MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 7 ME 20 Docket: Yor

- 16

- 7 Submitted

On	Briefs: October	13,	2016 Decided: January	26,	2017 Panel: ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN ,	JABAR , HJELM, and HUMPHREY , JJ.

BANK	OF	AMERICA,	N.A.

v. JOHN	CAMIRE

HUMPHREY ,	J. [¶1] John	 Camire appeals	 from a	 judgment	 of	 the	 District	 Court (Biddeford, Cantara,	J. )	entered	in	 favor	of	Bank	of	America,	N.A. (the	Bank)

. The	 judgment	 arises	 out	 of	 an outstanding	 credit	 card	 debt.	 	We	 affirm	 the judgment in	 favor	 of	 the	 Bank ,	 but	 because	 we	 conclude that the trial court erred	 in	 dismissing	 Camire’s	 counterclaim, we	 vacate that	 portion	 of	 the judgment and	remand the	case for	further	proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND [¶2 ] On	March	24,	2014, FIA	Card	Services,	N.A. , initiated	this	action	in the	 District	 Court (Biddeford) against	 John	 Camire	 to	 recover damages totaling	 $11,573.40	 arising	 out	 of	 a debt	 incurred	 using	 a	 Bank	 of	 America
credit	card

. Camire	answ ered,	moved	to	dismiss	the	complaint,	and	asserted2 various affirmative	defenses. He also	filed	a	counterclaim	pursuant	to	the Fair Debt	 Collection	 Practices	 Act (FDCPA), 15	 U.S.C.S.	 §§ 1692

- 1692p	 (LEXIS through	Pub.	L. No. 114

- 28 4); 32	M.R.S. §§	11001

- 11054 (2016)

. 1 [¶3 ] FIA	Card	Services moved	to	dismiss	the	counterclaim and attached an	affidavit	from	its	attorney ,	N.	Laine	Astbury ,	to	the	motion

. A ttached to	the Astbury affidavit	 was a	 computer	 printout	 from	 the	 National	 Information Center,	 a	 website that purportedly maintains	 data	 collected	 by	 the	 Federal Reserve	about	 financial	institutions. Astbury	averred,	based	on	 the	printout, that	 FIA	 Card	 Services,	 N.A.,	 acquired	 Bank	 of	 America,	 N.A., on October 20, 2006. Astbury also averr ed that the	 printout was authentic	and
admissible pursuant	 to M.R.	 Evid.	 902(5),	 which	 provides	 that	 books, pamphlets,	 and	 official	 publications	 “purporting	 to	 be	 issued	 by	 a	 public autho rity”	are	self

- authenticating. [¶4 ] The	 court	 ( Cantara,	 J. )	 denied	 Camire’s motion	 to	 dismiss	 the complaint and	 granted	 the	 motion filed	 by	 FIA	 Card	 Services to	 dismiss
Camire’s	 counterclaim

. In	 granting	 the	 motion	 to	 dismiss,	 the	 court concluded,	based	on	the	Astbury	affidavit	and	printout,	that FIA	Card Servic es was	not	a	third	party collecting the debt,	but	rather	stood	in	the	place	of Bank

1 Camire’s	pleading	is	unclear as	to whether	he	asserts a claim	pursuant	to	the Maine FDCPA or the federal	FDCPA

. The	trial	c ourt	addressed	both and	our	analysis	follows	accordingly.3 of	America, the card	issuer	that extended	credit	to	Camire , and thus	FIA	Card
Services	was exempt	from liability	pursuant	to the	Act. 2 [¶5 ] On April	28,	2015,	the	court	( Driscoll,	J. )	issued	a n order	following a	pretrial conference setting	the	matter	for	trial	and	stating that two	hours	or
less would	 be	 required

. The	 Bank was	 substituted	 as	 the	 plaintiff	 on November	 25,	 2014. 3 T he	 court	 ( Canta ra,	 J. )	 held	 a	 ben ch	 trial	 on
November 24,	2015. The trial	began	at	1:14 p.m. and	concluded	at	4:55 p.m. , running	 over	 the	 two	 hours	 allocated, even excluding	 breaks	 and	 recesses

. The	court reminded Camire	of	time	constraints on numerous occasions during
the	 trial ,	 but	 allowed	 proceedings	 to	 continue	 lo nger	 than	 scheduled	 and beyond the	extensions	of	 time	 for	 testimony	granted	by	 the	court during the
trial

. [¶6 ] The court	entered	a	judgment in	favor	of the	Bank	in	the	am ount	of $11,573.40	plus	c osts.		Camire	timely	appealed.

2 Camire	 appealed	 the	 court’s	 rulings	 on	 the	 motions	 and	 we	 dismissed	 the	 appeal	 as interlocutory.

3 At	 trial,	 the	 Bank’s	 witness	 testified	 that	 FIA	 Card	 Services,	 N.A.,	 was	 a	 division	 of	 Bank	 of America,	N.A.,	t hat	changed	its	name	to	Bank	of	A merica,	N.A.,	in	October	2015.4 II.		DISCUSSION
A. Due	Process [¶7 ] In	this	appeal, Camire primarily argues	that	the	trial	court	failed	to provide	 him with an	 adequate	 opportunity	 to	 present	 his	 defenses	 and thereby	denied	him	due	process	of	law

. Camire contends	that	two	hours	were insufficient	to	present	his	case

. “ We review	questions	of	law,	including	alleged
constitutional	 violations

. . . de novo.” Sparks	 v.	 Sparks ,	 2013	 ME	 41,	 ¶	 19, 65 A.3d	1223 (quotation	marks	omitted)

. [¶8 ] Procedural due	process	claims	follow	a	two

- step	analysis:	first,	the claimant	 must	 demonstrate	 “ a	 deprivation	 of	 .	 .	 .	 life,	 liberty	 or	 property interests”	and	 “[s]econd,	if	such	a	deprivation	has	occurred,	a	determination must	 be	 made	 as	 to	 what	 process	 is	 due.” J ackson	 v. Town	 of Searsport , 456 A.2d	 852,	 856	 (Me.	 1983)

. That	 Camire	 was	 deprived	 of a property
interest is	undisputed. The	parties	dispute	 the	second	step,	whether	Camire received	adequate	process. The	fundamental	requirement	of	due	process	is	an	opportunity	to be heard upon	 such notice and	 proceedings	 as	 are	 adequate	 to safeguard	 the	 right	 which	 the	 particular	 pertinent	 constitutional provision	 purports	 to	 protect. The notice and	 opportunity	 for	 a hearing must	be	granted	at	a	meaningful	ti me	and	in	a	meaningful manner.5 Kirkpatrick	 v.	 City	 of	 Bangor ,	 1999	 ME	 73,	 ¶	 15,	 728	 A.2d	 1268 (citation omitted)	 (quotation	 marks	 omitted). Pr ocedural	 due	 process	 requires	 an opportunity	to	be	heard,	not	an	opti mal	opportunity	to	be	heard. See Portland Pipe	 Line	 Corp.	 v.	 Envtl.	 Improv.	 Com m’n ,	 307	 A.2d	 1,	 14	 (Me.	 1973) (“ Procedural	 due	 process requires	 no	 particular	 form	 of	 procedure.”)

. Unrepresented	 parties	 receive	 no	 special	 consideration	 and	 are	 held	 to	 the same	standards	as	represented	parties

. See New	England	Whitewater	Ctr.,	Inc. v.	Dep’t	 of	 Inland	 Fisheries	&	Wildlife ,	 550	A.2d	 56,	 60	 (Me.	 1988)

. The trial
court	has	discretion	 to reasonably manage	 time	during	evidentiary	hearings.
See Dolliver	 v.	Dolli ver ,	 2001	ME	 144,	 ¶	 10,	 782	A.2d	 316 (“A trial court has
broad discretion to	control	 the	order	and	 timing	of	presentation	of	evidence and	 to	 set	 and	 enforce	 reasonable	 time	 limits	 on	 testimonial	 hearings.”) ; M.R. Evid.	611(a). [¶9 ] Contrary	 to	 Camire’s assertions,	 he was	 not	 entitled	 to	 as	 much
time	as	he	wanted or believed	he	needed	to	present	his	case. Not	only	did	t he trial	 stretch	longer	 than	 the two	 hours	 allocated , but	 Camire	 fails	 to explain what	evidence,	if	any,	 he	would	 have	 presented	 to	 the court	with	additional
time. On	numerous	occasions	when	the	court	urged	Camire	to	use	time	wisely6 or	 to	 move	 the	 testimony	 forward,	 the	 court	 was	 enforcing	 relevance objections	that	it	had	sustained. 4 See M.R.	Evid.	401

. [¶1 0 ] Because	 Camire received	 ample	 notice	 of	 time	 constraints, appeared	at	trial,	and	had	an	opportunity	to	present	his	defenses, we conclude
that the	trial	court	properly	exercised	its	discretion	in	managing	trial	time	and
that no	 due	 process violation	 occurred. See Daud	 v .	 Abdullahi ,	 2015	ME	 48, ¶ 8 n.2,	 115	 A.3d	 77 (concluding that no	 procedural	 due	 process	 violation occurred	 where an unrepresented	 defendant	 had	 sufficient	 time	 to	 prepare for	 hearing); Sparks ,	 2013	 ME	 41,	 ¶	 29,	 65	 A.3d	 1223; City	 of	 Old	 Town	 v.
Dimoulas , 2002	ME	133,	¶	24,	803	A.2d	1018

. [¶1 1 ] Camire	 raises	 no	 other	 argument concerning	 the	 judgment against	 him

. We	 therefore affirm the	 judgment in	 favor	 of	 the	 Bank	 in	 the amount	of	$11,573.40	plus	costs

. 5
B. Fair	Debt	Collection	Practices	Act Counterclaim [¶1 2 ] Camire	 contends that the	 court	 erred	 in	 dismissing	 his FDCPA counterclaim. T he	 court dismissed	 the	 counterclaim	 relying on	 the	 Astbury

4 Camire	does	not	argue that the	court	erred	in	any	evidentiary	rulings.

5 Although	Camire	also	asserted	a	counterclaim	pursuant	to	the	FDCPA, he	does	not	argue,	and the federal	and	Maine FDCPA do	not	provide,	that	a n FDCPA	violation	is	a	defense	to	the	underlying debt. Remedies	are	limited	to	legal	relief	and	attorney	fees. See 15	U.S.C.S.	§	1692k ( LEXIS through Pub.	L.	No. 114

- 2 84 ) ; 32	M.R.S.	§	11054(1)	(2016). We	accordingly	affirm	th e	judgment	in	favor	of the	Bank	with	respect	to	the	debt.7 affidavit	attached	 to	 the Bank’s motion to	 dismiss , effectively	 converting	 the
motion to	 dismiss in to	 one for	 summary	 judgment. See M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 12(b); Beaucage	 v.	 City	 of	 Rockland ,	 2000	 ME	 184,	 ¶	 5,	 760	 A.2d	 1054

. In	 these circumstances, we	review the	judgment to	determine	whether a	genuine	issue of	 material	 fact	 exists and	 whether	 the	 party	 that obtain ed a	 summary judgment	 is	 entitled	 to	 judgment	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 law

. See Libner	 v.	 Me.	 Cty.
Comm’rs	 Ass’ n ,	 2004	 ME	 39,	 ¶	 8,	 845	 A.2d	 570 ; see	 also M.R.	 Civ. P. 12(b), 56(c). The court	 relied	 on the	 Astbury affidavit	 and attached	 printout ,	 but
made	 no subsidiary	 factual	 findings	 and	 did	 not	 state	 the	 legal	 bas is	 for admitting	the	evidence. We therefore review admission	of	the	evidence for	an
abuse	of	discretion. See State	v.	Mills ,	2006	ME	134,	¶	8,	910 A.2d	1053

. [¶1 3 ] We begin	with	a	summary	of	relevant FDCPA provisions

— a	legal
issue of	 statutory	 interpretation that	 we	 review	 de	 novo. Commerce	 Bank
& Tr.	Co.	v.	Dworman ,	2004	ME	142,	¶	7,	861	A.2d	662

. The Maine FDCPA and federal	FDCPA each	provide consumers	with	a	priva te	right	of	action	against “debt	 collectors,”	 as	 defined in	 each	 act

. See 15 U.S.C.S. § § 1692a(6), 1692k ( LEXIS ) ; 3 2	M.R.S.	§§	11002(6),	11054

. Creditors	are	generally	exempt	 from the	definition	of	“debt	collector”	and are thereby	exempt	from FDCPA liability.
See 15	U.S.C.S.	 § 1692a (6)(A) (LEXIS) ; 32	M.R.S.	 §	 11003(1)	 (excluding from8 the	definition	of	“debt	collector” “[a]ny	officer	or	employee	of	a	creditor	while,
in	 the name	 of	 the	 creditor,	 collecting	 debts	 for	 that	 creditor” ). Pursuant	 to the Maine	FDCPA,	a creditor	may,	however, be considered a	“debt	collector”	if, “in	 the	process	of	collecting	 the creditor ’s	own	debts, [the creditor ] uses	any name	 other	 than	 the creditor ’s	 that	 would indicate	 that	 a	 3rd	 person	 is collecting	 or	 attempting	 to	 c ollect	 these	 debts.” 32	 M.R.S.	 §	 11002(6 ). The federal	 FDCPA	 similarly	 defines	 “debt	 collector”	 to	 “include[]	 any	 creditor who,	in	the	process	of	collecting	his	own	debts,	uses	any	name	other	than	his own	 which	 would	indicate	 that	 a	 third	 person	is	 colle cting	 or	 attempting	 to collect	such	debts.”		15	U.S.C. S .	§	1692a (6 ) ( LEXIS ). [¶1 4 ] If FIA	 Card	 Services is	 not	 a “debt	 collector” as	 defined by	 the FDCPA, Camire’s counter claim	 would	 fail	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 law and	 FIA	 Card Services	 was	 entitled	 to	 a	 summary	 judgment

. See 15	 U.S.C. S .	 § §	 1692a (6) , 1692k (LEXIS) ; 32	M.R.S.	§ § 11002(6), 11003(1) ,	11054

. The	issue is whether
admissible	 evidence in	 the	 record establish es without	 dispute that FIA	 Card
Services	is not	 a	 “debt	 collector”	 and	 thus exempt	 from liability	 pursuant	 to the Maine	and	federal FDCPA

. [¶1 5 ] Relying	 on	 the	 Astbury	 affidavit,	 t he	 court	 concluded	 that	 FIA Card	Services	was	a	“creditor” and	not	a “debt	collector

. ” Astbury averred that9 FIA	Card Services,	N.A.,	acquired	Bank	of	America,	N.A., on	October 20, 2006 , based	 upon	 an	 attached computer printout	 from the	 National	 Information
Center ’s	website

. Astbury thus has	no	personal	knowledge of	the	facts	stated in	 the	 affidavit ,	 but asserts that the	 printout is admissible pursuant	 to	 M.R. Evid.	902(5). [¶1 6 ] Maine Rule of	Evidence 902(5) ,	however, is not	an	independent
basis to	 admit	 evidence ; i t merely dispenses	 with ordinary authentication rules. See	 State	 v.	 Lane ,	 591	 A.2d	 866,	 867	 (Me.	 1991)	 (explaining	 that	 a document	within	M.R.	Evid.	902(5) requires	no	extrinsic	evidence	to	establish authenticity,	 but	 does	 not render	 the	 evidence	 admissible,	 as	 “[t]he	issue	 of admissibility	 is	 a	 completely separate	 question” ); see	 also Field	 &	 Murray,
Maine	 Evidence §	 902.5 at	 551	 (6 th ed.	 2007) (“[S]elf

- authentication	 under [Rule	 902(5)] does	 not	automatically	make	any	 document,	 public	 or	 private, admissible	in	evidence.”). [¶1 7 ] Therefore,	even if	 the printout qualifies	as a self

- authenticating “official	 publication , ” which	 is	 unclear , s ee M.R.	 Evid.	 902(5) Advisory Committee’s	Note	to 1976 amend. (noting that records	admissible	pursuant	to the	rule	“are	most	commonly	statutes,	court	reports,	rules,	and	regulations”) , there must	be	an	additional independent basis	to properly	admit	and	consider10 the	printout

. See Lane ,	591	A.2d at 867 .		The	printout	was	offered to	prove	the truth	of	the	matter	asserted

— that	FIA	Card	Services	and the	Bank are	one	and
the	 same

— and is	 therefore hearsay

. M.R. Evid. 801(c)(2),	 802. The	 Bank makes	no	argument that	the	printout	is	admissible,	but presumes as	a	factual
matter	 that FIA	 Card	 Services is a	 creditor, and argues FIA	 Card	 Services	 is
thus exempt	from	FDCPA	liability. [¶1 8 ] Yet	 e ven	 assuming that	 the	 a ffidavit	 and	 printout	 were admissible, and	accepting	that	FIA	Card	Services	is a “creditor ” as	defined	by the	 FDCPA, this	 does	 not necessarily establish an	 exemption from FDCPA liability as	 a	 matter	 of	 law

. S ee FIA	 Card	 Serv s.	 v.	 Saintonge ,	 2013	 ME	 65, ¶ 3 n.1,	70	A.3d	1224 (assuming,	without	deciding,	that a National	Information
Center printout,	 even	 if	 admissible,	 d id not entitle	 the	 moving	 party	 to	 a summary	judgment ). This	is	because	a creditor	 that uses	a	name	other	 than
its	own	to	collect	the	debt may still be	considered a	“debt	collector” pursuant to	 the FDCPA. See 15	 U.S.C. S

. § §	 1692a (6),	 (6)(A) (LEXIS) ; 32	 M.R.S. § 11002(6) (stating that creditors	may	be “ debt	collector s ” for	the	purposes	of the	Act if they	use “ any	name	other	than	the creditor ’s that	would	indicate	that
a	 3 rd	 person	 is	 collecting	 or	 att empting	 to	 collect	 these	 debts” (emphasis added) ) ; 32	 M.R.S.	 § 11003(1) (excluding	 “[a]ny	 officer	 or	 employee	 of	 a11 creditor while,	in	 the	 nam e	 of	 the	 creditor ,	 collecting	 debts	 for	 that	 creditor” from	the	term	“de bt	collec tor” (emphasis	added) )

. [¶1 9 ] As	the	plain	language	of	the	foregoing	provisions ma ke s clear, the name	in	 wh ich the	 creditor	 attempts	 to	 collect the	 debt matters. H ere,	it	is undisputed	that although	Bank	of	America was	the	original	creditor	and	card
issuer , FIA	 Card	 Services brought	 suit	 against	 Camire	 to	 collect	 the	 debt

. 6
Because FIA	Card	Services	proceeded in its	own	name rather	than	in	the	name of	the	creditor ,	it failed	to	establish	as	a	matter	of	law that it	was	not	a “debt
collector” and	 th ereby exempt	 from FDCPA liability

. See 15 U.S.C. S

. § § 1692a (6),	(6)(A),	1692k (LEXIS) ; 32 M.R.S.	§ § 11002(6) ,	11003(1) ,	11054

. As	a	result, FIA	Card	Services was entitled	to neither	a	summary	judgment	nor dismissal	 of Camire’s	 counterclaim on	 the	 basis that it	 was	 exempt	 from FDCPA	liability

. See id

. ; see	also Libner ,	2004	ME	39,	¶	8,	845 A.2d	570 ;	M.R. Civ.	P.	12(b),	56(c). Camire’s pleading	stated	a	claim for	relief	pursuant	to	the
FDCPA in all other	respects. 7 M.R.	Civ.	P.	12(b).

6 The	 relationship	 between	 FIA	 Card	Services,	N.A.,	 and	 Bank	 of	America,	N.A.,	is	 not	 entirely clear	from	the	record.		We	conclude that the	record	developed	at	the	time	the	court	dismissed	the cou nterclaim	did	not	establish	FIA	Card	Services	was	not	a	“debt	collector”	as	a	matter	of	law.

7 S everal	 Maine	 federal	 district	 court	 decisions	 have	 denied	 motions	 to	 dismiss Maine	 and federal FDCPA	claims	brought	against	third	party	entities ,	concluding th at the	pleadings	established a	 plausible	 basis	 that	 the	 third	 party	 was	 a	 “debt	 collector”	 pursuant	 to	 the FDCPA

. See,	 e.g. , Napolitano	 v.	 Green	 Tree	 Servicing,	 LLC ,	 No.	 2:15

- cv - 00160

- JAW,	 2016	 U.S.	 Dist.	 LEXIS	 14122,	 at *24

- 25	 (D.	 Me.	 Feb.	 4,	 2016) (conc luding	 plaintiffs	 alleged	 sufficient	 facts	 for	 a	 servicer	 of	 a12 [¶20] The	court	erred	in	concluding	that FIA	Card	Services was	exempt from	the	FDCPA	as	a	matter	of	law.		W e therefore vacate the order	dismissing
the	counterclaim and	remand the	case for	further	proceedings consistent	with this	opinion

. The	entry	is: The	judgment in favor	of Bank	of	America ,	N.A., in	 the	 amount	 of	 $11,573.40	 plus	 costs is affirmed. The order dismissing	Camire’s	FDCPA counterclaim is	 vacated,	 and	 the	 case	 is r emanded	 for	 further	 proceedings	 consistent with	this	opinion

.

John	Camire,	appellant	pro	se Kate	 E.	 Conley,	 Esq.,	 Susan	 J.	 Szwed,	 P.A.,	 Portland , for	 appellee	 Bank	 of America,	N.A.

Biddeford	District	Court	docket	number CV

- 2014

- 76 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY

mortgage	loan	 to	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 debt	 collector	 for federal FDCPA	 purposes); Beaulieu	 v.	 Bank	 of Am.,	N.A. ,	No.	 1:14

- cv - 00023

- GZS,	 2014	U.S.	Dist.	 LEXIS	 136876,	at	 *28

- 29	 (D.	Me.	Sep.	 29,	 2014) (“At	 the	 motion	 to	 dismiss	 stage,	 these	 combined	 allegations	 plausibly	 suggest	 that	 BANA	 was ‘using	 a	 name	 other	 than	 its	 own’	 that	 indicated	 a	 third	 party	 w as	 attempting	 to	 collect	 on Mr. Beaulieu’s	default.”).