IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-40122

IN THE MATTER OF: HALO WIRELESS, INCORPORATED,

Debtor

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

HALO WIRELESS, INCORPORATED,

Appellant

v.

ALENCO COMMUNICATIONS INCORPORATED; ALMA

COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY; BPS TELEPHONE

COMPANY;BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, L.L.C., doing

business as AT&T Alabama; BIG BEND TELEPHONE COMPANY,

INCORPORATED; BLUE RIDGE TELEPHONE COMPANY; BRAZORIA

TELEPHONE COMPANY; CAMDEN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH

COMPANY, INCORPORATED; CHARITON VALLEY TELECOM

CORPORATION; CHARITON VALLEY TELEPHONE CORPORATION;

CHOCTAW TELEPHONE COMPANY; CITIZENS TELEPHONE COMPANY

OF HIGGINSVILLE, MISSOURI; CONCORD TELEPHONE EXCHANGE,

INCORPORATED; CRAW-KAN TELEPHONE COOPERATIVE,

INCORPORATED; EASTEX TELEPHONE COOPERATIVE,

INCORPORATED; ELECTRA TELEPHONE COMPANY, INCORPORATED;

ELLINGTON TELEPHONE COMPANY; FARBER TELEPHONE

COMPANY; FIDELITY COMMUNICATION SERVICES I,

INCORPORATED; FIDELITY COMMUNICATION SERVICES II,

INCORPORATED; FIDELITY TELEPHONE COMPANY; FIVE AREA

TELEPHONE COOPERATIVE, INCORPORATED; GANADO TELEPHONE

COMPANY; GOODMAN TELEPHONE COMPANY; GRANBY TELEPHONE

COMPANY; GRAND RIVER MUTUAL TELEPHONE COMPANY; GREEN

HILLS AREA CELLULAR; GREEN HILLS TELEPHONE CORPORATION;

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 18, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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HILL COUNTRY TELEPHONE COOPERATIVE, INCORPORATED;

HOLWAY TELEPHONE COMPANY; HUMPHREYS COUNTY

TELEPHONE COMPANY; IAMO TELEPHONE COMPANY; ILLINOIS

BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, doing business as AT&T Illinois; INDIANA

BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC., doing business as AT&T Indiana;

INDUSTRY TELEPHONE COMPANY; K.L.M. TELEPHONE COMPANY;

KINGDOM TELEPHONE COMPANY; LAKE LIVINGSTON TELEPHONE

COMPANY, INCORPORATED; LATHROP TELEPHONE COMPANY;

LE-RU TELEPHONE COMPANY; LIVINGSTON TELEPHONE COMPANY;

MARK TWAIN COMMUNICATION COMPANY; MARK TWAIN RURAL

TELEPHONE COMPANY; MCDONALD COUNTY TELEPHONE

COMPANY; MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, doing business as

AT&T Michigan; MID-MISSOURI TELEPHONE COMPANY; MID-PLAINS

RURAL TELEPHONE COOPERATIVE, INCORPORATED; MILLER

TELEPHONE COMPANY; MOKAN DIAL, INCORPORATED;

NELSON-BALL GROUND TELEPHONE COMPANY; NEVADA BELL

TELEPHONE COMPANY, doing business as AT&T Nevada; NEW

FLORENCE TELEPHONE COMPANY; NEW LONDON TELEPHONE

COMPANY; NORTEX COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY; NORTH TEXAS

TELEPHONE COMPANY; ORCHARD FARM TELEPHONE COMPANY;

OZARK TELEPHONE COMPANY; PACIFIC BELL TELEPHONE

COMPANY, doing business as AT&T California; PEACE VALLEY

TELEPHONE COMPANY, INCORPORATED; PEOPLES TELEPHONE

COOPERATIVE, INCORPORATED; QUINCY TELEPHONE COMPANY;

RIVERA TELEPHONE COMPANY, INCORPORATED; ROCK PORT

TELEPHONE COMPANY; SANTA ROSA TELEPHONE COOPERATIVE,

INCORPORATED; SENECA TELEPHONE COMPANY; SOUTHWEST

TEXAS TELEPHONE COMPANY; SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE

COMPANY, doing business as AT&T Arkansas; STEELVILLE TELEPHONE

EXCHANGE, INCORPORATED; STOUTLAND TELEPHONE COMPANY;

TATUM TELEPHONE COMPANY; TELLICO TELEPHONE COMPANY;

TENNESSEE TELEPHONE COMPANY; MISSOURI PUBLIC SERVICE

COMMISSION; OHIO BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, doing business as

AT&T Ohio; TOTELCOM COMMUNICATIONS, L.L.C.; VALLEY

TELEPHONE COOPERATIVE INC; WEST PLAINS

TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INCORPORATED; WISCONSIN BELL

TELEPHONE, INCORPORATED, doing business as AT&T Wisconsin; AT&T

KANSAS; AT&T MISSOURI; AT&T OKLAHOMA; AT&T TEXAS; AT&T

FLORIDA; AT&T GEORGIA; AT&T KENTUCKY; AT&T LOUISIANA;

AT&T MISSISSIPPI; AT&T NORTH CAROLINA; AT&T SOUTH

CAROLINA; AT&T TENNESSEE; TDS TELECOMMUNICATIONS

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CORPORATION; CROCKETT TELEPHONE CO; WEST TENNESSEE

TELEPHONE COMPANY INC; NORTH CENTRAL TELEPHONE COOP,

INCORPORATED; HIGHLAND TELEPHONE COOPERATIVE,

INCORPORATED; GUADALUPE VALLEY TELEPHONE COOPERATIVE,

INCORPORATED; NORTHEAST MISSOURI RURAL TELEPHONE

COMPANY; PEOPLES TELEPHONE COMPANY, INCORPORATED, 

Appellees

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court 

for the Eastern District of Texas,

Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:

This case involves disputes between Halo Wireless, Inc. and the Texas and

Missouri Telephone Companies (“TMT Companies”), TDS Communications

Corp., and the AT&T Companies. The local telephone companies initiated 1

twenty separate suits against Halo before ten state public utility commissions

(“PUCs”). Halo filed for bankruptcy as a result of this collective action. The 2

telephone companies requested that the bankruptcy court determine that the

various PUC actions are not subject to the automatic stay provided by the

Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), because they are excepted under

§ 362(b)(4), or that the bankruptcy court modify the automatic stay for cause,

TDS Telecommunications Corp. operates in various states, and it has filed complaints 1

against Halo in public utility commissions in Georgia and Tennessee. The AT&T Companies

also operate in various states, and have filed complaints against Halo in Alabama, Florida,

Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. After the bankruptcy

court exempted PUC proceedings from the automatic stay, AT&T also filed actions in

Louisiana and California. The TMT Companies filed actions against Halo in Texas and

Missouri.

The total number of actions now appear to be more than twenty, taking place in 2

thirteen jurisdictions.

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pursuant to § 362(d)(1). The bankruptcy court held that the exception to the

automatic stay in § 362(b)(4) applies to the state commission proceedings,

allowing the telephone companies to proceed with their litigation in the PUCs,

but held that the state adjudicative bodies could not issue any ruling or order to

liquidate the amount of any claim against Halo, and that the bodies could not

take any action that affects the debtor-creditor relationship between Halo and

any creditor or potential creditor. Halo now appeals this ruling, contending that

because the PUC actions were brought by private parties, they should be subject

to the automatic stay. We agree with the bankruptcy court that the PUC

proceedings are exempt from the automatic stay, and we thus AFFIRM. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Halo states that it is a small telecommunications company that provides

wireless phone and data service to its customers pursuant to a license from the

Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”). According to Halo, it provides

wireless Commercial Mobile Radio Service (“CMRS”), as defined by Section

332(d)(1) of the Federal Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (“FTA”

or “Act”). The Appellees are all privately-owned local telephone companies. 

Their disputes with Halo center around the type of service Halo actually

provides, and whether or not Halo is properly compensating local companies for

the call traffic it transfers to them.3

Starting with the TMT Companies in May 2011, the Appellees have all

filed actions against Halo in state PUCs. The TMT Companies claim that Halo

is not a CMRS carrier, and that it was improperly using the TMT Companies’

networks without an interconnection agreement (“ICA”) or payment of access

fees. The TDS Companies allege that Halo has used service to Transcom (which

The allegations against Halo differ slightly among the Appellee phone companies. 

3

In each situation, however, the local telephone companies have brought their grievances to

state PUCs, which is where they find commonality. 

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Halo calls a “customer,” but the TDS Companies allege is a related entity) to

avoid state regulation and the payment of access charges to the TDS Companies. 

The AT&T companies all claim that Halo is violating its ICAs with them, and

they have asked the PUCs to determine that Halo’s traffic is not wireless. As

summarized by the bankruptcy court, “[t]he complainants contend that the

debtor is involved in an arbitrage scheme and that the debtor owes them fees

under applicable law and regulations. And more generally, that the debtor is

subject to the authority of the Public Utility Commission[s]. The debtor

contends that it is regulated by the FCC, not the Public Utility Commissions and

denies that it is engaged in an arbitrage scheme.” 

Because of the numerous suits filed against Halo by the Appellees, Halo

filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on August

8, 2011. Halo also removed the various PUC actions to federal court, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1452, and it then filed motions to have those actions transferred

to the bankruptcy court. In response to Halo’s declaration of bankruptcy, the

Appellees filed motions requesting that the state PUC proceedings be exempt

from the automatic stay under § 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. 

The bankruptcy court held an initial hearing on September 30, 2011 to

consider the Appellees’ motions, and it then made its findings of fact and

conclusions of law on the record on October 7, 2011. The bankruptcy court found

that “[i]t is the nature of the action[, not] the identity of the parties which

initially precipitat[e] the action[,] that determines whether Section 362(b)(4)

applies.” Despite the fact that the PUC actions had been initiated by private

parties, because they were all state regulatory proceedings, the court ruled that

they were excepted from the automatic stay under § 362(b)(4). The bankruptcy

court then incorporated its findings of fact and conclusions of law in Stay

Exception Orders entered for each Appellee on October 26, 2011. On that same

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day, Halo filed notices of appeal. The bankruptcy court certified the appeal 4

directly to this Court on November 7, 2011, stating that “[t]he judgment, order

or decree involves a question of law as to which there is no controlling decision

of the court of appeals for this circuit or of the Supreme Court of the United

States,” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2). Since the bankruptcy court’s ruling,

sixteen (of twenty total) of the Appellees’ motions to remand their actions from

federal courts back to the state PUCs have been granted. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“When directly reviewing an order of the bankruptcy court, we apply the

same standard of review that would have been used by the district court. 

Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, and conclusions of law are reviewed

de novo.” Drive Fin. Servs., L.P. v. Jordan, 521 F.3d 343, 346 (5th Cir. 2008)

(citing Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013).

III. ANALYSIS

Normally, when a party declares Chapter 11 bankruptcy, an automatic

stay is imposed on any other pending or future actions against the party. Under

the Bankruptcy Code, 

[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a

petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this

title . . . operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of

the commencement or continuation, including the

issuance or employment of process, of a judicial,

administrative, or other action or proceeding against

the debtor that was or could have been commenced

Halo also filed a motion for stay pending appeal, which the bankruptcy court denied. 4

The bankruptcy court found that Halo had failed to meet the four criteria for a stay pending

appeal, relying on In re First South Savings Association, 820 F.2d 700, 709 (5th Cir. 1987). 

Specifically, the court held that Halo had “not made a showing of irreparable injury absent a

stay,” while “the granting of a stay would substantially harm other parties by interfering with

the state utility commissions’ ability to regulate public utilities and by requiring creditors to

continue providing services to the debtor in the future.” The court further found that granting

a stay pending appeal would not further the public interest, and that Halo had not established

a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.

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before the commencement of the case under this title, or

to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before

the commencement of the case under this title[.]

11 U.S.C. § 362(a). “The purposes of the bankruptcy stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362

are to protect the debtor’s assets, provide temporary relief from creditors, and

further equity of distribution among the creditors by forestalling a race to the

courthouse.” Reliant Energy Servs., Inc. v. Enron Canada Corp., 349 F.3d 816,

825 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also

Matter of Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., Inc., 805 F.2d 1175, 1182 (5th Cir.

1986) (“The purpose of the automatic stay is to give the debtor a ‘breathing spell’

from his creditors, and also, to protect creditors by preventing a race for the

debtor’s assets.” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978

U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296-97)); Hunt v. Bankers Trust Co., 799 F.2d 1060, 1069

(5th Cir. 1986) (“The purpose of the automatic stay is to protect creditors in a

manner consistent with the bankruptcy goal of equal treatment.”). Thus,

Congress considered the automatic stay “one of the fundamental debtor

protections provided by the bankruptcy laws” when it was instituted. H.R. Rep.

No. 95-595, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296.

As noted in the text of § 362(a), however, there are exceptions to the stay

found in subsection (b) of the statute. The exception at issue here allows

the commencement or continuation of an action or

proceeding by a governmental unit . . . to enforce such

governmental unit’s or organization’s police and

regulatory power, including the enforcement of a

judgment other than a money judgment, obtained in an

action or proceeding by the governmental unit to

enforce such governmental unit’s or organization’s

police or regulatory power.

11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). The statute further defines a “governmental unit” as:

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United States; State; Commonwealth; District;

Territory; municipality; foreign state; department,

agency, or instrumentality of the United States (but not

a United States trustee while serving as a trustee in a

case under this title), a State, a Commonwealth, a

District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state;

or other foreign or domestic government. 

11 U.S.C. § 101(27). As stated in the accompanying House Report, “where a

governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud,

environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or

regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the

action or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay.” H.R. Rep. No.

95–595, at 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6299. “This exception

discourages debtors from submitting bankruptcy petitions either primarily or

solely for the purpose of evading impending governmental efforts to invoke the

governmental police powers to enjoin or deter ongoing debtor conduct which

would seriously threaten the public safety and welfare.” In re McMullen, 386

F.3d 320, 324-35 (1st Cir. 2004); see also In re Commonwealth Cos., Inc., 913

F.2d 518, 527 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that “a fundamental policy behind the

police or regulatory power exception . . . is to prevent the bankruptcy court from

becoming a haven for wrongdoers” (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)); In re Nortel Networks, Inc., 669 F.3d 128, 137 (3d Cir. 2011) (same);

S.E.C. v. Brennan, 230 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg.

Grp., Inc., 700 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1983) (same). The exception does not

allow enforcement of a money judgment against the debtor, however; at most,

a money judgment may be entered. Brennan, 230 F.3d at 71 (“It is well

established that the governmental unit exception of § 362(b)(4) permits the entry

of a money judgment against a debtor so long as the proceeding in which such

a judgment is entered is one to enforce the governmental unit’s police or

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regulatory power. . . . However, . . . anything beyond the mere entry of a money

judgment against a debtor is prohibited by the automatic stay.” (citations

omitted)). 

5

Therefore, the automatic stay and its exception present two different, and

at times competing, policies. On the one hand, the stay aims to protect debtors

and creditors during the pendency of a bankruptcy proceeding to ensure that

debtors get appropriate relief and that creditors receive payment in a fair and

orderly manner. See Commonwealth Oil, 805 F.2d at 1182. On the other hand,

the exception to the stay helps to ensure that debtors do not use a declaration

of bankruptcy to avoid the consequences of their actions that threaten the public

interest. See Brennan, 230 F.3d at 71 (stating that the purpose of the exception

is to “prevent a debtor from frustrating necessary governmental functions by

seeking refuge in bankruptcy court.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).

The court in Brennan cited other cases where courts allowed the entry of a money 5

judgment against the debtor, so long as there was no effort to collect on the judgment. See,

e.g., N.L.R.B. v. 15th Ave. Iron Works, Inc., 964 F.2d 1336, 1337 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam)

(“The ‘enforcement’ of the NLRB order that we command pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) allows

the entry of this aspect of the NLRB’s order as, in effect, a ‘money judgment’ against 15th

Avenue. The collection of that judgment after entry, on the other hand, is not authorized by

this ‘enforcement’ proceeding, and requires a separate application to the bankruptcy court.”

(citations omitted)); N.L.R.B. v. Edward Cooper Painting, Inc., 804 F.2d 934, 942-43 (6th Cir.

1986) (“[O]nce proceedings are excepted from the stay by section 362(b)(4), courts have allowed

governmental units to fix the amount of penalties, up to and including entry of a money

judgment.” (citation omitted)); E.E.O.C. v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 326 (8th Cir. 1986)

(“The entry of a judgment for injunctive relief and backpay is permitted under § 362(b)(5), but

the actual enforcement of the backpay judgment is not permitted.”); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep’t

of Env. Res., Com. of Pa., 733 F.2d 267, 275 (3d Cir. 1984) (“As the legislative history explicitly

notes, the mere entry of a money judgment by a governmental unit is not affected by the

automatic stay, provided of course that such proceedings are related to that government’s

police or regulatory powers.”). The reasoning in some of these cases was based on the nowrepealed § 362(b)(5), which stated: “[t]he filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of

this title does not operate as a stay under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement

of a judgment, other than a money judgment. . . .” That subsection was repealed in 1998;

however, as evidenced by the Second Circuit’s decision in Brennan, rendered in 2000, courts

still find the reasoning of those cases persuasive and applicable under current law.

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To determine whether proceedings fall within the police or regulatory

power exception to the automatic stay, “courts have applied two ‘related, and

somewhat overlapping’ tests: the pecuniary purpose test and the public policy

test.” Nortel, 669 F.3d at 139 (quoting Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098,

1108 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Chao v. Hosp. Staffing Servs., Inc., 270 F.3d 374,

385 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Spookyworld, Inc., 346 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003); Chao

v. Mike & Charlie’s Inc., No. H-05-1780, 2006 WL 18467, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan.

4, 2006). 

“The pecuniary purpose test asks whether the government primarily seeks

to protect a pecuniary governmental interest in the debtor’s property, as opposed

to protecting the public safety and health.” Nortel, 669 F.3d at 139-40. “The

public policy test asks whether the government is effectuating public policy

rather than adjudicating private rights.” Id. at 140. Thus, “[i]f the purpose of

the law is to promote public safety and welfare or to effectuate public policy,

then the exception to the automatic stay applies. If, on the other hand, the

purpose of the law is to protect the government’s pecuniary interest in the

debtor’s property or primarily to adjudicate private rights, then the exception is

inapplicable.” Id.; see also Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1109; Eddleman v. U.S. Dep’t of

Labor, 923 F.2d 782, 791 (10th Cir. 1991), overruled in part on other grounds by

Temex Energy, Inc. v. Underwood, Wilson, Berry, Stein & Johnson, 968 F.2d

1003, 1005 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992); In re Gandy, 327 B.R. 796, 803 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.

2005). The pecuniary purpose and public policy tests both “contemplate that the

bankruptcy court, after assessing the totality of the circumstances, [will]

determine whether the particular regulatory proceeding at issue is designed

primarily to protect the public safety and welfare, or represents a governmental

attempt to recover from property of the debtor estate, whether on its own claim,

or on the nongovernmental debts of private parties.” McMullen, 386 F.3d at 325;

see also Hosp. Staffing, 270 F.3d at 389 (stating that the tests “are designed to

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sort out cases in which the government is bringing suit in furtherance of either

its own or certain private parties’ interest in obtaining a pecuniary advantage

over other creditors”).

There are two main issues of contention between Halo and the Appellee

telephone companies on appeal: (a) whether the PUC proceedings are being

“continued by” a governmental unit, (b) and whether those proceedings are in

furtherance of the states’ police and regulatory powers. 

A. “Continued by”

Halo argues that none of the PUC proceedings should be exempted from

the automatic stay because an action must be prosecuted by and in the name of

a governmental unit in order to be excepted from the automatic stay. Halo bases

its claim on the statutory text, as well as court decisions that have applied the

exception to the stay only where the proceeding is advanced by a governmental

unit that sued or prosecuted the debtor to enforce the governmental unit’s own

police or regulatory powers. It notes that, while in some cases an action may

have originated with a private party complaint to a governmental unit, that unit

then conducted an investigation and adopted the role of the plaintiff or

prosecutor. 

The Appellees respond that the bankruptcy court’s ruling was correct

because the private party-initiated proceedings are essentially identical to

proceedings initiated by PUCs. Therefore, these actions should be excepted in

the same manner as those instituted by the state. The Appellees also argue that

Halo focuses on only one part of the statutory language when it states that an

action must be initiated by the government, because the exception applies to “the

commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental

unit . . . to enforce such governmental unit’s or organization’s police and

regulatory power.” § 362(b)(4) (emphasis added). According to the Appellees, all

of the state PUC actions are being continued by governmental units because

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they are ongoing, and they thus fall within the exception to the automatic stay. 

In support of their argument, the Appellees point to cases where a complaint

was initially filed by a private party, but then prosecuted or continued by a state

agency. 

Halo waxes hyperbolic when it states that “every reported case that has

applied the exception to the automatic stay has involved an independent

proceeding advanced by a governmental unit that sued or prosecuted the debtor

to enforce the governmental unit’s own police or regulatory powers.” While most

cases do involve actions pursued by a governmental unit in its own name, the

circumstances vary. As the Appellees make clear, many cases are initiated by

the filing of a complaint by a private party. This is especially true in actions

seeking to vindicate workers’ rights. See, e.g., NLRB v. Evans Plumbing, 639

F.2d 291, 292 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (two employees filed a charge of unfair

labor practices with the National Labor Relations Board, and the charge was set

for a hearing when the employer filed for bankruptcy; the hearing was held, and

the NLRB then filed a petition in this Court to enforce its decision ordering the

employer to reinstate the employees with backpay, which petition the Court

granted). Courts have recognized that though these actions may have

6

similarities to private litigation, they also promote the public interest by

See generally In re Mohawk Greenfield Motel Corp., 239 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999) 6

(two former employees filed complaints with the Massachusetts Commission Against

Discrimination, and after conducting hearings, the Commission found for them and sought to

enforce a monetary judgment; the bankruptcy court held that the hearings and the entry of

a monetary judgment were excepted from the automatic stay, largely due to the state’s public

policy against discrimination, but that any effort to enforce the award would not be allowed);

In re Ngan Gung Restaurant, Inc., 183 B.R. 689 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (private individuals

complained to the Attorney General about a restaurant’s labor practices; the Attorney General

investigated and then filed a Notice of Petition against the restaurant in state court, which

action the bankruptcy court held was exempt from the automatic stay); In re SSS of Ky., Inc.,

29 B.R. 19 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (where private parties filed an opposition to the sale of a

broadcast license with the FCC, the bankruptcy court ruled that the proceedings before the

FCC were exempt from the automatic stay).

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enforcing state laws and regulations. See, e.g., In re D. M. Barber, Inc., 13 B.R.

962, 963 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981) (“Proceedings before the National Labor

Relations Board are commenced by the initiative of aggrieved individual persons

and thus have some characteristics of private litigation. However the case law

reflects that the proceedings by the Board are not to adjudicate private rights

but to effectuate public policy.” (citations omitted)).

There are some cases in which courts have ruled that an action must be

brought by the governmental unit in order for it to be exempt from the automatic

stay under § 362(b)(4). In In re Reyes, for example, a private party filed a

complaint with the Texas Real Estate Commission (“TREC”) against a debtor

after she had declared bankruptcy. See No. 10–52366–C, 2011 WL 1522337, at

*1 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2011). The bankruptcy court held that the action

before the TREC was not exempt from the automatic stay. Id. at *7. The court

relied, in part, on the fact that once a complaint was filed, “the TREC would be

obligated to investigate the allegations if the complaint, together with any

evidence submitted with the complaint, provided reasonable cause for an

investigation.” Id. at *4. Thus, “[t]he Commission has no discretion in deciding 7

whether to investigate if the complaint provides sufficient grounds for an

investigation.” Id. The court also found that the action was not in furtherance

of the public interest, but rather to benefit the pecuniary interests of the

complainant. Id. at *6. The court therefore held that § 362(b)(4) should be

“narrowly construed” and “applied only when an action against the debtor has

been brought by the government.” Id. at *7; see also Nortel, 669 F.3d at 139

The court in Reyes also noted that the complainant and her attorney filed the 7

complaint against the debtor in the TREC in order to collect on a money judgment rendered

against the debtor prior to her filing for bankruptcy: “[The plaintiff’s attorney] had also

warned the debtor . . . after [he] had obtained the judgment for his client that, if the debtor

filed for bankruptcy, he would make sure that she lost her real estate license.” 2011 WL

1522447, at *4.

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(stating that though the U.K. Pensions Regulator is a governmental entity, and

though it initiated a regulatory procedure, it “is not a party to the pending

bankruptcy proceedings . . . [and] did not file a claim and therefore cannot

assert the police power exception”); Gandy, 327 B.R. at 802 (stating that “the

court must determine whether the plaintiff in the state court action is a

‘governmental unit’” (emphasis added)); City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 932

F.2d 1020, 1025 (2d Cir. 1991) (“11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) . . . requires that such suits

be brought by governmental units, not private persons.”). 

The court in Reyes relied in part on United States International Trade

Commission v. Jaffe, 433 B.R. 538 (E.D. Va. 2010), in making its decision. In

Jaffe, a proceeding before the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) was

initiated by a private party’s complaint, but the court found it “noteworthy that

the filing of the complaint does not initiate a formal ITC § 337 investigation;

rather, the action simply results in a ‘preinstitution proceeding,’ in which the

ITC ‘examine[s] the complaint for sufficiency and compliance,’ and performs a

preliminary investigation.” Id. at 541 (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 210.8). Once the ITC

does the preinvestigation and determines that a complaint was properly filed,

it institutes an investigation and provides official notice by publication. Id. The 8

matter is then referred to an administrative law judge, who determines, through

an adversarial process, whether or not the respondent has violated the Tariff

Act. Id. Therefore, even though the suit at issue was brought by private parties,

the court found that it “fits squarely within the § 362(b)(4) statutory exception

to the automatic stay” because “the ITC took affirmative steps to order the

commencement of a § 337 investigation.” Id. at 543. In Jaffe, then, though the

suit was commenced and pursued by a private party, the court held that it still

It was on this basis that the court in Reyes distinguished its case, because the TREC 8

had no “preinstitution proceeding,” nor did it have discretion in determining whether a

complaint was validly filed and thus should go forward. See 2011 WL 1522337, at *5.

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met the two requirements of § 362(b)(4): “(i) the action is brought by the

government, and (ii) the action seeks to vindicate the public interest, as opposed

to a specific individual’s or entity’s rights.” Id. 

Similarly, in McMullen, a couple filed a complaint against a realtor with

the Massachusetts Division of Registration for Real Estate Agents after the

realtor had declared bankruptcy. 386 F.3d at 323. The court held that

submitting a complaint after the filing of bankruptcy, which the Division then

investigated, was excepted from the stay, notwithstanding the fact that the

action was initiated by a private party. Id. at 327-28.

While the court in Jaffe took pains to point out the discretion the

government agency had in allowing an action to proceed, other courts have held

that actions brought by private parties are excepted from the automatic stay

without going into such an analysis. For instance, in Alpern v. Lieb, 11 F.3d 689

(7th Cir. 1993), the Seventh Circuit held that a proceeding to impose sanctions

under Rule 11 was exempt from the automatic stay. The court stated: 

[t]he Rule 11 sanction is meted out by a governmental

unit, the court, though typically sought by a private

individual or organization–a nongovernmental litigant,

the opponent of the litigant to be sanctioned. There is

no anomaly, given the long history of private

enforcement of penal and regulatory law. The private

enforcer, sometimes called a ‘private attorney general,’

can be viewed as an agent of the ‘governmental unit,’

the federal judiciary, that promulgated Rule 11 in order

to punish unprofessional behavior. 

Id. at 690. In In re Berg, 230 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit held

that an award of attorneys’ fees imposed as a sanction for unprofessional conduct

was exempted from the automatic stay. The court stated that “it is clear that the

purpose of such sanctions is to effectuate public policy, not to protect private

rights or the government’s interest in the sanctioned person’s property.” Id. at

1168. Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits focused on the fact that the

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sanctions at issue would help to promote the public policy of the state, in the

same way that the Jaffe court found that “ITC § 337 investigations plainly

evidence an objective purpose of protecting the public interest at each stage of

the ITC investigation.” 433 B.R. at 545.9

In this case, the bankruptcy court did not make any findings as to the

specific procedures in each state PUC, which would aid us in determining

whether the individual commissions conduct preinvestigation proceedings, or

have discretion over whether an action goes forward, as the courts in Jaffe and

Reyes did. According to AT&T, there is no real difference between proceedings

initiated by private parties and those initiated by the State Commissions

themselves. As an example, AT&T points to a recent action commenced by the

Wisconsin Public Service Commission, investigating the actions of Halo and

Transcom, among other companies, which it says is “substantively identical” to

the proceedings at issue in this case. Similarly, the TDS Appellees state that the

Georgia Public Interest Advocacy Staff and the consumer’s utility counsel

division become parties to the proceedings once a private party files a complaint. 

When a representative of the Missouri Public Service Commission (“MoPSC”)

appeared to give testimony at the hearing before the bankruptcy court, she

stated that the MoPSC becomes a party when a complaint is filed with it. See

MO. ANN. STAT. § 386.390(1) (West 2012). Thus, there is evidence that at least

some of the PUC actions at issue here are similar to any action that a state

 It has been held that qui tam actions are excepted from the automatic stay, as well. 9

In United States ex rel. Doe v. X, Inc., 246 B.R. 817 (E.D. Va. 2000), a private party brought

a qui tam False Claims action, and the federal government had not yet decided whether or not

to intervene. The court held that the exception to the automatic stay applied because “the

United States is the real party in interest in all qui tam suits,” such that “the instant qui tam

suit is ‘brought by a governmental unit’ for the purposes of § 362(b)(4)’s police powers

exception, even though the United States has not yet made its intervention election.” Id. at

820.

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regulatory commission might take itself, and that in some instances, a

“governmental unit” actually becomes a party to the action.

Perhaps more importantly, as the Appellees note, the statutory language

directs that “the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a

governmental unit” is excepted from the automatic stay. § 362(b)(4) (emphasis

added). It neither ignores nor twists the words of the statute to interpret this

phrase as excepting suits continued by a governmental unit, without regard to

who initially filed the complaint. Accordingly, we find that the PUC actions

meet the first requirement of the exception to the automatic stay, because they

are being continued by governmental units.

B. The State’s Police and Regulatory Power

Halo next argues that the various PUC proceedings are private contract

actions brought by the telephone company Appellees in their own pecuniary

interest, so they do not meet the second statutory requirement that an excepted

action be intended “to enforce such governmental unit’s or organization’s police

and regulatory power.” § 362(b)(4). In both its briefs and at oral argument, Halo

also stated that many of the Appellees’ claims are federal questions. For

instance, according to Halo, Transcom’s status as either an enhanced service

provider or an end user “is a federal question that several federal courts have

decided without prior regulatory input.” Halo also argues that whether or not

it provides CMRS is a question that is not within the state commissions’

jurisdiction, and but rather must be resolved by the FCC.

According to the Appellees, the bankruptcy court’s order does effectuate

the policies of the Bankruptcy Code because it prevents Halo from using

bankruptcy to frustrate governmental functions and to avoid the states’ police

and regulatory powers. The telephone companies argue that the order protects

important state regulatory powers, as well as public policies underlying

telecommunications statutes, regulations, and tariffs, including maintaining the

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proper balance of federal and state authority in telecommunications law. In

addition, the Appellees note that since ICAs must be approved by the state

commissions, they are not merely private contract disputes, but rather are an

aspect of the states’ regulation and enforcement of intra-state

telecommunications. Finally, the Appellees state that the fact that the PUCs

may determine whether Halo owes the Appellee companies fees or enter money

judgments does not preclude application of § 362(b)(4), because the bankruptcy

court’s order requires that the parties return to that court before the

enforcement of any money judgment can occur. 

Halo may be correct that some of the claims made by the Appellees in the

PUCs will ultimately need to be decided by a federal court. However, as this

Court has noted before, the FTA envisions a “carefully crafted federal-state

balance” that “erects a scheme of ‘cooperative federalism.’” Budget Prepay, Inc.

v. AT&T Corp., 605 F.3d 273, 281 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Core Commc’ns, Inc.

v. Verizon Pa., Inc., 493 F.3d 333, 335 (3d Cir. 2007)). Under this arrangement,

“responsibility for complex regulatory schemes [is divided] between states and

the federal government, with the federal government setting general standards

and ensuring overall compliance, while state agencies are given latitude to

proceed in any number of fashions, provided that they are not inconsistent with

the Act and FCC regulations.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The Appellees have brought claims under both federal and state

telecommunications laws, and further, interpretation and enforcement of ICAs

is entrusted in the first instance to state commissions. See 47 U.S.C. § 252;

Budget Prepay, 605 F.3d at 279 (stating that “interpretation of the terms of an

ICA, even if the ICA terms are intertwined with federal law, is a claim governed

by and arising under state law” (citing Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utility Comm’n

of Tex., 208 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2000)). 

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Furthermore, state PUC rulings are subject to federal court review. See

47 U.S.C. §§ 251, 252; Sw. Bell, 208 F.3d at 480 (“We also hold that the district

courts have jurisdiction to review such interpretation and enforcement decisions

of the state commissions.”). We have held that this federal review encompasses

not only commission decisions regarding compliance with the requirements of

the FTA, but also permits courts to review “the PUC’s state law determinations

. . . under the . . . arbitrary-and-capricious standard.” Sw. Bell, 208 F.3d at 482. 

Thus, Halo is not being denied a federal forum by the requirement that it first

submit to the jurisdiction of the state PUCs. While Halo may feel that it would

be more expedient and efficient to have all of these actions heard in one court,10

we responded to a similar argument in Budget Prepay by noting that “the

potential for inconsistent results” that arises from litigating in multiple state

commissions “[is] part and parcel of cooperative federalism,” and this result is

consistent with congressional intent. 605 F.3d at 281. By choosing to conduct

business in a number of different states, Halo has consented to such a system. 

We also find that the PUC actions at issue here pass both the pecuniary

purpose and public policy tests outlined above, and are thus in furtherance of the

states’ regulatory and police powers. Through these proceedings, the states do

not “primarily see[k] to protect a pecuniary governmental interest in the debtor’s

property, as opposed to protecting the public safety and health.” Nortel, 669

F.3d at 139-40. None of the PUC proceedings would give the states access to

Halo’s property. In addition, the bankruptcy court’s order ensures that if a PUC

rules that Halo owes fees to one of the Appellees, no enforcement of any money

judgment may take place without first going back to the bankruptcy court. 

Thus, the suits are not strictly in the pecuniary interest of the Appellees, either. 

While we need not delve further into this issue here, we note that even if it were 10

appropriate to consolidate all of these actions in one federal forum, we do not agree with Halo

that it necessarily follows that a federal bankruptcy court is the most fitting choice.

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Instead, they will aid in determining what kind of telecommunications provider

Halo is, how it should interact with the local telephone companies with which it

deals, and whether its interactions with them thus far have followed the

applicable rules and regulations. The fact that Halo must expend money in

defending these multiple actions does not mean that the exception should not

apply. As this Circuit has recognized, “in contemporary times, almost

everything costs something.” Commonwealth Oil, 805 F.2d at 1186 (quoting

Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 278). Even if a PUC enters a money judgment against

Halo, as long as it does not seek to enforce that judgment, the action still falls

under the exception to the automatic stay. Brennan, 230 F.3d at 71. This fact

seriously weakens Halo’s argument that the bankruptcy court’s ruling will

undermine “the ordered administration or re-organization of [its] estate or

business.” 

 Moreover, the FTA indicates that regulation of telecommunications

carriers serves the public interest. The Act was passed in part to ensure that

“all the people of the United States, without discrimination on the basis of race,

color, religion, national origin, or sex, [have available] a rapid, efficient,

Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with

adequate facilities at reasonable charges.” 47 U.S.C. § 151. This demonstrates

a clear public purpose to federal regulation of telecommunications. The Act

requires that “[a]ny interconnection agreement adopted by negotiation or

arbitration shall be submitted for approval to the State commission. ” 47 U.S.C.

§ 252(e)(1). Thus, the Act contemplates a public purpose to state regulation of

telecommunications, as well. Furthermore, even ICAs between two private

companies, such as those in dispute between AT&T and Halo (what Halo calls

“private contracts”), have a public nature, as they must be approved by the

applicable State commission. 

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Halo argues that “[t]he facts underlying the parties’ disputes involve

commercial competition and compensation–not government enforcement in the

public interest.” However, state case law and statutes regarding PUCs

demonstrate their public purpose. For instance, the Missouri Public Service

Commission Act “was the result of growing feeling that such competition, as

existed in this field, was inadequate to protect the public.” May Dep’t Stores Co.

v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 341 Mo. 299, 316 (1937). The Missouri Act

uses the “police power of the state,” id. at 316, in order “to secure equality in

service and in rates for all who needed or desired these services and who were

similarly situated,” id. at 317. In Georgia, the Public Service Commission

“clearly has enforcement and regulatory powers. It not only has the power to

conduct hearings and render decisions, it also has the power to act on those

decisions, such as granting or denying licenses and rate increases.” Campaign

for a Prosperous Ga. v. Ga. Power Co., 174 Ga. App. 263, 264 (Ct. App. 1985). It

is the policy of Texas “to protect the public interest in having adequate and

efficient telecommunications service available to each resident of this state at

just, fair, and reasonable rates.” V.T.C.A., Util. Code § 52.001(a). This policy is

effected through the Texas PUC, which “has the general power to regulate and

supervise the business of each public utility within its jurisdiction and to do

anything specifically designated or implied by this title that is necessary and

convenient to the exercise of that power and jurisdiction.” Id. § 14.001. When

resolving disputes, the Texas PUC is directed to consider the effect on

“(1) consumers, (2) competitors; and (3) the incumbent local exchange company.” 

Id. § 60.003(c). These cases and statutes provide examples of state PUCs’

mandate to protect the public interest, and show that they utilize the police and

regulatory powers of the states in doing so.

Under the pecuniary purpose and public policy tests, a bankruptcy court

must “determine whether the particular regulatory proceeding at issue is

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designed primarily to protect the public safety and welfare[.]” McMullen, 386

F.3d at 325. The bankruptcy court here recognized that “the actions of the

Public Utilities Commission . . . are aimed at effectuating public policies[.] [T]he

Public Utility Commissions are seeking to enforce regulatory statutes, including

their tariffs and rules.” The bankruptcy judge’s order limiting the effect of any

monetary judgments issued by the PUCs ensures that the actions at issue pass

the pecuniary purpose test; federal and state regulations and case law

demonstrate that telecommunications regulation is intended to serve the public

interest. Consequently, we find that the PUC proceedings meet the requirement

of § 362(b)(4) that the governmental unit be enforcing its police or regulatory

powers, and they were properly excepted from the automatic bankruptcy stay.

C. Motion to Strike

The Missouri Public Service Commission (“MoPSC”) filed a brief at the

same time as the telephone company Appellees. Halo then filed a motion to

strike the MoPSC’s brief and to remove it from the caption of the case, on the

grounds that the MoPSC is not a party to this action, the bankruptcy judge did

not grant the MoPSC’s motion to intervene, and that the MoPSC had not

requested permission to file an amicus brief from this Court. The MoPSC

responded to the motion, asking the Court to accept its brief as the brief of an

amicus curiae under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a) or (b) if the Court

does not recognize it as an intervenor. Halo opposes the MoPSC’s request for

alternative relief.

The MoPSC first argues that the bankruptcy judge granted its motion to

intervene. However, while the record shows that on October 7, 2011, a motion

to intervene was granted, the record does not reveal any court order associated

with that docket entry. According to Halo, the entry “reflects only the electronic

submission of a proposed order by the MoPSC.” The bankruptcy court did allow

the MoPSC to appear at the October 7, 2011 hearing in which it made its

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findings of fact and conclusions of law, and any testimony by a representative of

the MoPSC there is now part of the record. However, it does not appear that the

MoPSC was ever formally made a party to this action.

Halo opposes the MoPSC’s alternative request that its brief be considered

that of an amicus, arguing that the MoPSC has not met the requirements of Rule

29. Under that rule, “[t]he United States or its officer or agency or a state may

file an amicus-curiae brief without the consent of the parties or leave of court. 

Any other amicus curiae may file a brief only by leave of court or if the brief

states that all parties have consented to its filing.” Fed. R. App. P. 29(a). We

agree that the MoPSC’s brief does not fall within the parameters of Rule 29. 

However, it would still be within our discretion to accept the brief. See Fry v.

Exelon Corp. Cash Balance Pension Plan, 576 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The

court has discretion to accept an untimely filing when the value of the potential

amicus brief justifies the inconvenience of requiring the judges to review a case

multiple times . . . .”).

More fundamentally, Halo contends that the MoPSC’s brief “adds nothing

to this appeal.” The MoPSC counters that “[t]he other appellees in this case do

not adequately represent the interests of the MoPSC[,]” because they are

“regulated telephone companies” with “different interests than the MoPSC has

as a regulator.” As Judge Posner has written,

[a]n amicus brief should normally be allowed when a

party is not represented competently or is not

represented at all, when the amicus has an interest in

some other case that may be affected by the decision in

the present case (though not enough affected to entitle

the amicus to intervene and become a party in the

present case), or when the amicus has unique

information or perspective that can help the court

beyond the help that the lawyers for the parties are

able to provide. 

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Ryan v. CFTC, 125 F.3d 1062, 1063 (7th Cir. 1997); see also New England

Patriots Football Club, Inc. v. Univ. of Colo., 592 F.2d 1196, 1198 n.3 (1st Cir.

1979) (stating that an amicus is one who “for the assistance of the court gives

information of some matter of law in regard to which the court is doubtful or

mistaken” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). Here, there is no evidence

that any of the Appellees are poorly represented, or that there is a case outside

of those between Halo and these Appellees in which the MoPSC has an interest. 

While the MoPSC may have a “unique perspective,” due to its status as a

regulator, its brief in fact contains no information or arguments that the

Appellees did not already provide to the Court. Furthermore, because the

bankruptcy judge permitted a representative of the MoPSC to testify at the

October 7, 2011 hearing, this Court is already aware of the MoPSC’s concerns.

“Whether to permit a nonparty to submit a brief, as amicus curiae, is, with

immaterial exceptions, a matter of judicial grace.” Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v.

Scheidler, 223 F.3d 615, 616 (7th Cir. 2000). Because the MoPSC’s brief does not

meet the requirements of Rule 29, and we do not find that it adds anything

consequential to our consideration of this case, Halo’s motion to strike is

granted. See Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. El Paso Cnty. Water Improvement Dist.

No. 1, 222 F.3d 208, 209 (5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (“We find that

Southwestern Bell’s motion is untimely, that the issue Southwestern Bell seeks

to address has been adequately briefed by the Pueblo and the District, and that

granting Southwestern Bell’s motion would result in the needless delay of this

case’s disposition. Accordingly, Southwestern Bell’s motion is denied.” (citation

omitted)).

D. Motion to Take Judicial Notice

AT&T has filed a motion for the Court to take judicial notice of federal

court and state commission proceedings and orders that have been referenced

and/or discussed in the parties’ briefing in this appeal. Halo opposes AT&T’s

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motion, arguing that all but two of the matters come from outside the record and

were not considered by the bankruptcy court. Halo also contends that AT&T is

simply attempting to circumvent judicial rules regarding record excerpts and

record supplementation. 

Halo cites case law for the premise that judicial notice cannot be used as

“an impermissible attempt to supplement the record on appeal” with evidence

not before the district court. United States v. Okoronkwo, 46 F.3d 426, 435 (5th

Cir. 1995). However, “[a]lthough a court of appeals will not ordinarily enlarge

the record to include material not before the district court, it is clear that the

authority to do so exists.” Gibson v. Blackburn, 744 F.2d 403, 405 n.3 (5th Cir.

1984). In addition, it is within the Court’s discretion to take judicial notice of

information “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to a source

whose accuracy on the matter cannot reasonably be questioned.” Kitty Hawk

Aircargo, Inc. v. Chao, 418 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Bauer v. Texas,

341 F.3d 352, 362 n.8 (5th Cir. 2003). As AT&T has filed copies of publiclyavailable orders and proceedings, it is within our discretion to take judicial

notice of them. 

Ultimately, AT&T’s filing does not add anything to the record that assists

us in deciding this case. The reasoning of a federal court in remanding an action

by AT&T against Halo to a PUC, or a notice of proceedings by a state PUC not

involved in the present dispute, do not help us to determine whether the state

PUC proceedings should be excepted from the automatic bankruptcy stay. While

the remand orders may give more detail regarding federal and state

telecommunications law and how the two interact, they do not answer the

central question: whether the state PUC actions are “commence[d] or continu[ed]

. . . by a governmental unit” in the enforcement of its “police or regulatory

power.” 362(b)(4). Therefore, while we grant AT&T’s motion to supplement the

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record, we do so with the understanding that these documents are not especially

helpful to the Court.

IV. CONCLUSION

“It is well to remember that section 362(b)(4) embodies a fundamental

judgment of Congress: that protecting the public welfare and safety trumps the

concerns that underlie the automatic stay, a provision whose main purpose is to

prevent some private creditors from gaining priority on other creditors.” 

Spookyworld, 346 F.3d at 10. In addition, “a fundamental policy behind the

police or regulatory power exception . . . is to prevent the bankruptcy court from

becoming a haven for wrongdoers.” Commonwealth Cos., 913 F.2d at 527

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If Halo is permitted to stay all

of the PUC proceedings, it will have used its bankruptcy filing to avoid the

potential consequences of a business model it freely chose and pursued. A

finding that the state PUC actions are being continued by governmental units

does not run afoul of the statutory language of § 362(b)(4), and is in keeping with

the policy animating the exception. The PUC proceedings are also being used

to enforce the police and regulatory power of the states. Accordingly, the

bankruptcy court’s order was not in error, and the judgment of the bankruptcy

court is AFFIRMED. 

Halo’s motion to strike the brief submitted by the Missouri Public Service

Commission and to remove the Missouri Public Service Commission from the

caption of the case is GRANTED. AT&T’s motion to take judicial notice is also

GRANTED.

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