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THE ONGOING STRUGGLE AGAINST BOKO HARAM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 11, 2014

Serial No. 113–220

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

KAREN BASS, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

J. Peter Pham, Ph.D., director, Africa Center, Atlantic Council ......................... 8

Mr. Emmanuel Ogebe, manager, Justice for Jos Project, Jubilee Campaign 

USA ....................................................................................................................... 27

Mr. Anslem John-Miller, representative to the U.S., Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People ..................................................................................... 56

The Honorable Robin Renee Sanders, chief executive officer, FEEEDS Advocacy Initiative (former United States Ambassador to Nigeria) ........................ 67

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

J. Peter Pham, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 13

Mr. Emmanuel Ogebe: Prepared statement .......................................................... 31

Mr. Anslem John-Miller: Prepared statement ...................................................... 61

The Honorable Robin Renee Sanders: Prepared statement ................................. 72

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 100

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 101

Mr. Emmanuel Ogebe: Information on Boko Haram attacks .............................. 102

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations: Remarks 

by Dr. Zuhdi Jasser of the U.S. Commission on International Religious 

Freedom ................................................................................................................ 107

(1)

THE ONGOING STRUGGLE AGAINST BOKO 

HARAM 

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. Since November 2013, the U.S. Government has declared Boko Haram and its affiliate, Ansaru, to be Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This supposedly provides further tools with 

which to fight such organizations and their sponsors. However, an 

administration that resisted the FTO designation for so long continues to downplay its significance. This hearing is intended to provide information on that reluctance on obstacles to our effective security and our military assistance to the Nigerian Government in 

its antiterror fight. 

Boko Haram is a Nigerian terrorist group whose name in Arabic 

is ‘‘People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teaching 

and Jihad.’’ The name Boko Haram is from Hausa meaning that 

conventional education, boko, is forbidden. 

According to various reports, Boko Haram began in 2003 when 

about 200 university students and unemployed youth created a 

camp in Yobe State near the Niger border to withdraw from what 

they considered to be corrupt, sinful and unjust Nigerian Government, and their community was supposedly founded on Islamic 

law. The group was then known as the Nigerian Taliban. 

Violent clashes with Nigerian security forces nearly destroyed 

the group several times, but it charismatic leader, Mohammed 

Yusuf, kept the group alive until his death while in police custody 

in July 2009. Since Yusuf’s death there have been various spokesmen. Abubakar Shekau is now considered to be the leader. Furthermore, a breakaway group known as Ansaru has appeared on 

the scene, but still coordinates with the original Boko Haram. 

Because of its repeated attacks against Christian targets during 

holy days such as Christmas and Easter, Boko Haram is seen by 

some as principally an anti-Christian organization. This past year 

alone, Boko Haram terrorists are believed to have killed more than 

1,000 Christians in Nigeria. In fact, it is estimated that more than 

2

60 percent of Christians killed worldwide because of religious intolerance die in Nigeria. 

However, it would not be a completely accurate interpretation of 

the facts to assume that what is happening in Nigeria is just a 

Muslim-Christian conflict. The kidnapping of nearly 300 Nigerian 

schoolgirls in the Borno State, town of Chibok, on April 14, has 

caught the attention finally of the international community, albeit 

2 weeks after the incident. However, the kidnapping of 8 additional 

girls after that has been an afterthought; and the kidnapping of 

another 20 women last week has yet to receive much notice. 

Prior to the April kidnappings, Boko Haram had generally killed 

boys, but let girls go, warning them to go home and give up their 

dreams of education. There have been previous incidents, however, 

in which girls have been kidnapped, though not in large numbers 

as in Chibok. 

Now Boko Haram leaders realize that kidnapping girls gets 

worldwide publicity; and whether these girls are recovered or not, 

and God willing they will be, they know that they can do this again 

and get publicity for their nefarious group. The very news media 

used to galvanize pressure on Nigeria to obtain freedom of the kidnapped girls is being used by Boko Haram to brag of its ability to 

disrupt social society and taunt Nigerians and their government 

about their ability to take women and girls away. 

Several videos—and I have watched them; I am sure many of 

you have as well—purportedly of the kidnapped Chibok girls have 

been released, echoing previously used al-Qaeda tactics in this regard. 

In the past 2 years, our subcommittee has sent a staff delegation 

to investigate the Boko Haram threat, and this past September 

Greg Simpkins, our subcommittee staff director, and I visited 

Abuja and Jos to further look into the matter. And, frankly, we 

went to firebombed churches. We met with Archbishop Kaigama as 

well as Muslim leaders in Jos and had very, very eye-opening 

meetings with the survivors, some of whom had lost limbs, certainly they had lost loved ones to these firebombings. 

Just on Monday I returned from another 4 days in Abuja where 

I took time and met with a number of victims who had suffered so 

much, as well as government leaders. Last week in Abuja, one of 

the Chibok girls who escaped early on in the ordeal met with our 

delegation. This brave young woman has suffered so much and was 

clearly traumatized and in emotional pain. You could hear it in her 

voice, you could see it in her eyes as she sat motionless recounting 

her story, yet she spoke not of herself, but of her concern for her 

friends and her classmates who remain in captivity. 

I met with a Muslim father of two girls abducted from the 

Chibok school. Fighting back tears, he said the agony was unbearable. Again, this is a Muslim father. The story of his daughters underscored the fact that Boko Haram brutalizes Muslims as well. 

I also met with another Boko Haram victim, including a Christian mother of two, whose two daughters were abducted back in 

February 2012. She told us her husband was shot on the spot. 

Three months later they took the two daughters and abducted 

them. And then 3 months later Boko Haram gunmen returned and 

asked if her son had converted to Islam. When she said no, they 

3

shot him on the spot and killed her son. Again through her tears, 

which were almost uncontrollable, she recounted the horror of losing a husband, a son, and having two of her daughters kidnapped. 

We have wasted more than a year not using all of our tools because of the specious argument that doing so would provide publicity to terrorists. And now the administration is downplaying 

what the FTO designation can, indeed, accomplish. There must be 

a robust use of the benefits of this designation if we are to be successful in the battle against terrorism in Nigeria. 

The three criteria for an organization to be declared an FTO are 

that it must be a foreign organization; it must be engaged in terrorist activity; and it must threaten the security of the United 

States nationals, U.S. national security, or the economic interests 

of the United States. Clearly Boko Haram and Ansaru meet the 

test, and, again, that is why I introduced H.R. 3209 last year to 

urge the administration to declare Boko Haram a foreign terrorist 

organization. 

I want to point out that the meetings with our Embassy people 

were very fruitful, and I want to applaud them for their diligence 

and for their commitment both on the intelligence side, on the 

training side of just a small but not insignificant group of Nigerians, particularly in counterinsurgency, as well as humanitarian 

efforts that they have embarked upon to try to help those who are 

suffering so much. 

Boko Haram and Ansaru do wage attacks on the Nigerian Government as we all know, and they also have domestic targets as 

well. Nevertheless, their actions prove their participation in the 

global jihad movement that wages violent war worldwide to establish their skewed version of Islam as a prevailing religion globally. 

Various actions such as to the bombing of the U.N. office way 

back in 2011 in Abuja and numerous statements from Boko Haram 

spokesmen indicate that there is this international intent, and 

sadly they are growing. They are not diminishing; they are growing. This international focus has been confirmed by American and 

Nigerian intelligence. In fact, there was at least one American 

present during the U.N. office bombing in 2011 which we would 

have hoped the administration would have acknowledged. I and 

members of our full committee asked that question as recently as 

a hearing that was held, chaired by Chairman Royce. 

When then-Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson told us in a July 

2012 hearing on Nigeria that Boko Haram’s attacks were caused 

mostly by an animus against the Nigerian Government, I believe 

he was wrong in the apportionment of cause and effect. There is 

a tremendous animus toward the Nigerian Government and an effort to embarrass President Jonathan; however, Boko Haram is determined to convert or kill Christians and Muslims that they believe oppose them. 

Poverty did not create Boko Haram. That would be an insult, I 

would suggest respectfully, to the poor. Religious fanaticism, however, is what it is underlying and it is foundational. 

Underdevelopment in northern Nigeria provides fodder for a 

level of discontent with the Federal Government. It provides at 

least tacit northern support for anyone opposing the government. 

4

If northern Nigeria were its own country, it would be among the 

poorest, least educated, least healthy countries in the entire world. 

Largely due to the terrorist violence in the north, an estimated 

3.3 million Nigerians are displaced, making Nigeria the world’s 

third largest displaced population behind only Syria and Colombia. 

Many of those displaced people are farmers, which will certainly 

disrupt the next harvest and further impoverish Nigeria’s suffering 

people. Yet the blame for perennial lack in development in northern Nigeria should not be heaped on the Federal Government 

alone. We have been told that northern states have money for development, and one national legislator from the north acknowledged that each member of Nigeria’s Parliament has at least $1 

million—not Nigerian naira, but American dollars equivalent—at 

his or her disposal for his constituent services. National and state 

governments in Nigeria have to be pushed to do more on development with money they already have. 

Finally, it is imperative that we provide the training and support 

for Nigerians to develop their own capacity to help Nigeria end the 

Boko Haram threat. The Leahy law, which forbids U.S. support to 

military and security forces involved in human rights violations, is 

seen as an obstacle, to some extent, to achieving that goal, and I 

say that as someone who has been very supportive of the Leahy 

amendments both for DoD and the State Department over the 

many years. 

In this hearing room 15 years ago, when Indonesia was matriculating from Suharto to Habibie, and we were training the Kopassus 

group, an elite group of Indonesians, we had no idea which ones 

we trained and whether or not they were out there doing urban 

guerilla warfare and shooting people in Jakarta when violence 

erupted there. So there is a need for the Leahy law, but it has to 

be very carefully looked at so that fine infantry and soldiers who 

have the capability to be leaders are not screened out, and therefore diminishing the ability of the Nigerians to wage an effective 

campaign against Boko Haram. 

I would like to now yield to my friend and colleague Ms. Bass 

for opening comments. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith. As always, I 

thank you for your leadership of this subcommittee and for convening today’s hearing. 

I would also like to thank our distinguished witnesses, and I look 

forward to hearing your perspectives on the ongoing crisis in northern Nigeria, including an assessment of Boko Haram’s recent activities; the U.S., Africa Union, and international efforts to locate 

the kidnapped girls and mitigate the threat of Boko Haram; and 

what is ultimately at stake if efforts to quell the group’s heinous 

crimes are not implemented with sufficient resources and all deliberate speed. 

Since the April 15 kidnapping of nearly 300 girls by armed militants, international attention from both advocates and the international community has been focused on locating the girls as well 

as addressing the overarching security challenges caused by Boko 

Haram. 

Following President Obama’s initial condemnation of the attacks 

and kidnappings, the U.S. Government committed to provide techVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:07 Nov 13, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\061114\88290 SHIRL
5

nical and logistical support in the effort to locate the missing girls 

and support the Government of Nigeria in addressing the threat 

posed by Boko Haram. These efforts began with a joint assessment 

mission to Nigeria led by the AFRICOM Commander David 

Rodriguez and the State Department’s Under Secretary of State for 

Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights. Following the assessment, a multidisciplinary U.S. team was deployed to Nigeria, 

including military and law enforcement personnel capable of sharing with the Nigerians expertise in intelligence, investigations, hostage negotiating, and victim assistance. 

U.S. military assistance to Nigeria, I understand, is currently focused on military professionalization, peacekeeping support and 

training, and border and maritime security. This includes providing 

commercial satellite data and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to Nigeria’s military, and the two governments 

reached an intelligence-sharing agreement in mid-May. To further 

support this effort, President Obama has deployed approximately 

80 U.S. military personnel to neighboring Chad to contribute to the 

rescue efforts. 

I know that a lot has been said about the State Department’s initial reticence to designate Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, and as I understand there were several practical reasons to avoid such a designation in the past. The practical effects 

of the designation were few, I believe, given limited information 

suggesting material support for the group from individuals in U.S. 

jurisdiction. It is my understanding that they have raised most of 

their money from committing local crimes. 

Many U.S. officials cautioned also, as the chairman stated, that 

the FTO designation might actually serve as a recruitment and 

fundraising tool. Additionally, some global counterterrorism experts 

have made similar arguments about potential complications related 

to the FTO designation, suggesting a designation could inadvertently give additional visibility and credibility to a group among 

international Jihadists, or could make the operations of U.S.-based 

relief agencies in Boko Haram areas more difficult. Given the religious component to the conflicts in northern Nigeria, some experts 

also cautioned against that designation on the grounds that it 

could fuel perceptions that the U.S. was taking sides between Muslims and Christians. 

These and other concerns related to the designation were shared 

by State Department officials, according to former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson. 

It should be noted that the FTO designation primarily triggers 

the freezing of any assets a group might have in U.S. financial institutions, bans FTO members’ travel to the U.S., and criminalizes 

transactions with the organization, but does not convey authorization for direct U.S. military action against a terrorist group. 

Since the designation, however, was made in November 2013, it 

is unclear if it has had any impact on Boko Haram’s financing as 

the extent to which they raise funds from abroad is also unclear. 

As we prepare to hear from today’s witnesses, I hope we can 

learn critical lessons from the vast experience and use them to 

move forward to increase support for the most effective measures 

that bring an end to the scourge of Boko Haram in northern NigeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:07 Nov 13, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\061114\88290 SHIRL
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ria. I am committed to working toward this end and look forward 

to working with my colleagues in Washington and on the continent 

to find the most effective and sustainable solutions. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Ms. Bass. 

I would now like to yield to Mr. Weber. 

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am ready to get going. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Bera. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, Ranking Member Bass for calling this timely hearing. 

Obviously, the grave situation of the nearly 300 girls, that were 

kidnapped near Chibok is something that continues to distress 

many of us. You know, according to the United Nations, we have 

seen over 500 schools that have been destroyed in northern Nigeria 

by Boko Haram, leaving over 15,000 students without access to 

education and scores more, thousands more, who are now really 

fearful about obtaining that education. And, you know, it is those 

acts of terrorism that started to drive folks from just a normal civilized life. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses on what more we 

could do to help better support those within Nigeria, but then also, 

you know, when Ranking Member Bass touched on sources of funding, better funding of Boko Haram, you know, if I read some of the 

reports from Nigerian troops and so forth, many of them feel as 

though, you know, again, if I were to trust the reports, that they 

are underequipped compared to the Boko Haram troops and forces; 

so, you know, if they are going into the north and into some of the 

more difficult terrain to fight against one of the more betterequipped armies in Nigeria. 

One thing that we could do short of actually sending troops in 

would be to look for those sources of funding, and look for those 

foreign sources of funding, and try to as effectively as possible address the sources that are funding the Boko Haram troops and 

their equipment. 

In addition, I think I stand with Chairman Smith and Ranking 

Member Bass and the members of this subcommittee that we are 

committed to doing what we can as the people of the United States 

working with the international community to continue to aggressively address and fight the terrorism that is coming out of Boko 

Haram. 

So with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Bera, thank you very much. 

Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Bass, for holding today’s hearing on this very important issue. And 

even though we are working, obviously, together with some of our 

international partners to secure the return of hundreds of girls kidnapped by Boko Haram to their homes and to their families, we 

continue to learn of additional heinous acts perpetuated by this terrorist organization. In fact, earlier this week it was reported that 

Boko Haram brazenly abducted an additional 20 girls just miles 

away from the site of the kidnapping in April. 

This continued terrorization and intimidation is something that 

no civilized society can tolerate, and certainly we all agree no child 

in the world should live in fear of being kidnapped, forced into 

7

marriage, slavery, or killed solely because they pursue an education or practice of a different religious faith. 

With an estimated 5,000 people killed by Boko Haram-related violence, it is incredibly important that the international community 

continue to strongly condemn these actions, and remain focused on 

this terrorist group, and work together to hold Boko Haram accountable for these really despicable actions. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today about our efforts to respond to the horrific violence of Boko Haram and to doing 

all that we can to respond to the crisis in northern Nigeria. I thank 

the witnesses for being here, and I yield back. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. SMITH. I yield to my friend Mr. Stockman. 

Mr. STOCKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just quick comments, and then I thank you for coming before us 

today. 

One of my concerns is, which I expressed to the chairman, is the 

interpretation of some Nigerians regarding United States efforts. 

And I would think that we are transparent, but apparently there 

are some that believe we have ulterior motives for helping. I can 

assure you, regarding the chairman, that his sole purpose has been 

throughout the world is his compassion for others, and that if the 

leadership or anyone in Nigeria interprets our help or wanting to 

help as anything other than that, then it is incorrect. And I am a 

little bit alarmed at the way it is being portrayed, and I can assure 

you from our standpoint, our motives are there to help and not to 

have a political agenda. 

The other thing I am concerned about, which I would like to get 

answers to, I don’t know if it is a proper forum or we have to have 

a closed hearing, but I would like to know what kind of weapons. 

It is my understanding that some of the weapons from Libya have 

made it into the hands of the terrorists, and, if so, how many weapons and how much? Do we have any comprehensive count of what 

has ended up in their hands and how they are being used? 

If that is the case, everybody knows Libya was an armed camp. 

Ghadafi kept many weapons. For us to sit by and pretend that the 

terrorists don’t have weapons or weapons that could be harmful to 

Nigeria, I think, is a mistake. People say the best way that you can 

cure alcoholism is by first admitting you are an alcoholic; but if we 

don’t have an understanding admitting that we have a problem, 

then we can never cure the problem. And I think we need some 

honest debate, not criticism—we are not here to criticize—but honest debate on what is going on so we can help. 

Mr. Chairman, I think our intentions here today are to find out 

how we can help in the proper way and not being offensive, not 

being a big foot, a big print, but doing something that is real and 

not interpreted in a negative way. And with that, Chairman, I yield 

back. 

Mr. SMITH. I would like to now introduce our very distinguished 

panel, beginning first with Dr. Peter Pham, who is the director of 

the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington. He is the 

incumbent vice president of the Association for the Study of Middle 

East and Africa, an academic organization that represents more 

8

than 1,000 scholars, and is editor-in-chief of the organization’s 

Journal of the Middle East and Africa. 

Dr. Pham was the winner of the 2008 Nelson Mandela International Prize for African Security and Development. He has authored half a dozen book chapters concerning Somali piracy, terrorism, and stabilizing fragile states, as well as more than 80 articles in various journals. 

We will then hear from Mr. Emmanuel Ogebe, who is the manager of the Justice for Jos Project at the Jubilee Campaign, and an 

experienced attorney specializing on international matters focusing 

on Nigeria. Exiled to the U.S. after becoming a political detainee 

during the brutal years of Nigeria’s military dictatorship, Mr. 

Ogebe has played a key role in shaping U.S. policy toward Nigeria 

and its quest for democracy. He has experience in managing, designing, and implementing complex international projects and programs in Nigeria. 

Mr. Ogebe is presently practicing as a legal consultant on Nigeria admitted to the Washington, DC, bar. He holds the distinction 

of being the first specialist on Nigeria out of 100,000 lawyers licensed in Washington, DC. 

Then we will here from Mr. Anslem Dornubari John-Miller who 

served as the chairman of the National Caretaker Committee of the 

National Union of Ogoni Students, as well as the Movement for the 

Survival of the Ogoni People, the parent body under which the 

Ogoni nonviolenct struggle for environmental and social justice is 

being carried out. While in a refugee camp in Benin, he founded 

the National Union of Ogoni Students, where he educated the public on the situation of the Ogoni and drew attention to the plight 

of the refugees who are predominantly students and youth. 

Once resettled in the United States in 1996, he continued his 

work for the Ogoni people, where his efforts resulted in the resettlement of over 1,000 families in the United States. 

And then we will hear from Ambassador Robin Renee Sanders, 

who is CEO of FEEEDS Advocacy Initiative and owns FE3DS, both 

of which craft economic development and business strategies for African countries. In these organizations, she focuses on food security, education, the environment, energy, economic development 

and self-help programs, particularly for small and medium enterprises. Prior to this she served as U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria and 

the Republic of Congo, and was the U.S. Permanent Representative 

to ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West African States. She 

has served twice as the Africa Director at the National Security 

Council at the White House. 

This is a very distinguished panel, and we look forward to your 

insights and recommendations. 

Dr. Pham. 

STATEMENT OF J. PETER PHAM, PH.D., DIRECTOR, AFRICA 

CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Mr. PHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I would like to 

thank you not only for the specific opportunity to testify before you 

today on the subject of the ongoing struggle against Boko Haram, 

but also thank you for the sustained attention which the ComVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:07 Nov 13, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\061114\88290 SHIRL
9

mittee on Foreign Affairs, this subcommittee, and other Members 

of the U.S. House have given to this challenge. 

In it is oversight capacity, the House on this issue has been very 

much ahead of the curve. The very first congressional hearing on 

Boko Haram was in 2011, at which I had the privilege of testifying; 

at that time Boko Haram was considered so obscure that all of the 

participants at that event could have been convened in the proverbial broom closet. Sadly, our analysis proved prescient, and rather 

than fading away, Boko Haram today poses an even greater menace to Nigeria and its people, their neighbors, and, indeed, the 

international community as a whole. 

With your permission, I will present a summary of my current 

assessment of Boko Haram and then ask my prepared statement 

be entered into the record of this hearing. 

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, your full statement and that of all 

the witnesses and any extraneous material you would like included 

in the record will be made a part of the record. 

Mr. PHAM. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, the emergence of Boko 

Haram cannot be understood without reference to the social, religious, economic, and political milieu of northern Nigeria which 

have been marked by persistent corruption and relatively few improvements in socioeconomic indicators of well-being since the restoration of constitutional order to the country, leaving many communities in the north with the perception that they are falling further behind their counterparts. This has given Boko Haram’s message calling for a radical transformation of Nigerian society a wide 

resonance across the region even if the tactics the group has adopted are repugnant to the overwhelming majority of Nigerians irrespective of their ethnic identification or religious affiliation. 

In this context the group proved a useful instrument for the ambitions of certain politicians in northeastern Nigeria, including Ali 

Modu Sheriff, who availed himself of the support of the group’s 

leaders and their organization in his successful 2003 bid for the 

governorship of Borno State, and subsequently appointed a prominent Boko Haram member, Alhaji Buji Foi, to his cabinet as State 

Commissioner of Religious Affairs during his first term, thus giving 

the sect access to not only not inconsiderable public resources, but 

also public persona. 

Eventually the group’s relations with state and local authorities 

soured, tensions escalated, until, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, 

in 2009 security forces moved against the group. Founder Mohammed Yusuf was captured and shot, and not before more than 700 

people were killed, numerous public buildings, including government offices, police stations, schools and churches, were destroyed. 

With most of its leaders as well several prominent backers dead, 

the group receded from public attention, and a number of analysts 

even argued that it was finished. But far from being dead, the 

group underwent a dramatic transformation with help from foreign 

Jihadist groups, including al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb and alShabaab, emerging in what might be described as version 2.0, 

adopting one of the most deadly instruments in the Jihadist arsenal, the suicide bomb, and via attacks in 2011 of the Nigerian police force and United Nations headquarters in Abuja, demVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:07 Nov 13, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\061114\88290 SHIRL
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onstrating itself capable of carrying out attacks far from its usual 

areas of operation. 

2012 proved to be another significant milestone in Boko Haram’s 

evolution. While foreign links were a critical part of its ideological 

and operational shift from version 1.0 to the far more lethal 2.0, 

the takeover of northern Mali by various al-Qaeda-linked Islamist 

militant groups at the end of March 2012 provided a whole new set 

of opportunities leading to what I might term version 3.0. 

During the nearly 10 months in which AQIM and its allies held 

sway over northern Mali, Boko Haram was able to set up a number 

of bases in the territory where hundreds of recruits received ideological instruction, as well as weapons and other training that subsequently raised its tactical sophistication and operational tempo of 

Boko Haram’s attacks in Nigeria, elevating the group to the level 

of a full-fledged insurgency. 

Following the French-led intervention in Mali, the militants, possibly accompanied by a few foreign nationals, returned to northern 

Nigeria not only with training and some combat experience in 

desert warfare, but also vehicles and heavy weapons, including 

shoulder-fired missiles. Within weeks Boko Haram fighters were 

raiding military barracks for even more weapons; staging increasingly bold prison breaks; destroying numerous schools, hospitals 

and other government buildings; and engaging the Nigeria military 

in pitched open battles, and in some cases totally overrunning border towns. 

By the middle of 2013, the militants had effectively evicted Nigerian Government troops and officials from at least 10 local government areas along the borders of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, and 

set themselves up as the de facto authority in the region, often replacing Nigerian flags with their own banner, taxing and otherwise 

ordering citizens about, and creating a large area roughly the size 

of the State of Maryland within which they operated with even 

greater impunity. 

The foreign influence is discernible in the proliferation of the 

kidnappings for ransom, abductions being almost a signature trait 

now. The kidnapping victims now have included not only the 

schoolgirls from Chibok, but previously a French family of seven, 

subsequently freed after the payment of a ransom of $3 million reportedly and the release by Cameroonians of some 16 Boko Haram 

members; a French priest, two Italian priests, and a Canadian nun, 

all of whom were subsequently freed; and, more recently, 10 Chinese citizens abducted from a work site in northern Cameroon and 

still missing. 

Kidnapping for ransom, not only of higher-profile foreign nationals, but hundreds of Nigerians whose families have had to offer 

more modest payments, with most being reported in the order of 

$10,000 to $20,000, although more than $1⁄4 million has been paid 

for more prominent abductees, represent only part of the funding 

stream for Boko Haram, which is rather diversified. As I previously 

noted, the group enjoyed a partnership with state and local politicians as recently as 6 or 7 years ago and, thanks to these wellplaced supporters, appears to have benefited from public resources. 

There is reason to believe that even after the uprising and suppression of the group in 2009, some political actors funneled resources 

11

to it, albeit for a slightly different calculus than earlier politicians. 

Some cells have also been accused of carrying out bank robberies 

and other such, although the extent to which these crimes were 

committed by and for the benefit of Boko Haram as opposed to 

being criminal acts blamed on the group is subject of some debate. 

Two key aspects to bear in mind are that Boko Haram has developed a very diversified and resilient model for supporting itself, 

and that as it increasingly takes on more and more the character 

of an insurgency, it can essentially live off the land with very modest additional resources required, both factors rendering efforts to 

cut off funding particularly challenging. 

On the other hand, in a region where more than two-thirds of the 

population lives on less than $1 a day, the funding, no matter how 

modest, can go very far. For example, it is widely known that Boko 

Haram leaders pay Almajiri youth literally pennies a day to track 

and report on troop movements and in some cases to move weapons 

around. 

A comprehensive strategy is therefore required to respond to the 

burgeoning threat posed by Boko Haram, some of the elements of 

which would include, first, invest in better information and analysis. 

Secondly, encourage the Nigerian Government to deal forthrightly with the threat. Over the years the somewhat lackadaisical 

attitude that some senior Nigerian officials have taken toward 

Boko Haram has been perplexing. It should be noted that not only 

has the Nigerian military been largely ineffectual in its efforts to 

contain the insurgency, some military units spearheading the fight 

against Boko Haram such as the Army’s 7th Division, are so dysfunctional that just last month its soldiers were reported to have 

opened fire on their commanding general. Worse still are the instances of actual complicity with the militants, the motivations behind which run the gamut from political opportunism and/or cynicism to corruption; to social, ethnic, and perhaps even familial ties 

to the militants; and perhaps most concerning of all, ideological 

sympathy for the extremist agenda. 

In addition, address legitimate grievances. At the same time, 

confronting Boko Haram will require that the government carefully 

measure its response. The government, Federal and state, must 

also better address legitimate grievances which have rendered 

meaningful segments of the population amenable to the extremist 

message. 

Finally, promote specialized training for Nigerian security forces. 

Undoubtedly the Nigerian security forces, both military and police, 

could use assistance in the fight against Boko Haram; however, the 

need is less a matter of personnel and equipment than training, especially in intelligence and investigations. With a defense budget 

of approximately $6 billion, Nigeria does not want for material resources; however, what does want is lack of maintenance and how 

to use that equipment. One of the reasons the U.S. recently had to 

deploy and unmanned aerial vehicle to Chad to overfly northern 

Nigeria looking for the schoolgirls is because for want of upkeep, 

none of the Aerostar tactical drones purchased from Israel by Nigeria several years ago today fly. 

12

That being said, tailored efforts that meet vetting requirements 

stipulated by U.S. law can and should help Nigerian forces 

strengthen their civil-military affairs capabilities, facilitate interactions between military forces and civilians, and other useful 

skills. 

Finally, having just returned a day and a half ago from my second trip in a month to the region, we need to help strengthen regional cooperation and the capacity of Nigeria’s neighbors. Boko 

Haram has used Nigeria’s porous borders and the limited capacities of neighboring countries to its advantage. Greater cooperation 

and intelligence sharing between states in the region needs to be 

encouraged and facilitated by international partners. In this regard 

the regional summit in Paris last month is a step in the right direction. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, members of the subcommittee, nothing justifies the outrageous kidnapping of the Nigerian schoolgirls, and every realistic effort should be expended to secure their freedom. However, until the profound pathologies which 

beset the body politic and institutions of Africa’s most populous and 

wealthiest country are addressed, and until Nigeria’s international 

partners move beyond mere rhetorical gestures, it is well nigh inevitable that the tragedy of the Chibok schoolgirls will sadly be repeated many times over as the kidnappings of some 20 women 

from a nearby hamlet just days ago underscore. 

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Pham, thank you very much for your comprehensive testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pham follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. And Mr. Ogebe. 

STATEMENT OF MR. EMMANUEL OGEBE, MANAGER, JUSTICE 

FOR JOS PROJECT, JUBILEE CAMPAIGN USA 

Mr. OGEBE. Yes. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and distinguished Congressmen. I thank you 

kindly for once again giving me the opportunity to engage with you 

on the topic that currently agitates the conscience and the consciousness of many on our globe today. 

I want to share with you some of the perspectives from our recent visits to Nigeria, and I would ask your indulgence that my full 

statement be submitted for the record. 

May I say, sir, that it took the U.S. 25 months after first two 

Americans were attacked by Boko Haram before the designation of 

Boko Haram as an FTO occurred. It took the UK 16 months, after 

the first British citizen was killed, before the UK designated them, 

and it took the U.N. 33 months after the bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Abuja before they imposed sanctions on Boko Haram, 

and on June 2, the EU finally designated Boko Haram a terror 

group even though the first European citizen was killed 25 months 

earlier. 

So this shows there has been a systematic pardon by the international community to drag their foot on a group that is now recognized to be the second deadliest terror group in the world after the 

Taliban. 

May I just say that one of the things we noticed on my recent 

trip to Nigeria last week is that when I was in Nigeria in April, 

the average deaths a week were approximately 100. In the 4 days 

we were in Nigeria last week, the average was 100 a day, and so 

the world is unanimously against Boko Haram, but Boko Haram is 

still horridly against the world. 

May I go on to say with regard to—I have six points here with 

regard to the status of Boko Haram’s activities, but I will only 

mention two. One of them is the elevated gender-based violence. 

And that, of course, we have seen with the abduction of the women, 

but in addition to the abductions, this week we had, for the very 

first time, a report of a female suicide bomber, so Boko Haram is 

continuing to evolve its tactics and its horrors. 

The point number 5 here I will skip to is increased global Jihadi 

ties, and this is important. A British radicalized Nigerian citizen 

has been implicated in the bombing in Abuja that took almost 100 

lives. Now, why this is important is that we have only seen three 

British radicalized Nigerian terrorists undertake attacks. 

The first attack was against the United States of America when 

the underpants bomber tried to blow up a Delta plane. The second 

attack was last year when a British radicalized Nigerian beheaded 

a British soldier on the street, and then the third one was in April 

when they attacked a bus station in Nigeria. What this tells us is 

that Britain is becoming a source destination and transit country 

for terrorists who want to attack in Syria as well as in Nigeria, and 

this, I suppose, validates the fact that global terror is working 

hand in hand to undermine global security. 

Now, if I may go ahead, I would want to talk about Nigeria’s response to the insurgency, and I want to point out, as my colleague 

28

already has, that, you know, Nigeria’s multi-million-dollar CCTV 

cameras and Nigeria’s satellite have dropped out of the sky, so 

there are so many aspects of the dysfunction and inefficiencies in 

the system that complicates the threat metrics in Nigeria. 

I would want to point to point number 4 here where I talk about 

inadequate victim relief and psychosocial support. We met with 

parents of missing kids, and one of them told us how at least two 

parents that he knows have died from the sheer trauma of the not 

knowing what has happened to their kids. This is just the horror 

that keeps on giving, if one may use that expression. 

One of my concerns in trying to work with Nigerian Government 

leaders, especially those working refugee issues on why they have 

not been able to repatriate or assist IDPs was that all of that is 

under the national security advisor, and I would think that something as critical as care for citizens and displaced people would not 

be the forte of the NSA. The NSA has a lot of issues on his hands, 

and so Nigeria has this unwieldy bureaucracy that makes it not effective. 

Maybe I should touch on point number 5 with regard to dwindling troop morale. We have heard, of course, of the mutiny that 

occurred. There was reports yesterday about possible defections to 

Boko Haram, but it is easy to see that all is not well in the military 

establishment in Nigeria. 

I have a sub-header here on the international response, and particularly with regard to the U.S. Our findings indicate that the offices in the U.S. Embassy that should liaise with the Nigerian authorities on some of this critical issues are overstretched and 

understaffed. One of the diplomats expressed that they were sent 

out of Nigeria to a neighboring country at a critical stage in the 

investigations concerning the missing girls, and so that has, of 

course, been a concern for the folks at the Embassy who want to 

work on these issues. 

Similarly, I am aware that some years ago, the Treasury office 

that was located in our consulate in Lagos which is responsible for 

tracking financial crimes and transfers and things of that nature, 

was, for some reason, moved to South Africa, and so you begin to 

wonder, where are the resources to implement the FTO and to—

and to trace terror financing, which is badly needed. 

I would like to skip, if I may, to point number 3 in my statements, and I am talking here about the competitive disadvantage 

the United States has with regard to the area surveillance they are 

currently undertaking in Northern Nigeria in the hope of finding 

the girls. The problem with this is that this is an hour late and 

a dollar short because what has happened is that Boko Haram 

began aerial evasion techniques 11⁄2 years ago when they were in 

northern Mali. They were already conducting drills to evade 

drones, and so when we come in 11⁄2 years later, they are at least 

11⁄2 years ahead of us in that strategy. 

I would like to draw attention to another, I think for me, the 

most unsettling point here, which is poor intelligence. We met last 

week with one of the escaped girls, one of the Chibok girls who escaped from the terrorists, and to our shock and consternation, she 

had not been interviewed by the Nigerian police, she had not been 

interviewed by the Nigerian Army, and so the impression we have 

29

is that for some reason, 2 months after their abduction, the investigations have not been going very well if this key witness has not 

been interviewed by anyone. 

I think it was particularly unsettling that it would take an 

American NGO and an American Congressman to find out the facts 

of what happened to her. And several pieces of information she 

gave us last week are not even in the public domain, and so I am 

concerned that the multi-disciplinary force that the U.S. sent in 

has not been effectively able to work with the Fusion Centers in 

Nigeria to show them the basic groups of how to conduct a missing 

person investigation. 

I have several recommendations here, and I am going to just 

probably work on two. The first is the U.S. needs to provide technical assistance to Nigeria to set up a victim compensation fund 

similar to what we had for 9/11. There does not seem to be a sense 

of urgency on the Nigerian side to provide relief and systematic assistance to victims of this atrocity, and the United States needs to 

encourage Nigeria to do that and share with them the model that 

was used very effectively after 9/11. But let me say here that in 

addition to sharing with Nigeria that model, the United States has 

the ability to fund such a victim relief or compensation fund, not 

by using taxpayers’ money, but by releasing Nigerian funds that 

have been frozen in the United States or have been subject to asset 

forfeiture. We think that this is one way to get the Nigerian Government not only to do what is right, but to do it in a transparent 

manner that directly benefits citizens that have been impacted by 

this situation. 

I want to give kudos, if I may, to the State Department. This 

year they decided to start funding child terror camps for children 

who survive terror and they come to the U.S. to a 9/11 camp and 

get trauma care, and so this is a notable action by the State Department that we would like to applaud. 

Let me maybe throw a challenge now to many Americans, including the American Congresswoman and American Ambassadors who 

have actually gone to school in Nigeria and say that this is a time 

to stand with this country to ensure that there is not a rollback of 

education. 

So I am prepared to wrap up my remarks. I want to maybe point 

out that one of the real concerns for us with regard to the battle 

against Boko Haram is the fact that the United States, State Department in particular, has continued not to be very frank and 

truthful about the threats, the goals of the organizations, their objectives, and so on and so forth. I was particularly concerned to 

read Ambassador Carson saying a couple of weeks ago that Boko 

Haram does not present a threat to the United States of America 

today. Let me point out beyond any doubt that not only has Boko 

Haram remained a threat to the U.S., it has attacked four American citizens that I know of. It has attacked an American diplomat 

working with United Nations, it has attacked an American diplomat working at the American Embassy in Abuja, and it has attacked two American charity workers working in northern Nigeria. 

It beats me why the State Department has not acknowledged that 

still to date. 

30

As I wrap up, I do want to point out that the release and the 

prisoner swap with Sergeant Bergdahl could potentially have a 

negative impact on the ability of the Nigerian Government to negotiate with the terrorists to free the girls. I think that it presents 

itself as a victory to the Taliban, and as a result, Boko Haram may 

decide that, you know, we want the bigger stakes to be able to release the girls. I, therefore, would encourage the U.S. to consider 

the global ramifications of its dealings with terrorists in that nature before they take them, because the danger now is that American citizens might become human bitcoins for terror trades around 

the globe because the terrorists obviously are in constant touch and 

in constant leakages around the world. 

And so these are some of the few quick points I wanted to make, 

and I wanted to again thank you very much for the opportunity to 

share some of this thoughts with you, and I commend your courage 

and your lead in taking this up this issue at a time when no one 

was paying attention. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ogebe follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ogebe, thank you very much for your testimony. 

I just want to note for the record that it was you who set up the 

meeting for me and my staff director to meet with the young 18-

year-old survivor of the Chibok abduction. She left before they had 

even gotten a kilometer away from the school, but still was extraordinarily traumatized, so thank you for setting that up. 

Mr. John-Miller. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ANSLEM JOHN-MILLER, REPRESENTATIVE TO THE U.S., MOVEMENT FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE 

OGONI PEOPLE 

Mr. JOHN-MILLER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, all 

protocols observed. I thank you and members of your committee for 

giving me the opportunity to address you on current developments 

in Nigeria as they relate to the atrocities of the Boko Haram and 

how the United States and Nigeria can continue to work together 

to put an end to the activities of this terrorist group. 

First, I commend the Government and people of the United 

States for condemning the kidnappings of the Chibok girls and the 

Obama administration’s effort with the Nigerian Government to secure the release of these girls. I am very positive that with such 

collaboration, the Chibok girls will ultimately be reunited with 

their families. On the current efforts to rescue the abducted Chibok 

girls, I must emphasize that the United States and other countries 

involved encourage the Nigerian Government to employ every 

means available at its disposal, including diplomacy, to secure their 

release. While I continue to maintain my position that no government should negotiate with any terrorist group, I am deeply concerned that if the same principle is adopted in the case of the 

Chibok girls, their return may not be in the near future. 

Since the abducted girls are Christians, they risk being killed by 

the leader of Boko Haram because he knows that the girls remain 

Christians, despite their so-called conversion. He may resort to killing the girls if force is employed in their rescue just to blackmail 

the Governments of the United States, Nigeria, and others. In this 

regard, I commend the efforts of ex-President Olusegun Obasanjo, 

who has initiated some moves to secure the release of the girls 

through dialogue and diplomacy. 

While the United States and the international community’s attention is focused on how to secure the release of the abducted 

Chibok girls, it is important to note that this sophisticated and coordinated attacks that Boko Haram was carried out after the abduction of the girls show that the organization remains strong, 

bold, and determined to inflict unimaginable harm and destruction 

on Nigeria so that the Nigerian State will plunge into total anarchy 

and chaos, thereby making it ungovernable. 

As such, the ongoing war against Boko Haram in Nigeria should 

be treated—should not be treated with levity or treated as a local 

Nigerian crisis, but should be elevated to the status of the war 

against al-Qaeda. The United States Congress should, therefore, 

work closely with the Obama administration to develop comprehensive counterterrorism strategies that will help Nigeria to crush 

Boko Haram and put an end to the carnage and sufferings of the 

people of the northeastern part of Nigeria and the neighboring 

57

countries of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger Republic. Many terrorism 

experts and scholars have attributed poverty and underdevelopment in the northeast of Nigeria as the cause of Boko Haram and 

prescribed provision of job opportunities and development of the region as a solution to the problem, and I partly agree only in the 

context that poverty and idleness makes youths of the area vulnerable and easy targets for recruitment as Boko Haram operatives. 

However, I strongly believe that if the youth recruited were not interested in terrorism, they would have resisted because poverty, 

underdevelopment, and idleness is not confined only to northeast 

region of Nigeria, but visible everywhere in the country, especially 

in the Ogoni and the Niger Delta regions. 

Solving the problem of Boko Haram in Nigeria cannot be 

achieved without addressing the issue of corruption. While there 

has been much focus on corruption at the national level of governance in Nigeria and the military, very little attention has been paid 

to the level of corruption at the state and local government levels 

in the northeast and other parts of the country. Nigeria operates 

a Federal system of government. We share power between Federal, 

state, and local governments. These states and local governments 

receive monthly allocations from the Federal Government and are 

expected to use the funds to provide basic amenities and develop 

their states and local governments. 

However, such funds end up in the private accounts of the state 

Governors and the local government chairmen installed by the governors, resulting in paltry sums of money being spent on programs 

that have direct impact on the lives of the citizens of the state and 

local communities. 

To address the problem of corruption in Nigeria, I propose that 

the United States Government partner with Nigeria to encourage 

transparency and accountability at all levels of governance. The 

United States should also, through its Justice Department, investigate and confiscate all funds stolen by those in power at all levels 

in Nigeria and saved in banks in New York, Dubai, London, and 

so on, and prosecute the culprits. The benefits those corrupt politicians enjoy now such as sponsoring themselves and their families 

on limitless trips to the United States and other developed countries to spend holidays, buying expensive cars and luxury houses, 

and educating their children in the best schools in foreign countries 

at the expense of suffering masses should be stopped forthwith. 

It is only such decisive steps that will send a clear message to 

the rulers of Nigeria that the United States is serious about tackling corruption in Nigeria. While a few people may argue that the 

United States confiscating and arresting corrupt Nigerian politicians anywhere in the world may amount to interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation, I posit that such a step is reasonable and morally justified, especially since corruption breeds 

discontent and provides a platform for its victims to be recruited 

as agents of terror. 

Closely related to corruption are the human rights abuses committed by the Nigerian soldiers. It is no secret that Nigerian soldiers torture and commit terrible human rights abuses when deployed to various communities, and as such discourage the local 

population from cooperating with them and providing intelligence 

58

that would have helped in accomplishing their missions. A clear example is the activities of Major Paul Okuntimo, the then chairman 

of the disbanded Rivers State Internal Security Task Force who 

committed all sort of atrocities in Ogoniland during the height of 

the Ogoni struggle in the 1990s. Despite the extrajudicial killings 

and crimes against humanity, Major Paul Okuntimo and his men 

committed in Ogoni, he remains a free man walking on the streets 

of Nigeria instead of being locked behind bars. 

In recent times, several allegations of human rights abuses has 

been leveled against the soldiers deployed to northeast to fight the 

Boko Haram insurgency, and to date, no investigations have been 

carried out to unveil the truth or otherwise of the allegations. With 

such negative perception about the soldiers, the citizens find it very 

difficult to collaborate with them, and without the involvement of 

the locals who know the Boko Haram operatives, it is very difficult 

to defeat the terrorist group. 

To address this issue, the United States Government should prevail on Nigeria to set up an independent judicial panel or empower 

the National Human Rights Commission to investigate such allegations, and any soldiers incriminated be prosecuted so as to serve 

as a deterrent to others. A case in point is to also influence the Nigerian National Assembly to immediately pass the Enforcement 

and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, Genocide and Related Offenses bill of 2012. 

The declaration of Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States Government after the initial reluctance 

is a welcome development because it paves way for the United 

States Government to take various steps, including freezing of 

bank accounts, deployment of drones, and other assets to fight the 

terrorists. However, one major step that should be taken that will 

make the current war against Boko Haram successful is to work 

with the Nigerian Government to identify the sponsors of Boko 

Haram and bring them to justice. 

On occasions, notable commanders of the Boko Haram have been 

apprehended while hiding in the houses of influential politicians 

without the host politicians being questioned and investigated over 

their ties with the terrorists arrested. 

With such developments, civilians who would have provided credible and actionable intelligence are afraid that doing so would put 

them at risk, and inasmuch as this ugly trend continues, the Boko 

Haram insurgency will continue. 

To address this challenge, I urge the Congress to mandate that 

the Justice Department to immediately initiate steps to collaborate 

with the Nigerian security and intelligence services to investigate, 

arrest, and persecute all alleged sponsors of Boko Haram in the 

United States, or alternatively, the United States should work with 

other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to set up 

a special terrorism court to try all those arrested for involvement 

in the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Persecuting the sponsors and operators of Boko Haram in an international court will 

send a clear message to members and potential members of the terrorist group that the international community is very serious about 

bringing them to justice. 

59

It is imperative to note that Boko Haram insurgency has both religious and political undertones. The inflammatory and incisive 

statements made by some Islamic clerics and politicians, especially 

from the northern part of Nigeria prior to and after the election of 

President Goodluck Jonathan in 2011 has also served as an incentive to the insurgents. Shortly after the 2011 Presidential election, 

some notable politicians from the north called on the masses in 

northern Nigeria to revolt against the newly-elected President. 

With such statements coming from such influential leaders, their 

supporters subsequently rioted and attacked innocent graduates 

who were employed by the Independent National Electoral Commission, INEC, to help conduct the elections. 

To date, no single individual involved in instigating those unwarranted attacks on innocent graduates who devoted their time and 

efforts for the service of their country have been brought to justice. 

It is also crucial to note that the intensification of the attacks by 

Boko Haram is linked to the forthcoming 2015 general elections, 

and as such, necessary steps have to be taken by the United States 

and the international community to ensure that the outcome of the 

2015 general elections are devoid of all forms of malpractice because such would help in maintaining stability in Nigeria. A major 

step in this direction is to mobilize international observers to ensure that all votes are counted immediately at the polls and at the 

polling stations in the forthcoming 2015 general elections. 

As the United States Government seek ways to assist Nigeria in 

addressing some of our challenges, it is also instructive that both 

countries identify flash points where future crisis might erupt and 

take proactive steps to address them. A clear example of such flash 

points is the case of Ogoni. The Ogoni people, since the 1990s, had 

made presentations to the Nigerian Government and Shell and the 

international community to address the environmental challenges 

caused by reckless oil exploration in the area. To date, nothing has 

been done about it. 

In August 2011, the United Nations Environment Programme released the report of its findings in Ogoniland and submitted a report to President Jonathan who promised to promptly implement 

the report. In anticipation of a massive protest by the Ogoni people 

for failure of the government to implement the report after 1 year, 

the government, in 2012, established the Hydrocarbon Pollution 

Control and Restoration Agency, HYPREP. Despite their reservations, the Ogoni people assured the government and Shell that they 

will work with the government to implement the report. However, 

it is sad to note that to this date, very little attention has been 

paid to that. However, the United States has a role to play. It 

should encourage the Nigerian Government to address issues that 

are legitimate and will also be flash points in future. 

While the UNEP report remains unresolved, hundreds of Ogoni 

refugees and political asylum-seekers remain stranded in the Federal Republic of Benin, living under dehumanizing conditions such 

as no access to food, medication, education, and the rest. One of the 

cardinal solutions to the Ogoni problem has—as advanced by the 

Ogoni people, has been to ask the Nigerian Government to at least 

establish a Bori state. To date, not much has been said about that. 

However, it is difficult to assess that the outcome of the ongoing 

60

national conference in Abuja will be helpful given the majority 

versus minority efforts. 

Lastly, I would call on the United States Government that as a 

strong partner of Nigeria, they continue to work with the Nigerian 

Government to encourage address our problems. However, one 

major step that can be taken is to appoint a special envoy that will 

work with the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission to coordinate 

the efforts because so far, it is clear that both the United States 

has what it is doing on one hand and the Nigerian Government on 

the other hand. Once again, thank you for giving me opportunity 

to address you. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. John-Miller. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. John-Miller follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. I would like to now welcome Ambassador Sanders. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBIN RENEE SANDERS, 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, FEEEDS ADVOCACY INITIATIVE 

(FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO NIGERIA) 

Ambassador SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bass, 

and members of the committee, I want to thank you for inviting me 

here today to testify before you. I just returned from Nigeria and 

was in-country when the international community became more 

aware of the horrible kidnapping of 247 girls by Boko Haram on 

April 14, 2004. 

Honorable members, you have asked the panel today to discuss 

the ongoing crisis in Nigeria, and there are several components to 

this issue. However, my remarks will be based on my knowledge 

of the region, as I have been in every state in Nigeria and traveled 

by road from Abuja to Boko Haram’s current expanded territory at 

least four times during my tenure there; what I know of Boko 

Haram before and since its resurgence, noting that it existed since 

the late 1990s; and my conversations and firsthand observation 

while on my recent trip. 

I will address three things: The security environment in Boko 

Haram and areas of possible additional assistance; why Boko 

Haram was not initially considered an FTO or Foreign Terrorist 

Organization; and address what I am hearing on Chibok by my 

contacts. 

First, the Nigerian security services in the face of Boko Haram. 

Current Nigerian services have never experienced anything like 

what they are facing with Boko Haram today. They need to understand that Boko Haram is unlike the Niger Delta conflict, and they 

need to toss out that playbook in records to this conflict. Boko 

Haram is executing asymmetrical warfare, and for the most part, 

this is outside of the framework of the security forces and their capability to effectively respond. 

The Nigerian security services have been in recent conflicts, particularly the military, in recent conflicts in northern Mali, including the initial Nigerian Force Commander. The troops that have 

also served in Darfur are probably the few that have had the closest experience to asymmetrical warfare, which they are facing now. 

It is good that Nigeria has accepted international assistance. 

From my time on the ground, they have always had—I am talking about the Nigerian military and security services—the following challenges: Airlift, and these are also concurrent with my 

recommendations. Airlift. Airlift is key to troop rotation. As I heard 

reports on the ground of PTSD while I was there, it is important 

because of the distances and tough road travel in the northeast, 

and airlift is also important because it will help them react faster 

to the changing situation on the ground as they try to cover 

600,000 square miles of territory about the size of either Georgia 

or Wisconsin. 

The services need additional materiel, a special mobile communications equipment, vehicles, technology-based bomb detection 

equipment. From what I saw in many places when I was on the 

road there, the bomb detection equipment is quite rudimentary, 

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and they certainly need improved control over the porous borders, 

as we have already heard from my colleagues. 

They need improved military planning, logistics, equipment supplies, including sufficient spare parts and fuel. They need to expand its small special forces unit and its 24/7 counterterrorism center, both which were stood up or begun to stood up while I was 

there. They need to establish a satellite CT center closer to the 

northeast so information doesn’t take so long to reach and be analyzed. They need more rapid response forces or what we call mobile 

units and probably more outposts. Security service personnel and 

resources are both stretched thin. Realignment is better needed to 

address the current threat, improvement in strategic communication and review of existing communication approaches because 

what they have now is not working internally or externally with affected communities, particularly with the families. 

I would suggest a liaison committee led by someone respected for 

their human rights values that engages with and keeps the families informed, not someone who is a spokesperson used to dealing 

with the press, but a real advocate for the families. 

I traveled through Kano last month by road, and on my way to 

visit an agricultural project, I did observe a lot of the checkpoints 

along the way. There are about 30 to 50 kilometers apart. I did not 

see the ability to communicate between most checkpoints. I understand that in the northeast this is more acute as distances between 

some checkpoints are greater, adding to what we already know 

that information is not reacted to in a timely or effective matter. 

I am not excusing the poor responses and late reaction date. I am 

just providing recommendations from a strategic perspective on 

things that can be and need to be addressed right now, and I would 

hope that the assistance packages for Nigeria are including this. 

I also want to highlight that I think that this is a long war and 

a long conflict. Nigeria is at the beginning of this, and they have 

to realize this. This is no longer a localized conflict or insurgency. 

There is no easy fix, and every attack in response to Boko Haram 

cannot be viewed as a death knell blow to it. Long-range security 

framework to terrorist threat is what is needed. The security services need to regroup, reapproach, readdress in order to begin to get 

off their heels on the defensive and get more on an aggressive offensive footing. 

Right now, the security services are outgunned and out-strategically played. One thing I also want to put into the mix on which 

I am not sure there has been much focus is the language differences. Most of the security services in the northeast are Hausa 

speaking, while the majority of the village populations in both 

Borno and parts of Yobe are Kanuri speakers. Just like the U.S. 

Military had to ramp up on its Arabic speakers for Iraq, the Nigerian military will need to increase its Kanuri speakers as well. 

My next comment will be an unpopular thing to hear from many, 

but there are people and elements in the Nigerian military who are 

committed and serious, but they are under-supported and need resources. This does not dilute the issues of the very real challenges 

for security forces and reports in the past of corruption and failure 

to respond. That being said, I had several rank and file security 

service members come up to me on my last trip to say, ‘‘Madam, 

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you know some of us. You know we are not all bad. We do our jobs 

for our country. Tell people this, Madam,’’ and I said that I would. 

I highlight this to underscore who is going to fight this war, who 

is going to fight this conflict if it is not for the Nigerian security 

forces, along with assistance from the international community. 

They are the vanguard on this conflict, so we need to help them 

pull up their bootstraps as an institution, address any challenges 

that they might have, get it together so that they can effectively 

fight and fight the security threat they are facing. If this entire security structure becomes demoralized, then who is going to fight 

this conflict? 

There have already been reports of one or two incidents where 

military units allegedly have shown their frustration by shooting at 

commanders’ convoys. One happened when I was there. Relationships with neighbors on terms of sharing intelligence. Neighbors 

around Nigeria, they need to really work together and begin to 

really share not only resources but human intelligence information 

from villagers in Nigeria as well as neighboring countries. This will 

be critical elements to fighting this war, this conflict. 

There has to be better control of the porous borders and cooperation. P–3 surveillance planes can assist with this, but in the end, 

on-ground human intelligence is going to be key. Boko Haram also 

has been brutal, so brutal that that several villages and markets 

have completely disappeared. And I really appreciate your comment, Mr. Chairman, about raising the food security issue. Food is 

becoming scarce as planting and commerce have both dried up. The 

international community also needs to keep an eye on the food security situation as food shortages could become a real issue down 

the line. 

Turning to the question of the designation of Boko Haram as a 

Foreign Terrorist Organization. As I said earlier, Boko Haram has 

been around since the late 1990s and was more commonly referred 

to then and going forward, up until about 2003, as the Nigerian 

Taliban. Prior to the last 4 years, it executed localized sabotages, 

attacks on police stations, and recruited young people into the 

group but no kidnapping at that time. Evidence of some Boko 

Haram contacts with AQIM started to surface about 9 months after 

the extrajudicial killing of its then leader Muhammad Yusef and 

his key lieutenant Al Haji Buji Foi in July 2009. This was shared 

with the then-government. 

I was in Nigeria when Yusef was captured and killed, almost before the cameras, by Nigerian police. From early 2010 until August 

2011, almost a full year, there was a lull with some small acts and 

again localized. The morphing of Boko Haram to using al-Qaeda or 

AQIM-like tactics to achieve the goal of establishing an Islamic extremist caliphate began really surfacing in mid 2011 with the 

bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Abuja. And since then, Boko 

Haram has continually gotten more expansive in both its reach and 

brutality from 2010 to 2014. 

I will expect disagreement on this, but earlier than August 2011, 

before it bombed the U.N. headquarters in Abuja, in my view, Boko 

Haram would not have met the third leg of the cited FTO designation in the law. It must be a foreign organization; check. It must 

be engaged in terrorist activity; check. Its terrorist activity or terVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:07 Nov 13, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\061114\88290 SHIRL
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ror must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or national security. That didn’t really start to happen until 2011, and the rest of 

the designation also outlines that you have to have a consistent 

record over time in order to start making the case for FTO which 

began at that time. 

Chibok. First, my heart goes out to the families and the missing 

girls wherever they might be as I know they are suffering, scared, 

and afraid. In Paris Monday, there was a global conference on 

women, and one of the things that was said regarding the Chibok 

girls is that this tragedy is the epitome and dehumanization that 

girls do not have the right to control their own fate, their own education, and who they might choose to marry. 

Despite reports out of Nigeria, I do not think, and this is my personal view and assessment from having just been out there, that 

most of the girls have been in Nigeria for a long time. We have no 

idea how long ago the videos being shown were taken. And these 

terrorist groups learn from each other, and Boko Haram is nothing 

but strategic; therefore, I think it is unlikely that most, maybe not 

all, the girls have been put into smaller groups, taken across the 

border to Chad or Cameroon or elsewhere, or even if they remain 

in Nigeria or some of them do, they are probably in smaller groups 

or in singular situations. So again, the human intelligence factor, 

the HUMINT, that means everybody working together, sharing on 

ground resources is going to be critical to hopefully finding some 

of them. 

I also do not want us to forget that from January through March 

2014, young girls were being kidnapped, killed, terrorized, and brutalized by Boko Haram. Yesterday, as we already heard, more than 

20 more women were reported kidnapped near Chibok. 

During January through March 2014, young girls were burned to 

death in their dorms, other kidnapped, divided up based on their 

physical maturity level, and those who showed signs of puberty had 

their throats cut. All of these actions show that Boko Haram 

Shekau is acting on one of his stated goals, that he would make 

the mothers and the daughters of Nigeria suffer in revenge for the 

capture of Boko Haram family members by Nigerian security 

forces. 

I highlight all of these things to underscore that we as the international community cannot be sporadic on these horrible human 

rights violations and brutality of young girls. We must do all we 

can to protect the young women in the north, and I have a few recommendations, mostly on the human side of things just in case the 

current assistance packages are not including these things. 

I strongly believe that more trauma and grief counseling for the 

families and the returned girls must be at the top of the list. I already mentioned the liaison committee by someone respected for 

their human rights values that can help keep the families informed 

and also to avoid the similar tragedy that happened in Malaysia 

with the families not being informed and not kept in the loop. Ensure that the girls that have returned and their families are protected so they don’t become victims again. 

As I am sure, Boko Haram is watching what happens with them. 

If we protect their faces, this doesn’t mean that Boko Haram elements can’t figure out who they are, so we need to be careful with 

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their safety. I also believe that President Jonathan should meet 

with the families, even if it is not in Chibok. 

And I am not making an apples-and-oranges comparison necessarily, but if the world community can mobilize tons of financial 

technical human resources to find the missing Malaysia plane of 

239 people, it can mobilize the same, it can mobilize the same, to 

find the 247 girls, no matter in what country they are located. 

Things such as mistrust among neighboring countries in sharing 

intelligence information must take a back seat. I do see an array 

of assistance but nowhere near the level of mobilization that is 

probably needed by the entire international community full-time, 

all the time. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, thank you Ranking Member Bass, and 

members of the committee. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Sanders follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Ambassador, thank you very much for your, again, 

comprehensive statement, but also your very comprehensive recommendations as to what should be done. You asked the threshold 

question, who is going to fight this war, and of course it is Nigerian 

military. I think your point about that Boko Haram is executing 

asymmetrical warfare, that is, for the most part, is outside of the 

framework of the security forces and their capacity to effectively respond is a very profound and necessary statement. 

People are wondering why the success has not been gleaned by 

the military. I remember in Darfur, meeting with troops that had 

been deployed there as peacekeeping. This isn’t a peacekeeping 

mission. This is, as we all know, a counterinsurgency mission that 

requires a very, very specialized set of skills and training, and as 

Dr. Pham has pointed out in his testimony, you know, the 650-man 

battalion that is being trained up, while that is good, that is certainly only a drop in the bucket, I would respectfully submit, as to 

what is necessary. 

So my first question to the panel would be—as I said in my opening, I am very much in favor of vetting, as you pointed out, Dr. 

Pham, in your statement. Vetting is important, tailored efforts that 

meet the current vetting requirements can help Nigerian forces 

strengthen their civil-military affairs capabilities, but there are 

some aspects to vetting and exclusion of certain individuals who 

are capable and are not human rights abusers that may be excluded because of the current modalities employed by the Leahy 

amendment, and I was wondering if any of you, perhaps the Ambassador or Dr. Pham or any of our distinguished panelists would 

like to speak to that. 

Your point about the command and control and the ability to 

communicate, Madam Ambassador, is right on. I was there on the 

ground for 4 days and heard some of the U.S. experts and others, 

not being critical, but being observing what is taking place. The 

ability to communicate quickly, effectively with actionable information has to be at the top; otherwise, Boko Haram is gone, they have 

moved on, they have either abducted or killed in another area, and 

now they are somewhere else, so I think your point was extremely 

well taken there. 

Maybe there is a need, if you would speak to this as well, $6 billion. I have heard as much as $8 billion for their defense budget. 

Given their oil reserves and capacity there, money shouldn’t be an 

object to ensuring that there is, for want of a better word, an emergency supplemental funding to make sure that the bullets, the capabilities are there, including command and control, in a very, very 

expedited way so that the troops that are trained, properly vetted, 

counterinsurgency capacity can wage a battle, as you pointed out, 

Madam Ambassador, this is going to be a long-term battle. I think 

we kid ourselves if we think this is going away anytime soon, especially since it is in ascendancy, not descendancy, so if you could 

speak to that issue as well. 

And finally, on the issue of intelligence. I am very proud of what 

the United States is doing and very impressed by the capabilities 

of our men and women who are providing intelligence at the Fusion 

Center. It is, as you said, Dr. Pham, a very light footprint. It is 

very important that there not be a huge international presence, the 

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likes of which could be counterproductive, particularly to the propaganda war being waged by Boko Haram but very, very well focused 

capacity, assistance, and training, it seems to me, ought to be 

quadrupled, particularly in the area of training. I mean, they have 

the troops. They have the motivation. They just need a specialized 

skill that those of us in the West have been fighting, particularly 

our militaries, for so long in combating al-Qaeda and other kinds 

of groups, so if you could speak to those issues, I would appreciate 

it. 

Mr. PHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just briefly address 

your three points and defer to my colleagues. On the Leahy amendment, we all share the belief that, by and large, the Leahy law protects U.S. interests in the long term, but you do raise the question 

of the exclusion of qualified individuals who might be useful in this 

current fight. 

I would emphasize, I think, that the Leahy law, as I understand 

it, excludes battalion- and brigade-level units that have been implicated in, or at least well-documented human rights abuses. In 

many respects, what is needed in many of these units to raise morale in not only training but reforming of new units to give them 

a new identity, a new start. Before I turn away, I don’t want to 

say the Leahy law is irrelevant, but in a way we have got to work 

around. Although, already we have vetted 187, I believe, Nigerian 

military units and 173 police units, so there are actually whole Nigerian units that could receive assistance even now in their current 

form, but for other units, I think we can get qualified people, and 

sometimes that is the best thing. We have learned our own experience of the last decade in some of the wars, sometimes pulling people from different units and forging them together is the best way 

to move ahead. So I think we can—there are workarounds. We just 

need to be creative about it. 

Secondly, with respect to resources, I would tend to emphasize 

that we can get more, no puns intended, bang for our buck with 

Nigeria’s neighbors. Nigeria is a wealthy country. It can afford—

it needs training, but it can afford resources. The neighbors are 

less well-off, especially countries that have demonstrated a political 

will to fight the terrorists, Niger being a good example of that, but 

simply don’t have the resources, and there, because it is a smaller 

country, smaller military, we can better account for the funding 

being spent and the multiplier effect of having them seal their borders which Boko Haram has been using to cross, crossing Niger, 

Chad, other countries, might be a better use of our limited resources and then devote our resources in Nigeria to training rather 

than materiel, which Nigerians are more that capable of paying for 

themselves. 

And finally, on the intelligence issue. I probably would agree 

with your assessment on the good that we have done with the 

small number we put there, and we certainly can increase that. 

One thing, I would be remiss if I didn’t use this opportunity to 

raise the fact that we do not yet, after years of constantly talking 

about this year in and year out, and Ambassador Sanders, I think, 

will be able to comment on, we have yet to deploy a diplomatic mission north of Abuja. This is an area with arguably the largest Muslim population in all of Africa, larger than even Egypt’s population 

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if you think about the number of Nigerians in the north. We don’t 

have a diplomatic installation. We don’t have even the lightest of 

footprints to build bridges, to gather knowledge of the people and 

to build relationships, which will help in—when we have to ramp 

up in these cases, an we need to revisit this with, I think, far 

greater urgency than even in the past. Thank you. 

Mr. OGEBE. Yes. I have a couple of quick points here, sir, and 

the first is that as we worked on advocacy to bring about the designation, the FTO designation, we found that it was easier to 

blacklist a foreign army under Leahy than it was to get a designation for a terror organization, and so that was, I thought, ironic. 

Secondly, the guidelines for appealing an FTO designation are 

easier than for reversing a blacklist under Leahy, so I think there 

needs to be some kind of parity between the two because we need 

some of this foreign armies to help us with regional security considerations. 

The second point I wanted to quickly address was military capacity. Nigeria used to have a really outstanding Air Force, but all the 

years of military dictatorship saw attrition, internal attrition as 

generals—one general after the other killed off some of the best pilots, and so on and so forth, they had, so we now see a Nigerian 

Air Force that is a shell, a real shell of its former self. And last 

year Boko Haram attacked an air force base and destroyed five 

jets, and the Army’s response was, oh, you know, oh, the jets were 

faulty anyway, so it wasn’t a big loss. But what are they doing having five broken down jets in your base in the first place? 

I think the one last point I will make on this is that part of the 

problem with the military strategy is that there is so much 

disinformation that it is difficult to even know where to help them. 

They are not being truthful about losses, about combat incidents, 

and so on and so forth, so you don’t know what really is going on. 

And from what we can tell, they are taking a really bad bashing, 

as the Boko Haram video of the attack on Giwa barrack shows. 

They are really getting the short end of the stick in this battle. 

Thank you. 

Ambassador SANDERS. Thank you for your questions, Mr. Chairman. I want to start on the intelligence issue because I think we 

need to have a broader discussion about expanding what we mean 

by that. Certainly I am 100 percent behind you in terms of the capability of U.S. intelligence. I had the privilege of having access to 

that, so I do respect that, but I am actually talking about human 

intelligence on the ground, having a way to either better communicate with villagers and locals living in the area so you get a better sense of what is going on, which is why I kind of raised the language issue because I remember being up there and being with 

Hausa speakers in terms—even the military police contingents that 

were with me and not being able to communicate once we got outside of Maiduguri with the population outside of the capital because they weren’t speaking the same language. 

So when you look at some of these outlying areas, I was wondering whether or not, as part of this communication is that needs 

to be looked because maybe they are just not being able to communicate with each other. I am not reducing the issue any by saying 

that, but I think it is an issue that needs to be looked at. We found 

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that for ourselves in Iraq, and I think it may be an issue for the 

Nigerians to pay attention to, so those two things. 

In terms of intelligence also, the CT center, which I won’t say 

where it is, but I think they need to really have a satellite center 

closer to the area of conflict because if everything has to come back 

to where that center is located to be analyzed and reacted to, you 

are looking at days and sometimes weeks here to do that, so that 

is a reality that I think—I won’t say it is a quick fix, but it is certainly a reality that can address some of the issues. 

And then in terms of troops, I don’t know how many of the troops 

who serve in Darfur and Mali are either being included, maybe 

they are not even based in the north, I have no idea, but are they 

in this group that has been vetted that can actually provide some 

intel in terms of how you deal with asymmetrical warfare to their 

colleagues on the ground. I think that is a big issue. 

They have only a small special forces unit, and so maybe that is 

additional—I think maybe the trainers that we have there now 

from the U.S. are helping to do that, but their special units need 

to be expanded, and they have to have more mobile units than they 

have right now. 

Transportation from one point to another. I don’t know if you 

have been up there or my colleagues have been up there in recent 

times, but it is a very, very difficult environment to travel in, so 

I can’t—I can’t underscore enough the need for equipment, vehicles, 

and others. 

On the human rights issue—sorry. 

Mr. SMITH. Would you yield briefly? Would you encourage the Nigerian Government to do an emergency supplemental as we would 

do here, as we have done time and again to appropriate additional 

funds, because I heard story after story of too little ammunition, 

too little of everything, and how do you fight a battle or a war 

when you don’t have the capability in terms of munitions? 

Ambassador SANDERS. I have two responses to that. One, I think 

the money is there and they have enough money to do it. I don’t 

think the money is being deployed properly, and I don’t think it is 

getting where it needs to be. So you can add more money to the 

fire, but if it still doesn’t get deployed where it needs to be and utilized properly, you are still going to have the same issue, so I 

would stress deployment and utilization of the resources they have 

more effectively and more efficiently and getting them to the right 

people that need to have it, and certainly, in the northeast, they 

are short on a lot of things, even fuel, you know, to get from one 

place to another. 

On the human rights issue, one of the things that I had suggested when I was on the ground recently, not this year but the 

end of last year, was really looking at having fast track military 

courts on human rights issues so that there is transparency in the 

process, that the public knows, the military knows, and there is a 

sense of addressing impunity if things do happen in the human 

rights arena. So, that hasn’t been done yet, and I still think that 

that is something that they can do. 

The neighbors, cannot be stressed enough, their role is extremely 

important. They don’t have the resources, but it is not only just resources. There is a general mistrust in sharing intelligence across 

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countries, and I think that somehow we, maybe we can play a facilitating role in helping address that mistrust because without 

that kind of coordination, cooperation, and communication, then all 

the human intelligence stuff that we are talking about, even hard 

intelligence, is not going to be useful if it is not responded to in an 

effective and coordinated manner. 

On the FTO. I can just say this. I think that the—and then I will 

go back to Leahy, but on FTO, I would encourage, Mr. Chairman 

and Ranking Member Bass, that your subcommittee and your staff 

take a look at the details of the FTO. We are in a completely new 

global environment. When you look at the date on some of these 

updates, 1985, 1988, 1989, you know, we are in a completely different global world today than we were at that time, and we have 

a—I won’t say a Cold War element here because it is not, the dates 

don’t correspond, but in a way, it is structured that way, and in 

the end, I think that a closer look needs to be taken for the FTO 

so that we don’t wait 12 months, 25 months, 33 months to designate an organization that needs to be designated as such. So I 

would encourage that. 

I have already talked about the equipment issue. On presence in 

the north. That is really a thorn in my side, I must say, and I presume that my colleagues, who are on the ground there, feel the 

same. 

We have tried, I know, to establish a presence in the north several times. When I was there, there was an administrative decision 

at least. We didn’t get to implementation phase to try to have a 

small consulate in Kano. There were a lot of administrative challenges to executing on the ground, most of which was security. How 

do we protect the Americans that would be there? What we did 

have there in Kano, in Bauchi, and in Borno, and I went to all 

three sites, we did have an American corner presence. I don’t think 

because of the state of emergency that we can have those anymore, 

and the security situation; so the diplomatic issue, fundamentally 

and theoretically is absolutely on target. The reality, though, 

makes it a challenge for us as a government. How do we protect 

the people that are there, and how can they effectively do their jobs 

if they are then hunkered down and can’t get out? So that is the 

reality that we have to talk about because American lives come 

first. 

On the Leahy amendment on vetting, I think that we can find 

qualified people and elements. As I said, I know a lot of them personally. I have worked with them firsthand. I went to every single 

military exercise that I could get to to really have a better sense 

of what the capability was and the environment was; and as I said, 

there are a lot of good, dynamic people in the Nigerian security 

services. I had two military police responsible for my protection 

when I was there for 3 years, top notch guys. 

So I would argue that, you know, let’s walk the fine line that we 

have to walk on this, provide the training and assistance that we 

need to provide to the elements that we are sure of that have not 

been implicated in human rights violation. If they can stand up a 

fast-track military court to be able to address those other issues, 

let’s get that done. And I think that I have addressed all of your 

initial questions. 

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Ms. BASS. Thank you very much. I really want to thank all of 

the panelists. I think this has been an exceptional hearing, and I 

appreciate your information and your input and your recommendations. I just had a couple of questions. The report suggests that the 

Nigerian Government has been hesitant to accept U.S. assistance 

and, as a matter of fact, my understanding is we were trying to 

provide that assistance right away, and there was reluctance on 

their part; and I wanted to know if members of the panel could respond to that and maybe provide us some kind of insight. I would 

also like to know if that has changed. 

In my comments, I did go through several ways that I know our 

Government has been involved; but that doesn’t necessarily mean 

it is all that welcome. And, Ambassador Sanders, and this also applies to other members of the panel, too, I wanted to know what 

you feel specifically, especially in the north, are the most pressing 

concerns. I know it is poverty, but what exactly does that mean? 

And I did understand that there was a Nigerian entrepreneur who 

said that he is going to go up to the north and provide some jobs. 

I don’t know how specific or realistic that is. And I would, you 

know, agree with the panelists. It might have been Mr. John-Miller, I am not sure, who said that it is not just about poverty, but 

poverty does set the stage. When people are desperate, they will 

join forces like Boko Haram. So, anyway, I wanted to know about 

that. 

And this is just a side note for Dr. Pham. You said that the Nigerians had drones from the Israelis, but the drones don’t fly, and I 

just wanted you to finish that. You made that comment, but I 

wanted you to explain about that. Thank you. You can start, Dr. 

Pham. 

Mr. PHAM. Thank you, Ranking Member Bass. I will start with 

the last one on the drones. Two years ago on the ramp-up after the 

big wave of attacks on 2011, Nigeria purchased a number of drones 

from Israel, Aerostar drones. They also purchased, and the government allocated, reportedly $20 million for a maintenance contract. 

The Israeli firm that was supposed to maintain the drones came, 

set up shop. They never got paid, and so after a few months of this, 

although the money was allocated, they closed up shop and went 

away. They are in business to make money. They went away, and 

then no one picked up the slack. The money was allocated, and the 

good Lord knows where the money went. And so 2 years later when 

the drones are needed, not being maintained for 2 years, they don’t 

fly; and that is just one anecdote, and one could find others. 

A couple years ago some of my colleagues at the Atlantic Council, 

in the Africa Center, did an analysis of the Nigerian fleet and how 

many of the vessels listed in the battle order were in dry dock, and 

it was a good two-thirds of the fleet. So it is a systematic problem. 

It is not going to be solved overnight, and it doesn’t reflect on individuals who really want to serve their country. But it is a systematic issue. But they did have the drones. That is an open source 

bit of information out there that they have the drones, but none of 

them fly. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Would other witnesses like to respond to 

some of the other issues I raised? 

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Mr. JOHN-MILLER. Well, on the issue of the north and what 

should be done, it is not just an issue of underdevelopment in poverty, because like I said in my presentation, poverty is all about a 

place. If you go to the Niger Delta and look at the landscape, you 

will agree that the situation is not as grave as the Niger Delta. 

And even when the Niger Delta took up arms, when they were told, 

look enough is enough, they listened. So to tell me that poverty is 

responsible for the situation, that is not accurate. It has to be 

looked at from the lens of politics. The belief has been that it is 

a north-south divide when it comes to political offices. 

When a President comes from the north, obviously power 

changes hands when Yar’Adua came, and unfortunately he passed, 

power went to Goodluck Jonathan from the Niger Delta. And the 

belief was that when Jonathan completes his 4 years, it should go 

back to the north. With the belief that Jonathan is about to complete his 4 years and go, that is one of the reasons why you see 

the intensification of attacks. So this issue has to be addressed. As 

far as leadership in Nigeria is concerned, it is open to all. Not just 

a matter of one zone producing the elite of the country and then 

for some reason when the other one is unable to produce, it now 

brings up issues, and then there is crisis. 

It is also clear that corruption, until we deal with the issue of 

corruption, no matter the human intelligence we have and all that, 

corruption invades every aspect. Look at the case of the military. 

How can you have a functional military when the budget of the 

military is unbelievable, but where are the weapons to show that 

the budget actually was spent on the weapons. 

Ms. BASS. And one of the reasons why I asked you the question 

was I was just trying to identify some solutions. 

Mr. JOHN-MILLER. Right. So what should be done is this. The 

U.S. Government and the international community needs to sit 

down with the leadership of Nigeria and make it imperative to 

them that this the trend that corruption is having on the situation 

in the country. 

Ms. BASS. So the first question I was asking was about Nigerians’ reluctance to accept U.S. assistance, so within that context, 

how can we do what you just said? 

Mr. JOHN-MILLER. Okay. I read in the papers, and I am also 

going to bring you back to the issue of culture and also ethnicity 

as also part of it. When the U.S. responded that they were going 

to give the Nigerian Government drones and all that, everybody 

welcomed it. I issued a statement. It was just a few northern politicians who opposed it, and the reason for opposing it is that they 

see it as a way of empowering Jonathan; and if the assistance is 

accepted, it will certainly expose them, who are the sponsors of 

Boko Haram. 

So in their way, they don’t want anything that will give opportunity for the security operatives to unveil the real sponsors of 

Boko Haram. That is why no matter what you do, they will always 

criticize that. The best thing that should be done is to come out 

clearly and say as long as this is terrorism, if you are implicated, 

you will be picked up. This is a national security issue. It has nothing to do with politics. If you even look at the arguments over 

whether the Chibok girls are abducted or not, you will see that it 

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is politics. The Borno government is saying that the Federal Government is not doing enough. The Federal Government is saying, 

no, you are not doing enough. You will see that there is no unity 

amongst the levels of government; and when it comes to terrorism, 

the safety of lives and property of the citizens comes first. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. Maybe I can hear from the other two witnesses. 

Mr. OGEBE. Yes. I was going to say that part of the reluctance 

of Nigeria not accepting foreign assistance is this persona, this 

whole persona of, oh, big brother Africa; you know, we are the 

world. We take care of everyone; no one takes care of us. So that 

clearly was a constraint. But talking to some of the military 

sources in Nigeria for example, regarding the FTO, they did hint 

that there was a reluctance by politicians to have finances being 

tracked and all of that. So that may have been why they were not 

gung ho about FTO designation themselves. But I think that Nigeria is now at the point where they realize they can’t go it alone. 

And if this is any encouragement to you, some of the families we 

met last week told us how they were contributing $70,000. These 

are poor peasant families. But a witch doctor in Cameroon had apparently offered to help them bring back their girls, and these poor 

families were trying to raise that money; and here is what they 

told us. They said when we heard in the news that the Americans 

were coming, we decided not to raise that money, and that was for 

me very uplifting. And that was for me very uplifting. And I think 

it illustrates the point that they were retreating back into the dark 

ages because their government had failed. And then they saw a 

glimmer of hope from the world, and that is why the majority of 

them are excited about America’s intervention. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. Thank you. Let me go on to Ambassador Sanders. 

Ambassador SANDERS. Thank you, Ranking Member Bass. You 

are absolutely right in terms of there being a resistance to receiving U.S. military training more than anything else, not necessarily 

equipment, but really sort of the training. I saw that firsthand 

when I was on the ground. I spent my first 12 months or 18 

months fighting back their concerns about AFRICOM. If you put 

things back in context, you know, do a little bit of history on this 

issue, AFRICOM had really just been stood up for a couple years 

before, and there was this phobia about AFRICOM on the continent. When I landed in Nigeria, the phobia on AFRICOM was at 

an all-time high, not wanting a military footprint on the continent, 

all of those things that we have now seen kind of dissipate. 

I have always been a big advocate of AFRICOM in terms of its 

capability for training, the intel it brings to the table and everything else. As I said, my team and I worked really hard to change 

that dynamic around in Nigeria. So, yes, you are absolutely right. 

There was that resistance early on, and maybe things would have 

been different. Now I see a huge change in that. As you said, the 

AFRICOM commander was just there. I know he went to several 

locations, not just in the capital, and I think that is a real turning 

point for Nigeria. 

Let me just put one word of caution on the table though. As we 

move forward, now that we have this open door and there is a desire for our assistance and our help, I also think we have to reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:07 Nov 13, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\061114\88290 SHIRL
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member that this is a military that thinks of itself as a professional 

military. It has served in peacekeeping operations probably more 

than any other African country in the world. They were the top 

peacekeepers from the African continent. Their force commanders 

were in Mali. Their force commanders were in Darfur. They were 

in Liberia, for instance. So we have to keep that in mind as we go 

in and try help them and assist them. And keep that in mind that 

we can’t also add to the demoralization that they may be feeling 

now. We need to be going in with the best foot forward, which I 

am sure our guys are doing, but I just want to put that out there 

for the record. 

In terms of the poverty issue, definitely that is a feeder issue. It 

is not, I would say, I was always in the camp of saying that I didn’t 

see poverty being the driver. I actually saw when I was up there, 

I had a session with religious leaders. I had a session with students from Maiduguri University my last time up there before I 

left. And then I did an open town hall in downtown Maiduguri, one 

of the toughest environments I have ever had to speak in. 

What I walked away with from that encounter, at least the last 

one, which is very tough, very hostile to the U.S., all of those 

things, I walked away saying this is really more about a clash of 

civilizations, really a different world perception of where people, 

where the fundamentalist groups want to take their country. So 

how do we address that? 

What I saw this last time was a slight change in that because 

Boko Haram has been so brutal, that therecruitment and feeder 

issues have diminished somewhat in their ability to attract people 

to their entity, and that to me is a good sign that maybe we as an 

international community can capitalize on by then addressing the 

sectoral development issues, because the attraction for Boko 

Haram, I think, has been diminished quite significantly because of 

their brutality. 

I was at one session with a group of students at the University 

of Maiduguri, and I will never forget this young woman, and she 

stood up and said, ‘‘Why doesn’t the U.S. like people of Islamic 

faith?’’ There was that initial sense, I thought, from a lot of young 

people in that part of the region. I don’t see that as much now because of the brutality of Boko Haram. 

So I think we have an opportunity here to capitalize on that 

changing tide that has happened on the ground and really come in 

with some fundamental development tools to address education, 

health care, but more importantly, potable water and sanitation I 

would put at the top of the list, as well as really providing an enabling environment for people to live their lives in quality and in 

peace. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. SMITH. Gentlelady Jackson Lee from Texas is recognized. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your 

courtesies to a member of the Judiciary Committee and Homeland 

Security Committee and a former member of this committee that 

has had a very strong commitment to the continent, and of course 

to these issues, to our children, and to this crisis dealing with Boko 

Haram. 

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Let me thank each of the witnesses and take note of Ambassador 

Sanders for her service to the country and to Jubilee for its very 

in-depth persistent presence in some of the more difficult areas. 

So I am going to start with Mr. Pham on the presence or nonpresence of the African Union and whether or not they can pose an 

effective catalyst for a concerted purposeful action against Boko 

Haram. Do they have the necessary assets to view this as an attack 

on Africa and to be able to be helpful? 

Mr. PHAM. Thank you, Congresswoman Jackson Lee, for that 

question. First, let me begin by saying Boko Haram is a threat not 

just to Nigeria but to Africa itself. In that respect, it should be and 

it ought to be a concern for the African Union as a whole. That 

being said, the African Union faces several constraints which we 

have to be realistic about what it can do in this particular situation. The first constraint is the reluctance still, as Ambassador 

Sanders just mentioned in her response to the ranking member, of 

Nigeria to its going down, but there is still a resistance to outside, 

if you will, interference which the African Union would have to 

overcome. 

Secondly, the African Union, unfortunately, its counterterrorism 

center is based in Algiers. And part of that is it enters into the very 

murky and complex politics of Algeria, its relationship with alQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, its relationships with Boko Haram. 

It gets into a whole bunch of weeds. So although the legitimacy of 

the African Union should be brought into play, its condemnation, 

its convening power, in reality, we are facing a situation that requires immediate action and resources which by the time the African Union got it all together, it is definitely way too late for the 

poor girls from Chibok and for the current effort. So for now we 

should use what we can from the African Union, use its convening 

power, its moral authority, but recognize there are very severe institutional dynamics which limit its ability to act effectively in this 

particular situation. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I don’t want to pursue that frailty, but that 

disappoints me greatly. The African Union, as I understand it, 

based still in Ethiopia, is it, has military resources and assets as 

I thought, and I am just shocked that this is not a potent enough 

issue that they cannot be engaged. I am not going to ask you to 

respond, but I am just going to say on the record, I am disappointed, and I hope they will have an opportunity to meet some 

of their representatives here. I know we have met some of them in 

Africa, but I am just shocked because some of us as Members of 

Congress have indicated that that would be a good partnership to 

look at it from the African perspective. 

There has got to be some military force that has a concerted effort, and I heard Ambassador Sanders’ comments about the resources that Nigeria has; and I also heard your comments tragically that this has been going on since the 1990s, so it has now 

mushroomed, and it is now at a point where it is going to be that 

much more difficult to contain it, but contain it we must. That is 

my view of it. Contain it we must, and we must use not only the 

resources that we did looking for the Malaysian flight, which I 

truly believe we should as well. This is too rich a world, even with 

the developing nations, but I frankly believe that we should use the 

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resources that we are using collectively as a world family against 

al-Qaeda, because when you hear the word al-Qaeda, hair stands 

on the top of everyone’s head, and every resource that they have 

is thrown at it. In this instance, not only are we missing world support, but we are missing world resources. 

Let me ask Mr. Ogebe, thank you for being here representing Jubilee. Can you speak to the religious crisis that we are facing, and 

is there any way to part the waters on the religious crisis? Because 

if we are to go to Kano where it is sort of the centerpiece, does 

someone get on a van and come with a peace flag, a white flag, and 

say let’s bring everybody together? Is that a reality at this point 

in time? And I might just want to put on the record, Mr. Chairman, 

I am aghast, and I am going to get to the two other witnesses, that 

the loose existence of official military garb, uniforms, can be coopted, put on terrorists, and innocent persons in a church literally 

shot down in cold blood. The worst of it is that they were receiving 

these individuals, welcoming them as people who were coming to 

help them, save them, protect them. Emmanuel? 

Mr. OGEBE. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. Yes, the religious motivations of Boko Haram are explicit, and clearly they 

have conducted what I consider a pre-genocide on the Christian minorities of northern Nigeria. Now, speaking particularly with regard to their attacks on religious communities, last year they attacked over 60 churches, and in the same time frame they attacked 

about two to three mosques. 

So overwhelmingly their focus is on Christian targets, government targets, and occasionally they attack Muslim groups that cooperate with the military authorities. Now that said, the concern 

that you make with regard to their access to military uniforms is 

very valid, and this really has created a credibility crisis for the 

genuine security forces because there are people showing up in uniforms and carting away girls whom they say they are going to protect. 

And that had just happened again last week when they showed 

up in the church and rounded up people and said we are here to 

protect you and massacred scores of people in that village. 

Some of our findings are that at one point, the Nigerian chief of 

staff, in an effort to boost, recruitment of northerners into the 

army, enrolled a lot of people. There are mass recruitments. And 

the records indicate that the night before graduation, after all of 

the training, a lot of these people deserted; so they deserted with 

knowledge and tactics of the Nigerian military, and they deserted 

with uniforms. So when you watch some of the videos of the attacks, you can see that these are very well-trained people who 

know the ropes of the Nigerian military’s tactics. 

Secondly, and this is sad, this goes to the issue of corruption 

again. For many people in the security forces, they have to buy 

some of their own equipment, including their own guns and uniforms. And so if you open source uniforms and guns and bullets, 

you will clearly have a problem of proliferation falling into bad 

hands. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And you may have a problem, if the chairman 

is kind enough to indulge me, I am sorry, if I can continue, you 

may have a proliferation of mismatched uniforms not letting the 

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people know what is what. Let me just pose this question. I want 

to get to the other witnesses, because maybe I am being idealistic. 

First of all, would anyone listen to a ceasefire? Would anyone listen 

to the carrying of a white flag to go into the region and say, I want 

to sit down—and I see a smile—I want to sit down and at least talk 

about a ceasefire and a cessation of the violence, then begin to talk 

about the issues, because in the testimony that has been given in 

the questionings of the ranking member, there were the issues of 

extreme poverty, but there is also issues that the country itself has 

enormous wealth, but we know that the northern region is enormously impoverished, which may have been the genesis of a lot of 

this. Is there any, any hope of some kind of effort like that, and 

who would be the leaders of that effort? 

Mr. OGEBE. Well, with regard to the poverty, let me quickly polish that off. Boko Haram is killing Christians within their community who are as poor as them, or in some cases, even poorer because those Christians tend to be denied access to government 

services because they are religious minorities. The Christians could 

very well be terrorists as well if poverty was the simple reason or 

rationale for this, and they are not doing that. 

With regard to the idea of the ceasefire, Boko Haram does not 

respect humanitarian corridors or any of the conventions that civilized people respect in combat, for example, allowing medics to 

come in, allowing relief to come in. They have actually gone out of 

their way to kill medical workers, so they may not be open to moral 

suasion from any source. That said, at this point because of the 

world headlines, the global spotlight on them, they may be open to 

approach. 

I will say that we have contacts who have contacts who communicate with Boko Haram; and I tried to find out while I was out 

there last week whether they were open to talking, and apparently 

that channel has been silent for a while. I think, Congresswoman, 

if you wanted to lead that effort, we would be solidly behind you; 

but I can’t think of anyone who would lead the charge as far as 

trying to broker a ceasefire. But certainly with the media headlights, which they clearly like—they are media savvy—there may 

be a window to actually have a dialogue with them. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. So on this side of the table, let me 

now call for a ceasefire, and let me join with my colleagues here, 

Chairman Smith, and the members of this very esteemed subcommittee, and therefore, say that we want a ceasefire. We want 

to save lives. I know there are many experts at this table, but if 

they can hear the sound of our voices, we have just asked for a 

ceasefire, and I am not taking this lightly. This is baffling and outrageous, but I do believe that there has to be some moment where 

we can find a way to save these girls. 

May I ask the last two witnesses this question, and Ambassador 

Sanders, you in particular have just come back, for those of us who 

may be headed in that direction, what should we be looking for? 

What should we see? What should we ask? And to Mr. John-Miller, 

we thank you for your service. Again, I am going to ask you the 

question about any hope for a ceasefire from a humanitarian perspective that then gives us the opportunity to bring these girls 

back. We are hashtagging it. We are press-conferencing it. These 

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girls are still scattered, still away from their families, and still 

frightened; and so I would ask you that. I am going to go to Ambassador Sanders first, what we should be focused on. 

Ambassador SANDERS. Thank you, Congresswoman. I wanted to 

just briefly say something on the AU, and I will go right to your 

questions. I just wanted to let you know that the ECOWAS countries have trained together before and have worked together before 

in conflicts, so maybe that is where the additional troop support 

could come from as opposed to the broader AU, and maybe it could 

be under a U.N.–AU mandate with Nigerian troops in the lead but 

having additional support from troops who have been involved in 

asymmetrical warfare. So that is a possibility. They have had a lot 

of exercises together as ECOWAS, and that is a possibility. 

In terms of who you should meet, certainly you need to meet people in the security services. That would include the military, the 

police, and their equivalent of the CIA basically. I think you will 

get a sense from them of where they think their challenges are, 

and you can hear what they say, and then you can hear what our 

trainers are saying or those that are there to help on the U.S. assistance packages, and see where those things meet. And maybe 

there are still gaps, but I know that our team there is doing a top 

notch job. They always have. But I do think that those are key. 

Then I would also include the Justice Ministry in that as well 

because you want to make sure that everything possible on the justice and non-impunity side is being done as much as possible, so 

I would add that to it. 

I would lastly want to just say both Muslims and Christians 

have been killed in this conflict; and I would like to see us always 

talk about this conflict in that context. If you go back to what 

Shekau said a couple of years ago about trying to have an Islamic 

caliphate in northern Nigeria and really starting in the region 

where the state of emergency is, if you look at one of those states 

in particular, Adamawa used to be about 50 percent Muslim and 

50 percent Christian. The idea is to make Christians so fearful that 

they move out of the region. 

And I think that we can’t add our voice to that kind of dynamic, 

so we need to be very careful about making sure that we are talking about this as both Christians and Muslims, particularly moderate Muslims, being under siege there. But their goal to have an 

Islamic caliphate means that they don’t want anybody who is not 

Muslim in the north, and that includes moderate Muslims as well. 

So I think we just have to be really careful that when we talk 

about the devastation and the killing and the abuses and the brutality, everyone who is not part of Boko Haram is subject to that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. What I would say is, I asked Mr. John-Miller 

to finish my questioning, what I would say is that the idea behind 

the ceasefire, however it may be expressed here at the table, is 

really—was really to focus on the idea of the populations, the 

Christian and Muslim populations, who equally have been victimized, to actually see if they could be the fathers of this ongoing crisis. But what I would say is that is a very good point. It is a point 

that I pursued and will be pursuing as well. Yes? 

Ambassador SANDERS. I had one more thing to add on the 

ceasefire issue, and unfortunately, I am going to end up in the pesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:07 Nov 13, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\061114\88290 SHIRL
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simist column on this. Because I said earlier that I think this is 

about a clash of civilization in terms of how Boko Haram sees the 

world, I do not see them agreeing to a ceasefire; and I think that 

we have to keep that in mind as we look at strategic planning and 

how to address this conflict. I said earlier that we need to eliminate 

the current playbooks here and come up with a new playbook to 

address this threat. But if you are talking about and you are hearing what Shekau actually is saying and those that are following 

him are saying, these are not people that you are going to be able 

to reason with for a ceasefire; and I hate to say that, but I think 

we need to keep that in mind. 

Certainly we can make the effort and the approaches because I 

agree with you, we have got to do everything possible; but I also 

think we have to be realistic and also look at the possibilities they 

are not going to respond to any overtures of a ceasefire. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I am so grateful that we have this hearing to 

hear these kinds of very pessimistic facts, but to be realistic in how 

we approach this. And that is my point, that we may be in an 

arena that is more unique than we have ever had. And we have 

moved heaven and earth when we hear the word al-Qaeda and its 

subsets; we now have maybe a subset that is growing exponentially, and my fear is that it moves throughout the continent where 

we are trying to work against conflicts. So Mr. John-Miller, if I 

could finish with you on the questioning. 

And might I do this, Mr. Chairman, and let you know that we 

have some young people from the YES Prep North Forest area ECS 

Region 4 and CloseUp who are in this room, and I hope they are 

understanding that our hearing is about saving lives and having 

tolerance of different groups; so I welcome them here. 

Mr. John-Miller, your take on this whole epidemic of violence, 

and also, why don’t I let you focus on the possibility, or not the possibility, but the getting these girls back. 

Mr. JOHN-MILLER. Well, my solution is this. I am an optimist, 

and I strongly believe that every effort put in that direction is 

wanted. When the U.S. decided to help Nigeria publicly, I do realize that a lot of northerners welcomed the idea, although a few of 

them really rejected it. But when someone like President Obasanjo 

stepped in, we began to see some changes because a lot of northern 

leaders began to say they wanted ceasefire. They want to talk to 

Shekau and all that. So I think that one thing we can do is encourage President Olusegun Obasanjo to go ahead with what he is 

doing. I think one of the aspects that complicates the matter is the 

fact that from information reaching us, he is not all that good with 

the current President; but if they can keep their personal differences aside and look at this issue as a national issue, I am sure 

that Obasanjo is going to be able to do something about it, particularly when it comes to bringing back the girls. 

I also strongly believe that someone like the Reverend Jessie 

Jackson has earned the trust and respect of northerners in Nigeria, 

and he interacts with a lot of them. And the leaders in the northern part of the country play a big role. If these individuals are 

made to understand the reality of the fact that what is going on 

is going to drive away the development, is going to cause a lot of 

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chaos in the country, certainly they would be willing to work with 

individuals to bring an end to it. 

So I would recommend strongly that if it is possible people like 

Obasanjo and the Reverend Jackson should be saddled with that 

responsibility to at least help to look into the issue. If some people 

might argue that it is like giving Shekau more authority, that he 

is an individual, but the fact remains that like I stated earlier, if 

adequate diplomacy is not used, he will not release those girls, and 

any attempt to use force, he will kill them. 

So I would strongly suggest that people like Obasanjo and the 

Reverend Jackson should be looked into to possibly initiate that. I 

have also met with them, discussed it with them; and they are very 

optimistic that if given the support and mandate, they can be able 

to really make a dent or make a headway, so I want us to look at 

that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, as I close, let me thank you 

very much and thank the witnesses. I know that there is more that 

I could have garnered from this. I do want to say this on the 

record. I am pleased of the efforts that the United States and 

President Obama have taken, and I know they are prepared to do 

more particularly with the intelligence effort, the strategic persons 

that were on the ground, the ability to use the intelligence gathered to help with the finding of the girls. 

I gleaned from your statements, Mr. John-Miller, that emissaries—we have done it before, Mr. Chairman—so I am going to 

put everything on the table that we raise with Nigeria, we raise 

with the United States, we raise with the United Nations, just as 

there was an envoy to Darfur, there is one to South Sudan, and 

we know that those issues are still boiling, that we may need to 

do the envoy in this instance. And I also think, Ambassador, the 

ECOWAS is a great team. They have been successful in the past 

maybe with the embrace, as you said, of the African Union and the 

United Nations. 

I am throwing my hands up, Mr. Chairman, but I am not giving 

up. I am frankly believing that we have to keep this on a front 

burner to save lives, and I would ask, if they can hear my voice, 

for the people of Nigeria in the northern area to know that they 

are not abandoned and that there are those of us that feel the pain 

and certainly can’t equal their pain of loss of life, children, husbands, wives, and other family members or the loss of these girls; 

but we feel the pain, and I am just committed to trying to help as 

much as I can. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your leadership, and I thank Congresswoman Bass for her great leadership on this issue and your 

kindness for allowing me this time on the committee. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. I thank my good friend from Texas for being a vital 

part of this hearing and look forward to hearing of her upcoming 

travel. Thank you so much. 

Let me just conclude with a few final questions. I know you have 

been very, very patient with your time, and the subcommittee 

deeply appreciates it. 

Ambassador Sanders, again, I think it is worth reiterating. You 

testified ominously that Nigeria is at the beginning of a long war 

or conflict, and that they have to realize this; it is no longer a localVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:07 Nov 13, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\061114\88290 SHIRL
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ized conflict or insurgency. There is no easy fix or response, and 

I think that sobering analysis needs to be fully understood and appreciated by everyone. 

You also talked about that there needs to be regrouping, reapproach and readdress in order to get off their heels, that is, the 

Nigerian security forces who are on defense and go on aggressive 

offense. And I think we need to put exclamation points behind that, 

and that is why that training more rather than less and an acceptance by the Nigerians that there is a special skill-set that needs 

to be imparted that has been learned the hard way through our 

military; and, of course, there are others involved in this as well. 

So thank you for, you know, bringing that sobering analysis to the 

committee. 

You have also pointed out about the trauma issue. And, again, 

Mr. Ogebe brought several traumatized victims, moms, dads, that 

young girl who is one of the lucky ones who escaped Chibok. And 

noting parenthetically, and I think everybody knows this, the Boko 

Haram troops were wearing uniforms. They looked like they were 

the military. That is why the young girls in a very orderly fashion 

got into the vehicles. They thought it was the military. It was not, 

of course. They were terrorists. But the trauma counseling that you 

have called for I think is extraordinarily important. 

Years ago, I wrote the Torture Victims Relief Act which deals 

with those who have suffered trauma from torture. And I did serve 

as chairman of the Veterans Affairs Committee for a number of 

years, and I served on the committee for a quarter of a century. 

PTSD is such a significant mental health issue, and it would seem 

to me that these individual girls, those who have been abducted, 

all those who have been involved who have been victimized, there 

needs to be much more done. 

Mr. Ogebe, you talked about the victims compensation fund, and 

I do hope that President Goodluck Jonathan is listening and his 

staff. Put those resources toward the families; get them the kind 

of help, particularly psychologically, that they are so much in need 

of. Otherwise that trauma imbeds. It goes deeper. It acts out in 

many, many ways. We learned that especially with our Vietnam 

veterans when 10 years, 15 years down the line, huge problems 

manifested; and people who weren’t aware of PTSD didn’t have a 

clue, and that includes wives and husbands and families. 

I like your idea, Madam Ambassador, about President Jonathan 

meeting with the families. Invite them to the villa. Have a meeting 

with them and put his arms around them and say we care for you 

because you know with the election coming up, one of my 

takeaways from 4 days on the ground last week was that the election is serving as an acceleration phase for more terrorism. No ebb 

tide. They will get worse, not better. And as you pointed, several 

of you pointed out, the ability to bring bombs into Abuja itself and 

to breach the security perimeter is very real as witnessed by the 

attack in the bus station just very recently. 

Let me also point out, and I think it is worth bearing, when Greg 

Simpkins and I were there last September, we did meet with folks 

involved with President Jonathan’s Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution which was reaching out to Boko 

Haram, but it was a bridge to nowhere. Maybe hope springs eterVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:07 Nov 13, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\061114\88290 SHIRL
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nal. There might be something, but I would share your thoughts, 

Madam Ambassador. We are dealing with Joseph Kony. We are 

dealing with Charles Taylor, Slobodan Milosevic. We are dealing 

with bloodthirsty people who have been enabled and empowered to 

do more rather than less killing. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would the gentleman yield for just one moment? 

Mr. SMITH. Sure. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I just want to say that you have captured just 

the essence of the vitality of this hearing, and I want to add to 

what you are saying about the President. No one person can single 

handedly fight Boko Haram, but there are things that can be done. 

To my knowledge, there is no victims fund established, relief fund, 

that has been set up by the Nigerian Government for the victims 

who have lost people. I don’t know what the status of these girls’ 

families, but if they are mourning and are at a central point, just 

as the families of the Malaysian flight. They have left their homes. 

They are at a point, they are in need not only of the warm expression of concern; so I would like to make sure I put on the record 

that I hope, Mr. Chairman, I hope we can write a joint letter with 

your committee that we want a victims relief fund set up for this 

crisis that is ongoing by the Nigerian Government, and I think it 

is key that we do so. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, I have raised it. Mr. Ogebe has raised it repeatedly. I do know the personnel from the Nigerian Embassy are here. 

The Ambassador was here earlier. It seems to me this is something 

that could be done very easily because those families are left to 

fend for themselves, and as you mentioned, Madam Ambassador, 

the possibility, hopefully not the probability, but the possibility of 

being reabducted remains very real. Boko Haram is capable; and 

so, please, if you could respond. 

Ambassador SANDERS. I just wanted to add one more thing on 

the trauma and grief. I had it briefly in my statement, but I feel 

like I need to reiterate it. The PTSD also for the military, and I 

say that because I heard that a lot from some of the rank and file 

service members that I saw. Poor troop rotation in the area is one 

reason. So when we are looking at trauma and grief counseling, 

you know, hopefully in our package, we are also looking at that for 

the Nigerian military because I am hearing more and more about 

PTSD for them as well that have served in the northeast. So I just 

wanted to add that to the mix. 

Mr. SMITH. And if I could add and, again, having served on Veterans Affairs Committee for a quarter of a century, the Veterans 

Administration, notwithstanding the problems that are facing it 

now in terms of waiting lists, has literally written the book on how 

to deal with PTSD; so perhaps our own VA might be of some assistance in dealing with those thorny issues of deep psychological injury that the military as well as victims suffer. Would anyone like 

to say anything before we conclude? Professor Pham? 

Mr. PHAM. I just want to make two brief observations, Mr. Chairman. One is I agree with Ambassador Sanders that realistically, 

Boko Haram has not shown itself a respecter of persons. Even the 

traditional authorities are well respected in Nigeria. They have 

threatened the Sultan in Sokoto. They have attacked the brother 

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of the Shehu of Borno. These are traditional figures that enjoy 

great moral suasion. I hope for the best but I join Ambassador 

Sanders about not being particularly sanguine about the prospects. 

The other point I want to make is that Congresswoman Jackson 

Lee made an excellent point. The Pan-African dimension of tactics. 

A lot of the tactics that we have just discussed in the last few minutes are African tactics they have learned from other places. AQIM 

in its previous incarnation as the GSPC, and even before that as 

the GIA, the idea of wearing uniforms and using the uniform of the 

military is something they perfected to an art, and they still use 

in Algeria, and that Boko Haram has picked up. The idea of submitting, as Mr. Ogebe brought up, submitting to training as a way 

of outsourcing, if you will, in a very perverse way the training of 

your own fighters. We saw that year in and year out in Somalia 

when clan and even al-Shabaab militia would enroll with the 

former transitional Federal Government, receive the training, take 

the training uniform and weapons, and then move en masse to firing those weapons back on the people that train them. 

Again, they have had these connections. They are picking these 

things up. These ideas move very rapidly across frontiers, and this 

is why Boko Haram is even now more of a danger than it has been, 

because the means of communication that facilitate our getting information also facilitate them getting information and exchanging, 

if you will, best practices. 

Ambassador SANDERS. One last thing, and it is really on the 

heels of what Dr. Pham just said. It is a perspective I have coming 

out of the diplomatic corps in terms of how we share information, 

and maybe there are things that we need to pay attention to. These 

groups do learn from each other. When I looked at the Westgate 

situation, I thought that they had learned from the Boston Marathon bombers because they brought in a change of clothes so that 

some of them could actually leave the mall with civilian clothes on 

or change of clothes or harder to identify. 

I think what Boko Haram has learned from Westgate is the separation of the hostages and moving them around. I think that we 

have to pay attention to, you know, what we are saying out there 

and what we are hearing out there so that we don’t add to the arsenal of things that they use to further impose violence and brutality on civilian populations. 

So I would add that I agree wholeheartedly with my colleagues 

on the panel and everything that they have said, but particularly 

on this issue, I think we need to pay attention to the fact that they 

are paying attention to what we say and what we do and what we 

share; and they capitalize on that, and then they use it in the brutal way that we have seen here in the case of Nigeria. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Emmanuel? 

Mr. OGEBE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I agree with what Ambassador 

Sanders has said. There is a lot more that one would have wanted 

to share, but I have put it in my paper so that we don’t provide 

fodder to the terrorists who are clearly paying a lot of attention to 

all that is being said. 

I do want to quickly mention two things: The first is with regard 

to the fact that last week we met with a Muslim father who has 

two daughters who are missing, and a Christian father who has 

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one daughter. They traveled 2 days together to come to Abuja to 

meet with us. And there is something about the pain and the travesty of this experience that is making these people bond together; 

and as the Ambassador said earlier, hopefully we can seize the moment and help unite these communities so that they can turn on 

the terrorists that have devastated their lives. 

And so part of what we as non-profits plan to do is to continue 

to encourage the young girls with scholarships and so on and so 

forth, and these are some of the initiatives that we are working on 

stealthily because of the sensitivity of the subject matter. 

The last thing I want to say is, I want to use this opportunity, 

and Mr. Chairman, you will forgive me for my abuse here, but I 

want to pay tribute to my mother who was a northern Nigerian 

schoolgirl who cried in school when her teacher said that girls don’t 

read science. They only read arts. And she insisted that she wanted 

to be a doctor, and they finally put her in the boys school because 

boys were taught science; and she became the first female doctor 

from northern Nigeria. And I want to pay tribute to other young 

girls today, including those in captivity, who want to have that 

same opportunity that my mom had; and I thank you for the opportunity to say that today. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you so very much for your testimonies, very, 

very incisive. Hopefully we can take this and obviously work with 

the administration, work with other Members of Congress and the 

Senate to do far more than we have done. I do want to thank Embassy Abuja, including our DCM, and the two human rights officers, Helena and Michelle. I will go with just first names today, 

and Maria for their wonderful work, their professionalism. They 

were very helpful during my 4 days on the ground, and we will continue working with them; and without objection, testimony from 

the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, 

Mr. Jasser, will be made a part of the record. And again, I thank 

you for your testimony, and the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:03 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY MR. EMMANUEL OGEBE, MANAGER, 

JUSTICE FOR JOS PROJECT, JUBILEE CAMPAIGN USA


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MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, 

A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, AND CHAIRMAN, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS


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