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HAMAS’ BENEFACTORS: A NETWORK OF TERROR

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 9, 2014

Serial No. 113–213

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Jonathan Schanzer, Ph.D., vice president for research, Foundation for Defense of Democracies ............................................................................................ 11

Mr. Avi Jorisch, senior fellow for counterterrorism, American Foreign Policy 

Council .................................................................................................................. 34

Steven A. Cook, Ph.D., Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle Eastern 

studies, Council on Foreign Relations ................................................................ 47

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Jonathan Schanzer, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................... 14

Mr. Avi Jorisch: Prepared statement ..................................................................... 36

Steven A. Cook, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................................... 50

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 82

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 83

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 84

(1)

HAMAS’ BENEFACTORS: A NETWORK OF 

TERROR 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The joint subcommittee will come to order. 

After recognizing myself, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member 

Deutch, and Ranking Member Sherman for our opening statements, I will then recognize other members seeking recognition. We 

will then hear from our distinguished panel of witnesses. And without objection, the witnesses’ prepared statements will be made a 

part of the record, and members may have 5 days in which to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to the length 

limitation in the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

ISIL, al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas—these are some of the most 

dangerous terrorist groups out today. Though they have all of their 

differences, notably different ideologies, different objectives, what 

they do have in common is that they are all non-state actors who 

need to get their resources from somewhere. 

We are now just 2 weeks into the open-ended ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas. In the previous 2 months, Hamas 

terrorists have fired over 4,500 rockets indiscriminately into Israel, 

including into its most populated areas such as Jerusalem and Tel 

Aviv. 

Of course, it isn’t forgotten that the start of these attacks coincided with the abduction and murder of three innocent Israeli teenagers. Hamas originally denied its complicity in this heinous crime 

but last month admitted responsibility, and it is important to note 

when this admission took place and by whom. 

The announcement was made by a known terrorist and Hamas 

operative in Turkey where he lives openly. This is the same Turkey 

that is a supposed U.S. and NATO ally that is harboring not just 

this member of Hamas, but it is known to be harboring several of 

Hamas’ top operatives. 

But harboring these terrorists isn’t where Turkey stops. It provides financial, material, and political support for this U.S. desVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:34 Oct 28, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\090914\89738 SHIRL
2

ignated foreign terrorist organization and has been doing so for 

years without repercussions. In fact, in 2011, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan said, ‘‘Hamas is not a terrorist organization. It is a 

political party.’’

But Turkey isn’t the only U.S. ally, or at least U.S. partner, that 

has been known to harbor Hamas leadership and provide the terrorist group with funds. Qatar, the very same Qatar that the administration entrusted to monitor the Taliban five, who were 

swapped for Sergeant Bergdahl, and which it recently agreed to an 

$11 billion armed sale with, has been known to be perhaps the 

largest financial patron of Hamas. 

Not only does Qatar harbor Hamas figurehead Khaled Meshaal, 

Qatar reportedly threatened to exile him if Hamas accepted an 

Egyptian-backed cease fire agreement last month. In 2011, the 

Emir of Qatar was the first head of state to visit Gaza and pledged 

over $400 million of infrastructure money to Hamas. Qatar funds 

Hamas’ strikes in Gaza, as well as its project, building terror tunnels from which to attack Israel rather than building up Gaza for 

the Palestinian people. 

The administration took a step to block a recent transfer of funds 

from Qatar to Hamas terrorists, and earlier this year the Treasury 

Department openly admitted that Qatar for many years has openly 

financed Hamas. It is also supporting extremist groups operating 

in Syria and has become such a permissive terrorist financing environment for all of these groups, and that includes its funding of the 

Muslim Brotherhood, and, along with Kuwait, has become a major 

source of funding for ISIL, a threat that must be eliminated. 

According to reports, Egypt has charged former leader Mohamed 

Morsi with giving national security documents to Qatar, and Qatari 

connections to the Brotherhood are deep and troubling. But the administration has not done nearly enough to curb Qatari support for 

terror. 

We cannot continue to allow Qatari funds to go to terrorist 

groups, Hamas or any other, unabated and unaddressed. Yet we 

have been setting the example for the Qataris and the Turks with 

how the administration is dealing with Iran. Iran has long been a 

U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism and has actively worked 

to target and undermine our national security interest. 

Iranian technology and rockets have been used to launch thousands of rockets further into Israel, placing the majority of the 

country at risk. And the regime’s financial support has allowed 

Hamas to continue to resupply itself after its stockpiles run low or 

are destroyed by Israel. Yet for all that we know of the relationship 

between Iran and these terrorist groups, the administration has ignored this all in its pursuit of its weak nuclear deal with Iran. 

In fact, the Iranian regime’s support for terror, its ballistic missile program, or its human rights record, aren’t even on the table 

in these negotiations. So while we continue to give away the store, 

we strengthen and legitimize Iran and embolden other actors who 

see just how naive we truly are being to this threat. 

We saw how well this approach worked with North Korea during 

those nuclear negotiations, and I was one of the first who admonished the Bush administration for its mistake to take North Korea 

3

off the list of state sponsor of terrorism and for the terrible example that it set for future nuclear talks with this rogue regime. 

While North Korea continues to circumvent and violate U.N. National Security Council resolutions, like the incident with the North 

Korean flag vessel and Cuban weapons, or the reports that 

Pyongyang is seeking to conclude an arms deal with Hamas, it 

couldn’t be any clearer that it deserves to be redesignated as a 

state sponsor of terrorism country now. 

Some of our allies no longer trust us, and our enemies no longer 

fear us. If we don’t take immediate and decisive action against 

those nations that support terror and undermine our national security, especially those that are supposed allies, then we put our interest and our citizens at greater risk. 

We cannot allow this support for terrorism to continue. We must 

cut off the funds that go to Hamas and other terror groups. Only 

then can we begin to take down those terrorist groups and counter 

their radical ideologies. It all starts with the ideology. But like a 

flame without air, these radical ideologies, without money and support, will die out. 

I am pleased to turn to my ranking member, my good friend, 

Congressman Ted Deutch, for his opening statement. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you very much, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. I 

would first like to express how proud I am of what this committee 

and the full House was able to achieve in a bipartisan manner during this summer when Hamas waged war against Israel. We 

passed a resolution that I co-introduced with you, Madam Chairman, to denounce Hamas’ use of human shields as a gross violation 

of international humanitarian law and a heinous disregard of the 

basic human rights of the people of Gaza. 

We passed another resolution with 166 of our colleagues signing 

on as co-sponsors making clear to Hamas and the rest of the world 

that the United States stands firmly and steadfastly with Israel 

and will support that country as it exercises its right to defend 

itself from rocket attacks and other terrorist threats. 

And I join with many of my colleagues to deliver a message to 

the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights exposing their concentrated focus on Israel rather than Hamas, the terrorist group 

willing to sacrifice thousands of innocent lives and endanger millions more. All of these actions and plenty more send a clear sign 

to the world that Congress stands together in support of Israel’s security and will forcibly respond to terrorists that threaten it. So I 

would like to thank my colleagues. 

As the cease fire and the conflict between Israel and Gaza has 

taken hold, we have got to face the challenge of addressing this 

network of support for Hamas. The simple conclusion that we can 

reach is that Turkey, Qatar, and Iran all played varying roles in 

supporting Hamas, whether financially, militarily, politically, or a 

combination. 

These countries stood with Hamas as it encouraged families to 

remain in buildings as human shields, despite repeated warnings 

to leave by these Israeli military. These countries stood with 

Hamas as it spent millions and millions of dollars, not on the welfare of the Palestinian people but on tunnels for terrorizing Israeli 

communities. 

4

These countries stood with Hamas as it shot thousands of rockets 

into Israel indiscriminately and targeted urban areas full of civilians. These are despicable acts that were permitted to occur with 

the continued support from this network. And as I stated before, 

Congress took appropriate measures to condemn these actions, and 

I believe that the condemnation can be extended back to Hamas’ 

benefactors. 

However, the issue becomes more complicated when you began to 

zoom out and try to understand the larger regional implications of 

the conflict and of this terrorist support network. This is where it 

gets particularly complicated, especially in the context of the Syrian conflict, a calamity that is in desperate need of the world’s attention. 

The response to the United States thus far has been mostly humanitarian, with some military support to vetted opposition 

groups. But a great deal of our on-the-ground involvement in Syria 

is to Syrians inside the country that comes through its northern 

neighbor, Turkey. It is with cooperation with the Turkish Government that we and other humanitarian partners are able to continue to use their routes into the country. 

These are helpful measures that we need to deliver essential aid 

to millions of Syrians internally displaced and without access to 

basic supplies or food. The country has also taken in—Turkey, 

taken in over 800,000 Syrian refugees fleeing death and destruction. 

Turkey is also in a position to play a large role in combating 

ISIL. The threat to the Turks is very tangible. The group is active 

not far from the Turkish border. Turkey, a NATO ally, may soon 

have to deal with ISIL not as a threat to the stability of neighboring countries but to the direct security of that nation itself. 

The state has begun to take measures to restrict funds and foreign fighters flowing into Syria and is working to reduce the fuel 

smuggling out of Syria that helps in part to fund ISIL’s campaigns. 

Turkey has joined in Secretary Kerry’s announced coalition of 

states to combat the growing ISIL threat in Syria and Iraq. 

However, we cannot turn away from the country’s actions during 

the Hamas-Israel conflict. Turkey not only stood at the side of 

Hamas, but then Prime Minister Erdogan made egregious and 

wildly offensive accusations at Israel, comparing Israeli actions to 

those of Hitler and the Nazis. These statements make it abundantly clear that now President Erdogan and other Turkish leaders 

have fully embraced this policy of giving support and political cover 

to Hamas. 

So while complex conflicts like this require a careful approach 

when dealing with our partners in the region, our policy has to remain explicitly clear toward Iran. Hamas’ military capacity, including arms, rockets, methods of combat, and general funding, is 

largely provided by Iran. Repeatedly, the Israelis have intercepted 

shipments of Iranian arms en route to the Gaza strip. Most recently in March of this year Israelis intercepted the Klos C ship 

carrying 40 M302 missiles, 181 mortars, 400,000 guns. These are 

weapons that would have undoubtedly been used against Israel. 

We must remember that Hamas was able to reach Tel-Aviv, Jerusalem, and other heavily populated civilian centers largely due 

5

to the advanced rockets provided for or funded by Iran. Let me be 

clear: Any mutual interest that the United States and Iran might 

have, such as in combating the ISIL threat, will not distract us 

from our condemnation of Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism and our 

tough stance during negotiations of their nuclear program, nor will 

it detract from the necessity of preventing a nuclear armed Iran. 

We are just now moving away from a turbulent summer during 

which Israel faced significant threats from a terrorist group right 

on its border. Countries whose funds, resources, political clout, and 

vocal public endorsement were used to help Hamas fire rockets into 

civilian areas, build tunnels, and inflicting pain on innocent families are in some ways implicated for these same crimes. 

With things changing every day in the region, requiring new calculations and new strategies, it is important that the United States 

continue to make decisions based on our national security interest 

and those of our allies. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses today 

to explain not only the foundation of this network of support for 

Hamas but the true motivations and interests of these countries 

and how this information can be used to help shape effective policy 

decisions here, and I yield back. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

And now I am pleased to recognize Mr. Poe, because we are 

doing a joint subcommittee hearing. He is the chairman of our Subcommittee on Terrorism. Judge Poe. 

Mr. POE. I thank the chair. Hamas is a brutal terrorist organization. They are not a state. They are an international criminal organization that preaches hate and practices murder. The Hamas bigoted charter states, ‘‘The day of judgment will not come until Muslims fight Jews and kill them. And even stones and trees will call 

on Muslims to come and kill the Jews.’’

Specifically, the charter also calls for the annihilation and destruction of Israel. ‘‘Israel will exist and will continue to exist until 

Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it.’’

And Hamas has not revised this charter. It has not disavowed 

parts of it at all. It still refuses to recognize Israel’s right to exist 

and still calls for the killing of Jews. In 2006, Hamas senior leader 

Mahad Al-Zahra said that the group ‘‘will not change a single word 

of this covenant.’’ Hamas invented the tactic of suicide bombing 

that murdered many Israelis. 

In April 1993, Syria’s peace negotiations between Israel and the 

Palestinian leadership were underway. Hamas hates peace, so it 

had an operative named Tamom Nablusi drive a van into a parked 

bus and detonate it. This was the first-ever suicide bombing and 

it killed a Palestinian and wounded eight Israeli soldiers. Since 

then, Hamas has been responsible for the murder of hundreds—

hundreds of innocent Israelis. 

Hamas does not care about the lives or needs of the Palestinians 

either. As millions of Palestinians suffer from unemployment and 

the lack of basic services, Hamas spends money of its ill-gotten 

gain on tunnels and rockets from Iran designated to kill, yes, 

Israelis. It cannot govern and it will only drag Palestinians further 

into despair. 

6

During Protective Edge, Israel’s most recent operation against 

Hamas, the Israelis, in defense of their nation, destroyed or intercepted a majority of Hamas’ rocket supply, maybe as many as 

8,000 rockets. The U.N. and the world media faulted Israel for this 

war. They got it wrong. Hamas is a foreign terrorist organization. 

It is not a state. Israel acted in self-defense, and all countries have 

the sovereign right to do it. And we should make it clear that the 

United States supports Israel in this endeavor. 

Destroying rockets will not get rid of this problem, however. 

Hamas gets shipments of rockets from Iran and makes rockets 

from dual use material thanks to technology and know-how from 

Iran. It is only a matter of time before they reload and start firing 

those offensive rockets again. 

To stop Hamas, we must go after its finances and its suppliers, 

and there is plenty of evidence that Qatar and NATO partner Turkey, in addition to Iran, are the main backers of Hamas. Qatar and 

Turkey have pledged public and financial support to the tune of 

hundreds of millions of dollars. 

Khaled Meshaal, the leader of Hamas, lives comfortably in Qatar 

while the Palestinians go hungry. He lives along with a number of 

other senior commanders. In Turkey, the leader of a Hamas military wing, Qassam Brigades, also lives freely. The actions of Qatar 

and Turkey have inflamed relations with friendly Sunni Arab countries in the region, like Jordan, the UAE, and the Saudis. 

Qatar and Turkey should be held accountable for their actions, 

not just in Gaza with Hamas, but their support for other Sunni extremist groups. The United States must get tough with Qatar while 

looking at alternatives for our military bases in Qatar. 

Terrorist organizations, including Hamas, use Qatar as a financial clearinghouse. Despite years of U.S. Government urging Qatar 

to crack down, things have just gotten worse. In Turkey, Erdogan, 

our Erdogan regime must cut ties with Hamas and the Muslim 

Brotherhood or there is going to be consequences. There are all 

sorts of illicit financial transactions being processed through Turkey, including Iranian activity designed to skirt sanctions. No one 

should be surprised. 

It is time for the United States Government to wake up and see 

the Middle East for what it is and what it has become, not what 

we would just like it to be. If Hamas is going to be defeated, its 

money flow has to stop. We cannot stop Hamas’ finances by ourselves. We need countries in the region to work with us. If we want 

peace for the United States and peace for our ally, Israel, we must 

make our message clear. If you help finance Hamas, there will be 

significant consequences, and they will be unpleasant. 

I hope Qatar and Turkey are listening. No more filthy lucre to 

finance Hamas. And that is just the way it is. 

I will yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Judge Poe. 

Try to top that, Mr. Sherman, ranking member of Terrorism Subcommittee. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank the chairman and my fellow ranking member for holding these hearings. It is important that we identify the 

benefactors of Hamas, so that we can effectively deny it material 

and political support. Keep in mind, Hamas’ strategy is to create 

7

as many civilian casualties as possible on both sides. That is why 

its rocket attacks are designed to create as many civilian casualties 

in Israel, and then it uses as its chief political weapon the fact that 

there are civilian casualties among the Palestinians. Virtually 

every rocket it sends is a war crime, since its purpose is to kill civilians. 

The Israelis admirably have sought to minimize civilian casualties, and they have incurred losses as a result. If Israel had used 

bunker buster bombs to destroy tunnels, there would have been 

fewer Israeli casualties, and a lot more Palestinian civilians would 

have died. Instead, Israel sent in its ground forces, and it is that 

decision that caused virtually all of Israel’s casualties in the most 

recent war. 

We have got to avoid the body bag count method of moral analysis. We cannot assume that whichever side loses the most civilians has morality on its side. By that analysis, Eisenhower is a war 

criminal, since there are far more German deaths, civilian and 

military, than there were American. 

We know that Hamas has instigated the current conflict by kidnapping the three teenagers and firing rockets. We know that the 

purpose of the rockets it sent was to kill as many Israeli civilians 

as possible. For example, an Israeli child is killed by these rockets. 

It is not a tragic mistake for Hamas; it is a cause of celebration. 

The Iron Dome did much not only to save Israeli civilians but to 

save Palestinian civilians that would have died had Israel engaged 

in an even more robust response, which would have been necessary 

had there been more Israeli civilian casualties. 

So who are Hamas’ benefactors? We have heard them from the 

other opening statements. They are Qatar and Turkey and Iran. 

Iran has played a major role. There was a falling out in 2001 over 

Hamas siding with the anti-Assad forces in Syria. That has been 

patched up to some degree. But Iran is so preoccupied with other 

events involving Shiites from Lebanon to Iraq that it has reduced 

its support for Hamas for both political and economic reasons. 

Qatar—it has been described as 300 families and a TV station, 

300 families, a TV station, and a ton of petro dollars. Qatar often 

takes the role of trying to be close with every side of every conflict 

in the Middle East. They are buying $11 billion worth of our weapons, and they host the forward base of CENTCOM, the al Udeid 

Air Base. 

Their defense depends on us. We took the position during the 

first Gulf War that we would not allow small oil-rich kingdoms or 

sheikdoms to be wiped off the map. I don’t know if they should assume, given their policies, that that Kuwait Rule applies to Qatar. 

Turkey is providing substantial political support and economic 

support. $300 million was set aside for the Hamas government in 

2011, and Hamas allows its ‘‘charities’’ to fund Hamas directly. 

Pending weapons sales, military-to-military relations, economic 

sanctions, and the use of financial sanctions and blacklists for charitable organizations are all important levers. 

We have to focus not only on what the Governments of Turkey 

and Qatar do, but what they allow their wealthy citizens to do 

through trusts and foundations. And I look forward to our witVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:34 Oct 28, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\090914\89738 SHIRL
8

nesses’ testimony and their recommendations on how to attack this 

problem. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You did a very good job, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, you set a high standard. You compared me 

to the gentleman from Texas. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I know. After Judge Poe, that is tough. 

I will now be proud to recognize members for their 1-minute 

opening statements, and we will just go by the board that is right 

in front of your screen. Mr. Chabot of Ohio, our subcommittee 

chair. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair and Chairman Poe, for 

holding this important hearing to take a look at the links between 

Hamas and its supporters. Hamas required billions of dollars and 

considerable access to weapons and technology to carry on the 

nearly 2-month-long war against Israel. 

I, and I believe many of my colleagues, believe that the source 

of Hamas’ weapons and financial resources warrants considerable 

scrutiny. Although the conflict has quieted down for now, I am 

deeply concerned about the support provided to Hamas by a handful of global actors, despite Hamas’ reprehensible policy of maximizing civilian casualties. 

And as chairman of the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee, I continue to 

be concerned about North Korea’s support for Hamas and other terrorist groups. I want to, again, thank both of you for holding this 

hearing, as well as our ranking members, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I think there are 

four things that are pretty clear about Hamas and the situation in 

Gaza. One, Hamas must abjure its own charter and radically alter 

its behavior if it is ever going to have any respectable place at the 

international table. 

Secondly, its benefactors need to cut off its financial pipeline 

right now. Thirdly, the recent violence in the Gaza does show that 

there is no substitute for a long-term committed, sustained peace 

process between Israel and its Palestinian neighbors. And, fourth, 

the United States must remain engaged if we are ever going to end 

the cycle of violence in the Middle East. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I defer my time so 

that we can hear the witnesses. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Kennedy. 

Mr. KENNEDY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And I want to 

thank the witnesses for their testimony and look forward to hearing what you have to say. I echo the sentiments from our colleagues, very much looking forward to any suggestions you might 

have about how we can crack down on the financing of Hamas and 

their sources of income. 

And, secondly, what we can try to do to build up civil society 

there to erode support for Hamas in the long term as well. This beVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:34 Oct 28, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\090914\89738 SHIRL
9

came such a challenge because they were able to win an election. 

They were able to provide government services and give an explanation to the residents of Gaza as to why they should be representing them in government. 

What suggestions do you have for us about how we can make 

that case more explicit as to why that is not so? 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Madam Chair. I am just going to reserve 

time for the witnesses. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Madam Chair. Having visited Gaza 

many times, you are struck with the great potential of that region 

located along the Mediterranean, a population of less than 2 million, really a beautiful place in the sun potentially, but for the fact 

that Hamas is in control. 

And we see that time and again Hamas is not concerned about 

the death and destruction that happens in Gaza with some 2,100 

lives, 72 percent of whom are civilians. Rather, they seek to exploit 

Palestinian pain and suffering, and these are the conditions they 

seek to exploit, not conditions that they seek to end. 

So I look forward to today’s discussion with our witnesses, and 

with that I will yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Clawson. 

Mr. CLAWSON. After watching thousands of rockets fired into 

Gaza—into Israel from Gaza in the last 50-day war, it is clear that 

Gaza must be demilitarized. The first step of course is what some 

of my colleagues have already mentioned so clearly, and that is 

defunding. And the best way to do that is to follow the money. 

I am curious about what banking institutions are involved and 

how the transactions can even happen. It is not easy to move 

money across borders, in the Western world in particular. So that 

is my first question that you all might want to answer for us. And 

what countries are funneling that money? A lot of that has already 

been mentioned. 

So let us follow the money here today, see what allies of ours are 

involved, and let us see if we can cut the tap off. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you 

again for calling this important hearing. I would also like to echo 

the words of the ranking member on the hard and good work that 

this committee, the full committee, did over the summer during the 

war and look forward to continuing to do that. 

As far as today’s hearing, I think it is crucial that we have the 

opportunity to more deeply understand the support, the vast support network, that is funding and allowing Hamas to carry out its 

nefarious activities. I think it is crucial that we look for ways to 

change that network or influence and change the dynamics, so 

Hamas does come and continue to face the pressures, to alter their 

strategies and change their calculations. 

10

I would also like to hear from the witnesses today a little more 

in depth about the vast wealth accumulated by many of the leaders 

of Hamas while many of the people in Gaza are suffering and living in absolute poverty. But this is a crucial issue, and I am grateful that the committee is having this hearing. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. Duffy. 

Mr. DUFFY. I will reserve my time, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Lowenthal. 

Mr. LOWENTHAL. I yield. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. DeSantis. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you for 

calling this hearing. It is interesting to me we have heard a lot of 

members, I think correctly, talk about Turkey’s role in funding 

Hamas, talking about Qatar’s role, and we see these guys as the 

usual suspects for what is going on with ISIS, too. You have 

jihadists pouring into Syria. Where are they getting there from? 

They are getting there through Turkey. 

And so you have a President in Turkey who has aligned his country firmly on the side of the Muslim Brotherhood, and I would say 

that global jihad is just somebody who is supposed to be a part of 

NATO. So I think this cries out for more examination. And, of 

course, Qatar to continue to fund Sunni supremacism throughout 

the region, it is very much antagonistic to our interest and to the 

interest of our allies such as Israel. 

So thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Castro yields back. So Mr. Meadows is recognized. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I would just like to hear from our witnesses the 

correlation between Hamas’ funding now and how that parallels 

what we have seen with Hezbollah using charitable organizations, 

money laundering, et cetera, to fund much of their activity. It 

seems like the nexus there is indeed Iran, and I would love for you 

to comment on that. 

And I will yield back, Madam Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

Dr. Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Madam Chair. I would like to hear from 

you guys, as we go through this, recommendings on how we can 

change the dynamics over there. As Mr. Sherman brought out, 

Hamas’ strategy is to create as many civilian casualties as possible. 

And with the foreign aid that we give to the Palestinian Authority 

of $500 million a year, and in their own Resolution 21 and 23 they 

reward terrorists for creating crimes of terror and killing people, 

Israeli citizens and American citizens, they pay them a monthly 

stipend. 

I want to hear your recommendations on removing that and if 

that is—if you guys think that is a plausible thing that we should 

do. We have put in a resolution to get rid of that, and I would like 

to hear your comments. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. 

11

Mr. Cook. Thank you. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. I would just like to associate myself with the——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Microphone. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. Hello. I would like to associate myself 

with the profound and passionate remarks of Judge Poe. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Especially that filthy lucre. I liked that, Judge 

Poe. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And to wrap up, Mr. Weber. 

Mr. WEBER. Let us go. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. All right. Thank you very much. Thank you 

to all of our members for a wonderful attendance. We should give 

out cookies next week, Eddy. This is wonderful. And Mr. Deutch 

came on time, early even. What? So pretty good. Working on being 

a Senator, we hear. 

So we are so pleased to welcome back to our subcommittee Dr. 

Jonathan Schanzer, who is vice president for research for the 

Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Prior to this, Dr. Schanzer 

served as a counterterrorism analyst at the U.S. Department of the 

Treasury where he took part in the designation of numerous terrorism financiers. 

Thank you so much. 

We will then hear from Mr. Avi Jorisch. Mr. Jorisch is a senior 

fellow for counterterrorism at the American Foreign Policy Council. 

Prior to this, Mr. Jorisch also served at the Department of the 

Treasury as a policy advisor in the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, as well as a liaison to the Department of Homeland Security and as a terrorism consultant for the Department of 

Defense. Welcome. 

And last, but certainly not least, we would like to welcome Dr. 

Steven Cook. Dr. Cook comes to us from the Council of Foreign Relations where he is a senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies. Prior 

to this, Dr. Cook was a research fellow at the Brookings Institute 

and Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 

Thank you so much. We are so pleased with our distinguished 

panel. As I said, your prepared statements have already been made 

part of the record, and we will first hear from Dr. Schanzer. Thank 

you. 

STATEMENT OF JONATHAN SCHANZER, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT FOR RESEARCH, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. SCHANZER. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman Poe, Ranking 

Member Deutch, Ranking Member Sherman, and distinguished 

members of these two subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about Hamas finance. 

I should note up front that Egypt, under the Muslim Brotherhood 

regime of Mohamed Morsi, previously served as a major hub of 

Hamas finance. But since the ouster of Morsi by Abdel Fattah alSisi, the regime in Egypt has delivered a blow to Hamas finance 

by shutting down some 1,700 smuggling tunnels. This has deprived 

Hamas of the opportunity to tax its people on smuggled goods and 

12

has encumbered the group’s ability to transfer cash to its own coffers. 

With Egypt now under control, there are four other jurisdictions 

that contribute to Hamas’ estimated $1 billion annual budget, and 

those countries are Qatar, Turkey, Iran, and Sudan. Qatar is currently Hamas’ ATM. In the words of Treasury Undersecretary 

David Cohen, Qatar has ‘‘for many years openly financed Hamas.’’ 

The previous Emir pledged $400 million to Hamas in 2012. Qatar 

is also the home of many Hamas figures, including Hamas popular 

leader Khaled Meshaal. During my trip to Doha last year, one expatriate quipped to me that residents of Doha catch sight of 

Meshaal the way New Yorkers talk of seeing Woody Allen. 

Qatar was Hamas’ greatest advocate during the recent Gaza war, 

and Doha doesn’t stop there. It supports many other terrorist 

groups, as has already been mentioned, yet we call Qatar an ally 

and maintain our largest air base in the Middle East on Qatari 

soil. 

Turkey is another such ‘‘frenemy.’’ A NATO ally, Turkey has in 

recent years become a haven for at least a dozen Hamas figures, 

including the founder of Hamas’s military wing in the West Bank. 

His name is Saleh al-Arouri. Arouri recently made headlines when 

he announced that Hamas killed the three Israeli teens in the West 

Bank in June. Tellingly, he made this announcement in the presence of Turkey’s Deputy Prime Minister, who was there in the audience. 

Reports also suggest that Turkey may have pledged $300 million 

to Hamas several years ago. But Turkey’s support to terror doesn’t 

end there. Turkey has maintained a dangerous border policy that 

has contributed to the rise of ISIS. Ankara has also helped Iran, 

another Hamas patron, evade sanctions. 

Iran’s support to Hamas is a complicated story. While it was once 

the group’s top patron, Iran’s support to Hamas has declined over 

disagreements about the serious civil war. However, it is clear that 

strong military ties continue. The long-range rockets fired by 

Hamas in the recent war, M302s, were furnished by Iran. Many of 

the smaller and indigenously produced rockets in Gaza are the result of Iranian technical assistance. More broadly, Hamas’ guerilla 

capabilities have improved markedly over the years thanks to Iranian arms and training. 

Sudan, meanwhile, plays a significant role in the smuggling of 

larger rockets to Hamas, and this does not get a lot of attention. 

Iran ships these rockets by sea, and they often arrive in Port 

Sudan. From there, they are smuggled up through Egypt and 

across the Sinai Peninsula. Sudan has also stored Iranian rockets 

for Hamas. Notably, Israel bombed the Khartoum warehouse full 

of Fajr 5 rockets in October 2012. 

Madam and Mr. Chairman, I now offer these recommendations 

to Congress for consideration. 

Number one, support Egypt’s efforts to deter Hamas finance. 

They are doing more than was expected of them. They deserve our 

assistance in this regard. 

Number two, pressure Qatar to freeze Hamas assets and expel 

Khaled Meshaal, along with Hamas leaders. 

13

Number three, pressure Turkey to freeze Hamas assets and expel 

Saleh al-Arouri, along with Hamas leaders. 

Number four, Treasury should designate individuals and entities 

in both Qatar and Turkey that are involved in terrorism finance. 

Five, Congress should consider putting a hold on U.S. military 

sales to Qatar and Turkey until Hamas finance is addressed. 

Number six, conduct hearings and demand intelligence assessments of Qatar and Turkey. Both countries are involved in a lot 

more illicit financial activity than merely supporting Hamas. 

Seven, conduct an assessment by the GAO or the Pentagon on 

what it would take to move the al Udeid Air Base out of Qatar. It 

is difficult to justify our presence there while Qatar supports 

Hamas and other terrorist groups. 

Number eight, work with our defense and intelligence agencies 

to use both carrots and sticks to convince Qatar and Turkey to halt 

their support to Hamas. 

Number nine, consider ways to address the problem of terrorism 

finance through the JPOA nuclear talks with Iran. 

Number ten, keep the pressure on Iran through Treasury’s terrorism sanctions. More of those are needed always. 

And, finally, we must work with regional partners to block weapons shipments to Port Sudan. 

On behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, I thank 

you for inviting me to testify today, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schanzer follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Jorisch. 

STATEMENT OF MR. AVI JORISCH, SENIOR FELLOW FOR 

COUNTERTERRORISM, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY COUNCIL 

Mr. JORISCH. Good morning, Chairman, Ranking Members, distinguished members of the subcommittees. I am honored to appear 

before these distinguished committees to address a subject of great 

importance to our country and the world. I am also pleased to sit 

alongside my accomplished colleagues, Jonathan Schanzer and Steven Cook. 

One of the most effective ways of countering radical Islamic organizations such as Hamas is to have an exhaustive understanding 

of their financing in order to cut off their economic lifeblood. It is 

in the highest interests of the United States to force radical organizations to pay a political and economic price for their barbaric policies and ultimately shut them down. 

Hamas’ budget is between $500 million and $1 billion annually. 

In the last 7 years, Hamas has passed four budgets. In its most recent budget, 27 percent was to come from domestic revenue. The 

remaining 73 was to be covered by foreign donations. It is estimated that Hamas collected about $175 million annually from the 

tunnels, which served as the main source of their domestic revenue 

collection. 

International aid to Hamas has historically come from U.S.-designated state sponsors of terror, including Iran, Syria, and Sudan. 

But more recently, Qatar and Turkey have stepped up their giving. 

From 2006 through 2011, Iran served as Hamas’ largest donor, contributing some $250 million to $300 million annually. Historically, 

Hamas has provided—I beg your pardon, Iran has provided Hamas 

with weapons, technical assistance, and military training. But in 

2011 there was a near total rupture in the relationship when 

Hamas refused to support the Assad regime in Syria. 

Israel’s operation Protective Edge has brought Hamas and Iran 

closer, and we are now witnessing a reestablishment of bilateral relations. From 1999 through 2011, Hamas used Damascus as their 

primary political base of operations. But in 2012, the group announced its support for the Syrian opposition. As a Sunni organization, Hamas decided to support its fellow Sunni jihadis. Naturally, 

the Assad regime cut off Hamas. 

For Qatar, when Hamas lost funding in and support from Syria 

and Iran, it turned to the other Sunni regional powers, principally 

Qatar and Turkey. While it is difficult to say precisely how much 

financial support Qatar provides to Hamas, in 2012, the Emir 

pledged more than $400 million. Turkey provides strong political 

support and is also rumored to donate up to $300 million annually 

to Hamas. 

Ideologically, Turkey, above and beyond Hamas’ other donors, 

has supported the Hamas world view and their barbaric agenda. 

Ankara also provides comfort and support to some of the organization’s most important leaders. For its part, Sudan has served as a 

willing waystation for years for any weapons shipped to Gaza. As 

Dr. Schanzer pointed out, in four instances over the last 5 years, 

35

Israel is reported to have bombed arms shipments and Sudanese 

weapons factories. 

U.S. policy regarding terrorist organizations and their rogue financial supporters has unfortunately been inconsistent, to say the 

very least. On the one hand, President Obama has waged war 

against ISIS; on the other hand, he has proven himself open to 

working with Hamas and concomitantly negotiating with Iran, 

which may well be the biggest threat of all to Western liberal democracies. 

Hamas’ strategy and ideology are almost identical to Sunni 

groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, and Shiite organizations, like 

Hezbollah and the Clerical Elite, that governs Iran today. Hamas 

fires rockets from heavily populated areas into Israel’s major cities. 

It sends its members on suicide bombing missions. ISIS kidnaps 

and beheads journalists, and Iran is marching toward a nuclear 

bomb while using terror as an operational weapon. 

Madam Chairman, I have three primarily policy recommendations for the subcommittees to consider. 

First, the U.S. should cease all disbursement of aid to the Palestinian Authority as a result of the unity government formed between Hamas and Fatah this past June. Reversing years of U.S. 

foreign policy of not engaging in any way, shape, or form with a 

designated terrorist entity, Secretary of State John Kerry declared 

the U.S. would cooperate with the technocratic government. 

Two, in light of Qatar and Turkey’s relationship with Hamas, the 

United States should threaten to blacklist both countries, both for 

being state sponsors of terror or for disrupting the Middle East 

peace process. Congress should make clear that any form of financial or material support for terrorist groups such as Hamas violates 

U.S. counterterrorism laws. 

And finally, three, the United States should declare unequivocally that Hamas and al-Qaeda, including its affiliates such as 

ISIS, are ideologically one and the same and employ similar tactics. 

The West defeated each of the 20th century’s hostile ideologies 

using the full panoply of military, economic, diplomatic, and ideological weapons. Today’s greatest challenge—radical Islam—deserves no less attention and a multi-partite attack on so dangerous 

a threat to the life and principles that we and our allies hold dear. 

Thank you, ma’am. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jorisch follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Jorisch. 

Dr. Cook. 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN A. COOK, PH.D., HASIB J. SABBAGH 

SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL 

ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Members, 

members of the subcommittee for inviting me here to appear before 

you to discuss the important issue of Hamas’ Benefactors: A Network of Terror. 

The focus of my testimony will be the underlying political and 

philosophical reasons why Hamas enjoys support from Qatar and 

Turkey in particular. I will leave the financial issues to my two colleagues, Avi Jorisch and Jonathan Schanzer. 

Let me begin with Qatar. Qatar’s support for Hamas is consistent with its populist approach to the region, which is part of 

Doha’s broader effort to establish and reinforce its policy independence from larger and more powerful actors, especially Saudi Arabia. 

Qatar’s $400 million investment in Gaza in 2012, at a time when 

Hamas was moving away from Syria and Iran over the Syrian civil 

war, should be viewed in a similar light to Hamas’—to Doha’s $8 

billion investment in Egypt from the time Hosni Mubarak fell 

through the ouster of Mohamed Morsi, and its support for certain 

groups in Libya, an effort to leverage its vast wealth to purchase 

influence around the Middle East. 

The fact that the Qataris have tended to use their resources to 

support Islamist groups does not necessarily indicate that they 

share the violent world view of Hamas and other groups. Rumors 

about the former Emir, Hamad bin-Khalifa al Thani, being in support of the Muslim Brotherhood aside, it is more likely that the 

Qataris miscalculated the effect and extent of political changes in 

the region. 

Like observers in the United States, Europe, Turkey, and the 

Arab world, Doha drew the erroneous conclusion that popular 

movements that brought changes in the Middle East had paved the 

way for new Islamist political groups in the region. That being 

said, believing that Islamist political movements would dominate 

regional politics as a result of the Arab uprisings is qualitatively 

different from support for Hamas, however. 

Doha maintains without any irony that the sanctuary that it provides for Khaled Meshaal and others is a humanitarian issue. It 

also maintains that it plays an important role as a facilitator of 

communication between the Hamas leadership and other regional 

actors. This claim would be more compelling if the Qataris demonstrated they could actually influence Hamas leaders. 

This isn’t necessarily to excuse anything that the Qataris have 

done. It is not hard to notice the cynicism of Qataris who have used 

Khaled Meshaal’s presence in Doha, their overall relationship with 

Hamas, as part of this broad regional competition with the Saudis, 

the Emiratis, and in particular now the Egyptians. 

Although there is a certain propaganda value to giving Meshaal 

so much airtime on Al Jazeera and holding Qatar out as a defender 

of so-called Islamic rights in Palestine in contrast to other regional 

48

powers that implicitly support the Israeli war effort, Palestinians 

and Israelis suffer in the process. 

Let me now turn my attention to Turkey. On a superficial level, 

Turkey is an unlikely supporter of Hamas. It is a NATO ally, an 

aspirant to EU membership. It has long had relations with Israel, 

and it maintains a secular political order. But there are five important reasons why Turkey is a supporter of Hamas. 

First, there is broad public support among the Turkish public for 

the Palestinian cause. This doesn’t mean that Turks support 

Hamas, broadly speaking. But it has allowed the ruling Justice and 

Development Party to ally support, legitimate support, for Palestinian rights with support for Hamas. 

President Erdogan and the party from which he comes, the party’s rank and file, are all anti-Zionists. Their history, their philosophy, their world view is steeped in anti-Zionism. In February 

2013, in fact, then Prime Minister, now President Erdogan declared 

Zionism as a crime against humanity. 

Third, the Justice and Development Party has long harbored 

what can only be described as a peculiar soft spot for Hamas. Party 

leaders and activists are quite open about the fact that they see 

themselves and their history reflected in Hamas. They built a narrative linking the Turkish Islamist movement’s struggle against a 

repressive state and elite with Hamas and its conflict with Israel 

and the Palestinian Authority. 

Fourth, Turkey’s foreign policy activism under the Justice and 

Development Party has placed an emphasis on Muslim solidarity. 

Hamas and its conflict with Israel falls into the category of a Muslim cause, and is, thus, deserving of Turkish support. 

And, finally, the strategic vision of Turkey’s new Prime Minister, 

Ahmet Davutoglu, who previously served as Foreign Policy Advisor 

to the Prime Minister, and then, since 2009, as the Foreign Minister, requires support for Islamist movements around the Middle 

East, including Hamas. 

Davutoglu, quite simply, believes that a state system based on 

nationalism and political institutions that trace their lineage to the 

West is fundamentally unsustainable in Muslim societies. If Turkey is going to lead the region, Ankara must do so as a Muslim 

power in cooperation with Islamist groups like Hamas. 

Well, what should the United States do about this? In the context of the current regional environment, it does not lend itself to 

the United States taking tough actions against either Doha or Ankara. I will remind you that the President is about to announce a 

strategy for combating ISIS which will no doubt involve both Turkey and Qatar. 

Hamas isn’t going to lay down its arms against Israel, at least 

not in the short time horizons that policymakers have to deal with. 

Destroying Hamas, at least in the short term, is not even in the 

interest of Israel. The best answer that the United States—is to 

put itself in a position to actually pressure on its allies, Qatar and 

Turkey, to place, in turn, pressure on Hamas. 

How can the United States possibly do that? First, the Obama 

administration has been far too solicitous toward both countries, 

especially Turkey. There have been denunciations from the podium 

in the State Department and other places of Erdogan’s heated rhetVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:34 Oct 28, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\090914\89738 SHIRL
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oric during the recent war, but nothing from the President or the 

Secretary of State. 

Congress has been relatively silent on both Qatar and Turkey. 

During the conflict this past summer, four Members of the Congressional Turkey Caucus wrote a strongly worded letter to Prime 

Minister Erdogan, but other than that the Congress has not had 

much to say on the heated rhetoric coming from Anakar in particular. 

We should not allow a coming set of delegations to go to Turkey 

to register U.S. disapproval. There is a tremendous interest among 

the Obama administration to engage with the new Prime Minister 

of Turkey. I think that this is a mistake that is unlikely to move 

the Turks away from Hamas. 

The suggestion that we should somehow dismantle the al Udeid 

Air Base is a long-term solution to a much bigger problem that 

Qatar presents. Unfortunately, policymakers must be realistic. The 

U.S. does not have the means to make support for Hamas costly 

in either Turkey or Qatar. We will have to accept these relations 

for the moment while working over the long term to go after the 

financing of Hamas, to build up the Palestinian Authority against 

Hamas, and to make the impression on our allies that support for 

Hamas will, over a long term, have consequences here in the 

United States. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cook follows:]

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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

I will start with the questions and answers. Dr. Cook, I find your 

testimony troubling. You said, ‘‘We will have to accept these relationships.’’ And in your testimony you state that the U.S. has little 

to no leverage over Qatar or Turkey, pointed to repeatedly the al 

Udeid Air Base in Qatar as giving Qatar the position of relative 

strength in U.S.-Qatari relationship, yet Dr. Schanzer and Dr. 

Jorisch point to this as a point of leverage in favor of the U.S. 

You state, ‘‘There is not much else that can be done regarding 

Qatar, which is in a position of relative strength given the importance of Udeid to the United States military.’’ The United States 

may have little leverage with the Qataris about Turkey. Your recommendation is that the Secretary of Commerce should cancel a 

visit. 

And you state, ‘‘Unfortunately, Washington does not have the 

ability, primarily because of the United States needing Qatar and 

Turkey on other policy issues, to make these relations costly for 

Doha and Ankara. More than likely, the United States will have 

to accept this reality.’’ That is pretty depressing, and I think that 

we do have a lot of leverage. 

Giving Qatar support for terrorist groups—Hamas, ISIL, the 

Muslim Brotherhood, and others—it is very—in its very contentious relationship with some of the Gulf nations, I would ask the 

gentlemen if there is a way of leveraging what we have, plus our 

relations with the Gulf nations to press Qatar to abandon its support for terror. If so, why, and why has the administration taken 

the position of appeasing Qatar instead of condemning it for supporting terrorism. 

And the latest events in Gaza have rehashed the problem of appeasing Qatar instead of the Unity Palestinian Authority government. And thank you for pointing out how we have got to make 

sure that that divorce happens. What is Hamas’ role, and what will 

it be? Hamas has no intention of recognizing Israel or making 

peace with the Jewish state. It is a U.S.-designated state sponsor 

of terrorism. 

There are laws on the books—I was the author of one—that 

would preclude any U.S. funds from going to any Palestinian Government that included Hamas. Thank you for your recommendations about cutting off funding. 

And, Dr. Schanzer, you have done extensive research into the 

Fatah-Hamas relationship. And as you answer your questions from 

members, because I won’t have enough time, i hope that you will 

further explain those financial ties between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, and whether it is possible that U.S. money has 

indeed been going directly to Hamas, or indirectly. 

We know that Hamas used to get a lot of its money from taxing 

goods that entered Gaza from the smuggling tunnels, and they 

taxed residents also of Gaza, and of course from its patrons like 

Turkey and Qatar. We also know that it receives funds from other 

sources, like front companies and charities, and Mr. Meadows had 

asked about that. 

The Treasury has done a pretty good job of countering Hamas’ 

fund-raising activities, but more can still be done. If you could at 

times that our members will ask questions, somehow walk us 

57

through the network of charities and front companies and how this 

money finds its way into the hands of Hamas. 

But let me just, in my remaining 1 minute, have your take on 

whether we do have leverage or not over Qatar and Turkey. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Madam Chairman, thank you. I would say that 

we do have leverage. I think that, number one, to conduct an assessment of what it would take to leave al Udeid and to create a 

new base, whether in—I have heard options such as the UAE or 

Erbil or perhaps other places where we know that allies would be 

interested in doing this. 

I think even alerting the Qataris that we are interested in having these assessments done, either by the GAO or by the Pentagon, 

I think would send the exact right message to the Qataris that 

they will not enjoy the protection of the United States forever, so 

long as this relationship continues with Hamas. 

The other thing that I would note here is that we know that 

there are entities within the Qatari Government or within—that 

are based in Qatar, Qatari nationals, that are involved in supporting Hamas. We have to date not designated them. This could 

send shockwaves through the Qatari financial system. It would be 

a signal to banks around the world, to countries around the world, 

that Qatar has been tainted in the support of this terrorist organization. We have done this in the past with other terror groups and 

other countries——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I am sorry. I am out of time. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Sure. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And I would just point out, one last note, 

that the Qatari Foundation, or whatever they call themselves these 

days, was one of the sponsors of the Congressional baseball game. 

Shame on us. With their name in lights, yikes. So we should start 

pointing fingers at ourselves. 

Mr. Deutch is recognized. Thank you. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am just going to 

pick up where you stopped, Dr. Schanzer. You have—the panel has 

spoken about the budget. We have often focused on charities, but 

the specific focus on Qatar and their contribution to somewhere between a $500 million and $1 billion annual budget, how does the 

money flow? Where does it go? What banking institutions does it 

go through? And compare that to the way that we treat the banking system when it accepts the money of other terrorist groups, so 

that we might get some guidance on how to proceed from a policy 

standpoint, Dr. Schanzer. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Sure. Ranking Member Deutch, this is a difficult 

question to answer, and I think that is primarily because it is not 

like Hamas is settling up at the end of the year with Ernst & 

Young and declaring how they move their money. I mean, this is—

obviously, this is a clandestine terrorist organization. 

We have some hints about how some of this money is moved. For 

example, there was the recent attempt to transfer $60 million from 

Qatar to the Arab Bank in Jordan. They of course declined that 

transaction. This was just a couple of months ago once the Unity 

government had been forged, and that was turned down. 

We also have been aware of a practice known as bulk cash smuggling through the tunnels connecting the Sinai Peninsula to the 

58

Gaza Strip. This is a very fancy way that Treasury describes basically carrying suitcases or trash bags full of cash under those tunnels to replenish the banks in the Gaza Strip. 

There is all sorts of money laundering, over invoicing, under 

invoicing, sort of classic money laundering techniques, as well as 

perhaps even some straightforward transfers with bank accounts 

that appear to be legitimate with connecting countries. So there is 

lots of different ways that Hamas moves this money, but a lot of 

it is dealt in cash and that—but I should just note that this is the 

result of Treasury’s successes. 

We have driven Hamas’ finances underground, and to a certain 

extent we are now victims of our own success because it has made 

it harder to track. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Right. But, Mr. Jorisch, $500 million or $1 billion, 

that is a lot of plastic bags and suitcases. I mean, how do we track 

it? 

Mr. JORISCH. Ultimately, I agree with Dr. Schanzer. Much of the 

cash is going through the tunnels or was going through the tunnels, but ultimately the way the banking sector works is setting up 

correspondent bank accounts. 

Ranking Member Deutch, I don’t know where you bank, but let 

us assume your account is at Citibank. Just like you have an account at Citibank, Citibank has correspondent accounts all over the 

globe. It is called the correspondent account. Qatar has correspondent accounts all over the globe, including having Qatari financial institutions that have correspondent accounts here in the 

United States. 

If we really wanted to send shockwaves through the Qataris and 

Turkey, simply say to them, ‘‘Your financial institutions have to go 

through an added level of due diligence when going through the 

U.S. financial sector.’’ One, FINCEN, part of the Treasury Department, could issue a financial advisory that simply states, ‘‘Qatar 

and Turkey are helping Hamas and other terrorist organizations 

launder their money,’’ also sending shockwaves through the financial sector. 

And, finally, leveraging international organizations such as the 

U.N. and the Financial Action Task Force, which is the international body for money laundering in terms of finance, and have 

our U.S. delegation push them to add them to specific lists, basically ensuring that their access to the international financial sector 

is hampered. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I appreciate that. I just have 1 minute left, Dr. 

Schanzer. 

So, Dr. Cook, let me just ask you, you talked about regional competition. You talked about Qatar trying to announce its policy independence from Saudi Arabia. Can you—just in the remaining time 

I have, can you speak to the relationship between Qatar and the 

other nations that it is trying to separate itself from? And why is 

that happening? And, ultimately, how does that rift play into our 

hands of trying to stop the flow of funds to terrorist groups? 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much for the question, Ranking Member Deutch. Qatar is engaged in a competition with the larger, arguably more powerful countries in the region. In particular, it has 

a pathological problem with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. There 

59

has been an effort over a long period of time, but over the last w 

decades in particular, in order for the countries to establish their 

independence. Al Jazeera and its kind of unfettered look at the rest 

the region is part of reinforcing that independence. 

Funding groups that are not approved by the Saudis, the 

Emiratis, on the other hand of an issue, is a way in which the 

countries have sought to pursue a populist foreign policy and a way 

in which it has sought to reinforce this independence. That is, in 

part, the reason why the countries have invested as much as they 

have in, for example, Hamas, although all of the money that—this 

$500 million to $1 billion budget does not all come from the 

Qataris, not to excuse their behavior. 

But as Dr. Schanzer pointed out, the Treasury has been successful in literally driving Hamas underground. A good portion of that 

budget comes from smuggling under tunnels on the Sinai frontier 

in which Hamas collects taxes. There is an argument to be made 

that if you didn’t have those tunnels, and you opened up those borders, Hamas would suffer financially because they wouldn’t be able 

to tax at the kind of rate that they have. 

But, nevertheless, it is a policy conundrum for the United States 

and others how to go—exactly go out there. Do we try to shut down 

the tunnels? It increases funding for Hamas. How do we deal with 

Qatar, a country that in the short run, as we are about to undertake additional military operations in Iraq, as we are about to 

leave Afghanistan, as we are about to potentially expand military 

operations that include Syria, a place from which we are going to 

prosecute hostilities in the region. 

I will remind you and the members of the subcommittees that it 

was in 1996 that the United States abandoned its bases in Saudi 

Arabia, because the Saudis kicked U.S. forces out of the Kingdom. 

And it was in Qatar that the countries built this facility for the 

United States. 

So over the short run, in the next months or years, abandoning 

operations at al Udeid are not feasible, and that is why this leverage that we are talking about is not as great as it seems in the 

abstract. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Pleased to yield to our subcommittee chair, Mr. Poe, Judge Poe. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate especially the fact 

that all of you not only have answers, you have plans, excellent 

ideas on a plan. Excellent. I thank you for that. We ought to take 

them all and implement as many as we can. 

There is a couple of things that I see. One, direct money going 

to Hamas, and then indirect money from the United States going 

to Hamas, and I would like to talk about the second one first. 

The United States gives money to the Palestinian Authority. Is 

that correct? The Palestinian Authority uses money to pay terrorists who are in jail in Israel, and the more serious the crime that 

this terrorist, Hamas terrorist, has committed against Israel or 

Israeli citizens, the more money they get. Is that true? You can say 

yes or no or explain. We will go down the row. 

Mr. SCHANZER. It is a bit more complicated, Chairman Poe. In 

light of the most recent Unity government that was created, as I 

60

understand it, the PA knew that this was going to be a problem, 

and it was—and in order to head off that problem they moved the 

office that deals with this to the PLO and got it out of the hands 

of the PA. 

The PLO is of course not within the jurisdiction of the United 

States. We don’t fund it. We don’t have much influence over it. 

And, in fact, their funding is a black box. We don’t—you know, we 

still don’t know where it comes from. And so it is my understanding that they have moved the financing of these people who 

are now sitting in Israeli jails to the PLO. 

Mr. POE. So, but the Palestinians—Palestinian Authority does 

not pay it, the Palestinian—who pays that money to Hamas terrorists who are in jail? I know they get paid to go to prison because 

they have committed a terrorist act. That is kind of——

Mr. SCHANZER. So we believe right now that it is the PLO, although I think it is still not clear. It is not exactly as if the Unity 

government has had time to take form and for the bureaucracies 

to have shifted. The intent was back in I guess it was April or May 

when the Unity government was formed, the intent was to move 

it over to the PLO. It would be an interesting question right now 

to query the PA to find out whether they have in fact moved that 

or if it still sits within the PA. 

Mr. POE. All right. Mr. Jorisch. 

Mr. JORISCH. And I would counter by saying money is fungible, 

sir. And when money goes from the United States to the PA, ultimately you are swapping out one dollar for another. We are by 

happenstance—not even by happenstance, but we are funding 

these activities from taking place. 

Mr. POE. And I am speaking specifically about paying Hamas 

terrorists to be in prison. And the more serious the crime, the more 

money they get. Is that correct? Are they paid by the Palestinian 

Authority or the Palestinians for these terrorists when they are in 

jail in Israel? 

Mr. JORISCH. They are paid by—as Dr. Schanzer pointed out, 

originally they were paid by Hamas. And the Unity government 

came into place, these funds may have moved to an outside entity. 

But ultimately when they commit terrorist attacks, yes, their families are paid a significant sum of money on a monthly amount. Yes, 

sir. 

Mr. POE. Do you find that a bit alarming? 

Mr. JORISCH. I find it more than alarming. I find it disturbing 

and reprehensible. 

Mr. POE. And the more serious the crime, the more people maybe 

they kill, the bigger—more amount of money they get for themselves or their family. Is that correct as well or not? 

Mr. JORISCH. The larger the crime, the more they get? 

Mr. POE. Yes. 

Mr. JORISCH. I can’t say that I know, sir. 

Mr. POE. Anybody else can answer that? Dr. Cook, do you know? 

Mr. COOK. I am going to do something very un-Washington-like 

and say I do not know, sir. 

Mr. POE. Thank you very much. Qatar and Turkey, what approximately is the percentage of money that Hamas receives from 

these two countries? So their operating expense is—they have 100 

61

percent. How much of that 100 percent is from Qatar or from Turkey? And Turkey, excuse me. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Well, if you add up the annual $400 million that 

we believe has been pledged by the Qataris, and perhaps the rumored $300 million provided by the Turks, then you are looking at 

$700 million out of what was roughly a $1 billion budget. And this 

actually goes to—I want to just briefly——

Mr. POE. Is that 70 percent? 

Mr. SCHANZER. That would be 70 percent. Yes, sir. 

Mr. POE. Okay. 

Mr. SCHANZER. I am no math major, but I would actually just 

note, and this was—I wanted to add this on to my response to Mr. 

Deutch, that we believe that because of what has happened in 

Egypt that budget has dropped precipitously. That it could be now 

that Hamas is operating on a $300 million or even $350 million 

budget, I mean, we are really—we are talking about now 35 percent, using that math again, of that original budget. 

That is significant, and in many ways that could have been the 

reason why they launched this war, to basically fight for the ability 

to have those tunnels either reopened or to have the border opened. 

That may have been their strategy. In fact, according to some 

former colleagues of mine, that is exactly what they decided to do 

after that Arab Bank transfer was declined. 

Mr. POE. How many tunnels are there or were there? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Well, there have been 1,700 that have been shut 

down on the EU border. 

Mr. POE. Okay. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Sherman of California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Did you say 1,700? 

Mr. SCHANZER. I did. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Glad our record is clear. One other thing to clarify 

for the record, and that is that just because we have a military 

base in Qatar does not mean we have to defend that regime or that 

country. And last I heard, we have a base in Guantanamo. I know 

some members of this committee who do not believe that we should 

defend the Cuban regime from whatever external or internal 

threats it faces. You know, it wouldn’t be a bad thing to get rid of 

the al Thani family and keep the base. We have got a proposed $11 billion military sale, looking at the 

weapons that Qatar is acquiring in that transaction, but their overall military posture. Are they posturing themselves to defend themselves from an attack from Iran, from Saudi Arabia, or to project 

power outside their own borders? 

Mr. SCHANZER. I should just say up front—I will be very unWashington, too—I am not a military expert. But I can tell you 

that we have an analyst working on this to compile the list. And 

point number three of my testimony on page 16, it is the full list 

of the military deals that are pending, the $11 billion. 

Some of this material will be used certainly for defense, the ability to shuttle forces quickly to the spot of an attack, anti-missile 

batteries, things of the like, but also Apache attack helicopters, 

which have dual use. 

62

I would not propose right now to say that the Qataris are looking 

to go on the offensive in the region. I think they are trying to upgrade their military to——

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. Do the other witnesses have a comment on that? I would point out that the UAE appears to be involved in bombing Libya, and so small countries can project power. 

In light of Qatar’s support from Hamas, should we be approving 

and proceeding with this $11 billion sale? Dr. Cook? Maybe I could 

get a yes/no from all three of you. 

Mr. COOK. I don’t think we should be proceeding with the sale. 

No. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Jorisch? 

Mr. JORISCH. No, sir. I don’t think we should be proceeding with 

the sale. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Schanzer? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Nor do I. 

Mr. SHERMAN. One of the difficult things is there seems—there 

is general support for providing aid to the people of Gaza, and 

those people are held hostage by, and any dollars—Hamas—any 

dollar that goes into Gaza could be grabbed by Hamas. 

Now, I would point out that by U.N. statistics, the health and life 

expectancy of the residents of Gaza is better than that of the residents of Turkey, but—so we may be providing more aid, and we are 

providing more aid as a world than any other needy population in 

the world. But everyone agrees that at least some aid should read 

the people of Gaza. 

Israel collects a value added tax and tariffs on goods going into 

the West Bank and Gaza, gives that money to the PA. Does 

Hamas—who gets that money or the portion of it relevant to value 

added taxes and tariffs collected by Israel on goods legally going 

into Gaza? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Ranking Member Sherman, that is—about $100 

million per month that goes directly to the PA Government in the 

West Bank. The way that they——

Mr. SHERMAN. And that is on goods both headed to the West 

Bank and goods headed into Gaza. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Well, we have got a significant drawdown in 

terms of what is going into the Gaza Strip. But, yes, I think there 

is a small portion of that; obviously, a larger portion going to the 

West Bank. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Right. 

Mr. SCHANZER. I couldn’t tell you on the exact percentages, but 

at the end of the day there is money that is trickling through—the 

payment of officials on the other side, the Palestinian Authority officials, that continue to be paid there. Some of them may be aligned 

with Hamas, but, more importantly, there is the—and I have actually flagged this for this subcommittee before. The electric company 

that is operating out of Gaza has been funded almost entirely by 

the West Bank government, and Hamas collects the bills for that, 

and they do not remit it back. So this is an indirect way——

Mr. SHERMAN. So money is collected by Israel, it goes to the PA, 

and in various ways that benefits Hamas. Dr. Cook, do you have 

a comment on that? 

63

Mr. COOK. My sense is—and, again, I—the expertise in the flows 

of—financial flows is with Mr. Jorisch and Dr. Schanzer. But my 

understanding is, of course, that the Israelis collect this value 

added tax and then contribute it to the Palestinian Authority. That 

Palestinian Authority uses it as it sees fit. So it——

Mr. SHERMAN. Including methods that help—because I want to 

get in one final comment, and that is one of our possible responses 

to Qatar is to call for democracy in Qatar, in which the ruler of the 

country would be selected not only by those who are ‘‘citizens’’ but 

anyone who has lived there legally for 10 or 20 years. 

We are talking about a country with over 2 million people, 80 

percent of whom are guest workers. And I don’t know of any supporter of democracy that would say you could exclude 80 percent 

of the population of a country from voting and call it a democracy. 

And we have had some difficulty with promoting democracy in the 

Middle East, but if there is one place where I don’t think it would 

result in a worse government it would be Qatar. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Sherman. 

Pleased to yield to Mr. Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

And thank you, gentlemen. The testimony is fascinating. It is my 

understanding that United Sates taxpayers give approximately 

$300 million to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency annually in order to provide humanitarian assistance. And during the 

recent conflict, rockets were discovered in three of UNRWA schools. 

I can remember the wailing and the moaning about Israel bombing 

these schools, and I also remember the U.N.’s spokesperson deriding those actions. 

In one of those cases, UNRWA handed over to local authorities 

the rockets in the Hamas-run territory, and in another the rockets 

disappeared. Can I just get your comments on the relationship between you and UNRWA and Hamas, and what we can do to ensure 

that this—it is unbelievable to me. It is unimaginable that we, as 

taxpayers, then watch the criticism from the U.N. in particular. In 

particular. I can understand Hamas; it feathers their own nest. I 

mean, it furthers their goal and they do it specifically for that reason. I understand that. The U.N., $300 million in taxpayer money. 

Let us start with Mr. Cook and just go down the line. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you for the question, sir. UNRWA, as it is 

often referred to, is a deeply compromised organization, and it has 

been for some time deeply compromised by its relationship with 

various different groups and been caring for Palestinian refugees 

now for 60-plus years, and over that time has become compromised 

by its association with different groups. 

In the Gaza Strip in particular, UNRWA workers are either compromised by their—let us say their dispositions toward Hamas or 

are intimidated by them. And, as a result, that is how you get 

these bizarre situations in which UNRWA staff are handing rockets 

over. They are either compromised by supporting them——

Mr. PERRY. Please provide briefly your solution set at the same 

time. 

Mr. COOK. Well——

Mr. PERRY. What should the United States do, in your opinion? 

64

Mr. COOK. Well, I think that the solution is, obviously, to either 

not fund UNRWA or to build up the Palestinian Authority, so that 

it can take care of people in the Gaza Strip, something that we 

have thus far been unwilling to do, but, nevertheless, it is a solution to the problem. 

Mr. JORISCH. In short, defund UNRWA. UNRWA is engaging in 

horrific activities. It is aiding and abetting a terrorist organization. 

It is essentially allowing Hamas to store its rockets. The Israelis 

are left holding the bag. They don’t really know what to do with 

themselves. Essentially, they have to choose between protecting 

their own citizens and ultimately hurting civilians on the other 

side. 

There is a cycle of violence here that, really, there is very little 

that one can do. Defund UNRWA, simply put. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Representative Perry, I would actually just back 

up for a moment and note that in my view UNRWA has played a 

very peculiar role in perpetuating the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It 

has changed the definition of ‘‘refugee’’ such that you now have 

the—you have the children, the grandchildren, and the greatgrandchildren of the original refugees. 

So whereas there were roughly 800,000 refugees after 1948, 

today, by their calculations, there are 5 million refugees. There is 

no way, obviously, that Israel could accommodate them. In reality, 

there is probably something like 30,000, which is obviously a number that Israel could deal with, but UNRWA has not yielded on 

that. That is one area of reform that I think is absolutely necessary. 

But in terms of its direct support to Hamas, look, they are beholden to the people who control that territory. They are beholden 

to that government. They have to operate under Hamas rules. This 

means that in some cases the schools teach Hamas curriculum. 

Sometimes they hire Hamas as employees, and we have seen examples of this. 

The fact that they were allowing for the building of tunnels, 

these commando tunnels, underneath their facilities in my opinion 

very much needs to be investigated, if not by these committees by 

some other, to determine whether there is culpability. 

There is—actually, most people don’t know this, but there appears to be what I would only call a lobby office here in Washington. Why a refugee agency needs to maintain that here in 

Washington is still beyond comprehension to me. 

And so, look, in answer to your question, we either need to have 

a serious overhaul of this organization, or to defund it and let it 

collapse. It has got to be one or the other, and this has been a problem that has gone on for too long. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you. It would be fascinating, as my time expires, to know what this administration in the form of our Ambassador to the U.N. has done in this regard. I have heard nothing 

from the counterpoint side, and a strong statement or more from 

this administration to say it is unacceptable to the U.N., which we 

are great part of and the United States funds in a great degree, 

and yet we have no—we are saying nothing. We are silent. 

And I yield back. Thanks, Chair. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

65

Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Jorisch, I find myself certainly in agreement with much of 

your analysis, but I am concerned about your prescription. If I 

heard you correctly, your answer is defund UNRWA, defund the 

Palestinian Authority, put more pressure on Qatar, make their 

banking system harder, close the military base in Qatar. 

I am a little concerned that if we did all of that we—and maybe 

we should—but we certainly actually lose leverage, and it seems to 

me that we also leave the region, imperfect instruments though 

they may be, and even at times counterproductive instruments, 

with very little left with which to try to address a very complex and 

painful and difficult situation. Those seem pretty rigid, absolute 

prescriptions. 

Mr. JORISCH. Sir, ultimately, we have to know who our friends 

are and who our friends are not, send the right messaging to who 

our friends are not. We have a tremendous amount of leverage over 

Qatar. We have a tremendous amount of leverage over Turkey and 

others in the region, and we don’t leverage it. When it comes to our 

banking sector, they need us more than we need them. 

And I have a feeling, and I know for a fact having spent time 

in government, when you exert that pressure those governments 

move. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is sometimes true. But I guess I don’t share 

the view that you are either a friend or you are not a friend. I 

think the world is more complicated than that. In fact, I would 

argue that is part of the underpinnings of the Bush administration 

foreign policy that did not work. 

Dr. Cook, Mr. Jorisch just made reference to our leverage, a lot 

of—considerable leverage in Turkey. What leverage would that be, 

in your view? And, by the way, I appreciate your calling out the 

letter that the four co-chairs of the Turkey Caucus here in Congress wrote to Prime Minister, now President Erdogan. I was proud 

to be one of those four. And I think, frankly, President Erdogan has 

gone far afield, and I think we have got a problem now, given the 

fact that he has a new job. 

And of course ironically he used the letter publicly to help himself, which is always what I am concerned about, that when we 

make some strident statement here, it actually has a counterproductive effect—not that that is our intent—politically there. And 

we saw that certainly with Erdogan. 

But help us understand. What is the leverage? I mean, if I follow 

Mr. Jorisch’s prescriptions, let us close the bases in Turkey, let us 

kick them out of NATO, not that he said that, but that is where 

leads us, that logic. You are either a friend or you are not. You either do what we want or you don’t. And if you don’t, we are going 

to look at the absolute punishments available to us. Is that really 

the leverage we have over Turkey? 

Mr. COOK. Thank you for the question, Mr. Connolly. And I think 

that what your remarks reflect is the difficulties, the way in which 

we talk about leverage. We make assumptions that we have leverage in certain areas when we don’t necessarily have them. As you 

point out, that very strongly worded letter on which you were a coVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:34 Oct 28, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\090914\89738 SHIRL
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signer, Erdogan turned around and used very much to his advantage. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And by the way—I am sorry to interrupt—but for 

the record, we did not release the letter. It was a private letter to 

the Turkish Government and to him. He released the letter. 

Mr. COOK. Exactly, exactly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Because we were trying to show respect to—one 

last-ditch effort to get him to cease and desist and recall that 

virulently anti-Semitic language. And of course he decided to just 

use it for his own political gain. 

Mr. COOK. And that is precisely the case. And it is not just 

Erdogan and the ruling Justice and Development Party that he 

uses this type of anti-Americanism to advance their political agenda across the Turkish political spectrum. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But do we have leverage? I mean, how much of 

a threat is it really that we will close down the bases, we will——

Mr. COOK. Right. I think it is unlikely to have an effect on 

Erdogan, the threat that we would leave Incirlik Air Base, from 

which we are using for a variety of purposes with regard to Iraq 

and Syria and only going to grow in more importance as we get reengaged on those conflicts. 

I think what I pointed out in my testimony, something that 

Erdogan does in fact respond to, and that he does respond to public 

censure from senior U.S. Government officials. With all due respect 

to our State Department spokespeople, they are dismissed when 

they make statements criticizing Erdogan for the type of anti-Semitic language that he used. 

And I should point out he even used language that is deeply offensive to Americans asking rhetorically what Americans knew 

about Hitler. The answer is 200,000 Americans died fighting Hitler. 

But when the President of the United States—on the occasion 

that he has used the public censure of Erdogan, when the Secretary of State rebuked Erdogan directly for his statement Zionism 

is a crime against humanity, we saw some change in their behavior. 

These kinds of threats—I think the Turks know we are not going 

to leave Incirlik Air Base. I think the Turks know that we need 

them to—by dint of their geography on a number of regional 

hotspots. That is not to excuse their behavior. 

As I said in my testimony, there is a bizarre, a peculiar connection between the Justice and Development Party and Hamas, and 

it has got to stop. That said, I think those kinds of threats—Mr. 

Jorisch and Dr. Schanzer have a better view of the financial issues 

that are important in these types of relationships. That may in fact 

be something where the United States has leverage, but these 

other kinds of threats strike me as—and with respect to my colleague and friend, strike me as things that are not necessarily 

going to move President Erdogan or his new Prime Minister. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And 

I apologize to the panel, I wish we could have more—I only have 

5 minutes—because I know this conversation really has much more 

depth to it, and many more aspects to it. So thank you all for——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

67

Mr. Clawson is recognized. 

Mr. CLAWSON. I have a more short-term question for the three 

of you, please. In this recent 50-day conflict, Hamas has shot lots 

of rockets, right? And it is my belief that the Israeli Defense Organization have also destroyed some of their rocket-making manufacturing. So now, is Hamas resupplying? I mean, we have been talking about money. You know, more money means more rockets to 

Hamas, which means more rockets into Israel. 

So are they resupplying? Where are those rockets coming from? 

And what can the U.S. do to stop it? Or if we can’t stop it, how 

can we work with Israel to slow it down? I would like to hear what 

you have to say. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Mr. Clawson, thank you for the question. It was 

our understanding before the conflict began that there were roughly 10,000 rockets in Hamas’ possession. It fired off roughly 4,000 

of those rockets into Israeli airspace. Another estimated 2,500 were 

destroyed through Israeli operations targeting the rocket caches 

below ground or perhaps even some of them before they were being 

fired, even as they were on the launcher. 

And so that leaves us with about 3,500 rockets in their possession, a lot of them smaller rockets, the smaller ordnance. Maybe 

about 200 of those mid-range rockets, the M302s or Fajr 5s, still 

remain in Hamas’ possession. 

The resupplying of the smaller range rockets, the Qassam rockets, the Grad rockets, and even possibly the ones that they call the 

J80s, and perhaps even a few other varieties, are being rebuilt 

again thanks to Iranian engineers who have trained Hamas on Iranian soil to be able to put these together. 

So, in other words, they smuggle in these small bits of whatever 

they need for the rockets. Sometimes they use materials that are 

already there, including plumbing, piping, and other things that 

can be, you know, dual use. And so they have this indigenous rocket-making capability right now. It is the longer range rockets that 

I think the Israelis are more concerned about in terms of what 

was—what could be smuggled in, and it is for that reason that they 

are keeping a very close eye on the fishermen. 

You know, if you remember, the terms of the cease fire deal included the ability for the fishermen to go further out at sea. The 

concern is is that some of these fishermen are fishing for other 

things, bringing back rockets into the Gaza Strip. Of course, the 

tunnels remain a problem. Even though a lot of them have been 

destroyed between Sinai and Gaza, some of them are still operational, and that is—so at least some of those rockets are still getting in. 

And, of course, as I mentioned before, Sudan remains a significant pipeline. Port Sudan I believe is the area that we all need to 

focus on right now. That is the hub for where Iranian rockets arrive before they are smuggled up into Egypt and across the Sinai 

Peninsula. 

Mr. JORISCH. Mr. Clawson, I totally agree with Dr. Schanzer’s 

analysis. But ultimately, while we have been leveraged, we do 

have—and this is to Mr. Connolly’s question as well—lies strictly 

in the banking sector. When it comes to correspondent banking, ulVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:34 Oct 28, 2014 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\090914\89738 SHIRL
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timately each and every one of these financial institutions—Iranians, Sudanese, Qatari—all want a presence in the United States, 

all rely on the U.S. dollar. And our largest presence lies in whether 

we allow those financial institutions to have a presence in the 

United States and/or their third party transactions. 

So take a Sudanese bank or an Iranian bank. They are using European financial institutions, which essentially will allow them access to the U.S. dollar. Ultimately, our largest leverage lies with 

the financial sector. There is no financial institution in the world 

that doesn’t want a U.S. presence and/or access to the U.S. dollar. 

When we talk about moving the dial, the Turks and the Qataris, 

in particular, they want access to the United States. During Dr. 

Schanzer’s time and mine in the Treasury Department, we had repeated meetings with the Turks in terms of their status in the 

United States and with the FATF, the Financial Action Task Force. 

And I can assure you they moved very quickly when the FATF or 

the United States thought about, spoke about, even made intimations that it was going to be on a blacklist. And that does move the 

dial. 

Same thing when it comes to the Sudanese and the Iranians. The 

Iranians, the found it much, much more difficult in large part as 

a result of Congress, the CISADA, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act, to essentially move 

money around the international financial sector. 

Financial institutions around the globe stopped doing business 

with them. In 2010, before CISADA was passed on July 1, 2010, 

there were 59 banks around the globe doing business with Iran’s 

financial institutions. Afterwards, that number came down to 

maybe a dozen, maybe half a dozen, somewhere between half a 

dozen and a dozen financial institutions. 

There are those out there, policy analysts on both sides of the Atlantic, that essentially say that in large measure the reason why 

the Iranians are at the negotiation table today are in large part because of those sanctions. 

Mr. CLAWSON. If I can jump in just for a second. Moving money 

around in a multi-national organization, of which I have experience, is not easy to do. There is tax laws and regulations from the 

different—from all of the different originating countries. 

It feels like other than with the exception of Iran we are not really trying that hard. Is that right? Because——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Clawson, that is an excellent question, 

and maybe the panelists will have an opportunity to——

Mr. CLAWSON. Thanks, guys. Great job. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Schneider of Illinois is recognized. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And, again, 

thank you for calling the hearing, and the panel for helping us dig 

deeper into a very difficult situation. 

Dr. Cook, you seem to draw a distinction or try to draw a distinction between—specifically Qatar, between ideology and a desire for 

influence. The ideology of Hamas stems directly from its outgrowth 

from the Muslim Brotherhood. How important, in your view—I will 

open it up to the whole panel—is the Muslim Brotherhood ideology 

69

to the funding of Hamas from Qatar, from Turkey, from even individuals and others in the region? 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. It is a very, very important question, and 

I think the events in Egypt during the summer of 2013 have generally colored the way in which we view the Muslim Brotherhood 

and its popularity throughout the region. 

It had been quite popular in Egypt, and then suddenly wasn’t, 

and I think that there is an assumption that people make that the 

Brotherhood is on its last legs, on its heels throughout the region, 

when in fact I think private citizens, people throughout the region, 

do subscribe to a world view of the Muslim Brotherhood, and that 

is a function—and the funding that comes from not just Qatar but 

comes from all over the Middle East to Hamas and other organizations around the region are a function of the fact that the Brotherhood and its world view remain important in the politics of the region. 

There is no doubt that there are Brotherhood networks throughout the region. One of the demands that the Saudis and the 

Emiratis have of the Qataris is that they return Saudi and Emirati 

members of the Muslim Brotherhood that have found sanctuary in 

Doha. 

It is something that is I think deeply embedded and ingrained 

throughout the region. It is widely seen as legitimate. And Hamas, 

as a result, is widely seen as legitimate. Remember, this organization is referred to as Resistance. And in many ways many of the 

people who are—especially those private groups and private donations coming in, see Hamas’ legitimate resistance against the 

Israeli occupation. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. So, and, Mr. Jorisch, I see you nodding your 

head. Is there a relevant distinction between the Muslim Brotherhood driven ideology of Hamas and al-Qaeda or Islamic State? 

Aren’t they all part of the same line of ideology? 

Mr. JORISCH. The answer is absolutely yes, sir. If you look at the 

ideology of Hamas, and you look at the ideology of Islamic jihad, 

and you look at the ideology of al-Qaeda and ISIS, they are one and 

the same, and they have an ideology of essentially implementing 

the Islamic State not only in their own jurisdictions but growing 

it. 

There is Dar al-Islaam and Dar al-Harb. There is the Abode of 

Islam and the Abode of War. And each of these organizations is 

playing off of the exact same playbook, and which is why I find it 

so bizarre, so strange that the administration is effectively calling 

for war against ISIS on the one hand but negotiating or encouraging the negotiation with Hamas on the other. It makes no sense. 

We ought to have a policy on radical Islam, and we don’t have one 

today. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Dr. Schanzer? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Yes. Mr. Schneider, it is a very good question. 

Look, I think the way that Qatar is traditionally described in this 

town is pragmatic. I think it ignores the fact that—Qatar is in fact 

also a Wahhabi organization or a Wahhabi State. It is not in the 

same vein as Saudi Arabia, but it is certainly imbued with a certain Islamist ideology. 

70

And so we have seen not only the support of Qatar for Hamas 

or for the Muslim Brotherhood, but also for the Musra Front, other 

jihadi groups, in Syria the Taliban as we know. And, look, I would 

just point out also that—and this does not get a lot of attention, 

but Khaled Sheik Mohammed, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, 

lived in Qatar with the full knowledge of the Qatari Government 

for several years. And before the United States was about to take 

him out on Qatari soil in an operation, he was tipped off and he 

was able to leave. 

This is the kind of country that we are dealing with. And, yes, 

it is pragmatic in the sense that it is willing to buy large stakes 

in real estate ventures here in the United States, or other companies around the world, the fact that it has money to burn in the 

Western economy does not make it an equal partner ideologically. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Right. And I am sorry to take back the time, but 

I only have a few seconds. But it is that natural resource wealth 

leading to an ideology that has a broad reach across the entire region. 

And in the last seconds, and maybe we can submit answers later, 

or if there is time available, you have got the Muslim Brotherhood 

ideology coming in direct conflict with facing Iran. But Iran—this 

is not a case I believe of our enemy of our enemy is our friend. 

These are both issues that we need to address and stand up to. 

And while they fight each other, we need to know and understand 

our relationship vis-a`-vis each as well. 

And I see I am out of time. 

Mr. WEBER [presiding]. The gentleman yields back, and the gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for the witnesses. I have really appreciated hearing 

your testimony and your answers to the questions. And I think following up on that last series of questions, and I think, Mr. Jorisch, 

you really hit it on the head to point out to the extent to which 

Hamas is part and parcel of the other Islamic jihadist movements 

that we are seeing. 

Hamas wants an Islamic caliphate, correct? 

Mr. JORISCH. Absolutely. Yes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I mean, the idea that somehow they just—they 

are fighting against occupation is what people will somehow say. 

Of course, we know Israel left Hamas almost a decade ago, or left 

the Gaza Strip. They had a chance to govern themselves. They 

chose to elect Hamas. 

What did Hamas do? Did they try to turn it into a Singapore on 

the Mediterranean? No. They built terrorist tunnels. They purchased rockets. The infrastructure that was left behind by the 

Israelis, they raised and destroyed rather than use that. 

And so they have had opportunities, and to me when those people say, ‘‘Oh, it is just the Israeli policy that they are responding 

to’’ fundamentally misunderstands the ideology that motivates 

them. Do you agree? 

Mr. JORISCH. I don’t understand how we can be silent when it 

comes to Hamas when we are so loud when it comes to al-Qaeda 

and ISIS. It makes no sense. We should learn from 60 years ago 

to listen to what our enemies are saying. Hamas broadcasts clearly 

71

its ideology in its newspapers, on its radio stations, and its television statements. Hezbollah does exactly the same. 

As Mr. Schneider pointed out, in this case it is not under the 

enemy of our enemy is our friend. Hamas, the Sunni jihadi organizations, and the clerical regime that rules Iran today effectively are 

paying, when it comes to the issues that we care about, off of the 

same playbook. The same playbook. 

Mr. JORISCH. Absolutely. And that is why I appreciated the comments about the UNRWA funding. I have a bill, the Palestinian Accountability Act, that dealt with all of these issues. Any relationship in the government with Hamas, funding would stop. 

UNRWA, unless it could be demonstrated that they are on the 

up and up, funding ceases. And I think that that—it is a sense of, 

okay, some people say the world is complicated, but do you want 

to reward bad behavior, or do you want to punish bad behavior? 

And so for me it is simple. If I see UNRWA hiding rockets in one 

school, ‘‘Oh, we didn’t know,’’ then another, ‘‘Oh, we didn’t’’—so, I 

mean, at some point, you know, it is just—it doesn’t even pass the 

laugh test. And so I think it would, one, be a good judicious use 

of protecting the taxpayer by not sending that funding over there; 

and, two, it would also just be a statement of our values. You align 

with Hamas; you are clearly not interested in peace with Israel. 

You are certainly not interested in being a constructive force in the 

region, so then we should act accordingly. 

I think the Secretary of State should have cut off the funding. 

I think the chairwoman’s amendment she passed several years ago 

mandated that. They had kind of said, ‘‘Oh, well, Hamas doesn’t 

have undue influence.’’ But as you point out, money is fungible. 

The money that goes to PA they can say is not going to be sent 

to Hamas, but it frees up other funds that can go there. 

With Turkey, to what extent is it tenable to consider them to be 

an ally. Of course, they are in NATO. The idea was they are a 

bridge from kind of the West to the Middle East. They had played 

a constructive role and have been pro-Western in the past. Under 

this current President, they have gone in a very, very bad direction. 

So how should we respond to Turkey? I know some of you said 

pressure Turkey. But can you have somebody in NATO who is also 

funding Islamic jihad? I mean, wouldn’t that just completely rule 

you out of being an ally of the Western democracies? 

Mr. COOK. I assume that is a question for me. Thank you for it. 

I think that you raise some very serious questions about the Turkish Government under the Justice and Development Party and new 

President Erdogan, who was the Prime Minister over the course of 

the last 12 years. 

The Turks maintain that they want to have a 360-degree foreign 

policy, which means their connections, they are robust connections 

to the West, as well as connections to other countries in the region. 

My concern is, however, that they themselves are not being true to 

that 360-degree foreign policy, and that under the new Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, who is the architect of their foreign policy 

over the course of the last decade, believes Turkey to be a Muslim 

power. And, as a result of its—the role he believes it should play, 

72

requires that Turkey support groups like Hamas and others in the 

region. 

I think that it is up to NATO to determine whether Turkey has 

run afoul of what constitutes being a NATO partner. Certainly, 

what’s going to happen in the coming weeks, days, and months 

with regard to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and the conflict 

in Iraq, that will be a test of whether Turkey takes its NATO role 

very seriously. 

Thus far, they have said that they are playing a non-active role 

in this coalition. I am not exactly sure what a non-active role in 

a coalition exactly means, but I think that the question that you 

asked, Mr. DeSantis, about Turkey and its ultimate trajectory is a 

very good one. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thanks. I am out of time, but I appreciate everything that you guys have given us to consider today, and I yield 

back. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. 

The gentlelady from Florida is recognized. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I think we all agree 

that despite the fact—and we are grateful of the cease fire—that 

Hamas remains a threat. 

Since I am sort of at the end of the questioning here, and this 

has been a great discussion, I would sort of—I would like to ask 

you if you can just sort of sum up what we have heard in little bits 

and pieces. And if you could, as best possible, looking at the four 

named countries that you say are the—or maybe the benefactors, 

our four—yes, Qatar, Turkey, Iran, Sudan—if you could describe 

simply what you think are the motivating factors of why they are 

benefactors. Is it anti-Semitism, religious, economic, whatever, and 

what are our best leverage points in cutting off the funding? 

Mr. SCHANZER. I can maybe take a first stab at this, Ms. 

Frankel. Thank you. Look, I think that, first of all, the anti-Israel 

sentiment, the Islamist sentiment, these are kind of the lowest 

common denominators in all four of these countries. 

Each of them come about it from very different perspectives. 

Iran, I think a much more vitriolic brand; Sudan, I think somewhat 

subservient to Iran in that respect; Qatar and Turkey, more of the 

Muslim Brotherhood variety of this ideology. But, nevertheless, 

this resonates not only within the populations but also across the 

Muslim world. So this is an attempt to demonstrate leadership 

across the region as well as at home. And this I think continues 

to drive this activity. 

Now, as for how to handle this, we I think have really leveraged 

quite a bit of sanctions already on Iran, quite a bit on Sudan, and 

there are—look, I think there may be some juice left in the tank 

with the Iranians. I think there are still ways to pressure them. 

The Sudanese, probably less so; they are a basket case. 

But with regard to Turkey and Qatar, I don’t think we have even 

started to try. I don’t believe that we have sent the tough messages. I don’t believe that we have designated the one-off individual 

or one-off bank that can send that shockwave through the system. 

There is a way to turn this up one notch at a time to let these 

countries know that once you have done one designation, if they 

don’t fix things, then you do another, and then you do another. 

73

This is, by the way, what we did with the Iranians which led them 

to the negotiating table over their nuclear program, and eventually 

it got so painful that they decided that it was time to talk. 

We have not—I mean, we continue to hear that we have no leverage. I think this is very wrong. I don’t think that we have even 

started to try to see whether we have leverage. I think the time 

is now to start. 

Mr. JORISCH. I yield my time to Dr. Cook. I agree completely 

with Dr. Schanzer’s sentiment. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you for the question, Ms. Frankel. The basis 

for Qatari and Turkish support are—for Hamas are laid out in 

some detail in my written testimony. But it is a combination of 

both pragmatism, regional politics, and domestic politics that—essentially to support advances, particularly Qatari and Turkish interests. 

I think that as long as that logic holds, it is going to be difficult 

for the United States to undermine those relations. I certainly believe that in the short run our leverage, given the roles that both 

the Qataris and the Turks are playing in the region, and are going 

to play in the region, our leverage is more limited than my two colleagues would suggest. 

Over a long period of time, if the United States wants to consider 

moving its air bases from Qatar or moving a NATO facility, both 

the Incirlik Air Base, as well as the early radar warning missile 

system that is directed against Iranian ballistic missiles out of Turkey, those are the kinds of things that the United States and the 

Congress can explore in terms of gaining some leverage, as well as 

the kind of financial actions that Dr. Schanzer is discussing. 

But, unfortunately, I think for the short term, for the time horizon that this administration is looking at, and for the challenges 

that it faces in the region, the kinds of things that have been suggested in terms of leverage are not likely to come about. 

Thank you very much. 

Ms. FRANKEL. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I yield the rest of my 

time. 

Mr. WEBER. Excellent questions. Although I am a little miffed 

because you took one of mine. 

Okay. The Chair now recognizes Dr. Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate the testimony. It has been 

enlightening, and I feel your frustration because what you are recommending is what we should have been doing and we haven’t 

done. And for the last 30 or 40 years, when we look at what we 

have done with Mubarak and Egypt, knowing these tunnels are 

being built and we are giving money, and this veneer of democracy 

that they are building and are promoting, are allowing the terrorist 

acts to go on. 

And when you look at, like, Turkey’s new Prime Minister, 

Ahmet—I can’t pronounce his last name—believes that the state 

system, based on nationalism and political institutions that trace 

their lineage to the West, is fundamentally unsustainable in Muslim societies. If Turkey is going to lead the region, Ankara must 

do so as the Muslim power in cooperation with Islamist groups. 

74

I mean, it pretty much lays it right out there. The new Prime 

Minister says this. And so knowing that, and if we have been playing this game for—I don’t want to call it a game. If we have been—

our foreign policy, which I think is way off track, it is askew, it is 

a broken compass, because we don’t have strong national leadership directing this for what America stands for. 

If we don’t stand up and say, ‘‘This is what we want to do,’’ the 

Palestinian Authority—in fact, we have got a resolution on what 

we were talking about earlier. Paying $500 million a year over the 

last 10 years is $5 billion of the American taxpayers’ money, and 

they have—and this is from 2010—their resolution in the Palestinian Authority, Government Resolution 21 and 23, where they 

are paying the prisoners in Israeli prisons for acts of terror. It goes 

up to $3,400 a month. Average income over there is $4,000 a year, 

and we are promoting this. 

We know we are promoting it, and it is—the money is fungible. It is like Mr. DeSantis says, if we give $500 million here, even 

though it doesn’t go there, it frees up money coming from somewhere else. And I think it is time to draw a line and just say, ‘‘We 

are not putting up with this anymore,’’ and put the pressure on 

Qatar and Turkey and just say, ‘‘We are not going to help you work 

against us.’’ If we are serious about bringing peace to the Middle 

East, I think your recommendations are spot on, and we will promote introducing those as far as legislation. 

Other than that, Dr. Cook, you basically stated that—what I got 

out of your last statement, that Turkey—they want that 360-degree 

vision, you know, all-encompassing. It is kind of like they want 

their cake or our cake and eat it, too. You know, they are taking 

it with one hand—and we see this so often. They take money—

these countries take money from us with one hand, and then cover 

up their eyes with the other and ignore the problem. And the 

American taxpayers are the one on the hook, and our military are 

on the hook. 

And if we are to bring world peace, we need to act like the superpower that we are and just say, ‘‘We are not doing this anymore.’’ 

And if Turkey and Qatar don’t come to our side, I say we need to 

just put more pressure on them and go after the money, because 

I think the money is the thing that is the most important. 

And I just want to say I appreciate you guys being here, because 

I think you—like I said before, you are spot on with your testimony. We look forward to act on that. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. WEBER. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, 

Mr. Collins. 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is always hard to follow someone who has such a lack of passion for his issues as Dr. 

Yoho does, a dear friend of mine who has actually—I think it was 

really interesting—and before I get into the questions here, Dr. 

DeSantis, you hit on this, and I think personally—I know there is 

going to be a big speech tomorrow night. I am glad we are speaking 

and the world is shivering—tomorrow night about what we are 

wanting to do. 

But I would love to see a lead on sort of what you said earlier 

is the financial aspect of what we can do. I mean, as someone who 

75

has served at al Udeid, who has been at that base, who has been 

in Iraq, who has been, you know, back and forth here, I have got 

some other questions. But your comment hit me, and if anybody 

could—if anybody wants to—why don’t we—is there more of a concerted effort we could lead with cutting the funds off. 

If we could lead in these areas, whether it be Qatar, Saudi Arabia—I mean, let us talk about—let us just lay it on the table—

these areas where we could do the funding sources through ‘‘charitable organizations, non-charitable’’—that seems to me, you are 

right. Iran came to the table. There has been a lot of discussion in 

this room about, oh, now we have pivoted and we are—we let them 

off the hook. 

We are letting them do exactly what they want to do. We gave 

them some money, and they are spending that money in ways that 

we can’t be accountable to. So that—I want to just real quickly 

touch on that as far as a first piece strategy in our dealings with 

ISIS right now. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Thank you, Mr. Collins. First of all, with respect 

to Iran, I do believe that the sanctions that we have imposed certainly brought them to the table. There is no question about it. I 

think it became very painful for them over time. This was, again, 

that strategy of turning it up one notch after another. I think the 

swift sanctions in particular, or pushing them out of the swift system, I think was probably the final step that forced Iran to come 

to the table. 

I do believe now that the sanctions relief that we are offering Iran, more than $7 billion, has certainly helped them spark a resurgence in their economy, and that is certainly taking away some 

of our leverage. And, by the way, I should just note in the context 

of Hamas, as we give them these billions of dollars, and as they 

are shipping these weapons over to Hamas, we are indirectly subsidizing this. We are allowing for it to happen, and I think it is a 

big mistake. 

Mr. COLLINS. Well, I think that has been brought up, and ‘‘indirectly’’ is too kind of a word. You might as well just say, ‘‘We are 

directly doing it, and we are fighting on two fronts here.’’ That is 

another hearing that we could have. You know, we have been 

through it, and I appreciate your answer, but I want to turn to 

Hamas and I want to turn to a specific incident that—and all of 

you can comment on this. 

And this goes back to The New York Times reporting, an article 

about the three Israeli teenagers that were kidnapped in occupied 

West Bank in June. We know they were victims of a Hamas operation, supposedly without the foreknowledge of Hamas leadership. 

But according to Israeli investigators, two men associated with 

Hamas carried out the kidnapping and subsequent killing after receiving $60,000. 

Now, they were—this was—the money was flown from—you 

know, basically flew—or flowed from Gaza Strip to the West Bank 

in five installments, you know, the five installments clearly not 

raising red flags. There is an issue here that we could look at. 

The question I have is—and for any of you to sort of look at 

here—is Israel—with Israel allowing such restricted travel outside 

of Gaza, let us talk for a moment how that money would have 

76

flowed, because I think that goes to the heart of some of this funding, not only for Hamas but ISIS. I agree with you completely; let 

us call everybody what they are, and let us just don’t put one in 

another—can you speak to that? Any of you want to touch on that 

one? 

Mr. JORISCH. There are four primary means that you can basically move money. You have cash, you have the formal financial 

sector, you have the informal financial sector, and you have trade. 

I don’t know which of those means were used, but let us just take 

them each at a time. 

The cash is very simple. You basically put it in your pocket, you 

swallow it, you have it in a suitcase, what have you. You have the 

banking sector, so theoretically you could have had some coming 

out of an ATM, you could have had a wire transfer, you could have 

had a check, et cetera. 

Mr. COLLINS. And let me stop you, because given the travel restriction, don’t you believe that probably the banking sector or 

some other kind of sector probably was more at risk or more active 

here? 

Mr. JORISCH. I actually suspect it was probably trade. 

Mr. COLLINS. Trade. 

Mr. JORISCH. Or cash. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. 

Mr. JORISCH. So let us take this bottle here, and I am going to 

tell you that it is worth $1. 

Mr. COLLINS. Right. 

Mr. JORISCH. Okay? And if I ship 12,000 of these, you have got 

$12,000 that moves, essentially sell it on the other side. There is 

a tremendous amount of reporting these days that Hamas is reliant 

more and more on trade because we have squeezed them on the 

banking sector. These tunnels have now been destroyed, or the vast 

majority of them, so the amount of cash that can go through, more 

and more they are depending on over, under, and false invoicing. 

Mr. COLLINS. Okay. Well, I appreciate it. And, amazingly, time 

has got out here. This is something that could be discussed and 

needs to be discussed more openly, because we are—you know, we 

can’t isolate ourselves from the world. That is a fact. 

But also, we have got to be very smart on how we strategically 

put assets, both material assets and human assets, in these areas 

in which basically we are playing both sides off the middle. And 

that is not—and I appreciate, Dr. Cook, all of you here today, for 

doing that. 

And, Mr. Chairman, at zero, I yield back. 

Mr. WEBER. Let the record show you were actually 1 second over. 

Mr. COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, it was because of my north Georgia 

accent that just was so fast getting in there it just missed the——

Mr. WEBER. The gentleman yields back, and the gentleman from 

South Carolina is recognized. 

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and thank all 

of you for being here and providing some level of clarification. It 

is so sad to me this administration I think began with obfuscation, 

that it would say we are in a global war on terrorists. And then 

we get into, well, it is overseas contingency operation. 

77

By the time the American people figure out what is going on, we 

will have further attacks. And so I want to thank you for clarifying. 

What we are dealing with are terrorists, these people who have a 

keen interest in killing every Muslim that disagrees with them. So 

it is not just Jews, not just Christians, not just Hindus. It is so universal; it is just horrifying, although it is encouraging. 

I have been to the Middle East to see the Persian Gulf States, 

other examples. I have had—two of my sons served in Iraq, and the 

extraordinary people there who do want to live in the 21st century. 

I had another son serve with Bright Star in Egypt, and my youngest just got back from Afghanistan. And so there is hope, but we 

have got to show resolve. 

And, gosh, it is so frustrating to me, we get into semantics. The 

discussion this week as I came back, is it ISIS or is it ISIL? No, 

it is terrorists. And so thank you all for trying to clarify this to the 

American people. 

As we look at this—and, Mr. Jorisch, you already referenced it, 

but it is trade-based money laundering. And so the money to 

Hamas, through overpricing, undervaluing, whatever, there was an 

example of plastic buckets that cost $970 each from the Czech Republic. Really, we know they are really good buckets, but not like 

that. And so there was money that is being passed. How can we 

preemptively break this system? 

Mr. JORISCH. Mr. Wilson, thank you for your sons’ service to 

begin with, and I will take your first point and then move to the 

second. President Bush declared this a war on terror. With all due 

respect to President Bush, you can’t fight a tactic. We learned in 

World War II that you fight ideologies or countries. In World War 

II we fought Nazism, Communism, Fascism. We fought Nazi Germany. We fought Japan. We didn’t fight German U-Boats, and we 

didn’t fight Japanese Kamikaze airplanes. 

This administration, for its part, has refused to recognize that we 

are fighting radical Islam. And until we have a coherent, comprehensive strategy, as we did in the Cold War, when it came to 

a chess-like game, we are playing checkers and radical Muslims 

are playing chess. And until we have established a coherent policy 

on radical Islam, we are going to be behind the eight ball, and your 

sons, unfortunately, will be going to places without a coherent 

strategy. 

To your second point, trade-based money laundering, the only 

comprehensive strategy that we have established is something 

called the Trade Transparency Unit, which essentially collects information, trade information, imports and exports, and compares 

them to the other side of the invoice. 

Now, the United States Government has helped establish a number of these trade transparency units in places like Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and a number of other places. We might consider funding a number of other trade transparency units in places like Israel 

and in Europe, which we have not done to date. 

Mr. WILSON. And, again, I just thank you for raising that. And 

my visits—I have been to the Middle East now 12 times, and it is 

always encouraging, the people that we meet with. They really do 

want to be in the 21st century, and you identify it correctly—radical Islam, a small percentage. And so I am just very hopeful. 

78

And last year I appreciate Dr. Fred Kagan was right here in 

June, and presented a map showing the spread of the terrorist organizations across North Africa, Middle East, and Central Asia. 

And it was extraordinary, because at the same time the administration was saying that terrorism was on a retreat. At the same 

exact time, indeed, Dr. Kagan was correct. 

But even that, we get into semantics. I still distribute that map, 

and people say, ‘‘Well, actually, it is out of date because it doesn’t 

mention ISIS or ISIL.’’ Well, it doesn’t need to, because of the 

changing names every day. It is international terrorism that we 

have got to face. 

And I want to thank all three of you for, in a very positive way, 

raising this. But I am just so hopeful for the people of the Middle 

East, that working together with them we can address which is a 

threat to the American people. 

Thank you. 

Mr. WEBER. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes himself. I have got a three-part question, really, and Lois actually asked, I think, one part of it. If you 

were going to—and I am going to go to each of you individually, 

and we are going to do it in sections. If you could—if you are going 

to call out countries that: A) supported Hamas; B) supported jihad, 

which someone argued is one and the same; and, three, are working toward a caliphate, okay, if you were going to identify countries 

that met those three criteria, what countries would you identify? 

Let us start with you, Dr. Schanzer. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Well, I think the four countries that we have 

identified here today all do it on some level, and I think the important thing is to note that they are doing it in varying degrees and 

perhaps——

Mr. WEBER. And that is my second part of the three-part question. Rank those in order. 

Mr. SCHANZER. Well, look, I think Iran poses probably the most 

serious threat and is supportive of the most number of terrorist organizations around the world. I think Qatar has played a dangerous role similarly. Sudan has been more of a bit player, primarily because of its lack of resources. And Turkey is just new to 

the game. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Do you all agree with that? Dr. Cook? 

Mr. COOK. Sure. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. How do we effectively call them out and make 

them pay a price to change that strategy? 

Mr. SCHANZER. Look, with Iran and Sudan, we have already done 

that, right? We have called them state sponsors of terrorism. We 

have got sanctions, regimes, against them, and we have taken 

measures to isolate them. And I think we have done a fairly effective job, maybe not effective enough with regard to Iran and its nuclear program, but certainly we have given it a good college try. 

With regard to Qatar and Turkey, we have not even started to 

call them out. I can’t stress this enough. We know that Hamas 

operatives are operating there in the light of day, and we know 

that money is flowing from these two countries to Hamas. We 

know, by the way, that there is other support that they are providing to other terrorist organizations in Syria right now, the same 

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groups that we are trying to combat, and in some cases their policies have led to the rise of ISIS. 

That border policy on Turkey—I mean, again, it has been one of 

the most dangerous things I have seen in the last 2 years, and the 

Turks have gotten away with it. They continue to—I think to have 

a loose border policy. 

These are all issues that I think we have neglected to say publicly. The moment we begin to do that is I think the moment that 

these countries begin to second-guess the policies that they have 

adopted. I think that up until now it has been the quiet approach, 

asking them nicely. That has not worked. It is time to step up the 

pressures. 

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Jorisch? 

Mr. JORISCH. I agree. When it comes to Iran, Mr. Weber, Iran is 

the most dangerous player out there. They fund not only Hamas, 

they fund Hezbollah, tens of millions of dollars go every year—

rather, hundreds of millions of dollars a year go to Hamas, hundreds of millions of dollars go to Hezbollah. If you rank them by 

order, you have Iran, as Dr. Schanzer points out, which is number 

one, and the rest in falling order of importance. 

We are not leveraging our banking sector enough. We have 

not——

Mr. WEBER. So you would say that that is the top chair, whether 

we would want to bring a U.N. resolution, whether we would want 

to do other things, make the statement from the administration 

and/or Congress. Don’t want it to be said that Congress wasn’t 

doing anything. Well, that is a shock. 

You would say that—do it through the banking system, number 

one. 

Mr. JORISCH. Yes. 

Mr. WEBER. Number two? 

Mr. JORISCH. Ironically enough, we don’t actually have an effective messaging system to that part of the world. Our television station that broadcasts into the Arab world today, not terribly effective. The radio station that broadcasts into the Arab world today, 

not terribly effective either. Until we basically flood the Arab 

media—and I mean Al Jazeera, el Arabia, and others, with some 

of the smartest guys in the room, to articulate U.S. foreign policy, 

we are not playing the game. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Dr. Cook? 

Mr. COOK. Let me say that I am in general agreement with what 

Dr. Schanzer has said on these issues, but I want to broaden it. 

And I think we should understand that not only is it just Qatar 

or Turkey or Iran, but it is individuals throughout the region that 

are contributing to these groups, to Hamas, to ISIS, to all kinds of 

jihadi groups. And that makes it a bigger problem than just censuring one or the other or ranking these countries. 

Mr. WEBER. So do you designate those individuals? 

Mr. COOK. I think that in certain places we do have to designate 

certain individuals who do it, but I think that the idea that we can 

get after every single one of them is a fool’s errand. It is important——

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Mr. WEBER. Well, obviously, you can’t get after them, to use your 

term, but, I mean, you can take them—they can’t visit certain 

countries. You can do all of those things. 

Mr. COOK. I think the large numbers—with respect, sir, with the 

large numbers of people who do contribute to these groups, I think 

it is beyond the scope of everybody that we could designate. 

My point in raising it is to suggest that this is a larger problem 

than just either one government or another government or not. Let 

me also amplify something that Dr. Schanzer said. I think that we 

have been, as I said in my written testimony, far too solicitous of 

the Turkish Government. 

He and I disagree—he and I disagree over whether the Qataris 

are pragmatic or not, but the Turks have in a sense taken this on 

in an ideological kind of way, in their support for Hamas. And the 

administration has put too much emphasis on private communication. As Dr. Schanzer said, their border policy has been terrible. 

The kind of rhetoric coming out of Ankara from the most senior 

leaders of the government have created an environment of hostility 

in the region that has done nothing but advance their own domestic political agenda. 

I think it is important for the United States to call them out on 

that issue in particular. I don’t think, though, that we should fool 

ourselves into believing that once we do that that they are going 

to change. I think it is important for us in terms of our values and 

what we stand for in order to do those things, but it is not necessarily going to make them change. 

Mr. WEBER. Okay. Well, I am out of time, so we are going to conclude this hearing. Thank you for your testimony. We appreciate 

you all. 

[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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