was trained to believe in the hearts-and-minds approach, and this belief

was reinforced with each day on the job. Interrogation by psychological

methods produced more and better results and brought the interrogator decent satisfaction and a sense of self-confidence. Communist

troops and their cadre were extensively indoctrinated on RVN, society,

the RVNAF, abuses, classes, savage torture, etc.

A Communist political cadre at provincial party committee level,

captured on his way back from attending a regional-level discussion on

the 1968 general attack, stated that he was firmly determined not to

disclose any information and was prepared to cope with torture. This

torture did not take place. The interrogator maintained an extremely

decent attitude, and the subject was detained in a room with a window

which allowed him to observe all the activities of the interrogation

??. unit. Another surprise came to him when he noted the democratic

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~T" • ^v-r-i-T - .-- •— «— • - - -r - -• -vactivities of the officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted men of

the RVNAF, and the very close and non-discriminatory rapport between

them, particularly after work. The Communist attack right inside the

capital failed to cause these servicemen to panic and they continued

to perform their duties in a dedicated and cheerful manner, prompting

the cadre to ponder and to wonder if, after all, SVN did not have a

righteous cause. Even the presence of US advisers in the unit did not

provide him with an indication that there was something abnormal in

the relations between US and VN personnel or in their daily activities.

All these observations finally led him to decide to cooperate with the

interrogator.

Decent treatment came as a surprise to all PW and "hoi chanh". One

"hoi chanh" recalled he had turned himself in at a military base, bringing

along a K54 pistol. He expected to be harassed with questions for information of military value. He was surprised to find that the officer in

command treated him in a very friendly manner, asking about his family,

and about life in Communist ranks, as if they were two friends reunited

after a long separation and eager to learn about each other's families.

No mention was made of military information. The pistol he had brought

with him lay on the table, by his side, when it should have been put

away as a precaution.

Facing realities which totally contradicted prejudices gained

through indoctrination was the principal motivating force that prompted

interrogated personnel to cooperate. This cooperation became even more

sincere as the treatment of the source improved. On one occasion, a

high-ranking defector who had returned from regroupment to NVN indicated,

in the course of a conversation, that he missed his family very much.

With the lavish means available to the US side, the family was brought

in to be reunited with the source who never thought this could ever be

done.

Information provided by PW and "hoi chanh" was often of high value.

It would have been a real mistake to determine validity of information

solely on the basis of rank and position. This only applied to the US

and RVNAF people since they were subjected to need-to-know restrictions.

104

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105

On the Communist side, the policy of group study and discussion of assignments enabled the individual private to gain some insight on strategic intentions and requirements behind the campaign to come.

Interrogation at the various levels and interrogation by the VN

and US elements all produced results that were exchanged and consolidated.

This allowed those involved to discard false information and make significant HUMINT contributions.

In interrogation, combined and coordinated activities showed that

US efforts between 1965 and 1971 were directed at equally sharing the

quest for information from PW and "hoi chanh". Beginning in mid-1971,

as US Forces gradually withdrew from Vietnam, the number of US personnel assigned to the combined interrogation centers was reduced until

there were only one or two left and the activities became more of a

liaison than an operational nature.

:

Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC)

Of the four combined centers, CMEC was the last established.

Prior to that, the VN element was a materiel exploitation section of

the MI Center/J-2, JGS whose productivity in terms of in-depth exploitation of war trophies was negligible. Its primary concern with captured

materiel was to use them as a basis for protests with the International

Control Commission or for displays.

The Vietnam theater frequently saw the introduction of sophisticated

arms and equipment from the Communist bloc. New weapons in particular,

were used in every general attack to reinforce enemy troop confidence

as well as to surprise the RVNAF with unexpected enemy firepower. In

intelligence collection, the appearance of new types of arms and equipment at the frontline was always a telltale sign of a Communist general

attack in the making. The Communists were cunning in that, despite

being supplied with sophisticated materiel from abroad, they pursued

their efforts to make some locally for propaganda and motivation purposes.

CMEC was organized as follows: (.Chart 25)
—r—»—•—-—- . • f 1—•—•—"—• •„ •,•.•. »•,•;•."—' • '« -t »i - . . t ... i

Chart 25 — Organization, Combined Materiel Exploitation Center

Director, CMEC

Admin. & Sup-port

Division

Graphics Receiving

& Shipping

Laboratory

Exploitation

Division

Communication

& Electronics

Weapons

& Munitions

X

Mobility

General Supplies and

Equipment

Medical

Field Coordination Teams

No 1

No 2

No 3

No 4

No 5

cafe

CMEC mission was to: 1. Test, evaluate, and categorize captured

enemy materiel; 2. Disseminate technical intelligence information

obtained and technical publications; 3. Motivate field units to turn in

captured materiel and follow up on such activities; 4. Set up and

maintain facilities to display captured enemy materiel; 5. Participate

in interrogations of PW and ralliers and exploit of technical intelligence documents; 6. Dispatch field teams to visit combat units and

provide them with technical guidance when requested.

106

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US personnel assigned to CMEC numbered 93 while Vietnamese personnel

numbered only 44. The Vietnamese element was basically organized like

the US element except that its administrative and support division was

strictly administrative in nature and its functions much simpler than

those of the US element. Vietnamese specialists were detached from the

various service branches: a medical doctor from the Medical Corps dealt "'•

with medical equipment; two Signal Corps officers worked with radio and

electronic gear; two Ordnance Corps officers processed weapons; and a

Quartermaster Corps officer handled quartermaster item§. These representatives took the equipment to their respective organizations for '

testing purposes as CMEC did not have laboratories. The same procedure

applied to the US side, and the usual rule was that only sophisticated

arms were sent to the USA for examination and testing. - •

CMEC's most useful role was the publication of handbooks on Com- ß

munist war materiel used or likely to be used in Vietnam. These handbooks helped tactical units identify and report captured materiel and

equipment. In Vietnam however, the units often proved untruthful in

their reporting of new Communist armament, particularly individual weapons

identified by the handbooks as sophisticated. Many unit commander kept

those trophies as souvenirs or gave them away as gifts to personalities

in the administration. The best technical intelligence personnel could

do was to photograph these items. Later, as the units were given authority to set up unit displays, many commanders found ways to retain numerous

types of crew-served weapons that were captured for the first time.

Communist forces sometimes received arms from the Communist bloc

that were not even featured in the handbooks. In 1972, when they used

SA-7 heat-seeking missiles for the first time, these weapons were unknown

to CMEC. Characteristics of the US Red-Eye missile had to be invoked

when attempting to describe the SA-7. The first SA-7 missile to be

captured, in Quang Tri Province, was turned over to the US, and so were

subsequent catches in order for examination and testing to be thorough.

Later, in faithful implementation of a section of the bipartite agreement

which dealt with war trophies, a plastic replica of the SA-7 was made

for display in lieu of the real thing.

107

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;'•."•• ••- •-.' - ' - '

• - • --. *-. • v •"• --.---•-.-.-.- - - - -

Another weapon that the Communists used for the first time in —

Kontum in 1972, and caused serious psychological impact on RVNAF armored

and infantry troops, was the SAGGER AT-3 missile, designed for use against

tanks, boats or bunkers. At Tan Canh, Kontum, in MR-2, RVNAF armored

units described the zigzagging flights of the projectiles in pursuit ^—

of armored vehicles and the subsequent destruction of the latter as in

uncanny, deific battles of ancient mythology. Later the capabilities

of the weapon were determined to be significant. This missile was rigged

with wiring and the gunner had to steer it. Because of its jumbled wires

it was first nicknamed "bach tuoc" (octopus). Firing from an exposed

position while the battle was raging frequently made the gunner lose

control and miss the targets. This prompted Communist troops to play

with words and call the missile "bach truot" (ever-missing), a parody

of "bach tuoc" (octopus).

The psychological effect that sophisticated arms and equipment of

the Communist bloc initially made cannot be refuted. In this regard,

enemy tanks and armored vehicles are not to be ignored. The RVNAF

soldiers were used to fighting with tanks and armored vehicles supporting

them from the rear. For a period of time they were rudely shocked when

facing enemy tanks and armored vehicles for the first time. Later, as

they received more advanced antitank weapons, gained more experience, *

and learned from CMEC of the vulnerabilities of each type of vehicle,

the tactical units competed to destroy enemy tanks for rewards. Foremost V_-.\

of the tank-killer units were those defending An Loc.

Originally, CMEC was given authority to have the war trophies either *

sent to it or kept at the capturing units. Later this authority was

passed on to the Central Logistical Command and CMEC was allowed to keep

only one sample of each type. This limited CMEC performance and delayed

the evacuation of new Communist equipment which came in increasingly

greater numbers and types.

In summary, the Vietnamese military intelligence units had to rely

on the US for detailed exploitation of technical intelligence. The

lack of trained specialists and testing laboratories was an obstacle

that was never overcome.

108

• - - -•-•-• • • • - • • - • • •. . • - <. » j-
•-• -. -•—•:—• •--—. •- .^ ."-•.".'.- -•-.-- <". I •<• J •".*.»•." »

Intelligence Cooperation And Coordination

At The Field Level

While intelligence cooperation and coordination between US and

RVN agencies at the four combined centers and at Collection Unit 101

were based on bilateral coordination, the cooperation at corps, divisions,

sectors and sub-sectors was typically an adviser-advisee relationship.

This was because US intelligence advisers to field units were part of

the MACV advisory system. In reality, this relationship was more

cooperative than advisory in nature.

At corps level, the senior intelligence adviser was a colonel or

lieutenant-colonel, assisted by a deputy and other officers who performed

the same duties as their Vietnamese counterparts in the corps G-2. In

terms of coordination, the advisers to the corps G-2 supplied US-acquired

intelligence data, particularly information produced by SPAR (Significant

Problem Area Report), SLAR, Red Haze, aerial reconnaissance photos and

agents. United States advisers also provided office supplies that the

Vietnamese did not have funds for or could not find on the local market,

arranged for aircraft or helicopters to fly their counterparts on various

assignments, supplied equipment not provided for in the Vietnamese TOE,

and helped obtain slots in overseas training course.

The corps G-2 supplied the intelligence advisers with information

acquired by the VN side, PW or ralliers interrogation reports, refugee

interviews, preliminary document exploitation reports and information

reported by agents of the Vietnamese nets. This method of cooperation

indicated that there was no direct coordination between the Vietnamese

corps G-2 and the G-2 of the US Field Force. In most cases, communication

was made through the US intelligence advisers. Intelligence cooperation

and coordination at division level were confined to the same framework

as at corps level.

At sector level, intelligence cooperation and coordination received

special consideration because the heavy responsibility for coping with

the VCI and local force units was far out of proportion to the meager

collection resources available, especially since the one and only

109

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:•-.-.

security/intelligence platoon was always engaged in assignments not

relevant to intelligence. The sector S-2 staff of ten could not cope

with all the requirements. Since sector personnel allocations came

from the Regional Forces (RF) there was no way to reinforce sector and

subsector intelligence staffs with Regular Army MI personnel. Sector

S-2s were also occupied in miscellaneous duties assigned by the sector

commanders and could not keep up with new intelligence organizations or

directives from the JGS. Generally speaking, sector S-2 advisers had

received only crash intelligence training prior to assignment and possessed no practical experiences in the field. As a result, in 1966 there "

was a requirement for both sector MI officers and their advisers to attend

a special four-day training class. Each class had 20 students from ten

sectors of the various MRs. The instructors were intelligence officers

from J-2, USMACV and J-2, JGS as well as from the combined intelligence

centers.

Intelligence at sector level was very complex because the concept

of effectively coping with the enemy infrastructure by providing for

a firmer friendly infrastructure had led to the establishment of too

many organizations and committees at sector level. Sector intelligence

committees included the Provincial Intelligence Coordination Committee,

the Provincial Phung Hoang (Phoenix) Committee, and the Provincial

Security Committee. In addition to advising and cooperating with the

sector S-2, the sector intelligence adviser had to coordinate US intelligence activities in the various sub-sectors, receive reports and disseminate information to all places concerned, and provide intelligence

support to US/FWMAF units operating in the sector's territory. Sector

intelligence advisory teams started out with three men and later were

increased to seven.

At sub-sector level there were only two intelligence advisers, both

noncommissioned officers with the grades of E-7 and E-5 respectively.

Sector and sub-sector intelligence advisers provided office supplies and

equipment to the related S-2s, and funds to operate the volunteer agent

program, to support the conduct of special operations.

110

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»".•:•."—•

Military Intelligence Detachments (MID)

Though Vietnamese liaison officers were assigned to US taccical

units to help in public relations involving both the GVN administration

and civilian population, intelligence needs warranted immediate assistance in exploiting combat intelligence information derived from documents,

PW, and ralliers because US personnel were not familiar with the Vietnamese language. Originally, a joint concept was formulated that provided

for an exchange of MIDs, i.e. Vietnamese MIDs were to be attached to

US/FWMAF units and vice-versa. Later it was determined! to be unrealistic to

detach US/FWMAF MIDs to RVNAF units and only Vietnamese MIDs were detached

to US/FWMAF corps (Field Forces),divisions, and separate brigades. Each

was structured like an Airborne or VNMC (Vietnam Marine Corps) MID, with

30 men: 8 officers, 18 noncommissioned officers and 4 enlisted men.

The detachment had a headquarters, an interrogation team, a document

exploitation team, an order of battle team and an imagery interpretation

team. The mission of the MID was to exploit on the spot intelligence

•information obtained by the US units for immediate tactical response.

The MID later acted as intermediary for the US unit in contact with local

authorities, Regular and Popular Forces (RF/PF) units, the National

Police, the "Chieu Hoi" (Open Arms) services, etc.

Because of pressing needs, the MIDs could not have their full complement of men and their TOE was revised to include only 20 men organized

into two essential teams: interrogation and document exploitation. An

allocation of 360 men was approved for the activation of 18 MIDs. Priorities for assignments were determined by J-2, USMACV. Three of these

detachments were assigned to FWMAF (two to Republic of Korea Forces and

one to the Australian Task Force).

These MIDs were placed under operational control of the G-2s of

the allied units they were assigned to and coordinated with these tffiJ

own MIDs. The concept of cooperation was justified because it respci,

to intelligence requirements, although not every G-2 was entirely satisfied with the MID accomplishments. The reason for this was that in the

Vietnamese MIDs, except for the detachment commanders, all other personnel,

111

-.,

• -

. . .
^^^

• i

officers and noncommissioned officers alike, were fresh out of military

schools and basic intelligence training. They did not respond to the needs

and were not familiar with the enemy situation. On the other hand, though

selected for their English language skills, these very skills proved to be

limited. Living in most cases in the same barracks and making the first

contacts with a foreign unit proved to be difficult for both sides because of differences in customs, habits and language.

On the US side, counterintelligence (CI) was part of intelligence.

This was not so on the VN side. Consequently, some US units insisted

that the Vietnamese MID perform CI functions such as checking identification of Vietnamese civilians working in US military installations,

investigating illegal activities, etc. To the Vietnamese this went beyond the scope of the MID's mission. These MIDs were subordinate to the

MI Center of J-2, JGS but control was ineffective because inspections —

were conducted only once every six months. Later, the MIDs were placed

under operational control of the corps G-2 and the MI Center was restricted to administrative and logistical support. The MID program was gradual- v^-

ly terminated as US and FWMAF phased out of Vietnam.

Cooperation and Coordination in Human Intelligence

RVNAF Human Intelligence (HUMINT) units included: Unit 101 of J-2, ^.

JGS, the collection sections of corps and division G-2s, and the collection

sub-sections of sector and sub-sector S-2s. The Vietnam Navy (VNN) had

Unit 701 and the Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) had its own, undesignated,

collection detachment. Human sources were the oldest and most basic Q

form of intelligence collection but to the Vietnamese Armed Forces, it

was not until 1962 that this concept began to materialize and develop.

At this time the 300th Special Detachment was activated with a strength

of 388 men. Its mission was to collect strategic intelligence on the

Communists, but its operations were limited to SVN territory. From the

very beginning it conducted bilateral operations with US elements.

A basic agreement was signed between MACV and the JGS, which defined

this coordination in terms of the following basic points: 1. The Vietnamese Communists (VC) were the target of the collection effort;

U2

*. - • • > t*x» ... ..... .. «...
—„ ~~—„—- _

113

• v'

•:-.-v

i

2. No coordination would be effected with third countries nor would

operations be conducted in third country territory; 3. The US would

provide financial and material support; 4. Information collected was

to be equally shared.

At that time the US intelligence unit coordinating with the

Special Detachment was SMIAT (Special Military Intelligence Activities).

The 300th had a headquarters in Saigon, a detachment in each MR and

numerous teams operating in the provinces. Because of security requirements and the unit's personnel limitations, not every province had a

team. The US side was organized similarly and coordination was as much

advisory as operational. This fact was very important, because from

1962 to 1975 the activities of this Vietnamese collection agency reflected

entirely the organizational concept, operational procedures and techniques M

of the US collection agency. This peculiarity was beneficial for coordination because both sides shared the same techniques and methods.

However, it did not help develop collection concepts and methods consistent with the Vietnam theater. ~.t ft- ,.-&

Though effecting very close coordination in their collection efforts •."'.-'/

on common targets, each side gradually developed unilateral operations •"•.•"-."'

in response to its own needs. On the VN side for instance, the internal •.'••'.'•-,

• - • • -

political situation in 1963 grew tense with the Buddhist movement op- -I

posing the government and thus generated new, unilateral collection needs. ''/-'•/:

This was precisely why the 300th Special Detachment became too well known >"v\

after the 1 November 1963 revolution. Therefore its designation was -\ ,"

changed to the 924th Support Group and it was placed under operational _^J

control of the Chief of Staff, JGS, although technical supervision was

provided by J-2, JGS. "X--

In 1965, when US combat forces were committed in the Vietnam war,

more intelligence information was needed for tactical operations and j lj

this collection unit was subsequently expanded. On the US side, Detach- •-.'•

ment 1 of the 500th MI Group was transferred to the 525th MI group and

intelligence coordination was effected through the 149th Battalion of the

525th. After the Communist general offensive of 1968, the Vietnamization -. /.^I

plan was put into effect and 924ch Support Group was again changed to

.-- .-.:. . •. -•••_,-. _,_•_._... . ___ . _• . _ ., _- . ... , m . • . . . , . __, aju » _ . .
r r. r •",•••."• • l-, •.-. v • ----- --* -." "." - « " » -.» •»•,•»—»-.».•« .

Unit 101 under direct control of J-2, JGS. It gradually expanded on

the basis of a TOE strength of 918 men. By early 1975, however, because

of difficulties in training and personnel, the unit had only 799 men of

whom 44% were officers, 34% noncommissioned officers and 22% enlisted

men. Unit 101 was organized into a headquarters and six collection

detachments. {Chart 26)

Chart 26 — Organization, Unit 101

Commanding Officer

Liaison Officer Fund

Deputy

Staff

S-l S-2

Field Detachments

S-3 S-4

65 66 67 68 60 69

• \

Detachments 65, 66, 67 and 68 were in charge of MR-1, MR-2, MR-3

and MR-4, and based in Da Nang, Dalat, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho, respectively.

Detachment 69 was in charge of operations in the Capital Military District

(CMD), border areas and third countries, while Detachment 60 was especially targeted against C0SVN only.

The 525th MI Group, its counterpart, was composed of four detachments:

the 571st MID in MR-1; the 572d MID in MR-2; the 573d MID in MR-3; and

the 574th MID in MR-4.

. • . -

-

114

- -•- -* i • .- ^—I^J . ^
:

1>V

•

No longer constrained to its original mission as the 924th Support

Group, Unit 101 now reached into Cambodia to support RVNAF cross-border

operations conducted in 1970. Unit 101 teams dispatched officers, under

the cover of representatives of J-2, JGS and corps G-2s, to the Cambo- • •'.

•

dian military region G—2s and to some important provinces of Cambodia 1

to exchange information on the enemy situation and monitor the tactical ~ZZ

situation.

In South Vietnam, because collection operations were conducted

covertly, facilities and personnel were placed under civilian cover.

Agent handlers were given civilian occupations compatible with their ~~Z

•

own skills and consistent with the environment in their respective

target areas. These occupations included teaching in private schools,

-

operating small businesses, selling hogs, driving cargo trucks, etc.

Resources had to be provided to build the cover. The US provided oper- :~Zm

ational funds which helped purchase civilian vehicles and motorcycles, .;.• .•'.

rent safehouses, pay agents, and provide for other expenditures related

to collection operations. Vietnamese funds, allocated by the Defense

Ministry, paid for only 10% of the necessary expenditures. As a result,

the US picked up the tab for the remaining 90%. The US also provided

portable SSB radio transceivers for the internal communications system

which linked the headquarters to the detachments and teams. In their

professional field, US coordinators and case officers advised Vietnamese

personnel in all phases of Field Operations Intelligence (FOI). In

addition, US Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) organized FOI classes for collection personnel at the Vietnamese MI School, beginning in 1961. In

later years the training took place at the US Army Intelligence School

in Okinawa.

Though supported devotedly by the 525th MI Group in funds, resources,

and technical advice the Vietnamese collection effort met with two major

difficulties which seriously hampered its operations. The first one was

not unique to Unit 101. As a matter of fact all other HUMINT collection

organizations experienced the same problem. It involved cooperation

from the sources and the civilian population.

115

"-- "- '*--'*-"* -"• -'•» -'"•- * -- - - -» -• -' -- - - - - L. ..--*.-»-»--- . - .. - - ft • *• , *• -^-
'.•-".»—

r—"—•—•—• - . .- .......

In Vietnam a long standing question was: why was our side unable

to set up a "people's intelligence" system i.e. use the populace in an

intelligence capacity as the Communists did. The answer to this question

was very simple except for an unwillingness to face the truth. One had

to motivate the Vietnamese civilian to perform intelligence duties or to

cooperate with intelligence agencies. The motivation on the Communist

side was that failure to comply meant harsh punishment. However, on the

RVN side incentives were hard to find, and there even was a motivating

force which produced adverse effects. The people in SVN who lived under

the nationalist regime were still very much influenced by Confucian

ethics which asserts that reporting on someone else's activity is not

chivalrous if the report brings harm to that person. Non-interference

with another person's action might also have derived from the Confucian

philosophy of "not doing unto others what one shalt not have others do

unto oneself." This led the Vietnamese civilian to adopt the oft-condemned attitude of "not lifting a finger while the neighbor's house is

burning." These views, added to prejudices against the activities of the

old French "Deuxieme Bureau" in Vietnam, caused people to look down on

those connected with security and intelligence, or those providing

information to these agencies.

Prejudices against security and intelligence were gradually washed

away with time, but collaboration continued to be ignored by the populace,

and most agents cooperated for subsistence rather than for ideals. Even

in this case the earned income hardly justified the risks encountered,

particularly when going deep into enemy-controlled zones. The Communists

were merciless against those they considered spies, to whom they meted

out harsh punishment. Many people were assassinated and notes were

found on their bodies accusing them of acting as agents for the SVN

government, which in many cases was not true. This was why the bona

fide agents program designed to induce popular collaboration in return

for rewards also failed. The only agents available were mostly professionals who worked simultaneously for several agencies or doctored known

information for their own reporting.

116

•>• *•••••• * »*« -..-.-». - . , • M - . . , . _ _. _. .A ^ IJ, - L» - • •
"I»l • I • I ' • » - m v « P • 1« . » ' U' t I 1 • -• '.' » » I "W . • . • . »—••;»."-.'» T • " " -

An agent once provided Unit 101 with information on enemy forces

in an entire MR, complete with extremely accurate details on their cover

designators, cover numbers, letter box numbers, organization charts, etc.

The accuracy caused such bewilderment among intelligence officers that

J-2, JGS had to check with Unit 101 to reascertain the reliability and

capability of the source. Later, the source slipped up and was found

to be in possession of a MR-prepared document on Communist OB which he

had used to write reports on real units but imaginary activities. This

is not to say there were no outstanding agents or those with extremely

promising potential. However, where such sources were found, active

competition developed among the collection agencies and the winner was

always the one with the most means and power. Unit 101 frequently saw

extremely good prospective sources unexpectedly terminate their services

just as they were about to be officially recruited.

The second difficulty encountered in HUMINT was the state of general

mobilization which caused all male citizens from 18 to 37 years of age

to be conscripted. Personnel of the various intelligence nets of Unit

101 operating under cover were required to have papers certifying the

legality of their draft status, draft exemption, or military discharge.

As far as agents were concerned, failure to obtain draft deferment for

them negated all the efforts to develop them as sources.

The agency which had authority to issue such documentation was the

Mobilization Directorate. It refused to do so because it considered such

action to be illegal, though the JGS and the Defense Ministry had both

approved it for intelligence purposes. Finally, the Directorate approved

draft deferment for no more than 30 agents a year and no more than three

times each. To fulfill the need for legal documents for the agent handlers,

Unit 101 had to resort to forging discharge papers. This, however, was

legal forgery in that J-2, JGS and the Mobilization Directorate were

given rosters identifying those to whom such papers had been issued.

In addition to the two major obstacles described earlier, there were

other difficulties, for example, communications between the agent and

his agent handler, and between the agent handler and the team. The good

sources who operated in enemy/friendly boundary areas or had access to

117

• •-••»-»-»-•-- -
-•.-•-.---..-------.-.-.-.-••-- •--•.-..••-.-. - •.- .-; - • -. ••..••..-—- -.-.-..-. • - -

contested areas were frequently impeded by tactical operations. Uncompleted contacts had to be carried over according to plan, thus causing

loss of time. There were no available technical means of communication.

Other difficulties originated from unit commanders, particularly

those in command of sectors. They frequently had two conflicting attitudes. Either they suspected Unit 101 personnel of spying on them for

J-2, JGS and reporting to the JGS on internal affairs of the sectors or

they used them to meet their own needs for tactical intelligence. As

strategic intelligence was difficult to acquire, the agent handlers

were always willing to oblige by responding to tactical needs, disregarding strategic needs.

The two main difficulties encountered by Unit 101 were the same

as those confronting the collection sections of corps and division MIDs,

and to a certain extent were the common difficulties encountered by the

various agencies in Vietnam in collecting intelligence through agent

sources, though the extent to which they were hampered depended on the

power of each agency. Generally speaking, though bilateral collection

efforts helped resolve the problem of collection means and techniques,

they failed to upgrade the quality of information acquired and collection

through agent sources enjoyed but a modest position with regard to other

collection techniques, even when the 525th MI Group was always there to

support these activities during the period from 1965 to 1973. In 1972,

this support was gradually reduced until after the Paris Agreement went

into effect on 28 January 1973, when there was but a single representative

of the 500tb MI Group which was beginning to replace the 525th.

Cooperation And Coordination in

Aerial Photo Reconnaissance

During World War II, it was estimated that 80% of intelligence

information acquired came from aerial photo reconnaissance. This percentage remained the same during the Korean conflict. In the Vietnam

war, although no official statistics are available to this date, aerial

photo reconnaissance probably accounted for 65 to 70% of the intelligence

information acquired.

118

\ . •

*- '- - - - - - - - -• ......-.-•»... •-••-*-••
.-.-.-.- - . --,—.• .« '«' *m:

X, T "7^~^—r*~^"~_.^ ~^ T" "!• i". ." 5" • ." V .-_ .-,

114

1

Unlike the cooperation and coordination in other fields such as

combat intelligence or special collection, in aerial photo reconnaissance,

the VN side's contribution was rather modest. This was because the US,

with its air superiority and abundant assets, bore the brunt of the photo

missions throughout the Vietnam war.

By 1960, VNAF had only two C-45 aircraft for air photo missions,

both with extremely limited capabilities. In 1965, VNAF was able to

organize a reconnaissance squadron and in 1967 this was increased to two

squadrons. However, the total number of aircraft was only 13, of which

there were three RC-47, one EC-47 and nine U-6A. Aircraft such as the

T-28 were modified to become RT-28 for photo missions over areas defended

by enemy antiaircraft guns. Later this program was terminated because

the equipment was too old and photos taken could not be used for mapping

purposes. Not until after the Vietnamization plan had been implemented

did the VNAF get to activate a squadron of twelve RC-47 (716th Squadron)

and another squadron of six RF-5 (522d Squadron).

Meanwhile, during the same year, 1967, the US had the following

8

reconnaissance aircraft operating in VN:

US Air Force: 37 RF-4C, 13 RF-101, 3 RB-57, 34 EC-47.

US Army Aviation: 282 Bird Dog 01, 69 Mohawk OV-1, 20 Beaver U-6A.

US Marine Corps: 9 RF-4, 8 EF-10B.

7th Fleet: 27 AEW.

The above force continued to be increased. By 1968, for instance,

there were 327 01 Bird Dog observation aircraft and 115 Mohawks. The

Mohawks were first introduced into VN in September 1962 after the Vietnamese government had realized that Vietnamese RC-45 and RC-47 could

only operate in the lowlands and coastal areas. Six Mohawk OV-ls were

••

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t., •i

8

Fact Book, MACV J-3: August 1967, p. 39.

Ibid., p.p. 23, 24, 36, 37, 46.

•*-~t-*-- - - - -•-i--. •-.-.-.--- » t i * i •
-'-••.'-».»•» •.'•"•-«v».'•'."•- ".".".».".•. * •.».».'. ».".• '.»-•.• -" "" ' . ••" "

brought to Nha Trang and Qui Nhon airfields to support the air photo

needs of II Corps. A Vietnamese observer participated in each mission.

Reconnaissance targets were proposed by II Corps and submitted to the

corps advisor for approval and determination of priority before they

were forwarded to the 23d Special Warfare Aviation Detachment for execution.

In the first years of its use in VN, the Mohawk proved very effective

because the enemy was not familiar with it or with its characteristics.

With its high speed, this type of aircraft was able to approach a target

undetected. The Mohawk 0V-1A was equipped with a KA-30 camera installed

under its fuselage for vertical photography and a KA-60 near the nosetip

for panoramic photography with a field of view of 180 . The KA-30 camera,

with its 6 in. lens, produced photos scaled to between 1:3000 and 1:5000,

which were very useful for ascertaining enemy targets and activities.

Later, the Mohawk 0V-1A was tasked to perform another mission, tactical

support, because it was armed with rockets and cal..50 machineguns.

II Corps requested this unconventional support in many emergency cases.

Once the photo flight was completed, US processing of the materials

was very expeditious and results were immediately relayed to the requestors

for appropriate action. Meanwhile, on the VN side, facilities were

scarce. There was a lack of darkrooms, printers, processing paper, and

chemicals. Gradually, the Vietnamese units became used to submitting

their requests for air photo reconnaissance through US channels and

practically ignored VNAF. From 1965 to 1969, the RVNAF were responsible

only for supporting pacification and rural development; thus there was

not much need for air photo reconnaissance. Besides, photos taken by

the US side on its own were sufficient to meet the needs on the VN side.

The Mohawk's coverage was limited but the United States Air Force had

aircraft whose coverage was extensive. Combined US Army/US Air Force

action ensured better results in aerial photography.

Later, to minimize personnel losses in the face of increasing enemy

air defense capabilities, unmanned aircraft were used and their photos

proved satisfactory to the users.

120

"• * • • • - - - I • * - -" -•-•..-> . -.»^•.-... _»_*_*.
«. ••. ^. ^. • . /* •_ ii; i -m ••.».••.•»•..»•» J'l -,' '.» ".",» ." -•' -•" .T.' .F. y P ,'T .•» . • | - | P i- •— »•

Besides aerial photos, of which VNAF was able to contribute but a

few, two other air photo reconnaissance techniques were totally new to

the Vietnamese: SLAR and Red Haze. Mohawk 0V-1B aircraft were fitted

with Motorola side looking airborne radars which recorded moving target

indications generated by enemy troops as they moved on the rivers or

along jungle trails. Later, SLAR was applied for the detection of

truck convoys moving along LOCs. Mohawk OVICs applied infrared or Red

Haze techniques in low-altitude flights to pick up heat energy generated

by enemy activities, camps, troop concentrations or staging areas. Many

films generated up to 400 or 500 returns. SLAR activity was coordinated

with Shadow aircraft (Air Force gunship No 3) which could fly at speeds

comparable to the Mohawk's for timely intervention, or with the artillery

warning control center or helicopter gunships for tactical response.

Results obtained from picking up energy emissions were not well received

because it was difficult to identify the sources of energy: person or

animal, or activities, etc. Rain and humidity also restricted collection

activities. The RVNAF participated more in air reconnaissance than in

air photography. The participation began in 1964 with the assignment of

permanent observers to the US Army. These personnel conducted observation and made contact with RVNAF infantry units operating in the

target areas. At that time the US had three platoons of 0-1 Bird Dog

observation aircraft, totalling 53 aircrafts. One platoon was based in

Pleiku, one in Nta Trang and one in Can Tho. The participation became

more active after 1969, when VNAF activated five L-19 observation squadrons, each with 25 aircraft. These squadrons were located as follows:

the 110th in Da Nang; the 112th in Bien Hoa; the 114th in Nha Trang;

the 116th in Can Tho; and the 118th in Pleiku.

Aircrafts were assigned on the basis of one per sector and two per

division for observation, operational support, directing air and artillery

strikes, supporting military convoys and maintaining liaison. Because

of the varied duties involved, observation was usually given low priority.

By cease-fire day, VNAF received an additional number of 0-1 and 0-2

aircraft which gave it three more squadrons: the 120th in Da Nang; the

122d in Can Tho; and the 124th in Bien Hoa.

121

, -_•*..

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»'. '.*'*'. * * ''.'• ''•*'"'. •••'.••••.•••- 'T'T'T'l1'.' J'l'iil»! w • • • P • ;•

In addition to conducting visual reconnaissance, the observers were

trained to operate hand-held cameras, usually Japanese-made with 200-mm

lenses for target pinpointing. The US side was also equipped with 4x5

Polaroid cameras and sometimes used Kodak Ektachrome infrared aerofilms,

as at Ba Den mountain in Tay Ninh Province, to expose camouflaged items.

This worked on the principle that metal absorbs infrared radiation,

while living plants reflect it quite strongly due to the presence of

chlorophyll. Genuine foliage may appear for instance as pale blue, but

a bunker or other camouflaged objects will reveal itself by being shockingly pink. The shortcomings of this type of film were its cost and the

complexity of processing techniques.

Another technique in air reconnaissance used unilaterally by the

US was the airborne personnel detector (sniffer) also known as manpack

personnel detector (MPD) which determined the presence of personnel

concentrations by the detection of compounds excreted by the human body.

To accomplish this, helicopters which carried the devices had to fly

not more than 200 feet above the ground at speeds of 80 to 100 knots.

The difficulties were a failure to identify man versus animal, exposure

to hostile fire because of the low altitude, and the effect of weather

conditions, rain, fog, dust on the results. This technique was usually

applied to verify enemy troop concentrations reported by agents or aerial

reconnaissance and was suitable for areas ascertained to be unpopulated.

Information from air photo reconnaissance was very reliable and

the various units competed in asking for more, making it important to

ascertain priorities and legitimacy of the requests. On the VN side

requests for air photos were directed to the corps where priorities were

determined. They were then forwarded to US advisers and J-2, JGS was

notified. A Target Research and Analysis Center (TRAC) was set up at

Tan Son Nhut and staffed with US and VN Army and Air Force personnel to

oversee and satisfy air photo needs. Requests that VNAF was deemed able

to fulfill were turned over to the VN side. This was particularly true

for the areas in the Mekong Delta. Requests that matched photos available from previous US flights were satisfied immediately if the information derived from these photos was still considered to be valid.

122

•

--. —......
•i«r'm'^'|i.» ».. » . »—J-. V ." —

" "*.- T" ~^ ~T " "• ~~" ;• ~* " * "7- '» •» • • "1 ••! ' -. - - - - - —: -

Those photo requests chat required new flights would be responded to

upon completion of the flights and subsequent processing of the films,

at which time the photos would be forwarded to the requestors through

regular channels and information copies would be furnished to related

agencies.

By cease-fire day the air photo program had fulfilled all the needs

of the requesting units, with the US providing 97% of the coverage and

VNAF credited with the remainder. The Vietnam Air Force's participation

in visual reconnaissance was greater but this program was restricted by

the weather, nocturnal conditions, terrain concealment, particularly

in mountainous areas, and enemy antiaircraft firepower. The Vietnam

Air Force's ability to fill the gaps caused by the withdrawal of effective

US support following the Paris Agreement was minimal, particularly in

the face of continued requests by the units which had become overly

dependent on aerial photographs.

Signal Intelligence

In the RVNAF, J-7, JGS was responsible for the acquisition of signal

intelligence (SIGINT). Prior to 1961, Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) was

unknown in the RVNAF. However, the 1st Republic did give consideration to

applying this technique in intelligence activities. The nucleus of a center

for radio intercept was established in Saigon in 1955 under the RVNAF Telecommunications Command with a staff of approximately 80 military and civilian

personnel who had had basic radio intercept experience with the French

Army. This center had a branch in Da Nang. At that time, the mission

was to monitor broadcast from Communist radio stations in Peking, Moscow

and Hanoi, as well as free-world stations such as the BBC and the VOA.

In 1961 when SIGINT materialized the unit which first came into being

was designated 1st Signal Research and Exploitation Company and placed

under technical supervision of the commander, ARVN Telecommunications

Command. Another agency was established which took the name of "Special

Technical Exploitation Agency" and became subordinate to the Chief of

9

Information obtained from the BBC and VOA were used to crosscheck

domestic news.

123

••

--.-*. « | - -» ' ' - - .--•-. - .- - - - - ^~ - ^ . - . . _ • - » - -->.^»^^, ^- --^ ...
»- » -'» »••• • •—- - - - -—-- "- ~- "^ *• . " *~ •T»r • •-»»•.•»•« -.»'.»• .»—

_

~^-: —' •" •- » . » •

Staff, JGS.

After repeated political upheavals such as revolution and successive coups, the agency in charge of radio intercept at the CIÜ which

in turn reported directly to the Chief of State and Commander--in Chief,

was transferred to the JGS and J-7 thus came into being. The 1st Signal

Research and Exploitation Company was deactivated and its components

reorganized to become Unit 15.

Coordination was effected in the form of bi-weekly meetings to

discuss operations, intelligence collection requirements, priorities,

and assignments. With the increasing need, detachments were activated

to provide direct support to Vietnamese infantry divisions. In late

September 1907 the first three detachments were organized to support the

2d, 22d and 5th divisions respectively. Other detachments were subsequently formed for the remaining divisions and they became operational

in 1968. Radio Direction Finding (RDF) stations were also established:

in Da Nang to support MR-1; in Pleiku to support MR-2; in Song Mao

(Phan Thiet) to support MR-2; in Vung Tau to support MR-3; in Can Tho to

support MR-4; and in Con Son to support MR-4.

J-7, JGS personnel were trained in airborne radio direction finding

(ARDF) from U-6A aircraft in early 1968. In 1970, as the Vietnamization

program began, J-7 personnel were trained by the 694th Air Force Security

Force in ARDF from EC-47 aircraft. Unit 17 was activated to meet the

needs of airborne RDF from U-6A and EC-47 aircraft. EC-47 aircraft were

rigged for both intercept and RDF and there were two intercept sections

to one RDF section: improvements were made in RDF capability of the Vietnamese to prepare them to replace US units which were phasing out. This

system was reinforced by replacing outdated equipment at the MR st ions

with more advanced equipment. RDF was also directed at urban targes but

in this case equipment had to be borrowed from the US. J-7, JGS used

390 and 392-type radios tor RDF and AN/PRD-15s for radio intercept. For

ground intercept it received 80 radios against a TOE of 120. For shortrange RDF it had AN/PRD-3s which were usable in the lowlands but not in

hilly or mountainous area.

''-'

124

• - . . - fc_ala ^EkM ft • > » ft .- «-
• - • • • "T"-« • • • »—"• »—= = •• —T- • • " • • " •—•—""--

Between 1965 and 1968 the US was the sole provider of AKDF

information. Between 1968 and 1970 the US provided 95% and the Vietnamese 5°4. As regards MRDF information, the US acquired 50% and the

Vietnamese 50%. GRDF information was credited on the basis of 65% to

the US and 35% to the Vietnamese up to cease-fire day. The 718th

Squadron, 33d Wing, 5th Air Division, VNAF, had 33 EC-47 for airborne

RDF. Twenty three of these were based in Tan Son Nhut for missions in

MRs 1 and 2. J-7, JGS gradually gained credit for up to 90% of ARDF

and MRDF information acquired in country. Until cease-fire day the

principal US Army unit was the 509th RR Group which consisted of the

146th Aviation Company (RR) in Can Tho, 138th Aviation Company (RR)

and 224th Aviation Company (RR) in Da Nang, 175th RRFS in Saigon and

8th RRFS in Da Nang. A team of ten specialists from J-7, JGS was

dispatched to coordinate with the US unit in Nakhon Phanom, Thailand,

which was targeted against enemy activities along the Ho Chi Minh

trail.

Signal intelligence proved to be a valuable source of information

and was very well appreciated by tactical unit commanders since it

provided early warning of enemy troop movements and allowed time to

devise countermeasures. This confidence was reflected in the designation of ARDF information as A2 information and everyone but the intelligence specialists swore by A2 information but had no idea what ARDF

wa s •

The RVN military intelligence evaluation system was the same

used by the US Army. Letters A, B, C, U, E, F are used to indicate

the relative reliability of the source while numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

are used to indicate the evaluation of the accuracy ol the information

itself.

125

^ ^ _^_
I » I » • , »• I »• »• !•• f I» '• I." '••

^•ii.ii'i',ii •;•,•' i.'ii * * . i—: _-i ••»——- , 

Intelligence Training

The need to train intelligence and security personnel was not

recognized until late in 1955. It began with the establishment of a

school in Cholon to train officers and noncommissioned officers from the

intelligence, security, and psychological warfare branches of the RVNAF.

The school was named Cay Mai. Special classes were held for Civil Guard

personnel. In 1957 an annex was established in Vung Tau to train the

security/intelligence platoons and squads of the sectors and sub-sectors.

The Cay Mai school could accommodate 200 resident students and ten

courses. There were 22 different training programs in security and intelligence. Intelligence courses consisted of: 1. Basic Territorial

Intelligence Officer Course; 2. Intermediate Intelligence Officer Course;

3. Imagery Interpretation Officer Course; 4. Interrogation Officer

Course; 5. OB Officer Course, and the FOI (Collection) Officer Course.

There were three security courses: 1. Basic Security Officer

Course; 2. Intermediate Security Officer Course; 3. DAME/DASE Course.

Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were trained according to Central

Training Command (CTC) instructions and upon completing their training

were awarded certificates or diplomas. These were: 1. Certificate of

Qualification in MI, first degree; 2. Certificate of Qualification in

MI, second degree; 3. Diploma of MI Specialist, first degree; 4. Diploma

of MI Specialist, second degree. The same certificate and diplomas were

available for Security or Counter-intelligence specialists.

Courses attended by NCO specialists included: Imagery Interpretation;

Interrogation; Order of Battle; and Agent Handler.

From its very inception the Cay Mai School designed its own programs

of instruction and prepared its own training materials based on available

reference documents which covered both US and French intelligence techniques. United States documents were made available to the Training

•

Defense against Methods of Entry and Defense against Sound

Equipment.

12b

^_. . • •_
- -- - --.-,-.-

Relation and Instruction Mission (TRIM) but they were not complete. In

1956 a US adviser was assigned to the school but his role was very general,

He made recommendations on maintenance of barracks and arms, but in

training his role was limited to discussing training aids and monitoring

instruction and students' morale.

In September 1959 the first US-conducted intelligence course for

VN officers was opened in Okinawa to last ten weeks. The second and

other succeeding classes placed additional emphasis on training instructors. The Okinawa school then began to provide adequate security

and intelligence training materials to Cay Mai. In the succeeding years

Okinawa opened special courses such as DAME/DASE for MSS and FOI (Collection) for the 300th Special Detachment. Beginning in September 1960

mobile training teams (MTT) were sent to Cay Mai to instruct personnel

of the 300th. Instruction in Okinawa and by the MTTs was conducted

through Vietnamese interpreters. Later, however, Okinawa conducted

Allied courses which VN officers could attend if they passed the English

test. In 1965 intelligence training was stepped up as the US became

directly involved in the VN war, and Vietnamese officers were sent to

the Intelligence School at Fort Holabird, Md.

In 1968 it was determined that staff coordination between G-2s, G-3s,

chiefs of staff, and commanders was not close enough because of a lack

of knowledge of the mission and capabilities of intelligence officers.

Special orientation courses were conducted for G—3s, chiefs of staff,

and unit commanders. These courses were effective in changing the attitudes of the students, making them more inclined to cooperate and coordinate with intelligence personnel.

Intelligence training both at home and abroad had a shortcoming in

that it was not consistent with realities of a wartime situation. Staff

regulations and procedures were seldom required by the commanders or were

followed with great reluctance because they were considered burdensome,

dogmatic. To remedy this, intelligence students were sent on fieldexercise assignments to the divisions and sectors but results left a lot

to be desired because of time limitations. In lieu of classroom instruction, intelligence officers working at central agencies or at corps level

L27

- •

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- —E—:—T* T

~"" • • -------- - -

were sent out to deliver briefings on current events and on their own

duties and to visit various intelligence facilities to describe the

capabilities of their own agencies. This was aimed at acquainting students with the specialized support available to them on their jobs.

Students were also asked to write intelligence lessons as a means to

make individual experiences known to other students.

United States advisers contributed to training by providing documents

from Fort Holabird or Okinawa, or by participating in courses conducted

by MTT instructors. The most noteworthy example of training coordination,

however, remained in the training of US and Vietnamese intelligence officers at sector level by intelligence officers from J-2, USMACV and

J-2, JGS.

Documents provided by the US were revised to include typical

situations and field exercises based on factual incidents recorded in

the Vietnam theater. Still, training documents failed to meet the need

to train intelligence officers for an unconventional war.

"

L28

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CHARTER V

Military Intelligence Cooperation And Coordination

in Vietnam Following United States Military Disengagement

Defense Attache Office, Intelligence Branch

The Paris Agreement of 27 January 1973 called for withdrawal of

all US forces from Vietnam except 50 servicemen assigned to the Defense

Attache Office (DAO). This also applied to US intelligence organizations. They left, taking home their sophisticated equipment, lavish

means, and numerous technicians. The US intelligence apparatus which

remained in Vietnam after cease-fire day consisted of OSA and the DAO

Intelligence Branch.

The DAO Intelligence Branch was an entirely new organization with

extremely limited personnel allocations—by previous standards—of 10

military and 97 civilian personnel. Later, the number of military

personnel was further reduced to three. The mission of the DAO Intelligence Branch was to collect, evaluate and disseminate information on

North Vietnam and the Viet Cong in response to intelligence information

requirements levied by the US Army Support Activities Group in Thailand,

Commander in Chief Pacific in Hawaii, DIA, and other national intelligence agencies. The organization of the DAO Intelligence Branch is

shown in the following chart. (Chart 27)

Chart 2 7 — Organization, DAO Intelligence Branch

(DAO),INTELLIGENCE

BRANCH

Liaison, Coordination & Collection

Current Intelligence Security

129

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The Liaison, Coordination and Collection Section was the main

element of the Intelligence Branch. Its principal effort was in liaison.

To that effect it had four teams: Team 1 conducted liaison with Republic

of Vietnam (RVN) intelligence agencies in Saigon and at the military

regions; Team 2 conducted liaison with N-2, Vietnam Navy (N-2, VNN) and

was reinforced with representatives of the 500th Military Intelligence

Group from Thailand; Team 3 conducted liaison with A-2, Vietnam Air Force

(A-2, VNAF) and was reinforced with representatives of the 7602 Air Force

Intelligence Group; Team 4 conducted liaison with Unit 101 and was reinforced with representatives from the 500th MI Group. In its coordination

capacity, this section coordinated with aerial reconnaissance units of

the United States Air Force (USAF) in Thailand in relation to Photographic

Intelligence (PHOTINT) needs. The Current Intelligence Section monitored

the daily tactical and enemy situations and prepared daily intelligence

reports. The Security Section was responsible for classified correspondence and documents forwarded to the RVN. The Special Security Section

ensured the coordination of counterintelligence activities and requirements,

personnel security clearances, and liaison with the US Embassy on counterintelligence and security matters. It also coordinated the activities

of US military criminal interrogation teams in Vietnam.

Personnel of the DAO Intelligence Branch were newly assigned. Few

had worked for J-2, USMACV. The basis for cooperation and coordination

between the DAO Intelligence Branch and J-2, JGS was jointly agreed to

be as follows: exchange, on a broad and timely basis, of intelligence

requirements and data related to the threat against both parties (US and

Vietnam) and therefore of common concern to both parties.

Intelligence data supplied by J-2, JGS to the DAO Intelligence

Branch were intelligence data acquired within the scope of its responsibilities and pertaining to South Vietnamese territory. Intelligence

data furnished by the DAO Intelligence Branch to J-2, JGS were informtion pertaining to the areas outside South Vietnam, information on North

Vietnam and information related to infiltration from North Vietnam to

South Vietnam.

130

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•

--•

Difficulties Encountered

Under the new situation, after US forces had left and the Paris

Agreement went into effect, intelligence data could be classified in

two categories: 1) Totally lost, or 2) Limited and reduced. Those

data in the first category included: information obtained through SLAR

(Side-Looking Airborne Radar), Red Haze and People Sniffer techniques,

information derived from sensors; weather indicators from satellites.

Data of the second category included: Aerial photographs of North Vietnam

and Laos; information from in-country air photo reconnaissance, information from combat intelligence sources; information from agent sources;and

special intelligence studies.

The substantial reduction of communications,liaison, transportation

and support means made it more difficult to conduct intelligence operations. Intelligence training in Okinawa was discontinued. To fill

this gap, in-country courses were planned for personnel of Unit 101 and

VNN Unit 701, with the participation of US mobile training teams from

Thailand, but only two courses were actually held. The liaison system of

the DAO Intelligence Branch was unable to replace the intelligence system

of J-2, USMACV in the function of crosschecking intelligence information,

tactical information, etc., with the Vietnamese side. It was precisely

at this time when intelligence was confronted with numerous obstacles

and challenges that the need for intelligence information became more

pressing and important, more imperative even, than during the war. The

Paris Agreement brought no peace of mind to the leaders of South

Vietnam. There was a continuing strategic intelligence requirement to

determine the changes in North Vietnam's conduct of the war in the wake

of the agreement, the state of rehabilitation of military and economic

potentials in North Vietnam and Communist-controlled portions of South

Vietnam, and the level of infiltration of personnel and logistics from

the North to the South. Other less important but much needed information

pertained to negotiating strategies at the four-and two-party commissions,

the composition and activities of the Communist delegations, etc.

The standstill cease-fire had brought the Communists an advantage in

131

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I • . - •'.»•. T .1 T-l . • . ' - »•—i -*•—•—T5- r

that they now had buffer, leopard-spot zones. These were considered by

the Communists to be access points to the zones effectively controlled

by each side. The Communist objective was to prevent infiltration by

RVN intelligence into their zones through these points while using the

same points as bridgeheads for their own infiltration into nationalist

zones to gather intelligence.

The Paris Agreement gave birth to a new political element, the

Third Force, which encompassed the left-oriented political forces opposing

the government. Civilian intelligence agencies and the Military Security

Department (better known as MSS) virtually diverted their entire efforts

to cope with this threat.

None of the armed forces intelligence agencies, J-2 or J-7, JGS,

received any additional means to cope with their new difficulties.

STRATD/T (Strategic Technical Directorate), too, was deprived of all the

means that had given it mobility and it was reduced to reassigning its

teams to the military regions to assist them in a tactical capacity.

The combined intelligence centers of the past were ordered merged

into a single center designated Unit 306 of J-2, JGS. This reorganization created additional difficulties for J-2, JGS because the TOE was

subsequently revised to reflect a reduction by one rank for all job

titles while the missions required more effort than in the past. The

organization of Unit 306 is shown in the following chart. 'Chart 2c)

Chart 28—Organization, Unit 306 - J-2, JGS

J-2, JGS

X

Div. I Intelligence

X

Unit 306

r

Div. II

Document

X

Div. Ill

Interrogation

X

Div. IV

Materiel

3_

Div. V

Support &

Personnel

The Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV), was reorganized

to become the Intelligence Division or Division I; the Combined Documents

Exploitation Center (CDEC) became the Documents Division or Division II;

i

the Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC) became the Interrogation A

132 :•:

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Division or Division III; the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center

(CMEC) became the Materiel Division or Division IV; and the Military

Intelligence Center became the Support and Personnel Division or Division V.

Equipment formerly available at the combined intelligence centers

was owned by the US side. Because this was costly, sophisticated equipment, it was not covered by MAP-funded TOE allocations. Moreover, the Vietnamese side did not anticipate that the day would come when the Vietnamese

element would no longer have access to such equipment. When the US side

prepared to pull out, J-2, JGS requested that some essential equipment

be left behind. J-2, USMACV agreed in principle but ultimately the

equipment could not be transferred to the Vietnamese side because there

had been no advance planning for the authorization of such items.

Some non-essential items such as filing cabinets, desks, and chairs

were transferred to the Vietnamese by their respective US counterparts

though they were not TOE-listed. However, this prompted the Logistical

Command to order that all such items be turned in to storage depots. In

order to keep them for Unit 306 personnel to use, US liaison officers

had to resort to signing for them on a loan basis.

Liaison between JGS, military region/corps»division G—2s and sector

S-2s ran into difficulties because intelligence liaison flights were no

longer available. Documents and correspondence were forwarded through

the military postal system. Except where special provisions were made,

an average of three months elapsed between the day an enemy document

was captured in the field and the day it was received at the Documents

Division, whereas document evacuation used to be completed within a week.

When the exploitation was completed, it was another two weeks before the

results were disseminated to the unit. If the unit were a Regular Army

force engaged in an operation in another area, the document exploitation

report only reached the rear base, and there was no set time as to when

it would reach the MI officer.

Prisoners of war and "hoi chanh" (defectors) were retained at local

stations and the Interrogation Division sent teams out to interrogate

them whereas they should have been evacuated to the central Interrogation

Division as in the past.

133

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Captured material was sent in only if it presented new characteristics, but how could any characteristic be identified as new when not

all levels of intelligence were able to recognize the difference?

Combat intelligence data acquired were substantially reduced. In 1973

for instance, the enemy targeted his attacks against isolated outposts

near infiltration routes, and by concentrating large forces, was always

assured of victory. Such battles yielded no PW or documents to help

identify the enemy units involved. "Hoi Chanh" now came in smaller

numbers and there were no high-ranking ones. The psychology was such

that defections came when the fighting was fierce, when the enemy's

tactical position was weak, and the RVN had the upper hand. In the

seesaw situation of semi-war and semi-peace only the most determined

defected and there was a high rate of false defections.

Fewer documents were captured, not only because there were fewer

contacts with the enemy but also because the enemy had applied stricter

secrecy control measures, forbidding his troops to carry documents during

an operational mission. This prohibition occurred after the RVN had

repeatedly used captured documents to substantiate its protests of Communist crimes and deliberate violations of the cease-fire.

Intelligence previously acquired through communications means was

substantially reduced because the Communists had identified the communications intelligence reliance on overflights. To contain friendly

air activities, an additional 20 Communist air defense regiments infiltrated after the cease-fire with sophisticated armament never before

observed in the Vietnam theater. Among this new arsenal were SA-2 missiles; modified SA-7 heat-seeking missiles; radar-guided 100-mm, 57-mm,

and 37-nan antiaircraft guns; and self-propelled, multiple-barreled antiaircraft irtillery. The air defense perimeter expanded daily and proportionately reduced aircraft operational ranges. Typically in MR-3

enemy 37-mm antiaircraft guns were positioned in Ben Cat, Binh Duong,

1.5 miles northwest of Saigon. The antiaircraft missile which caused

the strongest psychological impact was the modified SA-7 missile. Its

effective altitude and speed had been increased, the altitude being

increased from 9,000 ft. to 15,000 ft., forcing VNAF pilots to fly above

15,000 ft.

134
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However, RC-47 and EC-47 aircraft could not fly'above 10,000 ft.

Moreover, photos taken by RF-5S flying above 4,500 or 5,000 ft. were not

usable because of the type of cameras mounted on the aircraft. The

cameras were the 70-mm KS-92. Photos from these cameras were to

cover an area between 400 and 500 square meters and the photography was

unusable for mosaics. Furthermore, no VNAF aircraft were equipped with

radar lock-on-warning (LOW) equipment. Areas denied to aerial photo

reconnaissance were MR-1, the tri-border area and the highlands of MR-2, and

the northern part of MR—3. Missions over these areas were very difficult

because VNAF had no long range rescue teams. On 22 September 1973, when the Communists launched their first armor-supported attack after the cease-fire

against the Le Minh outpost 38 km west of Pleiku, photo aircraft were

directed to record the number of enemy armored vehicles and their progress. This was to serve as a basis for a RVNAF tactical response and

as evidence of blatant violations of the Paris Agreement. However, it

was not until five days later that the flights were conducted. By that

time there were no traces left of enemy armored or infantry units. In

Quang Due, MR-2, the same problem occurred when in early November 1973

the Communists attacked the border outposts of Bu Prang and Bu Dop. The

requirement then was to determine the locations of enemy armored, antiaircraft, and artillery positions so that the corps might make counterattack plans. Wrong coordinates and inclement weather were blamed for

a delay that caused the air photo mission to be completed after the

counterattacks had been launched.

Beginning on 1 September 1974, reductions in military aid caused fuel

allocations and replacement parts to VNAF to drop to 65% of the year 1973.

This, in turn, led to a drop of air photo reconnaissance performance to

52% of the previous year. Total flight time for RC-47s was reduced to

150 hours a month, for RF-5s to 45 hours a month. To meet an essential

air photo reconnaissance need, J-2, JGS Interceded with J-3, JGS to either

borrow flight time from the following month or to reduce other flights,

but this was virtually impossible. These situations occurred when the

Communists launched large-scale attacks as in Ban Me Thuot. In other cases,

air photo reconnaissance needs conflicted with the needs to fly tactical

air or logistical support.

135

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The Vietnam Air Force could not conduct night reconnaissance as

it did not have sophisticated aircraft such as the RF-101 C Voodoo, RB-57F

Canberra, RF-4C Phantom or OV-1 Mohawk. After Communist forces had

overrun Ban Me Thuot the requirement was to detect enemy armored and

vehicular movements from Ban Me Thuot toward MR-3 or the coastal areas

of MR- 2. Monitoring the lines of communication (LOC) was possible for

a maximum of only eight hours a day, which meant enemy forces had 16

hours a day to move undetected.

United States-AEVN Intelligence Cooperation and Coordination

In The Face of New Difficulties

In air photo reconnaissance VNAF could meet only 7 to 10% of the

in-country requirements, which meant that 90% of these requirements

were still dependent on USAF air photo reconnaissance capabilities

called upon through the DAO Intelligence Branch.

Most US aircraft took off from Thailand. Reconnaissance flights

were conducted over North Vietnam, Laos and South Vietnam by SR-71 and U-2s.

RF-4s provided coverage of Cambodia and a 25 nautical mile-wide corridor along the Vietnamese-Cambodian border. Unmanned aircraft, or

Buffalo Hunters, were also used in South Vietnam.

In order to ensure secrecy and avoid North Vietnamese protests,

information obtained fromcp_7i an^ y-2 missi0ns was not passed to the

RVN. Exceptions were made in only very special cases and with DIA approval. Photographs and information obtained by RF-4s were passed to

the Vietnamese upon special request and with adequate justification of

the need. Unmanned aircraft, or Buffalo Hunters, were the only source

of information that the Vietnamese were totally entitled to. These

aircraft were launched from DC-130S at an altitude of 20,000 ft but

this was not allowed over Laos territory after June 1974. Thirty to

forty flights were performed per month, especially over areas inaccessible to VNAF. Photos thus taken were very sharp and clear. The overflights were programmed four days in advance and occasionally mechanical

problems did develop. In some areas Buffalo Hunters were used in a

136

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tactical reconnaissance capacity to provide information in support of

battlefield requirements. This occurred, for instance, in July 1974

during the battles of Thuong Due and Due Due in MR 1.

In mid-1974, Buffalo Hunter and RF-4 flight were stopped in Laos. When the

situation in the RVN began to pick up in intensity, the US reinforced

drone overflights with RF-4 missions in South Vietnam but such flights

were conducted at very high altitudes to avoid complications which might

develop should any be shot down.

Photos from Buffalo Hunter missions were originally delivered by

aircraft to the Vietnamese in three days. Later this was reduced to a

day. Prior to receiving the photographs the Vietnamese were given

readouts by messages. The photos consisted of three duplicate positives,

mission traces, select prints, and vu-graph slides. Of the three duplicate

positives, one went to VNAF Imagery Interpretation Center, one to Division

1/Unit 306, and one to the military region concerned.

The two Vietnamese Army and Air Force Imagery Interpretation Centers

usually re-interpreted and reprinted the duplicate positives for distribution to the areas concerned. Re-interpretation served a purpose.

A photo, for instance, was interpreted by Nakhon Phanom (NKP) as showing

NVA T-60 medium tanks on RVN territory. Verification of this information

was of utmost significance as North Vietnam had not been known to have

such tanks. Re-interpretation indicated these were only T-54 or T-59

tanks. Finally, another overflight was conducted over the target area

and DIA interpreters identified the tanks as T-54s and-T-59s. Additional

prints made by the VNAF Imagery Interpretation Center were sent to the

air divisions, but they did not reach them until three days later.

The Imagery Interpretation Section of Division 1/306, for its part, used

hotlines to relay readouts to the corps and divisions concerned. They

also sent selected prints but these did not reach the recipients until

a week later.

In urgent cases, a method commonly used for delivery was to carefully

package the prints and take them to a civilian terminal. There they were entrusted to passengers on Air Vietnam's domestic flights who were deemed

reliable such as high-ranking military officers on TDY or leave, or

137

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members of the clergy. Identification of these passengers, the flight

number, flight time, etc., were then transmitted to the local agency

which sent personnel out to meet the plane. This became the prime

method used by RVN military intelligence to ensure expeditious delivery

of documents.

The US and RVN held many discussions as to how to improve the

photography process. In June 19 74 they came up with an immediate solution and a long-range solution. The immediate solution called for

replacing the obsolete KS-92 cameras with KS-121s for the four RF-5 aircraft. Testing showed that the KS-121 had twice the resolution and

three times the accuracy, in addition to many other advantages. This

program was to fulfill its objective within six to nine months of the

signing of the camera purchase contract. The second solution provided

for F-5Es to be used in aerial reconnaissance. These aircraft could be

outfitted with KS-121s for photographing from low-to-medium altitudes,

or with KA-95s for medium to high altitudes. Purchasing the KA-95s

alone would have cost $7.5 million. The KA-95s and the KS-121s would

have cost$13.5 million. If approved the program was not expected to

fulfill its objective before mid-1977. However, till the very last day

it remained in the stage of a project.

In late 1974 another effort was undertaken in the form of a project

to equip C-130s with F 638-120 cameras to be borrowed from the Air Force

Logistics Command. This did not materialize either because the cameras

were not available.

As a substitute source of air photos, hand-held cameras received

special consideration. However, VNAF hand-held cameras had only 200-mm * m.

lenses and the high altitudes of the flights were not conducive to sharp

photos. A 600-mm lens would have been the minimum but even so, VNAF

was not able to borrow more than one. The ideal lens would have been

the F:ll 1000-mm Yashica which did get proposed but for which no funds *

could be obtained.

The difficulties encountered by VNAF impacted seriously on the

SIGINT program of J-7, JGS.

m

138

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139

.-

Though J-7, JGS had 33 EC-47 aircraft, one was destroyed by an attack

by fire while at Tan Son Nhut airbase in late 1973 and two others were

downed by SA-7s over northern Tay Ninh in May 1974. Of the remaining 30,

a theoretical operational status of 50% or 15 aircraft a day was prescribed but in reality only 33 to 35% of the aircraft were operational

on any one day because of lack of maintenance or personnel, or because

the targets were located too deep in enemy territory. For example, of

the ten EC-47s based in Da Nang, four should have been available for daily

overflights. On many occasions, however, only two were serviceable.

An effort was made to improve the EC-47 program by adding 7 more to raise

the total force to 40 aircraft and the number of daily flights to 20

but this project never materialized. Actually, with the enemy's new air

defense capabilities in the South, only RU/JU-21s could operate over

enemy-controlled areas thanks to their altitude of up to 26,000 ft. and

their speed of 180 knots versus an EC-47 altitude of 10,000 ft. and speed .

of 120 knots. Communist countermeasures were another obstacle to ARDF.

Once an EC-47 entered a target zone, it took five to ten minutes to pick

up radio signal and three lines of bearing (LOB) had to be obtained for

a target fix. In the wake of the cease-fire the Communists frequently

used 2- to 5-watt radios with very short ranges which, added to the

rugged features of mountain and forest terrain, made intercept very difficult. In addition, they used FM voice communications which the EC-47

could not pick up as it was not equipped for DF/FM voice intercept. The

Communists also used landlines whenever they could. A comparison in

1974 based strictly on the number of aircraft dedicated to ARDF would

show that the capability for this type of mission had dropped to about

1/3 of the 1972 capability. Moreover, each flight was reduced from eight

hours to five. Furthermore, a situation which received very little attention prevailed during the period from late 1973 onward. In the face

of increasing costs of living, military pay remained stationary and (,—-

therefore military personnel had to reduce their consumption of nutrients.

As a result, their productivity dropped markedly after three flight hours.

Five ground stations at I-hu Bai, Pleiku, Song Mao, Vung Tau and

Can Tho constituted the backup for the ARDF program. The HFDFs, with *?rr*r

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their high frequency direction finders (HFDF), did not produce effective

results; however, they were useful in locating target areas for ARDF

coverage. These centers were equipped with AN/TRD-15s which were not as

advanced as the AN/TRD-23s. There were only 80 such direction finders

against 120 authorized, and by late 1974 only 50 were operational. To C

replace them would have required funding and a delay of a year from the

date of order to date of delivery.

While PHOTINT encountered numerous obstacles resulting from US

troop withdrawals, the obstacles were minimal in the area of HUMINT.

Before leaving, the 525th Military Intelligence Group had transferred

to Unit 101 and MSS all transferrable equipment, including 17 radioteletypes. It had also trained 50 NCOs for five weeks to replace

personnel of the 504th Signal Detachment in operating these radio sets.

To improve Unit 101 intelligence reporting, an automatic data processing

(ADP) program was set up which provided for the encoding of intelligence

information reports (IIR). The 525th also trained a key puncher for two

weeks and experimented with encoding Detachment 69's IIRs. However, the "v

CICV computer had been removed and Unit 101 had to use the ADP facilities

of JGS. Shortage of qualified personnel to run this program caused it

to make no further progress. After the cease-fire the US representative

was a member of the 500th MI Group's Special Activities in Thailand.

This group continued to fund Unit 101's operations. Bilateral operations

of the pa=' w2re now conducted solely by Unit 101 personnel. However,

from a icnnical point of view, these personnel had by then become

extremely proficient and the results showed no negative effects of a

change to unilateral operation. On the contrary, unilateral operations

gave them opportunities to test new methods. Furthermore, the 525th MI

Group left barracks and quarters which provided more housing for Unit

101 families, thereby boosting its personnel morale.

Generally speaking, the cease-fire entailed a substantial reduction of intelligence sources and collection means, particularly PHOTINT

means. Those difficulties of a financial nature could not be resolved

because funds were just not available. This was why efforts to overcome PHOTINT limitations could not succeed though many projects had

140

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1 • • I • • . • 11

been formulated. An objective of this plan was -.o create voice intercept teams at the Sector level. Sector S-2's were to be tasked to activate and control such teams. In addition to Divisional Communications

Intelligence Detachments which had been operational for some time, there

were created additional detachments for those divisions whose tactical

or territorial responsibilities required more coverage such as the Airbone and the 23d Infantry Division. This effort, however, still failed

to provide coverage of the entire territory and meet the needs of the

sectors. In mid-1973, pilot sector intercept teams were set up in Binh

Dinh, MR 2, and Quang Tin, MR 1. Personnel of these teams were selected

from the sectors and their S-2 staffs and equipment consisted of AN/PRC25s or captured enemy radios. Thanks to enemy codes previously captured

in their local areas, these teams gradually succeeded in intercepting

and decoding most radio communications between enemy Local Force units

and in some cases between enemy Main Forces. This experiment was very

successful and the equipment required no additional costs.

In late 1973 sector S-2s nationwide were directed to organize similar

radio intercept teams after the experience of the above two sectors had

been studied for good points and shortcomings. Not all sectors enjoyed

similar successes, though, because such efforts depended on the sector commander's attitude toward organization not sanctioned by TOEs, his personal

interest in radio intercept, and in case such a team was created, the

ability of the team to break the enemy code. Overall, the efforts produced a significant volume of information which made them worthwhile considering the minimal investment in personnel and equipment. However,

an internal problem developed from the J-7 belief that such intercept

practices would eventually jeopardize J-7•s own operations. J-7 thought

that failure to give S-2 personnel specialized training would lead them

to make mistakes which would expose their intercept operations to the

enemy and thereby cause the enemy to take preventive measures. An agreement was finally reached which called for J-7 specialists to provide

technical advice to sector radio intercept teams if deemed necessary, and

141

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'.•.".•.' -i-i-ii' * ••••-• »-•-«•——7- •—T-7- -r ~- -. ^ -. '-\—---- - -- - -i

information acquired by these teams would be passed to local J-7 technical detachments.

In the field of HUMINT, new measures were applied to Unit 101.

First, to ensure adequate response to the unit's primary mission of collecting strategic intelligence, agents were screened to reduce the number

of sources whose experience was limited to tactical intelligence. Those

thus terminated were transferred to sectors or sub-sectors which had

indicated a need for them. This measure helped economize personnel and

funds for better support to strategic intelligence collection. Prior

to reducing its agents, Unit 101 produced an estimated 1,500 IIRs monthly

from its 92 intelligence nets. This massive production was precisely

the reason analysts found it hardly possible to evaluate and follow up

on the information reported. As a result of the new measure, the number

of collection nets was reduced by an estimated 10% to 80 but there remained a substantial number of agents. Selection then took place in

the form of immediate termination of those individuals found guilty of

feeding the unit falsified information. The next step was to place the

101 collection detachments under the technical control and guidance of

the corps G-2s. This was beneficial in terms of planning, employment

and evaluation, and gave the detachments increased support from their

respective corps G-2s. Unit 101 was tasked with tapping enemy landlines

but never succeeded because the targets were usually located in fighting

areas and, the unit did not have compact, concealable equipment to perform

these operations.

Radipteletype equipment transferred from the 525th to Unit 101 were

in turn loaned out to corps and division G-2s for their communications

with J-2, JGS and Unit 101 in Saigon. From the very beginning J-2 did

not have a specialized communications system such as the ones enjoyed

by MSS and J-7. Repeated proposals for establishing a specialized communications system for the Military Intelligence Branch were turned down

because, it was claimed, equipment was not available. Information

transmitted through common-user communications channels usually experienced a delay of at least 48 hours. To ensure expeditious exchange

of information, J-6, JGS and the Signal Department provided special

142

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support to help J-2, JGS establish hot lines for direct communications

with corps G-2s and the G-2s of divisions whose areas of responsibility

were experiencing increased tactical pressure. Field-grade officers

from J-2 were detached to corps and division G-2s to expedite the

routing of information over this communication system. Intelligence

and tactical information reports were thus dispatched immediately after

they had been made available.

Conclusions

Prior to the cease-fire, intelligence information acquired by the

various units was usually sent by US advisers through secure US communications channels to USMACV which in turn passed it to J-2, JGS. This

was faster than using regular Vietnamese channels. After the cease-fire,

the DAO Intelligence Branch had representatives at corps level only.

These were assigned as staff members of the US consulate general in each

military region.

At JGS and DAO HQ, coordination was extremely good because it was

based on practical considerations, openness, and mutual trust. Credit

for successful cooperation must be given to Colonel William E. LeGro

DAO Chief, Intelligence Branch, a true professional with broad experience

and a very dedicated man. Daily meetings between the two sides were

held to exchange information, discuss the situation, coordinate require- \-\

ments, and divide responsibilities, particularly in the area of PHOTINT. *VV

'.--'.•

Though data were picked up by J-7, the interpretation of Communist unit

relationships and subordination required assistance from the US side *___

because J-7 could not relate call signs to specific Communist units,

particularly those in North Vietnam or those recently infiltrated from -'-'

North Vietnam. Daily and weekly intelligence summaries were exchanged

regularly between J-2, JGS and the DAO Intelligence Branch. Every month . :

the DAO Intelligence Branch conducted situation briefings which wer? 'V[

of special interest to the Vietnamese side, particularly in terms ol

information on North Vietnam and infiltration-related activities. Because it did not have enough personnel, the DAO Intelligence Branch '-J.

143

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limited its own activities to current intelligence and situation estimates and did not compile intelligence studies. In contrast, J-2, JGS

made it a special effort to conduct studies on the enemy and was noted

for its achievements in the areas of: Communist military doctrine;

Communist strategic and tactical courses of action; artillery; communications; engineers; armor; messenger services; sappers; and Communist

base areas.

In summary, the cease-fire saw the US side drastically reduce field

collection activities since direct needs no longer existed. DAO intelligence requirements had to compete for priority with intelligence

requirements in other areas of Southeast Asia. On the Vietnamese side,

PHOTINT was substantially reduced but this was compensated in part by

increased efforts in COMINT. Quantitative reduction of combat intelligence

was offset by qualitative improvements and revamping of collection agent

networks. Close coordination between Vietnamese and US intelligence agencies

also helped intelligence respond effectively to the needs of the situation

from the cease-fire to the very last day.

144

--•*•<-•"• '•-•'•-•"•-1 i-'^-V' -- --'. . -- — — - - -- -' -- • i. ».,• » >•»••-
—; —. -s . J » • ». •»—-•: -••• •—T—»—•» -w -

CHAPTER VI

Successes and Failures of ARVN Intelligence

The 1968 General Offensive

When the Communists launched their General Offensive against

cities across South Vietnam in 1968, including Saigon and Hue, almost

everybody agreed that it was a total surprise. The general populace

of South Vietnam felt that the intelligence establishment had failed

to discover the enemy scheme. Moreover, casting the blame on intelligence was partially justified. Any military offensive must be preceded by preparations. There was no reason why an offensive of such

proportions should have entirely escaped the prying eyes and ears of

every intelligence agent. Strange as it may seem, no one reproved US

intelligence for this common failure, but they did reprove the United

States. One widespread popular Vietnamese belief at that time was that

the United States had entered into a tacit agreement with the Communists to let them proceed with a military action designed to bring about

a quick political solution for the war.

On the RVN side, no timely warnings were issued nor was there any

indication that an enemy action was imminent. Two days before the outbreak of the offensive, there was a decision to reduce the Tet truce

from 48 to 36 hours and to confine 50% of troops to barracks. However,

at the time the Communists began their attacks, on the second day of

Tet, most ARVN garrison units were left with only a scant 10 to 20% of

their combat strength. The majority of the troops were absent to celebrate

Tet with their families. President Thieu himself was not in Saigon; he

was quietly celebrating Tet in My Tho, home of his wife's family. Intelligence had failed; there was no question about it. What concerned many people

145

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I - • • I •"• • I ' - » . • -. • I- • . • - .» ' - •j. — - • i • •".. •.' • ' •» .»—» * ' '.»—•-."-•—• • ."_ „• .-. :-_ .

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146

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in retrospect was to what extent intelligence had failed, and how

the Communists had gone about preparing for their general offensive.

To put the event into its proper perspective, an examination of \.-"-'.

the military situation in 1967 is deemed necessary. This was a period

of relative stability; the security picture displayed throughout rural

areas was truly bright. Our two-pronged strategy of "pacification and ^ ^j

saarch-and-destroy" inflicted important losses on the enemy. On the

battlefield, major engagements took place only in border areas such

as south of the DMZ, west of the Central Highlands, and the northeast

of MR-3. The first indicator of a general offensive was an enemy document captured from the CT-5 Division in March 1967 which revealed a

planned attack against Saigon. This plan of attack was so primitive

and so ingenuous that intelligence experts simply disregarded it as

Utopian. Then, some time in early October, the RVN intelligence

establishment learned about the content of Resolution No. 13 issued

by North Vietnam's Labor Party Central Committee. The resolution

called for large-scale offensive attacks designed to bring about victory within a short time. At about the same time, another captured

enemy document belonging to the Armor Section of COSVN, code-named

Detachment 16, mentioned an enemy effort to train his troops in sapper

techniques and the use of captured ARVN tanks. Then late in November,

another captured document dated 1 September 1967 and bearing the title,

"New Mission, New Tasks" revealed among other things that the new objectives now coveted were to terminate the American presence in Vietnam and a coalition government. The document also disclosed that the

conduct of the offensive was basically a triple effort: military,

political, and proselyting action, to be launched in conjunction with

a general popular uprising, hence its code-name TCK-TKN (abbreviations

used in the document for general offensive—general uprising). Two

other captured documents again pointed specifically toward a general

offensive. The first one, a document of the B-3 Front headquarters

captured in Dakto (MR-2) in October 1967 spoke about large-scale

preparations being made for the 1968 Winter-Spring Campaign. The

second document, captured in Quang Tin, during the same month was most

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specific of all. It said in effect: "It is about time we proceeded

with the general offensive and general uprising. By utilizing

military units in coordination with the uprising movement of the popular mass, we will attack all provincial capitals and district towns

and eventually liberate the capital."

Thus during 1967, the number of captured documents was substantial

and indicated a large military move. In addition to the documents

specified above, there were several other piecemeal documents mentioning combat tactics in cities, a kind of tactic heretofore never subjected to discussion or training by the enemy.

Aside from documents, our intelligence also learned about an

enemy effort to reorganize his territorial command and control, particularly in his MR-4 or Saigon — Cholon MR and his Tri Thien Hue MR. As

of September 1967, the enemy MR-4 was reorganized into five sub-regions

centered on Saigon which in turn was divided into five areas or sectors.

At that time the significance of this enemy reorganization effort was

unclear. Only after the offensive was launched did we know that it

was part of the attack plan. Each of the five sub-regions was responsible for the offensive effort against a related target area of Saigon.

On 17 November 1967, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam

proposed a seven-day truce for the Tet holidays which began in late

January 1968. This was advanced at the same time with the three-day

truce proposed for Christmas and New Year. The truce proposal was

immediately interpreted by our intelligence officers as an enemy move

to take advantage of the truce to increase his logistic movements prior

to a major offensive. With all the intelligence data gathered, and in

the light of the documents captured, it was evident that the enemy

was preparing for a major offensive campaign. Our intelligence apparatus

correctly estimated this move but its attention was directed toward the

areas usually considered strategically important such as Khe Sanh. The

probability of Khe Sanh becoming a decisive contest objective like Dien

Bien Phu in 1954 was foremost in the minds of our intelligence analysts.

Little attention, if any, was given to the cities as probable objectives.

The timing of the enemy offensive was also estimated as more likely to

occur sometime after Tet than before.

147

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' ur.' IF—F ••*. !•" »'.»'.*•'"•'•»—».-.•«-••»—• -. -.—^———7-r——•—-tIn early January 1968, another enemy document was captured in II CTZ.

This was Combat Order No. 1 detailing a plan of attack on Pleiku city

some time before Tet.

On 28 January 1968, during a raid conducted in Qui Nhon city, the

local MSS arrested 11 Communist cadres of the city local force together

with two pre-recorded tapes. The tapes contained a proclamation inciting the population to rise up against the government and announcing

that in addition to the occupation of Binh Dinh province, the "Vietnamese

forces struggling for Peace and Unification" were also in control of

Saigon, Hue and Da Nang. The captured cadres declared that Communist

forces were going to launch an attack against Qui Nhon city and certain

others during the Tet period.

On the same day, G-2 of III Corps discovered the concentration of an

enemy force consisting of 1 artillery and 2 infantry regiments in an area

north of Bien Hoa. Then the next day, 29 January, the local population

of Ho Nai district, Bien Hoa province, reported the appearance of a

Communist unit in an area adjacent to the district headquarters itself.

During the night, guards on duty at III Corps Headquarters discovered an

enemy armed reconnaissance team and shot down one team member at the gate.

In Can Tho, Communist sappers disguised as tourists were apprehended

by the police while they were looking for rooms in a hotel.

At 2100 hours on 30 January 1968, troops of a RF battalion manning

positions on the defense belt of Saigon captured an enemy soldier armed

with an AK-47 rifle. He disclosed that Communist forces were going to

attack Saigon city, Tan Son Nhut airport, the Joint General Staff, and the

Saigon radio station at 0300 hours on 31 January. Then at 2130 hours,

another Communist soldier was captured at Phu Nhuan (in Saigon) with two

AK-47's of the collapsible stock model.

At exactly 0300 hours on 31 January 1968, or the second day of Tet

(Year of the Monkey, lunar calendar), the enemy general offensive broke

out.

Those were the intelligence data collected in a chronological sequence

that pertained to the 1968 general offensive. Through these data alone,

the enemy scheme of a general offensive was evident.

148

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Other data of significance could have proved helpful in intelligence

analysis and situation estimates during that time, but they were overlooked

or not given proper attention. There was for example the appearance of

new Communist weapons such as the modern AK-47 rifle and RPG-2 (B-40)

rocket launcher. The existence of such weapons was regarded by our intelligence experts as part of a normal modernization process and not

particularly significant. Then a rapid succession of enemy attacks against

district towns in III and IV CTZs, to include an attack on the city of My

Tho, failed to raise any suspicion of an abnormal effort by the enemy.

The attack on Loc Ninh district town in Binh Long province, north of Saigon,

on 29 October 1967 was particularly significant since it was conducted by

forces of the CT-9 Division, reinforced by 2 regiments of the CT-7 Division

and artillery units. The enemy succeeded, despite heavy losses, in occupying this district town which they held for some time. The significance of

these enemy actions was somehow lost to our intelligence experts. Only

sometime after the Tet general offensive had begun did it dawn on them

that all these attacks were conducted with the purpose of testing the

effectiveness of combat tactics used against cities and towns and probing

the reactions of the United States and the RVN.

The "Happy Tet" poem by Ho Chi Minh that Radio Hanoi repeatedly

broadcast for some time before Tet was also a significant indicator that

failed to draw the attention of our intelligence experts. For one thing,

it had become a habit of the North Vietnam leader to address Happy Tet

wishes to the North Vietnamese population every year. For another, words

of exhortation to victory were nothing new in Communist propaganda jargon.

What our intelligence experts failed to detect was the meaning that something new would happen this coming Tet and that it was going to be entirely different from previous years. The significance of Ho's short poem as

a signal for preparations and attack was later confirmed by several enemy

prisoners and returnees.

In brief, the information on hand was clear enough. There could be

no mistake about its implication and meaning. It is much easier in

retrospect to see the enemy general offensive coming out loud and clear

against city targets. What made our intelligence experts ignore the

149

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enemy plan was simply that they were all convinced, out of prejudice

and pride, that the enemy did not possess the capability, and that

it would be sheer foolishness for the enemy to attempt to attack our

cities. Such reasoning is understandable. Clearly, it is in line

with the military intelligence theory that only capabilities are real

and valid for estimate purposes; intentions are vague at best, hence not

valid. It was precisely because of this theory that our intelligence

experts overlooked the most basic thing in the analysis procedure,

a synthesis of all pertinent data, in this case of the data in hand on

offensives against cities. Such a synthesis could have been used

to see if the threat of a general offensive was real or how probable

it was. At the very least, there would have been requirements for

additional intelligence data or some advance warnings to the military

leadership.

However, our military leaders would not have believed such a probability if they had been warned. Given the optimistic mood prevailing

in domestic and American politics at the time, they were all elated about

military gains and generally held the view that a military victory would

materalize in the not too distant future. The intelligence establishment

was heavily influenced by such optimistic prospects and its tendency to

echo the official line was understandable. The important lesson under

such circumstances is that the intelligence community should make every

effort to provide a highly professional estimate based on all available

information even though this estimate might be unpopular and irritate

some leaders.

As a matter of fact, there did exist some intelligence analysts who

were really concerned about information available. However, they

persisted in thinking in a Phase I, II, III manner. During 1967 the

general tendency of enemy activities was still confined to Phase I of

Communist strategy which was essentially defensive. To pass onto the

Phase III, which was the general offensive phase, they thought that

the enemy had to proceed through Phase II which was a holding phase

characterized by limited contested actions. But our error was the

assumption that the enemy military effort at the end of 1967 was still

150

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I • . • | • | - • '".-".- • • * • • • ' • ' ".—•—•—T—-:—•—"r— --._••-• T ;-• nin Phase I. In reality, judging by the mobile form of warfare which the

enemy had been conducting for some time, he had already passed on to

Phase II, although this transition had been gradual.

A major shortcoming of Vietnamese intelligence during this pre-Tet

period, which contributed to its failure to predict the Tet offensive, was

the total lack of coordination among its multifarious agencies. Each

intelligence seemed to be interested only in its own activities as an independent organization. The exchange of information was formal, if any,

and generally untimely. No one agency had real authority in intelligence

or was qualified to serve as a clearing house uniquely responsible for

intelligence production. The coordination between RVN and US intelligence

agencies was also slack and piecemeal. Forty-eight hours before the

general offensive began, US forces were placed on general alert. It was

apparent that US intelligence was concerned and took no chances. On the

RVN side, ARVN Corps Commands were also issued a warning by JGS as to

the possibility of an enemy offensive but apparently the warning came

too late for any effective preparations. It was in fact issued on New

Year Day, barely sixteen hours before the outbreak of the first attack.

The 1968 Tet general offensive was a sobering event for the Vietnamese

intelligence establishment. Many of its deficiencies were exposed and it

was able to learn many invaluable lessons. First, it was learned that in

an ideological war such as the Vietnamese conflict, political considerations almost always outweighed tactical considerations. Experience shows

that even though the enemy might sometimes lack the military capabilities

for an offensive, he still went ahead with this offensive against all

odds if there was a certain political goal to be achieved. One lesson

was that the search for enemy intentions was also important. Second, it

was learned that the enemy always tried to achieve the element of tactical

surprise for each new major effort by the employment of new weapons or

weapon systems. The tactic to be used was also usually tested prior to

launching the offensive. Another invaluable lesson learned by the intelligence officer wasche should be truthful, unbiased, and should never try

to please his superiors by interpreting facts under a light they favored

or in the way they wished.

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The first phase of the 1968 general offensive also helped the RVN

intelligence establishment to learn more about the enemy. Unprecedented

numbers of prisoners, returnees, and important captured documents contributed toward deepening our knowledge on the enemy's strategy and

policies. As a result, we knew well in advance every detail about the

follow-up phase of his offensive, even the exact time of the first attack,

which began on 5 May 1968. This was due to our agent sources within

enemy ranks. In addition to information on the enemy campaign, these

sources also divulged the difficulties that COSVN was facing, particularly

the deteriorating morale of Communist units. At the same time, high ranking returnees contributed much invaluable information on the enemy's internal situation.

The general offensive of 1968 resulted in a very significant military

defeat for the enemy. He had thought that he could achieve a quick military victory by going all out against our major cities and population

centers. He had hoped that the population would rise up and give him a

hand, but none of these things had happened. At the cost of thousands of

lives, he must have realized that his strategy did not work. Within just

a few months after the defeat, COSVN fe]t compelled to issue in rapid

succession three major policy documents, Resolution No. 8, Addendum to

Resolution No. 8, and Resolution No. 9, justifying the military defeat and

explaining the need for a change in strategy, all in self-serving propagandists style. If anything, these documents showed to what extent the

morale of enemy troops had been shattered and revealed the disarray of his

units. But the political gains the enemy obtained through his general

offensive apparently led to the disengagement of US forces and the initiation of the Vietnamization program. Operations which revealed progress in

Vietnamization,such as the cross-border incursions into Cambodia in 1970

and into lower Laos in 1971,were among the many causes that compelled the

enemy to launch his general offensive of Summer 1972.

152

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The 1972 Easter Offensive

In early December 1971, information concerning a Communist general

offensive during 1972 was already being obtained and recorded. In contrast to the previous experience of 1968, the first information gathered

on the enemy preparations in North Vietnam was detected and made available to me by the J-2 of MACV. It was learned that North Vietnamese

general reserve divisions, after a prolonged campaign in lower Laos

during 1971, were redirected to North Vietnam where they went through a

process of replenishment and refitting and were preparing to move south.

From a strategic viewpoint, the probability of an enemy general offensive

during 1972 made sense since it was a presidential election year in the

United States. The enemy apparently anticipated the internal difficr ties

that the US was going to face during the election year. He surmised that

these difficulties would give him favorable opportunities. During 1971

foreign aid to North Vietnam had increased substantially and its level was

only a little less than during 1967. Based on lessons learned during 1968,

this increase in foreign aid level was unmistakably an indication of a

general offensive. Battles fought in lower Laos early in 1971 confirmed

the fact that Communist forces had received quantities of deadly new

weapons such as artillery field guns and howitzers of 100-mm, 130-mm and

152-mm, T-34 and T-54 tanks, SA-2 anti-air missiles, etc. With the new

deployment and disposition of NVA general reserve divisions in South Vietnam,

it was estimated that the general offensive would take place in three

specific areas: Tri Thien — Hue in MR-1, Kontum — Pleiku in MR-2 and lay

Ninh in MR-3. It was estimated, that the enemy's tactical approach would

be concentrated on a few key objectives in each military region instead of

encompassing all objectives throughout the country. The timing for the

offensive was estimated to be some time during March 1972.

Such was, in general terms, the intelligence estimate concerning the

enemy 1972 general offensive, which was issued in mid-January 1972 as a

result of an ever increasing flow of data. The exact time frame for this

offensive was still under debate at that time. It was estimated that

153

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March would be the best time as far as the enemy was concerned because

during the dry season, which had begun in October the previous year,

enemy supplies were moved in great quantities into South Vietnam. By

the end of February, it was estimated, these supplies would have reached

COSVN and been distributed to units under its control in MR-3 and MR-4.

Since the 1968 memory was still fresh, the assumption was that the enemy

would chose not to strike during the Tet holidays but probably before

or after.

Late in February 1972, President Thieu paid a visit to ARVN major

units, during which he presented his Happy Tet greetings to the troops.

The places that he visited almost coincided with the probable objectives

of the enemy offensive. It appeared as if his itinerary had been selected on purpose: Dong Ha and Hue in MR-1, Dakto, Tan Canh, Le Minh and

Binh Dinh in MR-2. The visit was also intended to provide the president

an opportunity to review the military situation with his field commanders

in the face of the coming general offensive and particularly to assess

the concern of our troops regarding the use of 130-mm artillery by the

enemy against the area south of the DMZ. But enemy tanks and their probable use in the offensive did not give rise to any appreciable concern

among our field commanders. Apparently they thought that, with the US

tremendous airpower, enemy tanks would be sitting ducks.

On 19 February 1972, information was obtained concerning instructions

passed from High Command Hanoi to Headquarters B-3 Front. Subsequently,

some of these instructions were passed on by this headquarters to its

subordinate divisions and provinces. The indications were clear enough

and led both US and the RVN intelligence authorities to the conclusions

that the enemy was going to launch his general offensive immediately

after the truce, probably on the 5th day of Tet. In Vietnamese intelligence eyes, this date was of particular significance since it was the day

selected by Emperor Quang Trung to launch his famous military march north

to defeat the Chiang in 1788.

As a result, a general alert was issued to units throughout the

country. But the enemy changed his plans and chose not to strike on that •.--""•

date. It was unclear to the RVN intelligence as to why there was such a

154
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countermand order. It was possible, however, to surmise that the postponement had some connection with President Nixon's visit to mainland

China from 21 to 28 February 1972. It was probable that China asked

for such a postponement because it did not want any misstep to spoil

the nascent US-China relationship.

Late in March 1972, information was obtained by J-7 of the JGS

that 29 March was to be the D-day of the general offensive. This information was disseminated to all ARVN units as a measure of precaution.

The 1972 Summer Offensive, as it became known to our side, broke

out at first in the DMZ area on 30 March 1972. Enemy 130-mm artillery

pieces positioned north of the DMZ concentrated their fire on all ARVN

outposts in the DMZ area. In a subsequent action, NVA general reserve

units moved across the Ben Hai river with the support of tanks. The

direction of attack during the enemy offensive in MR-1 was a surprise

to our field command. As a matter of fact, we had failed to predict

that the enemy would cross the DMZ and mount a frontal attack against

Gio Linh, Cam Lo and other outposts. It had been our assumption that

the enemy attack would be from the west instead of the north because

crossing the DMZ would be a blatant violation of the Geneva Accords.

The enemy firepower and forceful, all-out drive across the DMZ so

overwhelmed our advance positions that they were unable to report accurately the situation to the Headquarters of the 3d Division and I Corps.

As it turned out, up to three days after it was launched, the enemy

general offensive in MR-1 still failed to arouse any major concern in

Saigon.

The situation became serious when Communist forces infiltrated into

MR-3 from Cambodia and overran Loc Ninh on 4 April. Intelligence data

collected from a returnee and communication sources had pointed toward

Binh Long province as a major target area, but our own attention was

directed more toward Tay Ninh than Loc Ninh (a northernmost district

town of Binh Long province) because of Tay Ninh's political importance.

The enemy chose to attack Binh Long with two divisions, the CT-5 and

CT-9, with the support of tanks and with the CT-7 Division establishing

blocking positions on QL-13 between Chon Thanh and An Loc. The appearance

155

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of Communist tanks on the Binh Long front was claimed by the III Corps

commander to be a complete surprise. The tanks were instrumental in

the quick overrunning of Loc Ninh district town and the encirclement

of An Loc, provincial capital of Binh Long province. Information on

enemy tanks, however, had been reported by agent sources during the

ARVN operation at Krek and Chup in Cambodia as early as in December

1971. Those reports disclosed that there was a concentration of about

30 tanks, including PT-76s, T-34s and T-54s in the area of the Chup

plantation. Reports made at that time by the Cambodian local population to G-2, Republic of Khmer Forces General Staff also indicated

the same thing. But still our aerial photo reconnaissance failed to

produce any positive evidence. These reports on enemy tanks had been

disseminated three times to the III Corps Commander and his subordinate

division commanders. His claim of surprise was therefore unfounded.

When enemy tanks moved toward An Loc, two new types among them were

discovered: Chicom-make T-59s and some other models of the Russian

made BTR.

In MR-2, the enemy general offensive had already begun during March,

by drives against military strongpoints in the Truong Son mountain range

northwest of Kontum. The enemy main force conducting those attacks was

the 320th and NT-2 Divisions, whose presence had been detected by American

sources. Two ARVN Airborne brigades, deployed as reinforcement for II

Corps, had been engaged by enemy forces several times but it was not

ascertained as to whether these forces were part of the 320th Division.

Finally the II Corys commander promised to give a big reward to whichever

unit succeeded in capturing enemy prisoners needed to corroborate intelligence reports and identify enemy forces. One day later, an Airborne

battalion captured five enemy troops of the 320th Division and the next

day another four prisoners of the same division. The enemy pressure was

particularly heavy at Dakto and Tan Canh where the 22d ARVN Infantry

Division Headquarters was located. On 21 April, based on intelligence

reports, the enemy intention to attack the division headquarters became

evident. In the light of synthetized data on enemy movements, the

Division G-2 warned of an imminent tank-supported attack against the

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division headquarters, probably during the next two or three days.

But this enemy capability was rejected by the II Corps commander and

-\;' his American adviser. On 23 April, enemy PT-76 tanks moved in to

attack the 22d Division headquarters and overran it during the day.

During the first three months of the general offensive which

broke out almost simultaneously on three separate fronts, it was difficult to know which front was the enemy main effort. On all three

:"• fronts, intelligence collection was provided effectively by information

derived from all sources available, such as aerial photos, communi-

^^ cations intercept, and radio direction finding, in addition to combat

intelligence and agent sources. In fact, US — RVNAF intelligence forces •:

;.'> were so effective during this time that the movement of the 271st

Regiment was accurately followed from the DMZ area to Tay Ninh. After

*"*• the 271st Regiment was engaged by our forces in Tay Ninh, its identity

and other particulars were confirmed by prisoners and documents captured.

The loss of Quang Tri city on 1 May 1972 and the heavy casualties ':.-

suffered by forces of the 3d Division while retreating on what became Cj

known as the "Boulevard of Horror" toward Hue aggravated the situation *•"'

and endangered this city. The question pondered by intelligence experts

at that time was when Hue would be attacked. It had become evident that

_. should the enemy choose to attack Hue immediately, this city stood no •;.

chance of holding out, given the shattered morale of ARVN troops and the

.'.-* local population. The enemy's failure to advance onto Hue after Quang '.-•

Tri was regarded by many from hindsight as one of his major blunders, j£

* for he had squandered an invaluable opportunity to overrun this city.

The simple truth was that he had run out of his capabilities after taking

Quang Tri, although he was fully aware of the situation in Hue and willing

to take advantage of it. Through reports made by enemy units to higher

commands,it was learned that two regiments of the NVA 304th Division were

almost totally annihilated.

During the months that followed, battles continued to rage with

•>* fierceness despite a decrease in their number. In the meantime, at the

conference table in Paris, the positions held by the US and North Vietnam

were still light years away from each other. Based on a synthesis of

157

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intelligence data in mid-July 1972 J-2, JGS nevertheless predicted

quite accurately that a cease-fire was in the making and would

probably materialize sometime during November 1972. The cease-fire,

it was also foreseen, would be a stand-still arrangement leading to

a situation of "leopard skin" troop disposition and calling for the

creation of a national council of reconciliation and concord, the

transitional step toward an eventual coalition government. The

fact that a cease-fire was in the making became evident in the light

of stepped up orders issued by the enemy to make a census of RVNAF

prisoners* and to search for detailed information on his own personnel

that were detained by the RVN, including names. Information on the

date of the cease-fire became clearer in early October 1972, and up

to one month before it actually became effective, our intelligence

had gathered much data on an enemy scheme to take advantage of the

cease-fire.

The cease-fire of 28 January 1973 was a new page in the history

of the Vietnam war, and brought about new challenges for the RVN.

The Post-Cease-Fire Period

Whatever the viewpoint, the Paris Agreement of 28 January 1973 came

about as a real turning-point of the war in Vietnam. It brought about

a temporary and uncertain peace. But how long would this peace last and

how soon would the war resume and under what form? Was it going to be a

coventional general offensive of the 1972 type or was it to be a combined

military-political effort in which military pressure was used as a leverage to force the RVN to comply with political solutions conceived and

advanced by the Communists? Those were the questions that arose because

resumption of war was foreseen as inevitable, regardless of its form.

But the vital question that preoccupied the RVN was the matter of time:

When?

The first information that helped confirm the eventuality of war

resumption was provided by our own prisoners, who had been released by

158

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North Vietnam and gathered the information on their way south. In North

Vietnam, they reported, the mandatory military service was still as

effective as ever and North Vietnamese cadres never believed that

there would be true peace. The official party line was particularly

clear as to the meaning of peace and the Paris Agreement. As it was

explained by Van Tien Dung and To Huu during their visits to Communist

units in South Vietnam in March 1973, and later reported by enemy

prisoners and returnees, the Paris Agreement was but a pause, a stopover rest on the long journey toward conquering the south. The idea

of a stopover rest stemmed from a practical policy espoused by Truong

Chinh which, as has been mentioned in Chapter I, was aimed at buying

time for North Vietnam to reorganize and refit its own forces while

continuing to attrite the adversary forces by military action.

As a matter of fact, two plans were implemented simultaneously by

the Communists during that time. The first plan pertained to the

implementation of the Paris Agreement whereby, based on and taking advantage of the legalistic aspect of the Agreement, the Communists

would take up a political struggle to achieve political gains. This

amounted to demanding twelve basic freedom rights for the people of

South Vietnam, to include the right of movement. To achieve this goal,

the Communists felt they should demonstrate to the Vietnamese people,

particularly the South Vietnamese populace, the attractiveness of life

under their regime. Among other things, they believed they ought to

show that Communist living conditions under a Communist regime were

adequately comfortable and not in any way inferior to those found in

South Vietnam. As a result, Dong Ha, formerly a RVN district town, was

transformed into a modern city intended both as an unofficial capital

for the PRG and a model of Communist-run cities. It mushroomed overnight with pre-fabricated buildings, was provided with electricity and

running water, and was even adorned with a public transportation system

of some 30 brand new buses. The first aerial photo taken of Dong Ha,

which revealed the presence of these buses, took our intelligence experts

by surprise because even in Hanoi, the capital of North Vietnam, there

were no buses of this type. Our conjecture at first was that the buses

154

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were needed to meet increasing demands in logistics transportation.

But subsequent information obtained from Dong Ha indicated otherwise.

The buses were ised to transport civilian passengers, which was something highly unusual but required to make up a showcase of Communist

modern living. The significance of the whole show became evident when

we learned about a Communist plan to induce people to return to their

home villages in the areas under their control and to attract those

living under government control to go over to their side. In the Dong

Ha market place! Red Chinese consumer goods were plentiful and con- I

spicuously displayed. '.-'/

At the same time, North Vietnam also introduced teachers, public

health workers and the administrative cadre into enemy-controlled areas

in order to assist in running those places. In MR-3, according to

agent sources, about 5,000 Vietnamese living in Cambodia had been coaxed

by the Communists to repatriate and settle in an area near Tay Ninh;

this information was later confirmed by enemy prisoners. For a long time

the NLF of South Vietnam had contemplated Tay Ninh as the future capital

for a Communist-controlled nation, because geographically it was adjacent

to War Zone C and the Cambodian border and politically, it was an important area where the Cao Dai temple was located. The enemy's plan of

"returning people to their home villages" was initiated at about the

same time with the "Land and Population Grab" plan which was designed to

wrest more control away from the RVN government. Those were the objectives

contained in Directive No. 2/73 that COSVN issued about one week before

cease-fire day. One month after the Paris Agreement went into effect,

COSVN issued another directive, No. 3/73, whose aim was to reassert the

five plans and objectives of struggle earmarked for the post cease-fire

period: military struggle, political struggle, proselyting of RVNAF

troops, development of combat forces and expansions of territory, and

legalistic implementation of the Paris Agreement. Through this directive,

the Communists still considered political struggle as the main effort

but they also strove to achieve a military balance in their favor by

developing a combat force larger and more powerful than the RVNAF.

L61

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Directive No. 3/73 was known to us only partially, however. Most of

the information came from various agent sources and piecemeal documents.

We came into possession of the complete text of the directive only after

a raid conducted by the Sector of Binh Thuan into an enemy base in May

1973.

During this period, two enemy troop movements took place simultaneously. On the one hand, general reserve units such as the 304th, 308th and

312th Divisions withdrew into North Vietnam to undergo refitting. On the

other hand, troop infiltrations continued their movement into South Vietnam, intended as local replacements and replenishments. In logistics,

the enemy initiated a campaign called "logistic general offensive" to

increase movement of supplies into South Vietnam, particularly into the

northern area of MR-1. Intelligence sources indicated that the first

campaign lasted 45 days. Later, aerial photos taken to confirm those

reports revealed that the amount of supplies brought south was so great

that much had to be stored in the open. Apparently additional warehouses

had not been built in time to store the increased influx of supplies.

The Joint Communique signed in Paris on 13 June 1973 did not bring

about any concrete results. Neither side was willing to make concessions,

and only paid lip service to enforcing a true cease-fire. Internationally,

meanwhile, several events of importance occurred, the most significant of

which, as far as the RVN was concerned, was the termination of US involvement in Cambodia. Domestically, some opposition movements came into the

open and were particularly active, such as the national reconciliation

movement, the anti-corruption movement, the famine relief movement, etc.

All these events spurred COSVN into issuing Directive No. 4 in September

1973. The entire text of this document was provided by an agent working

with the enemy. Its genuineness was recognized after being collated with

other sources. The purpose of COSVN Directive No. 4 was "to provide

guidance for military and political cadres, people's organizations and

party members in mobilizing the popular mass for a three-front struggle

against the South Vietnamese government, with particular attention given

to the violent force of the popular mass."

162

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Also during this time, the Sector of Lam Dong succeeded in enlisting the collaboration of an enemy provincial political commissar. This

political commissar, who later returned to our side, gave us a most

important revelation: the Communists were preparing a "strategic-raid"

type offensive in MR-1 whose objectives were Hue and Da Nang. North

Vietnam's Air Force, it was disclosed, would also be employed during

this offensive. The purpose of the enemy plan was to strike a forceful

military blow to achieve some accomplished facts and exert pressure for

political demands related to the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

By chance, an aerial photo taken over Laos revealed a reduced model of

an airfield constructed on the ground complete with airplanes parked in

revetments, landing strips, and control tower. Our intelligence experts

tried to match this model with configurations of airfields in Vietnam,

Laos and Cambodian, and discovered that the airfield model represented

exactly the structural configuration of Da Nang airfield. As to the

enemy's plan to employ the North Vietnamese Air Force in an offensive

in South Vietnam, it was learned as early as during the first week of

the 1972 Summer Offensive that North Vietnam had plans to conduct air

raids against Carroll base and Quang Tri city despite the absolute air

superiority enjoyed by both the US and the RVN Air Force over South

Vietnamese battlefields. The enemy strategic raid plan was later made

public by the RVN government in an effort both to denounce the Communist

scheme of making a mockery of the Paris Agreement and to forestall an

enemy military action that could result in grave consequences.

At the end of 1973, several Communist leaders openly hinted at a

strategy shift in South Vietnam. The new Communist strategy, it was

disclosed, purported to push hard with military activities and escalate

attacks in terms of target importance and forces committed. Communist

forces would concentrate now on more important targets such as district

towns and subsector headquarters instead of isolated outposts, and

would increase the size of their attacks to regimental level and above

with combined use of artillery, armor, and anti-aircraft weapons. This

strategy was affirmed by Resolution No. 21 of the North Vietnamese

Labor Party as a result of a session held in October 1973. Based on

163

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this guidance, COSVN developed Resolution No. 12 of its own, whose

existence became known to us in early 1974 but its entire text was not

available until March. According to this resolution, the Communists

admitted that never before in the war had their military forces in

South Vietnam been so strong and were in fact stronger than the RVNAF.

The resolution also indicated that military activities to be conducted

in the future would all be large scale actions but they would be consistent with a policy of flexibility, or skillful coordination between

military and political-diplomatic efforts. In other words, the

Communists contended that military actions should result in political

and diplomatic gains.

tforth Vietnam's assessment of its military might was not entirely

subjective or self-serving. On the contrary, it reflected quite

accurately the balance of forces between the two warring sides. For,

in addition to replacing losses incurred during the 1972 Summer Offensive,

the enemy also succeeded in increasing substantially his military potential,

particularly in terms of anti-aircraft weapons, armor and artillery. At

Khe Sanh, for example, SAM-2 anti-aircraft missiles were installed as soon

as the cease-fire went into effect. Other radar-controlled anti-aircraft

weapons, such as 37-mm and 57-mm guns, were deployed as far south as in

MR-3. (Map 3 ) There were more than 400 enemy tanks and armored vehicles

after replacements were received. (Map 4 ) Heavy artillery, such as

130-ram and 122-mm fieldguns, was introduced into the three-border area in

MR-2 and north of MR-3 in great quantities. (Map 5 ) Despite serious

limitations in aerial photo reconnaissance, our intelligence was able to

detect enemy tanks, either camouflaged under thatch roofs or while moving,

and able to detect the movements of 130-mm artillery guns from outside

the border into MR-3. This information constituted evidence of tremendous

infiltrations and logistical buildup during the post-cease-fire period.

Information provided by the US Defense Attache Office revealed that

Logistics Corps 559 and three of its subordinate units Logistics Divisions

470, 471 and 473, formerly operating on Laotian territory along the old

Ho Chi Minh trail, had moved inside South Vietnam to construct roads and

transport supplies along the newly opened Truong Son corridor. Other

164

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Logistical Divisions of Corps 559 meanwhile still continued operating

outside South Vietnam, Division 472 in lower Laos, and Division 571

at Ban Karai and Mu Gia Pass. The Truong Son corridor, or new Route

14, was now extended from North to South Vietnam and major targets

of enemy attacks all lay in those areas bearing upon the extension

work on this new road system. (Map 6) In addition, the enemy installed two separate fuel pipeline systems, one leading from North

Vietnam across the DMZ into MR-1 and terminating in Quang Nam province,

and the other running south from Laos into South Vietnam along the __

Cambodian border and reaching into Quang Due province in MR-3. (Map 7)

Data gathered on the characteristics of these pipelines were carefully

studied by our intelligence experts who found that they carried diesel

oil. This fact was confirmed by the end of 1974 when a long-range

reconnaissance team was sent into Quang Due province to destroy part ~

of the pipeline system. '-:

Implementing Resolution No. 21 of North Vietnam's Labor Party

and Resolution No. 12 of COSVN, enemy forces attacked and overran their «1—.

first target of importance, the Dakpek district town in Kontum Province, „ .

which was in effect the first district town lost to the enemy since the ."-".'-•

cease-fire. The enemy attack took place on 17 May 1974, and was an instant success. The lack of forceful reaction on the part of ARVN forces

appeared t^, stimulate and encourage the enemy to overrun in rapid succession

a series . f other district towns. The most significant enemy action was %"".-.".-

his attack on the Thuong Due district town in Quang Nam province in July

1974. This attack was significant not so much because of the economic

and demographic importance of the target area, which included the Nong

Son coal mine and a population of 20,000, but primarily because of a new

tactic employed by the enemy, a form of conventional, combined-arms *-".- *

mobile warfare. The enemy unit conducting this attack was the NVA 304tt

(-) Division which had been directly deployed from Quang Tri and joined

forces with the 29/324B Regiment which had moved north from Dakpek in

Kontum Province. The combined movements of these two units came about as

a complete surprise for the local field command because, in contrast with

the previous period, we were unable to detect them. In addition to these

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infantry formations, the enemy employed one artillery regiment and

one armor regiment. Intelligence failed however to provide accurately

the enemy's order of battle during this attack and the movement of

these forces to Quang Nam was a complete surprise to the local field

command.

The new mobile, combined-arms tactic was recorded as the first

instance of its employment by the enemy on a South Vietnamese battlefield. In the eyes of Vietnamese intelligence experts, it was reminiscent

of a lesson learned previously from the enemy's practice of testing a

tactic before actually using it in a major offensive. This mobile tactic

was also characteristic of the maneuvering concept espoused by Van Tien

Dung, NVA Chief of Staff. It obviously bore his personal mark. As a

result, it was surmised that he, instead of Vo Nguyen Giap, would be

tasked to direct a future general offensive effort in South Vietnam.

In October 1974, a returnee who belonged to a reconnaissance unit of

the CT-7 Division, disclosed that the enemy was planning to attack the

district towns of Phuoc Long Province which lay along QL-14 such as Don

Luan, Due Phong, and even the provincial capital itself. He also revealed that the CT-7 Division was tasked to conduct this offensive campaign

with the support of tanks and artillery. This information proved correct

and reliable, being later confirmed by communications intercept and agent

sources. It was also consistent with the enemy's advocated strategy of

escalating his military effort from attacks against isolated outposts to

attacks against district towns and then provincial capitals. The enemy

launched his initial efforts against Don Luan and Due Phong on 14 December

1974 and finally overran the Phuoc Long provincial capital on 6 January

1975.

The 1975 General Offensive

The enemy's preparation to reinfiltrate his general reserve divisions

from the North into South Vietnam was first made available to JGS

by DAO. It was revealed in November 1974 that the NVA 316th Division,

after its withdrawal from the Plain of Jars in Laos and after undergoing

180

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refitting and indoctrination in North Vietnam's MR-4, was the first

one ordered to move into South Vietnam. Another NVA division, the

341st, which had been disbanded since 1968, was now reactivated and

received the same orders. The NVA 312th, 338th and 320th Divisions

followed suit at a later time. New recruit training centers in North

Vietnam, especially those in MR-4, which had the specific mission of

training troops as replacements and were capable of accommodating 18

recruit battalions at any time, were ordered to cut down their training programs to two weeks just as had been done during the 1968 period.

In logistics activities, there were increased movements of supplies

and personnel into South Vietnam at the outset of the 1974 — 1975 dry

season which began in October. Long convoys, sometimes numbering more

than 200 vehicles, were sighted moving along the new infiltration route

which began in North Vietnam, extended along QL-9 into lower Laos via

Khe Sanh, then veered south toward the tri-border area in MR-2, and

from there toward COSVN headquarters. In addition, other vehicle movements

were also seen bringing men and supplies from the A Shau, A Luoi area

into Quang Nam, Quang Tin and Quang Ngai provinces in MR-1 and into

northern Binh Dinh province in MR-2.

Gradually, indications of a general offensive in the offing

became complete and evident. There was also a marked increase in enemy

proselyting actions directed toward RVNAF troops. The MSS in effect

succeeded in neutralizing an important enemy proselyting organization

operating in Saigon. Among enemy cadres apprehended, there were those

responsible for military dependents in the Saigon-Cholon area and those

specifically responsible for the general reserve units, the Airborne

Division, the Rangers and the Armor Corps. The year-end estimate of the

situation in 1974, issued by J-2, JGS observed that the Communists had

the capabilities to launch a general offensive of a scale and intensity

comparable to those of the 1972 Summer Offensive and that this offensive

could be sustained for as long as 18 months. The scope of the general

offensive, it was forecast, would be a compromise between the 1968 and

1972 campaigns, that is an effort encompassing both frontline offensives

and attacks against cities and provincial capitals. The most appropriate

. .

181

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time frame for this effort was estimated 25 March 1975 onward.

Not everybody believed this prediction. While there was general

agreement on the facts presented, a few people were of the opinion

that during 1975 there would be attacks of a major scale but short

of a general offensive. These individuals thought the general

offensive would probably take place in 1976, a US presidential election

year. The RVN military intelligence nevertheless stuck to the estimate

that 1975 would be the year, especially after several additional enemy

documents advocated the need to launch decisive attacks against major

cities such as Hue, Da Nang, Saigon and Can Tho. The enemy reasoned

that once these important cities were taken, others would follow suit.

By now in the Mekong Delta, an intelligence synthesis indicated

that the enemy's main effort was to attack and occupy Moc Hoa, provincial

capital of Kien Tuong, open an infiltration corridor leading from outside

the Cambodian border into his base in the Plain of Reeds, and interdict

movement on QL-4 between Saigon and Can Tho. But the CT-5 Division,

which was to carry out this scheme, was defeated by the ARVN 7th and 9th

Infantry Divisions.

With an aim to coordinate its general military effort, COSVN made

plans to attack Tay Ninh city with the CT-9 Division and elements of the

CT-5 Division, to be augmented in time "y newly infiltrated units. This

piece of intelligence was provided by an enemy agent and duly confirmed

by other sources. Politically, Tay Ninh was an important province because it was the seat of the Cao Dai sect and militarily it was a key

buffer zone between the Cambodian border and War Zone C and the Iron

Triangle. It had been coveted by the enemy for a long time. To counteract

this enemy move, III Corps deployed the entire 25th Infantry Division,

reinforced by one infantry regiment, the 81st Airborne Ranger Group, and

an armor brigade into Tay Ninh. The engagement broke out on 10 March

1975 and led to the loss of a string of outposts located along the western

bank of the East Vam Co river, west of Tay Ninh province. But the 6th

Regiment of the enemy CT-5 Division suffered heavy losses during this

battle. Southeast of Tay Ninh, Tri Tarn district town and the Michelin

plantation were also attacked and overrun by the CT-9 Division. The CT-9

182

•MMMMMMI
I—T. HD-A132 112 INTELLIGENCE INDOCHINA MONOGRflPHS(U) ARMY CENTER OF

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Division then joined forces with three local battalions in a subsequent

move to cut off QL-22 and interdict traffic between Tay Ninh and Saigon.

The CT-9 Division failed in this effort, however, and QL-22 was finally

cleared by friendly forces. North of Tay Ninh, enemy pressure was

particularly threatening after Ba Den mountain had been occupied. The

enemy then moved his artillery pieces into mountain caves which had been

transformed into invulnerable firing positions by his engineers. Tay

Ninh city was thus directly threatened by enemy artillery fire. The

mounting enemy pressure was such that the Cao Dai Church was compelled

to issue a statement declaring that its Temple was a neutral zone and

asking both sides to stop military actions in this area.

The enemy's main effort, however, was directed toward MR-2. Since

early February 1975, contact had been lost with the NVA 320th Division

which usually operated in the Due Co area west of Pleiku. While efforts

were being made to search for the whereabouts of this major enemy unit,

an enemy cadre division was preparing to move south to launch an attack

against Ban Me Thuot, to interdict QL-14 at the joint boundary of Pleiku

and Ban Me Thuot provinces by attacking the district town of Thuan Man,

and to mount ambushes at the Buon Blech Pass to interdict our relief

efforts from Pleiku. The returnee also disclosed that this attack would

be supported by tanks and artillery and that the 320th Division was under

strict orders to conceal its movement toward Ban Me Thuot. Among other

things reported by this returnee, it was learned that enemy troops and

cadres were not informed of the geographical names of transit locations

and that movements were to be made only during hours of darkness. The

320th Division also exercised complete radio silence while moving.

After the loss of Ban Me Thuot, an enemy prisoner disclosed an interesting detail concerning the enemy's attempt at deceiving our intelligence effort. To keep its movement secret, the 320th Division left behind its command radio station at Due Co which continued to transmit while

the division was slipping away. In fact, this deception served no useful

purpose. For a long time our EC-47 airplanes had not dared to venture in

this area because of heavy enemy anti-aircraft fire. The objective thus

selected by the enemy for this offensive—Ban Me Thuot—turned out to be

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an entirely new one since his usual objectives in MR-2 were Kontura and

Pleiku. Despite efforts by several reconnaissance units injected in

the area between Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot to look for the 320th Division,

its whereabouts was still unknown. But through many interrogation

sessions, our returnee proved to be sincere. As a result, G-2, II Corps

concluded in his estimate that Ban Me Thuot was going to be the target

of the new enemy offensive. At about this time, in Binh Dinh province,

intelligence sources of the 22d Infantry Division revealed that the entire enemy NT-3 (Gold Star) Division was concentrating its forces in an

attempt to interdict QL-19 at Binh Khe and An Tue and that this effort

might last up to 3 months. Other sources from Nha Trang reported that

QL-21 would be interdicted between Nha Trang and Ban Me Thuot. All these

data clearly pointed toward an enemy plan of offensive whose initial move

was to cut off all lines of communication around Ban Me Thuot in order to

I

isolate it before conducting the main attack.

This was the intelligence estimate presented to the II Corps fcommander,

but for some reason he did not believe the enemy would attack Ban Me Thuot.

The defense of Ban Me Thuot was nevertheless reinforced by the 53d Infantry

Regiment and the Tactical Command Post of the 23d Infantry Division. The

city, up to that time, had been defended only by territorial forces. In

the meantime, our intelligence lost track of the NVA 316th Division whose

presence in North Vietnam had been reported. Our guess was that this

division was moving south. A warning was then issued to all Corps and

Division commands to watch for the 316th Division but all efforts failed

to locate f-his elusive unit. Late in February 1975, intelligence sources

in Binh Dinh province reported continuing movement of the NVA 3d Division

toward QL-19 and on 3 March, it was confirmed that this axis of communication was being interdicted. The 22d Division reacted immediately by deploying two regiments to Binh Khe and An Tue. Although friendly troops

held firm their positions at these two places, they were unable to clear

QL-19. At the same time, the enemy 95-B Regiment attacked QL-19 at Le

Trung, making the interdiction of this vital road more serious. At Khanh

Duong, the enemy 25-B Regiment established blocking positions on QL-14

and effectively cut off all traffic from Ban Me Thuot to Nha Trang. On

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7 March, during an engagement with enemy forces at Due Lap, southeast

of Ban Me Thuot, our troops captured a document which revealed the

presence of the F-10 Division in this area. So this division, too had

moved away from the Kontum area into the vicinity of Ban Me Thuot.

Another captured document, which was the enemy plan of attack against

the city, disclosed that the main effort would be driven from the

southwest; it was to be preceded by sapper penetrations, artillery

preparatory fire and an initial assault by tanks. On 8 March Thuon Nam

district town was attacked; QL-14 was thus interdicted midway between

Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot, exactly as reported previously by the returnee.

By this time, it had become evident that Ban Me Thuot would be the

objective of the enemy offensive.

Preparations for defense were going on feverishly in Ban Me Thuot

as of 9 March. The city braced itself for the attack because red alert

orders had been issued. Garrison units established positions on tall

buildings in the city and were issued additional anti-tank ammunition.

At 0330 on the morning of 10 March 1975, enemy tanks began to move into

Ban Me Thuot. But according to an enemy document captured later in Ban

Me Thuot, the attack took place at least two days earlier than planned.

The enemy had advanced the attack date because he knew his plan had been

leaked. He rushed the attack before our forces had a chance to consolidate

their defenses. As the battle unfolded, it was learned that the 320th

Division attacked the city and the Phuong Due airfield from the north.

The F-10 Division moved in from the southwest while the 316th Division

stayed back as reserve and did not participate in the attack until 11 March.

Enemy prisoners captured from the 316th Division disclosed that their unit

had moved from North Vietnam by trucks using the Ho Chi Minh trail in

Laotian territory and only crossed into South Vietnam at Due Lap in Quang

Due province in order to avoid detection by our intelligence. Orders

given to the 316th Division were strict: its movement was to be kept absolutely secret, no radio contact between elements was allowed and on arrival

at destination no contact was permitted even with local Communist authorities.

; j
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The enemy's basic objective when launching his offensive in the

Central Highlands of MR-2 in early March 19 75, as developed from a

captured enemy document, was to occupy two out of its three provinces

by the end of the dry season. Then at the onset of the rainy season,

he would stop his military activities and offer to negotiate with the

RVN government. In all probability, he would demand the establishment

of the National Council of Reconciliation and Concord and perhaps a

coalition government as well. If the RVN should refuse this demand,

then he would have the justification to resume the offensive. In any

case, the offensive was intended to force the RVN government into making

political concessions. Since the Central Highlands was composed of only

three provinces (Kontum, Pleiku, Darlac ) according to Communist territorial organization,the next target of enemy attack after Ban Me Thuot

was expected to be Pleiku.

The RVN decision to withdraw from Kontum and Pleiku must have been

a total surprise for the enemy. As a matter of fact, a report from the

B-3 Front on 18 March disclosed that the enemy was completely stunned by

this move- Almost immediately, the enemy field command at 3an Me Thuot

ordered the 320th Division to move quickly to intercept or pursue II

Corps forces, which had been withdrawing from Pleiku toward Phu Yen along

Interprovincial Route 7B.

When the II Corps convoy was stalled at Song Ba because of the lack

of river-crossing facilities, the 320th Division had already caught up

and engaged it in a battle at Phu Tue. Enemy soldiers captured here confirmed that they belonged to the 320th Division. From Song Ba to Phu Yen,

the II Corps convoy was delayed again by enemy blocking positions and

mortar fire at Cung Son and it suffered extremely heavy losses. It was

a Communist local force, a battalion of Phu Yen province, that intercepted the ARVN convoy here. But ARVN Ranger troops inflicted heavy

losses on this blocking force. According to an enemy soldier captured

there, only 10 men of his unit were left after the battle.

At Ban Me Thuot, the F-10 Division was ordered to deploy its entire

forces by trucks to Phuoc An on 18 March. Phuoc An was a staging point

for the ARVN 23d Division (-) in an effort to reoccupy Ban Me Thuot.

186

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After overrunning Phuoc An, the F-10 Division proceeded to Khanh Duong

with the support of an armor squadron to attack the ARVN 3d Airborne

Brigade. Its 105-tnm and 122-ram artillery pieces were also towed along

by trucks. Then at Khanh Duong, units of the F-10 Division took turns

attacking the 3d Airborne Brigade. The 316th Division meanwhile was

assigned to defend Ban Me Thuot and repel expected ARVN counterattacks.

On Route 19, to the north, the enemy 968th Division and the 95-B

Regiment were deployed to reinforce the NT-3 Division, and attacked the

ARVN 22d Division at Binh Khe and northern Binh Dinh. Despite fierce

resistance and gallantry in combat, both the 22d Division and the 3d

Airborne Brigade were unable to contain the enemy divisions. Binh

Dinh was lost to the enemy on 31 March and Nha Trang was evacuated on

1 April 1975. The disposition of enemy units following these actions '_

was reported as follows: the 968th and 3d Divisions at Binh Dinh, the

320th Division at Phu Yen and the F-10 Division at Nha Trang where the

NVA field command for the Central Highlands was also located. V-\

After success had been assured at Ban Me Thuot, the enemy immediately

increased action in MR-1. He moved the 325th Division from Quang Tri into t~J

the southwest of Hue with an aim to interdict Route 1 at Phu Loc. His

324-B Division meanwhile kept its pressure on the west of Hue. Although

the enemy move was known in advance, I Corps was unable to contain it and

QL-1 was effectively interdicted at Phu Loc on 22 March.

At Quang Tin, intelligence disclosed on 22 March that the enemy

711th Division was deploying its units toward Tarn Ky, the provincial

capital. Tarn Ky was attacked and overrun on 24 March. By that time,

most ARVN units in MR-1 had withdrawn toward Da Nang. On 28 March, the

enemy ordered his units to attack Da Nang. As it became known to us,

the enemy plan of attack called for heavy shelling of Da Nang airbase,

Non Nuoc airfield, and I Corps Headquarters to begin at 0730 in the

morning of 29 Mai.:.h. Then infiltrated enemy sappers would attack

friendly positions within the city before regular infantry units moved

in. Da Nang was lost to the enemy on 29 March 1975.

What remained now of MR-1 and MR-2 territory was just two provinces:

Ninh Thuan and Binh Thuan. Both of these provinces were integrated

187

•

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into MR-3 to facilitate command and control. By then, some political

opinions still expressed the hope that after their surprise victories,

the Communists might pause and make a political move to obtain a desired

solution. But available intelligence indicated otherwise. An intercepted message for example made clear that the Communists had decided

to go all out for a total military victory. All Communist units were

ordered to take advantage of initial gains to progress swiftly toward

final victory. During that time intelligence revealed that the NVA

312th Division had moved from North Vietnam into the A Shau valley ^^

and was proceeding south toward MR-3. Another artillery unit, equipped

with sixty 130-mm field guns was also detected in the tri-border area,

preparing to move into MR-3. At the same time, aerial photos showed

that SAM-2 anti-aircraft missiles were being deployed in the tri-border

area. Later, on 19 April, these SAM-2 missiles were moved toward the i*!*.

boundary of MR-2 and MR-3 and finally were detected moving on QL-14 toward their final destination in War Zone D.

In MR-3, the presence of the 341st Division was detected in the w

vicinity of Chon Thanh, north of Saigon. One of its regiments was first

detected by communications intelligence in late March 1975. Later, seven

enemy prisoners confirmed the presence of this unit in the area. The CT-7

Division by this time had moved out of its usual area of operation at Phu

Giao to conduct attacks against the district town of Dinh Quan on QL-20.

Traffic between Saigon and Dalat was effectively interdicted after Dinh

Quan was lost. Although this move had been detected two weeks earlier,

ARVN forces were unable to stop the enemy. After overrunning Dinh Quan

and moving into Dalat, the CT-7 was ordered back to reinforce the 6th and

34lst Divisions in their attacks against Xuan Loc. The battle for this

provincial capital began on 9 April and both the 6th and 341st Divisions

suffered heavy losses.

After the loss of Phan Rang and Phan Thiet on 14 and 18 April

respectively, the ARVN 18th Division and the 2d Airborne Brigade were

forced to evacuate Xuan Loc on 20 April and move to Ba Ria. During this

time, NVA 1st and 2d Corps and their subordinate divisions which had so

far been operating in MR-1 and MR-2 were rapidly moving south into MR-3

188

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in an effort to encircle Saigon from the north and southeast. South

of Saigon, in the vicinity of Long An, three enemy divisions, the

5th, 6th and 8th were concentrating their forces under the control of

a newly created corps command, designated Corps 232. To the west

of Saigon, the CT-9 Division was deployed into Hau Nghia province where

it joined forces with the 316th Sapper Regiment and prepared to attack

Phu Lam and Cho Lon. The 316th Division meanwhile was poised somewhere

between Trang Bang and Cu Chi with the apparent mission of interdicting

QL-1 in this area.

In Saigon, however, political circles were still desperately clinging to the hopes that a political modus-vivendi 3nd a cease-fire could

be achieved at the last minute. They did not know that Hanoi had decided

to take Saigon by 19 May, anniversary of Ho Chi Minn's birthday, that

information was provided by an enemy agent on 17 April. The enemy

final offensive, according to this source, was code-named the "Ho Chi

Minh Campaign" and its final objective, Saigon, had already been renamed

as Ho Chi Minh City.

In addition to tanks and artillery support, the Communists were also

planning to employ airpower in their final push against Saigon, particularly to bomb Tan Son Nhut airbase, the Joint General Staff compound,

and the Independence Palace. These reports on the enemy plan to use

airpower over Saigon coincided with intelligence previously obtained

in Da Nang which indicated that the Communists were conducting crash

training courses for their pilots in the handling of A-37 and F-5 bombers.

VNAF pilots captured by the enemy were being used as instructors. Another

report revealed that the enemy had instructed his sapper units not to

destroy bridges leading into Saigon and to leave public utilities in

Saigon intact.

On 24 April an enemy plan to interdict QL-15 between Saigon and Vung

Tau was obtained through"prisoner and other intelligence sources. One

captured enemy document observed that if Saigon and Can Tho were lost,

other cities in MR-3 and MR-4 would also fall.

On 26 April, the enemy began attacking Long Thanh and Ba Ria and

severed road communication by QL-15. Bien Hoa was also under attack.

189

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».».»_»•» » » m >•

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On 27 April, an enemy artillery unit was ordered Co locate firing

positions from which to shell Tan Son Nhut airbase, the JGS compound,

and the Independence Palace. A few days earlier an enemy sapper from

the 316th Sapper Regiment was captured as he was looking for a house

to rent near Gate No. 4 of the JGS compound. During interrogation he

declared that he was an artillery forward observer sent into Saigon with

the mission of directing fire on the JGS.

In the afternoon of 28 April, Tan Son Nhut airbase was attacked by

three A-37 bombers which had taken off from Phan Rang.

In the morning of 29 April, the Communists began to shell Tan Son

Nhut, the JGS and other places in Saigon. At the same time, enemy infantry units also launched probing attacks in the suburbs of Saigon.

At 1000 hours the following day, 30 April 1975, orders for the RVNAF to

surrender were proclaimed on Radio Saigon.

A nation had ceased to exist; an armed force had been defeated.

Sharing in this national tragic event, intelligence had also been defeated. At least, that was what the leader of the Republic of Vietnam

concluded when he scribbled a personal observation on a report submitted

to him by the National Intelligence Coordination Committee in mid-April

1975:

"Intelligence, beware of information planted by

the Communists. They strike Ban Me Thout when

you said Pleiku. And you said Tay Ninh while

they attacked Phuoc Long."

140

• •

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191

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- --.-_.--.

CHAPTER VII

Communist Intelligence

North Vietnam's Intelligence, Theory and Practice

During a war, Communist leaders usually write military articles

in which they analyze the conduct of the war and comment on the

strategies and tactics employed during each phase of the war. The

purpose of these articles is almost always self-serving. It serves

either to justify an action taken or to outline a new policy. Intelligence techniques, however, have never been discussed. In the

very few instances where it is mentioned at all, intelligence is

either treated as an implicit element of knowledge or broadly evaluated in terms of its effectiveness or usefulness during a certain

war period.

Mao Tse Tung implied such a knowledge when he discussed the basic

rules of guerrilla warfare. He wrote:

"Since May 1928, however a basic principle, simple

in character, with regard to guerrilla warfare

was already set forth in keeping with the conditions of the time, namely a formula in sixteen

key words:

Enemy advances, we retreat.

Enemy halts, we harass.

Enemy tires, we attack.

Enemy retreats, we pursue.

This military principle in a sixteen-word formula

had been accepted by the Party."*•

In his book entitled "Our Protracted Resistance War Will Win" and

published in 1946, Truong Chinh, a theorician and Politbureau member of

Hlao Tse Tung, Selected Works, Vol. I, 1926-1936 (International

Publishers, New York: 1954) p. 212.

142

.

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~".* *•"•••• "^1 • 1 •'! •". "

North Vietnam's Labor (Communist) Party, briefly criticized intelligence

work in the Viet Minh Army in these words:

"There are many ways of winning the initiative (one

among them is): to clearly know the enemy's situation in order to be able to concentrate our regular troops rapidly and move our reserve forces

swiftly to the required areas to act in good time.

At present our forces are not only poor in intelli-»

gence work but also slow in moving and regrouping."

In 1967, another high-ranking North Vietnamese military authority,

Truong Son, wrote an article on "Lessons Learned from the NLF Victories"

in which he advocated that, among the five lessons learned from military

victories, the first one was Intelligence. Said he:

"Only by understanding the enemy's strategic

determination and correctly anticipating the

laws and capabilities of enemy action can we

rightly build our own strategic determination

and our fighting pattern."

Truong Son also elaborated:

"In the summer of 1966, the South Vietnam

NLF Central Committee and various other

echelons concentrated their efforts on

studying matters concerning the enemy's

front such as: during the dry season,

what is the enemy's strategic intention,

how many troops will he have, what are the

capabilities of these troops, and where

are they going to be used? What are their

laws of action and so forth?"

The idea of intelligence as the first lesson to be learned in a

war is shared by Van Tien Dung,North Vietnam Army's Chief of Staff.

In an article on "Some Great Experiences of the People's War" published

during this period, he wrote that he had learned the need to "correctly

evaluate the enemy's strategic schemes and operational capabilities,

develop a steadfast determination to achieve success, and make careful

and positive preparations to cope with the enemy quickly and resolutely."

2

Truong Chinh, Primer for Revolt (Frederick A. Praeger, New York,

London: 1963) p. 187.

193

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The first and last remarks ever made on intelligence by North Vietnamese leaders during the long period of 21 years spanning two wars from

1946 to 1967 thus indicate that Communist intelligence had come of age

and was to be an effective tool during the conquest of the South.

Intelligence, generally speaking, is a process encompassing a number

of basic principles that have become universal. But intelligence as it

is actually organized and operated involves certain conceptual particularities and operational characteristics that vary according to the

political philosophy and administrative structure of each country.

Being a Communist nation at heart, North Vietnam apparently derives

its intelligence theory from Communist philosophical premises—in particular those of Marx and Engels—on the universality of contradiction as

a rule. Engels in effect theorized that: "life consists just precisely

in this—that a living thing is at each moment itself and yet something

else. Life is therefore also a contradiction which is present in things

and processes themselves, and which constantly originates and solves

itself; and as soon as the contradiction ceases, life, too, comes to an

3

end, and death steps in."

Lenin later translated this conceptual premise into concrete

examples that he used to demonstrate contradiction in almost all disciplines of human knowledge. In mathematics, for example, he found it in

addition and subtraction, differential and integral; in mechanics, he

found it in action and reaction; in physics, positive and negative; in

chemistry, the combination and dissociation of atoms; and in social

sciences, most particularly, class struggle.

From this purely theoretical philosophy, Mao went a step further

3

Mao Tse Tung, Selected Works, Vol Two, 1937 - 1938 (International

Publishers, New Yord: 1954), pp. 19, 20.

194

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195

when he made it a basis for his war theories with a view to single out

the decisive factors on which each warring party would rely to gain

victory. According to Mao, war depends basically on man and weapons

or man and technology, but man is always the decisive factor that wins

a war. As a result, the Communists usually rely on human whereas the - ' '•••

United States and other antagonists of the Communist bloc—as if in

keeping with the rule of contradiction itself—choose to depend primarily on the power of weapons and technology when fighting a war. [•••.••'••

It was on the basis of this human predominance axiom that during , " '" .

the war North Vietnam built its intelligence largely patterned after

Red China, and to lesser extent, Soviet Russia. Based more on human !-"\-"->

than technological resources, North Vietnam's intelligence system was

conceived within the conceptual framework of a people's war and came ^J

to be known as People's Intelligence. As part of a people's war, ••'•".

People's Intelligence also derived from it its two basic characters: *•!--••

all-people and total, which implied that intelligence was the duty of '.•'•''.'•':•

each citizen and should be carried out in every branch and every sector .' „,*

or activity.

Just as the theory of people's war materialized in a unified ef- '•_'.-•

fort to prosecute the war through the leading role played by the Party •.'•'.'•'.'

and the State, it was also built into the intelligence system which, \ •.(

under the same unified command concept, was placed under the direct V'.--

control of the highest Communist authority—North Vietnam's Politbureau. '.'•.•-

War, to the Communist, is just a continuation of politics, and its

nature, essentially a political act. Likewise, as North Vietnam saw • .1

it, there was no distinction between military intelligence and political

intelligence. Situation assessments or estimates, therefore, were

highly synthetized works that took into account every consideration, • '.-'.'.•'•'.

every aspect of the war. Structurally there was no discrimination J

either, since in North Vietnam there existed no separate military and

political collection agencies as was the case in South Vietnam. In

the same vein, North Vietnam made no distinction between domestic and

• - - -
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foreign intelligence or between tactical and strategic intelligence.

North Vietnam Intelligence Agency

Thus, North Vietnam's intelligence had been thoroughly guided by

Communist philosophy, and people's war theory in particular, in addition

to purely professional basic principles. Normally, theories and

principles make no profound difference as to their intrinsic values

or merits. What really matters is the extent to which these theories

and principles are observed and put to practical use. In this respect,

North Vietnam seemed to make considerable effort to narrow the gap

between theory and practice.

The most visible manifestation of these efforts can be found in

the establishment of the Central Research Agency (CRA) which has been

North Vietnam's top intelligence agency for many years. During the

war, the Central Reserarfch Agency not only served the North Vietnamese

Army High Command and the Ministry of National Defense but also the

government council or cabinet. In many instances when important

decisions had to be made, the CRA also provided instrumental intelligence

estimates directly to the reduced Politbureau which consisted of the

State President, the Party Secretary, the President of the National

Assembly, the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister. In fact, the

CRA was only responsible for military intelligence. Civilian intelligence was the responsibility of the Public Security Ministry

whose structural ramification encompassed every echelon of the administrative hierarchy, down to villages. The missions of the Public Security

Ministry included enforcement of security and order, collection of

information, investigation, surveillance and apprehension of criminals

and those elements or movements who opposed the Party and the State.

The Central Research Agency was organized into six staff divisions:

Administration, Technical, Communications, Training, Protection, and

Collection in addition to a Cryptographic Section. The Administration

196

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division was responsible for the status of intelligence personnel,

prepared individual biographic records, and recommended appointments,

assignments, promotions and sanctions. The Technical division collected all types of identification papers and documents, stamp and

signature samples, established false identification papers for penetration agents, produced chemical inks for special document writing,

and provided all materiel and equipment required by agents. The

Communications division operated radio communications systems between

the CRA and its subordinate agencies, other strategic intelligence

services, and its emissaries operating in South Vietnam. The Training

division conducted in-country intelligence courses or arranged for

special agent training in Soviet Russia and Red China. Selected

students also included CRA cadre courses varied in length, from six

months to two years. The Protection division was responsible for

counterintelligence activities; it prevented and investigated traitors,

infiltrated agents, saboteurs, and kept a close watch on suspects or

elements tainted by a bad record. The Collection division was organized

into many sections, each section being responsible for a North Vietnamese

military region. Most important, however, were the sections responsible

for South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which were called Battlefield C,

B, and A Sections respectively. The Central Study Office also kept

track of international developments, focusing particularly on countries

that were directly or indirectly involved in the Vietnam war such as

the United States, France, Thailand, South Korea, etc. The importance

that North Vietnam attached to intelligence on the United States was

evidenced by the creation of a separate section responsible for America.

Meeting intelligence requirements generated by the war in Vietnam

was clearly the mission of North Vietnam's Central Research Agency.

With this mission, CRA directly controlled all intelligence activities,

including those in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In addition to

collection networks which were generally local in character, CRA also

controlled certain special intelligence nets which were operated by

special "emissaries" from North Vietnam and focused on long-range

197 -

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objectives. While information collected by these special nets might

be provided in support of local needs, North Vietnamese special emissaries who operated them were not under the control of local intelligence organizations. They made up instead a separate organization

whose territorial-based structure was divided into: COSVN, MR Tri-Thien

- Hue, MR 5, MR 6 and B3 Front. (Map 8) The military intelligence

organization in each MR or Front directly subordinated to NVA High

Command was similar to that of COSVN which in effect enjoyed the same

relationship status with regard to North Vietnam. (Chart 29)

COSVN Intelligence Organization

Contrary to what its name may have implied, COSVN did not exercise

control over all Communist intelligence activities in South Vietnam.

Its control, based on Communist territorial organization, was limited

to an area roughly the equivalent of RVN MR 3 and MR 4. The rest of

South Vietnam came under the separate responsibility of the enemy

B3 Front, MR 5, MR 6, MR 10 and the MR Thi-Thien - Hue.

COSVN's responsibility, however, also encompassed those Communistcontrolled areas on Cambodian territory such as Krek, Svay Rieng,

Prey Veng and Kompong Cham, etc.

Intelligence activities under control of COSVN's Permanent Committee (Labor Party Central Committee's delegates in South Vietnam)

included security and military intelligence. Security activities were

organized at every echelon of the Party hierarchy: COSVN, Military

Region, Province, District, Village and Hamlet. As to military intelligence, while its activities generally followed along the same line,

its organization also included tactical components of the military

hierarchy, from Corps to Company. Basically, security functioned under

the control of the Party at each level of its hierarchy while military

intelligence was part of the staff organization at each tactical echelon.

COSVN's instrument to operate and supervise security activities

198

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B3 Front

High Command

North Vietnam Army

MR 5

MR 2 (8)

MR 6 MR 10

Regional Command

COSVN

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Tri-Thien - Hue

MR

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•

200

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was the Security Agency. Its mission was to ensure internal security,

keep watch over the thoughts and acts of all cadre and to prevent and

discover RVN penetration agents. In addition, the Security Agency also

provided security for headquarters and installations, protection for

high-ranking COSVN and NLF cadre, and directed spy and counter-spy activities in RVN-controlled areas.

COSVN's Security Agency was organized into three sections: Internal Reconnaissance, External Reconnaissance and Protection.

1. Internal Reconnaissance Section:

The mission of this section was to maintain and ensure security in

Communist-controlled areas in South Vietnam as well as in Cambodia.

The section was empowered to arrest and detain suspects, civilian and

military alike, interrogate, investigate, and establish reports. It v^

operated a detention camp for security convicts (code-named K-25) and

was supported by a security unit (code-named K-35). This unit studied

personnel records, granted security clearance, kept a close watch over *0

military and civilian cadre, and prevented the penetration of RVN agents.

In general, the Internal Reconnaissance Section enjoyed large investigative powers and had the prerogatives to install its personnel in every

organization to serve as its eyes and ears.

2. External Reconnaissance Section:

I

The mission of this section was to collect information through spy

activities, recruit and train planted agents, train and re-train collection personnel, provide special espionage tools and weapons for agents,

direct assassination plots and obtain security reports.

3. Protection Section:

This section was responsible for providing peripheral protection

for headquarters and installations by using patrols, insuring protection

for high-ranking cadre and constructing shelters. It conducted training

for bodyguards assigned to protect high-ranking cadre during displacements

through dangerous zones. It also deployed security personnel to help

secure infiltration accesses into Communist-controlled areas along infil-

•

tration corridors and the Cambodian border, prevent sabotages and inves-

• ..

i—

tigate penetration efforts by RVN agents. For the performance of its

201

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tasks the Protection Section was assigned to the (COSVN) Protection

Regiment No 180 which consisted of two battalions, D-l and D-2. I

The D-l battalion was assigned the responsibility of protecting \'--S'

COSVN high-ranking cadre, and providing security for headquarters and <

i:a base camp and installations. The D2 battalion was responsible for •'.'-.. J

peripheral security. * '-•!

Outside and under COSVN, security sections were established at

every echelon of Party hierarchy. While the responsibilities of these

security sections remained identical, their sizes and effectiveness

varied greatly depending on the war situation and the extent of Communist

control in each area. In general, at the village level, the security

cell was tasked to organize and direct such security activities as manning guard posts, checking entry and exit movements, identifying strangers, arresting suspects or criminals, conducting preliminary investigations, and keeping watch over "reactionaries." Another responsibility

of the village security cell was to deter and unearth crimes either by

the populace or village government officials. In certain pre-determined ^

cases or when authorized by a higher echelon, the security cell was

permitted to carry out surreptitious executions or assassinations. Its

assassination subcell was usually tasked for these ignoble jobs. A village security chief was generally appointed by the Party hierarchy and

usually selected from among the members of the Village Party Committee.

He was assigned two assistants if the village consisted of several

hamlets. A hamlet was assigned two elected security agents by the

village security chief if the hamlet was made up of several households.

The village security cell was both subordinated to the Village Administrative Committee and the District Security Section whose mission was

to organize and provide guidance to village security cells and resolve

problems raised by or beyond the power and capability of village security chiefs.

At the district level, security activities had more of a professional character. They included establishing political and military

order of battle records and keeping surveillance files on suspects,

nationalist local parties or associations, religious organizations and

202

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leaders, and GVN employees or their relatives. Every month, the district

security section prepared a situation report on friendly and enemy activities. With regard to the enemy (RVN), the monthly report specified

which types of activities—political or military—had been more intense

during the month and analyzed the objective, scope, intensity and characteristics of each. Reports on friendly activities included information

on the populace's behavior and reactions to enemy activities, actions

taken by the local Communist government with regard to the enemy and the

populace, Communist military activities during the month in terms of

frequency, form, results, advantages and disadvantages, and a recapitulation of political activities during the month. As far as the Communists were concerned, information on political activities consisted

of such data as the results of enemy proselyting actions. Typical examples

include: how many enemy troops had deserted, how many more had been

contacted; the frequency of indoctrination sessions held, what subjects

had been studied; and, in terms of political struggle, how many direct

confrontations had been initiated, how many demonstrations had been

organized, how many protest motions had been forwarded, etc.

In its responsibility to protect the local district government,

the security section had the duty to coordinate security protection

plans with military units operating in the area. When there were top

echelon Communist organizations in the area, such a security plan usually

divided the area into three distinct zones with different control measures

applied to each. In the outer zone, checks were made on movements of

strangers. The intermediate zone was a zone of restricted movements to

strangers, in which every displacement or activity of the local population

was placed under tight control. The inner zone was of limited access

which was allowed only to people with official business.

In summary, the Communist security system was designed to carry

out both defensive activities such as security, protection, order and

offensive activities such as espionage. Its objectives included not

only the enemy but also the population and Communist cadre and troops.

Due to the predominant role played by the Party, in general, enemy security activities were closely coordinated with military intelligence for

whose activities they also provided effective support.

203

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COSVN's military intelligence instrument, the Military Intelligence

Agency—code-named B-2—was subordinated to its military command, which

was called "Regional Command". The Military Intelligence Agency, COSVN

(MIACOSVN) was responsible for collecting information pertaining to the

organization, operation, policies and plans of the RVN military, political,

economic, administrative, diplomatic, activities and others. MIACOSVN

supervised and provided guidance on intelligence activities performed by

military units, to include espionage.

MIACOSVN was organized into eleven staff sections and was supported

by a communications battalion. The staff sections were: Enemy Situation

Study, Cadre and Organization, Ground Reconnaissance, Technical Reconnaissance, People's Intelligence Nets, Espionage, Law Enforcement, Techniques

and Tracks, Rear Services, Training, and Crypto.

1. Enemy Situation Study Section.

This section was responsible for keeping track of developments in

the RVN and allied military forces, political and economic activities,

establishing and disseminating reports to user organizations.

Information and data collected by military intelligence organizations

at all echelons were routed to this section which analyzed and interpreted them and developed intelligence estimates and reports. The Enemy

Situation Study Section also received copies of information exchanged

between COSVN and Military Regions or disseminated by North Vietnam's

Central Research Agency.

2. Cadre and Organization Section.

This section was responsible for keeping personnel records, evaluating personnel qualifications, recommending jobs and assignments, receiving and assigning intelligence personnel infiltrated from North Vietnam, recommending promotions and sanctions, keeping track of the security

status in units and areas under Communist control, and organizing military intelligence conferences.

3. Ground Reconnaissance Section.

This section was responsible for conducting reconnaissance of the

enemy's military organization, dispositions, and equipment for defense

in addition to collecting information on order of battle. To carry out

204

_. . • • . . -i . __
.'I

- .

this mission, the section was assigned one or two organic battalions,

called Ground Reconnaissance (GR) Battalions. The D46 Ground Reconnaissance Battalion, for example, had a strength varying from 300 to 400

men and was organized into 3 companies and 1 section (Section 7). This

section consisted of 3 GR detachments of 17 men each, whose specific

mission was to collect information from areas such as Suoi Vang, Cau ; ~

Khoi, Suoi Da and the Trang Sup airfield in Tay Ninh province. The

Ground Reconnaissance Section directed and controlled the activities

of 10 GR detachments which were deployed at Cu Chi (Hau Nghia province),

Phu Hoa (Binh Duong province), Ben Cat (Binh Duong province), An Loc ~~Z

and Loc Ninh (Binh Long province), Boi Loi (Tav Ninh province), Ba Ra

(Phuoc Long province), Phuoc Tuy, Bien Hoa and Long Khanh. Each detachment was commanded by a cadre having a rank ranging from deputy company

to deputy battalion commander. ~^m

4. Technical Reconnaissance Section. '-.••'.

This section had been expanded considerably since 1965. Its mission V -

was to intercep enemy radio communications to collect information as v.

well as to conduct ICD (Imitative Communications Deception) and jam • -'•%

enemy radio systems. In its initial stage of organization, the Technical Reconnaissance (TR) Section activated a TR battalion, code-named ._

D4, which was organized into 5 companies totalling approximately 300 ••"!•-'. v,

!

men. With this strength, the section was able to organize 30 TR teams, -0

all deployed in the RVN MR 3. Each team had a varying strength depending

on the importance of the target area. According to its report of September 1966, the D4 battalion was able to exploit 7745 messages out of a

total of 7793 intercepted. The TR teams were equipped with radio s*ts

captured from the RVN and allied forces such as AN/PRC-10, AN/PRC-25,

AN/PRC-6, AN/GRC-9, SCR-300, AN/VRC-3, SCR-694, etc. and supplied by

Red China, such as models 71B and 102E, or even procured from the local

market and modified to receive FM bands.

5. People's Intelligence Nets Section.

This section organized and provided guidance to people's intelligence nets in Communist-controlled and contested areas.

205

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6. Espionage Section.

This section managed and kept track of espionage activities, _

provided guidance and direction to agents, and studied and reviewed

intelligence reports sent in by spies and agents. -.'-.'

7. Law Enforcement Section.

This section detained, interrogated and investigated suspects and t'-'-'•"',

established reports. It also handled high-ranking RVN prisoners or

those who were apt to provide important information, and provided information support to the Internal and External Reconnaissance Sections.

Under the section's control there was a prisoner detention camp, codenamed K55, which consisted of three wards, Nos. 1, 2, and 3. Prisoners

and detainees were classified and treated in different manners according

to their willingness to cooperate. Those who were die-hard or deemed

dangerous were detained in underground cells of ward No. 3.

8. Techniques and Tracks Section.

This Section processed negatives and printed photos taken by Unit

KA5. It also produced false identification papers and documents intended

for use in GVN-controlled areas or in Cambodia, collected documents and

photos for a reference library, conducted investigations on lost documents and weapons, and endeavored to detect traitors.

9. Rear Services Section.

This section provided rear services for the Military Intelligence

Agency and its subordinate organizations and units, to include food

service and materiel support. It was organized into several subsections:

procurement, truck transportation, bicycle transportation, quartermasters,

production, etc.

10. Training Section.

This section prepared and published training materials, organized

intelligence courses for all levels, established indoctrination programs,

provided instructors and assisted in re-training personnel of the External

Reconnaissance Section. Under the section's control, there was the

K25 School which provided training only for low-level cadre, from deputy

squad leaders down. Cadre of higher ranks, from squad leaders to company

commanders were trained separately. Instructors were usually selected

. -.

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among cadre of various sections. Courses of instruction varied in length

from three to six months. However, those cadre who were selected to

undergo training in North Vietnam usually went through two years or longer

courses, during which classroom training was given in Hanoi but practical

work took place in Hai Phong.

11. Crypto Section.

This section's responsibility was to encode and decode messages

exchanged between Reconnaissance Sections and their subordinate companies

or detachments, or among various sections of MIACOSVN.

12. MIA Communications Battalion.

The MIA Communications Battalion was organized into three radio

companies, one express messenger company, one repair unit and one training

school. Twice daily, the battalion communicated with subordinate MI

units to receive and transmit information. Equipment used by the battalion were all 15-watt Red Chinese or Russian supplied radio sets.

The express messenger company was 50-man strong and equipped with 10

Honda motorcycles. In addition to dispatching high precedence correspondence, this company was also tasked to transport high-ranking military

intelligence cadre or visitors from the duty guardpost to MIA headquarters

and back. Another responsibility of this unit was to detail men to entry

points to take delivery of newsnaoers published in Saigon.

In addition to its eleven staff sections and the communications battalion,

MIA also operated a dispensary and a separate recovery center. The

organization and operation of MID revealed certain characteristics of

its own. First, its subordinate units underwent constant changes, either

merging with each other or being disbanded as dictated by the circumstances.

Second, every unit and its staff sections were assigned several different

code-names and code-numbers. Third, MIA usually suffered from a shortage

of specialists and had to rely on North Vietnam infiltrated personnel

for certain key positions. Fourth, MIA enjoyed no prerogatives over

strategic intelligence units detached from North Vietnam. Finally, new

sections could be created as requirements arose. For example, during

the period from 1968 to 1971, there was the Prisoner Exploitation Section,

especially created to handle RVN prisoners of war. But this section was

«

-«

207

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later disbanded and its personnel absorbed in the Law Enforcement Section.

After the cease-fire, to meet the needs for prisoner exchanges, a Prisoner

Section was created with the mission to study and recommend lists of

prisoners susceptible to be released, determine which prisoners to be

withheld and suggest which areas would be appropriate for the exchange >>\

of prisoners.

Compared to military intelligence organizations serving other military

regions or the B3 Front for example, COSVN's MIA organization did not

present any significant difference save for an additional subordinate MI

agency to handle the Saigon - Gia Dinh - Cholon area which the Communists *

regarded as the nerve center of the RVN-US war apparatus. Particular

importance was attached to this MI agency because it was responsible for

an area where strategic decisions were made and directives issued and

where internal differences or conflicts, as far as the RVN was concerned,

usually broke out most intensively.

Sources and Dispatching Methods

Communist intelligence employed certain sources and dispatching

methods which were radically different from those used by the US and the

RVN. This difference materialized in reconnaissance and messenger units,

and most importantly, in the Communist people's intelligence system. v

1. Reconnaissance Units. .-.

Reconnaissance was the name the Communists gave to intelligence units

organized especially to serve a battlefield prior to and during a

campaign. Generally of company size, reconnaissance units were organized t—...

into three-man cells assigned to operate with combat units from company

to division level. Prior to launching a military campaign, reconnaissance

cells were sent into the objective area to conduct a research on terrain

and the situation. Elements of situation research included: enemy, local - -

population, and probable impact of a military action on the political

situation. Concerning the enemy, research efforts focused on his order

of battle, strength, forces, organization, equipment, disposition, defenses,

morale, habits, commanders and reinforcements. Concerning the local

208

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' . - - - .

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population, the research task was to find out the attitude of the people

toward the Communists, toward the RVN, the kind of popular support that

might be expected, and the probable impact of the campaign on the populace.

Reconnaissance on terrain was aimed at collecting the same information

that every tactical commander needed to know to plan and coordinate his

fire and maneuver with accuracy and to make a judicious use of firepower

on each type of target.

Reconnaissance as it was practiced by the Communists was guided by

certain basic principles. First, it should be specific and based on

sensory perception, or as the Communists put it, what could be "seen by

the eyes and touched by the hands." Second, reconnaissance should be

performed many times, by many different elements to double-check and

cross-check all information gathered. A last-minute reconnaissance should

always be conducted one or two days prior to launching the attack in order

to preclude the unexpected. And if the attack was important enough, the

commander of the unit conducting it was required to personally reconnoiter

the terrain at least once. Data collected through reconnaissance would

be reported on a scaled-down sand table constructed by the attacking

unir for the purpose of planning and rehearsing actions by participating

elements in minute detail.

Methods of collecting information through reconnaissance included

observation from mobile or fixed positions which were generally established

near enemy garrisons and along axes of communication; probes made among

the local population; contacts with local party and government representatives who were usually supported by local sources such as people's

agents nets, security agents and enemy informants; and abduction of

enemy troops and seizure of documents if required. There were still

other forms of reconnaissance which either employed military intelligence

personnel disguised as local inhabitants or the local inhabitants themselves who lived near or within the target area and served as planted

agents. During an offensive campaign, reconnaissance cells operated in

conjunction with combat troops on the battlefield. Their mission was to

keep track of developments in the enemy situation, his movements, reinforcements and supply activities, and to assess the results of shellings,

209

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attacks or raids. Reconnaissance units also assisted in the routing

of information and messages by establishing field telephone lines between

the command post and combat units. More recent tasks performed by reconnaissance cells included combined activities with artillery forward

observers to assist them in adjusting fire on targets.

The various tasks performed by reconnaissance units were considered

of utmost importance by the Communists who were usually convinced

that half of the success in any attack depended on their completion.

As a result, reconnaissance personnel were very carefully selected and

usually regarded as crack troops. The effectiveness of reconnaissance

units prompted the Communists to activate special-action units which

came to be known as "Sappers." The initial mission given to Sapper

units was reconnaissance; at a later stage, they were employed in sabotage

missions. Sapper units were rapidly expanded and upgraded beginning

in 1969. From company-size units operating individually, Sappers were

later organized into battalions and finally regiments, all under control of a separate Sapper Command. If Sapper units drew much attention

from ARVN and US forces during the war, it was only because of their

conspicuous and sometimes spectacular exploits which seemed to overshine the more obscure, but nonetheless just as effective, accomplishments achieved by reconnaissance units. Because of its tactical nature,

such reconnaissance work was called "ground reconnaissance" to make

it distinct from another type of reconnaissance called "technical

reconnaissance."

Technical reconnaissance units were in fact communications intelligence units whose mission was to collect information through radio

communications intercept. Communist intercept activities, as a matter

of fact, became more extensive during the period of US participation,

beginning in 1965. For their operation, technical reconnaissance units

used mostly captured US-made radio equipment, augmented by Red Chinese

and sometimes home-made radio sets which were in fact circuit-modified

commercial FM receivers procured on the local market and appropriately

given local trademark labels such as Ap Bac, Saigon 1, Saigon 2, etc.,

210

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after modifications. In general, these units operated in the vicinities

of RVN or US unit headquarters for clearer reception of radio communications. Although their activation lagged behind ground reconnaissance

units, technical reconnaissance units proved to be efficient and vital

as providers of accurate intelligence for the Communists.

2. The Messenger Systems.

The enemy's basic deficiencies in signal communications and his

fear of intercept led him to rely more on messengers for the dispatching

of intelligence reports and official mail. Messengers made up an extensive

and intricate system. They were usually selected among the local population because of their better knowledge of terrain and weather and

their special ability to find alternate routes to bypass ambushes and

troop maneuvers. Communist messengers were, therefore, highly familiar

with our military activities; they knew where our patrols usually operated,

the type of targets on which our artillery usually fired, and where our

mines and obstacles were placed. There were two kinds of messengers:

legal and illegal, depending on whether they lived and worked legally

in GVN-controlled areas. In addition to their routine task of dispatching

intelligence reports and official mail, messengers also doubled as intelligence agents. They were thus required, while on messenger routes, to

report on everything they had observed concerning the enemy, the populace,

the crops, the weather, road conditions, etc. Another task performed by

messengers was to serve as guides for visitors, infiltration groups and

supply parties.

The so-called "Ho Chi Minh Trail" — sometimes dubbed "The Old

Man's Route" by the Communists — was initially a messenger route which

resulted from painful and persistent pioneering efforts by the Viet Minh

in their quest for a safe transportation and dispatching route from

North to South during their "Resistance War in South Vietnam" episode,

back in early 1946. This route, which meandered along tortuous mountain

trails on the eastern slope of the Truong Son chain, was later expanded

211

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^•^-«-7-^1 • 1—• •—9—i 1 1 .—-——•

into a large infiltration corridor made up of both longitudinal and

latitudinal local messenger routes connecting successive zones with each ."•".;•.

other. In each zone, there were established liaison way stations manned

by local messengers who served as guides. Several way stations were

manned by local messengers who served as guides. Several way stations

were grouped under a "binh tram" (military post) which controlled messenger activities and routes within a defined zone. Linked together,

local messenger stations and routes made up an integrated and intricate

communication system which effectively ensured a continuous flow of men

and supplies and whose appearance could be likened to a giant cobweb.

In addition to the Ho Chi Minn Trail, there were other messenger routes

which connected Communist bases and sanctuaries together. From the

Cambodian border leading inside the Mekong Delta for example, there were

three routes called la, lb and Ic. The la and lb routes were located

in Kien Tuong province, while the Ic route was located in Kien Giang

province.

3. The People's Intelligence System.

Although reconnaissance and messengers were important elements

of the Communist intelligence structure, its outstanding feature was

the popular-based collection organization called the people's intelligence system. The concept of people's intelligence can be traced

back to the Russian Revolution of 1917.

Fundamentally, people's intelligence means that every citizen

participates in intelligence in order to safeguard his (or her) own

welfare and the welfare of his family and community. The basic

objective to be achieved in people's intelligence is to know everything that can be known about the enemy while concealing from him

and denying him knowledge about us. The Communists usually likened

the enemy to an actor performing on stage under floodlight before

an audience. His every gesture, every utterance can be perceived

by hundreds of eyes and ears, yet he cannot make out anyone from the

audience who, like the people, blend themselves with the dark background.

212

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-• .- .-- .-• .-• -• ."- ••-.-.- - .-•-•;.-' .-•_-• .-.-•.-•-.- . . • •

To enlist participation of the people in intelligence work, the ——

Communists in Vietnam likened informing and reporting to a civil duty

bound on every citizen. Any refusal to cooperate, negligence or failure ..:.'"--

to report automatically made the defendant a reactionary or an accomplice

of the enemy, which were crimes punishable by severe sanctions. It was -• j,

this threat of severe punishment that forced everyone living under the

Communist regime or in a contested area to cooperate in intelligence

work.

To effectively check every citizen's thought and actions and ' ~~Z

ensure his cooperation, the Communists imposed on the citizenry a double

control system, based on community or administrative divisions on the one

hand and on trade, professional or civic organizations on the other.

First, no household could function individually under a Communist regime. '^M

Every three or five households were to make up a household group in

which each household was responsible for keeping watch over the others

and reporting on them. Theoretically, each three to five-household unit

was under control of a chief who was selected among household heads -^

and assisted by three assistants, for economic and financial affairs, ".-.'•

education and cultural affairs, and public health and social affairs, ';'.•';'-"•

respectively. In reality, however, this type of organization was applicable

only to larger communal units grouping ten or twelve households. Whatever -1

the size and organization for control, the purpose of each household group ""-"'••

was always to check on the activities and attitudes of its member house- S\"-\

holds in terms of security and information gathering. The character of •-"-'.•

family gatherings, the identity and purpose of each visitor, for example, ^-<

were all subjects for detailed reporting. Above the household group

level, there were similar organizations based on household groups, streets

and blocks.

The second type of control was apparently more important and more -, ', ,j

effective since it was based on trade, professional or civil organizations

of which every citizen had to be a member. For example, farmers were :-'..'•

required to be members of the Farmers Association; workers automatically

became affiliated to the Workers Association, etc. For each trade, each —'-^&

profession, there always existed some kind of association whose membership

•:

2i3 -...:•

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——:—j-, . . i—r—:—; r-—r—- •.- T -—• — .-

was mandatory. In addition, there were also civic organizations that

grouped children, youth, women and senior citizens under attractively

named associations, such as the Youngster and Junior Vanguards, the

Salvation Youth, etc. No one, in effect, could escape regimentation.

It was these organizations that usually exerted a dominant influence

upon the individual, much more so than the family. As a member of an

association, the individual was constantly exposed to political indoctrination and civic education which taught him, among other things, that

reporting was one of the basic and important civic duties.

The people's intelligence system thus reached down to every household and encompassed the entire social stratification. Its basic method

of information gathering was reporting. In the areas completely under

Communist control, reporting was directed toward counterintelligence

and unusual happenings while in contested areas, it covered both intelligence collection and counterintelligence. The method of reporting

was made simple enough for everyone to participate while tending to his

usual business. A roadside bicycle mechanic, for example, could provide a

daily report on the volume of military traffic, the types of military

cargo transported, the direction of their movements, etc. A farmer tilling

his land or a child looking after his buffalo in the vicinity of an airfield could give an account of how many aircraft had landed and taken

off during the day and even their types. A woman merchant in a market

place could provide such military information as troop strength, operational

preparations, new units, etc., through doing her daily business. Within

a household group, almost anyone could inform on unusual activities of others,

the duration of their absence, contacts made with strangers, and so on.

Those people whose normal business required them to go back and forth

regularly between Communist and GVN-controlled areas were usually tasked

to dispatch information or documents or to procure items of military

necessity. The Communists were especially interested in those people

whose relatives worked for the GVN. Depending on the degree of relationship, these people could be used to press or blackmail their relatives

into cooperation by providing information of interest to the Communists.

Those who had special abilities in intelligence work would be selected

to undergo training in order to be employed in a higher collection field,

214

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for example, as undercover agents, by posing as har girls, waitresses,

clerks in those business premises in close proximity to military bases,

airfields, ports, etc. In general, women, children and old people were

more likely induced into intelligence work than young men because draftage youths were usually subjected to identification checks. When there

were indications that US forces would participate in the Vietnam war, the

Communists initiated a program of agent training whereby women were taught

English and prepared to apply for jobs in American agencies and organizations. To give them credence and a good cover, the Communists subsequently managed to have them attend GVN-run English classes.

With time and experience, popular sources and informants were apt to

graduate into full-fledged intelligence cadre at the service of military intelligence agencies. When thus promoted, they no longer belonged

to the people's intelligence system which, in effect, functioned only at

lower levels and in those areas under contest or Communist control. Not

everybody, however, could become informants in the people's intelligence

system. The Communists made certain exceptions and excluded from their

service certain categories of people, in particular: 1. those who worked

for the GVN or served in the RVNAF and the National Police; 2. those who

were pro-GVN; 3. those who were active in religious organizations; 4.

those who bore a hatred toward Communism for personal reasons; 5. those

who had been convicted or indicted by Communists; 6. those former Communist personnel who had been detained and released by the GVN after co4

operating with it; 7. and finally, ralliers.

Despite these exceptions, informants working for the Communists were

numerous and ubiquitous. They were generally able to gather information

on our activities on a country-wide basis. Among their methods of operation, the most universal and effective was through familial connections.

4

The purpose of listing these seven categories of persona non grata,

according to Communist documents, was to eliminate the possibility of

RVN-planted agents volunteering for Communist intelligence service. The

Communists nevertheless focused on inducing GVN and RVNAF cadres into

their spy network every time they felt they could be certain of success

in each individual case.

215

• -• ----- - - - -
" " "' '.'•'.'•','•'

Successes and Failures of Enemy Intelligence

In 1958, a lieutenant working for G-l, General Staff was found AWOL.

He was responsible for processing ARVN strength reports. An investigation discovered that when he fled North Vietnam with other refugees in

1954, he left his family behind. With vital documents on ARVN strength

in his possession, he had apparently returned to Hanoi.

In 1962, a young and brillant signal officer earmarked for an assignment in COMINT was extradited from the United States where he was attending a computer course related to decryptment work. He was arrested as

soon as he arrived at Tan Son Nhut. It was discovered that he had been

induced to operate as a planted agent in South Vietnam since his school

days in Hanoi. While living in Saigon, he was watched over by a Communist

cadre, his own stepfather, who also happened to be an ARVN warrant officer.

Also arrested with him was his brother-in-law, a Communist agent, who was

serving as an ARVN lieutenant and English instructor at the ARVN Language

School.

During an operation in 1963, ARVN forces seized from the enemy a copy

of the entire RVN Economic and Strategic Hamlet Plan. This plan was

drafted in 1961 by economists Vu Quoc Thuc and Staley and disseminated to

several governmental agencies. An investigation failed to determine when

and where the document had been stolen.

During the 1968 Tet offensive, a note booklet was discovered on the

corpse of a Communist intelligence cadre in Hue. In this booklet there

was a long list of important RVN personalities, complete with their addresses,

professions, vehicles, habits, etc. Even minor details were found carefully

noted, if deemed relevant. On a certain official, it was noted, for example,

that he always carried a pistol for self-defense but the pistol was usually

put away in the glove compartment of his car.

In 1970, operational forces in MR-3 captured from the enemy a copy of

the JGS Combined Campaign Plan (AB-144) in which important directives were

given to Corps for the implementation of the GVN pacification and rural

development program. After an investigation, it was found that the plan

216
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had been sold by a major working at J-3, JGS for 250,000 piasters, of

which he had received 100,000. He claimed that he needed the money to

buy a house for his family. Again, in 1970, a Communist cadre dis- "-.;!->.

closed that he was completely conversant with the RVN-US negotiating .•>•.

platform and objectives in the Paris talks thanks to a source close to ':'.£?/

a member of the RVN delegation. *~

>..

One of the most important and public-rousing espionage cases was

.•-.-•

the Huynh Van Trong affair, unearthed in 1971. He was a trusted aide

working in the Office of the Presidential Political Assistant. To

help his penetration, a Communist cadre recommended him to a Catholic T*

bishop who enjoyed a good relationship with President Thieu. Operating

under a pre-conceived plan, he provided much accurate intelligence data .'

on the Communists and soon earned complete trust from his superiors.

In his capacity, he was tasked to write situation analyses and estimates.

R

In December 1973, Communist sappers in coordination with planted -;.-"!

agents succeeded in blowing up the Shell fuel storage plant at Nha Be,

causing 80% destruction to the fuel stocks. This was done while the

world was being caught in the grips of an energy crisis.

In 1974, a rallier revealed that in Kien Giang province, the

Communists were able to intercept and break through 90% of the contents

of messages exchanged between the Sector and its Subsectors. This feat,

he said, was attributable to the effectiveness of Communist Technical f'i?

Reconnaissance units. '•/-.

Again in 19 74, a "legal" Communist messenger was apprehended at Cu \.'V

Chi. He was a peddler of plastic toys, and some microfilms were found

concealed in his merchandise. Among the microfilms seized, there was a

photocopy of a report by the Joint Senate-Lower House Defense Committee

. *- -

filed after an inspection tour in MR-2. The report contained detailed ; '.

•'• '•

information on the friendly situation, enemy capabilities and policy and

the difficulties and requirements of MR-2. Another microfilm revealed a

photocopy of the enemy order of battle strength in South Vietnam. The

investigation on the Senate-Lower House report did not bring about any

results because of constraints imposed by congressional immunity. But it

was discovered, in the case of the enemy 0B strength, that this document | j

217

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had been loaned to a major working at the Central Intelligence Office

by his friend, a lieutenant belonging to the OB section of Unit 306, J-2,

JGS. Using his friendship, the major had asked to borrow the document V->

for reference purposes, claiming that it would take him a long time to

go through official loan procedures. He went into hiding one day after

the "legal" messenger was arrested. "^

The above examples are but a few selected among other instances of

enemy intelligence exploits. They indicate that the enemy was apt to

employ every approach, every technique to collect intelligence data that :'•-.'•

were required for his strategic and tactical needs. Among his collection ^

methods, the most widely used was found to be the familial connection

approach. Quang Ngai province offered the most typical case of this

approach. During 1973, an enemy notebook was captured which contained

•—

a long list of Communist "legal" agents among whom, there were several -<

civil servants and servicemen. An investigation revealed that in most

cases, these civil servants and servicemen had been pressed into Com- ••';.-

munist service by their close relatives. "-)•'-;

Despite its extensiveness, the enemy collection effort was still ^^jj

- , plagued with tactical deficiencies and strategic errors. During the

1968 Tet offensive, for example, when attacking Quang Ngai provincial

capital by surprise, the Communists had estimated that they could seize .'-v

•

this city with relative ease. As a result, they began their attack at ""I

0400 hours. Two hours later, ARVN forces of the 2d Infantry Division .'•[.

initiated a counterattack and drove the enemy out of the city, capturing

in the process several prisoners. After interrogation, the prisoners

revealed that their intelligence estimate for the attack indicated that *-ll

the ARVN 2d Infantry Division was only armed with M-l rifles and carbines.

They admitted they did not expect so much automatic fire from ARVN forces, ."•.;;

which caught them entirely by surprise. This was an instance of enemy

failure to collect accurate intelligence data prior to an attack. One r^-^

day prior to the enemy offensive, the 2d Infantry Division had received

emergency shipments of M-16 rifles, for the first time.

In 1970, when ARVN forces made preparations to launch a crossborder offensive operation into Cambodia, an enemy document was captured ~~"T

219

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which happened to be the CT-9 Division's intelligence estimate, dated

one day before the operation's D-day. The enemy division estimated that

ARVN forces would not dare to strike into Cambodia for fear of world-wide

political and diplomatic repercussions.

In early 1967, the North Vietnamese leadership, and Vo Nguyen Giap

in particular, concluded that the US would make a landing in North Vietnam. As a consequence he initiated a plan, which was approved by Hanoi's

Politbureau, to organize a people's militia force to face an eventual

US ground offensive. The activation of this colossal militia force was

met by stiff opposition by some other North Vietnamese leaders because

it created two major difficulties. First, North Vietnam ran the risk of

drastic curtailment in economic production, its manpower being absorbed

into non-productive national defense tasks. Second, the armed militia

might be dangerous to the regime's security in case they became disenchanted with the war effort. Still, Vo Nguyen Giap was irretractable

as to his prediction of a US landing, which apparently obsessed him and

spurred him into taking some pre-emptive counteraction. This was how

the 1968 general offensive came about, undoubtedly a result of Giap's

estimate. He also predicted that this general offensive would be crowned

with certain success because, according to his estimate, it was supported

by a general popular uprising. Events had proved him wrong.

Another major intelligence blunder committed by North Vietnam was

its failure to assess correctly the nature and extent of US reactions as

it decided to blockade Hai Phong and fly B-52 bombing missions over both

Hanoi and Hai Phong in late 1972. Hanoi's estimate at that time did not

include these possibilities.

In early 1975, North Vietnam estimated that in case of general

offensive in South Vietnam, the US probably did not have the capabilities

for a ground intervention by Army forces, but it still had the capabilities for intervention with, the US Air Force. As a matter of fact, Hanoi's

resolution asserted that no matter what will happen, we must be armed by

a spirit that does not fear an American re-intervention.

220

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An Evaluation of Enemy Intelligence

During the Vietnam war, it was evident that the Communists attached

much importance to intelligence which they regarded as one of the major

causes for success or defeat. The achievements that they obtained in

intelligence gave us certain indications as to its effectiveness.

A careful analysis of events revealed that the Communist hands had

been reinforced by certain external supports that facilitated to a great

extent their intelligence collection effort. A high-ranking rallier who

used to be responsible for cultural affairs and history and had served

as personal secretary to another high-ranking cadre in the Saigon Military Command told us a revealing story that shed some light on this external support.

Everyday at 1700 hours, he recalled, Communist messengers were ready

at pick-up points in Cu Chi (Hau Nghia province), Trang Bang (Tay Ninh

province), Ben Cat (Binh Duong province) to take delivery of newspapers

from Saigon. (As a matter of fact, all Saigon newspapers were published

in the afternoon in order to reach newsstands.across the country the next

day). The procurement and shipment of newspapers were performed by

Communist agents in Saigon and intended for the Press Section of COSVN.

By the evening, this Section had completed a press analysis report for

the consumption of COSVN's Military Intelligence Agency. The reason for

three separate pick-up points, the rallier said, was to make sure that

newspapers reached the Press Section in time for its analysis work because newspapers were a major source that provided abundant information

on the RVN military, political, economic and diplomatic activities.

Should one messenger cell fail to deliver them, there were always two

others. It was estimated that up to 80% of information gathered on the

RVN were found in newspapers. Communist military specialists took particular interest in reports carried by the "Tien Tuyen" daily (a commercialized

Government Political Warfare Department publication) because these provided

accurate and timely information. Political and economic specialists favored

the "Chinh Luan" daily for its professionally written articles on political

and economic affairs.

221

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Even the tabloids of dubious quality could furnish some information of

interest to COSVN and help it take timely and appropriate actions.

Through press reports, for example, the rallier revealed, COSVN learned

that Mr. Nguyen Van Bong, Chairman of the "Radical Movement," was being

consulted for the post of Prime Minister and this probability was near

certain. As a result, COSVN promptly decided to get rid of him the

rallier concluded.

The press as well as other news media in South Vietnam such as

radio and television constituted perhaps the wealthiest and quickest

source of information. Saigon newspapers were usually censored by the

GVN but in most cases, the censored reports just contained controversial

information on internal politics. The reader was always able to get

vital military information with relative ease. In a press interview he

gave in February 1975, for example, the commander of II Corps withheld

nothing from what he knew about the enemy's goals and future actions in

his MR and even outlined his operational plans in no uncertain terms.

There was once an article written by a VNAF officer who took pride in

listing everything he knew about the VNAF organization, and the number

and types of aircraft. Every morning, the Military Broadcasting Service

gave a detailed account of recent battles, complete with live coverage

and interviews with participants who reported in vivid and accurate details the battle progress, its objectives, the friendly tactic and, of

course, their identities and position.

What made these things happen the way they did? Was it because the

GVN wanted to prove some point or just because it wanted to get rid of

an inferiority complex? The point to be proved was clear enough. We

were a free and democratic society. Our life quality was improving and

catching up with other advanced countries in the world. Thus, the GVN

felt compelled to duplicate the Western democratic way of life in

national affairs, even its errors and weaknesses. It seemed to be oblivious to the fact that South Vietnam was just an underdeveloped country

that a vicious war was tearing apart.

Every year, budget projects prepared in detail by each ministry of

the GVN were submitted to the Senate and Lower House for approval. The

222

•
." ." F ." .' I" . •••''* • ". ".' "*. .'- ."• ' i | P' p . . . J • | . . ' I '

procedures for reviewing and hearings were as open as in any democratic

country. Defense budget committees of both houses of the General Assembly

naturally had the right to ask detailed questions about proposed expenditure and the Ministry of Defense was required to present justifications.

Questions and answers resulted in the revelation of all defense secrets,

for example, how many general reserve brigades, how many armor squadrons

would be activated next year, or how would the GVN go about upgrading

Regional Forces into regular forces, how many troops would be involved in

the process, etc. All these were sensitive defense secrets which, after

going through the legislative machinery, ceased altogether to be secrets.

Each year, the Prime Minister's Office published a roster of key officials

of the GVN, to include those of the Ministry of Defense, the Joint General

Staff and the Services and Arms of the RVNAF, complete with position titles,

dates of appointment, personal addresses, and home and office telephone

numbers. This roster alone was apt to give the enemy a detailed knowledge

about our governmental structure, its subordinate agencies and its responsible leaders, all for free. On the civilian side, it was known that government agencies were generally careless and peremptory in safeguarding

classified papers and documents. A crypto clerk in the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs was once found working on his encrypted messages in an

open office in the presence of visitors. The loss or pilferage of documents, therefore, usually went unnoticed and even if it was discovered,

there were chances it would not be reported. A utility man might by

chance obtain old files and documents and sell them for a profit. In one

instance it was discovered, also by chance, that classified papers

by stacks were used by street vendors to wrap foods and sandwiches.

The kind of inferiority complex that obsessed the GVN was apparently

its feeling of being the underdog in political struggle and propaganda

effectiveness vis-a-vis the Communists. This explained why the GVN always

went all out to regain an equal status. Intelligence was sometimes employed toward this purpose, unfortunately, without reservations or respect

for the safeguarding of secrets. During a meeting of the Two-Party Joint

Military Commission, a RVN delegate did not hesitate to quote the content

of COSVN Directive No. 3/73, a recently captured document, to prove his

!<

223

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point that the other side made a mockery of the Paris Agreement. The

unfortunate result was that he had helped the enemy to learn that the

RVN did not possess the complete text of the document. As a consequence,

the enemy ordered all his cadres to destroy it. To pro\e that the enemy

constantly violated the Paris Agreement, our information and propaganda

agencies found it expedient to divulge intelligence data on his infiltrations of men and weapons, his scheme of attack, etc., and even disclosed the sources of these data. This either helped the enemy know to

what extent our intelligence effort had succeeded or prompted him to

take steps to counter it. Either way, it was the war effort that suf- •

fered the most.

The compromise of tactical operations was sometimes attributed to

enemy penetration or monitoring feats. The general impression was that

no matter how secret an operational plan was kept, the enemy would learn

about it sooner or later. The Lam Son 719 operation in early 1971 was

frequently cited to make this point on enemy forewarning. But the RVNUS strategic idea of striking into enemy-held sanctuaries and logistical

bases across the border had already been exposed by the Cambodian incursion of the previous year. There were indications that Communist units

operating in lower Laos had been warned to take precautionary measures

against the probability of similar cross-border incursion in their area

of operation by RVN-US forces. Thus, it was a matter of simple logic

that the next target would be the logistical base complex in lower Laos

and the time frame for a possible attack anywhere within the short dry

season.

The amount of preparations and the delay in launching the attack

could also have been elements that helped reinforce the enemy's reasoning

and his alertness. While there was no proof that his intelligence

actively sought to find out and know about Lam Son 719 while if. was

being planned, there were possible clues unconsciously given away by

ARVN units getting prepared for the attack that any alert enemy agent

could have picked up and reported.

Over the years, ARVN units were plagued by the impossibility to

keep operational preparations under wraps. There were some reasons for

224

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- this. First, the unit's dependent quarter was always an abundant source

of information on the unit's activities. If the unit was preparing for

some action, the troops' dependents were bound to learn about it the

* :•"• minute orders were given. Some units tried to offset this shortcoming

by confining troops to the barracks prior to an operation but even then,

äjmjpj the dependents always managed to learn about what their husbands and

fathers were up to. Second, it was a fact that small unit commanders

were extremely careless when talking over the radio despite warnings and

education. In addition to this deplorable habit, they also never bothered

pcy to use voice codes which they considered cumbersome and inconvenient.

That explains why the enemy monitoring of ARVN low-powered FM networks

was so widespread and productive. Thus, to say that the RVN unconsciousV-V ly gave Communist intelligence a helping hand is not an abusive statement.

In addition, North Vietnam must have received some intelligence

. support from the Communist bloc and Soviet Russia in particular. This

support was evidenced by the supply of weather information and data

Nv- concerning B-52 flights. Weather information helped the enemy select

the more appropriate days to push their attacks without fear of our

.\-\ tactical air. Data concerning B-52 flights such as take-off time, number

of aircraft, direction, speed, etc., certainly helped the enemy to an-

.--. ticipate the approximate time of strike and the general target areas.

f& At least, the kind of external support the enemy received from Russia

could be helpful in alleviating his constant fear of B-52 strikes and

comforting the morale of his troops. The common belief, instilled by

political commissars and held among enemy troops as true was that his

£-_« intelligence was infallible and knew everything. Enemy troops believed,

for example, that every B-52 overflight was known a few hours in advance

|v\ but never found out why. If this claim had been true, no one else could

have provided the forewarning but the Russians with their extensive,

I sophisticated monitoring network. Other local indications could also

have forewarned the enemy about B-52 strikes, such as the suspension

of tactical air and reconnaissance flights over the target area, etc.

The ARVN could not possibly know about B-52 flights since no field commander had ever been notified in advance. Hence the contention that

225

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leaks on the ARVN side which were picked up by agents within its ranks

led to the enemy's advance knowledge on B-52 flights was unjustified.

There was only once, an unique instance which was never repeated, that

an ARVN corps commander was notified in advance of B-52 flights. The

Corps commander felt it his duty to notify his division commanders who

in turn notified their subordinates down the channels with the end result

that at battalion level, notification was communicated among units by

messages in clear. But that was the only time this ever happened. Moreover, the selection of B-52 targets was a MACV prerogative, based on

recommendations by ARVN Corps Commanders who always communicated directly

with their US advisers or Field Force commanders in such matters by voice

rather by correspondence. In strategic intelligence too, both Russia

and Red China must have been of great help to North Vietnam by providing

information concerning US policies, attitudes and probable courses of

action for certain periods of time. But apart from this external help,

conscious or unconscious, how in reality did Communist intelligence fare

by itself?

As has been said earlier, the enemy succeeded reasonably in intercepting our communications through the use of his technical reconnaisr

sance units. However, this effort was only of a small scale and his

resources and techniques were rather rudimentary by US standards. The

enemy communications intercept effort would have been less successful

if on the RVN side, tighter countermeasures had been taken. A novel

technique that the enemy introduced late in the war was air reconnaissance; first flights were recorded in late 1974. But the flights were

few and their coverage,limited. The results must also have been marginal

because sophisticated techniques such as SLAR and Red Haze were entirely

beyond North Vietnam Air Force capabilities.

In technical intelligence, North Vietnam was in fact more concerned

about finding out how US and RVN techniques worked than trying to employ

these techniques. Since 1965, North Vietnam had been trying to learn

about the capabilities and limitations of the EC-47, Mohawk, pilotless

air reconnaissance, and sensors. Its interest focused particularly on

ARDF methods. At first, it was evident that Communist intelligence was

226

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not familiar with this technique of intelligence collection. One of its '••,

reports in fact read: "Enemy intelligence has discovered the location

of ...division headquarters at ... Please inform the division and apply

strict security measures. Try to find out why information has been

leaked." It certainly took the enemy a long time to find out. When

the enemy began to know more about ARDF, he made a conscientious effort

to shoot down what he called "electronic reconnaissance" aircraft whereever possible or took protective measures such as radio silence, or

even radio deception as in the case of the NVA 320th Division which

left behind its command radio station at Due Co while slipping out surreptitiously toward Ban Me Thuot in February 1975.

By contrast, the enemy was more successful in people's intelligence.

As has been said, the system was built on the base of "all-people" and

"totality." Consequently, it provided the enemy with a considerable

amount of sources in every locality, in every field, and at any time.

The system was totally responsive to the enemy's intelligence requirements without creating incidental problems such as funds, recruiting,

operational control, etc. which ordinarily plagued any human intelligence effort. Taking its roots from the people themselves, the Communist people's intelligence system was difficult to detect and destroy.

Even if it could be detected, the leads would not help us go far or

obtain information of any importance.

In addition to its contributions to intelligence on a professional

point of view, the Communist people's intelligence system also played

an important political role in the war. By actually participating in

it, people felt they were truly involved and in fact behaved as though

they held the Initiative and actually directed the war effort themselves.

This was a definite advantage over our side which was always hard put

to elicit the people's participation..

It was however not the Communist intelligence agencies that

actually organized the people's intelligence system and pushed it ahead.

It was the party and its local committees that played a key role in

pushing party policies and directives, enforcing and controlling them,

and instituting appropriate sanctions. Even ^n regular meetings of

227

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local party committees, which were normally held once every week or

bimonthly, the most important item of discussion was always a review

of the enemy situation in every aspect. Local party committees, however,

were active and effective only in Communists controlled areas. Their

activities were severely restricted in contested areas.

For all its merits, the Communist people's intelligence system was

plagued by a serious drawback: the non-professional or amateurish

character of people's nets. Their reports were usually inaccurate,

incomplete and confusing. But perhaps people's intelligence derived its

merits more from quantity than quality, as Mao Tse Tung put it:

4

"Quality could be replaced by quantity and morale." Another deficiency

of this system was that it worked more in theory than in practice.

Although the basic motto prescribed that each citizen should be an

informant, the passive and resilient nature of the Vietnamese common

farmer or villager and his traditionally-ingrained aversion to authoritharian power would never make him a good one.

The extent of enemy penetration into GVN agencies and the RVNAF

ranks, and the existence of turncoats among them, however, were not as

ubiquitous and potentially serious as they appeared to be or as was

generally surmised. If enemy penetration had been extensive and effective, what can explain then his dismal failure to incite disruptions

or rebellious acts within the RVNAF ranks during his offensive campaigns

of 1968 and 1975 which were, so to speak, go-for-broke affairs? The

fact was, even during these extremely confusing times, not. a single ...

turncoat incident had been recorded save for the apparently enemy-induced

bombing of the Independence Palace by a F-5 pilot in mid April 1975.

An idea can be made, however, of the extent of enemy penetration as it

existed in 1968, based on enemy documents. The enemy Saigon-Cholon

4

Mao Tse Tung's Selected Works, opus cited.

228

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Front Connnittee, in fact, disclosed in one of its documents captured

during the Tet offensive that he had succeeded in enlisting the service

of 112 sources in Saigon-Cholon—an open metropolitan area of over 2 million inhabitants. And this was at the height of his success in infrastructure activities.

A case study of Communist intelligence at work perhaps could give

us a better idea as to its effectiveness. This is what a military intelligence cadre of Tay Ninh province told us about his provincial intelligence set up: The provincial military intelligence section has the

mission to collect military as well as political intelligence in its

area of responsibility (the province) and order of battle information

such as unit designation, location, strength, biographies of military

and civilian personalities of interest to the Party, defense plans and

position of bases, outposts, reinforcement plans, and local terrain.

This information is to be reported on a daily basis.

The Tay Ninh Military Intelligence Section was organized into five

provincial collection teams under province control, eight district col-

'*» lection teams under respective district control, a number of people's

collection nets, and most particularly, a technical reconnaissance team

for the collection of communications intelligence. Four out of the five

provincial MI teams were deployed around Tay Ninh city: Cau Sat, Cau

mam Khoi, Giong Ca, Ho Don; the fifth one was Trang Bang district. Each

team was controlled by from one to three cadres and its mission was to

'l-'^j- keep track of all ARVN troop movements.

For the dispatch of information, the Tay Ninh MI Section employed

both "legal" messengers and radio. Messengers were responsible for

dispatching routine or low precedence information between the Section

and its teams or between the Section and infiltrated agents or regular

agents. Radio was used only for transmitting important information to

m.. higher intelligence agencies. Among the teams, the technical reconnais-

•,".'• sance team was regarded as the most effective, providing instant information through communications intercept. The Section's people's collection nets were not very active; they existed only in name.

'•VThe Tay Ninh MI Section was not successful in recruiting penetration

229

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agents. So far, there were only two such agents known; one was a

member of the local Democratic Party (GVN-organized), the other was an

ARVN corporal working at Sector headquarters. The Cau Sat team had five

agents, none of them penetration. Other teams fared no better. "In

summary", the MI cadre concluded, "The Tay Ninh MI Section was not effective. Its activities were seriously curtailed by a shortage of MI

cadre, failure in agent recruiting and poor communications."

The status of enemy military intelligence in Tay Ninh of course

did not reflect the overall situation; it did, however, indicate that

the Communist intelligence system was plagued with many deficiencies

and difficulties. Still, it enjoyed some advantage over our own military

intelligence. For one thing, enemy intelligence plans were based on

and made up part of a national plan conceived by the Politbureau. For

another, the enemy intelligence effort was a unified effort, centrally

controlled and judiciously distributed to responsible agencies throughout the hierarchy. This feature could be observed through the enemy

general offensives of 1968 and 1975.

Regarding methods of collection, the Communists were more effective

in human intelligence than technological intelligence which was in effect one of its basic weaknesses. But they were apt to learn more about

it in time. What is more important to intelligence, however, lies not

in collection methods or the data gathered, but in the analysis and

synthesis of these data. This is something no intelligence specialist,

regardless of his ideological conviction, can deny. The problem is

always to arrive at an accurate estimate for every situation. But to

me this has always seemed to be one of the enemy's shortcomings.

His other shortcoming derives from his own shortsighted, subjective

view. By subordinating intelligence to politics, he has come up with

self-serving estimates just to keep in line with his ultimate goal. He

erred fatally in 1968 when surmising that the South Vietnamese population was ripe for an uprising. Only later was he able to find out why

it did not happen. In fact, the enemy intelligence establishment has

never been able to do a professional job just because it can never

bring itself to contradic the party line. To the Communists, facts

230

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CHAPTER VIII

Conclusions

232

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Every qualified observer will agree that the RVN had too many intelligence agencies, civilian, para-military and military. These agencies

were in different command channels and reported to different authorities.

This, gave rise to redundancies in tasks and objectives, dilution of effort and, worst of all, unhealthy competition. An effort was made to

offset the handicaps of this situation by establishing intelligence coordination committees but this solution did not work out as expected.

Effective coordination suffered from the fact that it depended upon the

willingness to cooperate of the individual members involved. The members

enjoyed equal status and enjoyed equal prerogatives; this statutory

equality even existed among collection agencies and the command organization which directed the collection effort. The principal endeavors of

these collection agencies usually tended toward gaining the trust and

confidence of the high-ranking authorities to whom they were subordinate.

Among the many ways they could achieve this approbation were by providing

the kind of information that the authorities liked most to have and, by

giving them raw information for the sole purpose of making them the first

ones to know, regardless of the validity of the information which had ß:- j|:

yet to be analyzed, interpreted and evaluated. The lateral dissemination

of such information to other interested intelligence agencies was relegated

to secondary importance and sometimes withheld altogether; lateral dissemination was not mandatory. ^

The assignment of prerogatives and resources to intelligence agencies

was based not on the mission, organization and performance of the agency

concerned but on the relationship the agency enjoyed with the authority ..."

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that employed it, and most particularly on the power of this authority.

•-'.••".'

South Vietnamese leaders were of course fully aware of the organizational complexity and multiplicity of the intelligence establishment

and consequently, the need for streamlining, and unifying the intelligence

effort. But the intricate interplay of political powers and interests ."V*-\"

prevented progress along these lines because it remained the basic .-;/«!

desire of each executive authority to have under his personal control ~^—

an intelligence agency that he could freely use for his own end. Moreover there was always the danger of creating a new kind of power rivalry

if all intelligence agencies were placed under any one authority. No

one really wanted an all-powerful intelligence authority. ~~ ~z

Although there existed too many intelligence agencies, their efforts

were nearly exclusively limited to in-country collection. Agencies such

as the Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

the Research and Documentation Office of the Ministry of Defense, and !^

its military attache offices overseas, were ineffective organizations

which contributed very little in terms of collection effort in support ]•••"-"

of the intelligence requirements of the war.

Within South Vietnam, the primary interests in information and the _,|

objectives of intelligence activities focused mostly on the military

situation and internal politics. Economic intelligence was largely v" '.

neglected. The lack of good economic intelligence led to ineffective

resource control programs. Rice, the most important national resource -|

which directly affected the lives of the populace, was not subject to

effective control. Production, distribution and trade in this vital

commodity were manipulated by profiteering middlemen who always managed

to divert large quantities into enemy-controlled areas. In addition to J

speculation and pilferage of rice, the RVN Government was also plagued

by a proliferation of counterfeited banknotes. There were many reasons

to believe that the enemy was behind this sabotage of the currency but

this suspicion was never confirmed by hard intelligence. I

Despite the emphasis on tactical intelligence, and some considered

this emphasis excessive—the resources allotted for tactical intelligence

collection were far below requirements. The RVN defense expenditures

233

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r

T^~T' - .-• -• - :-v-.-»'.-^-.-. -.-*T*^T- ."- • " "• '••"• "•."•."•

represented Che greatest share of the national budget but most of the

defense budget was earmarked for what were considered priority needs

"to move, to shoot and to communicate." Very little was spent "to see;"

the leadership failed to realize that it made little sense to have

mobility and firepower if the enemy could not be found and his activities anticipated.

Not only did the RVN political and defense leadership show little

interest in military intelligence, field commanders in general did not

regard military intelligence as a command responsibility such as operations, logistics and training. Strange as it may seem, military intelligence was considered a staff responsibility, an activity for which

intelligence specialists were primarily responsible. With this attitude,

it is not surprising that military intelligence was frequently made the

scapegoat for tactical failures while victories invariable appeared the

result of good tactical operation. Although the RVN military doctrine

defined command responsibilities as encompassing all tactical aspects

—including intelligence—the concept seemed to be lost on our commanders. The training of cadets in the military schools was heavily oriented

toward tactics. Future commanders were trained to maneuver troops but

learned little of other command responsibilities. As a result, thoughout their careers as commanders, they held the notion that tactics was

the only command responsibility.

Because most commanders had inadequate knowledge of the art of

tactical intelligence and consequently little confidence in the ability

of intelligence professionals to furnish competent evaluations, they

were not satisfied with the traditional method used to denote the readability and accuracy of intelligence information. For example»a piece

of information evaluated as B-2, should be considered reliable and of

high value. In South Vietnam, however, commanders usually did not consider B-2 information reliable enough to warrant action. Information

whose evaluation stood below A2 or A3 was generally regarded as inconsequential and ignored. In an effort to convince commanders of the

true validity of certain important information, and also to tactfully

defer to their intractable disposition toward the evaluation system,

eventually, all pieces of information were clearly identified as

234

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• * _• J> m* •< m wr • _ *
•.-i-»->- 1 - *•• •.-»•••» .-»"* —. ; *. .T. -. *•• »." »•»-«•' •

-^~*~t '•-;•.'.•**•;*.".'.•—«•; •- — - - ;- ••- jto their specific source such as aerial photo, communications intelligence, prisoner of war or agents, etc. This disclosure of the nature

of the source of course ran afoul of intelligence security principles

which were established to protect the source, but it effectively served

the purpose of convincing commanders as to the validity of the information. There were instances of course in which the source had to be

protected at all costs. In those cases, the information was only described as "special" and "of high value."

Sometimes—and unfortunately with disastrous results—senior commanders were unable to understand the implications of critical intelligence information furnished them. It was not enough for the intelligence officer to gather and analyze accurate, timely information concerning enemy capabilities and intentions and furnish the commander a

finished intelligence estimate. Unless the intelligence officer had the

time, and opportunity to explain its importance and make sure that the

commander fully understood, there was a fair chance that the estimate

would be misunderstood and perhaps disregarded.

"Know thyself and know the enemy" is a recognized universal precept.

But knowledge about the enemy, as far as intelligence is concerned, was

limited to commanders only. Rarely did commanders take the trouble to

inform or indoctrinate their troops concerning upcoming operations. A

unit going into battles stands a better chance of success if each of its **•

men knows something about the enemy he is likely to confront, such as •2\\-*\*

his identity, type, size, capabilities and vulnerabilities. If such ••'•':'••'.-'

knowledge had been provided before each battle, each soldier would ha'e felt • •"-.-'-.;

more confident and would have performed his duties with greater spirit.

Intelligence on the enemy in South Vietnam derived from both political and military sources. A problem arose when they flatly contradicted

each other. If such was the case, which source should be given more

weight and used as the basis for a correct estimate? Civilian intelligence agencies tended to trust information obtained from political sources

because they were usually connected with higher enemy echelons. In

contrast, military intelligence organizations usually considered infor235

-

-* * * A . - • - ^ - - • - * -
-,-.-.. . ,-.••-.. • • " '- • • ' • T" •••»—•.••.— •• • • • •-:-- - - - • - - - ..yp.

mation derived from military sources more reliable even though the

information was sometimes just the interrogation of an enemy soldier.

The rationale supporting the military intelligence viewpoint proved to

be correct on many occasions. In contrast to the South Vietnamese and

American practice of not informing lower echelons concerning strategic

concepts . at places political indoctrination was the Communist normal

way of life and an important part of basic military education. Communist

soldiers were constantly updated on the latest Party line, political

objectives, the demands placed on military units, and the specific tasks

they had to carry out. As a result, strange as it may seem, even a Communist cadre of the lowest echelon possessed a surprisingly good knowledge about strategy and more specifically what his unit was about to do.

Although there was always the risk that information could be planted by

the enemy for deception. By and large, enemy tactical commanders did not

often go to the extreme of deceiving their own units, neither were they

permitted to alter plans once issued by higher authority. Thus information obtained from military sources was usually more reliable and more

accurate than that from political sources. Information derived from

political sources

wa

s frequently deceptive and misleading. As preludes

to their offensives of 1968 and 1975 for example, the Communists implemented elaborate and detailed plans aimed at leaking political information designed to conceal military moves and degrade the importance of * 'ßi

militari intelligence gathered by the RVNAF.

TT

- general, knowledge about major enemy offensive campaigns, and

gene, al offensives in particular, was predicated upon the following

indicators listed in their usual order of appearance in intelligence

reports.

1. Latest resolution adopted by the Politbureau of the Labor

(Communist) Party.

2. Official trips overseas by key governmental or Party officials

to seek aid and resulting increases in aid from the Communist

Bloc.

3. Appearance of modern weapons.

4. Reorganization or activation of command and control systems.

236

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i- I'm1'!1'!".'>'.»' »V -.". v -r i" .• ,• '*' * • .• *»*,'' * * .' *;' *t ••". ».»•«.' -—'• • •• •—"—"T—•—•••-••••—• 7-

5. Advance test of a certain form of tactical maneuver to be

employed in the offensive campaign.

6. Intensive indoctrination or special study sessions held in

units.

7. Visits made by high ranking military delegations from countries

giving aid.

8. Decreasing rate of returnees (ralliers).

9. Movement of reserve units into the battlefield.

There were other indicators such as logistic preparations, replacements and replenishment of unit strength, but these are not listed

because they were perennial activities applicable to campaigns of short

duration as well.

Despite their relatively clear significance, indicators such as

those listed above sometimes led to diverging assessments and different

opinions as to the enemy design. This was chiefly due to the fact that

military commanders and intelligence officers were usually interested

only in enemy capabilities and totally overlooked enemy intentions. As

a matter of fact this was exactly the way they had been trained to think;

military intelligence doctrine always emphasized capabilities and gauged

predictions based on intentions. The reason was simple; capabilities

could be pretty well measured, qualified and described while intentions

were often obscure, vague, and highly contentious. In the Vietnam war,

with its strong ideological context enemy capabilities more often than

not did not indicate the probability of attack and therefore did not

protect against surprise. Political dictates usually overrode military

common sense and Communists units were often tasked to launch attacks

for political gain without having the required capabilities to execute

such attacks successfully. "Suicide" was the usual term used to describe

surprise attacks; we learned that suicide was one of the enemy's capabilities. It was apparent that intelligence estimates had to take into

account both enemy capabilities and intention no matter how farfetched

his intentions might be.

Intelligence estimates were sometimes erroneous because the analyst

tended to see the enemy through the lens of his own culture and experience and

judged the enemy's actions and behavior as if the enemy would react as

237

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he would given certain stimuli. This was a common shortcoming. Intelligence analysts were rare who could reason the way the enemy did. This

at least in part accounted for the fact that RVN military intelligence

establishment failed to predict the enemy attack across the DMZ in the

1972 Summer Offensive. Such an action, it was thought, would constitute

such a blatant violation of the 1954 Geneva Accords that the enemy would

certainly never do it, given his usually reverent remarks about the

inviolability of the Accords, Similarly, few military commanders expressed

concern when enemy tanks appeared in large numbers on South Vietnamese

battlefields since the US and the Vietnamese Air Forces had absolute

superiority in airpower and could easily cope with the new threat.

In fact, it was not easy to place ourselves in the enemy's position

because our imagination, albeit aided by a thorough knowledge of the

enemy, usually fell short of reality. For example, although it was common knowledge that the enemy attached importance to the defense of his

bases and rural areas, we only discovered how important they were when

he resolved to attack our cities at great cost, just to loosen our grip

on the rural areas. To most of us it was a sobering experience that

helped us learn more about the enemy.

Operational experience in South Vietnam showed that there were

discrepancies between intelligence theory and practice. The discrepancy

stemmed from two facts. First, Vietnamese military intelligence did

not have a theory of its own. Like military doctrine in general, it was

largely based on American combat intelligence theory which had been

conceived for conventional war in which the enemy was always somewhere

in front of us and reacted in generally predictable patterns. Vietnamese

students attending intelligence courses found out that what they were

taught could not be applied in totality to the local environment and the

conditions of the war. Our tactical commanders acquired the practice

of responding only to simplified, condensed pieces of intelligence. They

were interested only in short, clear-cut answers to their queries about

the enemy for example, what was he going to do, when and where? Seldom

did they ask for more, such as how and why? It was almost a certainty

that any intelligence estimate that was written according to prescribed

238

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staff procedures and format would be automatically disregarded for the

simple reason that it was too long to read. Vietnamese tactical commanders rarely took any interest in documents having more than two pages.

The gap between intelligence theory and practice, therefore, should have

been reduced in the sense that for any theory to be useful, it should

reflect realities and be more realistically adaptable to practice.

Intelligence in Vietnam was truly a complex business because the

war itself was complex. It was at the same time a war of ideologies,

a civil war between the North and the South, and a war that was half

conventional, half unconventional, and finally totally conventional

at the end. Furthermore it was a proving ground for strategies, tactics,

and the modern weapon systems of two great contending world blocs.

Intelligence in Vietnam had its share of failures and successes.

During the early period of the war, it was plagued by instability, dilution of effort and a lack of professionalism. With the advent of cooperation and coordination with US forces, however, it gradually improved

and really attained solid ground after 1968. From that time on, its

activities were crowned with successes on a professional point of view.

But its successes could have been more substantial if intelligence had

been given its justified status and most importantly, if its capabilities

had been employed more impartially, objectively, and in a more disinterested

manner. Intelligence could have reaped more successes if the political

system to which it responded could have rallied more popular support

and consequently obtained more contributions towards intelligence activities from people in all walks of life. Such assistance to one's own

armed forces after all, was nothing more than a civil obligation which,

like paying taxes, was perhaps not pleasant, but nonetheless was vital to

the existence of the nation.

These conclusions on intelligence in Vietnam are not intended to

advance any innovative'ideas. They are rather an attempt to summarize

what actually took place in intelligence activities there during the war.

What we experienced there and the lessons we learned from our experiences,

although set in perhaps the most complex environment in which any war

was ever fought, were not greatly different from what others have

239

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experienced and learned in other conflicts. In fact, throughout there

was a thread of sameness, of timelessness in the fundamental principles

that have for ages been the foundation of successful intelligence practice.

There needs to be simplicity of organization; unity of effort; careful

delineation of interests and authority; free lateral exchange of infor- "^

mation among agencies; comprehensive coverage of all categories of useful

information and sources; clear definition of intelligence priorities;

unity of command and recognition that intelligence is a command responsibility; finished intelligence rather than raw information flowing to

the decision makers; appropriate high status accorded to intelligence

among the other military arts and activities, and this high status must

be recognized in the military budget; specific efforts to pass essential

information about the enemy to the troops who do the fighting; an appreciation of the importance of learning the enemy's intention and of

correctly interpreting intelligence concerning them; a theory of intelligence that fits the situation faced by the commanders and intelligence

professionals who use it; and finally, any nation fighting for its

existence must make every effort to mobilize its entire population in

support of its armed forces, and this support must include intelligence.

If it does, the reward could be immeasurable in terms of frustrating

the enemy's intelligence and tactical operations as well as providing

to the nation's armed forces a vast resource of information concerning

enemy activities.

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AK-47 Russian designed assault rifle, 7.62-mm

'.*-"•"* ARDF Airborne radar detection finding '•y';'-:

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ASA Army Security Agency '-.''<

A-2 Assistant chief of staff for military intel-

£"-***-* ligence Air Force

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BDA Bomb damage assessment

*» • ' '-?-. CDEC Combined Document Exploitation Center '-.••".'

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CI Counter Intelligence

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CICV Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam

CIO Central Intelligence Office

CINCPAC Commander in Chief Pacific • .'- -" w CMEC Combined Materiel Exploitation Center E££|

CMIC Combined Military Interrogation Center

•-."-•"."• COMINT Communication Intelligence •.-"".-*'

COSVN Central Office of South Vietnam -"."-".',

Cr! CRA Central Research Agency

DAO Defense Attache Office • *«

DAME Defense against Method of Entry .\'

DASE Defense against Sound Equipment

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*C- DIA Defense Intelligence Agency ;•;

• DIOCC District Intelligence Operation Coordination

Center

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EEI

FFP

Essential Elements of Information

Field Force Police

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FWMAF

G-2

HOPLRS

HUMINT

ICD

IDHS

II

IIR

IP IRS

JGS

J-2

J-7

LOB

MACV

MAP

MI

MIA

MIBARS

MID

MPD

MSD

NICC

NILOS

NOFORN

NP

NSA

NVA

N-2

OB

OSA

PF

Free World Military Assistance Forces

Assistant Chief of Staff for Military

Intelligence Corps and Division level

Hot and Immediate Photo Interpretation Reports

Human Intelligence

Imitation Communication Deceptive

Intelligence Data Handling System

Imagery Interpretation

Intelligence Information Report

Immediate Photo Interpretation Read Out

Joint General Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence

Assistant Chief of Staff for Signal Intelligence

Lines of Bearing

Military Assistance Command Vietnam

Military Assistance Program

Military Intelligence

Military Intelligence Agency

Military Intelligence Battalion

Military Intelligence Detachment

Man Pack Personnel Detectors

Military Security Department (also MSS)

National Intelligence Coordination Committee

Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer

No Foreign

National Police

National Security Agency

North Vietnamese Army

Assistant Chief of Staff for Military

Intelligence Navy

Order of Battle

Office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador

Popular Forces

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PHOTINT Photo Intelligence

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PIOCC Province Intelligence Operation Coordination ' ]

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POW

Center

Prisoner of War

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RF

RVN

Regional Forces

Republic of Vietnam

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•'.'. • RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

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SA-7 Russian Heat-Seeking Rocket ;Vy

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SIGINT

SLAR

Signal Intelligence

Side Looking Airborne Radar

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SPARS Significant Problem Areas Report

STRATDET Strategic Technical Detachment

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SUPIR

S-2

Supplemental Photo Interpretation Report

Officer in charge of the Military Intelligence

Section of Regiment or smaller unit, Sector

M

and Sub-Sector level

y-.' TR Technical Reconnaissance

TRAC Target Research and Analysis Center HI

.-"..•' TRIM Training Relation and Instruction Mission

T-34 Russian tank '»• ,

.*•.. T-54 Russian tank

W T-59 Chinese copied T-54 Russian tank KM

.*• •"* . T-60 Russian medium tank

USAAG united States Army Support Activities Group

**• | VC Viet Cong -.'•j-

@ VCI Viet Cong Infrastructure m <W

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VNSF Vietnam Special Forces

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243

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