, _' . ... .. . ...

Indochina Monographs

RVNAF and US Operational

Cooperation and Coordination

Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong

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RVNAF and US Operational

Cooperation and Coordination

Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong

117

U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MULITARY HISTORY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

" -_STRIBJTT•ON STATEMENT A

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library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Truong, NgoQuang.

N.V.N.A.F. and U.S. operational cooperation and

coordination.

(Indochina monographs)

1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975. 2. Vietnem,

QuWn Lu'c--History--Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975.

3. United States--Axmed Forces--Hiistory--Vietnamese

Conflict, 1961-195. I. Title. II. Series.

D355 7.7T78 959.704'3 79-607170

This book is not copyrighted and may be i-eproduced In

whole or in part witthmt cousulting the publisher

First prini~ng 1980

4

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b I

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Indochina Monographs

This is one of a series published by the U.S. Army Center

of Military History. They were written by officers who held

responsible positions in the Cambodian, Laotian, and South

Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. The General

Research Corporation provided writing facilities and other necessary support under an Army contract with the Center of Military History. The monographs were not edited or altered and reflect the

views of their authors--not necessarily those of the U.S. Army or

the Department of Defense. The authors were not attempting to write

definitive accounts but to set down how they saw the war in Southeast Asia.

Colonel William E. Le Gro. U.S. Army, retired, has written a

forthcoming work allied with this series, Vietnam: From Cease-Fire

!:.i• to_ Cap-itula-tion., Another book, Thee Final Co llap~se by General Cao

.I Van Vien, the last chairman of the South Vietoamese Joint General

-. Staff, will be formally published and sold by the Superintendent

•;: •of Documents.

-• i:Taken together theue works should provide useful source

materials for serious historians pending publication of the more dofinitive series, the U.S. Army in Vietnam.

I • JAMES L. COLLINS, JR.

Brigadier General, USA

A, Chief of Military lHstory

2: I ... /.
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Preface

Over half a million US combat troops fought in South Vietnam

at the height of the war. The indigenous troops they came- to assist---

the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces-numbered nearly one million overall but much less than that in first line combat effective troops. In

contrast to the Korean War, there was no unified command to direct the

common war effort. The nature of the war itself and the environment

in which it was fought were also much different from those that made

up American military experience. These and other peculiarities of the

Vietnan War made the effort of cooperation and coordination between

American and Vietnamese combat forces an unusually complex and challenging, though rewarding, venture.

This monograph analyzes the problem areas of operational cooperation

and coordination, conceived both as a command and control device to

prosecute the common war effort and as a means to improve the combat

effectiveness of the RVNAF. It also attempts to evaluate the successes

and failures of this combiued ef~fort. As author, I am fortunate enough

to be able to draw on my personal com•bt experience which began as

platoon leader, continued through the intermediate echelons and culmi- I: kated in a Corps cowmand. Throughout vny military career, I was also

privileged to be. associated with several distinguished U5 advisers with

whom I enjoyed a productive working relationship And whose devoted

- j friendship I greaitly value. This has enabled me to gafc. insight into

the subject at hand. Where ty memory is short on data and statistics,

I have found the doc-uentation available particularly helpful. All the

coa.,mOts that I make -particularly with regard to RVNAF capabilities and

v .'"1
leadership -. reflect my own point of view as a field commander and

for which I am solely responsible.

I am indebted to General Cao Van Vien, Chairman of the Joint

General Staff, RVNAF, and Lieutenant General Doug Van Khuyen, Chief of

Staff of the JGS, for their valuable comments on some problem areas

concerning cooperation and coordination, particularly General Khuyen's

contribution of his expertise in logistics. Major General Nguyen Duy

Hinh, who served under me for several years as Commander of the 3d

Division, is appreciated for his appropriate and always thoughtful comments. Brigadier General Tran. Dinh Tho, Assistant Chief of Staff J-3,

A !and Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung, Assistant Chief of Staff J-2, of the JGS,

each in his own field of expertise, contributed accurate data on operational planning and intelligence activities.

!: Finally, I am particularly indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Chu Xuan,

Vien and ft Pham Thi Borns. Lt. Colonel Vien, the last Army Attache

serving at the Vietnamese Embassy in Washington, D.C., has done a

highly professional job of translating, editing, and also assisting

with the development of the introduction chapter. Ms. Bong, a former

Captain in the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and also a former member

of the Vietnamese Embassy staff, spenc long hours typing, editing and

"in the admtiaitrative preparatioa of my manuscript in final form.

McLean, Virginia ;quag Truong 30 Septemer 1976 ac Nueu eral, ARVN

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Contents

- -Chapter Page

I.* INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Build-tip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Large Scale Operations .. . .. . ... . .. .. 8

The Phasing Dam of US Combat Activit~ies . . . . . 11

Sunm ofMa or Ee nts and Comm'ents ....... 1

11. THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF AND 4ACV . . . . ... . ... 18

-.- Role of The Joint General Staff . . .... .. .* . 20

operational Coordination . . . . . ..... 24

Combined Intelligence Activities . . . . . . . . . 28

Logi~stical Support of The RVNA.F. . .. .. .. .. 36

I.ARVN CORPS ANDSFEDUSFORES .F..R.E. . .. .. .... 42

Deploymrent of RMV and US Porces .. .. ..... ....... 42

Org~anizational Arrangements for Comnand and iControl 47

Mission RelZationships . 9. ~.. . ... 52 IIV. RVNAP-US JOINT COR~AT OPERATIONS. .. .... ...... . . 63

Opera tional Coopera~tion and Coordination Procedures 63

Zntelligene . .. .. ....... . . . ..................... 66

Oerationa4 PManning . . .. .. . ................. . . 69

Assignment of Objectivea, operationat Areaa and

reve-Pire zones. .. . .. . .............. 72

Allocation of Reaozaves .. . . . . . . . 78

U00 of Firopr~ler . ..............................

Ciuitiam Evacuation, Caauatties wnd Propertyj Owwga 86

secial Plningn Csnsierdt~i0?s. .. .. ....... . . 90

Opmto Daaý-n Son 2 :6i .al .. .. .. . . 0 103

V. COM{BINED OPEJRATION'S AS A MZE4W OF IMY -VIG ARVt4

* W OMATEFCTIENf3ESS . . . . . . .. . . . . . ...

pa . . . ... . . - 3

V14
Chapter Page

VI. SOME CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING RVNAF PERFORMANCE .... 152

Expansion of the US Territorial Advisor Sytem . . 152

The Mobile Assistance Concept .... .. 156

Attitude of RVNAF Troops Toward Ameins ..... 161

"The Tendency to Let Americans Do It AUl 164

Effect of One-Year Tour and Six-Month Ro;ati'o'• .* .* 168

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

GLOSSARY ...... .. . 184,

Tables

NO.

1. Civilian Casualties and Causes ... ......... . 87

Charts

1. RVN Military Organization, 1966 . . . . . ...... 21

2. Organization, Joint Operations Center, JGS . . ..... 27 L 3. RVN Territorial Command and Control .......... . 44

4. Arrangement for Combined Cowtand and Control, ItZ,

SApril 1968 .......... 51

5. Command Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

6. Configuration of Tactical Zones and Areas . . . . . . . 74

7. Task Organization, Operation LAM SON 260/NEVADA EAGLE 108

8. Coordination and Control, Combined Action Program . . . 122

"9. Organization, Province Advisory Team ......... 154

Maps

I. Deployment of %ajor Logistical Coammtnds . . . . . . . 37

2. Deployment of Kajor ARVN and US Units, March 1966 . . . 48

3, 1966 Combined Campaign Objectives . .. ...... 55

4. Operation DELVWARE/LAM SON 216 ......... .... 95

5. Operation LAM SON 260/NEVADA EAGLE . . . . , . . . 110

6. Corbired Action Program, ICTZ. November 1969 . . . . .. 121 RANG DONG Area of Operation, 1967 .. 130

8, Par-of Operations, I CTZ, 1....38

9. DONG TIE Areas of Operation, III•U TZ . 143

Arriv~l of the 173d Airborne Brigade, Sien Hoa, 5 Hlay 1965 . 14

Departure of the Last US Combat Unit, Da Nang, Harch 1973 14 Some Commuatst Trucks and Weapons Captured in the- A Shau

Valley, 1968. .. . .... .... .... ........ .... 1...03 J ~~~Pair-Off Senior Co*=nders Conference, 11 0TZ ....... 13?

Dong Tien Joint Tactical Operations Center, Tay Kinh . . . 1. 131

Fairfax Operation, Gia Dinh Province ........ ... 145

Dong TiLn Comaanders Plan.ing an Operation .1..6... . - 16

"A flbile Advisory Team, 1968 .. ... ... .... . 160

Artillery Advisor and Couaterpart DuringDril1 ..... , . 160

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GUAPTER I

Introduction

The war in South Vietnam took a momentous step forward in March

1965 when US combat troops were committed to the land war. This

occurred just five months after the first US airstrike was unleashed

against North Vietnam as a result of the Maddox incident in the Gulf

of Toukia and other escalated actions by the enemy in the South. By

this time the American effort to help the shaky government of South

Vietnam to meet the increasing Communist military threat had been

built up to approximately 23,000 men, mostly assigned to field advisory

teams and combat support units. The decision that President Johnson

and the US Congress made to reaffirm US commitment to the Republic of I.' Vietnam was a bold and fateful step. For the first time in the war,

US ground troops were sent to Vietnam, not only to advise and support

their Vietname-se- ally, but also to destroy the enemy. A nev e-ra was

about to open which saw the fietrican and Vietnamese combat troops fight

"hand in hand in a succesWon of campaigns designed not only to destroy

the enemy but also to boister -ie capsbilities of the faltering

Rep blic of Vietnam Artad Forces (RWUF) as well,

I•l This radical departure of US policy toward South Vietnam did not

stem froo an expansionist design. R•ather it was forced on the- United

States by the gravity of a deterivratain situation. For one thing,

the five-year old counter-iasurgenc-y var had definitely escalated to

a aew level and its nature had changad iith the introduction of full

strenagth regiettal uants f rom the 'North Vietrnacse regular Army (NVA)

* and the activation of division-ai:e tlts in the South, such ap the

CT-9. The Viet Con& forces. increasingly replenished with North Vietulaese troops, began to ,receive uderu weapons fro .the Co=nu ist Bloc,

I• •
such as the AK-47 assault rifle and the RPG-2 rocket launcher. From all

indications, the enemy seemed to be entering an important phase of his

strategy and was on the'verge of winning the war after his resounding

victory at BLnh Gia. Military strategists--American and Vietnamese

alike--ere concerned about the possibility of a Comunist wedge being

driven across the country from the Pleiku-Kontum area to Qui Nhon.

This action, if successful, would effectively cut South Vietnam into

two parts along National Route QL-19 and create favorable conditions

for the enemy to achieve further victories. The whole process, it was

feared, could eventually lead to the disruption of the RVNAF and the

consequent collapse of South Vietnam. In addition, the overall political

and military situation of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) was deteriorating

at an alarming rate.

Only one year and a half had elapsed since President Ngo Diuh Diem

* was overthrown on I November 1963. His overthrov ushered in a period of

* iturmoil marked by internal power struggles, factionalism, and divisive- S I ness. The armed forces lost essential unity of purpose and solidarity

which took mouths, if not years, to restore. The reign of the Revolutiouary Military Council led by General Duoug Van Minh lasted only three

ephemeral monuths; it ended with the arrest of the Council key members in

a Uaodloss coup staged by General Nguyen llMn who iXstalled himself as

Prime Z'{Lnster. His first act was a wholesale purge to consolidate his

power. Still unable to rally support for hi%- one-m~c rule, KhJnh maneuvered

to establish a 'triuzvtrate" military leaddrship including hi~clf.

G-earal Hitth and General Trau thien ghlem, and appointed a civilian

prIme mnLser. To give c.rediblity to a Iorm of "deauratirule, au

xassembLy of politiciahs- and notables was cteated under the name of

"i"National High C wiciVO whese given rolt was half legislative, hailfconsutative. But the true political powter still lay ia the hands of the

"Armed Forces Council" composed of a select groAt.p of emergin, young,

and -bitious men. It was this collcctive WIlitary leadership that

replaced the ineffective trium•irate, appointed the (Cief of State,

and later dissolved the Natioual High Coeuicil whlch had begun to inoriuge

t2 !NO.
on the generals' power.1

The whole period in retrospect seemed to tear the country apart and

turn the army into an arena of power struggle and political intrigues.

The machinations and upheavals in Saigon made their rippling effect felt

throughout the hierarchy. Unit commanders no longer dedicated themselves

to the task of fighting the enemy; they spent their time and energy

switching loyalty to save their own skins. Plagued by distrust and petty

bickering, the military leadership failed to rally popular support and

impart sense and direction to the war effort. In the countryside, the

Strategic Hamlet system which heretofore had provided some measure of

territorial security almost completely fell apart due to neglect. Its

impetus was gone and many outlying areas relapsed into the grips of

the enemy infrastructure. In several instances, Regional and Popular

Forces (RF and PF) commanders struck a tacit "live and let live" arrange-

"ment with local Communists. The total RVNAF force structure was 500,000

by the end of 1964 but this was just a nominal figure, cot indicative

of real combat strength. By any standards, overall effectiveness of the

RVNAF was markedly on the decline. Poorly uaotivated and poorly led,

RVNA. units were hardly a match for their determined and better-disciplined

foes.

" All in all, this uws a dark period of time whose events threatened

the very survival of the RUN. and as a direct consequence, brought about

- - the increasing cotLitment of US coebat troops to the land war which w4s

to be carried into new heights over the -ext fev years.

J

""Th-T hlgh-haaded coup promted US Axb.s~ador Axwell p Tzalor to

use the rather wdip1oatit method of dressing durn the fi -ese

generals for their ursettiLng actiov4. The US was striving duriug this

tice to restore politiczl stability In S,!ub Vietan.

3

.2 ¢b
The Bui d-Up

Upon recommendations of General William C. Westmoreland, Commander

of the US Military Assistance in Vietnam (USHACV), the United States

government agreed to deploy combat forces to South Vietnam to ward off

the imminent disaster faced by the RVUN.

On March 8, 1965, the first major US combat unit, the 9th Marine

Amphibious Brigade, arrived in Da Nang to provide protection for the

airbase there which, because of increased air strikes against North

Vietnam, had become a major target for enemy sabotage. It was soon

followed in May by the US Army 173d Airborne 3rigade, which was deplcyC.d

to Bien Hoa and Vung Tan for the same purpose: security for airbases..

These initial combat contingents were to prepare the groundwork for the

rapid buildup which soon followed with the arrival of other major US

"units and the expansion of airfields, ports, and logistics bases

throughout the country.

June and July 1965 were 'he months of most significant events. The

four-month old civilian government under Chief of State Phan Khac Sun

* ,. .and Prime Minister Phan tuy Quat resigned as a result of irreconcilable

differ-nces between the two leaders. It was decided that the Armed

. Forces Council would take over, apparently leaderless sice its chairman. General Khanh, was ousted and expatriated In February a a result

of his dictatoril actions, the Coautwil voted to install Ltucenant

GenerAl N.uyen Van Thieu, then Minister of te-fease, as Chair•an of the

Natimotl Leadership Comittee (ChLef of St•te or President) and KA-or

:*. • General NguyetnC ahe Ky, C nder of VtetnAse AMr Force. as IChairman of the Central Executive Comittee (PrIbe Minist-er). The

inauguration of the Thtet±-Ky &over=Aer~t brought back some ceasure of

political stability ad ended the pVrtid of tur oil. General Ky's hithanded adtho", hotever, gradual•t erQOed the relatiocshlip oetveus

biahelf and General Thien and led to their u)lictate split tn 197>. O- n

the battlefield, the Vietnase Ak.- suffered its second major setback

at Dorn*- Xaa s•i•n-e 5in Cia in l.ate feceubr 196. at thr e h•and of the

saw enemy, the CTr-9 rbv,.sion. two bat-tallons- ware virtually destroyed.0
including the 6th Airborne Battalion. It was in June that B-52 bombers,

.,in addition to tactical jets, were used for the first time to destroy

enemy bases. The results were impressive, and B-52 strikes were to

become a moat successful means of air support in the years to follow.

In the meantime, the arrival of the III US Marine Amphibious Force

* ~in South Vietnam enabled the US Military Assistance Command to proceed

with the development of major bases. Chu Lai was the first base and

jet airfield complex to be created out of wilderness by the Marine

Seabees. Construction work also began on the major logistics bases

at Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon and Da Nang after they had been secured by

US combat forces. This was a time of accelerated buildup. During the

month of July, the 2d Brigade of the 1st US Infantry Diqision arrived

4 at Long Binh, soon to be transformed into one of the largest logistics

2 base complexes in South Vietnam. -It was followed by the 1st Brigade of

the 101st Airborne Division which was deployed to Cam Ranh Bay where

the construction of a port and an airfield were transforming it into a

major logistics complex of the 2d CTZ.

In September, the entire US 1st Air Cavalry Division arrived at

Qui Nhcn and deployed to An Khe where it established its operational

base. Late in December, the 3d Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division

closed in and deployed to the vicinity of Pleiku, seat of the Headquarters, II Corps, RVNAF. By year end, US m~ilitary strength in

Vietnam had reached above the. 130,000 mark to include 92,000 Army,

8,000 Navy, 37,000 Marines and 14,000 Air Force. The pace of the buildUP had been set and was carried into 1966.

On February 6, 1966, President Johnson arrived in Hlonolulu to confer

with leiders of the RVN government. The conference strengthened the

pledge by both governments to defeat Coammunist aggression and bring

about social betterment of South Vietnam.

In March, a serious political crisis erupted in Hlue and Da Nang.

Militant Buddhists joined by radical students staged demonstrations

The entire 1st Infantry Division completed its deployment by October

the same year.

5
demanding more rapid progress toward elective government. Some

ARVN units, like the 1st Infantry Division and the Rangers sided

with the Buddhists and it appeared that the I Corps Commander,

Lieutenant General Nguyen Chanh Thi, was also behind the mve.

It was feared the movement could turn into open armed rebellion

and disrupt the war effort. As a result, General Thi was relieved of

-77his command and replaced by a rapid succession of three Corps Commanders

3 who were all removed after refusing to repress the rebels. Finally

"Vietnamese marines and paratroopers were surreptiously brought to Da

"ang by US cargo and Vietnamese commera-al planes and they finally

quelled the rebellion.

By late April, the US 25th Infantry Division had completed its

deployment to South Vietnam and was stationed in Hau Nghia province where it

established its base camp at Cu Chi. In August, the 196th Light

Infantry Briga-. errived and soon operated in Tay Ninh province. It

was followed by the US 4th Infantry Division which completed its

deployment in October and was assigned to the Kontum-Pleiku area where

it established its base camp at Mount Ham Rong. With chq arrival of

the 199th Light Infantry Brigade in the Saigon area and the first

elements of the US 9th Infantry Division which was eventually to establish a base

camp at Dong Tam in Dinh Tuong province, total US military strength in

South Vietnam, by year end, had reached 385,000 men.

[ :The period of buildup was marked by joint efforts of the United

.- States and five other allies--the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Australia,

the Philippines and New Zealand--to firm up their resolution to help

South Vietnam resist Communist aggression. This was 0-e object of the

"Manila Conference" held on October 24, during which the allies pledged

that their military forces would be withdrawn as the other side withdrew its forces to the north, ceased infiltration, and the level of

3These colanders were: Major General Nguyen Van Chuan, Lieutenant

General Ton Th.,t Dinh, and Major General Huynh Van Cao, all natives of

Central Vietnam. Finally, MAjor General Hoang Xuan Lam, commander of

the 2d Infantry Divisionwas designated I Corps Colander. lie re.=ined

in this job until early 1972.

6
violence thus subsided. President Johnson who attended this meeting

took time out to make a surprise visit to US troops in Cam Ranh on

October 26.

The build up of US and allied forces in South Vietnam, it has been

said, was a determined effort to defeat aggression on the one hand, and

to help South Vietnam to consolidate, expand and improve its armed forces

on the other. Toward this goal, US forces, after a period of familiarization with the environment, began to conduct operations with the

participation of ARVN forces. The majority of these combined operations

were campaigns lastiLg from a few weeks to several months during which

ARVN force6 mostly olayed a seccadary role, their commitment rarely

exceeding the size of a regiment.

The first major engagement involving US and ARVN troops of II Corps

occurred in October 1965 in the Central Highlands, where the enemy had

assembled three regiments and attacked the Piei Me border camp, west of

Pleiku. Then, during the month of November, the US 1st Air Cavalry Division

and ARVN troops were engaged in a major battle in the la Drang valley

from which they came out as victors.

Beginning in 1966, combined US-RVN military effort shifted toward

populated centers where a major task of pacification was being emphasized

by the RVN government. However, the exposure (f US combat forces to the

populace was deemed undesirable by the RVN government for political and

psychological reasons. Barely ten years had elapsed since the last

, iFrench troops had departed. Apparently, it would tarnish the image

of national independence and suzerainty if foreign troops made their 1: A! appearance among the population. This was a dilemma for the RVN governwent, torn between its concern for outward propriety and the indiapensable commitment of foreign troops, which finally prevailed. The

largest of such commitments took place in Tay Ninh province where the

US Ist and 4th Infantry Divisions, the 173d ABN Brigade and several

A-RVN battalions defeated the NVA CT-9 and drove it back into Cambodia.

In Binh Dinh province, ARVN forces in cooperation wth the US ,st Air

Cavalry Division and Korean units succeeded in decimating the NVA

"Gold Star" Division (later designated 3d Division) and driving it away

7
... from the northern half of the province. In the first CTZ, US and RVN Marines

conducted a successful combined operation against the NVA 324B Division

in Quang Trn province.

By year end, total enemy combat strength in South Vietnam had increased

to over 282,000. This included about 58,000 men infiltrated from North

Vietnaw during the year, an indication of increasing reliance on NVA

replacements. The enemy now committed entire regiments in battle and

sometimes a full or even reinforced division. This was to presage a new

period of major engagements pitting the now modernized VC-NVA units

ag-iin,.t AVN and US troops whose total strength approximated the one

million mark.

Lar ge Saab Operations

Gaie of the major tasks undertaken by the US Military Assistance Command

in South Vietnam during this neriod of major engagements was the qualitati,'e and quantitative impr.oement of -he RVN Armed Forces. At the end

of 1966, tetal AVNAF strength scood at 633,645 men including nearly.

300,000 Regional and Popular Force-i. This strength was to increase by

122,000 4uring the first half of 1968 as a result of general mobilization.

It was also during this period that improvement and modernization programs were initiated and Lheir implementation accelerated in the wake

of the Tat offensive. It was not until mid-1968 that for the first

Li time the RVNAX were entirely equipped with M-16 rifles. Thiare is no doubt

that the RVNAF came of age ducing this pertod and emerged from it as

a full-fledged military force, capable of sharing the ceiat burden with

US forces on an equal basis and rmady to take on aew responsibilities.

The improved performance on the plrc of the RVNAF was due in

part to combined operat.onai campailns during which combat skills and

teamwork were learned and developed in keeping with standards set by

US forces. Whereas the joint US-RVN Combined Campaign Plan-devLloped

each year since late 1965--provided che diviiion of taskn and ciordination

of the overall effort, it was the concept behind 'he actual execution

of this plau. that made it work. Whether called "Buddy System" or

. '
"Combined Action," it afforded the opportunity for ARVN forces to

observe and evaluate the combat standards displayed by US units in

action. This was one of the primary objectives of combined operations

of all sizes. Still, throughout this period, the RVNAF were only

primarily responsible for area security in support of pacification

while US forces sought out and destroyed main enemy units.

In the III Corps area, Operation FAIRFAX, conceived under this

tutelage concept, paired off and integrated three US battalions with

those of the ARVN 5th Ranger Group down to the squad level. The

campaign lasted the entire year of 1967. While it was deemed a success,

in essence it was an operation planned and directed by US forces and

while the integration of forces down to the lowest level proved to be beneficial, it certainly did not help enhance ARVN capabilities for planning

and conducting combat operations o•d their own. Thus it was decided to concentrate on combined operations in which US and ARVN units operat.,d

side-by-side in close coordination and in direct support of each other.

* ARVN units would thus benefit from additional helicopter, artillery,

air and logistical support which was amply provided by US units.

In January 1967, Operation CEDAR FALLS was launched into the "Iron

Triangle" and Long Nguyen enemy base areas, during which US troops of

the Ist Infantry Division, the 173d ABN Brigade and 11th Cavalry Regiment and several ARVN battalions discovered and destroyed a vast underground shelter complex of the enemy's T-4 Military Region. In February,

another major combined operation, code-named "JUNCTION CITY," was

directed against War Zone C in Tay Ninh province. In this operation,

US forces of the Ist and 25th Infantry Division, the 173d Brigdde, the

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 196th Light Infantry Brigade

flushed out and destroyed major enemy combat units while the ARVN 5th,

25th, 18th Divisions and elements of the ABN Division and -he Marine

Brigade maintained a security cordon near the populated areas. The

operation continued until mid-May and ended with resounding successes.

In 1968, in keeping with the same concept of mutual support and

coordination, operation TRUONG CONG DINH was conducted in March in

Dinh Tuoug and Kien Tuong provinces with the participation of the US

9
9th Infantry Division. It was followed by Operation QUYET TMANG, conducted in the Saigon area and involving elements of the US 1st, 9th and

25th Divisions and the .ARVN 5th and 25th Division, and Airborne and

Marine troops. Then in April, the US 101st ABN Division and the 3d

Brigade, 82d ABN Division, in conjunction with the ARVN 1st Infantry

Division, operated in the lowland of Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces

in operation CARENTAN II. Operation TOAN THANG, which was followed by

TOANG THANG II In the Capital Military District, was conducted next with

a combination of ARVN III Corps and US II Field Force units. Also,

in April, the ARVN 1st Infantry Division in coordination with the US

1st Air Cavalry Division launched Operation DELAWARE/LAM SON 216 into

the A Shau Valley to pre-empt enemy preparations for an attack on Hue.

By far the greatest challenge during this period of time was the

enemy's country-wide Tet offensive campaign launched on January 31, 1968,

against 36 provincial capitals, 5 major cities, including Saigon and

Hue, and 64 district towns. It was followed in May by another wave of

attacks, but in both phases of the offensive, the enemy was dealt a

resounding military defeat. The longest battle was fought around the

citadel of Hue and the final success of ARVN units in reoccupying the

city was again an outstanding example of combined efforZ and mutual

support between US Marine units and ARVN troops.

It was also during this period of large scale engagements that the

US followed up with the deployment of additional units and nearly

completed the buildup of US forces in South Vietnam by the end of 1968.

The US 9th Division, part of which had arrived in December 1966,

completed its deployment in January 1967. It was followed in September

by activation of the 23d Infantry Division (Americal) based at Chu Lai.

Then in November 1967 the entire 101st ABN Division arrived. Its 1st

Brig.de had been operating in South Vietnam since the early buildup more

than two years earlier. The last major combat units brought into South

Vietnam were the 3d Brigade of the 82d ABN Division which arrived in

February 1968 and the ist Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division, which

10 (

'.1*-
I-7, . .I...

arrived in July the same year. Thus by the end of 1968, total US

,..military strength in South Vietnam had passed the half million mark

I~ (536,040) with 113 maneuver battalions. During the same period, RVNAF

forces were built up to a ceiling of 826,500 men (including about

393,000 RF and PF troops), and a total of 160 maneuver battalions.

The RVN, meanwhile, succeeded in consolidating its political base

* -by inaugurating the 2d Republic with President Nguyen Van Thieu and

Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky,who were elected on 3 September 1967,

along with members of the Senate of the National Assembly. The

installation of the Lower House followed in October and completed the

process of democratizing the military rule that had begun in November 1963.

On the US side, General William C. Westmoreland was appointed US Army

Chief of Staff and left Vietnam for his new post on.30 June 1968 after

serving four distinguished years as Commander, US Military Assistance

Command, Vietnam. He was succeeded by General Creighton W. Abrams, who

assumed command on 3 July 1968.

The Phasing Down of US Combat Aativitiea

The political impact of the enemy Tet offensive in 1968 brought

about far-reaching developments in US policy concerning the war in

Vietham. While President Johnson emphasized in Honolulu in July 1968

that the US would pursue the war at the current pace if North Vietnam

did not curtail its aggression, there were indications that he was inclined toward bringing about peace through negotiations. The stop-andgo bombing orders frequently issued by the US President constituted an

effort toward this end but did not succeed in bringing the Communists to

1. the negotiation table until he decided to step down. As soon as

President Nixon took office, he entered into secret negotiations with

North Vietnam toward what he had promised: ending the war and bringing

home US troops. At the same time, in keeping with his doctrine of

self-determination and emphasis on the role the allies were to play in

common defense, which he formulated in the Hidway conference on 8 June

1969, he also ordered the initial redeployment of 25,000 US troops as the

~ 1 11I

,i.>.ti 
first step of the withdrawal process. This action, in concert with

other US efforts to accelerate the turn-over of equipment and the RVNAF

Improvement and Modernization Plan, including the building up of RVNAF

force level, was part of a preconceived program, conveniently called

"Vietnamization" and aimed at disengaging US combat troops from Vietnam

and turning over combat responsibilities to the RVNAF. Thus, from a

peak of 549,500 on April 30, total US tv•-o• strength in South Vietnam

began to decrease in preplanned increments until, by the end of 1969,

it had been reduced by 110,000 men. Over the next year, 1970, each

successive announcement to the effect that the RVNAF had markedly improved

was accompanied by a parallel reduction in US force so that by year end

total US strength stood at only 335,000. Then, over the next two years,

the unilateral withdrawal of US troops was kept up at a continuous

pace, diminishing US strength by half at the end of 1971 until it was

reduced to a token figure of 24,000 a month before the Paris Agreement

was signed.

The redeployment of US forces from Vietnam during this period of

time was also paralleled by substantial reductions in B-52 sorties,

tactical air, and naval support, and the gradual transfer of US bases

and other facilities to the RVNAF. Thus, in a sense, US combat operations were progressively reduced beginning in 1969 and as far as US

forces were concerned, appeared to be just delaying actions pending redeployment. It seemed that, according to public announceaents, MACV was

satisfied with the improvemeats made by the RVNAF during the previous

years and believed that they could carry on with only modest support

from US forces.

But still, in keeping with the tutelage concept and under the pressure

of Vietnamization, combined operations continued throughout the period,

although spaced further apart, and with less and less US troop comitment. It appeared that US forces were gradually reverting to their preinvolvement role of combat support. Operation SPEEDY EXPRESS, which

ended in Hay 1969 after 6 months of activities was perhaps the last

major engagement of US troops in the Mekong Delta. In III Corps tactical

zone operation TOAN TWANG, Phase 3, which lasted from February to October

1969 was crowned with success, but the US 1st Infantry Division which

12

1 -
participated in it began to stand down pending redeployment in April 1970.

By the end of 1970, the US 4th and 25th Infantry Divisions were redeployed,

thus leaving the III Corps area and the Central Highlands virtually void

of major US combat units. And when 1971 ended, there was no

longer any division-size US combat unit in the country, except for the

101st ABN Division (-) in Phu Bai.

The last major joint US-RVN combat venture was the cross-border

operation into Cambodia on 30 April 1970 aimed at destroying COSVN headquarters and enemy sanctuaries. It was followed by two other operations

in May, involving a total of 50,000 US and ARVN troops, and ended on

30 June. In September, the US Marines Combined Action force was inactivated, ending US Marine combined combat activites in T Corps area.

In January 1971, the US Special Forces turned over to the RVNAF the

last of its border camps in the Central Highlands after more than 5

years of operations. On 8 February 1971, the ARVN I Corps, augmented

by the Airborne and the Marine Divisions launched operation LAM SON 719

into Laos with the objective of disrupting NVA logistical installations

along the Ho Chi Minh trail. Although it was a combined effort of major

proportions involving substantial air and helicopter support, no US combat

troops went ing'o Laos; they weire only deployed to provide security and

"£- I set up lines of communication to support the RVNAP on the friendly side

of the border.

Combat activities during this period of US force standdowu culmindted

in the enemy summer offensive of 1972 during which Quang Tri provincial

city and the district towns of Loc Ninh in MR-3 and Dakto, Tam Quan, and

Bon& Son, in MR-2 were lost. With effective support of B-52 sorties,

however, the RVILAF succeeded in relieving Au Loc after a month-long siege

and warded off the enemy threat against Kontum. Also with extensive US

naval and air firepower support, the Vietnamese Marines finally reoccupied

Quaug Tni city on 15 September 1972. 4

4 The Marines actually penetrated Quang Tri citadel and physically

- .reoccupied it in the afternoon of 15 September, but the RVN flag was

officially hoisted over the citadel only at 1000 hours the following

day.

13

J
'-4k

......

Arrival of the 173d Airborne Brigade, Bien IHoa, 5 May 1965

I- a-~

6oparture of Ohc last US c.ombat unit (3-21 Battalion, 196th Light

Infantry Brigade), Dla Niang, March 19 73.

14
On 28 June 1972, Genaeral Fred C. Weyand assumed the duties of

Commander, US Military Assistance, Vietnam, replacing General Creighton

tW. Abrams who returned to the United States to be US Army Chief of

Staff. The phasing down of US involvement through the "Vietnamization

process was completed in November 1972 with a crash program of equipmeat stock-up for the RVNAF in anticipation of a cease-fire.

Swmir* of Major Eventsand Copmnte

The US active involvement in the Vietnam war was a relatively short

but highly effective venture. By the time it ended, the major objective-,

" it set about to accomplish had been reached; there was no doubt about

it. In the first place, US engagement in both the air and ground wars

had averted the almost certain loss of South Vietnam and set back North

Vietnam's plan to conquer the South for several years. Second, US

direct intervention had helped stabilize the political turmoil and

restore constitutional government and democracy to South Vietnam thus

creating favorable conditions for self-determination, a principle the

United Srates always advocated. Finally, the effectiveness of US air.

4-i power, the combat performance of US ground troops, and the availability

. tM ! sticl facillttes helped consolidate, improve, and expand

the capabilities of tIih RVNNAP tr^ th etont that they finally emerged

as a viable force capable -under certain -onuiti -- o' defending the

nation.

Throughout the years of US involvement, several events of far-

!reaching importance came to a.-fect the course of the war, the tactics

1 : used to fight it, and eventitally the outcome of the war itself.

The buildup of US combat forces was a quick-reaction move designed

S"to *vert -an imtinent danger rather thon to vin the war. The US sent

troops to South Vietnam with the reservation that they would be withI• driwn as soon as the enemy showed signs of relenting on his aggression.

Alt-hough US troop strength reached a peak of 549,500 in April 19696

this peak was never taiintalned for any length of time. Like a perfect

I parabolic curve, the buildup came down just as soon as it reached its

Sapes, and tie curve downward was just as unrelenting as the curve upward.

a n t

fis
One might speculate, from hindsight, what would have been the course of

the war had US strength been maintained for a few years longer. Then, the

withdrawal of US troops could have been carried out more slowly, thus

affording the RINAF the chance to fill in the void, in terms of combat

units, firepower, mobility and psychological conditioning.

The use of B-52 bombers to support ground troops was a marvelous

tactical innovation that helped turn around the outcome of many battles.

The fact that it had been used for so long and so unfailingly in every

case turned it into a major psychological factor that sustained the morale

of the RVMAF in the field. In time, it became a central tactical factor

on which our field comanders relied, perhaps unduly, in their battle plans.

The same could be said of US firepower in general, whether provided by jet

fightersartillery or naval guns. It was unfortunate that this firepower

support was also reduced along with ground troops whereas it could have

been selectively maintained to keep the tactical balance unimpaired.

Over the period of US involvement, the RVRA$ almost doubled in size

if not in capabilities. This rapid expansion and modernization was made

possible by general mobilization and the several Improvement and Modernization plans implemented. Whhile it was true that this gas ap impressive

increase of the overall force structure, figures might be misleading. For

one thing, the number of combat units did not increase in any substantial

way. The 18th Infantry Division which was activated in 1966 was largely

a consolidation of independent regiments and the 3d Division was ouly

created as late as 1971. Several additional ainger groups were organized

indeed but they lacked the firepower and combat footiug of divisions,

* ,•which constitute the true backbone of any army. for another, the strength

of the regular forces was only less than half of the RLW total strength.

Pven cten the ratio of logistics and support troops to coobat troops

was sucs that the RVRAF in the end did not enjoy any signif icant !ncrease

n overall combat1 •reng. Al0 the rapid a"-rical buildup could

only have been achieved at the detriment of the qualirv of troops and

lower echelon leaders, for no awamt of traian~g could, in a relatIvely

short time, turu out experieaced leaders and combat-tested troops.

16
Ile, .

Finally, the advent of combined operations conceived and carried

out under the tutelage concept, although salutary in its overall effect,

hardly helped to enhance Vietnamese planning capabilities. In the

planning stage, US commanders usually tended to keep it all to themselves, thus relegating their Vietnamese counterparts to the role of

blindfolded executors. This was understandable enough given the possible

- leaks on the part of the Vietnamese, and the fact that combat assets

were largely under US control. Operational plans on the Vietnamese side

were sometimes merely translations of US orders. In addition, the

tactical role played by RVNAF units was largely a secondary one and only

became a major one when US troops redeployed. Then there were

other difficulties arising from the mere fact that US troops were total

strangers, racially, culturally and mentally different from the indigenouspeople they had come to help.

These and other facets of the problem, US operational cooperation

and coordination, their successes and failures, strenuths and weaknesses,

are the things this monograph proposes to eluc~idate.

1 17
i"0

CWATER I I

The Joint General Staff and MACV

The introduction of US combat and other allied forces in the Vietnam

ground war to fight alongside the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces gave

rise to problems of coordination and control. Givet, the size and diversity of forces committed, military leaders at first were inclined toward

some form of unifWed command of the multi-national United Nations or

NATO type. In April ,965, General Westmoreland, commander US MACV,

suggested the idea of a combined VS-RVN coumaad with an Amertcan general

officer in charge, assisted by a Vietnamese deputy or chief of staff.

For political reasons, however, the US MACV commander thuught that this

combined command should be gradually and quietly introduced.

The idea of a combined command appeared to receive wide acceptance

among top Vietnamese leaders when it was first suggested. They felt that

this arrangement offered an ideal arranggnc for prosecuting the wat

sohow -which was going to be the primary responsibility of US forces.

The divisiveness amidst the Vietnamese %ilitary leadership and the

deteriorating situation at the time also seemed to favor this arrangement.

tn tiaete hovevwr. this attitude became less entthusiastic as Vietnamese

leaders grew more aware of their role and responsibility, And most

.j paticulardy, of the actitudes among the population whom they were trying I to rally to the national caute. Sensing this chainging *ttitude, the US

dropped'the tatterv altogether and withdrew the recocuetd4aaoo conceraiag

the US-RMN combined command..

In kespgpi- with the US a-v.w•d policy of seSf-deteruiation and his

misslon in particular. General WeetmoreLand explained the rationale

behLud his decision.

44
I consistently resisted suggestions that a simple, combined command

could more effectively prosecute the war. I believed that subordinating

the Vietnamese forces to US control would stifle the growth of leadership

and acceptance of responsibility essential to the development of Vietnamese

forces capable eventually of defending their country. Moreover, such a

step would be counter to our basic objective of assisting Vietnam in a

time of emergency and of leaving a strong, independent country at the

time of our withdrawal. Subordination also might have given credence

to the enemy's absurd claim that the United States was no more than a

colonial power. I was also fully aware of the practical problems of

forming and operating a headquarters with an international staff.,

Opting for cooperation and coordination instead of a unified command,

General Westmoreland must have carefully balanced the pros and cons.

The intimate cooperation between MACV and the JGS and his close relationship with his counterpart, and the fact that the US was providing the

RVNAF with equipment and logistical support notwithstanding a substantial

:i •I-increase in MACV budget, all these could exercise as many direct influences

q- .on the RVNAF and the conduct of the war as would a combined command, and

without its disadvantages. Under a combined command in addition to the

political and psychological handicaps mentioned earlier, US forces might

run the risk of losing some freedom of action, and the pressure exerted

through such a cowiand might well lead to an even more extensive American

participation in the war. This was not what the US had set about to do in Vietna

And so the concept of cooperation and coordination took over. It

was based on the principle of equal partnership and a harmonious division

of tasks. US forces were to assume the primary-burden of the warSIi searching out and destroying enemy main forces-while the RVN armed forces

concentrated on supporting pacification and eliminating the enemy infrastructure. Paradoxical as it might seem to traditionalists, the concept

of cooperation and coordination proved to be sound and effective for

immediate purposes as well as for the ultimate goal of developing the

- RVNAF capabilities to defend their country.

A

Ro ou the War in Vietnam, "Section II: Report on Operations

in South Vietnam, January 1964-June 1968," by General W. S. Westmoreland,

Commander, US MACV.

19

4''

----. ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
At the national level, this concept worked well between MACV and the

Joint General Staff due to the harmonious relationship b~ateen their comninanders. Anxi-ous on its part to assume the war role on equal terms and

to give new sense and direction to the command and control of the RVNAP,

the RVN government designated Lieutenant General Cao Van Vien as Chairman

of the Joint General Staff in October 1965, and later elevated him to

four-star rank. The affable personality of General Vien, his professional

competence and his anolitical attitude were qualities that made him a fine

counterpart of General Westmoreland, a dedicated professional soldier and

diplomat. To ensure even closer coordination, General Westmoreland

designated as his personal representative to the JGS, Brigadier General

James L. Collins, Jr., who was senior adviser of the RUNA.F territorial

forces- This close relationship was to produce excellent results in the

combined effort of prosecuting the war and greatly inspired subordinate

com~manders and staffs of-both countries.

Ro~e of the Joint COeneraZ Staff

As command body of the RVN armed forces, the Joint General Staff was

-the focus of cooperation and coordination between the RVN and the US

forces in South Vietnam. Since the RVNAF force structure increased

rapidly during the years of US partici~pation, the JGS also underwent a

substantlal development in staff strength, although its basic organization IramaA.-ned the same. (Chart 2) Its general staff divisions almost paralleled those of MACV whose chiefs served as advisers. Staf-f coordination

between the JGS and HACV was performed either on an ad-hoc basis. or on

a fixed schedule* deterviued by mt~tual agreement. Major areas of interest

Al included, as far as the JOS was concerrned:

JGS HMAC

m ents, armed sotrensch and force structure Plan.

j -2. Situation estimates and intelligence plans.

J-7 -echnical intelligence collection.

1-3 -1-3 AanuaL comblvied campaign IplAns - Coatiogeacy

pLans U S air anti naval supporzý Organization,~

expaision and moidcratizaion of uaits.

20
R8i c U.
J-3 Civil Operations Combined plans for pacification support.

and Revolutionary

Development Support

(CORDS)

Central J-3 Training plans and programs, in-country

Training and overseas.

Command

(CTC)

Central J-4 Logistical support plans. Use of US

Logistical assets to compensate for RVNAF shortages.

"Command Equipping of units.

(CLC)

J-6 J-6 Communications-electronics plans.

Use of US long-line communications

facilities.

General US Agency for Inter- Troop morale, civic-action and psyops.

Political national Development

Warfare (USAID)

* Department Joint US Public Af-

* fairs Office (JUSPAO)

In general, the procedures for liaison and coordination were established

between corresponding staff agencies as soon as both the Chairman of the

JGS and the Commander of USMACV had agreed in principle on a certain subject, and upon their direct instructions. More often than not, the command agreement was translated into a letter order or directive that both

staffs worked out separately at first upon receiving specific guidance

instructions. Before submitting the letter order or directive for signature to their respective commanders, both staffs took steps to consult

each other in order to make their work thoroughly compatible. When both

commanders had signed, the letter order or directive was to be hand-carried

to units and agencies for execution, and a signed copy was exchanged

between the two staffs for records.

Long-range plans vre subject to more elaborate procedures. An initial step consisted of a letter order or directive signed by the Chairman

of the JGS and the Commander of USMACV, directing the formation of a combined working committee and specifying, among other things, 1) the purpose

of the committee and a detailed agenda, 2) the composition of the committee,

which usuAlly included, on the Vietnamese side, a chairman, a deputy chairman, general..and speciat staff officers and representatives of civilian

agencies or of the ARVN Corps involved in the plan, and 3) the date-time

and locatiqn Of the first meeting of the lommit tee, usually at MACV

22

:"_________
)• headquarters or at the JGS. Before such a letter order or directive was

submitted to the Chairman of the JGS and the MACV Commander for signature,

its general content had already been subjected to extensive consultations

and exchange of information between both staffs.

During the first meeting of the combined working committee, its cochaimen first relayed specific guidance instructions given by the Chairman

of theJGS and the MACV Commander, then introduced their staff members by

name and rank. If the plan needed extensive study and elaboration, then

the co-chairmen would direct the formation of parallel US and RVN sub-Committees whose chairmen were usually counterpart staff division chiefs.

EAch sub-committee was responsible for the study of certain areas pertaining

to its assigned staff duties. Sub-committee chairmen were assisted by

general and special staff officers and if required, by representatives of

GVN civilian agencies or US Field Forces and ARVN Corps. The working com-

- mittee co-chairmen also determined the time allotted to staff studies and

the deadline for completion. Work locations of sub-committees, however,

were left to the choice of their chairmen. Then the working committee cochairmen decided on the following meetings during whichprogress of subcommittee works would be reported and reviewed. The review process usua.lly

took long working sessions of the combined committee. After each sub-committee reported its progress, there were comments and lengthy discussions.

The plan was gradually modified and updated until final agreement was

reached by both staffs and approved by the co-chairmen who then decided on

"procedures for dissemination. This planning process took place between

* the JGS and MACV every year since late 1965. Its product was the "Combined

Campaign Plan" which provided specific guidance and directives for the joint

military effort to be taken up by the RVNAF and US forces during the following year. Planning work was ustially started by mid-August and ended by

early October. The fiMal plan was disseminated by mid-October to ARVN Corps

and US Fie.d F;rc~s as a basis for detailed operational planning. Operational

* I plans were subsequently submitted by ARVN Corps and US Field Forces to the

JGS and MACV respectively for approval by the end of the year.

nohr major combined effort which took place each year was the RVMAF

development and modernization plan. This involved force structure planning which was jointly reviewed by the JGS and MACV before being submitted

to Washington for final approval.

23

.21
recomm The procedure pdatiouwhich for was force structure planning usually started by a JGS based on force structure increase requirements

and accompanied by justifications as to manpower, organization and training

capabilities. Force structure increase usually involved the formation of

new units recommended separately by the services. The requirement presented by the JGS was a compilation of recommendations made by Corps and

2 :the services with the concurrence of their advisers. Combined staff

meetings between the JGS and MACV were then called, during which the JGS

presented its requirements and justified them. After the Juatifications

All were deemed satisfactory, the JGS would send a formal request to MACV

under the form of a force structure plan. The plan was reviewed and

modified as necessary by MACV, which then formally notified the JGS of

every modification made to the original request. MACV notification

served as basis both for the JGS to develop imp.lementing programs and

for the Ministry of Defense to plan its budget for the following fiscal

year. A schedule was finally established by J-3, JGS, for the activation

and training of units in coordination with the Central Logistic Command

which was responsible for the timely issu.e of equipment for the new units.

During the implementation, every difficulty which arose unexpectedly was

jointly solved by the JGS and MACV. In brief, the RVNAF development and

modernization plan was subjected to very close coordination between the

JGS and MACV throughout its whole process, from initial planning to the

final employment of new units.

Operational1 Coordination * I

The JGS and MACV were not responsible for organizing and conducting

tactical operations. Their role was to monitor, supervise and support

operations initiated and conducted by ARVN Corps and US Field Forces.

As a result, the bulk of staff work performed by the JGS and MACV in

operational matters focused on technical and support problems.

As usual, based on joint assessment of the situation, the JGS and

MACV advised commanders of ARVN Corps and US Field Forces of the military

efforts to be conducted in their areas of responsibility, which generally

fell into two major categories: search and destroy, and pacification

support. The JGS and MACV also advised them of additional support resources 4l 24
they might expect to receive and how long and where these resources would

be provided.

These advices were given to Corps and Field Forces. commanders in

several forms, the most usual of which were: 1) messkges, 2) confidential

directives, and 3) general operational concept. Upon reception of these

advices and based on them, ARVN Corps or Field Force commanders established

operational plans for their areas of responsibility. These plans were

usually presented by the field commander in person to the Chairman of the

JGS or the MACV commander. As far as ARVN Corps were concerned, each

II. -plan was often accompanied by requests for support or troop reinforcements.

If an operational plan was approved, its support requirements were

immediately met by the JGS if they lay within RVNAF capabilities. In case

these requirements were beyond RVNAF capabilities, an arrangement would

be made with MACV to obtain the support from US resources.

Firepower support requests usually involved additional US tactical

air or B-52 strikes which were allotted by MACV on a priority basis.

For tactical movements ARVN units were reinforced as required by VNAF

airlift assets if the operation involved the displacement of heavy equipment. Most of the times, however, they %ad to rely on their own assets.

If the movement required a concentrated use of helicopters, the JGS would I take steps to make them available by reassigning VNAF assets from other

Corps Tactical Zones for the duration of Lhe operation. In such cases,

MACV would provide helicopter support for the CTZ whose assets had been

temporarily reassigned. In most combined operations, additional helicopter support for ARVN troop movements was usually provided by MACV or

US Field Forces. The JGS met a Corps request for troop reinforcement in

a particular operation by redeploying reserves from another, or other

Corps when the general reserve was not available. In those cases,

arrangement was made with MACV to provide a US emergency reaction force

for the Corps whose reserves had been redeployed.

On the US side, operation plans presented by Yield Force commanders

for their areas of responsibility (CTZ) were studied and reviewed by

MACV staff division chiefs before submitting them for discussions in a

joint session with their JGS counterparts. As soon as an agreement was

25

K .-

:I'i~ • ! : • l I . .. " "'• . .C,, .-- -- -- . .
reached on operational support requirements, both staffs would present

the plan for approval by the Chairman of the JGS and the MACV commander

with specific recommendations. In case these recommendations were

approved, a message or directive would be issued to both Corps and Field

Force for execution.

Most combined operations were subjected to approval by the JGS and

MACV in keeping with the procedure mentioned above. The 1970 crossborder operation into Cambodia and Lam Son 719 operation into lower Laos

were outstanding examples of combined planning effort. In a few cases,

however, operational planning was entirely done by the US Field Forces

* involved with little participation by the counterpart ARVN Corps staff

* and never submitted to the JGS for discussion. The JGS operational

staff, for example1 , knew absolutely nothing about operation JUNCTION CITY

until it was launchedalthough the operation plan had been published by

2 II FFORCEV a month in advance. It was learned, however, that strict

security measures were enforced to prevent compromise and the planning

group was held to a minimum even within II Field Force. It was doubtful

then that III ARVN Corps had advance knowledge about this operation at

all despite the fact that the mission assigned the planners of II Field

Force read: "on order, II FFORCEV in coordination and cooperation with

the III ARVN Corps conducts a major offensive into War Zone C, etc." 3

Once a major combined operation was launched in any CTZ, it was the

responsibility of both the JGS and MACV to monitor its progress and

take actions to provide support as required for the duration of the

operation. This was a continuous task demanding the constant updating

of the situation in progress for both staffs had to keep the Chairman A.

of the JGS and the MACV commander continually informed. As far as the

JGS was concerned, the instrument that provided this continuous flow of

operational data was the Joint Operations Center (JOC), which, linked

2Lieutenant General Bernard William Rogers, Cedar Falls -Junction City: A Turning Point, (DA, Washington, D.C.: 1974), p 85.

I3 bid., p 87.

26. ,

N6,*
9

I !1together with Tactical Operations Centers (TOC) at Corps, Division and

Sector levels, formed a highly integrated and instant system of operational reporting.

The Joint Operations Center was placed under direct control of the

Assistant Chief of Staff J-3, JGSand consisted of three major divisions:

Operations and Intelligence, Air and N~aval support, Service and Combat

Arms. (C~hart 2) To each division was assigned a US liaison officer

whose duties were to channel to MACV any information not made available

through the US system.

Organization, Joint Operations Center, JGS

Chart 2

S ~ACS, J-3

S~JOC

Sf Director

ii

rat Air and Service and

el Naval Support Combat Arms

I
Upon completion of the operation, both the JGS and MACV were required

to compile data based on unit reports in order to draw up "Operational

Reports, Lessons Learned" for the benefit of future operations. If the

i. I enemy made use of any new weapon or equipment, or tactic, a combined

study would be immediately initiated and the technical eata as well as

data on counteracting measures or techniques would be disseminated to

all units.

Combined Intelligence Activities

Among the various areas of operational cooperation and coordination,

none was more concrete and more successful than intelligence. This was

*, because the combined intelligence effort was characterized by mutual

support and had a common objective. Both American intelligence and its

Vietnamese counterpart had its own strengths and weaknesses. The US. was

endowed with superior technology, sophisticated gadgets, abundant resources

and a vast, competent organization, but lacked profound knowledge about

the enemy. In contrast, the RVN had none of the US material advantages,

but it enjoyed a vast, intimate knowledge about the enemy, his pyschology,

his technique and his culture and language. So the two intelligence

counterpart organizations complemented each other very well.

Intelligence cooperation and coordination between the JGS and MACV

was also solidly cemented by formal bilateral agreements which provided

procedures for smooth operation and guidelines for problem-solving. It

was agreed, for example, that enemy captured weapons, in general, would

belong to the party who happened to seize them, but as far as sophisticated

weapons and equipment were concerned, the item captured would be turned

over to MACV for test and assessment and the JGS would benefit from the

results obtained. As to enemy prisoners and returnees, it was agreed

that they would be turned over to the RVN as a matter of principle. There

were also formal agreements such as those concerning signal intelligence

and photo intelligence for example, which both the JGS and MACV precluded

from disseminating to third countries if such intelligence was collected

outside the RVN. In sum, these agreements provided for a harmonious and

productive cooperation that lasted throughoAt the years of US participation

in the war.

'I.

.57
There were in general two forms of intelligence cooperation and coordination. At the JGS and MACV level, such effort was more of a professional partnership than the advisory relationship which usually

characterized cooperation at Corps and lower levels. In particular,

coordination between J-2/JGS and J-2/MACV was daily effected through the

intermediary of a group of US officers who operated a liaison office at

.-JJ-2/JGS. Truly professional cooperation, however, was performed through

- weekly inte'iigence briefings during which JGS and MACV intelligence

staffs exchanged current information and estimates on enemy capabilities

- •in the week to follow. JGS and MACV Assistant Chiefs of Staff for

Intelligence did not meet on a regular basis. They met on.y when it was

required and the subjects of discussion between them were generally

administrative in nature; they neldom discussed the enemy situation.

As a result, the exchange of information concerning the enemy was rather

slow and frequently outdated. Cooperation and coordination, therefore,

appeared to have fallen short of their real goal which was to meet mutual

information requirements. As of 1969, however, intelligence coopevation

between the JGS and MACV began -o function more effectively.

There were four combined intell.igence agencies which performed all

the functions required for the indexing, storage, interpretation, analysis,

*,production and dissemination of intelligence. These were: The Combined

I• :-.• .intelligence - Center, Vietnam (CICV), The Combined Document Exploitation

Center (CDEC), Combined Military Interrogation Center (01C), aad tne

Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CIEC). They were truly combined

organizations in which Vietnamese and American personnel were paired off

in almost all functions, worked in the same location and shared the same

facilities. Each national element was under the control of a separate

director; thus each combined intelligence agency had two chiefs at every

"-i level of organization. There were sowe differences, however, between

4 [American and Vietnamese elements of the sawe agency. The organization

of each element was not exactly the same and US personnel were usually

more numerous than their Vietnamese counterparts.

29

*?. - ' -
1. The Combined Intelligence Center,,Vietnam (CICV)

Activated in January 1967, CICV was assigned the mission of preparing

and maintaining an all-source intelligence data base for use by the JGS

j and/or MACV and producing and disseminating intelligence which was

required by other agencies. Major functions performed by CICV included:

a. Provision of intelligence derived from, and concerned with,

land form, geology, soils, vegetation, drainage, climate, lines of communication routes and avenues of approach, and man-made features.

b. Propagation of order of battle intelligence on Viet Cong

and North Vietnamese Army forces in the RVN.

c. Preparation of imagery interpretations for the production of

intelligence in the form of bomb damage assessments, enemy defense overlays,

lines of communication studies, detailed interpretation reports and

other special studies.

d. Development of targets for maximum utilization of aerial

bombardment and other offensive action.

e. Formulation of technical intelligence concerning enemy

capabilities, vulnerabilities, and order of battle.

To carry out its mission and functions, CICV ;rs organized into six

"sections: Terrain, Order of Battle, Imagery Interpretation, Technical

Intelligence, Targets, and Research and Analysis. The Vietnamese CICV

organization did not include Technical Intelligence and Research Analysis

because these functions were performed by CHEC and J-2 respectively. One

* ;of the technological innovations made available by US resources was the

use of computers for the storage and retrieval of intelligence data.

.m•ong the functions perfomed by CICV, the most important was enemy

order of battlewhich included enemy force4 in North Vietnam, Laos,

Cambodia and South Vietnam, his infiltrations and his political infrastructure in South Vietnam. By common agreement between the JGS and

HACV, enemy units were categorized as., min force, local force and

guerrilla. Main force units were defined as those directly subordinate

to the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN) or an enetmy military

region, subregion or front. Local force units were those directly subordinate to province and district party coc•ittees and noroally operating

"within the territorial jurisdiction of their control headquarters.

30

:•.• . ..
Guerrillas were defined as those fighting forces directly subordinate to

the party apparatus at village and hamlet level.

A distinction, however, was made between North Vietnamese Army (NVA)

"and Viet Cong (VC) main and local force units. MACV defined NVA units

as those formed, trained, and composed completely or primarily of North

Vietnamese, in contrast with VC units which were chose formed and trained

in South Vietnam and whose original composition consisted primarily of

people residing in South Vietnam. This distinction became unclear in

time because VC units were gradually replenished with North Vietnamese

infiltrated troops and ultimately were composed primarily of North

Vietnamese. The enemy 5th, 7th and 9th Divisions for example, had more

. . than 70% of their strength made up by North IVietnamese troops, and the JGS

classified them accordingly as NVA units while MACV continued to consider

them as VC units. The last cAegory of enemy personnel was the Vietnamese

Communist Infrastructure (VCI) which was the political and administration

organization through which the Viet Cong exercised control ovar the people

in South Vietnam. Defined as such, the VCI did not include members of the

enemy military forces although guerrillas were usually an integral part

of the VC infrastructure. The methods of determining enemy forces and

strength also differed somewhat between the JGS and MACV. American

methods were generally rigid, and XACV seldom recorded an enemy unit unless it was confirmed by two different sources. Vietnamese methods,

meanwhile, were mre flexible, sometimes accepting a sole source

indicative enough if no other sources were available. There arose, as

a result, a discrepancy between American oud Vietnawse estiz-ces of enemy

strength despite the daily cooperation and coordiation.

Another azea of productive combined effort made by CXCV was intal1igence on terrain. Two Idportant diata base documents prepared by CICV,

a dictionary of geographical names and an analytical study of geographical

areas, prowd to be extremely valuable. Thanks to ab.,danb aerial photo

assets provided ýy US forces, the updating of =aps and lines of cauaicatlon

status bezame fa,,t.er and more accurate. C[CV studies also Included an

analysis of rice growing areas and of the control of rice In &overnmentcontrolled and eneay-held areas-, wich were of great value to the goveftr ut of the MN.

31

iI. i .... ... -- = - . - H._

[I
The largest section of CICV was Imagery Interpretation. WJhile on

the JGS side, imagery interpretation was primarily confined to aerial

photos, US imagery interpretation also included infra-red photos and

side-looking airborne radar (SLAB) in addition to aerial photos. I'iwgery

interpretation was greatly enhanced by the availability of modern American

facilities such as a view computer, rear projection viewerand photo

printer. Aerial photos provided by USAF units were an intelligence source

most appreciated and widely used in briefings and debriefings. They were

valuable in locating enemy artillery positions and were instrumental in

eliminating 130-mm and 122-mm guns which shelled Hue city in June 1972.

The target section provided target data for tactical and strategic

air bombardments. This was a function concerned primarily with, and

performed mostly by, the US element since it involved only the employment

of US Air Force units. The ARMN element confined itself to monitoring

the progress, particularly a-52 sorties. It focused its effort primarily

*.a enemy bases, sanctuaries and infiltration routes, Here again, it

benefited immensely from US scientific capabil.-ities by using the US-de~vised

me-thod'of pattern activity analysis,which combined and synthetized as many

as 30 different kinds of data on a single target. The data were recorded it ou eighL separate overlays placed on the same- area base map, and when

comibined and corroborated, provided a pattern which clearly indicated

euemy force disposition, tapabilities and probable course of action.

This targec area anailysis techbuique was miost appreciated by Vietnamese

field unit co-mmanders.

J ~2. The Combined Documont E.loitation Center (CDEC)

COEC was activated in O0iobr 1965 and was designed to provide katelligene baed onz thev exploitatiorn ofenemy-captanch dcuept Irnltio.s h

IUS elecment. provided and operated this- facility,wilich tuas capabale of trac*

latiaig Frenth. Chiaese, Caabodiaa -and Japaaese in additioa to English and

V7i7 7777se.
... APThe exploitation of enemy documents, which had been a major handicap

of the JGS for many years because of the lack of modern copying, storage

and retrieval facilities, now was greatly enhanced thanks to US-supplied

modern facilities such as microfilms and xerox machines. About 1OZ of

enemy-captured documents contained information of intelligence value. N

In the exploitation process, American and Vietnamese elements worked

separately but exchanged final interpretation results. These results

were frequently not similar. The American element relied mostly on

Vietnamese civilian employees who were not usually competent in intelligence work. Enemy documents were also difficult to read since they

were mostly handwritten, highly condensed,and often making use of

abbreviations. In such cases, only the most experienced Vietnamese

intelligence officers could read accurately and interpret correctly

enemy documents.

The majority of enemy documents were captured by US forces since

during the early years of US participation, it was they who conducted

seart.h-and-destroy operations against enemy bases. US forces were also

trained to be document-conscious while Vietnamese troops took enemy

documents rather lightly and usually discarded them in favor of weapons.

This poor habit fortunately was corrected in time and the JGS was able to

collect an important amount of enemy documents over the years. These

proved to be extremely valuable since enemy strategy and long-range plans

were known largely through the exploitation of documents. Documentbased intelligence also was one of the most abundant, accurate and reliable sources.

3. The Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC)

SCbaC was activated in January 1967 with the mission of interrogating

enemy prisoners of war and selected returnees of importance. CHIC c"mprised an American and a Vietnamese element which were organizad

differently. The US element was organized into an Operations Branch and

S I , a Support Branch. The Operaticns Branch performed CKIC essential

functions which consisted of interrogation, source procurement and

requirement. US interrogators were usually assigaed interpreters and

spedial aids or assistance. Inform-Aon obtained went into preparation

33
of interrogation reports which were translated into Vietnamese for intracenter use. The US element also translated reports produced by the ARVN

element selected for reproduction as CMIC intelligence reports and disseminated to US intelligence consumers. The ARVN element consisted of

an Operation, an Exploitation and an Editing Branch. The exploitation

branch performed the actual interrogation of PWs and returnees while the

Editorial Branch was responsible for the preparation, reproduction,

and dissemination of ARVN interrogation reports.

CHIC was capable of handling up to 63 sources. Prisoners of war

usually underwent initial interrogation at tactical units before being

processed to CMIC. The time of detention at the center was usually less

than two months, after which prisoners were transferred either to other

4. intelligence agencies or to detention camps. A priority system was

established whereby a source was assigned first to the interrogation

element to whose needs the source was considered of particular value.

The results obtained by US interrogators were usually compared with and

completed by those obtained by Vietnamese interrogators who enjoyed a

superior knowledge of the enemy language and psychology and could more

effectively detect any fabrication, false or inflated deposition made

by the prisoners. Treatment of enemy prisoners at CMIC was considered

good as attested to by visits and reports made by the International Red

Cross.

It was this humane treatment which earned the trust and full cooperation of captured enemy personnel. Vietnamese interrogators were trained

to use psychological methods in order to obtain better results. Punishment or torture were almost never used. Detained enemy personnel were

given the opportunity to observe CHIC activities and draw conclusions

f.or themselves. An enemy provincial political commissar, for example,

decided to. cooperace with our interrogators after realizing that what

happaned to him was not what he had been educated to believe. What

struck him the most "as the absence of torture and the free, democratic

way of life amog .ARVN officers and enlisted men. Another high-ranking

returnee, who wasa Southerner regroupee, was completely dismayed when

his iaoily was brought to him for a visit. In general, information

provided by enemy prisoners of war and returnees proved highly

34

* I;: _ .. __
A valuable, no matter what rank they held. It was a frequent error on

our part to Attach value only to rank and position, because the Communist

education system enabled even the lowliest cadre to have a fairly good

knowledge of the tactics as well as the strategy to be employed in a

certain military campaign.

4. The Combined Materiel Exploitation Center (CMEC)

Among the four combined intelligence agencies, CMEC was the last

Sto be established. Its mission was to examine, evaluate, and classify

J . captured enemy materiel and to prepare and disseminate technical iqtelligence reports, summaries and analyses. CMEC also provided "Go Teams" 11 to respond to requests from tactical units or for exploitation of other

targets of opportunity which could not be processed in a normal manner.

.1 Enemy materiel was classified into 5 categories: CommunicationsElectronics, Weapons and Munitions, Medical, Mobility, and General

Supplies and Equipment. CMEC did not possess an elaborate laboratory

system for the test and analysis of all types of materiel. On the

Vietnamese side, enemy materiel was usually routed to related services

for examination and evaluation. The same applied to the US element which

usually shipped the most modern and sophisticated enemr materiel to the

US for test and evaluation. The most useful service performed by CMEC

was the publication of catalogues on enemy weapons, munitions, equipment and supplies employed or to be employed in Vietnam, which helped

units to identify and report newly captured materiel. Another CMEC

valuable service was the dissemination of detailed information concerning

< #i enemy tanks and armored vehicles, and in particular, their vulnerable

spots. This was instrumental in the destruction of great numbers of

enemy tanks during the 1972 summer offensive.

Other modern enemy weapons processed by CHEC included the heatseeking, SA-7 antiair missile, all captured samples of which were turned

over to US forces, and the wire-guided AT-3 antitank missile. In particular,

captured equipment related to cryptography were all directly routed to

the US 509th Radio Research Group for e.xploitation. In general, technical

intelligence was one of the areas in which Vietnamese had to rely entirely

on American capabilities. The lack of trained specialists and the absence

:35

4. ¶. . .. ..
t\

of a test laboratory were the major drawbacks of CMEC, as far as the

JGS was concerned.

Logistical Support of the RVNAF

The RVNAF and US forces fighting the war in South Vietnam had their

own logistical system and were generally self-supporting. There was, as

a result, no combined logistical agency as was the case with intelligence,

eithek at the central echelon or in the field,to provide direct support

for units of both forces. Since materiel and equipment were separately

managed, the principle set forth for the support of the RVNAF was maximum

utilization of Vietnamese assets. Lateral coordination with the US

logistical system was made only when RVNAF assets were exhausted. Provisions of additional equipment and supplies for the RVNAF were made on

the basis of reimbursement.

The organization for coordination and cooperation in logistical

support was in effect a parallel structure at every echelon. (Map 1).

US Forces RVNAF

MACV JGS/Central Logistics Command

US Army, Vietnam (USARV) Central Logistics Command

Ist Log. Command Central Logistics Command

I Support Command, Da Nang 1st Area Logistical Command

Support Command, Qui Nhon 2d Area Logistical Command

Support Command, Cam Ranh 5th Area Logistical Command

Support Command, Saigon 3d Area Logistical Command

Support Group, Support-Activity ARVN service and technical units

At the central echelon, the Central Logistic Command (CLC) at the

JGS was responsible for coordination with MACV J-4 in the following areas:

1) Review of TOE's and TO's for RVNAF units and agencies, 2) Estimates of

major item requirements, based on TOE's, annual force structure, on hand

and due-in quantities and losses and maintenance float estimates, 3)

preparation of military aid budget and national budget requirements, 4)

Establishment of import schedules for major items of equipment based on

unit activation time-tables and other requirements, 5) Establishment of

supply requisitions, 6) Management of military aid budget and national

36

1 iAl"

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
f K;MAP 1. - DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR LOGISTICAL COMMANDS

DMZ S CUA VIET US ARMY SUPPORT WUNDER BEACHCO..DDANN

TAN MY ARV RE 1T LG DONG HA NAVAL SUPPORT ARNITAE O 

COMMAND ACTIVi fV DA N~ANG % U DNN

USARMY SUPPORT COMMAN1, ARVN 2D AREA LOG UNO

LGCOMMAND 1

AR VN TH AR EA LOGUYN

'4' 1 1 LOG CENTRAL

ARVN~~HA ONU RANGALO 

YOMN SUPRTCMMN [119 AM ANHOBA

LOGISTICCOMMAND SAIGONRE

DA MAJR O 14NATIOANHL HBAY

% 22

BIE HO

USARMY 0 SUP.R COM
military budget, 7) Determination of logistical force structure, organization and operation procedures in keeping with national resources and the

RVNAF support requirements, 8) Determination of procedures for mutual

support in all areas, 9) Determination of procedures for the control of

aid properties in order to ensure their timely and economical use.

At the field level, each Area Logistical Command (ALC) was responsible

for coordination with the related USA Support Command in all areas of

"mutual support in accordance with principles and procedures jointly

established by the CLC/JGS and J-4/MACV.

In supply and maintenance, the principle of maximum utilization of

ARVN assets was strictly enforced.* Area Logistical Commands usually

relied on available stocks in field depots for issue to troop units.

If there was a shortage of any kind, a requisition had to be placed with

the CLC which always attempted to fill it out of ARVN stocks. In

case the CLC was unable to meet the requirements, it would ask MACV J-4

to deliver the supply item from the US if such an item was not due-in, or

to speed up its delivery if it was due-in. If the delivery time was too

long, MACV might direct USARV to provide an advance loan out of its stocks

and the loan would be deducted from aid allocations to the RVNAF. In

the case of operational emergencies, each ALC was authorized to arrange

with the local US Support Command for an advance issue out of its stocks

then report the transaction to the CLC which then initiated procedures

required for reimbursement.

During the period from 1965 to 1967, RVNAF logistical units

provided gasoline and diesel oil support for certain US combat

units since US logistical units were not as yet deployed throughout South

Vietnam. Class III ARVN Quartermaster supply points provided this type

of support on the basis of reimbursement. Every month a statement of

account was sent by the ARVN Quartermaster Department to the US Sub-area

Petroleum Office, VN (SAPOV) for reimbursement of fuel quantities

delivered to US units.

There was practically no mutual support between US and ARVN logistical

units in field echelon maintenance since each of them was ent'Arely capable

of supporting themselves. However, depot rebuilding programs were annually

"38
established by service departments in coordination with US advisers.

Transportation was one of the weakest areas in the RVNAF logistical

system, and this was an area where maximum support was provided by US

forces in South Vietnam. At the central level, CIC coordinated inter-

.. regional movement and transportation requirements with MACV Traffic

Management Agency and with the Military Sea Traný ,ortation Service

Office, Saigon. At the field level, this coordination-was performed

between the ALC and the US Regional Traffic Management Agency and USA

SSupport Command.

In port activities, it was agreed that the management and operation

of South Vietnam ports, such as Saigon, Cam Ranh, Qui Nhon and Da Nang

* would be a US responsibility since port requirements and facilities were

predominantly American. US port operation provided support for both

Vietnamese civilian port authorities and the RVNAF Transportation

Terminals. All goods shipped to South Vietnam, including munitions,

were unloaded and transferred to Vietnamese depots by US forces.

Transportation of fuels from overseas into South Vietnam or from

the storage plant at Nha Be to ports at Can Tho, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon

and Da Nang was performed by SAPOV with US Naval ships or contracted

comnercial ships. Once shipped to the ports of destination, the fuels

would be pumped directly into the nearest ARVN or US field depot, or the

regional storage facilities of one of the three foreign oil companies

operating in Vietnam (Esso, Shell, and Caltex). ARVN field depots then

K .took delivery of fuels from these storage facilities to replenish depot

stocks and those of ARVN-operated supply points.

Medical treatment of wounded ARVN personnel was normally performed

by ýhe ARVN Medical Service. US forces, also accepted them for treatment

at field hospitals if they were emergency cases brought over by the

medevac system and upon requests of the ARVN Medical Service. Such

r treatment at US medical facilities was entirely free. US forces also

provided substantial support for the RVNAF in medical evacuation by

helicopters since ARVN facilities were in short supply. Requests for

helicopter medevac were generally routed through ARVN operational

channels. If these requirements could not be met by Vietnamese assets,

then ARVN field commanders could directly request assistance from US

39

&,

q ~~~- .. _..

. ., ,I•
Field Forces. Wounded ARVN soldiers were evacuated, as a rule, to the

nearest medical treatment facility regardless of who operated it.

In real estate, it was the RVN which was responsible to provide for

the needs of US and allied forces, in accordance with the 1950 Pentalateral Agreement (the US, Vietnam, France, Laos and Cambodia were

signatories). A GVN inter-ministerial committee chaired by the CLC

commander was designated with the duties to: 1) coordinate with local

authorities for the provision of land and buildings for US and allied

forces, 2) determine procedures for property control, 3) review compensation rates recommended by local authorities, and 4) resolve

complaints.

MACV was the sole agency which coordinated with the committee on real

estate requirements generated by US or allied forces. Land was usually

provided to US and Allied forces on a temporary basis and it was MACV

responsibility to return it to the committee when it was no longer

required. All compensations for requisitioned lands were financed by

the RVN national budget. Other US requirements in buildings and storage

facilities which the committee was unable to meet were fulfilled by

MACV through leasing or construction.

In summary, logistical coordination and cooperation between US forces

and the RVNAF brought about excellent results. The RVNAF obtained adequate

support from US forces in addition to regular military aid. One of the

backlashes of this generosity was the over-dependence of Vietnamese consumers on this unlimited support and a certain prejudice against the

Vietnamese logistical system. ARVN' unit commanders, for example, usually

turned to American units nearby to obtain quick and abundant supplies of

artillery munitions, grenades, fuel, and construction and barrier material,

instead of requisitioning through the normal ARVN supply channel. This

practice resulted in two drawbacks. First, ARVN units developed a spendthrift habit, making wasteful use of available supplies. Second, the

ARVN logistical system was unable to record true requirement experiences.

An outstanding example was the consumption experience pertaining to

105-ammunition. E~periences recorded during the period from 1967 to

1969 showed a consumption rate of only 12-16 rounds per day. This rate

40
. .

shot up to 28-32 rounds per day during the period from 1970 to 1971.

I When an investigation was made into firing logs, it was found that the

consumption rate was the same for both periods. The balance, of course,

was provided by US units whose records were unknown to the R'VNAP

logistical system. It's no wonder that no complaints were ever heard

about shortages in munitions and other supplies during the period of US

participation in Vietnam.

j41

i!i, I
CHAPTER III

ARVN Corps and US Field Forces

Deployment of RVN and US Forces

When the US initiated its buildup of combat units, South Vietnam

was militarily organized into f6ur Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) and the

Capital Military Region (CNR) for the purposes of command, administration,

and logistics. Each Corps Tactical Zone was placed under the command of

a Corps Commander who also assumed the administrative and political duties

of a Government Delegate. Similarly, the Capital Military Region commander

was also Military Governor of Saigon - Gia Dinh.

The ist CTZ comprised the five northernmost provinces of South

Vietnam; its northern boundary was separated from North Vietnam by the

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The 2d CTZ encompassed twelve provinces of

the Central Highlands and the coastal area. This was the largest and

most sparsely populated zone. The 3d CTZ covered ten provinces surrounding

Saigon and was considered the most important. The 4th CTZ was made up of

sixteen provinces of the Mekong Delta, the rice bowl of South Vietnam.

The CMR comprised the metropolitan area of Saigon - Cholon and Gia Dinh

province whose districts surrounded Saigon like a cocoon.

Each Corps Tactical Zone was in its turn divided into Division

Tactical Areas (DTA), each DTA being the tactical area of responsibility

assigned to an Infantry Division. There were, as a matter of fact, as

many DTA's as there were Infantry Divisions. In addition to DTA's

In 1970, the designation Corps Tactical Zone was changed into

Military Rebions (MR), and the Capital Military Region became Capital

Military District (C04), under operational control of MR-3. DTA's were

abolished (Presidential Decree No. 614a-TT/SL of 1 July 1970).

42 (

9''"9

t- - .'.-
a Corps Tactical Zone might include a Special Zone assigned to a separate

subordinate command, such as the 24th Special Zone of the 2d CTZ which was

responsible for Kontum and Pleiku provinces. Each DTA encompassed several

provinces which, under the military territorial organization system,were

called Sectors. In most cases, the province chief, usually a field-grade

army officer, was also Sector Commander.

In addition to a civilian administrative staff, each province had a

Sector Command which was responsible for the tactical employment of Regional

and Popular Forces (RF and PF) to assure territorial security for

the province. Operationally although not administratively, provinces or

! -/ Sectors were under control of the DTA of which they were part. The

Sector's area of responsibility or province was further divided into

several Subsectors or Districts. Subsector commands were the lowest military

control bodies of the military territorial organization system. Depending Si on its size, each sector might include from two to eight subsectors. (Chat 3)

Tactically, infantry divisions were assigned to CTZ'p as a general

function of population density, enemy strength and the level of enemy

activities in each zone. Thus the 3d and 4th CTZ, which by far controlled

the majority of the population, were assigned three infantry divisions each.

All four CTZ's, in principle, were placed under operational control of the

Joint General Staff (JGS). Due to the nature and proportions of the war,

which was mostly fought at the division level and rarely at Corps level,

corps commanders were delegated authority for operation planning and

* execution under the supervision of the .JGS.

In view of the severe enemy pressure in South Vietnam, the build-up

of US and other combat forces of the Free World Military Assistance Organ-

* ization (FWMAO) was effected rather rapidly. By March 1966, US Field

Forces had been deployed throughout the country. At that time the aggregate

2At the end of 1973, a lower echelon of military territorial organization, the Sub-subsector, was created at the village level. Its functions

were to assist the village chief in controlling and coordinating village

security forces to incude National Police, Popular Force, and People's

I Self-Defense Force (PSDF). This organization was proved highly effective

I iin neutralizing enemy infrastructure.

I 43

7.l
JOINT GENERAL STAFF

CORPS

(CTZ)

DIVISION

REGMET w ýw qr a no " sw " ECORPROVINC

ILI

BATTALIO SUBSCOs /ITR

SCOMMAND

- OPERATIONAL ECOTORDCrRi

j CEXARI'3-RVN TERRjITORIAL COMMAN4D AND CONTROL

44
strength of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAf), US, aad EWNA

forces stood at 816,000 men, including 581,000 of the RVNAF, 22,400 of

2: 1the FWMAF, and 213,000 of the US forces. The FWTAF represented contributions made by the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Australia, New

Zealand, the Republic of China, aud the Philippines, in decreasing order

ft .of importance.

During this period of US buildup, the RVNAF force structure was made

KMup of: 1) Regular Forces; Army, 273,000; Navy, 15,000; Air Force, 13,000;

Marines, 7,100; 2) Territorial Forces: Regional 135,000; Popular, 137,000,

C or a total of 580,000 men under arms.

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was composed primarily

of ten infantry divisions deployed to all four CTZ's. The Ist and 2d

Infantry Divisions were deployed to the Ist CTZ; the 22d and 23d Infantry

. Divisions to the 2d CTZ; the 5th, 10th, and 25th to the 3d CTZ; and the

7th, 9th, and 21st Infantry Divisions to the 4th CTZ. 4 In addition to

infantry divisions and separate regiments which v.ere a±l under operational

j control of Corps, there were twenty Ranger battalions which were usually

employed as Corps reserves, and asstgned to them accordingly. An Airborne

Division and a Marine Division constituted the General Reserve under

direct control of the JGS. In total, there were 141 maneuver battalions

of the RVN regular forces operating throughout South Vietnam.

The Regional and Popular Forces assumed responsibilities for territorial

security at provinco, district, village and hamlet levels. The Regional

Forces were basically organized into cot~mnies assigned to proviaces

"The total number of ARUN infantry divisions increased to 11 when . •the 3d Infantry Division was activated in October 1971 to replace the US

::• ~3 Ma• .rine Division.

3darIn 1967, upon recocmendation of the 10th Divsion Con•nder, Brigadi

General Do ge G who beleved tha nuber 10 as a bd number, the 10th

-t Division was changed into the 18th, presumably a luckier number.

in 19n 1970. RF Companies were consolidated Into battalions; later on,

in 1974, RF battalions were grouped into Hobile Groups with organic

tIP' artillery support (one battery of four 105-=r howic:e-s).

S,,O4lln a a w i as a .-. -. -•:
There were, in addition, 12 RE battalions. RF companies operated

within the confines of a province and under the control of the province

chief/sector commander, Popular Forces were organized into platoons.

Lightly armed, PF platoons assured the protection and security of villages

and hamlets where they lived, under the control of the district chief/

subsector commander. As a rule of thuwb, each PF platoon was assigned

to a hamlet.

Free World Military Assistance combat forces included: the Ist Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, and a 105-mm howitzer battery of the

Royal New Zealand Artillery, totalling about 1,400 men and operating in

the 3d CTZ under operational control of the US 173d Airborne Brigade

(Separate); and the Republic of Korea forces which were mainly deployed

in the 2d CTZ and comprised the "Capital" Infantry Division and the 2d

Marine Brigade, with an aggregate strength of over 20,000 men. In total

there were 10 maneuver battalions of the FWMAF in South Vietnam.

During this period of time, US combat force structure in South Vietnam

was made up of: 1) Air Force, 28,747 men; Marines, 39,441 men; Army,

134,324 men; Navy 10,111, and Coast Guard, 462 men.

US tactical air support was provided by the US 2d Air Division.

The mission assigned this division was to defend the airspace of South

Vietnam, maintain air superiority, conduct operations t3 destroy enemy

units, and provide air-ground support as required.

The US III Marine Amphibious Force (00F) which included the US 3d

Marine Division and the Ist Marine Air Win&. and other supporting units,

vas deployed in che Ist CTZ. Total Itt MAY combat strength was *ad-e up

of 13 maneuver battalions operating in the five northern provinces vhich

were the Zarine-s' assigned tactical area of operation.

US Army units =-ade up the bulk oft US comtbat forces in South VietnA=.

During this period of time, US Army units included: the 4st Air Cavalry

Division (Air Mobile). the 1st Brigade, 104t Airborne Division, and the

34 5rigade, 75th~laliantry Division, operatingi in the ý1d aTZ. the sts

Infantry Division, the 1731 Airborne 5rig4de (Separate), and the 2d

Brigade. 25th Infantry Divisloo, assigned to operate in the 3d CI.

Hlowever, there uere no LS combt units deployed to the Mekog Delkta.

t4

r-, - "_ SI -- _ _ 
In total, there were 28 US maneuver battalions operating in the 2d and

3d CTZ. (Map 2)

In general, despite their heavy logistical appendages, US units

:1 were deployed where tactical requirements warranted their commitment,

particularly units that enioyed great mobility such as the Air Cavalry

Division and the Ai'Surne Brigades. In contrast to ARVN infantry

divisions, no fl, unit was made responsible for a permanent tactical area

of responsibility.

The deployment of US forces throughout South Vietnam-except the Mekong

Delta-brought about the most reasonable balance feasible between friendly and

enemy forces. There were, in each Corps Tactical Zone, sufficient forces

for the protection of important population centers and enough combat strength

to conduct sweep operations. The build-up of US and F`WMA forces also

raised the morale of ARVN troops and restored confidence among the

population.

Organizational Arrangements for Conmznd and Control.

Following the accelerated buildup of US combat troops, command and

* control organizations were also rapidly developed and by March 1966, US

field commands were already in place throughout the country. It was

from this time on that large-scale offensive operations began and initiative

was, gradually regained on all battlefielde.

To exercise coanmand and control over US forces in the field, General

William C. Westmoreland, Commander, USMACV, instituted in each Corps

Tactical Zone--except the -ýth CTZ--a US Field Force Command, There were:

1. The III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) command, activated in

May 1965, and co-located in Da Nang with Headquarters, I Corps,

RVNAF. III MAF was responsible for military operations in the 6

IsL CTZ,

6Initially, III MAF was called Ill Marine Zxpeditionary Force. The

term "Expeditionary" was later dropped because it w&s unpopular among

the Vietnamese who still recalled with bitter -esentment che French

Expeditionary Corps. "Force" was also favorel over "Corps" because this

term had been used for the RVNAF; besides, it was confuslng sense to have

two Cor~s in the same CTZ.

47

S1•.

4 .. .. . . ... .- 4'--- .-•

-- -, * ............ ............................................... ... ..... ......... ...... M 4 4 ., ,•• ,p-+..-. --••..-•.•
MAP 2. - DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR ARVN AND US UNITS, MARCH INS

xxx

xx ARVN I

xxx

MAF III

xx QUANG TRI Nut hu Bli

x xx THUA

ARVN THIEN 2

a Nang

QUANG ARVN

NAM

QUANG TIN xxx

QUANG xx

NGAI

3 25 KONTUM

BINH

xx DINH

Xx 22

^0 K16 23 PLEIKU aul ARVN

73 Nhon

x PHU

BON xxx

2 25

PHU

YEN

xx DARLAC

5 Ban Me Thuot KHANH

ARVN HOA

xx QUANG Nhs Trang

DUC TUYEN

A V PHUOG On W Cam Ranh x

GIN14 LONG DUC NINH ON - THUAN 101

Xk LAM DON zin

TA Rano

NINH BINH H LONG VHVAN ANVN OUCONG KHANH INH xxx

Cu A.""I'01 Xuald Lot TUV Chi xx

HAU NG 1A SAIGO KMN KICEN 10

WiAlk PHON LION to P uOC xxx

00C Tuy 131C AAVN

AN uO GI IIFFV

KIE-W IAN DIN I

QIANQ3 V VINN ;gx

PNONO ONG "OA Vulip xx You - DIN14 VINH JAV Thu

Hij N' te\ll rkle VN 113 HIE

RAC xxx LIQU

ARVN IV 21

48

1%

all
4. 2. The I Field Force, Vietnam (IFFV) Command, activated as of

September 1965 and located in Nha Trang. IFFV was responsible

for military operations in the 2d CTZ. II Corps Headquarters,

however, was located in Pleiku.

3. The II Field Force, Vietnam (IIFFV) Coummand, activated in

March 1966, and co-located in Bien Hoa with Headquarters, III

Corps, RVNAF. IIFFV was responsible for military operations

in the 3d CTZ and the CNR.

The functions of a US Field Force Command were essentially the same

as those of an ARVN corps command, which involved primarily the operational

control of combat and combat support units assigned to it, with the

exception that, unlike the ARVN Corps, the US Field Force was not strictly

bound by territorial duties. The collocation of III MAF and II FFV Headquarters with those of I and III Corps respectively, made cooperation

and coordination between US and RVN forces easier and more convenient.

K The physical separation in the case of I FFV and II Corps was offset to

some extent by instant and extensive communications, and by frequent

staff and command visits. -I The organizational concept behind Field Forces was a sound one. It

befitted the political and military situation of that time by preventing

the confusion of having two corps operating in the same area of responsibility on the one hand, and by providing flexibility for the span of

control, which could be easily adjusted to changing tactical requirements

and command responsibility, on the other.

In early 1968, to counteract the severe threat caused by the presence

of NVA units in the two northern provinces of the 1st CTZ, the Commander,

j USMACV, decided to reinforce this area with two additional US units: Ml .the ~ combat-proven Ist Air Cavalry Division and 101st Airborne Division.

At the same time, MACV Forward was activated and installed in the HluePhu Bai area, under the command of General Creighton W. Abrams, Deputy

Co~ader ACV, to exercise supervision over increasing combat and

logistics activities of US Air Force, Naval, Army, and Marine units in

the area. Amonth later, MACV Forward was dea~civaLtd and transformed

into US Provisional Corps, Vietnam, under the cotmnand of Lt. General

William B. Rosson. Later still, Provisional Corps, Vietnam was changed

'1 49
into US Army XXIV Corps as of August 12, 1968. XXIV Corps exercised

operational control over all US forces operating in the area defined

by the DMZ in the north, and by the Hai Van Pass, just north of Da Nang,

in the south. These forces included the 3d Marine Division, the 101st

Airborne Division, the 1st Air Cavalry Division, and the 1st Brigade,

5th Infantry Division (Mechanized). XXIV Corps also closely coordinated

combat operations with the ARVN 1st Infantry Division in this area.

,.,(Chart 4)

Also, during 1968, tactical expediency in the face of the enemy

Tet offensive led to the creation of an additional field command whose

* components were drawn from the II FFV. Called "Hurricane Forward," this

*' field command was collocated with the CMD and exercised control over US

forces operating in the Saigon - Gia Dinh area. As of June 4, 1968,

however, this temporary field command took on a permanent character and

became the Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC), under Major

General John H. Hay. CMAC planned for and operated the defense of the

Saigon - Gia Dinh area in coordination with commanders of the US 7th

Air Force and Naval Forces, Vietnam, and the Saigon - Gia Dinh Military

Governor, Major General Nguyen Van Minh.

The final development of US command and control structure in South

Vietnam included the activation of the Delta Military Assistance Command

(DMAC) on April 8, 1969, whose commander, Major General George S. Eckhardt,

was also senior adviser to the commander, IV Corps. DMAC was created

for the express purpose of controlling US forces which operated separately

in the Mekong Delta, including the US 9th Infantry Division (-).

The aforementioned field commands continued operation until 1970

when they began to decrease in strength or downgrade along with the

gradual redeployment of US and FWMA forces from South Vietnam, and the

turnover of combat responsibility to the RVNAF. 7

-O1n March 9, 1970, XXIV Corps Headquarters moved to Da Nang to take £.-i ~~over II W\. Lt. C. eral Melvin Zais, Commander,•VCrsbcm

seniradvser o te I grpsCo~ad50 W

_______
U- a z

ZZ

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N zz

r.c 

5I >

L czcI_'_ _-

o ~ ~~ r=...Ii n~ ~~ I- a. -- rcu,",m,,,, . _ _

cr cc >i /...tJ• 0 0 m• •, I,.r.. ,• .,,,.

i:!:- • i _L _ . (• u I.. ._. ,..._ > _l

'v a." cc - - •" * CC

- -0 >. i

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•÷ ,-- Itn

>Ic

:e m i =.== N•I mmli a limmmtram
With the introduction of US ground combat forces in South Vietnam,

and following the activation of US Field Force commands in all four Corps

Tactical Zones, some modification in the US advisory effort became necessery. When he first arrived in Da Nang, the commander of the US III MAF

was designated as senior adviser to the commander of I Corps. Consequently,

all I Corps US advisers were placed under operational control of the commender, III MAP. The former US senior adviser, a colonel, now became

deputy senior adviser. The same arrangement was applied to the 2d and

3d CTZ when I and II FFV were activated. The two former senior advisers

to II and III Corps also became deputy senior advisers under the com-

* manders of I and II FFV, respectively, who became senior advisers. The

case of the 4th CTZ was an exception in that there were no major US

units operating in the area at that time. As a result, the US advisory

organization in the 4th CTZ underwent no change and continued under

direct control of MACV. (Chart 5)

The realignment of the US advisory system in view of the presence

of the US Field Forces was a shrewd and. suave arrangement which paid off

handsomely in a psychological sense, insofar as Vietnamese commanders

were concerned. Operationally, however, it brought about practically

no change. The day-to-day advisory activities were carried on as dutifully as ever by the Corps Advisory Group no matter who became the

nominal chief. The senior advisers, meanwhile, seemed to be more concerned with their own troops than with advisory duties, which was perfectly

natural. In retrospect, if the US Field Force Commander could have given

more time to his role of senior adviser, -i.e., cooperation and coordination on a daily basis-then perhaps the combined military effort

in each Corps Tactical Zone would have been much better.

?4iWsion Re Zatlionhip3

At the Corps Tactical Zone (Military Region) level, the three US

Field Forces and their Vietnamese counterparts, the ARVN Corps, were on

a par with each other. They operated on the basis of cooperation and

•! ~mutual assistance, being equal partners work.iug toward a common goal. - That this working relationship could be maintained and bring about

excellent results throughout the years could only be ascribed to a

I52

L
CL m

'1 4

cd~ 3

fnQCI0

awe am" L a.)"

0 5003
commendable spirit of willingness and self-effacement on the part of the

field commanders involved.

Beginning with 1966, with a view to expand and coordinate offensive

military operations, MACV and the JGS jointly developed a comprehensive

"Combined Campaign Plan" which set forth the objectives, policies,

relationships, and the various areas of coordination required for a

* Iharmonious effort of both RVN and US forces in all the Corps Tactical

Zones.

The basic objectives as determined by the first Combined Campaign

* plan were to clear, protect and assist in the development of heavily

populated areas around Saigon, in the Mekong Delta, and in selected

i portions of the coastal plain. 'These were called national objectives.

(Map 3) In addition, in each Corps Tactical Zone, there were certain

key areas, generally populated and of political and economic importance,

to be secured and protected which constituted CTZ objectives. Both national

and CTZ objectives were selected on the basis of a strategic concept-sometimes metaphorically called the "oil stain" strategy-which called for the

consolidation of'several nucleii in the first stage, then the outward

expansion of government control from these nucleii at a later stage. Outside of these objective areas, existing governmental centers of political

and demographic importance, such as provincial capitals and district towns,

were also to be protected. Finally, to eliminate the enemy main force,

search-and-destroy operations were to be conducted ift those outlying

areas located outside of national and CTZ objectives.

The responsibilities assigned to ARVN Corps and US Field Force

commanders encompassed the following major efforts:

1. To establish and protect important bases.

2. To defend governmental centers and to protect national resources.

3. To open and secure major lines of communication, railways

and waterways.

4. To conduct long duration ground and air operations against

enemy forces and bases.

5. To neutralize the enemy strategy.

6. To provide security for the expansion of government control.

* 4 54

"11(6

,• • I •" ' - " "•..•1•:.1
MAP 3. - 1966 COMBINED CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES

QUANG

TRI

THUA

THIEN

QUANG NAM

QUANG TIN

I xxx QUANG

NGAI

KONTUM

BINH

DINH

PLEIKU

PHU

SON PHU

YEN

DARLAC KHANH

HOA

QUANG

DUC TUY

PHUOC Duc. NIN

LONG THUA BINH LAM DONG

x1l TAY LONG Ill x NINH INH

BINH tj Chi LONG THUAN

DUONG H HIA K"ANH OINH

DINH TUY

TUON5Gý Kýjl E

XIEN "N TTU 0 LONG JAN AR ILE N

CHAU PHONG x XIII HOA HU

noc IV TUY

N

KIEN GI KIE GIANG VINH A CONG NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

0. RHONG VIN I

DINH 0 H C"UON UJA THIEN X cyz 08JECTIVES

UYEN

UAC

LIEU

AN

TIZ
7. To interdict land and sea infiltration routes.

8. To provide tactical air and logistic support.

Under the guidelines thus provided, ARVN and US field commanders

in each CTZ were directed to cooperate with each other to conduct

operations based both on the MACV-JGS-established operational schedule

* and on the requirements of assigned responsibilities and the situation

in the Corps Tactical Zone. The basic operational concept during that

period of time prescribed the employment of RVN forces for the protection

of governmental centers, the protection and control of rice and salt

producing areas, and eventually for sweep and secure operations in

selected areas of priority. US and NMA forces, meanwhile, were

responsible for the security of their bases, the clearing of areas adjacent

, to those bases and, as directed, assisting in the defense and control of

* rice and salt producing areas. In addition, Vietnamese, US, and FWMA

forces, in cooperation with one another, would conduct offensive-type

operations aimed at destroying enemy units and bases located beyond

secure areas.

Despite the fact that the tactical aspect of the situation varied

according to the periodic enemy pressure and the terrain and weather

of each particular Corps Tactical Zone, operations generally fell into

one of three major categories: search-and-destroy, clearing, and

securing. Search-and-destroy operations were aimed primarily at

locating enemy forces and bases, and destroying them without holding

terrain. Clearing operations were of the longer-term offensive type

conducted in coordination with territorial forces for the purpose of

driving enemy forces away from a target area, and holding it for an

indefinite period of time. In these operations, the continuing presence

of friendly forces was deemed necessary to provide security and instill

confidence among the local population. Securing operations were generally

conducted by territorial forces, frequently augmented by a regular ARVN4

or US reaction force if necessary. They were mostly saturation patrolling

activities conducted on a permanent basis to provide security for lines

of communication and important localities within a particular Tactical

Area of Responsibility (TAOR). .

-5

-565C

* .*-I
In keeping with the above directives and policy, large-unit offensive

operations, at brigade and higher level, were conducted on a regular

) basis-mostly by US forces and on their initiative--in all CTZs, except

the Mekong Delta. With abundant firepower and mobility, US units

usually focused their efforts in searching out and destroying major

enemy units and logistical bases, or reacted in response to the situation

and intelligence recorded. The RVNAF, meanwhile, were stretched over the

entire national territory for which they were responsible. With only

limited firepower and mobility, Vietnamese units usually operated in

- populated areas near the major axes of communications, and concentrated

their primary effort on the support of pacification and rural develop-

[ merit.

Combined operations which integrated or paired off ARVN and US units

were sometimes conducted, depending on the tactical situation or as a

response to the force requirement of certain types of effort, provided

that both sides could muster enough forces for the operation.

In the 1st CTZ, for example, after it was discovered that the h NVA 324B Division had infiltrated into an area north of Cam Lo (Quang

Tri) in late June 1966--the first instance of a NVA division recorded

crossing the DMZ-operation HASTINGS/LAM SON 217 was launched. It was

a major combined operation conducted by the ARVN Ist Infantry Division

reinforced by general reserve units and the reinforced US 3d Marine

Division. During the operation which lasted from 7 July to 3 August

1968, friendly forces clashed violently with NVA forces from the moment

the operation was launched until it was terminated. The enemy 3248

Division suffered considerable losses in this operation.

* iIn the 2d CTZ, the US 1st Air Cavalry Division, joined by Vietnamese

and South Korean units launched several consecutive operations to clear

the coastal plain in northern Binh Dinh which was a national objective.

The operations, code-named XASItER/MIIXTEWING/T6 P44ONG I, lasted from

January 24 to March 6, 1966 and succeeded in destroying the. major part

, of enemy regional main force units in the area, and at the same time

it-flicting heavy losses on the NVA 3d (Gold Star) Division.

57

IN .-. -.
Another large scale combined operation, ATTLEBORO, was conducted

from September 14 to November 24, 1966, with the participation of the

US 196th Light Infantry Brigade, the US Ist Infantry Division, the 3d

Brigade, US 4th Infantry Division, the US 25th Infantry Division,

and the US 173d Airborne Brigade, combined with forces of the ARVN 5th

Infantry Division. It was the largest combined operation until that time

striking into the enemy War Zone C in the 3d CTZ. The operation inflicted

severe losses on the enemy CT-9 Division and 101st Regiment, drove them

across the Cambodian border, and resulted in large quantities of weapons,

ammunition, and supplies being captured. The enemy winter (dry season)

campaign plan in Tay Ninh proviace was thus thwarted.

The joint military effort, made during the initial stage of US participation, resulted in several concrete achievements. Enemy forces and

his combat potential were seriously attrited and his infrastructural

iorganizations badly damaged. Due to these achievements, South Vietnam

"was able to overcome a most dangerous period, regain its balance and

stability, enlarge its control and restore confidence among the troops

and population.

The actual accomplishment of common responsibilities depended in a

large measure on the cooperation and arrangement between US and ARVN

j field commanders in each Corps Tactical Zone. As directed by MACV and

the JGS, US Field Force and ARVN Corps commanders jointly initiated

courses of action, determined the conduct of operations and assigned

intermediate objectives to divisions, sectors and other subordinate

units. In genera.1 the joint concept of force employment during this

"period tended toward assigning ARVN units more responsibility for

territorial security thMi for mobile combat operations. Lacking 4

stantially in combat support facilities, MRVN units were yet to prove

their combat effectiveness and reliability. So the primary effort of

seeking out and destroying the enemy was taken up by US forces Vho, in

view of their substantial firepower aid mobility assets, enjoyed a

great tactical advantage and usually held the initiative, in large-scale

operations. It was asaumed that for these reasons, US forces were

better suited to the task olf eliminating enemy =ain force units

58
and destroying enemy bases which were usually located in jungle and

mountain areas.

This division of tasks between US and ARVN forces no doubt spared

the ARVN Corps commanders the major war burdeni. It was also a reflection

of the prevalent political situation in which Corps commanders played

a preeminent role. Still affected by an undercurrent of instability,

the RVN military governm'ent found it prudent to entrust political power

to Corps commanders who were selected among members of the ruling Armed

Forces Council. As a result, AMIN field commanders were sometimes more

preoccupied with politics than combat operations. The I Corps commander,

* ~Lieutenant General NJguyen Chanh Thi, for example, was deeply involved

in politics because of the close relationship he enjoyed with military

rulers. His controversial role in the Buddhist uprising in 1966, however, led to his dismissal. A Corps commander was usually assigned many

positions of key importance. Lieutenant General Le N4guyen Khang, III

Corps commander, for example, retained five additional positions for

himself.8 Because of these burdensome duties, Corps Co=mzanders were

hardly able to devote themselves to the military effort. Hardly if ever

could they spare time to visit subordinate field units, provide them

guidance, and follow up on their actions. As a direct consequence, comrand

#nd COnri~ol, morale, and discipline were adversely affected. This situation gradually improved after 1967 when democratic rule was established

anid more and more professionals were assigned to key commands and posi.-

tioris. Still, to ensure that the common effort would succeedi as directed,

US Field Force commanders usually played the preponderant rote iii the

couduct of combat operatioos. As a result of this role anid of their

capacity as senior adviaers, they txerted a certain infunence on their

AMV counterparts.

Inadto1ohspltclpstosa.mmeNtoa

A
The deployment of forces, arrangement for command and controL, and

the assignment of common tasks to ARMN Corps and US Field Forces, in

I, retrospect, can be said to be reasonable and conforming to the situation

of South Vietnam at that time. This was truly an excellent working

arrangement that eventually led to the successful accomplishment of a

common goal chrough cooperation and mutual assistance. It was an

arrangement that fully exploited the advantages and shortcomings of

either side, and provided a good opportunity for ARVN units to learn in

a most realistic manner all aspects of cvnmmand. staff planning, and

combat techniques through combined activities. In reality, however,

both sides were more concerned with immediate goals and cobtainiog,

immediate results than attempting wo reach for thie obJectives of a more

distant future.

There were some US commanders who contended that, in view of the

tremendous military power and superiority enjoyed by US forces, searching

out and destroying enemy units hidden in outlying areas was not really

a big challenge. This idea was shared L-y many ARMN commanders. It was

true that the United States had more military might than required to win

the war in South Vietna~m if it had been willing to. But A~mericaa policy } ~was apparently constrained by itb gradual. response approach and failed

to bring all US military maighc t.,, bear on the war at the appropriate I time.~Various progrs ofcmined action aimed at upgradlpg. the RVUF

combat effectiveness, and complementi.ng the etfrort of US forces at the

Sa~e time- were su~gtsced but few were impeented. Zn fact. US units

were sonm±what chary oE the complexzitiea involved in coordination and

the 4dditiunal burden of providing all kinds of aupp-Ort for kApVN units.

Only rare-lIy -lid they suggest combined acton. Ti-q re-ason for thisreuxctance t-ts simple enot!N:,h IS c~nes'4 ~yrgd~e

IAMNZ uniza athough ao!y AR-!ý unit. re4dvi t'itAi~e -ýuld in

factmak qe~u~.U ton tribuco td the flftl1=nt off thtir coatw4o ~u
R In addition, US Field Force and unit commanders, having to cope

with several duties and obligations at a same time, and trying to perform them in a totally strange and complex environment, seldoma detanded

or advanced initiatives of their own concerning combined activities with

Vietnamese units. As senior advisers, however, they felt obliged to take

some interest in ARVN units. But the periodic visits they paid to their

counterparts were largely courtesy calls or official tours characterized

by all the pomp, civility and reserve of diplomatic encourAters. Ever

guarded and courteous,US commanders seldom offended their counterparts

by critical remarks which could well have been beneficial for the success cf

a common enterprise. For the most part, therefore, US commanders stuck

to their own business, leaving the day-to-day workipg contact to US

advisers and liaison officers.

ARVN forces deployed in the CTZs were usually bound by their territorial security mission, and constrained by territorial responsibilities.

This was a complex mission that finally absorbed and heldi back the great

majority of regular army units. An adverse consequence was that, after

a long period of operating from fixed positions, the combat spirit and

effectiveness of a unit was greatly reduced. Once adapted to a certain

familiar environment, troops tended to become careless and soft, and

more disposed toward personal comfort; combat aggressiveness either decreased

markedly or was completely gone. And in time, they became just another

kind cf territorial force.

Cooperation and coordination, as a compromise between military and

political considerations, were certainly not an ideal way to prosecute

a war, much less the war in Vietnam. But cooperation and coordination

did work and did succeed, to some extent. It was only regrettable that

it had not begun earlier. If, in the initial stage of US participation,

i - [US Field Forces commanders had initiated extensive combined acuion pro-

.• grams and taken advantage of their preeminent positions as senior advisers

to demand more of their cc'nterparts, then ARVN units would have certainly

benefited more from the presence of and cooperation with US forces.

Their combat effectiveness would have upgraded more quickly and more

substantially. At the very least, their pe..formance and discipline would

61
have been much better. Finally, if US Field Force and RVN Corps

commanders had had the opportunity and willingness to cooperate and

coordinate on a daily basis, to see for themselves problems as they

arose, and jointly decided on the spot how to solve them, then the

combiaed effort to utilize every available asset to prosecute the war

would have been more productive and more successful. These observations

were substantiated by the remarkable progress achieved by the P.VNAF after

the 1968 Tet offensive through the years of intensive cooperation and

coordination with US forces, and as a result of more determined efforts

by the United States to help the RVNAF gradually take over the primary

war burden.

62

~~~ ~ ill 
II

CHAPTER IV

I .RVNAF- - US Joint Combat Operations

Operational Cooperation and Coordination Procedures

Combined operatlons, involving the participation of both Vietnamese and American units, were planned and controlled by commanders at

all echelons on the basis of cooperation and coordination. Beginning

in 1966, for operations of all types - whether separate or combinedthe coordination between RVNAF and US forces, and occasionally between

operating forces and the local government, was governed by instructions

provided by MACV and the JGS in the annual Combined Campaign Plan.

Procedures established for such operations by MACV andJGS-also applied,

by extension and with some modifications, to qnilateral operations.

RVN and US commanders were instructed to peirsonally discuss pl'wnnd" K operations as early as possible in order to arrive at an agreement on

purpose, general objectives, operational concept, participating forcee,

and planned duration. All these provisions were laid out in written

orders which served as guiding instructions for the staff and subordinatc.

. units, Following the initial agr-em-nt, com=andars were to meet period!-

cally with each other in order to review planning progress aud issue

.• . . . ....... further instructions au necessary.

As soon as there was agreement between com•manders, staff officers of

both comma-ends convened to plan operatioual details. Based on guiding iastructions agreed upon, the planning task was aimed at: (1) determ-ning

objectives, responsibilities, forces, phases and proje..ted duration of

the operations; (2) deLormining the -xoundaries of tactical ar-as of,

: i63

. ," S:
responsibility to be assigned to each force; (3) arranging details for

air, artillery and naval support and other support requirements; (4)

issuing guidance and instructions to subordinate commanders.

In view of security requirements both comnmanders implemented

special measures to ensure secrecy for the planned operation, such as

(1) limiting the number of planning personnel, (2) utilizing the

* tactical operatiorscenter or a safe working area with limited access,

(3) strict control of documents and materiels used in the planning process, message transmissions, and in particular, all telephone communications

pertaining to the operation.

Subordinate staffs and commanders were subsequently informed in time.

i in order to proceed with timely planning and coordination for the

operation. Appropriate security measures, again, were taken to prevent

disclosure.

When the operation was about to be initiated, the US and ARVN commanders involved established their command post at the same location,

usaally at a Fire Support Base in order to facilitate coordiuation, mutual

support, and common decision making. These collocated command posts were

provided with adequate personnel and facilities tor the coordination and

control of combat -iurport assets such as air, artillerv and naval fire,

engineers, ana helicopters. At the Corps and Field Force level, command

posts were usoally not collocated, but liaison officers were exchanged

I'between RWN and US command posts in ordertoastinpnigdrcn

In the cease of US forces-, this coordinati.on was effected through the US

advisov/ teas asalgtied to tite loc~al government.

~ iWhen operatioas were conducte' u~nilaterally, US forces usually coordtnt~d wth th loca goventn at provihee and district level throug

'oa S advisory tea=,. This coordination soactimes included the estabI ishmenz of an operational liaison teata at the local government headqarf~.rt;. la order to allow ior tiutel coordination, US tactical coc~nders

vere ilnstruc~ted to contact the local US advisory teams as early as possible.

I6
During the operation US units made maximum use of ARVN liaison

personnel with a view to facilitating coordination with and identification

of friendly forces. The ARVN liaison personnel were also used to

identify and make contact with the population. In addition, US tactical

commanders were instructed to pay equal attention to psywar and civicaction activities in conjunction with tactical activities. United

States Operations Mission (USOM) and Joint US Public Affairs Office

(JUSPAO) representatives were provided to assist them in planning and

implementing these activities which were also coordinated with ARVN unius

and the local governments in the area of operation.

When ARVN units operated independently the Vietnamese tactical unit

commander was instructed to cooperate and coordinate with local authorities, and establish operational liaison with US units. Hie and his US adviser

coordinated and established liaison with US units and local US advisers

in the area of the planned operation (province or district). ARVN unit

commanders were also directed to give attention to psywar and

civic action activities in conjunction with combat activities. These

programs and activities were to be coordinated with the local govern~ment.

A salient feature of the Vietnam war was that the civilian population

usually lived and stayed in the area of operation during the course of

military operations. Aa a result, US and ARVN forces were instructed to

exercise great caution to minimize human casualties and property losses

to the local population.

Wheni contact was made with the enemy in a sparsej.y populated area,

air and artillery fire could be applied freely in keeping with standing

operating procedures. In the absence of eatemy contact, however, uiokobserved fires were to he delivered only aftelr targets had been claired

vith loci-l authorities, AV .4 l.iaison officers, and artillery or air

forward controllers.

Tlhe emplioyment of naval gunifire. grtillery, and tactical air on

enemy-hold at- suspected targets in villages or hamlets that were usually

Inhabited by the local population vas regulated as folLows. These

regulat ions applied to hoth US and ARM~ forces.

65
1. All firings should be controlled by airborne or ground forward

air controllers (FAC) .and air or ground forward observers (FO), and

should be carried out only upon approval by local authorities, and by

US and ARVN units involved in the operation.

2. Even in case of being fired upon by enemy small weapons from

villages or hamlets not located within the ground area of operation,

the operational unit was permitted to attack only after warnings had

"been given by leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, or other appropriate

means.

3. A village or hamlet mar be fired on without warning if the

fire support plan included such firings in support of infantry troops

maneuvering through the area, or if the commander was certain that

warning would be detrimental to the operational mission.

".Intet ligence

With the buildup of US combat forces and the extension of combat

operations throughout the country, there was an urgent need for the

unification of American and Vietnamese intelligence efforts. This was

an area of vital interest to MACV and the JGS. At the beginning of US

participation in the ground war in 1965, ARVM combat intelligence capabilities were still undeveloped. Knowledge about the enemy was scant

and not subjected to systacatic collection and analysis. ARVN combat

intelligence came of age and became the effective instrument it was

largely due to cooperation and coordination with US intelligence agencies.

A major step forward vas taken by KACV and the JGS when Combined

Intelligence Center.staffed by US and RLt'AF personnel, were est:ablished

•"•t to operatre the four key intelligence functions: interrogation of enezy

II .•:j prisoners1 e•!oitation of enemy docum.nts and materiel, and establishment

of ,ntellignce reports for both US and RVN co=,and systems. With

50c Chapter it.

66 - _ _
4 technological and material support provided by the US, these Combined

'' Intelligence Centers functioned effectively and provided accurate,

timely intelligence for the combined combat effort at the highest level.

At the Corps level, intelligence cooperation and coordination

was effected between ARVN Corps G-2 and the US intelligence advisory

section which provided advisors for each G-2 functional component. US

advisors usually provided G-2 with intelligence data collected by US

sources such as aerial surveillance and photo reconnaissance, infra-red

(Red Haze) photography, side looking airborne radar (SLAR), and UScontrolled agents. In return, G-2 provided US intelligence advisors with

.Intelligence data collected through Vietnamese sources, such as interrogation reports, document excploitation, and information provided by

ARVN-controlled agents. The same procedure for cooperation and coordination was found at division and regimental levels. In fact, practically all direct intelligence cooperation and coordination between ARVN

Corps and US Field Forces was effected through the advisory system.

ARVN liaison officers were usually attached to US combat forces

operating within a Corps Tactical Zone. These ARVN liqison officers

areas of operation. US combat forces, however, required immediate

assstace n te eplotaton f cptueddocuments and the interrogation

oX prisoners ofwror rtnes Thsassistance was provided by ARVM

-miitay iteligece(MI) deahet sindto USfocsathFil

Foceo Crpdivision, n. eprt brigade levels. Each MI detachmentwasiniialy athorzed8 oficrs,13 Cos and 4else e n

orgaize ino aheadquarters-, an interrogation team, n document exploicatio tem, n oderofbattle team, and an imagery interpretation team.

FLý ater itsstregth asrevised t20wih2teams,on friteogin

andon ocueat fr xpoittin.th Mdetcment missionwatop -

vie n-hesptexploitation of Inelgnedata collected by US coimbat

unis fr ieditereaction purpose. it wsalso used by US units to

estalis conactand liaison with local govertm-ental authorities, RiF and

PFandiththenational police when they operated in populated are"s.

The ANIA1detachment cooperated with its US military intelligence counterpar. wichwasunder the operational control of the US G-2.

67
•iIi

V

With modern, abundant technical facilities and efficient organization

and operation, US forces could easily overcome difficulties in intelligence when they conducted operations in remote areas against enemy bases

and sanctuaries. Cooperation and coordination with ARVN corps and divisions usually provided them with supplemental intelligence data for their

operational purposes. When operating in populated areas or in support of

RVN pacification, however, the acquisition of targets and identification

of enemy personnel became a real problem. Intelligence cooperation and

coordination at the territorial level, ie. province and district, was

usually a complex business because in addition to the normal tactical intelligence cooperation with ARVN units, US forces were also required to

coordinate with several intelligence agencies at sector or subsector

level, such as the Provincial Intelligence Coordination Committee (PICC),

the Phoenix Committee, the Provincial Security Committee, the Screening

Committee, etc., and not infrequently with local forces as well. An

efficient procedure devised by some US units to handle this complexity was

the establishment of a Combined Intelligence Center, as was the case with

Fairfax operation, or a Combined Interrogation Center under the control

of the US G-2 or S-2. Members of this combined interrogation center

included representatives of local US and RVN intelligence agencies, such

• .as the National Police, Special Police,Provinctal Reconnaissance Unit (PRU),

Police field force, Sector or District S-2, Military Police Interrogation

Section and the G-2 or S-2 staff of the unit, Through this combined intelligence effort, prisoners of war, returnees, suspects, and refugees

could be rapidly screened, classified and interrogated to provide instant

information required for i=ediate action. in addition the Combined

Interrogation Center also alleviated to a great extent the requirements

placed on tie Local screening comittee by serving as a clearing house

4 for detainees of all types.

in general, the cooperation and coordination effort in intelligence

he to IA"4 OW O-rces was a subject of particular etphasis and mutual

itterest. This combined effort helped US forces overcome their initial

""un.amiliarity with the local environwnt and their relative inexperience

68 (

,. .-
II.

I' .- with regard to enemy local forces. It also enhanced ARVN intelligence

capabilities and brought about mutual faith and a healthy professional

relationship between US and RVN intelligence organization at all levels,

including combined Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP). The exchange of information, whether through channels of the hierarchy or

laterally, was gradually improved and became swift and effective

enough to serve its purpose. Intelligence estimates produced by ARVN

-' "Corps G-2, for example, were widely respected by both US Field Forces

and MACV. The primary weakness in the ARVN process of intelligence

- collection and production, however, was the difficulty in obtaining

timely, accurate intelligence reports from subordinate units and from

If sectors and subsectors; lack of trained and qualified personnel; and

lack of adequate technical intelligence resources. Also, because of the

elusive nature of the war, the acquisition of targets, which was usually

the key to operational success, was only partially effective.

Operationali PL~aning,

In many cases, planning for long-duration campaign or large-scale

operations was initiated by Americans. Vietnamese staffs usually played

only a marginal role, aad their contribution was somewhat pro foma.

Vietnamese field commanders .had little i.erest in planning. This was

because they did not control the combat support assets required, and I also, frequentlybecause they did not have a good grasp of the situation

Involved, M~ost ok the rime the Vietnamese ield counders would o ly

offer a few comments on US-drafted plans or would just uncritically

approve the reco=mendations made by US advisers. They seedol involved

. their staffs in the planning process,

In the cont•ot of the Vietnam war, ARVN corps and divisions were

also responsible for territorial security in addition to the conduct of

combat operations. Their staffs, therefore, usually vorked at and con-

"trolled all activities from fixed headquarters. !hen tactical

69
requirements demanded the establishment of a Forward Command Post, which

* was usually done at division level, the bulk of key staff personnel still

remained at the main headquarters, performing territorial duties. That

explained why Vietnamese commanders called these forward CPs "light".

A light CP usually consited of the unit commander and a few members of

his operational staff. Thus, the limited staff personnel, who were usuA ;ally inexperienced and with little training, were unable to provide the

continuous planning and coordination required by intense combat operations.

They were also unable to determine tactical requirements for combat and

combat support. As a result, operational plans were usually not updated.

Vietnamese staffs often tried io make up for these deficiencies by issuing

some orders at the last minute. This created even more confusion and

¶ difficulties for the effective coordination between combat and support

actions.

SITactical planning at regiment and battalion level was even more

haphazard due primarily to the very small size of their staffs and the

lack of experienced and knowledgeable staff officers. At these levels,

staff officers usually did not know how to coordinate intelligence resources or to make effective use of combat support. Also, the general

shortage of staff officers made it difficult either to direct subordinate

units in daily activities or to plan for future operations. These grave

deficiencies put the planning burden squarely on the unit commander's

shoulders. Frequently the unit commander did most of the informal staff

planning while his staff did only routine work and waited for orders.

The inevitable result of all this was that US tactical advisers were

compelled to assist the ARVN unit commander and sometiues to take over

the entire planning task.

Generally, AýLRM unit comanders at all levels made tactical decisions

wLthout a basis of formal planning. An adequate and timely operational

plan was a rAre thing in ARVN field units. Planning activities were

-geonerally confined to the top lavel, with minital participatio;% of staft

officers arC performed only on a daily basis. Partial or segmental orders,

which changed with every passing day, were the usual practice for conducting operations. these orders usually alloved very little time for ¶ :maneuver and support waits to complete preparations. The orders were also

70

5-,.- • ._,_,__...._W____
frequently given at the very last minute. The result was confusion,

loose coordination between maneuver units, and ineffective employment of

§ 1 combat support assets. Also, intelligence directives were seldom issued

along with combat orders. Subordinate units, as a result, rarely concerned themselves with the execution of intelligence plans.

In practice such deficiencies in staff planning did not affect the

operational coordination effort seriously. This was because, through US

advisers, the ARVN units usually maintained lateral coordination, at

every tactical level, with US units. To function effectively they depended

primarily on this lateral coordination instead of directives and guidance

given through the ARVN channel, which, if ever made available, merely

reiterated, rather belatedly, what the unit had already learned from US

advisers. And because operational coordination never ran into trouble,

there appeared to be no need for combined planning, which unfortunately

was seldom made a subject of common interest or concern at the tactical

level.

There was no question that US units always operated according to

plans which were usually detailed and timely. Planning was an American

inherent forte. Not only did American field commanders have a total

grasp of the tactical situation, they also enjoyed tremendous support

assets, In planning, they were particularly security-minded; and because

of the constant fear oZ leaks, they tended to do the bulk of the planning

u" ilaterally when combined operations were to be conducted. There was,

of course, the usual coordination with, and some concributiou from, Vietnamese counterparts at the beginning of the planning process. However,

this was apparently just a formality. By having the Vietnamese make an

initial contribution, the Adericans undoubtedly wanted to space them the

embarrassment of being dependent on American initiative and blindly following what had been laid out. Therefore, when the Americans departed

they left behind a critical weakness in the ARVM operational command

process. Now ARVN fibld comanders had to ma-ke do with poor pLaz'ning wid

as a resu•c. usually cade haphazard tactical decisions which were never

based on careful study and analysis.

p w •71

S . 77S
Over the years of fighting alongside US units and working with US

advisers, it was true that ARVN units had learned a lot and matured in

every aspect: technique, staff work, and tactics. Cooperation and

"coordination did give ARVN tactical commanders excellent opportunities

to develop their leadership and assume the combat responsibility. It

was unfortunate, however, that once left to themselves, most of them

usually reverted to their old habits, the habits they had acquired

well before the advent of US-RVN cooperation. Very few of them indeed,

took any interest in correcting themselves to keep abreast of new trends

in warfare and to adjust to the requirements of the tactical situation.

As a result, staff planning remained one of the gravest deficiencies

among several ARVN field commands up to the final days.

C"

Assig~nment of Objectives, OperationaZ Areas and T'ree-Fire Zornes

~ t To ensure complete coordination prior to planning for a certain

* combined operation, both the ARV14 field commander and his US counterS ,1 part ought to have advance agreemtent on the assignment of operational

* ~areas, free fire zon~es and objectives for each unit. In the context of

* a war without clearly defined 'frontlines, operational efforts usually

Concentrated on destroying the enemy and expanding the gvernment4 controlled area instead of pushing forward a physical frontliae or

occupying more enemy-fwied territcory as is the ease with conencitoal

j warfare. In keepitig with this warfare aspect, Corps Tatical Zone * Icoomnds usually dete rmined the areas an w-hich friendly etforts should

* 

!iA

I

areas of concentrated efftort utre d eteined on the basis of loCAL

* environent, enent bctivite Levali the location o et-iW r bases, e 

population density, linet of cor unicnat ion and terrain a

* 72

ob d r n h ed o e-

•, part-~ ouh ohv dac gemn o h sineto*prtoa
44

In general there was common agreement on four clearly-defined types

of areas or zones based on the criteria mentioned above. Secure areas

consisted of populous centers where the local government was well

established and operating effectively. Movements were free within

these areas, day and night. In such areas, there were in general no

,-'major enemy actions save for occasional sabotage or random shellings. .I Consolidation areas were sandwiched between secure areas and clearing

zones. These areas were usually under government control and subjected

to intensive pacification. In such areas, the control of resources and

._ population were strictly enforced. Enemy actions in these areas were usually

not conducted on a large scale. They were limited and took place

most often in the form of shellings and sabotages. The primary responsibility of friendly forces assigned to consolidation areas was to prevent

the enemy from making inroads into secure areas. Next in the security

scale were clearing zones which were in effect contested areas placed

under the control of field commanders. These clearing zones were usually

divided into Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAORs) assigned to combat

units whose mission was to destroy enemy units and bases. Clearing zones,

'.n general, included friendly operational bases, unpopulated areas, and

J •areas under enemy control.

:.Finally, adjoining the national boundary were border gurveillance

;ones. These vere areas in vhich tactical unit co .anders were respnnible for detecting enemy troop concentrations and taking necessary security

ea-sures. Border cones were usually included to tactical areas of responsi-

& bility. lly, AeVN rotlar farces as well as US units were s'sine

oparational missions in el 0 ones n ordqr to stop the cAin force

- - units frob infiltrAtiin iito consolidatiou or secure arteas 4d to Assure

con tittuous improvtm*ent of the security. situationi. It Vag in clearng

zones D that eo-bat operations uere usually conducted, either eparately

ý-kor Jointly, and focused on destroying enday main iorco wlits and logistics

or operational bases. rriandly units cperatii fin clearing zones we."

also tasked to provide support, u.tenever required, for PF and PF unit;

K I73

I * I-.. .
-K I 

rBORDER SURVEILLANCE ZONE

AO Tact ical Area of

Responsibilitv

(TAOR)

OARINGARVN Field

bCLERINGZONECoamnarwer Tactical ZN

Area of

Interest

(TAOI)

CONSQLIDATiQN ZONE

R#g1ofta And SECURE AREA)p e~

CHART 6-CON~4VI(URATIC)N (W TACTICAL. ZON&ES ANiD AgEAs
ý4" and for other pacification forces such as PSDF, National Police, RD cadres,

PRU, and armed propaganda teams. The support was to be through the

destruction of enemy forces who threatened friendly local forces in the

* consolidation or secure areas. At the same time, border activities were

& "conducted to interdict enemy infiltration efforts.

As a general rule, ARVN units concentrated their effort primarily

on consolidation areas wheze the population lived and participated in

pacification suppor' whereas US units which, because of their powerful

firepower and great mobility, took up a further-reaching effcrt, focusing

primarily on unpopulated clearing zones. This division of res.onsibility

also recogni:ed the inherent difficulties US units experienced due to

language and cultural differences. US units also provided support to

,friendly territorial forces by destroying those enemy forces detected in

consolidation or secure areas in case ARVN units were not up to this task,

In keeping with thi:. or lonal concept, ARVN Corps Tact 4 cal Zone

and US Field Force command usua±ly assigned to each division or separate

brigade a Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI); each TAOI included, but was

not necessarily limited to a TAOR. IA was a duty of the tactical commander who was assigned a TAOI to throughly familiarize himself with the

local environment, and to keep track of friendly activities in the area.

Thus, through mutual cooperation and coordination, maximum effectiveness

of friendly forces and firepower could be achieved. The difference between

a TAOI and a TAOR lay in the fact that within a TAOI, the responsibility

of a tactical commander was general in nature and not limited to tactical

actions or military operations. De'pending on the relationship between

ARVN Corps and US Field Force commanders and the particular aspect of

each Corps Tactical Zene, ARVN and US major units were assign.ed a common

TAOI to conduct parallel or combined activities, or each unit was assigned a separate TAOI.

A division, in turn, assigned to each of its subordinate regiments

or brigades a Tactical Area of Responsibility or an Area of Operation (AO).

In each TAOR, the tactical commander was fully empowered to develop and

maintain bases and installations, control movements and to conduct combat

operations on a continuing basis with forces under his operational control.

75
Every fire and maneuver action taken in a particular TAOR by any friendly

force had to be thoroughly coordinated with the force commander of that

TACG.. Depending on the tactical situation and intelligence, a unit which

was responsible for a TAOR would be assignec' an Area of Operation (AO) to

conduct an operation of some duration. An area of operation was assigned

only to a particular operation; it might be located within or without a

TAOR. Battalions or units subordinaLed to a regiment or brigade, in

general, were not assigned permanent TAORs. They were tasked to conduct

operations only to liquidate objectives within an area of operation.

There were several instances in which the enemy took advantage of

the fixed boundaries between tactical areas of responsibility by conducting activities in the area straddling a common boundary or using it

as a safe haven to elude friendly operations. To prevent the

enemy from doing this, several measures were taken. First, friendly

activities were concentrated on objectives located along boundaries.

Second, a common boundary might be modified or displaced upon agreement by

the rzponsible units concerned, depending on the tactical situation and

the terrain in the area of operation. Third, there was usually advance

agreement or coordination between operational commanders and adjacent

territorial commanders on the conduct of operations or pursuit actions

across boundaries, mutual reinforcement and support,ab well as other

necessary measures.

Beyond friendly areas of opera.:ion, there were zones in which firing

could be freely applied. In these free-fire zones, firing,strafing, or

bombing could be instantly called whenever the enemy was detected without

fear of confusing him with the local population and without having to obtain

time consuming clearances from local military and civilian authorities. Like interdiction coastal zones, free-fire zones were areas through which the

enemy usually moved his troops and supplies or which he used as safe havens

from which to launch shellings or ground attacks against friendly units.

These free-fire zones were of course off-limits to the local population; and

movements to and fro these zones were severely limited. While the civilian

-2 population generally stayed out of these areas, there were exceptions.

76
Sometimes the civilian population chose to enter prohibited areas where

they could find some productive farmland or a fish-yielding canal or

"coastal lagoon, despite the dangers that might shower on them at any

given time. As a matter of fact, the local population knew that friendly

control over these areas was not entirely tight or permanent, particularly

at night. Consequently, the application of fire on those free-fire zones

sometimes inflicted losses on the local populace. There was no way to

tell, at aight, whether the prowling people were enemy troops or just

some fishermen taking in their catch.

Another device for facilitating operations against the enemy while

avoiding harm to the civilian population was the imposition of curfews.

Briefly speaking, curfews were imposed in insecure areas during the hours

of darkness, generally from midnight or sometimes earlier till dawn.

During this period, the friendly population was required to remain in

their houses. Accordingly, any movement at night could be automatically

considered inimical and engaged at once.

The only problem which arose was the imposition of over-restrictive

curfew hour--almott always by an over zealous province chief-, which

interfered unduly with civilian pursuits. As an area became secure,

curfews were progressively relaxed and eventually lifted completely. In

areas where tle authorities and the people were in rapport and communicated

freely, the curfew hours could be adjusted readily. In 3ome areas,

however, the curfew was a source of friction, particularly where fishermen

were concerned since fishing was conducted most productively at night.

In general, free- fire zones were theoritically a sound idea. In

trackless jungle, mountainous areas and swamps where the Communists

would establish base areas and there was no friendly population, the

free-fire zones allowed friendly troops to conduct operations freely

without time-consuming requests for political clearance. They did

credte problems in the boundary areas around the populated centers.

Sometimes in these areas, the farmers, fishermen, or wood cutters would

infiltrate the free-fire zone without permission and without the knowledge

"of the local authorities. As a result, they were sometimes the target

of attacks by fire. This obviously caused resentment regardless of the

legalities involved.

'1 77

0:7I
In retrospect, the free-fire zone concept, for all its advantages,

had some undesirable side effects. In the first place, it encouraged

indiscriminate use of unobserved harassment and interdiction fire. This

increased the expenditure of artillery ammunition and the actual effect

on the enemy was often rather insignificant. In addition, some commanders would take the easy way out and try to control a free-fire zone by

fire to the detriment of active ground operations. Thus the free-fire

zone sometimes encouraged a lack of activity and aggressiveness in low

level commanders.

The assignment of objectives usually depended on the nature of the

objective, and the capabilities, firepower and mobility of each unit.

At the beginning of the operational cooperation and coordination effort,

ARVN and US units usually operated in adjacent areas. ARVN units were

understandably assigned less demanding or populated areas located near

axes of communication; they usually manned blocking positions for US

forces. In time, ARVN forces became more combat effective and were able

to conduct search and destroy operations in cooperation with US .units.

When cooperation was subsequently closer between the two forces, ARVN

forces were able to conduct offensive operations against important objectives, in delta plains or in jungle and mountains, in conjunction

ýrith US forces or as part of the same unit. In the APACHE SNOW combined

operation conducted in the A Shau Valley in May 1969, for example, the

2/3 Battalion of the ARVN Ist Infantry Division mounted a joint attack

A .with two US airborne battalions against Hill Dong Ap Bia, a solidly

entrenched enemy strong point occupied by the NVA 29th Regiment. With

all-out support provided by US tactical air and artillery, ARVN and US

battalions successfully liquidated the objective after two hours of

fierce fighting without any unfortunate mishap or confusion.

jAlcoation of Reaouzres

ARVN inf~antry divisions were made responsible for large tactical

areas of responaibility in which the division duties were concentrated

78
on territorial security and the support of pacification. Prior to

1969, some divisions did not have enough battalions to operate

* .effectively. Because of territorial responsibilities, units organic

to the division were scattered throughout the TAOR. When it was

re.quired to mount a large-scale offensive attack, the division was

usually able to gather its forces for the effort. But this depended

in a large measure on the tactical situation, enemy pressure in the

TAOR, and the limited capability for replacing the divisional units

by territorial forces.

To provide divisions with enough forces for operational requirements,

the Joint General Staff sometimes reinforced them with units of the

general reserve (the Airborne division or the Marine division) if such

reinforcement was requested in the operation plan.' Corps reserves

were generally limited to a reaction force composed of a few ranger

Sbattalions, but even these units were not available at all times for

employment. In general, units which were temporarily redeployed from

static territorial missions to participate in mobile combat operations

tended to be more diseiplined, more audacious and more efficient at

teamwork. Their combat effectiveness usually Improved rapidly.

In the initial stage of US participation in the war, combat

I• support resources for ARVN units were limited. They were usually

employed to support pacification operations, defend important areas,

and activities of territorial forces. When participating in combined

operations with Ua forces, ARVN units were usually provided the fol-

,* lowing support: (1) fire support, including artillery, tactical

air, and naval gunfire, (2) gunships, (3) engineers, (4) airlift

(for troop movements and supplies), (5) comunications, and (6)

medical evacuation.

To ensure a harmonious effort among elements participating

in a certain operation, the coumander of a US unit providing support

-*- for ARVN units usually initiated appropriate procedures for coordination even though the supporting unit might be only a company or

79
a battery. This was done to ensure that no relevant aspects of

coordination would be overlooked. Supporting elements were designated

during the planning process and liaison teams were usually attached

to the ARVN units being supported. These liaison teams daily compiled

the requirements of the supported unit and transmitted them to the

supporting unit. Based on priorities established by the ARVN operational commander, the supporting unit reviewed support requirements

and recommended the allocation of resources. Such recommendations

were usually approved by the ARVN operational commander. He seldom

made decisions that ran counter to recommendutions made by the supporting unit commander.

When the combined operation involved the participation of

several units, it was necessary to establish a Combat Support Coordination Center (CSCC). The CSCC was provided with adequate signal

communications facilities and included representatives from supporting units. It was usually established at the echelon which was

responsible for the conduct of the operation -corps, division,

brigade or regiment --- and served as a focal point for the coordination of various combat support resources. The establishment

of a CSCC not only facilitated the planning of fire support; it

also help speed up the exchange of information between various

elements and provided an effe-tLve means for emergency personal

* contacts. In addition, it also helped resolve the problem of

language barrier usually found in support coordination, particularly

when Army Aviation units were involved.

Signal communications never constituted a seriously impeding

factor in combined operations. Through the US advisory cummunications

systems, US supporting units were able to maintain effective communications down to ARVN battalion level. With regard to US units

responsible for providing direct support to ARVN forces, the best

communications were those provided by the US advisory system and

US liaison elements.

80C
Logistics was usually considered as a limiting factor in combined

operations. Its limitations were responsible for the short duration

of combat operationa conducted by ARVN units. Although the ARVN logistics

system was well established at every echelon, it operated on an area basis

and was not responsive enough to support ARVN units conducting protracted

operations away from their rear bases. This was particularly true during

the post-1968 Tet offensive period. Certain categories of supply, espec-

- ially barriers and other materiels required for the construction of fire

support bases, were usually not available in adequate amounts to meet

operational requirements. ARVN logistics staffs were often not thoroughly

conversant with the tactical situation. They were usually busy going

through rigid, complicated procedures instead of providing direct and

timely support for combat units. In general, they were accustomed to

conducting business "as usual" and befitting a policy of normal or short

duration support. Logistics was not given its necessary attention by

* Ifield commanders at any echelon; it did not play its proper role in

operational planning.

During the initial period of US participation, ARVN combat units had

to depend almost entirely on US units for every kind of supplies including

barrier and construction materiels for fire support bases, ammunition,

and frequently even food. These supplies were lavishly dispensed by US

units, for a certain time. Later on, particularly after the Vietnamization

program was formalized, US forces provided supplies for ARVN units only

on an emergency basis and if the requested items could not be provided

by the Vietnamese logistics system. This was done on purpose to stimulate the development of a self-supporting ARVN logistics system and

efficient logistics operation. When requesting logistics support through

•. ARVN channels, units tended to use US advisers as leverage in the hope

"of obtaining adequate and timely supplies. This led in some instances to

excessive and apparently wasteful demands. US advisers were usually devoted to the support of the units they advised; they were very efficient

at cutting red tape and taking short cuts. In a later period, however,

they confined themselves to monitoring supply requests through normal

channels and interceded on behalf of ARVN units only when the request failed

81
to get through. As a result, there was an improvement in logistics

operation and increased confidence in the effectiveness of the ARVN

logistics system amoig ARMN field units.

There was no question that ARVN 'units usually relied on the de- Ivoted and adequate support provided by US units which generally

treated them without discrimination. This reliable support was largely

"instrumental in improving combat morale. Adequately supported ARVI units

never faltered when participating in offensive operations against

outlying enemy bases. On the contrary, they appeared "to enjoy the

challenge and became self-confident when authorized to participate in

such operations. They certainly preferred them over the tepid pacification support activities. The employment of support assets during

the initial stage of combined operations was naturally hesitant and

ineffective. In time, however, ARVN units became more effective in

making full use of support resources. It was obvious that, when ARVN

and US units had the chance to operate together more than once, the

troubles that usually plagued coordination would be ironed out and

support would be more effective. In keeping with the effort to increase ARVN combat effectiveness, it was deemed necessary that additional combat support resources be provided ARVN units, particularly

in Army aviation and Lire support.

Usoe of 1Pirepower

When large-scale operational efforts were begun in late 1966,

artillery and tactical air support made available to ARVN combat units

were still limited. Each ARVN infantry division at that time had only

two organic 105-mm howitzer battalions, with occasional support provided

by from two sections to a battery of Corps 155-mm artillery, depending

on tactical requirements. In the absence of organic heavy artillery,

ARVN field units usually depended on long-range fire support provided

by American 8" and 175-mm artillery.

82

. .
It was apparent that,given the high level of enemy activity

and the sizable operational areas, such an artillery support structure

was not commensurate with tactical requirements. The practice of using

only organic artillery also limited the amount of firepower that could

) effectively be brought to bear in a certain offensive operation. Moreover, in addition to providing support for operational units, corps

and divisional artillery units were also responsible for supporting

Regional and Popular Forces. Artillery missions, therefore, ranged from

providing direct support for regular ARVN units to attachments and

.direct support for Sectors (provinces) and 3ubsectors (districts). To

support territorial forces in their mission, ARVN artillery units were

usually broken down into sections scattered throughout a Corps Tactical

Zone in order to provide coverage for important axes of communication

and populous centers.

When they were required to conduct operations well beyond bases

and axes of communications, ARVN field units were usually unable to

obtain adequate fire support. First, not every ARVN unit had organic

artillery. Second, the ARVN artillery unit might be reluctant to deploy

or be proscribed from deploying in view of its permanent territorial

support mission. Third, the tactical situation might demand the heli-

.lift of artillery whereas ARVN artillery units during that time were

not capable of this type of mobility. As a result, wherever US artillery

units happened to be available for support, they usually did almost all

the things normally required of a direct support unit. A US artillery

- I unit usually provided liaison officers and forward controllers who

maintained direct communications with the unit's Fire Direction Center

(FDC) and could call for fires at any time. A US artillery unit could

also move easily to provide the right kind of support in accordance with *J ithe maneuver plan laid out by infantry units. The usual practice employed

by US forces during the period of combiqed operations was to assign one

artillery forward controller team to each ARVN battalion and one artillery

liaison officer for each ARVN major headquarters or maneuver control

headquarters. The tasks- performed by these liaison officers and controller

teams included, apart from cailing for fire missions, the planning of fire
coverage for the protection of the unit and the planning of concentrated

fire on objectives. The language barrier was no problem since the US

adviser and his ARVN counterpart unit commuander could converse in

English. When assigned to an ARVN unit, the US liaison officer and

the forward controller team usually relied on the US adviser and his

relationship with the ARVN unit commander to transmit requirements from

the Vietnamese system to US units. Since he thoroughly understood what

the ARVN unit requirements were, it was just a matter of picking up the

telephone or the radio handset to talk with another American at 'the FDC.

This practice was similar to that used in Combat Support Coordination

Centers. An alternative method was to put an interpreter at the American

FDC to communicate with Vietnamese forward controllers cr batteries.

Over a period of time, the use of an interpreter was not necessary because

Vietnamese forward controllers, who were usually young officers, could

use English to control fire through the radio system.

The shortage of artillery assets required for the simultaneous

j support of different missions generated the need for tactical air to

provide support for operational vnits. Since tactical air invariably

achieved excellent results, ARVN unit commanders and certain US advisers

developed the tendency to rely entirely on tactical air for support even

when both tactical air and artillery were available and both were equally

effective for their purpose. During that period of time, the Vietnamese

Air Force was capable of providing only a little over ten sorties per

day for each Corps Tactical Zone. Operational units, as a result, depended mostly on the powerful firepower or US tactical air when there was a

requirement to level solid enemy fortifications or bases, especially if

j these objectives were located in jungle or mountainous areas. ARV1P

operational units also depended on US gunships for immediate support after

initLial contact was made uith the enetiyý In general, coordination and

control of tactical air support was smoothly operated through the US

advisory communications system.

The powerful US tactical air and artillery firepower provided ARVN

combat units with a most effective and accurate support, and assisted

them in winning several major battles. Vietnamese commanders and troops

¶" I 84
ai

alike were entirely confident of this support effectiveness. This

confidence, in turn, enhanced their morale and remarkably improved

unit combat effectiveness. The lavish use of firepower, however, became ingrained in Vietnamese tactics and became a bad habit. Whenever

contact was made with the enemy, regardless of size or firepower, ARMN

units invariably requested all-out fire support by artillery and

tactical air; they took less interest in the unit organic weapons, light

or heavy. This over-reliance on heavy firepower more often than not

amounted to sheer waste and overkill, and resulted in much human loss

and property damage to the local population living fa the area of

operation.

To rAnimize human loss and property damage to the population, M&CV

and the Joint General Staff jointly published operational procedures

regulating the use of firepower which were binding on both US and ARVU

units when they conducted operations in populated areas. These procedures

have been presented earlier in this chapter. Given the nature of the

Vietnam war, however, it was usually difficult, if not impossible, for

operational units to accurately estimate the size and potential of enemy

forces before contact was made and before the objective had been

liquidated. There were times when a whole hamlet was leveled and only

a dozen or so enemy troops were destroyed with it. In contrast, there

were also times when friendly units incurred heavy losses because of inadequate fire support. Save for a few cases of negligence, no univ

conmander ever wanted to ca'ese losses or injuries to his innocent countrymen.

His natural inclination as troop commander, however, was to minimize

losses to his men even when this w4s apt to cause damage and casualties

to the populace. Only the most experienced field commanders could

effectively employ firepower with accuracy and tailor it to the size and

-nature of the objective.

In addition to tactical support artillery, naval and tactical and

. strategic air firepower were also employed in unusual, and unobservable

fire missions to attack and destroy enemy bases and those areas where an

t •enemy troop concentration or movement was reported. There was also the

nightly interdiction and harassment artillery fire. These types of fire

i : •35
werm effective when they were carefully planned. Artillery interdiction

and harassment fire, however, was not carefully pnnmed. It was usually

applied in a haphazard and unruly manner, particularly in the Mekong

Delia, chiefly for the purpose of enhýanciug the morale of RF and PF

troops in isolated 9utposts.

Civilian Evacuation, Caoualtiea wtd Property awamge

After 1959 when the war entered a more active phase in South Vietnam,.

many innocent civilians, caught,-in crossfire between opposing sides,

were killed or wounded. Most of these casualties occurred among the

rural population. The civilian casualty rate increased proportionately

with the fighting level and reached an all-time high in early 1968 when

"the Communists launched the Tet offensive against cities and major

* population centers throughout the country.

Civilian casualties had many causes but most frequently were due

to enemy booby traps or to mortar and rocket fires. Civilians also

died from stray fire during battles, or from friendly aerial bombings

and occasionally from the deliberate use of terror by Communist forces.

The most worrisome problem in this regard was the deliberate Com=unist

tactic of precipitating a battle in a populated area. If the friendly

forces declined to fight in order to avoid casualties and damage to

the friendly population, the Coaunist would strengthen their control

of the area. 0a the other hand, if a battle ensued by choice or was

unavoidable, the civilian population suffered casualties and damge..

This not only caused resentzeat agai-at both the GVN and the Comunists

•I but required an expensive and time-constming rebuilding process to

restore the physical danige and for the people to regain their morale

and confide-ace.

Civilian casualties and their caugas are presented in Table 1

for the period froo 1967 to 1970. It should be noted, hovever, that

casualty figures in Vietnam were notoriously unreliable and that it

was most difficult to determine whether the casualties vere caused by

Communists or friendly action, or both.

8686
Table I - Civilian Casualties and Causes2

Mines, mortar and Shelling andota

booby-trap bombing

1967 15,253 9,785 18,811 43,849

1968 31,244 15,107 28,a52 74,403

1969 24,648 11,814 16,183 52,645

1970 22,049 7,650 8,607 38,306

2"Aunex F", State-wnt of Ambassador Williaim E. Colby, Depu•y to

.COMUSHACV for (ORDS, before the Subco=ittee on Refugees 4ad Eacaipes

of the Senate Comittee ou the 'Judiciary, 21 Aprl 1971.

3 The enemiy socwtim used uzexploded bombs -and artillery shells

as booby-traps..

I

I!•: 87
As of late 1968, however, civilian casualties were gradually reduced as a result of improved security which was achieved throughout

most of the countryside by the pacification effort. Regulations for

the use of firepower were constantly updated by MACV and the JGS and

their strict application was enforced by both US and ARVN forces when

conducting operations in populated areas. Operational techniques

4 such as the soft cordon, for example, which was characterized by a

maximum limitation of firepower with a view to minimizing casualties

and property damages to the civilian population, were especially encouraged. So were plans to neutralize the enemy "mini-bases" which

were thoroughly rigged with mines and booby-traps, especially in IV

Corps Tactical Zone. It was also recommended that artillery harass-

"ment and interdiction fire be cut to a minimum. Violations of fire

employment regulations which caused casualiLies to the local putt,-

lacion were carefully studied to determine those responsible and also

served as a basis for equitable compensation and relief to the victims.

When accidents, casualities and property damage were caused to

the civilian population by US units, immediate steps were taken to

comfort and 4ssist the victims of these units. Injured people were

given first aid and immediately evacuated to the nearest US or RVN

medical facility. lTis medical issistance avd care vas continued until the victims completely reo@vered. Also transportatton was arranged

fot relatives to mnake visits. Damaged properties or houses wer ie-mediately repaired, rebuilt or equitably compensated.

"Te soft crdon is characrerined by li=itcd use of fire wer re- . sulting in mnim= property daages and injury to civilians, and slow,

panstaking searches of villages and suspicious areas by the sepIrg

and cordon forces. The cordon iorce serves a dtal rurtose: it blocks,

and at the same tize. sezrches. the so-called blockivg oositieos are

not static defensLva positions but are moving, searching troops .ho =-e

detAiled searches. They occupy and serme as a "noose" tround the cordoned area. 1te protracted occupation of an area causes the concealed enemy to become itpatient and huncry, forcing them to reveal oihe.r

bhding places. See wis4 L= Son 26ONAVADA AGLE operaticn later in

the chapter.

68
~AIO

Skirmishes between the two sides constituted a major source of

danger for the civilians and their families who resided in the area.

To them, friendly aerial bombings and strafings were as deadly as the

enemy rockets, mortar shells, mines and boobya-traps. The big difference

was that US units always looked after the victims with care and swiftness,

- ~regardless of who caused the injuries. This instilled comifort and confidence among the population. By nature, the Vietnamese peasant is

- re3ilient and accustomed to hardship. As a matter of fact, he never

expected to receive so much help from US units if anything happened to

* ~him, his family or his property. This help was a necessary effort which

was both humanitarian and psy-cholo~io~ally Ldvantageous Wno~far as the

Vie tnarmse, peopl~e were concerned. *if all civilian casualtiev aind

property damagea could have been compensated or repaire~d as swiftly

* aud as fairly, it would have been great souirce of comfort fcr the

* ~unfortunate civilian living in the midst of a wear..

The. evacuation of the civilian population during combat oe ratioas

usually created many difficult problems chiefly when it was necessary

to diaplace and resettle a large num-ber of people. Diring Operation

Cedar ralls con4uct.M by 11 'FNV in December 1966, about 6,000 civilians

living in the Ben Suc area vere evacuated- to Phu Cutmg district In

ýUinh Wuong province.. The ftckory/La.SoP 54 c t~ie4 peration Joint y

* conduc-ted by the US 3d Marine Division and the ARVIN !at Infaatry Division

*im May 1.967 displAced a total of 13,000 people form the D1.2 area to Cam

Id LO ia'trict in Qmaig Tn-, province. Those were but a few excamples of

iarga..scele civiliank evacuation aLtcasioned by friendly operations.

The m~ost frustratinq, thing about civilian evacuations was that :21 eey cold uver -ee aesively planned in Advance. This was due

* .~.pr-iwrily to the nocesity of k -ping opersoal pan erot. Coodi

nation vi~ the local governmftt oad other MV of, Us agencies for the

~J evacuation of the local population was allowed ool>' after the operation

a -een in progress. Is) the few ins-tenes -in wbtý;h advance coordiuation

was necessary# it Vas limited to a few hihrnig zii . As a

reault, Ilefitiencie~s were bo-wad to occur during the initial staige of

teevacuoatkon.

89
A*WCivilian evacuation was a responsibility of ARMN units and the local

goverument. In the performance of this task, they were supported by US

units and civilian agencies which provided abundant transportation and

supplies. The displacement of the populace and their belongings, therefore, was usually smooth and rapid, regardless of size and load. Despite

the lack of advance planning, Vietnamese officials who were experienced

and familiar with this task could always run the operation without difficulty.

Resettlement of the displaced population remained, however, a

thorny problem in the evacuation process. This subject cannot be discussad

at length within the scope of this monograph since it was a rather complex

socio-political problem. In general, very few Vietnamese, and the

peasants in particular, were willing to re"JInquish their land, their

"houses, and thelt normal habitat for a safe, aaw life elsewhere even

though threatened by the conutan. dangers of war'. A~ftec they had been

displaced and resettlei in some local refugee center, most of these

reiuctant refugees found it hard to make a living as soon as relief was

removed. Consequently, some were forced to live on relatives and some

would try to return to their old place if that was still possible. Thus,

with the exception of large scale aa'd permanent resettlement projects,

very few of those makeshift resettlement craters th&z musbroomed overUight in the wake of military operatima could effectively serve their

purpobe Lor axy ioug period of time.

Spec-tat Ptzrning ConaidBrtiota

Operations conducted in desolate and remote jungle or mountainous

areas neceisitated the employment of tzctics which differed greatly from

those employed in operacions conducted in the flatter" and more open, populated areas. This was cantamount to prosecuting two different kinds of war.

In both types of operations, cooperation and coordination between participstin US and ARVN forces were deeted necessary and mutually beneficial.

In the case of operationa corducted in remote jungle oi" moutaiaous

areas, however, the planning and co-ordination process was much less complicated since it did not involve many of the problems and constraLts found

in populated areas. Such operations were usually conducted in areas which

90
harbored enemy logistics bases, troop cantonment havens or major headquarters, political or military. These areas generally were sheltering

North Vietnamese main force units. Planning for these operations was

S- exactly like planning for conventional batties. The usual tactic was

to employ B-52, tactical air, artillery and naval firepower on the

objective, followed by a swift troop movement into the objective area

to exploit results. Both US and ARVN training, organization, and equipi•w-s :ere properly geared for such operations, operations in which firep.)wer ant' mobility were most valuable advantages. To make rapid and

accurate use of tactical air and gunships and also to avoid identification

* arrurs between the two participating forces in this type terrain, much

* i'care aa4 atLention was given to the assignment of boundaries and objectives

*t dwiug the planning process.

The allocation of combat support and logistics resources for ARVN

¶• units during the entire operation was deer.i necessary to maintain their

sustained combat effectiveness on a par with US units. When provided

with adequate support and when all requirements were fulfilled, ARVN

units could make substantial contributions to these operations. Familiarity

with the terrain and the enemy, and adaptabilitl to the environment were

their natural advantages. Their endurance and resiliency also helped them

cross jungles and mountains without much difficulty. They were particularly efficient in conducting reconnaissance with long range reconnaissance patrols, particularly when these patrols were jointly organized.

In general, when planning for operations in remote or jungle areas, the

maximum exploitation of combat c~pabilitlea of each of the participating

*- . units, and the eifective use of combat support assets were cousidered

- "the key to auccess.

In contrast, when US units or ARMN regular units operated 13 populated areas or participated in 'the pacification program, they were faced

* " t , with many complex probleos. Not only did they have to fight the enemy,

they had .to also provide protection for villages and hamlets. And the

most difficult part of it all was the goal of doing all these things

• without causing damage and casualties, or even antagonizing the local

, '. population. Civil action efforts played a very important role in such

91

INO
S.....,.

operations. The most practical civil action effort was to limit the use

of firepower, but this firepower constituted the great advantage of the

"US units. American reactions to enemy provocations, regarded by the Americans as defensive acts, were regarded by the population as offensive acts

since it was American bombs and shells which caused the casualties and damages.

Fire limitations therefore were a central problem. The difficulty lay not

in persuading troops to limit the use of firepower, but in the decisions

made in the heat of battle concerning the use of artillery, gunships, and

tactical air. The natural inclination of unit coimanders of all echelons

was to minimize losses to their own men rather than losses to the civilian

population. However, in a war in which political considerations usual2'y

outweighed military requirements, a certain compromise had to be made in

"order to win over the people's hearts and minds. In addition to the limited

and controlled use of firepower, curfew time and free-fire zones also needed

to be made flexible, and tailored to seasonal changes in each locality so as

not to obstruct the normal life cycle of the local population.

Before being introduced into an area of operation, units should be

"thoroughly oriented on local customs and manners in order to avoid awkward

situations which would interfere with the development of good rapport with

the population. Only in such a way could there be a genuine cooperation on

the part of the local population. Particular attention should also be given

to preventing the enemy from taking propaganda advantage of our mistakes.

To addition to difficulties that arose from relations with the frieudly

population, operational units had other problew, such as the local governwent, military authorities, and territorial forces in the area of operation.

Coordiuation with them was necessary in order to combine effectiely the

military and civilian efforts. The plarning for operations in populated

areas thus required detailed and careful preparation and close coordination

and cooperation among all the elements involved. US units usually combined

daily tactical efforts vith a powerful dose of psyvar and civil action ta an

attempt to achieve good rapport with the- local population. In general, oper4: ations of this type required flexibility, nor only in force organizatioa but

also in tactics, techniques, and the utilization of support assets.

US units •-certainly had to face many complex problems in addition to

their inherent disadvantages in language, culture and race. Despite all

this, they succeeded admirably in nany instances in bringing about

92up
a well founded confidence and security for the population, even in areas

where the population had lived for a long time under Communist influence.

Operation DEL4 WARE/LAM SON 216

Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 in the A Shau valley was a typical

case of combined operations conducted in remote and jungle or mountainous

areas with the purpose of destroying enemy logistics bases and command

headquarters. It was planned in the wake of the enemy 1968 Tet offensive

as one in a series of major combined efforts striking into enemy bases

which heretofore were considered as inviolable.

US and ARVN forces were then taking the initiative. Driven back

from cities and population centers, NVA units retreated toward jungle or

mountainous redoubts to replace losses, refit, and prepare themselves

for the next wave of attacks. Launching major offensive operations against

enemy bases was a great challenge for ARVN units at that time as their

principal effort during the previous few years had been concentrated on

pacification support. Most combat actions by ARVN units had been confined

to securing or to search-and-destroy operations of very short duration,

usually conducted in some nearby foothill areas.

ARVN units had incurred sizable losses during the intense fighting

that characterized the initial phase of the enemy general offensive.

There were serious losses of experienced cadre and troops. Some ARVN

battalions had been reduced to a strength of approximately 100 men, and

replacements were all new recruits. This made ARN combat effectiveness

- j somewhat questionable in the eyes of US commanders, in particular those

who were already dubious as to their effectiveness. Indeed, in the beginalug, mowt US units were u-tethusiastic about the proposed combined operaioas. This was understandable- enough, since cooperation with AaVN units

might turn out to be an additional burden to the US unitam.

4 •The Delaware/Lam Soo 216 combined operation took place in the A Shau

valley, in the westtra part of I CTZ, in aid-April 1968, This was the first

major effort to penetrate this loagtime enemy held area since 1966 when a

US Special Forces cazp there was overrua. ITe A Shau valley, which included

93
the A Luoi airfield, was surrounded by extremely rugged mountainous

areas covered with dense jungle. Located near the Laotian border, it

was crisscrossed by a road-system which linked the enemy bases and sanctuaries in Laotian territory with his advance bases located in the foothill area west of I CTZ coastal plain. (See Map 4) The weather in the

A Shau valley areas was unpredictable; it was usually cloudy during the

monsoon season. The objective area was confirmed as one of the NVA major

logistics bases. Intelligence reports estimated enemy forces in the

area to include: a command and control headquarters, one engineer

regiment, one transportation battalion, one signal battalion, one antiaircraft battalion, armor elements, and base protection units.

The concept of maneuver set forth in the operational pla'A stated

that the US 1st Air Cavalry Division in coordination with the ARVN 1st

Infantry Division was to conduct a heliborne operation into the A Shau

j valley, occupy the A Luoi airfield, and organize reconnaissance patrols

in force. On f-day, the 3d Brigade, ist ACD, with 3 battalions and support artillery elements, was to land north of the A Luoi airfield, establish fire support bases, destroy by fire enemy positions around the

airfield, and conduct reconnaissance in force in the area. On D+1, the

3d Brigade was to continue operations while the radio relay terminal at

A Shau began to function. On D42, the 1st Brigade, Ist ACD, with 3 battalions and support artillery elements, was to land and occupy the A

Luol airfield, and conduct reconnaissance in force in the area, On DQ4,

engineer and signal equipent and an initial logistics element vere to

-- . be halilif ted into the A Luoi airfield to begin repair to the airfield.

Then, on D44, the 34 Regiý*nmt, t ARN fattry Division, was to

land into the area south of the A Luol airftel; :.-.i u4port artillery

elements and to conduct reconaissance in iorce. On Dý-5 the airfield

would begin operation with C-7A aircraft, and on 6+6, w6ith C-123 aircraft. Reconntaissancc in force opetaations were to be conducted throughout

the A Shau valley until termination of the combined operations. 're fire

support plan gave priority to the 3d Brigade on D-Day. All ilandinp velte

to be supported by artillery and tactical air. Air coverage was to
I IMAP 4. - OPERATION DELAWAREILAMd4ON 216

7, ~ j*VICKIC 1 

'5-7

F--

D 628

I It

2- i 1-I PEPE 3 INL-AW N
A~rI

to be provided by fixed-wing aircraft and gunships during landings.

On the US side, maneuver forces included:

lst Brigade, lot Air Cavalry Division:

1-8 Cay., 2-8 Cay., 1-12 Cay.

2-19 Arty (DS), A Battery, 1-30 Arty (GSR)

A Co, 8th Engr. (GSR)

2 Sqds, 25th Inf.

Det. 11th Pathfinder Plat.

'Fwd Spt. Tm., 13th Sig. (DS)

1b., 191st MI Co.

Tm., 5th Weather Sqdn.

Plat., 545th M? Co.

Tm., 246th Psyop. Co.

Det., Co. D 52 Inf.

FSE, Div. Spt Cmd. (DS).

3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division:

1-7 Cav., 2-7 Cay., 5-7 CaD.

1-21 Arty (9S), C Battery, 1-30 Arty (GSR)

SC Co, Bth Eugr. (DS)

2 sqds, 34th Inf.

Det, Ilth Pathfinder Plat.

SFud. Spt Tm, 13th Sig.

TM., 191st HI Co.

Tm., 5Sth Weather Sqdn.

Plat., 545th V Co.

Tw., 245th Psyop. Co.

1 FSE, Div. Spt Cmd (DS)

On the Vietn•r.ese side, s-aneuver forces included:

3d Regimrent, Ist lofantry Division

1st Battalion, 3d Regt.

12d Battalion, 3d Ret. 'Id n~ataino, Isit Regt. : 'I

C Battery, 1-12 Arty. (DS))

96
US support to Vietnamese forces Included:

A Battery, 6-33 Arty, US (GSR)

Arty LNO and FO tms., 1st ACD Div. Arty.

AT Sect (106 RR), D 1-9 Cav.

*I Plat., C Cot 14th Engr. (DS)

Fwd. Spt. Tm. (VHF), 13th Sig. Bn.

- On 19 April (D-day), the 3d Brigade, 1st Air Cavalry Division made

inin-tial heliborne landings in the A Shau valley. The 5-7 Cav., supported

by the 11th Aviation Group, landed and established Landing Zone Tiger,

while the 1-7 Cay. landed on LZ Vicki. The direct support artillery

- :battery intended for the 5-7 Cay was also moved to LZ Tiger. Despite

extensive preparatory fire and the protection of landing approaches provided by elements of the 1-9 Cav., enemy anti-aircraft was still very

active. A total of 23 helicopters were hit, of which 10 were destroyed. Both the 5-7 and 1-7 Cay. met no enemy resistance during

landings, but the helilift of the 1-7 Cav. was delayed due to intense

enemy anti-aircraft fire and bad weather. klso, because site preparation

required extensive engineer work, the movement of a direct support artillery battery into LZ Vickl was not completed as planned.

In conjunction with landings of the 3d Brigade, Company E of the 52d I ~Infantry (-), two engineer squads of the Sth E.ngineer Battalion, and

elements of the 13th Signal Battalion were helilifted to a high =ouutain

peak to install a radio relay site at Signal Hill.

OX 20 and 21 April, the heliborne movement of troops into the area

north of A Shau valley was continued; Copany B (4) of the 2-7 Cav. landed

-" and established 12 Pepper. But ocber troop and supply coveenit wg-r-e delayed because of bad weather and etrezely heavy raitS. The 1-7 Cay. aLso

began otaneuvering from 12 Vicki to seize and secur~e LZ Good=-at uhile

forces on Signal Hill continued work on a landing tonie and relay. site

preparation. An enemy probing attack on Signal iil caused 4 killed and

3 wounzded.

Then the 5-7 Cay. nitiated activities In the vicinity of LZ Tiger,

concentrating on the interdiction of 1oute 548 which ran into the A ShAu

valley from Lace. Searches i-ere conducted in force in order to find and

4 97
neutralize enemy anti-aircraft positions. The weather, meamnhile, continued to ingede all •if activitites during the day of 21 April. But

the 1-7 Cav. continued to overcome -the rugged terrain and succeeded in

occupying LZ Goodman. On its way to t•is LZ, the 1-7 Cav. found and

destroyed 2 Russien-made bulldozers. The 5-7 Cay., meanwhile, continued

its search operations around "? Tiger, and work also progressed on Signal

Hill, where a small D-4 bulldozer was brought in to clear the landing

zons. In the early afternoon of 21 April, a section (two 105-mn howitzers)

of A Battery, 1-21 Artillery Battalion was helilifted into a firing

position on Signal Hill, from where it provided all night support for

B Company of the 2-7 at LZ Pepper.

On 22 and 23 April, with improved weather, the 3d Brigade was able

to complete its troop movements into A Shau. The 2-7 Cav. and the Brigade

headquarters landed at LZ Pepper, and by early afremik.rn of 22 April, the

1-7 Cav..had completed its defense positions at LZ Goodman. The 5-7 Cav.,

meanwhile, continued its search operations, concentrating its effort on

the areas west and south of LZ Tiger. genefiting from good weather

the movement of artillery units was completed during the day of 23 April.

A direct support 105-tm battery landed at LZ Goodman, and another at LZ

Pepper. An additional 155-cam howitzer battery was also helliUfted into

* L2 Goodman by early mornIng the following day.

On 24 and 25 April, after having completed its troop movements into

A Shau, the 3d Brigade coutinued reconnaissance in force operations,

"by spreading out from LZs Ter. Goodman and Pepper in an extensive

search effort. The 1-7 Cav. found and captured three flat-bed trucks and

three 37-tu anti-aircraft guns. (to 24 April, the 1st Brigade heilif ted

its 2-8 Cav. into L Cecile together with a direct support battery (-) of

three 105-t howitzers, but the movement uas later suspended because Ma

bad woather. On 25 April, the weather -proved agaio. and the 1st grigaEe

quickly moved its temaining battalions aad the 1-8 Cay iUt te Sane *

!-- -As sooa as it landed, the 2-8 initiated reconnaissance in force activities

7 scuth and west of LZ Cecile uhile the 1-8 Caw. aasuned the defense of 12

Stallion aad pushed Its cotpanies north in a search effort. The 1-12 Cav,

neau=hile, operated south and east of the U2.

98C
Air.

"From 26 to 28 April, the movement of artillery units into LZ

Stallion for the support of the 1st Brigade was continued, and

reconnaissance in force activities were intensified throughout both

the 1st and 3d Brigade areas of operation. Friendly forces also

"began to make light to medium sporadic contacts with the enemy.

During their extensive searches, they found and captured several

enemy 37-um anti-aircraft guns which were mostly scattered throughout

the area north of A .Shau valley, and many important caches of all

kinds of supplies, particularly in the area called the "punchbowl"

* ::iwhich was located in the 1st Brigade AO. Tactical air and artillery

provided powerful support for units conducting the search effort. *1

Also, as of 26 April, heavy drops of materiel and equipment by C-130

cargo planes were delivered at the southern end of A Luoi airfield.

From 29 April to 3 May, the ARMN 1-3 Battalion and the command

post of the 3d Regiment were air lifted into the area of operation,

south of the A Shau Valley where they established LZ Lucy. They were

followed by the 2-3 Battalion on 30 April and the 2-1 Battalioa and

the regimental direct support 105-m. battery on 1 tay. This completed

the deployment of the 3d ARVN Regiment. Like the US 1st and 3d Brigades,

all three ARVN battalions conducted reconnaissance in force operatioms

as soon as their landings were completed. Their companies spread out

around LZ Lucy in search of the -ez.y.

During this cime, US vnits continued their reconn•issauce in force

effort wi-th encouraging results. Host re=ArkAble was the skillful waneue riag of the Z-8 Car. into the "Puachbov t " base ares which vas heavily

protected by enemy forces. Artillery and tactical air firepower vas

used extensively ia this maneuver &ad destroyed several solidly fortified

anezy positioas in this arpa. By 3 Kay, the 2-8 Car. was in full Co"trol

ot his are4a T ons. of enemy supplies were ca-ptured iad 30 NVA troop.

.* were killed.

In conjtrncton with these operations, the introduxcr~n of additiottal

support elements into U Stallion was .ontr'"nd. The 8th Ligiaeer sat-

. talion uorked day and night on the A Luoi airfield and by I May, the

airfieid began operation with the laad of C-7As and C-123s. By

99
3 May, work on the lengthening of the airstrip was completed and the

airfield began to accommodate C-130b as well. In the meantime, the

l-t Air Cavalry Division Tzctical CP, supported by elements of the

13th Signal Battalion, began to operate as of 1800 hours of 28 April.

From 4 to 7 May, after search operations in the vicinity of LZ

Lucy had been completed, the ARVN 3d Regiment began conducting offensive

attacks in a southeasterly direction along both banks of the Rao Lao River

with its 2-1 Battalion to the north and the 2-3 Battalion to the south. j

The 1-3 Battalion, meanwhile, stayed back for the defense of LZ Lucy,

which was now reinforced by A Battery of the 6-33 Artillery Battalion.

The 3d Regiment progress met only scattered enemy resistance although AR'N

troops found many important supply caches. By 7 Hay, units of the 3d

Regiment had advanced to the limit of maximm 105-um range from LZ

Lucy. On 7 May, the 1-12 Cav. replaced the l-j Battalion for the defense

of LZ Lucy. Another direc-t support artillery battery was helilifted

from LZ Stallion to LZ Lucy. The 2-8 Cav., meanwhile, continued searchIng the "Punch Bowl" base area, retrieving enemy-captured weapons, a.d

destroying eramy supply caches. The 1-8 also continued securing LZ

Stallion by deploying rear company and platoon-size search rties to

the south and east of the !2,-

While keeping up its search operatious, the 3d Brigade found several

supply caches and electrical and telephone wires crisscrossiug the valley.

Its fire support bases, uhich vrarddled the access routes to the valley,

were coustantly harassed by eaemy B-40, 8,-.= mortar, &ad I2-cm rocket

fire.

on 8 and 9 May, the ARWN 34 Ptegiaeutu moved two additionat Artllery

baeries by helilff Into LZ lta-n to extend the fire support rioge toumrd the south. U Lillian had been secured by the 2-3 Satetalion the

day before- With this additional artillery sOipport, the 3d ReStmant resumed

its offensive atta2cks toward the A Shiu airfield and soon covered the

entire valley with its search parties. The US 1st and Md Briades,

meanwile, continued operations in their areas of responsibility. tn

addit-on to reco n. issatce in force operatio•os. the 3d Regzimeat and 3e6

Brigade also 1=41tiated exteasixe preparation of obstacles to Lwaee euezy,

100
activities after the extraction of friendly forces, The direct support

engineer company of the 3d Bi-gade established, within the brigade AO,

32 separate obstacles which completely blocked Route 542 south of LZ

Tiger. The engineer platoon supporting the 3d Regiment established 16

obstacles within the regiment's AO.

From 10 to 16 May, after completing reconnaissance-in-force operations and establishing obstacles, the 3d Brigade and 3d Regiment began

to withdraw on 10 May. The 5-7 Cay. and 1-7 Cav. and artillery units

moved out of LZs Tiger and Goodman by helicopters on 10 May. At the

same time, the 2-1 Battalion of the 3d Regiment was helilifted to LZ

Stallion (A Luoi airfield) where it boarded fixed-wing aircraft and was

moved to Quang Tri. From LZ Pepper, the 2-7Cav. (-), the 3d Brigade

headquarters and the artillery battery were extracted to Camp Evans.

The extraction of the 3d Brigade was completed on 11 May. The

"3d Regiment also completed its extraction by helicopter, to include the

1-3 and 2-3 Battalions, the regimental headquarters and the artillery

battery.

Also, during the period from 10 to 15 May, the 1st Brigade continued

its activities and established obstacles in its area of operation. In

the meantime, logistical elements were helilifted from LZ Stallion to

Camp Evans while heavy equipment were moved out by fixed-wing aircraft.

Heavy rains that began in the afternoon of 11 May, however, rendered the

A Luoi airfield completely unusable after that day. After establishing

a total of 26 obstacles, the 1st Brigade continued to provide security

for LZ Stallion during the time logistics and support elements were

extricated. On 12 May, the tactical CP of the 1st Air Cavalry Division

and elements of the 13th Signal Battalion were helilifted to Camp Evans.

On 15 May, the 1st Brigade began extricating its units, the 1-8 Cay.,

1-12 Cav., the Brigade headquarters and artillery elements from U2s Lucy

and Stallion. The last units to move out of A Shau valley were the 2-8

Cav. and its artillery battery, which were helilifted out of LZ Cecile on

16 May, and the remaining elements of the 13th Signal Battalion at Signal

Hill which were moved to Camp Evans on the same day.

101
Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216 was terminated at 1100 hours on

17 May 1968 after all US and ARVN participating units had been redeployed to designated areas and were ready for new assignments. The

results achieved by the operatinn were substantial. Enemy casualties

amounted to 425 killed, 3 captured, and 7 returnees. Weapons, ammunition,

and materiels captured included: 2 bulldozers, 73 wheeled vehicles,

3 tracked vehicles, 1 tank, 13 anti-aircraft weapons, 2,371 individual

weapons, 31 crew-served weapons, 42,347 large caliber rounds, 1,521

mines and grenades, 168,879 small arm and 12.7--m rounds and 71,805 lbs

of food stores.

Continuing its combat activities, the 3d ARVN Regiment, once again

in close coordination and cooperation with the 3d Air Cavalry Brigade,

initiated another major combined operation just one day after the cornpletion of operation Delaware/Lam Son 216. This- operation was launched

on 18 May against Secret Base 114, an Important enemy base located deep

in the jungles of west.-:. vua Thien. The aftached 2-I Battalion was

'first deployed into the enemy base area where it established FSB Miguel.

On the same day, before dark, the regimental headquarters and one 105-in

direct support artillery battery were helilifted into the LZ. The following day, 19 May, two other battalions of the 3d ARVN Regiment completed

their deployment into the area of operation. The 1-3 Battalion landed

and secured LZ Jose, east of Base 114. The 2-3 Battalion was also moved

to LZ Jose.

As soon as the troop landings were completed, these two battalions

conducted offensive operations southwestward, searching out enemy main force units

and striking into the enemy tactical headquarters anA logistics Installations. During the entire period of operation, units of the 3d ARVN

Regimentengaged the enemy in medium to heavy firefights throughout the

area of operation. They discovered and destroyed many important control

headquarters and logistics installations of the enemy. What was iost

remarkable about this follow-on operation was its duration. In close

cooperation and coordination rirth the US 3d Air Cavalry Brigade, the 3d

Regiment conducted sweeping operations and fought for 116 consecutive

U 102
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Soce Cocmnunst trucks and weAPOns captured in the A Shau valley,

ICUZ, operation-UELAW;ARE/LAM SON 216, April 1968.

103
iI.

Farther to the north, similar combined operations were conducted

by the ARM? 1st Regiment and the US 1st Air Cavalry Brigade. In close

coordination with each other, both units launched repeated attacks

against enamy Base 101, west of Quang Tri province. These operations

were also sustained for a long time and brought about encouraging results.

DELAWARE/LAM SON 216 was the first large scale combined operation

conducted by forces of the US 1st Air Cavalry Division and the ARVN 1st

Infantry Division against an enemy base located deep in the jungle and

mountains. Its success required a close and constant coordination and a mutual

trust becween the participating forces. Since it was a difficult and

hazardous mission, the US 1st Air Cavalry I Division at first was not enthusiastic about cooperating with ARVN forces. The combat effectiveness uf

the ARVN 3d Regiment was held %U serious doubt by US forces. What they

¶ were unaware ot was the high morale and discipline of this unit. Troops

and commanders of the 3d 'egiment were particularly proud when they were

given the cbncs,. to operate alongside the ist Air Cavalry Division, a

unit whose combat Prowesa and firepowez they held in high regard.

It was understandable tiat duriuq this operation, the ARVN 3d Regiment

was assigned the least difficult oojective, The results obtained by this

ARVN unit, therefore, were only modest, but the psychological impact of

its participation in a diffieult" peration was extremely favorable among

other ARMV units and the population. The t-erational plan was well executed

and the performance of all units vas excellent. This was chiefly due to a

high degree of cuoreratiou and cnordinatcon between US ane AiXVN forces.

'he operation was also a successful Pest that brouqht about mutual

trust and gave a gaod impetus to combined activities of US and ARV1W

forces in the l1th DTZ (Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces). As a result,

coordination and cooperation beca. exceptionally good at the sector and

subseccor levels betueen ARVN and US forces on one side and territorial

forces on the other. Difficulties and troubles, if any, occurred only

when US and ARVN combined their efforts for the first time.. After the )

ioi initial steps had been taken, a spirit oi cooperition and teamwork

-I• j ,104
rapidly developed and in time led to continued success. Some

reluctance to cooperate existed at first on the part of a few

American commanders because they were uneasy about ARVN combat

effectiveness. However, after they had seen ARVN units prove themselves in combat, their prejudice disappeared and they realized that

cooperation with ARVN combat elements could help make their task

easier and contribute to success.

A great benefit of combined operations of this type was the

rapid improvement of ARVN combat effectiveness. The 3d Regiment,

until operation DELAWARE/LA42SON 216, was generally considered mediocre

among ARVN regiments. But after a few months operating alongside

the US 3d Air Cavalry Brigade in enemy base area 114, the 3d Regiment

achieved marked progress and became one of.the best ARVN combat units.

Operation LAM SON 260ANVADA EAGLE

Operation LAH SON 260/NEVADA EAGLE was an ARVN-US combined operation

r- conducted in the Vinh Loc district of Thua Thien province in mid-September

1968. The objective of the operation was to destroy enemy local units,

eliminate his infrastructure and guerrillas, and ultimately restore local

government control and security for the local population.

Vinh Loc district was a long and narrow island sandwiched between

the sea and Thuy Tu Sound and located some 20 miles east*southeast of Hue

city. Its length was 25 miles and its width, about 3 miles. Before the

enemy 1968 Tet offensive, Vinh Loc had been a prosperous and relatively

secure district. Its population of approximately 50,000 lived mostly by

fishing and farming. During the Tet offensive, the enemy took advantage

of the deteriorating situation and infiltrated local troops into the area

to reinforce and expand his infrastructure. Several villages and hamlets

came under enemy control. The enemy's ultimate goal was to turn Vinh

Loc district into an impenetrable safe haven and staging area for his

local units. As of that time, local government control was effective only

1.105

L
in the eastern portion of the island where about 29,000 local inhabitants

and 12,500 refugees lived. The remaining 8,500 of the district population

were virtually under enemy controL. Enemy local forces in the area were

estimated at anywhere from 2 companies to 2 battalions, not including

the guerrillas and infrastructure.

From March to August 1968, Vietnamese territorial forces and US units

separately conducted several screening operations in the enemy-infested area

without any significant results. In general, when operating by themselves,

RP and PF units met with forceful reactions from enemy local units and

never fulfilled their mission. On their part, US units usually swept

through objectives in the area of operation for only a short time, then

quickly moved out. As a result, enemy forces either put up token resistance or avoided contact altogether by hiding themselves and waiting out

operating forces. This enemy tactic was well known by the local governS ment and Vietnamese and merican units. Nothing could be effectively

done against it, however, because separate efforts never gathered enough

forces for a saturation effort and the idea of cooperation and coordination

was yet to be willingly shared by the commanders concerned.

It was decided theu that only a combined effort of US, ARVN, RP and

the local government could achieve the desired results. Opeatin LAM

SON 260/NEVADA EAGLE was the product of detailed planning and close

coordination between operating forces of both sides. The overall operational concept was to achieve tactical surprise by quick action. Strict

security measures were therefore enforced to avoid disclosure of the

operation plan. The last coordinating session to finalize the plan, for

I example, was held off until the day before D-day which was scheduled to

be on 11 September. As a result, operational orders were issued to

participating forces only at the last minute , allowing them just enough

time to prepare for action. In addition, reconnaissance over the

target area was held at a minimum; also, operational headquarters and

support units were to move into position only after H-hour.

The operational plan first called for a cordon to be surreptiously

put in place utilizing all resources available. The key to success $ •rested on deanyin the enemy any advance warning signs of the operation.

106 ()
Then quick action was to follow with the landings of heliborne forces on

the beaches. After landings, operating forces would sweep across the

island during the first day. The move was designed to fragment enemy

forces into separate elements and interdict all communication between

them. Care was also taken to block all the routes that the enemy usually

employed to evade friendly troops.

-To minimize damages and casualties to the local population, preparatory fire was to be held to a minimum and support fire was to be employed

only in case of significant resistance. Special precautions were taken to

avoid unnecessary destruction. For the effective control and screening

of the population, each operating unit was accompanied by representatives

of the local government. All youths of draft age were to be temporarily

detained, including those who possessed legal identification papers.

i lThen a careful and minute search would be conducted throughout the

* island. As soon as they were introduced into their areas of operations,

participating units would quickly fan out and search. The search was

to be thorough and systematic. Information provided .by the local governmetn, population, prisoners, or returuees and any other sources would

be instantly exploited to give focus to the search effort.

The operational plan carefully detailed the task organization

-of participating forces which were composed of blocking forces, a

maneuver element, and control and special elements. (Chart 7)

1. Blocking forces consisted of 2 battalions of the 54th Regiment,

1st ARVN Infantry Division, deployed in Phu Thu district; 1 company of

* the 1/501st, 101st US Airborne Division, deployed on the Phu Vang - Vinh

toc border for 10 September only; 7 P? platoons, 5 of which were deployed

to Vinh Loc and 2 to Phu Vang; 2 ARVN Coastal Groups (12th and 13th), 1

Patrol Boat River Group, USN, and 1 Patrol Air Cushion VeWIle Group, USSO

all deployed on the Thuy Tu Sound; and I Swif t oat Groupt, USN, in the

.2I ocean screening the coaut.

2. The maneuver element was composed of the lst Battalion, 54th

Regiment, lst AAVN Infantry Division. asigued to the western half of the

island; the 1/501 Battalion, 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, assigned

to the eastern half; I squadron of the 7th hAnored Cavalry Reinaat,. lot

107
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ARVN Infantry Division, assigned to operate with the 1st ARVN Battalion;

2 RF companies of Vinh Loc district, assigned to the center portion of

the island; 3 PF platoons, assigned to operate with US forces in the

eastern half; 100 National Police Field Force (NPFF) cadres of Thus Thien

province; 8 census-grievance cadres of Vinh Loc district; and 17 police

Special Branch, also of the district.

3. Control and special elements included: the 2d Brigade Coumand

Group, located 44 Phu Thu; the 54th Regiment Command Group, co-located

at Phu Thu; the 7th Cavalry Task Force Couand Group, located in Vinh

Loc; the 1/501st Battalion Coamand Group, located in Vinh Loc; the

District Couand Group, the Province Command Group, and the Combined.

Intelligence and Processing Center, all located in Vinh Loc. The Combined Intelligence and Processing Center was the most important of all

elements. It was composed of the Provincial Intelligence Section, the

Provincial Military Intelligence Detachment, the 1/501st Battalion S-2

section, the District Intelligence section, and the NPFF and Special

Police Branch. In addition, special teams such as the Provincial Information Service team, and Provincial Psyops teams also participated in

the operation.

During the night of 10 September, all blocking forces moved to I their assigned positions. Most of the:e units were operating in nearby

areas during that time. Thus their movements were made to appear toutine

and caused no suspicion to the enemy. Closing in stealthily by night,

they were in position by the time~the initial assault was launched.

The cordon phase of the operation was a success; the enemy still did

rot suSpect that he was trapped. (Map 5)

At 0715 hours on 11 September, elements of the 7th Armored Cavalry,

"which had embarked on naval ships during the night, landed at a beachhead

on the western half of the island. They 1uediately pushed inland, di*-

.Viding the island into two separate areas. This was the first time

armored vehicles had been employed on the island; their presence, therefore, su-Sr

' prised and confused the enemy. Almost at the same time, the 1st Battalion,

54th Regiment, was helilifted into three assigned landing zones: Gray,

Tan and White, on the western half of the peninsula. Two RF companies,

109
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meanwhile, moved into positions along the beach in the center portion

of the island. The 1/501st Battalion, as scheduled, alighted at

three landing zones on the eastern half: Greeu, Purple and Yellow.

By 1100 hours, all forces were moving southward across the island and

by 170C hours, they had swept through the last assigned targets !czated

along the southern bank of the island.

During the first day of the operation, there were medium scale engagements with the enemy. Caught entirely by surprise, enemy troops did

not have time to take evasive action or bury their weapons. They either surrendered or were captured. When the first day was over, more than 300

suspects had been detained. During the night, friendly forces consoli-

* dated their blocking positions and placed extensive ambushes over the

avenues that the enemy might use to exfiltrate from the area. The entire

island was illuminated by flares throughout the night.

On the second day of the operation, 12 September, friendly units

began a careful search as they moved slowly back toward the sea. Each

area of responsibility was minutely and methodically combed. During

the operation, Vietnamese units proved their efficiency in thorough search

techniques; patience was the key to their productiveness. As they continued

the search, they made use of every bit of information provided by prisoners,

__ r-turuees or thb local population. Each source would accompany the search

unit t: t" .- e ct•td area and guide our troops in their search. This I method proved to be moat effectiv-! and a u-ed inroughout the operation.

Suspects were sent to the district headquarters --hare tft, wee .er Re

rogated and screened by the combined intelligence elements. he inter '".'n

land screening task was performed day and night, without interruption.

j The hm.viest engagement of the operation occurred on 12 September

between US troops and the enemy. The 1/501 Battalion encircled the

enemy C-3 local force company in an area about 2 miles east of the d-scricr

headquarters. Caught in an open :icefield area, the entire enemy •cocpany

surrendered after putting up a fierce resistaace. Only 20 enemy troops

succeeded in escaping the encirclement.

Throughout the operation, psyvar activities were also pushed vigorously.

Two loudspeaker teams accompanied friendly troops during the search. In

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addition, our aircraft flew many broadcast and leaf let-drop

missions. The local inhabitants were urged to stay calm and not to

be afraid of friendly troops. They were persuaded that

once enemy installations and troops were destroyed, they would enjoy

complete security under goverrnment control. These psywar activities

proved to be effective in controlling the population and persuading

several enemy troops to surrender.

Operation LAM SON 260/NEVADA EAGLE lasted ten days. By the last

day, 20 September 1968, results obtained were substantial. The enemy

lost 154 killed, 370 taken prisoners (including 126 VCI members, 155

guerrillas, 68 local force troops and 21 main force VC and NVA troops),

and 56 returnees. A total of 1,970 suspects were detained and processed.

Among them, 30 were found to be criminals; 55 were held for further

investigation, and 139 youths volunteered for military service in the

ARVN. According to one captured VC warrant officer, from 80 to 90

percent of VC cadres and troops in the island were killed or captured.

The enemy was thus dealt a resounding defeat. Casualties on the friendly side were unusually light. Only one member of the propaganda team

and one policeman were killed, and 12 wounded (7 ARVN, 3 US, 2 R1MY

Damages caused to the local population were also minimal: only 2

civilians were wounded and 3 grass huts were destroyed by fire.

l"uediately after the copwletion of the wilit~ry operation, a pacification program was initiated throughout the area. Two Rural Development

teams had been brought in to Vinh Loc district on 18 September 1968,

two days before the operatlon was terminated. Together vith R1 and PF

units, they were assigned to organize local defeose and re-establish

local a•imnistration. At the same time, People's Self Deofense tea=s

.vre al-o activated In every village and hamlet throughout the district.

I Th lotal pooplation ok Vioh toc district were greatly encouraged .-- by the happy tu if event-. They were all determined to return and rebuild their villages. In particular. thiy ex;ressed the desire to see

iUS and AV"N' units continue their activities in the district u tiL security

became total. They requested very little assistance and relLef ftom the

district government, except for medicine and corrugated iron sheets for

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roofing. The district of Vinh Loc recovered rapidly under government control. Market places and schools were repaired rapidly and the

local economy regained its normal prosperity within a few months.

Afterward, the people of Vinh Loc district lived in complete security

under the effective protection of popular and self-defense forces. This

situation was maintained throughout the following years until the very

last days of the RVN.

Some outstanding lessons were learned from operation LAM SON 260/

NEVADA EAGLE. First of all, it was recognized that the policy of

minimizing damage and casualties to the local population worked to the

advantage of friendly troops and the government, This is a principle

that ought to be applied to any operation conducted in a populated area.

.- .Fever casualties and less damage means less burden for the government

and less misery for the population. There is more cooperation with

operating troops when it is realized that they come to protect and not

to destroy. The LAM SON 260/NEVADA EAGLE operation succeeded because

all com•anders operated under this principle and took extra precautions.

The participation of provincial civilian and para-nilitary forces

proved to be very beneficial in this operation. Information concerning

enemy whereabouts was instantly exploited and used. Also, there was

less confusion and fear among innocent detainees. Local self-defense

forces were employed to assist In searching their own villages. In

the operation, 20 SOF meobers were helilifted to s search area where

they effectively assisted US forces in rootitg out the VC1.

The ¢ombined Interrogatlou center functioded effectively and pro-

. vided valuable Infortation to operating forces. Xrt success hinged on

*1 .good organization, continuous operation, Instant exploitation of sources

and innovative ideas. O 12 Sptreber, for example, a total of 212

suspects were routed to the center at one ti-e. Their processing took

less than two hours. Instead of lengthy interropatios, the police

officers simply asked the- to move to one side if they belong to the

K-4 Battalion, and to the other if they belonged to the C-118 Company.

Sixty-three anong theza instinctively d•d as they were told, thus,

unwittingly givoS themselves away.

11i• _ _ __3
The outstanding success of the operation, in general, was attributable to the excellent performance of all operational elements

and to careful planning and close coordination. All participating

commanders proved to be coopera~ive and determined to attain the common

objective. Constant consultations and a perfect coordination of all

efforts helped solve all misunderstandings. The key factors here were

unity of purpose, iutegration of efforts, and physical proximity of

control headquarters. What was more important though was the fact

that no single element ever tried to claim all the credit for itself.

It was a genuine .ombined effort in which the results obtained were a

credit to all, regardless of who actually did what.

Flexibility in execution is another factor of success which should

"be regarded as a rule. The responsibility for exploiting information

should be given to whichever unit is nearest to the target, regardless

of boundaries or area of responsibility. A unit whose area of responsibility is unproductive should be iimediately redeployed to where it

can perform. Whenever a need for consu.•tation arises, unit commanders

should make an effort to get together. Also, supplies, information and

ochei: resources should be distributed on an equal basis and based on

true requiremwats. All these factors were regarded as key to success

in combined operations of all sizes between US and ARVN forces.

The 54th ARVN Regiment that participaced tiu this operation was

activated just after the 1968 Tet offensive. Its cadres and troops were

relatively inexperienced. But this regiment- proved to be able to perform

just as well an any other that is properly motivated and led. During

operatioQ LAM SON 260/,NEVADA EAGLE, this regim-at ude remarkable conZributious ia destroying enemy. uaits and uprootiog his infrastructure,

It was subsequentar redeployted to NNsa Doog valley and part1Cipattd in

combied reccanausisaaces to force with units of the US '01st Airborne

Divislou. Len In a differett envirome-nt, it continued to perform

well. The conclusioo was that once the first step had been takes La

the righit directiaon, sutcess could be expected 'to follow.

t 4 -2

11
CHAPTER V

Combined Operations as a Means of Improving

'd• ARVN Combat Effectiveness

Objecea and Z:vceduvee

One of the major goals of MACV in South Vietnam was to help the

RVNAF improve their combat effectiveness so that they would eventually be capable of defending tlieir country unaided. The combat

situation in South Vietnam offered excellent opportunities to put this

policy to work since both the RVMAF and US Forces fought the same enemy

on the same battlefield. The theory espoused by MACV was that, by participating in combat operations hand-in-hand with American units, Vietnamese

forces-regular and territorial--would acquire valuable and practical

experience which could hardly be acquired in a training center. Thus,

combined and joint operations offered ARVN units not only the chance to

observe American methods of operations, American use of firepower and

mobility assets, and American leadership in aqtion, but also offered the

fringe benefits of additional combat support which could not otherwise

be made available from Vietnamese resources. This was in fact a very

special type of on-the-job or in-action training in which US units performed the role of instructor by giving real life, positive examples of

combat actions and counteractions in various tactical situations and types

of terrain; and the ARVN units under their tutelage benefited from observing and emulating the US units.

! iDuring the period of US active participation in Vietnam, this training

concept was put to use at different levels and 'it differnt timas. In late

1965, the III Marine Amphibious Force in I Corps Tactical Zone took up the

most extensive organized effort of upgrading Popular Forces in a program

called "Combined Action" which eventually abso)'bed a considerable amunt

of Marine manpower. Under the Combined Action Program (CAP), Marine rifle

squads were sent into hamlets where they lived and operated with the local

115

------------------------------- Mill~$.l-v- l 11' 
Popular Forces platoons for a period of several months until the PF

platoons were considered effective enough to defend the hamlets by themselves.

The program was initiated at first around US bases and along National 4

Route 1, then expanded outward until local security had improved to the

degree that the Marines were no longer needed. At this level, the program

was tremendously beneficial to the GVN pacification effort. As a matter of

fact, it was the district chiefs who designated target hamlets for the

CAP in accordance with pacification objectives and local conditions.

Despite the fact that the program achieved remarkable success, it was not

pursued on a country-wide basia since, unfortunately, it required considerable US manpower. Considering its achievements, one may wonder what the

CAP would have contributed to the overall pacification effort, had the

program been made a systematic and continuous combined US-RVN endeavor

throughout the country. It was understandable that US forces were primarily concerned with destroying enemy main forces but it was also important

to eliminate the enemy infrastructure which was at the root of insecurity.

The commitment of US forces in this effort would have been entirely justifiable. Similar types of effort were made by US Army units elsewhere since

1965 but were not systematically continued due to the priority given to

combat operations.

General Vestmoreland felt that Saigou, the national capital, and its

surrounding districts should be given priority in the common military

effort since they involved the prestige of the GVN. The ARVN and territorial units which were assigned for the defense of this important area,

therefore, should also be made effective. As a result, he directed, in

late 1966, the initiation of Operation FAIRFAX, the first large-scale combined effort ever attempted, in which American and Vietnamese battalions

were paired and tasked to support pacification in three key districts of

Gia Dinh province surrounding Saigon. It was General Westmoreland's

desire that US battalions, by participating in co bat operations in a populated center, would inapirc ARVN regular and teirrtorial units and instill

confidence among the population. The thrae participating US battalions

were able to provide considerable cowbat support resources for the operation since they were subordinate to three different US infantry divisions.

N 116
i!----, -*ll-- i,,,,6

Operation FAIRFAX, which lasted the entire year of 1967, was initially

troubled by coordination and control problems. US and ARVN units, as a

matter of fact, operated more on the basia of cooperation and mutual respect

under the control of the district chiefs involved. Since the district

chiefs, who were company-grade officers, were outranked by both US and

ARVN unit commanders and not usually held in high regard by the latter,

problems were bound to occur. In the absence of higher command directives,

minor issues frequently developed into major problems. This situation

changed for the better, however, when the 5th ARVN Ranger Group and the

US 199th Light Infantry Brigade took over and assumed responsibility for

the conduct of the combined effort. Coordination and control became

more effective and the operation was termed a success when the US 199th

Light Infantry Brigade was redeployed in November 1967 leaving only

Ranger and Lerritorial forces in charge.

After the enemy Tet offensive in 1968, combined operations of this

type became more common. In principle, ARV* units remained under

V-itnamese commanders although their headquarters were frequently collocated in the same base with US counterpart inits. There were many

c , •'owever, where small units such as platoons or squads were exchanged

or cross-attached between US and Vietnamese units. In I Corps Tactical

Zone, Lieut-nant General Richard G. Stilwell, the new XXIV Corps Commander,

went a step further when he suggested the integratiou of all US and ARVN

tactical operations in his area of responsibility. Hisi idea highly inspired me, who, as commander of the lat ARVN Infantry Division at that

time, was his counterpart. Jointly, we began to conceive operations and

each of us contributed his share of the forces. Our units atted in concert under a virtual unified command since both of us were always in

perfect harmony. We also encouraged the co-lLocation of US brigade and

ARVN regimental command posts in the same fire support base, since we

were agreed that this provided closer and better coordination in tactical

matters. General Stilwell was an indefatigable, energetic and devoted

field comander. He and I usually worked very closely together and spent

most of out days in the same helicopter visiting our units. It was my

privilege to have been afforded the opportunity to cooperate with him

117
and earn his trust. Our association was truly a working relationship

inspired by the professional interest shared with each other and was in

contrast to the superficial politeness that characterized so many other

similar relationships. And I think that our joint efforts brought about

results which highly benefited the comon cause we pursued.

The practice that we adopted was fully supported by Major General

Melvin Zais, Commander of the US 101st Airborne Division, who succeeded

General Stilwell in 1969. He applied similar methods along the same line

in the 1st Marine and the Americal Divisions. The Americal Division,

however, had for some time conducted combined operations with the ARVN

2d Infantry Division. The marked improvement of this unit's effectiveness

was largely due to these combined operations. The success achieved by.

the Americal Division could be ascribed to its practice of establishing

couon tactical areas of responsibility for both US brigades and ARVN

regiments and collocating their command posts at the same base camp.

In II Corps Tactical Zone, a combined operations program was initiated by Lieutenant General William R. Peers, commander of US I Field Force

in early 1968, with the cooperation of his counterpart, Lieutenant General

Lu Lan, Commander of ARVN II Corps. With the US 4th Infantry Division

- "guarding the central highland approaches, Generals Peers and Lu Lan began the "Pair off" program which combined forces of the US 173d Airborne

Brigade and the ARVN 22d and 23d Infantry Divisions. This concept was

later expanded to include Vietnamese artillery and other combat support

units. There were some drawbacks, however, in operational coordination and

cooperation due to the considerable separation of the Headquarters of II

Corps and I US Field Force and the relative lukewarmness of participating

ARVN field commanders.

In III Corps Tactical Zone, similar effo•rts were later made by the

coma'nder of US It Field Force, Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell. In

mid-1969, General Well, in cooperation with Lieutenant General Do Cao

Tri, Comander of III Corps, initiated the Doug Tien (Progress Together)

program which paired the lot and 25th US Infantry Divisions and the 199th

Light Infantry Brigade with the ARVN 5th, 25th and 18th Infantry Divisions

118
respectively. combined operations were most extensively conducted by the

1st US and 5th ARVN Infantry Divisions, and prepared ARVN units to assume

almost all of the 1st US Division area of operation when it was redeployed

in 1970. On the border areas, II Field Force paired Vietnamese Airborne

brigades with those of the lot US Cavalry Division (Airmobile). In time,

" -/ the ARVN Airborne units became proficient in heliborne operations thanks

to the large resources and modern methods used by US units. The Dong

Tien program proved invaluable training for ARVN units which later

successfully conducted the cross-border operation into Cambodia without

significant US support.

Combined operations programs, conceived as a means of improving ARVN

combat effectiveness, were a successful training vehicle. Not only did

ARVN units improve markedly and became more proficient in modern warfare

methods, but ARVN leadership also became more aggressive as a result of

the fine examples displayed by US field commanders. In retrospect, these

programs truly paved the way for Vietnamese commanders to assume new

responsibilities as US forces began to withdraw. In contrast, combined

operations certainly were not all crowned with success. There were

difficulties and problems generated by human and procedural factors. The

association with US units and their abundant resources also developed

certain psychological conditioning and habits among ARVN unit troops and

commanders which proved to be adverse in the long run. For the purpose

of this monograph, the author proposes to examine in detail each of the

four above-mentioned programs.

Thea Combined Action Pi'ogn

Shortly after their landing in I Corps Tactical Zone, the Marines began a pacification program in the poptulated areas near Da Nang. The key

to this progr 3 c 4he combined action concept whose basic premise was

that rapport with the local population was both a military necessity and a

prerequisite for permanent security. The problem of winning over the

allegiancu, of the rural population was one of the most difficult challenges

of the war, not only for the government of South Vietnam but also for the

US forces who came to its assistance. This was a unique and unprecedented

119

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N . . • .,., : .:U•. 
problem for American tactical commanders. Traditionally, American military

doctrine, tactics, and training were geared to fight a conventional

war; and little thought had been given to the political and psychological

aspects of the type of war fought in South Vietnam, where many battles took

place in the very midst of the rural populace. To overcome this problem,

the approach employed by the Marines was to seek rapport with the rural

population through the Popular Forces (PF), who were stationed throughout

the villages and hamlets. Because these PF units were locally recruited,

they enjoyed the advantage of knowing the local area and people, including

the local enemy. In contrast, they were in general poorly equipped and

deficient in leadership and training. These were deficiencies which could

be overcome by US resources, leadership and know-how.

The method used by US Marines was to train by example, and the

principle applied was to integrate a number of Marines at the lowest levels

with PF units. The combined action concept thus was a happy marriage between two different elements who mutually reinforced and compensated for

each other's weaknesses. In such an arrangement, PF units benefited from

US firepower, communications with larger units, and medic.l evacuation.

Conversely, US Marines were able to overcome some of the disadvantages

of being foreigners.

The Combined Action Program started in August 1965 with a combined

action company (CAC) composed of from three to twelve combined action

platoons (CAP) initially assigned to the area around Hue city. It grew

to 79 platoons grouped into 14 companies in 1967 and by November 1969,

-reached a total of X14 platoons grouped into 20 companies spread throughout the populated lowlands of all five provinces of I CTZ. (Map 6)

These CAPs provided security for some 350 hamlets and protection for about

135,000 villagers. In manpower, the program involved about 2,000 Marines

and Navy Corpsmen and approximately 3,000 PF troops.

Control and coordination headquarters for the CAPs existed at the

District, Province, and Corps levels. The 114 CAPs were organized into

20 companies (CAC) which in turn were controlled by four Combined Action

Groups (CAG). In general, company headquarters corresponded to and were

collocated with District headquarters; group headquarters cor-responded

1.2

i I ' • • " '• : TM +120
00

hIN

H Iu

O Ii

(12
!L

with and were usually located near Province headquarters. At Corps level,

coordination was performed between the Director, Combined Action Program,

and the Deputy Comander for Territory, I Corps, who in turn reported to

the commanders of III MAP and I Corps, respectively. (Chart 8)

Coordination and Control

Combined Action Program

(Chart 8)

I

I CG, I Corps CG, I MAF . . . . . I

Dep. Cdr, Terri- _~~---~~~ Director CAP

tory R&P forces

Province Chief CO ------- I - CALG II 1⁄2 I I

District Chief -- - L CO,-- CiAC Z

I i Combined Action Platoon

122

: '% -. . . ..
Basically, each Combined Action Platoon was composed of a USHC squad

and a PF platoon. The USMC squad had 15 men, including the squad leader,

1 grenadier, 1 corpsman- and 3 fire teams of four Marines each. The PF

platoon, in theory, had 35 men, to include the platoon leader, a headquarters of 4 men and 3 rifle squads of ten men each. In total, the aggregated strength of a CAP was 50 men (15 USMC and 35 PF). In practice,

however, the PF strength was never fulfilled due to various manpower

problems encountered by the GVN. Initially, the CAPs were placed under

operational control of the Marine commander of the tactical area of responsibility in which the CAP operated. In time, however, since the Marine

element lived and worked with the PF and pacification being the primary

mission, CAPs were placed under operational control of the local district

chief.

Both the Popular Force and USMC elements of the Combined Action Platoon

were assigned the following mission:

1. Destroy the enemy infrastructure within the village or hamlet

area of responsibility.

2. Provide military security and help maintain law and order.

3. Protect the friendly governmental structure.

4. Protect bases and lines of communication within the village and

hamlets by conducting day and night patrols and ambushes in the assigned

area.

5. Contribute to combined operations with RF, ARVN, FWMAF and

other PP units in the assigned area.

6. Participate in civic action and conduct psychological operations

against the enemy.

7. Participate and assist in rural development to the maximum extent

possible, consistent with the accomplishment of the foregoing tasks.

In addition, the US Marine element had the mission of providing

military training to the PF troops in order to prepare them for more

effective performance of their tasks when the Marines were relocated to

another area.

123
Almost all Marines participating in the Combined Action Program were

volunteers assigned directly from the US. A few volunteers came from

III MAF units. Regardless of their origin, all Marines were screened for

adaptability to the program; after selection, they attended a two-week

CAP school at Da Nang before going to their CAGs for subsequent assignment

to the CAPs. Some Marines later came back for intensive Vietnamese

language training at Da Nang. Perhaps the foremost requirements for

adaptability to the problem were the willingness to undergo hardship and

above all, an affection for the Vietnamese people. In all frankness,

we had to admit the cold fact that not all Marines-and US troops by

extension- understood and warmed to the local Vietnamese people. While it

appears doubtful that as many as 40% of the Marines disliked the Vietnamese, as

claimed by a knowledgeable author, the fact was a Marine could not live

and work with them unless he sympathized with and tame to like them. 1

After all, this was a volunteer, not an assigned job, and a CAP Marine

could quit any time he chose. The turnover rate, happily, was rather

small throughout the entire duration of the program. There were even

some CAP Marines who extended their tour of duty voluntarily for a

period of three or more months.

A Combined Action Platoon was assigned to work with a village.

Marines lived and worked with the PF in the village itself. They trained

the PF in the daytime and, together with the PF, conducted patrols and

ambushes at night. The headquarters of each CAP was a fortified compound

consisting of several barbed wire fences, heavily sandbagged bunkers and

a network of trenches. This was where the Marines and PF ate and slept,

and worked in the daytime. The CAP headquarters was also a safe haven

where the village chief and RD cadres sometimes spent their night. By

any standards, living conditions in the compound were spartan: there

was no elect.icity and no running water. At night about 6 Marines and

10 PFs guarded the compound, normally at 50Z alert. The rest of the CAP

1Pi. J. West, Jr., The Village (New York; Harper and Raw, 1972), :! ~p 11. ,

p124
was out patrolling and laying ambushes. Patrols usually started at dusk

and were conducted only as a means to drop off ambush squads or team,

S igenerally two or three each night.

Tactics employed by the CAPs were founded on three basic principles:

tactical mobility, economy of force, and credible perm&nence. Although

a CAP did man and guard a headquarters compound, it did not defend the

village or hamlet from behind bunkers and barricades. The basic tactical

idea was to lay out a screen of ambushes on the approaches to the hamlet

instead of putting up a static defense vail around it. The hamlet was

usually manned by Popular Self-Defense Forces (PSDF). This kind of

mobility was also used most effectively by the enemy. It instilled a

psychology of offense, not of defense, and embodied, in practice, the

precept of "defense through offense." Coupled with stealth, the kind of

mobility practiced by the CAP provided not only offensive striking power,

but also the protection afforded by elusiveness. By virtue of this quality

of elusive mobility, the CAP seemed to be everywhere but never predictably

anywhere. The unpredictability of CAP ambushes was the basis of CAP

security against surprise attacks by overwhelming enemy forces and what

was more important, it insured that the enemy would never feel safe anywhere

in a CAP area of operations.

When a CAP first moved into an area, the Marines had to concentrate

on basics and usually took a large share of the more dangerous duties.

There always teaded to be intense action and frequent contacts in the

beginning before the enemy activity tapered off. Then the PF gradually

took over, becoming more aggressive and more confident of the=.elves.

Being a small elewent, the CAP, of necessity, had to apply the principle

of economy of force. Its tactic was to combine a minimum of personnel

"w•th a maximum of firepower. In the presence of an enemy force, the CAP

exposed only a small target yet was able to bring down the firepower of

a Marine battalion in terms of air and artillery support. The CAP

did not operate independently. Marina units usually conducted larger

operations in the CAP's area, utilizing CAP personnel• as guides and as

a source of intelligence. These units also provided quick reaction forces

to support the CAP in an emargeacy. In general, however, CAPs were capable

of defend4lng themselves against enemy local units.

.. ... . 125 -.
The third principle of CAP tactics was that of credible permanence.

The PF, being recruited from the local area, were villagers by nature.

Like the PF, the CAP Marines were also villagers in that they Lived with

the PF and among the local population long enough to become known and befriended by the villagers. Their stay partook of permanence since they

would remain as long as they were needed. In a sense, the CAP was

practically "married" to the people, the village administrative structure,

and the land. This quality of permanence was one of the characteristics

that set the CAP apart from regular infantry units and accounted for its

success among the local population. The CAP, as a secondary effort, also

conducted civic action, not so much for what it could physically achieve

with its limited manpower, but as a means of getting local officials

involved in helping the people.

There was no question that the Combined Action Program had a generally

good record. .US Marines were fond of saying that no village under a CAP

ever reverted to enemy control. That was true as long as the US protective

shield was nearby. More meaningful, however, was the number of villages

that ultimately no longer needed Marinie protection. As a matter of fact,

when Marines began to withdraw late in 1969, the security picture in I

Corps rural areas was never so bright. The advantages of the Cf#P %ere

obvious. It provided continuous protection to the village; it trained

"and motivated a local self defense force; and it was a potential source

for the type of intelligence that would ultimately break the enemy infrastructure.

The presence of the CAP was a source of frustratiou to the enemy who

attempted unsuccessfully to counter it. As a matter of fact, the enemy

wvs able to destroy some of the CAP headquarters compounds by aeaas

of surprise attacks In force. But he never destroyed a sbile

CAP. The effectiveness of the CAPs was demonstrated by the fact that

wherever they were located, the enemy was denied bin tource of manpower

because he was denied a free hand in recruiting and iatidation. The

enemy was also denied his source of food since he found it too ristky to

run rice parties through the ubiquitous CAP aubushes. He was no longer

-able to collect his taxes of wney or rice or enlist the support of the.

villagers. His source of intelligence gradually dried up as the villagers

126 .1
4

cooperated more fully wit~h their PP and Marine protectors. Finally, the

stability and credibtlity of the GVN was greatly enhanced when village

officials could safely stay In their homes at night and the commn people no

longer feAred reprisals from the enemy.

On the minus side, the CAP was costly in terms of American manpower.

The Marines and the GVN wanted to expand the CAP, but MACV could not spare

the manpower and instead developed the concept of Mobile Training Teams

(MTT) to replace the CAPs. There were also difficulties in com3and

relationship in some instances between the CAP and the local district

chief. In one case, two village chiefs were summarily removed because

they had received favorable publicity and eminence from close cooperation

with US Marines. I Corps Tactical Zone was an area where local politics

* played a great role, chiefly at the district and village levels. The

* ~VNQDD (Vietnam Nationalist Party) and the flai Viet parties had ramifications and influence among the population. Many able PF platoon leaders

were dismissed or transferred because of their political affiliation,

'I much to the chagrin of the Marines who only kcnew the military and professional aspect of the problem. After living a long time in the village,

some Marina" tended to become too independent and sometimes acted in defiance kof their superiors. Portuziately. these cases of insubordination were

few. In other cases, Marine energy and initiative tended to overshadowi

local Vietnam-se military and civilian leadership whereas the real goal

was to help these leaders become less dependent on Azerican pre-sence.

WJhen the Americal Division took over the Marines area of respos--

ibility in Quang TOn and Quaag Ngai provinces in mid-1969, it continued

the Combined Action Program u&ith some modifications. The program was

renazned Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUP~P) although its basic

concept was similar. The CUPP basic twait was the coopany whose squad-8 7 were asuigned to work with PP platoons like the Marines. But Unlike the

CAP Marines who were all volanteers assigned directly from the US- and who

P4. stayed as member* of a CAP for their entire tour. the Arm~y squads which

replaced them were no,... Members of a CUPP unit werg~ still part of an

infantry co~any and continu~ed to associate with it. The Marines employed

the tactical. nobility concept, without defense walls or perimeters. to

127
the CUPP, hamlets were protected by a combination of a defensive perimeter

and a series of nightly ambushes. In general, the Combined Unit Pacification Program, like tbe CAP, accomplished many of its objectives.

Operation Fairfax/Rang Dong

In late 1966 while the major American effort in III Corps Tactical

Zone continued to focus on enemy main force units and American operations

were typically large-scale efforts such as operations Cedar Falls and

Junction City, General Westmoreland, commander of USMACV decided to commit

an American infantry brigade on a long term basis to the Capital Military

District which comprised Saigon and Gia Dinh prov~nce around it. This

effort became known as Operation Fairfax which was initiated on I December

1966 and terminated on 14 December 1967. At the time of the decision,

the security situation in Gia Dinh province was deteriorating rapidly and the

enemy infrastructure and his 165A Regiment became a major problem. Many

villages came under enemy control The most troublesome areas were the

di-trjts of Thu Duc, Nha Be. and Binh Chanh, located directly east, southea•t and south of Saigon. respectively.

Accordiug to General Westmoreland, the GVN was reluctant to put regular

ARVN forces in the vicinity of Saigon and attempted to solve the security

problem by increasing RF-PF strength. At his urging the- JGS assigned two

airbc-rue battalions to 00 but their operations were ineffective. It vas clear

that ARVN forces could not cope with the situation. The GVN government,

""ea-awhile, wa4s Just beginning its prograo of elections and its political

stakes were understandably high. In the face of this situation, the

US-KACV coazander recoue-nded chat US troops be cocittced as a catAlyst

for AUN tod PF-PF action. He advized the JGS that NACV would match One

for one the three kA/N battaLions to be coiitted-.

nu essence, Operation Fairfax was a combined operation coeducted

Jointly by US 11 FV, and W. "ang Don" was its Viewa•-se counterpa•rt code name. Forces deployed uere three US battalios• a"d three

•.': '.ARV battalions.

The aisslen of OGperation Fairfax stated that ti Fi.eld Force, Vietnw=

In cooperat•cix with ARVZ/]N would coadtct operationa In Bobh Chanh, Thu

cL

..
~ I

Duc and Nha Be Districts of the Capital Military District to destroy the

Viet Cong forces, guerrillas, and infrastructure. (Nap 7) The underlying objective behind this mission was the restoration of security in

"these areas to a level that could be maintained by ARVN, RF-PF, and the

national police. The US battalions were also assigned the additional

mission of training and improving the local RF-PF units to the extent chat

they would be able to provide continuing security after Fairfax ended.

Initial US forces committed to the operation were three infantry

battalions, one from each of three US divisions: the 2-16 Infantry, 1st

Division, the 3-22 Infantry, 4th Division, and the 4-9 Infantry, 25th

Division. They were replaced in January 1967 by the US 199th Light

Infantry Brigade. On the ARVN side, the JGS committed two airbornebattalions of the general reserve, the 3d and 5th, and the 30ch Ranger

Battalion. These units were subsequently replaced by the 5th Ranger

Group.

In the initial phase of the operation, the US 2-16 Infantry and

the ARVN 30th Ranger Battalion were assigned to Thu Duc; the US 4-9

infantry and the ARVN 3d Airborne Battalion were assigned to Binh Chanb;

and the US 3-22 Infantry and the A.RVN 5th Airborne Battalion were

assigned to Nha Be. When the US 199th Light Infantry Brigade and the

5th ARVN Ranger Group subsequently took over, the 4th Battalion, 12th infantry

was paired with the 30th Rangers in Thu Duc; the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry

was paired with the 33d Rangers in Binh Chanh; and the 2d Battalion, 3d

Infantry was paired with the 38th Rangers in Nha Be. Ehch US infantry

battalion was thus collocated with a =ounterpart ARVN battalion and they

shared a common area of operation which was the district. The 5th Ranger

Group meanwhile detached a command liaison group to the 199th Brigade

Forward CP at Cat Lai. This arrangement provided on effective coordination

and conmmand facility for the control of tntegrated operations in each

district. To delineate areas of responsibility and to preserve basic unit

autonomy, each district was divided into two TAORs, one under the

responsibility of the US battalion, the other under the ARVN battalion.

129

7!'. 2 r
xZx

44(

.1V 1

13D

I - -

ý07 7 7ý 
Since Fairfax was essentially a pacification operation, US and ARVN

battalions were instructed to support the district chief and work for him.

The rationale behind this was that operations would be no better than the

intelligence provided by the district chief and he was in fact the government representative in the area. This cooperation was achieved through

the establishment of .an Area Security Coordination Council (ASCC) which

was composed of the American and Vietnamese battalion commanders and the

district chief. These principals met every few days to plan and coordinate

the overall effort. The ADCC had no chairman or executive authority. All

decisions were, therefore, based on mutual agreement or compromise. In

essence, thaese meetings were the-means of formalizing decisions before

cach of the three members issued orders through his own chain of command.

Other innovations in cooperation and coordination were the creation

of a Combined Intelligence Center (CIC) and a Civic Action Coordination

Center (CACC) which were in fact subcommittees of the ASCC and assisted

the latter in matters concerning intelligence and civic actions. To

motivate and gain the cooperation of the many different Vietnamese and

American agencies involved, the US battalion S-2 served as the spearht-ad

of the new combined intelligence effort which included the ARVN Battalion

S-2, the district S-2 and Military Security Service, and the GVN combat

police. The CACC was composed of the S-5s of the district and US battalion, the ARVN battalion and USAID representatives. The entire effort

relied on voluntary cooperation. The CIC was in effect an attempt

to organize a clearing house for the flow of various intelligence inputs.

Its product was diqtributed to all members involved. Two helpful byproducts of this effort were the creation of a combined interrogation

section and a combined intelligence reaction force whose success greatly

enhanced cooperation and enthusiasm.

The method of operation was a mixture of cross-attachment, pair-;off,

and integration. Since both battalions had four organic rifle companies,

a company from each battalion was placed in direct support of the other

battalion and vice-versa. The attached company was further broken down

by exchanging platoons with the remaining two componies of the battalion.

Ou many occasions, ARVN, RF, PF and US squads worked together. An

- 131

i 77
additional area of emphasis was the requirement to provide maximum training

to the district RP and PF units. This was accomplished by placing at

least two PF soldiers in every American squad on a continuing basis.

The size of operations varied greatly. Several operations each

month involved all eight rifle companies. On the other hand, combined

platoons often conducted independent missions away from their parent units.

Movement was by foot, helicopter and boat. While daylight operations were

not normally smaller than platoon size, the basic unit for night ambushes

was the combined squad. Under this system, the two battalions could

saturate the district with over forty ambushes on a given night.

Specialized operations were also a part of the overall effort. Each

week the intermixed units carefully cordoned and searched various villages

in cooperation with district police forces. After several months experience

and after the enemy main force units suffered heavy 'casualties, Fairfax

forces shifted emphasis to small unit antiguerrilla tactics. This effort

was a marked success. By breaking down into many small units and by moving

constantly, the combined unit practically saturated the area of operation

and effectively deterred enemy movement and resupply throughout the

districts. Another tactic contributing to the success of Fairfax operation

was the concentration of both day and night operations around selected

villages identified as main sources of enemy subsistence. Also coordinated

with saturation patrols and selective operations was the use of aroundthe-clock harassment and interdiction artillery fire and air strikes on

the inaccessible enemy base areas which in fact drove the enemy either

-away from or into thle area of infantry operations or into ambushes.

A movement control system was also initiated which designated -certain

key areas as off limits either to all movement, movement by sampans or

motorized sampans, or movement without a special pass during curfew hours

or even during daytime. Despite its military effectiveness, this movement control sometimes had to be suspended or modified in the interests

of the local people who were in general farmers, workers, or merchants.

A training program for both the ARVN battalion and the RF-PF units

went aloug concurrently with field operations. The battalion training

program began at squad level and culminated in a battalion test administered

by the American battalions. The three battalions of the 5th Ranger Group -

132

NI ......
completed training in September and then were given a five-day concluding

evaluation exercise. By November, all units were rated combat ready and

as of December, the 5th Ranger Group assumed responsibility for military

operations in the CMD with only a small US advisory element. To upgrade

RF and PF units, US battalions tried a number of methods. First, there

was a limited version of the Marine CAP concept. An American squad moved

into a RF-PP outpost for a period of from two to four weeks. During the

* day, American and Vietnamese worked together to rebuild defensive positions

* using American materials following a joint plan approved by the district

chief. In addition, the US squad gave weapons traininS and conducted

practice firing. At night Americans and Vietnamese set up joint ambushes.

Later the 199th Brigade formed Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) which moved

throughout the province assisting both RF-PF units and RD cadre teams.

Judged from the results obtained, there was no doubt that Fairfax

operation was a success. It was the result of extensive planning and it

received direct attention from 'the USMACV commander himself. The overall

objective was achieved since security in Gia Dinh province improved

remarkably. Over a thousand enemy were killed and 40 chose to

return to our side. Enemy activity in general was severely disrupted

although his infrastructure was not affected in any serious way. His

efforts to reestablish his once-strong influence in the area surrounding

SSaigon, especially in Binh Chanh district, were largely negated.

The Fairfax operation lasted about one year. Over this period of time.

it did produce a dramatic change, but a guarantee of long term results

could not be expected. It generated a favorable mood of cooperation

between US and ARVN units and also between ARVN units, th3 RF-PF, and

the people. ARVN and RF-PF units performance improved markedly as a

result of the example set by US battalions, their close association with

the US battalions, the exchange of combat units, and the sharing of

abundant American resources. They performed their mission well but were

still not fully committed to the people. By contrast, US units developed

good rapport with the local population,whom they zealously helped through

civic actions. There were some reasons which could explain this apparent

paradox. A major reason was that requests Lo assist the farmer, who

1133

OW.. a~~...
probably lived better than the ARVN dependent, was not a reasonable demand

in the ARVN soldier's eyes. Many of them wondered why they were not the

ones to be assisted instead. Also ARVN units had very few resources with

which to carry out civic actions. There were also the problems of ARVN

leadership and discipline that probably would take a long time to be

resolved and this depended on the dedication and examples of higher command

leadership. In the special case of Fairfax, the US units proved that they

could work well with the people and obtain their confidence over a period

of time. The fiue conduct of American troops perhaps was a backlash for

their ARVN counterparts since it showed how differently they behaved.

On the negative side, first of all, there was no single chain of

command. The ASCC was a good coordinating structure but did not provide

for clear-cut command and control. Decisions were coupromises between

the individual interests of the US battalion commander, his ARVN counterpart and the district chief. The interplay of their personalities was

the key to success. The critical factor in this arrangement was the

district chief who was the junior in military rank, yet seemed to enjoy

a greater power.than the ARVN battalion commander. The CIC, although an

excellent concept at the district level, was plagued by the scarcity of

trained and qualified intelligence personnel. There was also the language

problem which resulted in more time spent for planning, coordination, and

execution and, not infrequently, in outright misunderstandings. The lack

of interpreters at lower level combined units such as platoons and squads

also impeded the joint effort to some extent.

In short, the Fairfax approach was not as permanent as the Marine

CAP, and the relocation of US wults was deemed somewhat premature. Here

again, as elsewhere, American presence, initiative, drive, and resources

were Instrumental in gaining success, for a time. The permanent danger

was that the ARVN had become psychologically and materially too dependent

on Americans.

134 C

"JL-
i

M"e Pair-Off Concept

The pair-off concept was instituted in II Corps Tactical Zone in the

wake of the enemy 1968 Tet offensive as an offspring of the "oue war"

concept then embraced by HACV. Prior to this time, cooperation and

coordination in II CTZ, in particular during the enemy offeysive, was rather

spasmodic and ineffective. The US I Field Force and ARVN I Corps usually

operated separately, each concerned with and confined to its own

responsibilities. While US forces sought out and fought enemy jamn force

units in outlying areas of the central highlands, II Corps forces generally

limited their activities to pacification support in th' lowlaid coastal

areas and populated centers. This was a reasonable division of tasks

given the rugged and sprawling terrain and the relative ineffectiveness

of ARVN units at that time.

It was then decided that since enemy forces, whether regular or

local, were but one, the war effort should also be one. The key to success

was now to'exploit effectively the advantages of each national force while

minimizing its disadvantages. To US forces, it was like fighting with

blindfolds because the enemy was hard to distinguish. Hence, they preferred to keep to their own areas of operation. ARVN units, by contrast,

knew the enemy and the terrain well but could not sustain combat for a

lengthy duration, nor could they effectively platu and employ US combat

support assets. Besides, accustomed as they were to the brushfire actions

of pacification support, there was no way they could get off the ground and

look the enemy main force units squarely in the face.

The pair-off concept thus came about as a means to upgrade ARVN combat

effectiveness and prepare ARVN units for a larger share of the combat

burden. It was decided that each ARVN unit was to be closely and continually

affiliated with a US counterpart unit and that operations were to be con-

.. ,. ducted jointly, regardless of the size each force could commit. Coordination

and cooperation were effected throughout the hierarchy from Corps to

battalions and districts. Each month, the commanders of It Corps, IFFV

and ROK forces and their staffs convened in a tripartite meeting during

which the military situation was reviewed, problems discussed and resolved,

and the objectives laid out for the following month in accordance with the

135

... _ _u

• .: - , .,.•. •, • ... .-...- •;. • ....
MACV-JGS Combined Campaign Plan. The three commanders took turns in

chairing the meetings. Despite the great distance between II Corps and

IFFV headquarters, located at Pleiku and Nha Trang respectively,

Lieutenant General W. R. Peers, commander of IFFM made almost daily trips

to II Corps headquarters. In addition, there were also periodic meetings

of the various staff agencies of the three nations and daily contact and

communications between them. Lieutenant General Lu Lan, commander of II

Corps and Major General Choe, then Deputy, ROK Field Forces were in total

accord with the pair-off concept. The "one war" concept pervaded the

thinking and actions of all commanders and forces within II CTZ.

During the period of.time the pair-off concept was implemented three

significant combined combat operations were conducted almost simultaneously

in II CTZ: BINH TAY/MACARTHUR in the Chu Pa foothill area, DAN THAWG/McLAIN

in Binh Tuy province, and DAN SINH/COCHISE in Binh Dinh province. (Map 8)

Save for the Chu Pa campaign which was in effect aimed at destroying the r NVA 24th Regiment in its base area, the other two operations were conducted

primarily to assist the pacification effort in populated areas. The

strategic objective of II Corps during that period was to, expand government control of the population. Its efforts achieved spectacular gains

by October 1968 when 95% of the population were reported living in A, B or

C, i.e. secure, hamlets. The disposition and mission of each of Il Corps major

subordinate command was as follows: the 22d Division was supporting

pacification in its area of operations (Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Phu Bon)

with emphasis on populous Binh Dinh province; the 23d Division, in an

economy of force role, was conducting pacification and security operations

in defense of major population centers throughout its vast area of

opeiations (Darlac, Quang Duc, Lam Dong, Tuyen Duc, Biuh Thuan and Ninh

Thuan provinces); the 24th Special Tactical Zone was providing security

in support of pacification in the populated areas of Kontum province,

generally along National route QL-14; US forces under IFFII included the US

4th Infantry Division, headquartered at Pleiku, the 173d Airborne Brigade

(separate) at Bong Son (Binh Dinh province) and Task Force South, a

brigade-size unit at Phan Thiet.

136 (
PAIR-OFF II CTZ Senior Comanders Conference at Headquarters, IFFV

in Nha Trang, July 1968. Sitting from left to right: HG Lu Lan, CG,

II Corps; LTG William R. Peers, CG., IFFV; and MG Choon Shik Imv CG.,

ROK Forces, II CTZ.

DONG TIEN Joint Tactical Operations Centers, lot Brigade, US let Air

Cavalry Division and ARkIN 2d Air~borne Brigade. located in Tay Ninh,

III CTZ, December 1969.

137
MAP S.-PAIR-OFF OPERATIONS, It CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

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DAN SINN

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MACARTHUR 2

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24Th $72 X 22

PLEIKU UNn

Hsu Son

24 P4

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Ban Me Thuot 2

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QUANG TIJYEN

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44234

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;&8 Lo(9
1. DAN TW•G/MCLAIN Operation

This was considered, the best example of the pair-off concept in action.

Conducted on 1 August 1968, the operation combined forcO.s of US Task Force

South (2 battalions and 1 armor cavalry squadron) and those of the 23d

ARVN Division (44th, 53d Regiments and 2d Ranger Group). The area of

operation covered the northern part of Binh Thuan province and part of

) - Lam Doug Province. The units collocated their command posts to simplify

coordinating plans and operations. Bilingual operational plans and orders,

situation reports, and briefings were used throughout. -Combat support,

including artillery, tactical air, and aviation was shared, based on

tactical requirements. Of particular interest was the emphasis on naval

gunfire support which was provided by the USS New Jersey for a six-day

period. in late October. RF and PF units were frequently integrated into

operations and worked closely with ARVN and US units. In September, for

example, one company of the US 3d Battalion (Abn) conducted a six-day

i I combined operation with the 444th RF Company, including a combat assault.

During two multi-battalion operations conducted by the 3d Battalion

(Abn) and the 2d ARVN Ranger Group, the respective command posts were

collocated to facilitate coordination and control. The collocation of

command posts and combined operations provided a good opportunity for

ARVN troops, staffs and commanders to observe their counterparts at work

in performing their respective tasks. This served to some extent to inspire

our commanders, staffs and troops to learn by trying to do the same, but

that was not enough. Perhaps, by operating alongside US units, they

became more confidbnt as-a result of the lavish combat support they could

* obtain. But the most important result of the pair-off concept in this

combined operation was increased and more sustained ARVN participation

in combat operations. This, perhaps, was made possible by a combined

effort at Corps and Field Force level.

2. DAN SINKI-COCHISE Operation

Operation Dan Siah-Cochise began on 22 August 1968 as a coordinated

effort involving elements of the ARVN 22d Division and the US 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate). It was planned in three phases. Phase I vas

a search and clear operation to clear enemy forces from the operational

area, northeastern Binh Dinh province. Phase 2 was a detailed search of

* I 139

iJ iii-i .--. -.
the area including screening and classification of all the civilian population. Phase 3, a saturation phase, continued with US and ARVN forces

operating in the area to deny the return of NVA-VC forces, to develop the

confidence of the population in the government and ARVN units. and to protect the population from enemy harassment and exploitation. This operatiod

was significant for two reasons. It was a completely combined and

coordinated operation, at times involving three ARVN and three US

battalions; it was also the first time US forces participated in a

pacification support operation in a populated area of II CTZ, in keeping

with the stepped up pacification effort.

3. BINH TAY/MCARTHUR Operation

This was a combined ARVN-US operation launched to counter the threat

posed by the NVA 24th Regiment which was reported to have infiltrated in

the Chu Pa mountains, northwest of Pleiku, toward the end of December

1968. The commander of the 24th Special Tactical Zone confirmed this

information through a returnee. To preempt the enemy action, a combined

operation was planned for January 1969 in the Chu Pa area. The mission

was to defeat the enemy in the base area and to destroy his supplies.

The operation was initiated on 4 January 1969 as battalions of the ARVN

42d Regiment on a reconnaissance in force mission began making daily

contacts with elements of the NVA 24th Regiment.

In the subsequent phase of the operation, ARVN battalions provided

a blocking force while US battalions from the US 4th Infantry Division

air-assaulted into the area and began sweeping in an effort to drive

the enemy out of his dug-in'positions toward the waiting ARLIN forces.

The operation ended on 28 February 1969 when the enemy withdrew into

Cambodia. It was clearly a success since it preempted the enemy spring

offensive in 1I CUZ.

In addition to combined operations, a new advisory concept, designated the

Comba- Assistance Team (CAT) was formulated and tested by the Advisory Group

of the ARVN 22d Divisioa In August 1968. The test demonstrated that the

propoaed coucept improved ARVN leadership and initiative and increased the

ARV, capability for making independent use of US cembat support assets.

Accordingly, CO.USMACV granted each Corps Senior Advisor the authorit- t.

organitZe advisory elements under the CAT concept. Subsequent evaluation

.................................. ......
S-i

however, indicated that ARVN improvement was not as significant as anticipated,

and that substantial advisory assistance was still required. In Intelligence,

under the pair-off concept, it was suggested by the Comnnder, IF"V, that each

ARVN unit monitor should keep tra&. of a specific VC unit but the idea

proved difficult to implement. A substantial Improvement was achieved, however, by ARYN artillery units as a result of the Associate Battery Program.

US units provided survey data to ARVN units and assisted in the training of

forward observers, fire direction center personnel, and gun section crew.

Also, assieting the II Corps artillery advisor, were two artillery combat

assistance teams (ACAT), one designated ACAT North assisting ARVN artillery

units in the 22d Division tactical area and the 24th STZ, and the other ACAT

South, assisting ARVN artillery units in the 23d Division tactical area.

There was no doubt that the pair-off concept, as seen through the above

examples, brought about some measure of improvement and confidence among

ARVN units. It was unfortunate that the program could not be sustained beyond 1969. Despite the temporary achievements, the fundamental, persistent,

and most debilitating weakness of ARVN was the lack of strong leadership

at all levels. US efforts to help ARVN forces overcome th1.• problem were,

in general, uot too successful. Another weakness was poor and hiphazard

staff work, particularly at division and lower levels. This obviously

stemmed from poor training and lack of demanding leaders. Coordination

and cooperation, finally, depended on the examples set by higher levels

of com-and. The problem was best su=ed up by Lieutenant General Lu Lan,

commander of 11 Corps, wheu he said. "If at the top level, we don't coordinate, how do we e3pect coordination at lower lovels?"'

Do crxg~e Zgther') ogxZVM

Operation W).ng Tien uas a short-term test program which called for

the close association of ARVN LII Corps snd US 11 Field Force units on a

continuing basis in specific areas of III CTZ. It was a program jointly

initiated by the co~azder of III Corps and the caunder of Ut Field Forces.

F Th•e program began on I July and lasted through the ra•iy esason of -969.

Actually, it was soe-what opea-eaded with an underlyiug concept that as an

ARMN battalion reached a satisfactory level of combat effectiveness, it u--

'phased out of the program and returned to indepeaenst operations.

l1,

. 0' 
Three major goals that III Corps and I1 Field Force attemipted to

achieve through Don& Tien were:

1. to increase the quantity and quality of combined and coordinated

joint operations;

2. to materially advance the three major ARM misslons: support

of pacification, improvement of combat effectiveness, and intensificatlon

of combat operations;

3. to effect a significant increase in the efficiency of utilizing

critical combat and combat support elements, particularly AMy Aviation

assets.

Underlying these self-improvement goals was the objective of veakening

the enemy at all levels so that on the one hand, his local forces could be

controlled by the RP-PF and PSDF, and on the other, major ARVN and US

forzes could conduct combined and coordinated operations against NVA main

force units in their base areas such as War Zones C and D during the dry

season. To achieve this objective, the effectiveness of RF-PF and PSDF

* should be improved to the extent that they could assume the tasks being

performed by ARVN units assigned to rural development and static security

missions, thereby releasing ARM units for mobile operation3.

Within UII Corpa Tactical Zone, Dong Tien areas and asaociated AR.-US

units were asoigued as foollows: ,;p 9)

Area Province ARVN U

"I Biuh Long and 5th Inf. Division & lot Cav. Division (AN)

Mhoe Long provincial. forces

Z Binh Duoug 5th Wnf. Division & lac Ini Division

proviocial, forces

3 Long ULah and 18th %nf. Division & 199th 4igb laf. Ede

B.tih Tuy provincial forces

4 Phuac Tuy 18th Inf. Division 6 Ist Atatra..ian Task

provincial forced Force

ItE FMORCEV Circular NNuber 525-1. 26 Jtue 1969, Jointly signed by

Lieuten~wt General Juliap 3. Eweil, GG, I flrC•RV, an Lieutena•t

1G.fteral 00 C&o Tni, CO. III carps &W 1.I Ctz.

SC I

Iii I I.. . . ~
x0

U..

zz

V.3 I c

~0

00

3j x

t~It

x x

I * .
Area Province ARVN us

5 Long An 25th Inf. Division (46th & 3d Bde, 9th Inf

59th. Regiments) & provincial Division

forces

6 Hau Nghia 25th Inf. Division (49th Regi- 25th Inf. Division

ment) & provincial forces

7 Tay Ninh ARVN general reserve units 25th Inf. Division

and provincial forces

This assignment reflected no change in the deployment and disposition

of ARVN and US forces. Dong Tien areas were the usual areas of operation

to which units of both forces had been assigned. Dong Tien was also a

short range training and test program designed to get ARVN units off the

ground by the end of the rainy season. The procedures established by III

Corps and II FFORCEV for the implementation of the program pointed to the

usual formula of coordination and cooperation. In fact, in each Doug Tien

area, ARVN and US division commanders would appoint a senior area coordinator responsible for coordinating all aspects of military operations.

Coordination, it was clearly stated, would usually be done at sector/

regiment/brigade level. Also, It was understood that ARYN and US commanders

each retained their full command responsibilities. Coordination at CorpsField Force level was much 'mre informal as the program was essentially

de~centralized to and conducted at division-separate brigade and sector level.

However, the two senior commanders, by lending the program the force of orders

and their personal attention, kent it moving forward.

In actual implementation of the Dong Tien program, a number of methods

of operations were'devised and tested at each level. In the area of the

ARVN 5th and US 1st Divisions (Biub Duong province), for example, an area

Combined Coordination Center was established at Beu Cat to receive reports

from both ARVM and US units and acted as the cat.lyst for the lateral

flow of information between US brigades and ARVN regiments, Every eveniug

a combined staff briefing was given to both AR"N and US commanders with

counterpart staff briefings following each other. These mutual briefings

ultimately led to jointly conceived operationn. The two divisions also

"orgaulzed a Combined Strike Force (CSF) at Phu Van, consisting of one

US and one ARVIN compauy under the command of a US major. But the concept

did not work and the CSF was disbanded.

144

N .- ..- - . • _ . . . . • ..- ÷
IIR

FAIRFAX Operation, Gia Dinh province. An integrated US-ARVN

combat team heading hack to base camp after an all-night ambush

patrol,

i14

•:.-•145

' t .- . . , .
t)

DONG TIEN Commanders planning an operation (Left to right: Col. Robert

Haldane, CO, 3d brigade, US 1st Inf. Div.; Col. Le NIguyen Vy, CO, 8th

Rgt., ARVN 5th Inf. DIiv.; LTC Maurice Price, Senior Adviser, 8th ARVN

"Rg.; and Cpt. Chau Minh Kien, CO, 1-8 Battalion).

146

-- ,
At regiment/brigade level, the usual method used was to collocate

an A•MV battalion in the same Fire Support Base with a US battalion.

Then the two battalions conducted planned combined operations from the

FSB and in the area around it. In some instances, the ARVN battalion

was prepared to assume complete responsibility for a certain FSB. In

the FSB, the battalion TOCs might be either integrated, or combined or

just collocated. Each of the methods used offered some advantages and

the same number of disadvantages but the best was perhaps collocated

TOCs. There were a few instances where units did not share the same

f;. FSB but cross-attached a liaison group at each CF. This was an arrangement which provided few advantages. In field operations, battalions

usually used the method of the "dual company" with a combined CP, a

method which offered the most advantages for the ARVN battalion. In

the dual company method, platoons might or might not be cross-attached.

In a few instances, companies were cross-attached in a battalion-level

operation, but this was not an effective method since the AlRN battalion

commander did not have the experience needed to handle a US Company. At

the company level, platoons were usually cross-attached or they might

operate as dual units. The same applied to squads.

In general, the dual concept appeared to work best at company level,

since it offered an opportunity to develop the leadership capabilities

of ARVN company commanders and at the same time provided maximum US support

for the ARVN unit, while minimizing the loss of unit integrity. Combined

with cross-attached platoons and squads, it was perhaps an excellent

method to upgrade the combat effectiveness of the ARVN company, provided

the two US and ARVM companies were associated on a continuing basis for

a reasonable period of time. In terms of control and coordination, the collocation of CPs at battalion and company level was proved to be advantageous

since it offered a maximum exposure to US staff and command procedures and

maximum opportunities for coordination and cooperation. Disadvantages

existed, however, in that ARVN commanders might be seli-couscious of their

own deficiencies and became dependent on US initiative.

The Dong Tien program definitely improved the combat effectiveness of

ARVN units throughout III Corps although it was short-lived. The 8th

AS. .~ - 4 . V 147.
Regiment, 5th Infantry Division, for example, eliminated over 100 enemy

per month in its area of operation, a threefold increase over the pre-Dong

Tien period. As an ARVN unit showed definite. signs of improvement, it was

taken out of the program and assigned a separate AO of its own. The program's

most eloquent result lay in the fact that, during 1970, III Corps units

were able to successfully conduct independent operations striking into enemy

base areas, and most particularly into Cambodia, with relatively little

assistance from US forces. Many basic problems still plagued the ARVN at

low level units, such as weak leadership, lack of planning know-how and the

inability to effectively use combat support assets. In general, the better

commanders benefited most; some of the others, while making progress, did not

do as well. On balance, however, there was a general improvement in aggressiveness, better coordination, and more sustained combat effort.

Swmuaru and Ez"a~uation

Four different concepts and programs have been presented as approaches

attempted by US forces to improve the regular ARVN combat effectiveness

and upgrade the local RF-PF units. They have been selected over others

for the reason that each effort was conducted in a different Corps Tactical

Zone. Two of these efforts focused on .low-level territorial units and took

place in relatively populated areas. The two others, meanwhile, concentiated on regular ARVN units and took place in outlying areas. Perhaps the

overall objective attempted by MACV when it directed and encouraged these

efforts also encompassed a variety of purposes. This objective was reflected

in its "lone war" concept which purported, in effect, to be the answer to the

enemy's "total war" and which was in line writh the RVN strategy.

One of the key aspects of the Vietnam war that frequently escaped the

minds of some ailitary leaders was that it was a double war, one that

was fought by main forces in a conveiutional manner, and the other waged

at the grass roots level with local forces and guerrillas. The enemy

was but one, whether on- may choose to label him Viet Cong or NVA; he

was the Vietnamese Cowunist, regardless of where he was born or trained.

The arbitrary distinction between VC and NVA, however academically

justified, was just a fallacy; and it served ý.he myth perpetuated

by the enemy that none of the NVA troops was in South Vietnam. The respouse

... j 148

, Z.-7I 
to this double war was obvious; a double eJfort was to be made to eliminate

the enemy at two different levels, in two different environments, and by

two different approaches,

* :This was the rationale behind pacification and the upgrading of

territorial forces on the one hand and the sharpening and strengthening

of regular ARVN forces on the other. The strategy was both sound and

necessary. All programs seemed to work for a certain time; their limited

goals were all achieved, sometimes beyond expectations.

The Combined Action Program, for example, gave as good results as

anyone could expect. It operated on the same tactical mobility principle

of elusiveness that the enemy used so effectively. It presented a credible

permanence that fostered the kind of popular rapport and allegiance that

was needed to defeat the enemy's own kind of "people's war." It was

finally instrumental in bringing about a strengthening of our own infrastructure while denying the enemy the very environment in which he usually

prospered.

Discontinuing the program in favor of the less expensive MAT program

seemed not to be well justified. What did two or three thousand Marines, or

even more, really cost in terms of manpower as compared to the hundreds of

thousands committed? There is little doubt that the CAP program was a positive

influence and that the MAT program was less effective. One can only assume

that US authorities felt they could not afford the personnel resources to

implement CAP on a nation-wide basis.

> The Fairfax operation achieved practically the same results as the CAP

program, although on a smaller scale. Its success was made possible perhaps

due to the personal attention of COMUSMACV hiumself. Besides, Saigon was an

area of great importance to everyone concerned. "It must succeed," was

the only explanation the COMUSKACV gave. The pair-off concept in 11 Corps

CTZ, meanwhile, was not as successful as expected, perhaps because it came

about too belatedly and was uot sustained for a longer period. The terrain :1 •was rugged and too large even for the combined forces of three nations.

Cooperation at lower levels was lukewarm at best, given the lack of interest

at division level.

The Dqng Tien program, by contrast, was a more complex enterprise

which succeeded remarkably despite its iew months of existence. The dual

149
and cross-attachment arrangement at lower levels seemed to be the

answer to the problem of effective cooperation and coordination. But it

attested to the infeasibility of joint command at these levels, given

the natural tendency of every ARVN leader to be his own boss.

Association with and exposure to US methods and initiative, however,

brought to the surface many ARVN inherent weaknesses and deficiencies.

Some of them were just differences in methods, culture, or way of life.

Others were either technical or procedural problems that could easily

be disposed of by more specialized and intensive training. Still others

were human and difficult to resolve in the short term. The key to

success in every human endeavor is of course people. In coordination

and cooperation, personalities played the dominant role. Unless both

comuanders were willing to play the game and forsake their interest

to a degree, there was no way to foster a genuine working relationship.

Americans were usually impatient with ARVN lethargic work habits.

Given their one-year tour, it was understandable that they always tried to

get the most out of it. Vietnamese, meanwhile, felt they had all the

time they needed. After all, they might well spend the rest of their

lives with this war.

Poor planning was one of the most glaring ARVN deficiencies. It

was even more acute at regiment and battalion levels. Perhaps lack of

training was responsible for it; perhaps the quality and limited number of

personnel available at these levels did not permit effectiveness in staff work.

But the primary reason, however, seemed to be the lack of aggressive and

demanding coannauders. ARVN commanders at these levels, it was usually

admitted, fought battleo without tactics, relying primarily on their

own personal methods. In addition, the ARMN colander was everything

In the unit. His staff had little, if anything to say. It was the

comander who decided every thing, told them what to do, where and

when to go, and how to run the complete operation. And when he was

4 absent, very little could be accomplished.

Finally, it was widely accepted that leadership was a perennial

problem for ARVN at every level of its hierarchy. This problem was so

extensive and so deeply rooted that it is difficult to explain thoroughly

150 C
within the scope of this monograph, Suffice i.t to say that unless a

comander or leader had professional competence, devotion, and moral

rectitude, he certainly could not expect his subordinates to be dedi-

* • cated and aggressive. The basic IngredIents that were usually found

lacking were: motivation and aggressiveness. Perhaps the passive and

resilient nature of the Vietnamese could not produce the all-pervasive,

gung-ho type of tigers of whom Westerners were so proud. In the context of an ideological conflict, there were certain other qualities

that perhaps counted more in the eyes of the Vietnamese, qualities

that were more ethical, more ipiritual in nature. Perhaps lack of

political awareness, and the social and economic degeneration due to the

. war were at the root of the problem, too. Whatever the causes, the problem

certainly could not be solved in a year or two. There was finally the

will and determination to fight, which again depended on motivation and

leadership, and without which there was no sense in upgrading mere physical

capabilities.

d 151

. '
CHAPTER VI

Some Considerations Affecting RVNAF Performance

Expansion of the US Territorial Advisory System

As the pace of the US combat force build-up quickened after 1965,

the advisory effort also expanded and developed at a rapid tempo. It was

a dual effort by the United States to help build stronger regular forces

to combat enemy main force units on the one hand and to assist South

Vietnam to consolidate its governmental base so that effective control

could be exercised throughout the national territory on the other. These

two objectives were closely related. As has been said in the previous

chapter, the war in Vietnam was a dual war which had to be fought on two

different levels by two different approaches. While .the destruction of

enemy main force units required large-scale operations and the deployment

of sizable units and resources, the task of helping South Vietnam consolidate its government demanded that security be provided at the village

and hamlet level. Concurrently, as security improved, an expansion of

the RVN influence and control was deemed necessary. These are areas

where US advisory and assistance contribution were most beneficial.

The US involvement in South Vietnam began soon after the 1954 Geneva

Accords with an advisory effort but this effort existed only at the high- 7

est level, in training centers and in major units. It emphasized primarily

training and helping the ARMN reorganize its units. In 1959, when the

military situation began to deteriorate, advisory teams were sent to

infantry regiments and separate battalions in the combat arms of the Army

such as Artillery and Armor, and in the Marines. The mission of these

teams was to provide immediate assistance And also to evaluate the

effectiveness. of the advisory effort. Infantry battalions were assigned

advisovy teams for the first time in 1961. Also at that time each

152

!
province was assigned a US adviser whose mission was to assist the

province chief' and sector commander in administrative as well as tactical

duties. This new interest in territorial matters was perhaps due to the

fact that the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps began to develop substantially during that time. Then in 1964, in an effort to effectively

help the government of South Vietnam exercise control over the entire

national territory, provincial advisory teams were increased and a limited

effort was made to expand the advisory system down to subsector or district

level during April and May 1964. This expansion was not systematic,

however; it was designed to test the feasibility and efficiency

of the advisory effort at that level. In the initial stage, MACV assigned only thirteen advisory teams, each composed of an officer and an

enlisted man, to districts surroumding Saigon. After just one month of

¶ trial, there were definitely encouraging signs of success. As a result,

100 additional teams of five men each, including two officers, were

rapidly deployed to selected districts during the period from September

to December of the same year. 'During the next two years, 1965 and 1966,

additional advisory teams were made available and by the end of 1966,

almost all districts throughout the country enjoyed the presence of au

advisory team. 1

As of 1966, in view of the rapid expansion of territorial forces,

MACV organized Mobile Advisory Teams (MAT) to work with RF and PF units

at the village and hamlet level. By 1968, the US territorial advisory

system was well established and functioning as a comprehensive and elaborate organization at the province level. (Chart 9)

The prlimary mission assigned to advisory teams at province or district

level was:

1. To advise and assist the province chief or district chief and

his staff in all matters pertaining to the counter-insurgency

effort, the pAcification and development program, and the operation of a miliýry campaigu. I

i"n some provinces and districts, US Special Force teams acted a3

advisors.

I I

, /! 153
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2. To assist US and ARVN regular units located in the area or

coming from other areas in the fulfillment of their mission.

3. To provide liaison between US units and the province chief or

district chief and his staff.

By the very complexity and nature of advisory duties at the province

or district level, there was a need to integrate the military and civilian effort in the advisory team. As a result, territorial advisory

teams consisted of both military and civilian personnel who were selected

among those more experienced in military and adminisraraive matters.

The composition and strength of each team, however, depended on security

and political requirements of each particular locality. This afforded

flexibility in organization and a more efficient use of advisory personnel. As a rule, if the senior adviser was a military officer, his deputy

was a civilian and vice versa. At the district level, however, since

their mission was heavily oriented toward territorial security, most

senior advisers were military officers.

What frustrated the advisory effort most at the territorial level

was the poorly-organized, under-staffed Sector (Province) or District

headquarters. The lack of qualified and capable cadres in these staffs

was a serious handicap. A Sector headquarters was authorized a strength

of 183, including 32 officers, if the aggregate strength of RF and PF

units in the province was more than 10,000. A Subsector (District) headi.•..quarters was only authorized 38 men. including nine officers. if the. total

strength of PF unit- irn the district was more than 1,500. It was obvious

O aat at the province level, the Sector headquarters was barely able to

control and effectively employ a force whose strength approximated that

of a dlvision. AS * result, RF ajd PF units were getter4ly poorly led

and iaeffectively ezployed in the all-encompassing task- of providial;

territorial security. this ineffectiveness gradually eroded the coaftdance of the local population.

"Contrary to the usual uneasiness that A.ericans fellt, the presence

J* of US advisers .iin provinces and particularly In districts causedlittle

"adverse psychological iLpact awoag the population. Canversely, it

was this )=erican presence that created coniidence in and prestige for

135

S-,..
the local government. Through the devoted advisory and assistance effort,

many of the basic needs of the population were usually met and territorial

forces were kept in fairly good shape. US territorial advisers usually

spent half of their time on civilian affairs and the rest was devoted to

cie military effort. In this regard, military advisers provided very

effective assistance to Sector and Subsector headquarters. Their contributions were particularly significant in the implementation of defense

and of pacification and development plane, as well as in operations and

"in the employment, training, administration, and logistic support for

RF and PF units.

As a result of this advisory and assistance effort, territorial command

and control became more effective and the operation of Sector and Subsector

headquarters became more systematic and efficient. '.cabat and logistic

support for RF and PF units also had fewer problems* &t the district

level, the advisory effort was even more beneficial; it helped bring about

a more rational distribution, employment, and control of RF and PF resources. In general, US territorial advisory teams were tremendously useful and efficient in problem-solving and rooting out ineria and complacency

at Sectors and Subsectors. Particularly, in view of the language barrier

and relative unfamiliarity of US personnel with local problems, the expansion of the US territorial advisory effort was a step in the right direction. Its achievements spoke for themselves. The improvement of RF and

PF combat effectiveness, however, was an enormous task which required

still more advisory effort and attention.

The U and PF were a sizable military force which tade up appro&Imately

one half of the total RVWAs trength. They consisted mostly of companies

and platoons scattered throughout the national territory with the difficult

and important mission of providing and maintainirng týrritorial security.

Tht RF and PF soldier served -n or mar the hamlet where he uas borv arid

grew up. He was fam-liar with the natural And social eaviron~eut and the

situation in the localty whcere he vas assigned to vork aad took an active

interest in improvirng its situatioo. Uasically, he was a good soldier

eadowed with resiliency ad endurance. Ko.ever, beine part of the

territor•al organization, he was placed =nder an intricate co=and

156'
and control system which generally inhibited his full development.

As the lowest echelon in the military hierarchy, RF and PF units

did not receive adequate training, equipment and support. Their

effectiveness when compared with ARVN units was low; they usually

came to be regarded as "poor cousins" by regular troops. Because

of these inhibitions and constraints, RF and PF units seldom achieved

a desired level of effectiveness. How, under those conditions, were

they able to provide security and support for the pacification

program, once US forces were redeployed and replaced by ARVN units?

-This was a major problem area that required a considerable effort of

improvement if the RVN strategy was to succeed because half of the

war was fought where the RF and PF were located.

Prior to 1968, there were no advisers with territorial units.

As MACV viewed it, the assignment of advisers to thousands of units

scattered throughout the country on a permanent basis was a difficult

"and costly proposition in terms of manpower and support. Any effort

to upgrade territorial forces necessarily depended on the initiative

and capabilities of US combat units operating in the locality; there

was no other practical solution.

During 1967, US Field Force commands initiated an upgrading

program for RF and PF units based on the mobile training concept.

US Mobile Training Teams (MTT), each consisting of from three to ten

members, were used in rotation among RF and PF units. The MTT mission

was to organize, train, and supervise these units until their performance was deemed satisfactory. Various names were given to these teams

and all indicated to some extent the nature of their mission, There

were, for example, Combined Mobile Training Teams, Combined Mobile

Improvement Teams, "Red Catcher" and Impact Teams, and Regional Forces

Company Trait.ing Teams. The advantage of this mobilA training concept

was the ability to provide training for a large number of units within

a reasonable time. But for that very reason, the time that a mobile

training team was able to spend with each unit was necessarily lim.:ted;

i . -"hence, the result.a achieved were also limited. Even with this econom ical

use of training manpower, the mobile treining program proved tostly iu US

157

--. _717, :, * - 4 d t• .- . , _ :.-' •• •

44 • "'''' 4'•"''• 4'• ..... -'II4" '• •-• -" '• • • •
personnel because the number of RP and PF units had increased considerably.

And when conducted separately, this training effort ran short of the

close coordination and cooperation which were required for any combined

effort to become a success.

During this period, the Joint General Staff also initiated its

own programs for improving the effectiveness of territorial forces

with the encouragement and assistance of MACV. Under these programs,

RF companies were rotated between field duties and training. They

underwent a 12-.week training program at National Training Centers

just like regular units. The advisory effort, meanwhile, turned to

the organization of RF company training advisory teams which were

test-deployed in all Corps Tactical Zones. Each team usually consisted

of three officers and three NCOs and was attached to a RF company

undergoing training at the National Training Center. Its mission was

to assist in training the company. After the formal training program

was completed, the team stayed with the company for a period from

six to nine months to follow up on its training until the company was

judged capable of independent operation. For all its merits, this

method of training failed to bring about significant results.

Finally in late 1967, drawing from previous experiences, MACV

initiated an extensive improvement program for territorial forces based

on the Mobile Advisory concept which had been successfully adopted by

II Field Force. This effort aimed at improving territorial forces in

all aspects: tactical operation, administration,and logistic support.

In addition to Mobile Advisory Teams, MACV also created Mobile Advisory

Logistical Teams (KALT) whose mission was to help upgrade the territorial

logistic organization and operation.

This large-scale improvemeot program was implemented in early 1968.

A total of 353 Mobile Advisory Teams was planned and by year end, they

had been deployed to all four Corps areas. Before their field deployment, these teams received training at the US Army Vietnam (USAkRV) Ad-

"viser School. Upon completion of training, they ware assigned to provinces with the mission oi upgrading RP and PF uairs by directly advising

158 (
and assisting their commanders. Each MAT consisted of two officers

(team chief and deputy), three E{ (one light weapons infantryman, one

heavy weapons infantry'an, and one medic), and one Vietnamese intlerpreter

The team usually lived with a RF and PF unit if the situation permitted.

Its members helped train the unit and accompanied it in operations.

Emphasis was placed on command and control, the conduct of operations,

particularly night operations, marksmanship, the use of mines and booby

traps, and the planning and control of fire support. After achieving

its goal of upgrading the territorial unit--which was usually done

within 30 days-the MAT moved to another unit and started the training

process again. From time to time, the team also revisited an old unit

to evaluate its progress and to provide assistance as required in order

to prevent the unit from deteriorating. A MAT eometimes worked with

a RF company and several PF units nearby -it the same time. The success

of Mobile Advisory Teams could be mea3ured by the improved capability

of the territorial forces to conduct independent operations with a

minimum of support from the outside.

During 1969, the MAT effort also assisted local governments in

expanding control, constructing more outposts in areas formerly under

* I enemy control, coordinating the use of fire support, and developing and

employing the command and control capabilities of RF Company Group

iHeadquarters. These were territorial tactical commands activated during

1968 under the control of Sector commanders. Each RF Company Group

Headquarters consisted of one commanding officer, his deputy, two officers

and three NCOs who made up three staff sections: operations, intelligence,

and training. The Headquarters was designed to exercise operational conIt .rol over a territorial force of approximately five RF companies or an

equivalent number of PF platoons. By 1970, when almost all RI company group

headquarters and companies had achieved substantial improveme-nt, the

MATs were redeployed to areas where village and hamlet security needed

t.o be improved, and where the local government control required consolidation. Their new mission focused on upgrading the Popular Forces,

S.raining and deploying the People's Self-Defense Forces, and coordinating

159

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!Pm:

A Mobile Advisory Team, 1lth US Armored Cavalry, instructing the

948th RF Company, 1968.

I.•.

Artillery Advisor and couLiterparL during drill

160

N7 %
activities of Rural Development cadres and the National Police. The

MATs also assisted in developing village defense systems which were

realistically tailored to local requirements. As the situation and

time permitted, the MATs also assisted, advised and encouraged village

chiefs to initiate and implement village self-development programs.

After several tests and trials covering a long period of time,

the MAT program was found to be the most effective and realistic

instrument for upgrading the combat capabilities of territorial forces.

An outstanding example of its success was the marked improvement brought

to the great mass of RF and PF units in the Mekong Delta, a sizable

but ineffective territorial force which had been plagued by lethargy

and indolence. Although the task was enormous and complex, MAT members

quickly adapted themselves to each situation, strove for innovative

ideas and unfailingly fulfilled their responsibility. Their presence

and assistance in the improvement of rural security brought confidence

to the population and prestige to the RVN government.

The role of territorial advisers was challenging and Interesting.

In time, it became one of the most important contributions made by

United States forces in South Vietnam. As long as the advisory effort

lasted, it helped improve the image of the RF and PF trooper, who, like

his communist adversary, could fight like a tiger if property motivaned

and led, but seldom did because he was not.

Attitude of H;'JYA Troopa Toward Amercana

The presence of Americans in South Vietnam no doubt accounted for

the pervasive confidence amoag the population and RVNAF troops that A final victotry would evenatually be- theirs, As far as the RVNAF were

concerned, Americans were either advisers, s=aritans, or comrades-inarms. This American standing prevailed no matter how ugly the Americans

were painted by Communist propa~anda. Very few people in South Vietnam

were suspicious of American good will and altruism.

The American involvement had a good start in the mid-fifties

when the US began to assist the development of the nascent Nlational

161

-~~~~.. -1.S Now" 
Army of Vietnam. Its goal then as always, was to make South Vietnamese

forces strong enough to defend their land and their people. It was

realized that without a strong native army, South Vietnam could hardly

defend itself against subversion and invasion from the north, regardless

of how many allies came to its assistance.

During its first few years of existence as an independent republic,

South Vietnam was able to stand firmly on its own due to American aid

and assistance, which also helped it build a viable military force.

Under the guidance, inspiration, and assistance of American advisers,

this military force gradually developed into the full-fledged Republic

of Vietnam Armed Forces, a source of pride and confidence for the nation.

In Saigon, staff members of the US Military Assistance Command acted as

advisers to their Vietnamese counterparts in the Joint General Staff in

matters pertaining to intelligence, plans, programs, and operations. In

the field, US advisers were permanently deployed to regular maneuver

battalions and as Mobile Assistance Teams roving among territorial forces.

In the initial stage of the war, however, these advisers were primarily

concerned with the distribution of war materiel and the training in its

handling and use. But when fighting escalated seriously, American advisers became increasingly involved in tactical and combat training for

units and in advising and assisting unit coimmanders in the conduct of

operations.

Despite its limitations in personnel, the advisory presence greatly

influenced a unit's performance. With only a few members, US advisers

did the best they could to take care of problems and they constantly

strove to help make the unit eftective. In addition to resources that

they could make available for operatioual requiremeats, their knowledge

of techniques, planning, and operations also contributed a great deal

to the successful accomplishment of the unit mission in several instances.

-I. The unit comander also benefited in many ways. The presence of advisors

acted in essence both as a catalyst that transformed and improved and

as a stimulant that spurred and activated both the unit and its

cot.ander. As a result, comnd and control at every ARVN echelon

became more effective and unit perfortance lazproved markedly.

162

-~ 777 
On the other hand, the presence of advisers in several cases stifled

the unit commander's initiative and downgraded his authority and

prestige. As a matteri of principle, an adviser exercised neither command

nor authority with regard to his counterpart; the relationship between the

two of them was necessarily based on mutual trust and respect. In almost all

cases, the adviser simply acted as an assistant to the unit commander;

in principle, he should restrict himself to that capacity.. But there

were instances that required the advisser to transcend his capacity and

practically take over in the name of the unit commander. This occurred

in a few units whose commanders were weak and indecisive in the face of

combat pressure. The power and influence of US advisers in the field

did tend to overshadow the role of Vietnamese unit commanders. For

example, activities of a unit tended to follow along the lines recommended by the adviser. In many instances, it was the adviser who won

the battle by calling in effective tactical air or firepower support

from US resources. This gradually produced over-reliance and sometimes

total dependence on US advisers. As a consequence, the initiative,

responsibility, and prestige that the unit commander usually wielded

were greatly affected and,over the long run, the presence of advisers

resulted in reduced opportunity for ARVN cadres to develop their command

capabilities and leadership.

When US combat units were introduced into South Vietnam to fight

the war, their role overshadowed the advisory effort because they held

the initiative on the battlefield and coordinated all military efforts.

As of this time, A•M• units began to keep close cntact with US units

through the intermediary of advisers. Their purpose waý to obtAin additional support from US resources to meet operational requireme.ts,

and, almost unfailingly, US units obliged by giving all that had beeu

requested. Because of the plentiful and sometimes lavish support

provided by US units the morale and comibat effectiveness of MRIN units

was very high. Later when called upon to participate in co.biued

".operatios wlth US forces, ARMW units appeared to enjoy th• opportunity

if onlv because of the dependable support they could always expect, In

time, they came to regard Americans as protectors and providers instead I

163

.. 7.
of advisers and comrades-in-arms.

The consequence of over-reliance on material assets as substitutes

for initiative and prowess was a failure to develop the infantryman's

capabilities to the full-the very qualities that distinguished the

Vietnamese soldier: endurance, perseverance, resiliency and manual

dexterity. Because they were organized and trained by US standards,

and exposed for a long time to US warfare methods, ARVN units inevitably

became accustomed to conducting operations with an abundance of supporting

material resources. The result was that when American presence and

assistance were no longer available, the morale and combat effectiveness of ARVN units became uncertain.

The Tendency to Let Americana Do rt Ati

The American military presence in South Vietnam, with its powerful

combat forces, its impressive array of resources and its Sigantir. bases,

really overshadowed the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. The Vietnamese

.people suddenly found their own military force shrunken to the size of

a midget. There was nothing in the RVNAF comparable to the awesome

might and modern assets which symbolized the "oemi:potent" posture of

the United States. Soon, they were convinced, Americans would deal the

insurgency a resounding defeat. Those were the first impressions

4P engendered by the initial buildup of US combat forces and their successful offensive campaigns to retake the areas that had been lost to

the enemy. At that time the Vietnamese were reassured and, by staking

total confidence in US might, they took little interest in the efforts

of the RVtwhich appeared in cheir eyes as insigaificant and superfici al.

Sha4 It was true that even the highest field comands, the ARVN Corps, only imited resources and limited capability. At best, they were

just capable of controlling territorial security activities and implementing short-term plans such as dry season or rainy 3iqsoa campaign plans,

and plans for the protection of rice crops, national resouftes, etc. Thoe

A were routine and undramatic plans which looked sore important in form

1-64

-,'-•..:~4 * -;- ----- -,
than in substance and which were renewed and repeated every year. Small

wonder that nothing substantial had ever been achieved through such operations. Corps comands almost never deployed and operated in the field

as tactical headquarters. They never had the opportunity nor the

requirement to operate in the field because operations were usually

conducted at the battalion or regiment level, or at the most and only

rarely, at division level. And most operations lasted only a short

time to allow units to return to their territorial duties to which they

were permanently tied.

'When US Field Forces began operation in Corps Tactical Zones, their

capabilities and combat posture practically turned each of them into a

key tactical command for the initiation and coordination of all military

efforts within its area of inLerest. For one thing, Field Forces had a

better grasp of the military situation and for another, almost all support resources were under their control. This operational practice

reflected and befitted the realities of this period and was deemed vital

for the integration of all military efforts to effectively counteract

an emergency situation. From a temporary arrangement dictated by

expediency, US Field Forces gradually became permanent. Their initiative,

responsiveness, and all-pervasive efficiency soon stifled the development

of ARVN operational capabilities at the tactical level. Soon, ARVN tactical

co~manders began to lose their combat initiative and became overly dependeut

on US forces for meeting major enemy initiatives. Gradually they lost interest

in the combat situation outside of pacification areas. It was as if the

war was beiag fought in a distant and alien world. AOVN comnauders had

little idea of what US forces were doig; US activities were after

all none of their busiuess. The passivity and lack of enthusiasm on

j ~the part of ARVN tactical commuanders resulted in a greater freedom of

action for US forces, first of all because ARVN units would not get io

their way and second. if they were called upon to cooperate, there was

otmuch they could coitribute to the joint effort.

During the period from 1965 to 1968, ARVN unlts performed oply a

secondary role which was wstly confined to the support of pacification.

US units, "eanwhile, were responsible for nearly'all combat operations

165
throughout the Corps areas. The less spectacular operations of ARVN units

earned them the unjustified criticism that they were not too concerned

with the combat situation. In fact, there was little they could do about

it. ARVN units had indeed improved a great deal in combat effectiveness

by this time but they were still considered not up to the task of taking

on major enemy units. In general, they were inadequately equipped to

respond effectively to operational requirements. It was during this

period that combined operations were initiated, but the idea of cooperating

with ARVN units was not widely welcomed by US forces. In the eyes of

some US commanders, ARVN units were but an additional burden they had

to take in tow and that were apt to cause wore problems than they were

worth. Moreover, the feeling among some US commanders during that

period was that US forces alone could defeat the insurgency wl.thout

ARVN participation.

The strategy then adopted by MACV and the JGS concerning the prosecution of the war placed equal emphasis on three major tasks: combat

operations, pacification, and territorial security, which were all equally

important. The division of tasks, as outlined by the Combined Campaign

Plan, was a judicious distribution of responsibilities in which each

force, Vietnamese or American, was employed according to its capabilities

or where its advantages could be best exploited. The attempted goal was

to achieve a balance of tasks whichi could eventually bring about maximum

contribution to the joint effort. Hence it was agreed that US forces,

with their plentiful resources, would tackle the hardest part by conducting search-and-destroy operations while the lesser endowed ARVM forces

focused their efforts on pacification and security. ARVN units accepted

this division of tasks wi:h some reluctance since mst of them would

have welcomed the opportunity to conduct mobile operations, especially

when reinforced by American firepower and mobility support, ARVN u-its at that time ere seldom given the opportunity to develop their combat effectiveness, bound as they were to the tedious task

of pacification support aad territorial security responsibility. Boredom

and routine gradually eroded their tombit skill and spirit to the point

that tteirthey became almost as passive and as lettargic as the territorl
forces. But the enemy 1968 Tet offensive came in time to offer ARVN units

the much-welcomed chance of undertaking active combat operations once

again. Starting with the battles fought during this offensive, ARVN units

really took the big leap forward and contributed a larger and larger

share to the combat burden heretofore almost exclusively borne by US

forces.

In the area of logistic support, much has been said about RVNAF

lack of planning and overdependence on US resources. This was true to

some extent because the RVNAF logistic system was more geared to area support than to mobile operational support. By and large, the primary supply

requirements for area-type activities consisted of foodstuff (rice)

and ammunition for small arms. These basic commodities were generally

stocked in field depots at a level that provided continuous supply for

several weeks, if not months. Field units usually drew their supplies

from these depots by their own means. Rarely was a supply point estab-

"lished for the sole purpose of supporting a particular operation.

Logistic planning therefore was not particularly emphasized throughout

the hierarchy.

So when it came to providing support for large-scale, combined-arms

operations which were conducted away from bases and lines of communication,

the RVNAF logistic system usually ran into difficulties. Experience

showed that combat units participating in these operations were in short

supply for almost everything. The major obstacle was and had always

been the lack of transportation resources. F'or such operations, logistic

planning of necessity required a long time for preparation and for coordination with several different units. The risk of disclosure, there- j fore, was so great that operational cotiandors usually avoided detailed logistic

planning for security's sake. Blesides, the 1%VNAF. did riot have the

resources nor the capabllity to effectively support major operational

4. efforts, particularly when these involved the use of hellopters for

supply and support. Dunrn the L= Son 719 operation into La-os in

M ay 1971, tor exazple, it was the US forces that provided alwst all of

the logistic support for A7., iits. In other cases, US logistic

167

i"h : • I ., . ... . : • : " -- :';": %
support was needed at least during the initial stages of an operation

so that it would not end up as a failure because of supply or materiel

shortages.

The conclusion that has to be drawn from the foregoing is that if

there really was a tendency to let Americans do it all, it was not the

natural and common inclination of all ARVN commanders. But it did

exist to some extent. Thus, either it could be attributed to undue

reliance and uncritical confidence on US capabilities and resources,

or it stemmed from a common desire shared by both sides to meet emergency

requirements.

E'ffeot of One-Year Tour and Six-Month Rotation

Hundreds of thousands of American servicemen contributed to the

American effort in Vietnam over the years of involvement and direct

participation. They either served in US units or as advisers to the

RVNAF; there were many among them who volunteered for more than one

tour of duty; some served two or even three tours. Except for the top

positions, the usual tour of duty for the American servicemen in Vietnam

was one year. It was a short time indeed, but for all practical

. purposes one year seemed reasonable enough and was suitable to most of

them. The continuous exposure of US troops to field conditions and war

risks, however, made the one-year tour of combat duties a long oae,

particularly in the Vietnamese eanviroament. Hence a six-month tour

rotation policy was adopted to alleviate trauma aud risks. Since the

"American participation in the ground war was not designed to last for

a long time, it was a reasouable policy to allocate the hardship so that

nobody shad to eodure more than his fait share. This policy proved

J, beneficial for the upkeep of morale and effectiveanes, aa far as US

combat forces were concerued. For the advisory program, however.

the one-year tour obviously had its drawbacks.

168

[ ,, ' . ". . ." .
Among ARMN units, the change of personnel, particularly in command

positions, greatly affected the performance of the unit, Because of

the lack of a solid foundation and despite formal standing operating

procedures, all activities of the unit depended almost entirely on

the personality and capabilities of the commanding officer. If he was

a good comander, the unit performed well. But if he was ineffective,

the unit was apt to deteriorate rapidly. In contrast, US units appeared

not to be affected much by personnel change. This was due to established traditions, a solid foundation and well-honed operating procedures

from the top to the bottom level. A good US commander could only make

his unit a little better whereas the worst that a bad commander could

do to his unit was a slight decrease in overall efficiency, which in

most cases was hardly perceptible.

Although the one-year tour and six-month rotation policy gave

rise to minor problems of personnel turbulence and loss of continuity,

it was beneficial in many ways. Due to established procedures, regulations and t:raining, new arrivali in a US unit were usually able to

familiarize themselves quickly with unit problems and have a "fee]l"

for unit operations within a short time. The short and definite period

of one year was an incentive that spurred them to give the best "of 71i. their abilities and performance to contribute to the unit achievements.

If the tour of duty had been longer or open ended, the protracted

combat and hardship tn au unf audlIiar environme~nt wdould certainly have

woru them down and made them weary of the war effort.

The six-wuth rotatiou of battalion and coopany cadre between

- combat and staff duties was a judicious arrangement that improved the

quality of performance in both duties.- A staif officer with comb-at

experience would certainly perC-m bettee than - desk-bouad officer.

11ovever. for higher level co~and positiems, 4 certain coratinuity

aud longer comtbat experience was necessairy. Brigade commatders.

fot exa=rpl. should hare semvid at leiast .ace year Ln their potition.

It was obvious that faailiarity v.ith the unit and stability of co=and

at these levels could tend to c.-shion the ad%erse effect caused by

the quick turnover of personnel at battailon aud company leve•L. V 169
!iOver the years of association with the US presence, ea,-, Vietnamese cotander worked w.Lth several American advisers; they ived

with each other and fought side by side like a man and his shadow.

An ARVN commander usually stayed in his position for many years

but every year he had to work with a different adviser. At the

battalion level, this change in relationship occurred every six months.

The relatively rapid turnover of advisers at battalion level had a

definite adverse effect on the advisory program. While an adviser

did not command the unit, his prestige and standing among ARVN troops

were considerable. He was understood to be in a position of power

and authority with regard to his counterpart. As a result, every

change of adviser disturbed the atmosphere of the uniL.

An adviser's duties necessarily required a minimum of stability

and continuity. His activities were not confined only to the unit

he advised; they also encompassed the total envirounment in which the

I i unit operated. Consequently, the adviser had to perform in both

"capacities: military and civilian., Despite the fact that the advisory

system was well established with time-tested procedures that enabled

an adviser to acquaint himself rapidly with a new situation, he cerS~tainly had to rely on past experiences and knowledge in order to

effectively solve many different and complex problems in his area of

.' responsibility. A case in point was the District Senior Adviser

•'.-. - whoge tour of duty was extended to 18 wonths instead of 12 iti later 7 years. This extended tour not only benefitted the advisory system in

'r.es of personnel stability, it also enabled the adviser to assist the

territoria,' forces and the population wre effectively because of his

loa& experience and fmi-:ari:t wth th: toc=li-y C £ta envlro~ent.

la coutrast to the~ US cozSat semvie=An. the adviser lived with

Vietnam-se soldiers and in close touch with the local population. both

of whom had apent their entire lives In war. What they needed was

socoae whom they could trust and on whoem they cold depend throughout

the years. The adviser's short tour of duty vas certainly no help in

this regard. The longer an adviser livd with a unit and shared the

hardships aud d•gers with its =ea, the more the wn in the unit felt

170

I * 1?

S.... !-r • • • :; • ; ". I •'i. .... ÷•- .r, •, i•• ••
close to and trusted him out of a sense of loyalty and confidence.

The adviser's position aleo required him to have some continuity in

his a~uignment in order to fully grasp every problem concerning the

unit and the external influences bearing on it. This was the best

way he could find the appropriate ingredients for improvement-by

living and caking advantage of his experience, not by arbitrarily

suggesting innovative ideas.

(17

I

'*171

I',-
CHAPTER VII

Summary and Conclusions

The introduction of US combat forces in early 1965 saved the

Republic of Vietnam from military defeat and helped it restore stability

and consolidate a more viable regime. The short term goals that the

United States set about to accomplish were successfully achieved within

a relatively short time. Despite obstacles, the Americans also finally

succeeded in developing and improving the Vietnamese armed forces on

which the Republic of Vietnam depended for its survival.

Resorting to the use of combat force meant that the US advisory

effort and level of military assistance up to that time had either fallen

short of their goal or were not enough. Then three and a half yea.-s of

intensive fighting also failed to bring the enemy to his knees. Entering

the war with the posture and disposition of a fire brigade, the Americans

rushed about to say the Vietnamese house from destruction but took

little interest in caring for the victims. Only after they realized that

the victims, too, should be made firefighters to save their own houses,

did Americans set about to really care for them. Valuable time was lost,

and by the time the victims could get onto their feet and began to move

forward a few steps after recovery, the fire-brigade was called back to

the home station.

Throughout the years of participation, the American presence greatly

bolstered the RVNAF performance and morale. There could be no doubt

about it. The positinn enjoyed by Americans with regard to the RVNAF

was either adviser or comrade-in-arms. Well established and with

carefully selected personnel, whose devotion and abilities were undeniable,

the US advisory system admirably performed its difficult and complex

role. American combat units also made substantial contributions to this effort.

172
It was obvious that, while operational cooperation and coordination

between RVNAF and US forces might not be an ideal solution for the

conduct of the common war effort, it was the most realistic way to

improve morale and combat effectiveness of the Vietnamese armed forces.

Cooperation and coordination also helped to make the task of US forces

easier to carry out in many ways.

It is difficult to make an assessment of the US advisory effort.

Suffice it to say that it was instrumental in transforming a disorganized,

poorly-led, and unschooled army of some 150,000 into a modern and highly

organized tri-service military force nearly ten times as large which

successfully held and pushed back the NVA invasion of 1972. During the

first few years the effort of US advisers met with considerable obstacles,

particularly in the area of training. Several years of hard fighting on

all battlefields from north to south and of living close to French

forces--and undoubtedly under their influence--had instilled a certain

psychology of intractability, unruliness, and complacency among the

Vietnamese military cadre. Their adjustment to the American way of

doing things was painful and slow. They found American training and

warfare methods too inflexible, too mechanical, and not realistically

J ' adapted to the Vietnam battlefield. The language barrier and cultural

difference also formed a wide and seemingly unbridgeable gap. To a certain extent, tile Vietnamese were not interested in training and did not

think it was necessary. After all, they felt they were experienced

enough and knew how to fight this kind of war. American tactical advice

was something they thought they could do without.

During the early sixties most US Army company-grade officers that

were assigned to field advisory duties---except for a few Korean War

veterans-had no combat experience. They were in a truly awkward

position vis-a-vis the Vietnamese regimental and battalion commanders who

had gone through so many battles during the first Indochina war. Their

role and effectiveness, as a consequence, were greatly reduced. The

adviser's duties were mostly limited to end use inspections, maintenance

of weapons and materiel, and asaisting the unit in military techniques

S•and logistics, but seldom in operational matters. This situation changed,

S173

I*ll y-
when US combat support assets-airlift, helicopters, and later, tactical

air-were made available. For the first time, ARVN unit commanders felt

vulnerable and helpless without advisers who controlled and provided the

support assets. The role of advisers began to grow in importance and

their effectiveness increased markedly with the advent of airmobile operations and US tactical air support. This new aspect and level of the war

had changed the advisory relationship for the better.

The training and development of the RVNAF made encouraging progress

as a result of increased US assistance and advisory effort. But soon these

achievements were undermined by political events that began in late

1963 and carried into the next few years. Command and control of the

RVNAF, which had for years been a basic weakness, were further disorganized

*l and weakened by political intrigues and machinations. The armed forces

were iiv:deplorable shape and their deterioration prompted the United States

to intervene. The experience of this period demonstrated that no matter

how effective the military advisory effort might be professionally it

could do little to influence the course of events unless the advisers to

key command positions also doubled as political counselors. But the

nature of the war and the realities of a developing country in which the

military so strongly dominated politics perforce perhaps would have

* required a special breed of politico-military advisers.

If the RVNAF had had a tight and unified command system throughout

the entire hierarchy--from the top echelon to the PF platoon-then the

* US advisory effort to develop and improve these armed forces would

certainly have been much easier and less painful. For the Vietnamese

private-whether regular or territorial--was basically a good soldier,

courageous, enduring and resilient. The young cadre at low level units

were also highly motivated, enthusiastic, and easy to mold. The trouble

was that these fine soldiers and cadre were not brought along by good

leadership. In general, the pressure exerted by advisers to relieve ineffective commanders.or to withdraw from units with a poor record only worked at

the lower levels. It served no practical purpose for the benefit of the RVNAF

apart from oausing confusion among the troops. In.retrospect, the improvement

of military leadership, particularly at the higher levels of the hierarchy,

174
would have been more vital for the purpose of developing combat effectiveness for the RVNAF than any other program. At the higher levels,

what the advisers sought most to do was establish good rapport with their

counterparts rather than pressuring them to do the job. But, niceties

and civility simply did not work when a war was being fought. As General

James L. Collins, Jr. has so aptly commented on this problem:

"The rapport approach is dangerous because it lends itself

to the acceptance of substandard performance by the adviser. In

any future situation where advisers are deploy':d under hostile

conditions, the emphasis should be on gettiP4 the job done, not

on merely getting along with the individus! being advised." 1

The US advisory effort suffered a setback during the first few

years of active US participation in the war. The role of advisers was

overshadowed by the presence of US combat forces on whom the success or

failure of the war effort depended. ARVN units began to turn to US

field commanders for operational guidance and support since it was they

who wielded true military power, not the regular advisers who during

this time acted mostly in a liaison role. Because of their reduced role

"and the priority of personnel assignment given to US combat forces, the

selection of advisers was no longer subject to exacting criteria, and

the advisory effectiveness suffered accordingly.

But it was also during this period that more consideration was given

to pacification, and the advisory system was thus greatly expanded on a

territorial basis. The availability of US advisers at the district level

was truly beneficial for the pacification program and contributed substantially to the general war effort. The adviser at district level was

a military officer but his encompassing duties required him to act in

both military and civilian capacities. As a matter of fact he was a

special kind of adviser. Because of the combat and social environment

Brigadier General James Lawton Collins, Jr., The Development and

Training of the South Vietnamese Arm 1950 -1972 (Department of the

Army, Washington, D.C.: 1975) p. 130,

175
in which he lived and operated and the many and highly diversified problems

he had to solve, the district adviser at the end of his tour had truly

become a political-military adviser in his own right. The unique experience and invaluable training thus acquired by US officers might well

make them more qualified leaders in future assignments.

The task of upgrading RP and PF combat effectiveness through the

device of Mobile Assistance Teams was only reasonably successful. This

was due less to the limitations of advisory personnel than to constraints

of the territorial command and control system. Conceived and operating

i as part of the RVNAF, the RF and PF were nevertheless placed under a

different comnand channel and more often than not were employed in a

haphazard and unorthodox manner by a province or district chief who was

, always too busy with his administrative or political duties. Lacking

strong and effective mainforce backing and adequate combat support, RF

!° and PF were usually exposed to piecemeal defeat and seldom had the

offensive spirit or the motivation required to accomplish their difficult

mission.

On their part, the ARVN regular units did not fare tuch better,

bound as they were to their territorial sescurity and pacification support

duties. Only rarely did they have the opportunity to evade the debilitating effect of routine activities and participate in mobile operations.

Not until after 1968 was there any systematic effort to improve their

combat effectiveness through intensive programs of combined operations.

But by the time ARVN units really got off to a good start US forces were

already standing down to redeploy.

In addition to -he advisory effort, the presence of US combat forces

in South Vietnam since 1965 also contributed substantially to upgrading

the RVMF and enabling the RVN government to consolidate its popular

base and control. This contribution was made through combined operations

jointly conducted by the RVMAF and US forces against enemy forces and

: +bases. With a view to integrating all military efforts, emphasis was

placed on cooperation and coordination between Vietnamese and American

combat units. Short of a unified command, this was a good working solution to direct the common war effort although it was far from being ideal.

( (

176

d
To provide guidance and direction for successful cooperation and

coordination in operational matters, the RVNAF Joint General Staff and

the US Military Assistance Command jointly worked out an annual Combined

Campaign-Plan which set forth the objectives, policies and procedures to

be carried out by US Field Forces and ARVN Corps. The plan provided

general guidelines for the common war effort but failed to institute any

combined staff agency to monitor, supervise, and follow up on its actual

conduct. These functions were performed separately by the JGS and MACV

although cooperation and coordination were achieved through periodic

combined cousand. or staff meetings. It was apparently felt that such an

arrangement was enough since the field commands were responsible for the

actual planning and conduct of combat operations. Only in intelligence

were there permanent combined agencies for analysis, production and

dissemination.

During the early period from 1965 to 1968, various formulas were

suggested but the actual combat cooperation and coordination effort at

the field level was piecemeal and individualistic. It depended primarily

on the personal rapport between counterpart commanders, the relative

interest each of them took in the combined effort, and the tactical

situation in each corps tactical zone. The role played by the RVNAF was, i as a matter of fact, a passive one since they were made responsible only

for territorial security axid pacification support. It was the US forces

that held the initiative in combat operations because they were assigned

this mission and controlled all vital support assets. The division of

tasks thus determined by the Combined Campaign plan reflected the status

of the RVNAF during this period. Their combat effectiveness was marginal

and their combat support assets were still very limited.

Aside from securing operations conducted by US forces around their

bases, which necessarily involved elements of ARVN or territorial forces,

large scale actions against enemy bases were almost exclusively planned

and performed by US forces. In the few operations involving the participation of ARW4 forces, Vietnamese units seldom numbered more than a few

battalions which were either assigned objectives of secondary importance

!. !or served as blocking or cordon forces. The US Marines Combined Action

177
in ICTZ was probably the first conscious effort at coordination and cooperation at the lowest echelon. Although its goal was to provide support for the pacification program and training for the Popular Forces,

it certainly benefited US Marines forces by providing security for their

bases. The first significant combined operational effort was Operation

FAIRFAX whose success was due both to the long duration of the operation

and the personal interest of the MACV commander himself.

In general, the combined effort during this period depended largely

on the personality, policy and operational concept of each US Field Force

Commander and, to a lesser extent, on the attitude of his ARVN counterpart. The degree of rapport between them was a factor that determined

cooperation and coordination between their staffs and subordinate commands. If both American and Vietnamese field commanders were willing

and shared a common enthusiasm for combined efforts, then cooperation

S i and coordination automatically became a rule or practice between their

staffs and units.

As has been said earlier, ARVN Corps commanders were usually deeply

involved in administration and political matters and could not spare

enough time or energy to devote to the tactical problems which, fortunately, were cared for by US Field Forces. The rare visits they made

to subordinate units were always solemn, formal and time-consuming occasions that practically stopped all activities of the unit being visited.

An ARVN Corps Commander never casually dropped in for a visit or for a

working session with the unit commander. How could the Corps commander,

in these circumstances, have a full" grasp of the military situation in

his own area of responsibility? Corps commanders were not interested in

what US forces were doing, either. There were occasional visits to US

forces, of course, but they were more in the nature of ceremonial or

official functions. Although some claimed that US Field Forces withheld

information concerning US plans and activities--which was probably true

in a few instances--Corps commanders were never fully informed about the

tactical situation and friendly activities, either Vietnameje or American.

They depended totally on US initiative and efforts.

178(

.|I
Corps staffs, as a consequence, were never required to make studies

or plans to respond positively to the requirements of the situation.

(Most of the time Corps staffs performed tedious routine work on a day-today basis. Operational plans, therefore, were almost always initiated

and worked out by US Field Force staffs. It was common knowledge that

Corps operational plans during this period were more often than not

merely translations or excerpts of US plans and orders.

On their part, US Field Force commanders were always devoted to and

busy with their own duties and units. Despite their nominal capacity

as Senior Corps Advisers, they. rarely performed their advisory functions.

The true adviser who worked closely with the Corps commander was always

the Deputy Corps Adviser. The changeovers of US Field Force commanders

also affected the adviser-counterpart relationship and by extension, the cooperation and coordination between ARVN and US forces. There were some

exceptions; these were cases in which cooperation and coordination had

been well established and where US commanders enjoyed a true prestige 1 and trust with regard to their counterparts and Vietnamese troops.

At lower echelons, brigade or battalion, US unit commanders were

generally reluctant to participate in combined operations with ARVN units.

At these levels there existed no adviser--countetpart relationship between

US and ARVN unit commanders. When they participated in cokbined operations, their relationship was usually one of mutual support-for the

duration of the common effort. The reluctance to cooperate on the part

of US brigade or battalion commanders derived chiefly from a prejudice

:- against the combat effectiveness of ARMN units. They appeared not to realize

that perseverance, determination and tolerance were the ingredients that

were required from both sides to arrive at genuine cooperation.

Geographic location and terrain also affected cooperation. For a

Corps which was responsible for a too large area such as the II CTZ,

distance was really an impediment to the combined effort. Since II Corps

*t. and its divisions headquarters were located far from I Field Force and

its subordinate units and because each of these units were assigned a

separate area of responsibility, effective cooperation and coordination

became a real problem. Some of the difficulties were overcome by good

179
comuniaations and by frequent combined command and staff meetings, but

* I •these were mainly useful for planning purposes. For a genuinely integrated

effort to be effective on the basis of cooperation and coordination,

thete was also a requirement for constant supervision and follow-up by

both commanders on the battlefield on a regular, if not daily basis.

The best solution to achieve this would have been a fully integrated tactical

operations center or at least the co-location of headquarters or command

posts at every tactical level. The exchange of liaison teams between

headquarters was a poor substitute for coordination by close physical

proximity, because liaison teams obviously have their limits.

A major impediment for the RVNAF was the continuing lack of combat

support assets and the perennial shortage of forces available for combined

operations. Almost all assets required for the sdpport of ARVN units were

* I provided by US forces, from a command and liaison ship to airlift or

helilift facilities, firepower, engineers, supplies, medical evacuation,

etc. In large measure, therefore, combined operations depended on the

availability of resources. This explained why they were usually initiated

and planned by US forces. Then, in order to muster enough forces for the

combined effort, it was usually necessary to redeploy ARVN units committed

to pacification support. This was a step that neither the US Field Force

"commander nor the Corps commander took lightly, given the emphasis

the RVN government placed on pacification and rural develcpment at the

time.

Not until after the successful counterattack by US and AR•VN forces

in the wake of the enemy 1968 Tet offensive did operational cooperation jand coordination develop into a systematic and p~urposeful effort. Thisa

was basically due to a drastic change in American policy toward the war.

The US wau more and more inclined to curtail US participation and was

turning over more combat responsibility to the RVNAF. Programs were

initiated to quickly expand and modernize the RVNAF on the one hand and

upgrade Vietnamese combat effectiveness on the other. This preparatory

work was to pave the way for the Vietvamizatiou program and the disengagement of US forces from South Vietnam.
The task of improving the RVNAF combat effectiveness became the

major concern of MACV and US Field Forces. Since the trend of modern

warfare emphasized airmobility and the effective use of firepower support, the US effort concentrated on training ARVN units in airmobile

operations and the coordinated use of combat support besets. In contrast

to the earlier period, combined operations involved an increasing number

of ARVN units and were conducted more regularly within pre-conceived

programs. At the same time, more modern weapons and equipment were made

available to ARVN infantry divisions.

Following encouraging results achieved through the integrated

"employment of US and ARVN units by US XXIV Corps in the two northerrnost

provinces of I CTZ, I and 11 US Field Forces initiated extensive programs

of comblaed operations in 11 and III Corps Tactical Zones. These program,

called "pair off" and "Dong Tien" respectively, have been 'discussed in

Chapter V. In general, they substantially contributed to the rapid

improvement of morale and combat effectiveness of ARVN units. For one f thing, these programs offered-Vietnamese unit commanders at all echelons

a good opportunity to learn their trade. For another, they were a

training method that no school or training center could duplicate in

classrooms or even in field exercises. By working day and night side

by side with US uits, Vietnamese commanders were able to absorb several

invaluable experiences in comand and leadership that neither advisers

nor schools could have provided. The advantages of these programs were

evident. The only drawback was their short duration. One may wonder

what these programs could have done to the RMIAF had they beeu initiated

at the very beginning of the US participation in the war. Then perhaps,

*Vietnamization. could have- begun much earlier. And if, iaste-ad of a

gradual response approach, the US had fully and resolutely brought its

entire military might to bear on the war effort, then surely the outcome

of the war would have been different.

The advent of combined operations also helped to some extent to

mitigate the problem of shortage of capable cadre at all echelons. Those

ARVN units which were most exposed to US tutelage and had several opportunities to operate alongside US units, such as the lst and 22d

"181
Infantry Divisions, for example, were all able to develop a very cohesive

and uniformly capable command cadre. In addition, they also acquired

good traditions and a solid reputation as proven combat units. The high

degree of success in these instances, however, depended more on the

genuine interest and close association that US commanders displayed toward

ARVN units than anything else. An outstanding example was found in the

tactical area of responsibility of the US XXIV Corps where cooperation

and coordination were neither forvmally instituted under any formalized

program nor bound by any procedure or rule. The key to success here

was the US commander himself who daily visited and made himself available

to ARVN units on a permanent basis. It was his personal care for the

needs and well-being of ARVN troops that made them feel as familiar and

as close to him as to their own commander.

On the other hand, when ARVN units directly cooperated with US

forces on a permanent basis, their higher commands usually became complacent and less active. All that they had to do was monitor, follow up, and

be satisfied with results and reports. The task of planning and conducting

- I operations was entrusted to divisions and regiments and to whatever arrangements for coordination and cooperation they made with US units.

This passivity in leadership and planning in time turned into a major

deficiency which became more acute when US forces began to redeploy and

which adversely affected both morale and combat effectiveness of the RVNAW.

Trained and accustomed as they were to US resources and standards,

ARVN units naturally acquired skills and proficiency in the employen-t

of modern combat support assets. This posed no problem as long as US

forces were ther, siace they supplied what the RMNAF were unable to provide.

t.hat was questionable 4n the long run vas the own ability of the RVNA•F

to provide support assets at the same level and rate once US forces were

withdrawun. The most serious drawback seeied to be aa ingrained habit of

overkilling by profligate use of firepower and the over-dependence of

ARVM unit cocoanders on tactical air support, particularly B-52 strikes.

In retrospect, as has been sid earlier, the combined operations

effort initiated by US forces to upgrade the RVZAF combat effectiveness

and as preparation to turn over the combat responsibility to the RVIAF

182

• . '.
should have been encouraged much earlier, when US Field Fo~rces were

activated. Since the combined effort was in essence a joint enterprise

at all levels, the question was why had it not been attempted also at

higher levels. To have good combat troops and adequate support resources

was certainly not enough. There should also have been stronger leadership, more effective planning, better command and control, and more

profound motivation. ARVN Corps staffs and even the JGS could have been

given the opportunity to learn, too. Why limit the training to lower

levels? It did not make sense to have old fashioned and lackadaisical

commanders in charge of advanced and modern troops.

In general, despite shortcomings and drawbacks, the US presence and

effort truly helped the RVNAF to improve in most aspects. In return,

US commanders, and advisers in particular, learned something about the

complex nature of the Vietnam war and acquired invaluable experience

that might be helpful to them in some future conflict. There remains

though a fundamental question regarding the Vietnam conflict. Qhy was

there a failure to produce strong leadership and motivation? This was,

in the final analysis, what plagued the RVNAF the most. To be able to

answer this question requires a thorough knowledgd of the nature of the

war, the kind of political system that directed the war effotc, and the

circumstances that affected leadership and motivation. A full answer

to why there was such a profound lack of strong leadership and adequate

motivation lies in these characteristics of the war, its politics, and

"its c~rcutances. It can be said though that good leadership and

Motivation were delfinitely not developed to 4an dequa t extent and that

this iailure had a disaltrous effect on the eventuail outcome of the war.

Aii

I-. . . _ _ .'

•tm
7,

Glossary

AMN Airborne

ACD Air Cavalry Division (US)

A & DSLC Administrative and Direct Support

Logistics Company (at least one per

province for support of RF-PF)

AK-47 Soviet 7.62-mm assault rifle

ALC Area Logistical Command

AO Area of Operation

APC Armored Personnel Carrier

Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

Common abbreviation used to refer to

regular Army forces to "\actude airborne and ranger units.

AT Antitank

Buddy Oper4tioaus Combined operations by US and South

Vietnamese forces.

CAC Coebtln'd action Company

iCAIG 5Cobined Action Group

CAUP Cobined Action Platoon

j" CAT Combat Assistance Tee=

c.V Cavalry (US)

COEC Coobirzed Docuwint Exploitation Center

.CI• CombIned Intelligence Center, Vietnam

CCLC Central Logistic Co=Land

o.kC Capital Kilicary Assistance Co=tnd

W or OM Capital Military District or Region

0'3C Goabined Materiel ExploItation Center

CHC Cocbined X111iary Interrogation Center

in-rn
COMUSMACV Commander, United States Military

Assistance Command, Vietnam

Cordtn and Search Operation to seal off and search an area

CORDS Civil Operations and Revolutionary

Development Support. A MACV organization

that provided single manager direction of

all US civil/military RD activities in

the Republic of Vietnam.

COSVN Central Office of South Vietnam

"CP Command Post

CSCC Combat Support Coordination Center

CT Abbreviation of Cong Truong, term used by

the ýC to designate divisions activated

under COSVN

CTC Central Training Command

CTZ Corps Tactical Zone. The geographical

area of responsibility of a Corps, but

freqdencly u~sed to refZei to the Corps

Headquarters itself.

CUPP Combiaed Unit Pacification Program

DMAC Delta Military Assistance Command (MR4)

DMZ Demilitarized Zone

uS Direct Support

DSA District Senior Advisor

DTA Division Tactical Area. The geographical

area of responsibility of a division,

frequently used to refer to the Division

Headquarters itselt.

:•DC Fire Direction Center

FFV or FFORCEV -ield Forces, Vietnam (US)

FO Forvard Obseiver (A~rtillery)

S•-3B Fire Support Base

J FSE Forvard Support EleFment

9 tAF Free World Hilitar•y Assistance Forces

General Support

GIND General Political Warfare Department

GVN Government of South Vietnam

-J-2 Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence

165
JGS Joint General Staff (RVNAP)

"JOC Joint Operations Center

JUSPAO Joint United States Public Affairs Office.

Served US interests as well as advising

the GVN in information and psychological

operations.

KIA Killed in Action

LNO Liaison Officer

LOC Lines Of Communication

Local force Viet Cong combat unit subordinate to a

district or province

LRRP Long Ranqe Reconnaissance Patrol

LTL Vietnamesc Interprovincir L Route

(Lien Tinh Lo)

LZ Inding Zone

H4-16 US light weight, rapid-firing 5.36-emn rifte

MACV Military Assistance Crmmand, Vietnam

HAE MILine Amphibious Force (US)

Main force Viet Cong and North Vietnamese military units subordinate c't the Central Office

of South Vietnam. mil1tary regiona, or

other higher tzchelcn4 of command.

I I 11A1 Noh~le Advisory Team

K*EICAP Medical Civic Action Program

H4DEVAC Medical Evacuation

H1 Military Intelligence

SMilitary Provine"a Health Assistance ' 1,rogram

MP Military Police

MR Military Region

IS Military Security Service (Vietucm•se)

Mobile Trainlog Team

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPFP National Police Field Force

HT Abbreviation of Non& Truong, alternate

tertm ued by the VC to deignate a divi-

*1 ~186 

'

,-.I _ mmg~"•II~ a 
kNVA North Vietnamese Army

Pattern Activity Procedure begun in mid-1966 which consists

Analysis of detailed plotting on maps of information on enemy activity obtained from a

variety'of sources over an extended period

of time.

PF Popular Force (s). Military forces

locally recruited, employed within their

home district and organized into platoons.

PICC Province Intelligence Coordination Comittee

PRU Provincial Reconnaissance Unit

PSA Province Senior Adviser

PSDF People's Self Defense Forces

PsyOps Psychological Warfare Operations

_P Prisoner of War

QL Vietnamese National Route (Quoc Lo)

I RD Rural or Revolutionary Development

RF Regional Force (s). Military forces

recruited and employed within a Province.

ROK Republic of Korea

RPG-2 Soviet antitank grenade launcher desi• ated

"3-40 by the VC.

RR Recoilless Rifle

IRVN Republic cf Vietnami. Sometimes used interchangeable with GVN when referring to the

gove.,mment or with SN wheu referring to

the couat;y.

RVNA.F Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

SSAPOV Sub-Area Petroleum Office. Vietnam

Search-and-clear Offenaive military operati•n designed to

sweep through an area with the objective

S -of locating, driving ou-t, or destroying

the enemy. 1 -Search-and-destroy Ofefnsive operation designed to seek out

and destroy enemy forces, headquarters,

and .upply installaetio, with emphasis

.,on destruction rather than occupation.

SLR Side Lo-k-Ung Airborne dar

SVN South Vietnam. Geaera!.Ly connotes the

land itself.

187 L _ _ _ __"
TAOI Tactical Area of Interest

TAOR Tactical Area of Responsibility

TL Vietnamese Provincial Route (Tinh Lao)

TOC Tactical Operations Center

USAID United States Agency for International

Development

USARV United States Army, Vietnam

USOM United States Operations Missi••,

a precursor of USAID

.USMACV United States Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam.

VC Viet Cong. Co~mnist insurgents in

South Vietnam

VCI Viet Cong Infrastructure

VHF Very High Frequency

VNAF Vietnam Air Force

SVietnam Navy

I88"I

4i

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