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THE SHOOTDOWN OF MALAYSIAN FLIGHT 17

AND THE ESCALATING CRISIS IN UKRAINE

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND 

EMERGING THREATS

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 29, 2014

Serial No. 113–192

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

PAUL COOK, California 

GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina 

STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Ian Brzezinski, resident senior fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council .................................................................... 10

Mr. Anthony Salvia, executive director, American Institute in Ukraine ............ 17

The Honorable William B. Taylor, vice president for Middle East and Africa, 

United States Institute of Peace (former United States Ambassador to 

Ukraine) ................................................................................................................ 24

Leon Aron, Ph.D., resident scholar and director of Russian studies, The American Enterprise Institute ..................................................................................... 30

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Ian Brzezinski: Prepared statement ............................................................... 12

Mr. Anthony Salvia: Prepared statement .............................................................. 20

The Honorable William B. Taylor: Prepared statement ....................................... 26

Leon Aron, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................................. 32

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 54

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 55

The Honorable William Keating, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts: Material submitted for the record .................... 56

(1)

THE SHOOTDOWN OF MALAYSIAN FLIGHT 17 

AND THE ESCALATING CRISIS IN UKRAINE 

TUESDAY, JULY 29, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m., in 

room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher [chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and 

Emerging Threats] presiding. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I call this hearing, entitled ‘‘The Shootdown 

of the Malaysian Flight 17 and the Escalating Crisis in Ukraine,’’ 

to order. Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative 

days to submit additional written questions or extraneous material 

for the record. 

On July 17th, a civilian airliner flying over Ukraine crashed into 

a field about 30 miles from the Russian border. All 298 people 

aboard tragically lost their lives. Today, before we do anything else, 

let us make it clear that we all extend our sympathy to the families 

of those victims of that crash. There are 298 families at least who 

are now in deep mourning and suffering, and they have our sympathy and our thoughts and prayers today. 

Our world today seems overwhelmed with such turmoil. On each 

continent there are various groups battling each other who are 

willing to use force and kill others in order to change the status 

quo or to protect the status quo. We see this today, but we also saw 

this through the 40 years of Cold War that is within our memory. 

During that time, people in Hungary, Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, 

and so many other trouble spots were caught up in local differences 

and local power struggles that had far-reaching, way beyond their 

borders implications. 

Today, Ukraine and Russia are in transition from what is what, 

and to who knows what is going to happen, but it is a transition, 

and that transition makes for volatility and undermines the stability, yes, it undermines the stability of the world and threatens 

world peace. 

I intend this hearing today to be a balanced hearing, a dialogue, 

not a diatribe against any point of view. We have assembled a 

panel of experts on Russia and the region with a goal of learning 

the facts and getting a better understanding of the truth; hopefully, 

without bellicose rhetoric. 

2

Last year, before the upheaval started in Ukraine, Ukraine faced 

an economic meltdown. Its elected President, Viktor Yanukovych, 

had a choice between a somewhat long-term yet limited offer by the 

European Union or a deal with Russia which offered more money 

up front and long-term affordable energy. He took the Russian 

deal, not because he was bullied, as some anti-Russian commentators suggest. No, he took the deal because it prevented an immediate crisis and he had every right to make that as the elected 

leader of Ukraine, and it was a defendable decision. 

But because he was duly elected and not a Third World dictator, 

the Ukrainian people should have used the ballot box to express 

outrage and remove him from office if that was the will of the majority of the people of Ukraine. Instead, street violence, spontaneous or not is debatable, led to the elected leader fleeing Ukraine, 

undermining stability, the stability that we are supposed to see 

that comes with a democracy and comes with people accepting the 

electoral process. 

At the least, it is commendable in the last 6 months, since 

Yanukovych’s removal, the people of Ukraine were given the 

chance to vote on installing a new President. The ongoing violence 

in Eastern Ukraine, however, can be traced right back to the violence and extralegal nondemocratic maneuvers of those who 

brought down that elected President. The ongoing violence is chaotic, and this needs to end. The chaos, the violence, no matter what 

preceded it, needs to stop now in Ukraine. The MH17 shootdown 

should be a turning point for all sides. It is time for the guns to 

stop shooting and some thoughtful reevaluation to commence. 

This conflict is having serious, not just regional, but global consequences. For one time over the last few years, Russians and 

Americans, seem to be headed for a new Cold War. Igniting a new 

Cold War would be a tragedy for not only the people of the United 

States and Russia, but for the people of the world. We need to identify and implement policies that will bring the United States and 

Russia together as partners to solve problems and the serious challenges that we have and the threats that are posed to both of our 

countries. 

Restoring peace to Ukraine would be a good start in deterring a 

potential new Cold War and establishing perhaps some stability 

and peace in the world. So today’s hearing, hopefully, will identify 

some of the areas of friction and maybe shed some light on the 

events in Ukraine that will help permit us to find solutions instead 

of fanning the flames of conflict. 

We have the witnesses who will be introduced just before their 

testimony, but today we have with us also the ranking member, 

Mr. Keating, and I would yield to him at this point for an opening 

statement on his part. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The entire world was sickened by the video footage of so-called 

separatists sacking the crash site of airline flight 17 over Ukraine 

on July 17th; almost 300 people losing their lives. And I offer officially my deepest condolences to the families of those victims. 

This footage is well-documented, and we have been agonized over 

reports of bodies decaying in sweltering heat and allegations that 

separatists continue to disturb and destroy evidence at the crash 

3

site. Although the separatists eventually allowed international experts to retrieve most of the victims’ bodies and the plane’s black 

boxes, they have continued to prevent international monitors from 

accessing the crash site. This is completely unacceptable. It is essential that a full and transparent international investigation 

begin immediately and the fact that this crime must be established 

and the perpetrators must be brought to justice. 

What is most tragic about this disaster is that it was completely 

avoidable and completely unnecessary. Without prejudging the outcome of a widely hoped-for international investigation, it is entirely 

accurate to say that this tragedy is the direct result of Russian efforts to sew chaos and instability in Eastern Ukraine and in the 

wider Eastern European region. 

Shockingly, this horrific disaster has not stopped Russia from 

continuing to fuel the conflict in Ukraine. Russian forces are increasing weapon deliveries to separatists and even firing artillery 

against Ukraine troops from within Russia. Although it is well 

within President Putin’s power to put an end to this fighting, he 

continues to insist he has no power over the so-called separatists. 

Nothing could be further from the truth. 

The leaders of the so-called separatists in Eastern Ukraine are 

not Ukrainian citizens. They are Russian citizens. They are subject 

to Russian law. Their financing comes from Russia, as do their 

weapons. Even more troubling, they are trained Russian operatives 

who fought in Chechnya and worked covertly in Transnistria, 

Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and even the Balkans to destabilize 

democratically elected governments, like the current Ukraine Government, and keep them from strengthening ties with anyone but 

Russia. 

I support the administration’s use of targeted sanctions in concert with our European allies to press Russia to end its support for 

so-called separatists in Eastern Ukraine. I am encouraged by the 

impending agreement by the EU to strengthen sanctions against 

Russia, and I look forward to the European leaders’ decision, which 

can come as early as today. These measures are designed to show 

Mr. Putin what the world already knows, that it is well within 

President Putin’s power to end this conflict. 

Yes, it is just not our steps or sanctions that are being closely 

examined, but our commitments to NATO and the transatlantic 

partnership that continue to be scrutinized by those who are 

threatening the ideals of rules of law, transparency, accountability, 

and indeed individual liberties. 

For this reason, I urge leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to 

move forward in setting the global standards for trade, health, environment, and labor by promoting the upcoming TTIP agreement 

and further would encourage increased dialogue on the future cooperative defense structures under the NATO umbrella as well. These 

institutions will carry our partnership into the future and offer a 

window for increased engagements with other like-minded partners 

throughout the world. 

For the immediate future, however, we owe it to the victims of 

MH17, and to the people of Ukraine, to press Mr. Putin to put an 

end to his bitter and wholly unnecessary proxy war, a sentiment 

that has wide agreement on both sides of the aisle in this body. 

4

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

We are honored today with the presence of the chairman of the 

full committee, Foreign Affairs Committee, Ed Royce, who we 

thank you for joining us, and thank you for your leadership in this 

committee. And we would hope that you might have some thoughts 

to share with us at this time. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you, Mr. Poe. I also want to extend my sympathy to the families 

who lost loved ones as a result of the downing of that airliner. 

I wanted to express my thanks to both of you, and the ranking 

member, and also to Mr. Poe for coming with us. Frankly, we flew 

into Eastern Ukraine, into this region, and into the province that 

is next to Donetsk several months ago in order to have a dialogue 

with the Russian-speaking people of that region, in order to get 

feedback from the NGO community, from the community in general. I will tell you we had discussions with Russian speakers, the 

women’s groups, the minority groups, the Jewish community, the 

governor, the civil society types, the lawyers. And in listening to all 

of that dialogue, they communicated one grave concern to us. Their 

concern was in the weapons and the caliber and quantity of those 

weapons flooding in over the border. 

Now, General Breedlove also, who is the Allied Commander at 

NATO, expressed these same concerns, and this was months ago, 

and he informed us, he informed the U.S. Government that his concern was with the training that separatists were receiving inside 

Russia on this SA–11 missile system. His other concern was with 

these systems, as well as tanks, coming over the border from Russia and being put into the hands of separatists. 

Part of the concern about the way this is being done is because 

of the way in which these separatists are being recruited. They are 

being recruited on social media. And in the words of one U.S. official, every malcontent and skinhead who responds to this rhetoric 

in the Russian-speaking world, whether it is from Russia or Eastern Ukraine, who is recruited, is probably not the best soldier. It 

is not a well-trained soldier, certainly. And to put these types of individuals on an SA–11 system to shoot these systems is to run an 

enormous risk. 

Now, this was a tragic accident in terms of hitting a jetliner, in 

my view. That was not the target. The target was Ukrainian military planes, and 12 of which had been shot down, and I think several others since. But they are shot down with this system. They 

are shot down by these individuals. And when we say not properly 

trained, I don’t think there is any question of that, because look for 

a minute to what happened in front of camera crews when these 

same separatists were guarding the site, the crash site. You notice 

that they took passports, they took Visa cards, they tried to use 

those Visa cards, unprofessional conduct. A soldier would not be 

doing this. They took someone’s wedding ring. They took cell 

phones and made calls on those cell phones. 

This is the concern, this was the type of concern expressed to us 

by the governor on down in Dnepropetrovsk, the fact that we would 

have a motley crew like this. And another point they made is that, 

yes, some speak Ukrainian Russian, but a lot of them are 

5

Muscovites. They speak with a Moscow accent. They are not locals. 

They are people who have been recruited, been trained, rather 

poorly trained, and then thrown into this environment. 

Our goal has to be to try to wind down this crisis, wind down 

this situation, and I believe we have an opportunity to do that. We 

have an opportunity because we have had this election now, and 

we have a plan which yields a lot of local autonomy. We have a 

plan which is a rather generous peace plan which, obviously, offers 

amnesty, as you know, for those who struggled against the government in Ukraine. 

You have the will of the local Ukrainian Russian-speaking population, the majority of that population, to be part of this new system because they will be able to elect their own regional representation. But one thing stands in the way. What stands in the way 

is the insistence on President Vladimir Putin that he continues to 

bring in heavy weaponry and put that into this struggle, and as a 

consequence drive up the violence in the region. 

Russia is stepping up its actions, and that is why the United 

States and why Europe is working on a plan now. I must mention, 

we already passed out of this bill, the Ukraine Support Act, H.R. 

4278, we passed this out of committee, myself and Eliot Engel were 

the authors of it. It expanded our President’s authority to increase 

assistance for democracy and civil society there, and enhanced 

U.S.-international broadcasting that we are trying to use right now 

to counter the Russian propaganda in Russia. 

The administration has provided $23 million in nonlethal security assistance since March and proposed a $40 million program to 

train and equip elements of the National Guard in the Ukraine. 

The announcement yesterday that the U.S. and EU have agreed to 

impose new sanctions, including on the defense, financial, and energy sectors, is an acknowledgment that the actions taken to date 

have been insufficient to deter President Putin. 

Given that the Europeans can bring far more leverage to bear on 

Russia than the United States, the responsibility falls heavily on 

them to convince President Putin that his current course cannot 

succeed and will only bring increasing pain to his country and his 

economy. Only under the pressure, that kind of pressure, is he likely to choose peace and finally allow the Ukrainian people to achieve 

the security, prosperity, and freedom they have so long sought, and 

I think that is the best course of action. And I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And we would now like to hear an opening statement from Judge 

Poe, chairman——

Mr. SHERMAN. Are you going to go Democrat or chairman? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, Mr. Sherman, the ranking member of 

the subcommittee. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

You listen to the American media and it is as simple as an old 

western movie. That is true of this crisis, that is true of an awful 

lot of crises where we think that one side is the black hats, the 

other side is the white hats. This committee, or combination of two 

subcommittees, has a diversity of views and I think will be a good 

exposition of the range and complexity of this crisis. I think the one 

6

thing we all agree on is that the Time magazine cover, ‘‘Cold War 

II,’’ needs to be avoided. 

The plane was shot down, almost certainly with an SA–11 or 

similar missile, I think certainly an accident, was shot down in a 

war zone in which separatists were shooting down other planes. 

The separatists did not use reasonable care to be sure that the 

plane they were shooting down was, like the other planes they had 

shot down, a Ukrainian military plane. 

There was a lack of care to go around. The Ukrainian Government closed its air space over this area up to 32,000 feet. They 

knew their own planes were being shot down and it was perhaps 

the height of arrogance to think, well, they are shooting our planes 

down at 10,000 or whatever thousand feet, so we will let planes, 

invite planes to fly over at 32,000 feet. 

We have got the Malaysian Airlines aware that planes are being 

shot down in this zone by not shoulder-fired missiles, but something more advanced, and they said, well, 32,000 sounds good to 

us, we will go 33,000. 

We have got the separatists who clearly didn’t exercise due care. 

And finally, you have a Russian Government who knew better than 

the Ukrainian Government the military capacities of the separatists and could have closed their own air space along the border, 

thus making it impossible for civilian planes to fly where civilian 

planes should not have been flying. 

Of course, the separatists could have issued their own, since they 

style themselves a government, limitation use of the air space. 

Whether that would have been listened to by anybody, I don’t 

know. But if Russia had closed its air space immediately adjoining 

this Ukrainian region, planes would have avoided the area. 

It is clear that sanctions are justified against Russia. They are 

interfering in the Ukraine. They are armoring the separatists. And 

I think that was well summarized by the gentleman from Massachusetts. That being said, our friends in Kiev who want us to take 

actions on their behalf ought to be taking some actions on their behalf. They ought to be offering the most generous possible package 

of local autonomy. Instead, they come and say, well, maybe we will 

continue the practice of having the governors of each oblast—state, 

if you will—appointed by the central government. I have worked 

with the gentleman from Texas, and I know if that was the practice here of our Federal Government appointing the Texas governor, well, we might have some problems. 

They should be offering budgetary autonomy. They have done so 

in the vaguest possible words, whereas the Party of Regions, the 

last party to win an election held in peace, has put forward a more 

expansive list of actual autonomy. So I am not willing to see the 

whole world convulsed because those in Kiev could say, well, 51 

percent of the people of the entire country support a strict centralized system. It is not our job to work with our allies to get them 

100 percent of what they argue is justice. It is our job to work with 

these allies when there is a great injustice, as we are seeing now. 

And finally, there were comments about Yanukovych being driven from power. He ran on a platform, on really a constitutional 

issue, that he would face west. He then reversed himself and faced 

east. What I would like to know from the witnesses, because our 

7

chairman brought this up, is did the Ukrainian people have a capacity to reverse that reversal through the ballot box or was 

Yanukovych about to take action which legally was irreversible in 

signing the agreement with Russia, or as a practical matter would 

have been irreversible because the EU would not have accepted the 

Ukraine in its new status after the next regularly scheduled election? 

So I look forward to what I think will be a far more wide-ranging 

and interesting discussion of all of the issues involving the Ukraine 

and the plane than I have heard in most American media. And I 

yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

And now we have Judge Poe. 

Mr. POE. I thank the chairman. 

I think it is important that we view this more in a historical 

long-term perspective than just the isolated, small, tragic issue of 

the Malaysian airplane being shot down. That is the way I see it. 

Putin is the center of all of this. He sees himself as the modern 

day Peter the Great. Even in a recent profile of Putin, his closest 

advisors called him czar. Much like Peter the Great, Putin sees and 

wants an expanding Russian empire. 

Any objective observer would conclude nothing has stopped Putin 

in his desire for more territory. The administration and our European allies have tried to shame and isolate him by kicking Russia 

out of the G–8. He doesn’t care about those diplomatic niceties, and 

it hasn’t had any effect on him or his decision making. Putin and 

his cronies have brushed off pinprick sanctions and other weak attempts to get him to change his course. He hasn’t changed his longterm course, in my opinion. The lack of strong response to Putin’s 

aggression has only really encouraged him to be more aggressive. 

And then over the sky of Eastern Ukraine, a surface-to-air missile was launched and it destroyed the Malaysian civilian airliner. 

This dastardly deed killed—rather murdered—298 people. The missile and launcher were Russian. This is a photograph of a similar 

missile launcher that is Russian made. The individuals shooting 

down the plane were so-called Russian-backed separatists in 

Ukraine, and apparently the crash site, which is a crime scene on 

the ground, is controlled by pro-Russian sympathizers, and it has 

been compromised by malcontents. As the chairman pointed out, 

they are pillaging the wreckage site, taking property from the people that were murdered on that plane. Unlike the civilized world, 

Putin’s reaction was to deny that he had anything to do with it and 

persist in outlandish Area 51-type conspiracies about who did it. 

Putin, I call him the Napoleon of Siberia, has fingerprints all 

over this Lusitania-type incident. This is the latest in a series of 

aggressive acts by the Russian bear. I did mention in this committee on March 25th that Putin is determined to start Cold War 

II. Ever since then, he keeps doing things to encourage that philosophy of wanting to be starting that Cold War II again. 

In 2008, years ago, most Americans don’t even remember, the 

Russians invaded the sovereign nation of Georgia. Not the State of 

Georgia, but the nation of Georgia—unlike one of our fellow committee members—was worried about Georgia being invaded and he 

missed it. It was the Republic of Georgia. The Russian bear gobbled 

8

up one-third of the territory. The world leaders, they protested 

loudly, but they were glad it wasn’t their homeland, and then the 

world moved on. The Russian tanks are still in one-third of Georgia. I have seen them. I have been there. 

Then the Russian bear hibernated for a while and then in 2013 

it woke up hungry and it had its sights on its prey of Crimea. That 

belongs, still belongs, to Ukraine. So to satisfy its appetite for more 

czar-like territory it was gobbled up. Now the Russians unlawfully 

occupy Crimea. The world leaders once again got on television and 

voiced opposition, then they went off back to their policy of what 

I call appeasement. 

So, still hungry, the bear of the north woke up again in Eastern 

Ukraine, looked for more prey, and it subversively has supported 

insurrection against the Ukrainian Government to gain more territory. Reports indicate Russian special forces are playing the role of 

pro-Russian separatists, Russian special forces that were similarly 

pretending to be Georgian separatists. Battles are being fought, 

people are dying, and Russian imperialism persists in its aggression. This seems like this is a war to me on Ukraine. 

And then the Malaysian airplane was shot down. Also, as the 

chairman pointed out, other Ukrainian military aircraft have been 

shot down. Two Ukrainian military jets, over Ukrainian sovereignty, were shot down by Russian missiles fired from Russia. 

That seems to be somewhat aggressive. The world leaders are outraged, but the bear has not stopped. 

So what will the heads of states do? Will the world leaders continue to take the position the bear hasn’t eaten them and they will 

do little but pontificate and hope the bear’s appetite is satisfied? 

Maybe the bear will hibernate again. When it wakes up, like it always has, it will wake up hungry, and then when it roars, who will 

be devoured next, the rest of Ukraine, Moldova, Latvia, Estonia, 

Poland, or just another group of people on an airplane flying over 

another country? Only Putin knows what the roar of the Russian 

bear will bring to the rest of us. 

Appeasement certainly doesn’t seem to be working, doesn’t 

seemed to have stopped the aggression. It is important that we do 

what we can to help the Ukrainian nation keep its sovereignty. 

Yes, it is their country. They should defend it. It is their responsibility. But we can provide them military equipment, jam Russian 

missiles. The Russians must be made to understand they have to 

stop invading other people’s territory. 

Second, as when I was in Ukraine, all the Ukrainians talked 

about was being energy independent from Russia. That is, developing their own natural gas to compete against Gazprom and getting U.S. natural gas to them. They wanted that. They don’t know 

our answer on that. 

And third, we actually need sanctions that work to have an impact. So I ask the question: Is there not one bold Churchill to be 

found among the overpopulated, boastful Chamberlains among the 

world leaders? We shall see. 

I yield back. 

Mr. KEATING. Will the gentleman yield? Will the gentleman 

yield? 

Mr. POE. I yield back. 

9

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We will have some time for interaction after 

the witnesses testify. And I guess, Your Honor, that is just the way 

it is. 

We are going to go to the witnesses now. And anyone who has 

an opening statement, or extraneous material to add to the record 

at this point, it will be added to the record, without objection. 

We have four witnesses with us today. I would ask if they could 

try to, unlike the rest of us up here, limit the actual testimony to 

5 minutes, although your written testimony can be as long as you 

would like. And then we will actually try to have a dialogue on this 

and ask you about the positions you have taken, and perhaps some 

questions that will utilize your expertise and help us get a better 

understanding of exactly what is going on in Ukraine. 

I will introduce all four witnesses and then we will proceed with 

the testimony of each witness, and then a question-and-answer period. 

Our first witness is Ian Brzezinski, a senior resident fellow with 

the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council. He served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for 

Europe and NATO policy between 2001 and 2005. He has a long 

tenure of working with national security issues, including working 

on Capitol Hill for 7 years. He also worked as a volunteer in 

Ukraine in the early 1990s, advising the Ukrainian National Security Council, Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, and Parliament. 

We have Anthony Salvia, who is the director of the American Institute in Ukraine, a privately funded, nonprofit organization dedicated to providing information and education about the United 

States policy in that country. He served as an executive assistant 

to the president of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty from 1988 to 

1993, and then went to Russia as director of the Moscow Programming Center for the RFE–R, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 

from 1993 to 1996. He is a graduate of Johns Hopkins University, 

has a master’s degree in European Affairs and International Economics. 

Next we have Dr. Leon Aron. He is a resident scholar and director of Russian studies at the American Enterprise Institute here in 

Washington. He is widely published. He is an expert on Russia, 

having authored three books and hundreds of articles on the subject. He is also a frequent media commentator, and earned both a 

master’s degree and his Ph.D. From Columbia University. 

And we have with us Ambassador William Taylor. He is the vice 

president for Middle East and Africa at the U.S. Institute of Peace. 

From 2011 to 2013, he was the special coordinator for the Middle 

East transitions at the Department of State, and he has also coordinated our assistance to Egypt Tunisia, Libya, and Syria. He 

served as the U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine from 2006 to 2009. Before that, he served in Baghdad and Kabul. He is a graduate of 

West Point and a veteran of the United States Army. 

We turn to our witnesses now. And, Mr. Brzezinski, you may proceed. 

10

STATEMENT OF MR. IAN BRZEZINSKI, RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, BRENT SCOWCROFT CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Chairman Rohrabacher, Chairman Poe, Ranking 

Member Keating, Ranking Member Sherman, members of the committee, thank you for the privilege of appearing before this hearing 

to discuss ramifications of the shootdown of Malaysian Airlines 

flight 17. That tragedy is the consequence of Russia’s invasion of 

Ukraine, and specifically the Kremlin’s stoking of an insurrection 

in Eastern Ukraine. The MH–17 shootdown should prompt us to 

carefully assess the effectiveness of the West’s response to these 

provocative acts of aggression. 

The invasion of Ukraine began in February. Today, some 6 

months later, Russia still occupies Crimea. The insurrection in 

Eastern Ukraine, which has intensified, has been led and fought by 

Russian operatives, enabled by Russian weapons, and reinforced by 

Russian military forces massed along Ukraine’s border. 

Yesterday the United States and West European officials announced agreement on a new set of sanctions against Russia. As 

we learn more about these sanctions, I hope they will mark a departure from the empty warnings, brooding ministerials, and the 

hesitancy and incrementalism that has characterized the West’s reaction to this invasion. 

Indeed, over the last 6 months, U.S. policy appears to have been 

shaped more by the lowest common denominator of what our allies 

are willing to do rather than by initiative and decisive action on 

the part of Washington. And it has been counterproductive. It has 

emboldened Russia. After each increment of targeted sanctions, 

Russia has increased its support to its proxies in Ukraine. The 

Kremlin’s deployment of irregulars with small arms is now complemented by training and recruitment centers in Russia, and its 

transfer to its proxies of tanks, rocket launchers, surface-to-air missiles, including most notably the Buk SA–11 air defense system, 

among other equipment. 

If the pending decisions by the United States and the EU are a 

continuation of past hesitancy and incrementalism, they risk leading to a stalemate in Ukraine, another frozen conflict that will 

leave Ukraine crippled and unable to pursue its European aspirations. Worse, it can embolden Putin to press further into Ukraine 

and pursue similar strategies toward Moldova and the Baltic 

States. 

The West needs a comprehensive strategy, targeted at persuading Putin to remove his forces from Ukraine, deterring Russia 

from further aggression against Ukraine and other neighboring 

countries, reinforcing Ukraine’s capabilities for self-defense and assisting Ukraine to become a prosperous, democratic European 

state. 

Towards these ends, the U.S. should undertake the following initiatives. First, stronger economic sanctions against Russia are in 

order. The overly selective scope of current sanctions has failed to 

inflict the systemic economic pain necessary to make an authoritarian regime rethink its actions. Sectoral sanctions should be imposed and the key targets should be Russia’s energy and financial 

sectors. There should be no loopholes and no exceptions. 

11

Second, a more robust effort is needed to shore up NATO allies 

in Ukraine. In early June, President Obama announced the European Reassurance Initiative to reinforce Central European allies 

and build the military capabilities of East European partners. This 

is an important initiative, but almost 2 months later it remains unclear exactly what it will yield. It would be useful if the ERI established a strategically significant U.S. enduring military presence in 

Poland and the Baltic States. It would be even better and more 

useful if NATO’s West European allies contributed to this initiative. 

Third, we need to provide military assurance to Ukraine. To 

date, NATO and the United States have unwisely done the opposite. They have drawn a red line on the alliance’s eastern frontier 

that leaves Kiev militarily temporarily isolated. Now that Russia 

is firing artillery into Ukraine, erasing that red line has become 

more urgent. 

Toward that end, the United States should grant Ukraine’s request for lethal military equipment, including surface-to-air missiles and anti-tank weapons, deploy intelligence and surveillance 

capabilities in Ukraine, along with military trainers, conduct military exercises in Ukraine to help train its armed forces. None of 

these initiatives would threaten Russian territory. 

Fourth, the West needs to step up its efforts to counter Russia’s 

aggressive propaganda campaigns. The Kremlin’s effort against 

Ukraine in this realm has been the most intense we have seen 

since the end of the Cold War. 

Fifth, the West needs to support Ukraine’s effort to reform its 

economy and integrate into Europe. To its credit, Washington has 

done well in mobilizing international financial support for Ukraine. 

Freeing up U.S. LNG exports to Central and Eastern Europe would 

be another way to reinforce the region’s security and help Ukraine 

diversify its energy base. 

And finally, the West needs to reanimate the vision of a Europe 

whole, free, and secure. The situation in Eastern Europe today necessitates that NATO make clear its open-door policy is no passive 

phrase or empty slogan. 

Mr. Chairman, the shootdown of MH–17 is a stark reminder of 

how regional conflict can have immediate implications far beyond 

its immediate vicinity. I hope the sanctions that are being rolled 

out today will reflect a firmer response and stronger leadership on 

the part of the United States. That will be necessary if the West 

is going to convince President Putin to reverse his dangerous 

course. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Salvia. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ANTHONY SALVIA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN UKRAINE 

Mr. SALVIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to Judge 

Poe and Congressman Keating and Congressman Sherman and the 

whole committee for the opportunity to address this joint subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 

The controversy over the shootdown of Malaysian Airlines flight 

17 remains unresolved. There are the predictable charges and 

countercharges, which are no substitute for proper investigation resulting in the conclusion that all parties, above all Russia and 

Ukraine, can and must accept. 

Meanwhile, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine continues to grind on 

to the detriment of all Ukrainians. It is safe to say many hundreds 

have died. I think the New York Times said yesterday 800 since 

April have died in Eastern Ukraine and thousands have been 

wounded. According to the U.N., some 230,000 have fled their 

homes, of whom more than 100,000 have been driven out of the 

country. Donetsk, a city of 1 million, is under siege. Its water supply is at risk. Sections of the city have no electricity, sewage, or 

gas. Shops are closed. Food is increasingly hard to come by. 

What will happen now? Will there be a cease-fire leading to a negotiated settlement so as to salvage Ukraine’s increasingly slim 

prospects for unity? Or will Kiev continue to seek a military victory 

in the east and use the National Guard, which includes in its ranks 

member of the extreme nationalist Praviy Sektor, to repress the 

native population? 

As of now, Kiev seems determined to prosecute the war, which 

means in the context to create demographic change in the country. 

Kiev cannot afford to pay its soldiers. There is a high rate of desertion and Ukraine’s economy is teetering on the brink of collapse. 

But it is making headway in one area, namely in the killing of East 

Ukrainian civilians, which Western observers at long last have 

begun to take note, including a New York Times article of yesterday. 

And indeed, as Human Rights Watch reported last week from 

Donetsk,

‘‘Unguided rockets launched apparently by Ukrainian Government forces and pro-government militias have killed at 

least 16 civilians and wounded many more in insurgentcontrolled areas of Donetsk and its suburbs, in at least 

four attacks between July 12 and 21, 2014. The use of indiscriminate rockets in populated areas violates international humanitarian law, or the laws of war, and may 

amount to war crimes.’’

Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Kiev is curtailing the use 

of these missiles in populated areas or, for that matter, the resort 

to air power and artillery against anti-Kiev fighters Poroshenko 

calls terrorists, dirt, and parasites. Poroshenko brushed off calls 

from Paris, Berlin, and Moscow to extend his June 20th cease-fire 

and resumed his offensive against his own people. The Eastern 

18

Ukrainians are responding by shooting down as many of Kiev’s 

military plans as they can and the cycle of violence spins on. 

There are those in Washington who see Ukraine not at all for 

itself, but strictly as an adjunct to its obsession with Russia, concerning which the prevailing attitude is, we must win, you must 

lose. Perhaps Washington and its friends in Kiev can succeed in 

decimating Donetsk and Luhansk, but this is not likely to be the 

end of it. 

Indeed, in the Washington Post just the other day, I believe it 

was the day before yesterday, Serhiy Kudelia of Baylor University 

wrote about the prospect of you can defeat Donetsk and Luhansk, 

but what about a long-term counterinsurgency that leaves the 

place in a state of not the same degree of upheaval as all-out war, 

but a situation of a lack of resolution, a kind of Northern Ireland 

situation, only worse. 

It is unlikely Poroshenko would be embarked on his present 

course without Washington’s support and pressure from his own 

radical nationalists. It is telling that on July 22nd, President 

Obama called for a cease-fire in Gaza, but said nothing about a 

cease-fire in Ukraine. 

There is no military solution to Ukraine’s internal problems, 

which are political, economic, and cultural in nature. Ukraine is 

the second-poorest country in Europe. Its foreign exchange reserves 

are shot. All resources are being poured into the campaign to destroy the most prosperous part of the country, East Ukraine. 

And indeed, Serhiy Kudelia, writing in the Washington Post the 

day before yesterday, I don’t know how he came up with this figure, but he put a figure of $800 million on the need just to conclude 

this campaign on the part of the Kiev government. Where are they 

supposed to get this money when they are in arrears to the tune 

of multi-, multi-, multi-millions and billion, and then to add on this 

expense? Where does the money come from? 

As former Acting Prime Minister Yatseniuk stated upon his recent resignation, the coalition, the governing ‘‘coalition of Fatherland, UDAR, and Svoboda has fallen apart. Laws haven’t been 

voted on. Soldiers can’t be paid. There is no money to buy rifles. 

There is no possibility to store gas. What options do we have?’’ 

asked Yatseniuk. 

Well, there is this option: A comprehensive cease-fire, genuine 

negotiations, and a balanced settlement that addresses Ukraine’s 

real needs. Such an approach would command wide European and 

especially German support. 

Dr. Robert Legvold of Columbia University in New York recently 

observed that Europeans will not support one side pushing for military victory over the other. He said,

‘‘Kiev’s part in the political dialogue must be flexible and 

genuinely open to meeting the concerns of the majorities 

in all of Ukraine’s eight eastern provinces. It means more 

than convening peace talks, even if without preconditions. 

It means getting the U.S., the United States, to invest 

more effort in drawing all parties toward a political settlement.’’

19

That is the heart of the matter, how do we get Washington on 

board with the idea of a cease-fire negotiation, a peaceful settlement? Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Salvia follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Taylor. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM B. TAYLOR, VICE 

PRESIDENT FOR MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA, UNITED 

STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE (FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO UKRAINE) 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Chairman Rohrabacher, Chairman Poe, 

members of the subcommittees, thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to you today on the shooting down of Malaysia 

flight 17 and the escalating crisis in Ukraine. I commend you for 

this timely and important hearing. The views I express today are 

solely my own. They do not represent those of the United States 

Institute of Peace because we do not take policy positions. 

In my view, today Russia is the single greatest threat to peace 

in Europe. If the West does not confront this threat, that is, if we 

appease the Russians now, we will have to confront an even larger 

threat tomorrow closer to home. 

Members of this committee, and my panel members, are very familiar, very aware of the situation in Ukraine. Russian support for 

the so-called separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk—weapons, leadership, financing, organization, personnel, fighters—is the only 

thing keeping the Ukrainian Government from establishing security in Southeastern Ukraine. Security is needed to find the remaining victims of the missile strike on the Malaysia airliner and 

to complete the investigation. Russian support allows the so-called 

separatists to continue to impede those efforts. 

In my view, we must confront the Russian war against Ukraine. 

This aggression started with the quiet invasion of Crimea last 

spring. A sham, at-the-end-of-a-rifle referendum was followed by an 

illegal annexation. The international community should not allow 

that annexation to stand. Until that situation is resolved to the satisfaction of Ukraine, the Russian Government should pay serious 

penalties to Ukraine for the temporary loss of income and illegally 

confiscated assets that would have come to Ukraine from Crimea. 

The international community did not confront the Kremlin on 

Crimea. As a consequence, the Russians continued their aggression 

in Donetsk and Luhansk. The leaders of the separatist movement 

unit have become almost exclusively Russian. Russian equipment 

continues to flow across the border unimpeded. This equipment, including sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons, shot down the Malaysian airliner, killing 298 people. No matter what individual separatist pushed the button to fire the weapon, let’s be clear, Mr. 

Chairman, the tragedy is Russian responsibility. 

What should be done? First, human decency requires the return 

of the victims to their families. Further, experts need access to the 

crash site to complete the investigation. If the so-called separatists 

continue to impede these efforts, the international community, led 

by the Dutch, Australians, and Malaysians, supported by other nations with victims on MH–17, including the United States, and 

with the approval of the Ukrainians, should provide an armed 

international security force to protect the investigators and allow 

them to find victims and complete their investigation. That investigation should lead to criminal prosecutions of those found responsible. 

25

Second, the international community, led by the United States, 

should provide Ukraine with the means to eliminate the separatist 

forces in their country. This means weapons, military advice, intelligence, and financial support to pay and equip their soldiers. 

Third, the international community should follow the individual 

travel bans and asset freezes with harsh economic sanctions on entire sectors of the Russian economy to deter the Kremlin from continued support to the separatists, to force them to close their border to weapons, fighters, and military support, and to pressure 

them to return Crimea to Ukraine. 

Fourth, the international community, led by the United States, 

should provide financial support to Ukraine as it simultaneously 

confronts Russian aggression and undertakes serious economic and 

political reform. The International Monetary Fund loans may have 

to be increased. Bilateral support will have to be expanded. Advice 

on economic reform, energy pricing, and anti-corruption in particular, will be needed. 

Fifth, the international community should respect Ukraine’s 

right to decide with whom to associate politically and economically. 

Western political and security institutions, specifically the European Union and NATO, should be open to membership applications 

from Ukraine. 

Mr. Chairman, it is a tragedy that it took the shooting down of 

a civilian airliner over Ukraine to force the international community to confront Russian aggression. If we don’t confront it now, it 

is appeasement, and Russia will not stop at Donetsk. 

Thank you, and I am happy to answer your questions. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Taylor follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Dr. Aron. 

STATEMENT OF LEON ARON, PH.D., RESIDENT SCHOLAR AND 

DIRECTOR OF RUSSIAN STUDIES, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. ARON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Answering your 

call to see how the settlement could be reached in Ukraine, I think 

it is very helpful to look at the sources of Russian behavior and put 

the conflict in the wider military and political context to see what 

shapes Mr. Putin’s strategy. 

From the moment the regime of Viktor Yanukovych was overthrown in Kiev at the end of February, Russia, that is Mr. Vladimir Putin, has pursued three strategic goals in Ukraine. First, to 

punish, humiliate, destabilize, if possible dismember and ultimately derail a Euro-bound Ukraine. Second, to prevent the West 

from imposing meaningful, binding sanctions. And finally, to continue to solidify Mr. Putin’s domestic political base by rallying 

around the flag. 

This third objective is the most important one. By all indications, 

Mr. Putin is engineering a Presidency for life. This is not an easy 

task in a Russia with a stagnant economy, possibly sliding in recession, rising food prices, enormous corruption, and continuing decline in the quality of education, health care, and upward mobility. 

As recently as the end of 2013, according to public opinion polls, 

the Russian people’s trust in Putin’s promises, his popularity, and 

the desire to see him President again in 2018 were at record lows. 

All, however, was forgiven and forgotten in the deafening din of 

the monopolistic propaganda that followed the annexation of Crimea and the by-proxy invasion of east-south Ukraine. The patriotic 

euphoria at the sight of these alleged victories, for the alleged just 

cause of saving the ethic brethren from the depredation of what 

Moscow continues to call the Nazi junta in Kiev, combined with an 

equally unbridled paranoia of the NATO plots from which only 

President Putin is capable of shielding the motherland, all of that 

has proven irresistible. 

But there is something else that interfered with Mr. Vladimir 

Putin’s success, and that is the unexpected Ukrainian advance on 

the battlefield, which created big political problems for Putin. As 

I have mentioned, the effort of the Russian domestic propaganda 

machine has been very successful. But if one lives by propagandistic hysteria, one may also die or at least be bled by it. The 

propaganda-induced mood cannot be tamped down quickly to justify giving up on the forces of civil self-defense, as the Kremlin continues to call its proxies in Ukraine. 

Therefore, a retreat from, not to mention a defeat in Ukraine is 

not a political option for Mr. Putin. So in the face of the Ukrainian 

advance, from the beginning of July, Russia in effect has imposed 

a no-fly zone over east-south Ukraine, and that is the political and 

military context in which the tragedy of the downing of MH–17 has 

occurred. 

Now, where from now, as far as Russia is concerned? Well, if the 

efforts to stop the Ukrainian advance with a no-fly zone, as well 

as the accelerated movement of troops and heavy equipment across 

the border, which has been mentioned here already, fail, Mr. Putin 

31

may declare Ukraine in the throes of a fratricidal civil war and 

thus necessitating Russia’s direct military intervention to protect 

innocent civilian lives. 

In doing so, Mr. Putin is likely to invoke the so-called Libya 

precedent, which Moscow repeatedly hinted at as a justification for 

such an action. After all, from their point of view, Moscow would 

only be following what the West did in Libya in 2011. 

This option, however, is not without risks, and the biggest of 

them is that the Ukrainian Army is likely to put up a fight. And 

if Russian casualties begin to multiply, Putin’s domestic support 

may begin to erode very quickly, because over half of the Russians, 

according to public opinion polls, repeatedly told the pollsters that 

they do not want Russia to invade Ukraine directly. 

Therefore, it seems to me that Vladimir Putin’s preferred choice 

is likely to be a call for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and, 

as it has done repeatedly in the past, Moscow will call also for direct negotiations between Kiev and it proxies. 

Now, there is nothing inherently wrong with that, in fact that 

should be welcomed, except we have reasons to doubt that the real 

peace rather than victory in Ukraine is the goal, because such a 

cease-fire will enable Russian separatists to stay in control of the 

territories they hold today and Russia’s proposed truce would allow 

Russia to have its cake and eat it, too. It will stop the Ukrainian 

offensive, it will save the proxies from defeat, while at the same 

time avoiding resorting to the direct invasion by Russian regular 

troops. 

And so whatever the actual tactics, Russia’s strategy will continue to be shaped by the fact that a successful low-intensity war 

in Ukraine is a key domestic political imperative of the Putin regime. That, in turn, makes not the prospect for peace, but a bloody 

stalemate as the likeliest outcome in the short and perhaps even 

medium term. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aron follows:]

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Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I want to thank all of our witnesses. 

We have as not as broad a range of opinion as I would have liked 

to have had, although we have differences of opinion in the panel. 

I plan to ask my 5 minutes worth of questions and then we will 

give my other colleagues a chance. 

First of all, do we agree that this was not an intentional 

shootdown of this airline? Does everyone agree to that? I mean, nobody said, let’s shoot down a commercial airline. 

With that said, there are—not counting the victims of this airline—did we say there were 800 people who have been killed since 

February? 

Mr. SALVIA. According to the New York Times of yesterday, they 

gave a figure of 800 since April. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Is that figure about right with the rest 

of you? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. It is probably more like 1,000. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Probably more. 

Of those who are dead, how many are civilians from the eastern 

part of Ukraine who have been killed by the military operations by 

the Ukrainian Government in that region, of the dead? Of that 800 

dead, are we talking about half of them? Or the vast majority of 

them? 

Mr. ARON. Mr. Chairman, it is very difficult in the conditions of 

the urban warfare, it is very difficult to establish which side killed 

how many people. And the propaganda efforts on both sides are 

tremendous. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So would you agree with that, Mr. Salvia, 

that it is hard to tell? 

Mr. SALVIA. Absolutely, yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It seems to me that it wouldn’t be that hard 

to tell. It seems to me that if you have dead civilians on the ground 

in Eastern Ukraine that you would have to assume that they were 

not being shot by, intentionally, by the separatists who are there 

as part of their community. That would seem to be that way. 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, it is hard to tell. We don’t 

know. But what we do know is that we have recently seen that the 

separatists have killed civilians and put them in a grave, in a mass 

grave. We found this over the last couple of days. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The separatists killed the civilians? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. For what reason did they do that? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. We don’t know, sir. What we know is there 

are some dead people. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Have there been any cease-fires in this between the separatists and the Ukrainian Army? There have been? 

Mr. ARON. There have been cease-fires. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How many cease-fires have there been? 

Mr. ARON. There were several. But the latest one, if you remember, Mr. Chairman, the latest one is of course because of MH–17. 

It was a unilateral cease-fire. But the one before ended when the 

separatists attacked the Donetsk airport. It was a unilateral ceasefire by Ukraine, and it was broken by the separatists. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So there have been cease-fires. Do you 

agree with that, Mr. Salvia? 

35

Mr. SALVIA. Your question? I am sorry? Will you repeat the question? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How many cease-fires do we know of there? 

Mr. SALVIA. Well, the main one was the one Dr. Aron was referring to, which was June 20th to June 30th. So it was a tentative 

cease-fire, but that then ended in renewed fighting. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Have there been other cease-fires? 

Mr. SALVIA. Brief ones. Again, as Dr. Aron said. After the immediate shootdown of the airplane there was a brief one. There has 

not been a prolonged cease-fire coupled with serious negotiations. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think your point that we have been calling 

for cease-fires in Palestine, Israeli cease-fires, we don’t seem to be 

putting that type of energy into calling for cease-fires and negotiations in Ukraine. 

Is this issue one of where people are demanding federalism and 

there is not a negotiation on this issue? Or is this just a matter 

of the people are just demanding that they have a separate status, 

totally separate status, and become independent of Ukraine? The 

people who are actually fighting, what demand have they made? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, I guess my impression is, is that while there 

is generally always a demand for more autonomy from regions——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI [continuing]. This conflict wasn’t created by 

Ukrainians seeking greater autonomy. It was created by Russian 

operatives who were sent into Eastern Ukraine and seized buildings and violently closed off the region. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the people who are seizing buildings, the 

first buildings that were seized that I remember in Ukraine were 

seized by the people who were trying to force the democratically 

elected President out of his office, seizing buildings in the western 

part of Ukraine. And I am sure those were local people, although 

there has been the suggestions that they were very radical. And so 

buildings were seized there. 

Do you agree, Doctor, with that analysis, that the people who 

were basically starting this and seizing those buildings originally 

were all Russian agents and not local people? 

Mr. SALVIA. Well, I don’t know. I think that may go a bit far. I 

mean, it certainly is true what you say that a lot of this originated 

last winter when you had the efforts to overthrow what you correctly say was the democratically elected Government of Ukraine, 

a government which faced elections in February 2015. 

In other words, if the opposition in Ukraine was upset with what 

Yanukovych did about the European Association Agreement, they 

had a whole year to organize, to deal with the matter at the ballot 

box. After all, the Maidan movement, which I was hugely sympathetic to myself, personally, was all about European values. Well, 

what are European, Western values but democratic elections? Elections were coming. 

Unfortunately, it didn’t go that way. And those elections could 

have been monitored by Western monitors to see if there was any 

kind of vote fraud, had they occurred. We saw what happened in 

2004 during the Orange Revolution when there was vote fraud and 

our Western monitors found it and they brought it to light. That 

36

could have happened again. You could have had a democratic process taking place and these issues dealt with that way. 

Instead, to get to your point, a violent solution was opted for. 

And I was in the Maidan in February, saw young guys running 

around town with spears and pikes and sharpened metallic objects. 

There were huge military tents in Maidan with crate after crate of 

Molotov cocktail mix. What were these guys doing with that stuff? 

Where did they get it? 

In any case, so you had the violent overthrow of the government. 

And then the uprisings in the west, Lviv declared itself a Partyof-Regions-free-zone and that kind of thing. This was all seen as 

hugely provocative in the East. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The most important thing that you are bringing out is that the violence that we are talking about did not start 

with the separatists taking over a building in the eastern part of 

Ukraine, although that was a violent act. And the military coming 

in to then make sure that those buildings were not occupied, but 

instead were under the sovereignty of the Kiev government created 

more violence. 

There is one other question I had that was specifically—oh, yeah. 

The question that was posed, and I believe by one of the other panelists, was that if indeed Yanukovych would have signed this 

agreement with Russia rather than the European agreement which 

was offered, which he didn’t feel was as good an agreement, could 

the Ukrainian people in the next election cycle, which would have 

been 2 years away, eliminated that agreement and eliminated—

well, they could have eliminated Yanukovych, obviously—through 

the ballot box or was this agreement a situation that there was no 

democratic alternative to counteract because it would have been 

permanent? 

Mr. SALVIA. Let me just say that what Yanukovych did was he 

said no to the Russian Eurasian Customs Union. He said no to 

that, right? He said yes to the European Association Agreement, 

though pending revision, because he said this is radically not in 

our interest, I am not going to sign in Vilnius, we won’t sign that. 

And he also said that the European incentive package was completely inadequate, of $800 million, contingent on renewed IMF 

funding, which he didn’t want to do. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, whatever agreement that he signed 

with Russia, could the people of Ukraine have elected a Parliament 

that would have eliminated that 2 years down the road? 

Mr. SALVIA. I think so, because the agreement that Putin was offering him at that time was—again, Yanukovych rejected the Russian deal of entering the Eurasian Customs Union. So there was 

no treaty or anything like that. What Putin was offering was a financing deal, saying $20 billion coming to you and a cut in gas 

prices. That was a simple deal, and that could have been reversed 

or not. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. First of all, we hope that the violence that 

now plagues Ukraine, that there is not only a cease-fire, but that 

there is a cessation, that people with this airline catastrophe where 

you had so many innocent people lost their lives just from a commercial airliner, let’s hope that this jars people to the point that 

they sit down and take nonviolent options seriously and negotiation 

37

seriously with each other. That is not the case, if Mr. Brzezinski 

is correct, that this is basically an outside-motivated violent episode, and it is not just erupting from the inside. 

I happen to think that this started when Yanukovych was overthrown with violence, and that is the point it started. Whether or 

not that means that now outsiders have taken over the situation 

and that Ukrainians themselves are not going to be able to do this, 

come to an understanding, I hope that we play a positive role in 

bringing that together. And I would hope that if Russia is indeed 

fanning the flames rather than trying to just react to other violence 

that is going on, I would hope that the Russian Government sees 

a way to start bringing peace to Ukraine as well. I hope that we 

would submit that to them and their conscience and turn a spotlight on it in the world. 

So I now yield to my ranking member, Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Salvia, I noticed in your comments the absence of Russian 

involvement conspicuously in this. And you are pointing the finger 

at the constitutional government’s repression of the national population and Washington’s obsession with Russia. 

Now, I want to learn a little bit more about your organization, 

the American Institute in Ukraine. I want to ask you a question, 

how it was founded, who is funding it, where it is headquartered—

I couldn’t find a site—where it is based. Just briefly. What is the 

American Institute in Ukraine? 

Mr. SALVIA. It is a nonprofit organization. It is a very small 

group. It is myself and a partner working with a media group in 

Kiev that put on roundtable discussions in Kiev, at least until recently. It has been kind of hard to operate——

Mr. KEATING. So it is headquartered in Kiev? 

Mr. SALVIA. Well, you know——

Mr. KEATING. Is it registered as a foreign agent? 

Mr. SALVIA. We had an office in Kiev. 

Mr. KEATING. Are you registered as a foreign agent, then? 

Mr. SALVIA. In Kiev? Where? 

Mr. KEATING. Here. If you were in Kiev, are you registered as a 

foreign agent? Yes or no? 

Mr. SALVIA. We don’t represent——

Mr. KEATING. Yes or no? 

Mr. SALVIA. No. 

Mr. KEATING. Do you have a 501(c)(3), since you are a nonprofit? 

We couldn’t find any. 

Mr. SALVIA. I believe it is a 501(c)(6). 

Mr. KEATING. You have that as a nonprofit? 

Mr. SALVIA. Yes. 

Mr. KEATING. Okay. Now, I want to talk to you about the institute, too, because you mentioned you have other partners. You 

have two principals, Mr. Jatras and Mr. Spinck, that are also with 

the Global Strategic Communications Group, and they are in management positions with that. 

Now, this organization, along with the two principals I mentioned, currently were registered lobbyists and/or registered foreign 

agents. You have had those for clients, that group. Is that correct? 

Yes or no? 

38

Mr. SALVIA. Agents for what group? 

Mr. KEATING. Global Strategic Communications Group, which 

you and your principals you just mentioned. I want to find out 

about that group. 

Mr. SALVIA. But you mentioned something specifically about one 

of them was working for whom? 

Mr. KEATING. I want to know if that organization I just mentioned, along with the two principals I mentioned, are currently or 

were in the past registered lobbyists for foreign agents and for 

other clients, including a former Prime Minister of Ukraine, including the deputy, Russian Federation State Duma and his party, and 

including Russian corporations. 

Let me be more specific so I just get a yes or no from you. In 

2005, the Foreign Agents Registration Act had some information, 

and it said that organization served as the PR arm for Deputy 

Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Dmitry Rogozin and his 

Rodina party. Further, there is another FARA inclusion that declares that it is associating with members of your organization with 

the now ousted President Yanukovych of Ukraine. Is that correct, 

yes or no? 

Mr. SALVIA. Yes. One of the——

Mr. KEATING. That is correct, yes. 

Mr. SALVIA. One of the members of the group was giving advice 

to Yanukovych. 

Mr. KEATING. I just want the public to know. I am asking the 

questions. I just wanted the public to know for transparency reasons why your remarks, which were so conspicuously absent Russian involvement, may have been absent that. 

And I just want to go further, if I could, and just say this. I want 

one more question as well. 

The Kaalbye Shipping International, Kaalbye Shipping International has been listed as a client of Global Strategic Communication Group as well. Now, is that the same Kaalbye Shipping International which was implicated in the illegal transfer of Russian 

arms to Syria, Iran, Sudan, and other countries of concern? Is that 

the same? Yes or no? 

Mr. SALVIA. Sir, I am not familiar with that whole thing. I am 

just not familiar with it. Sorry, sir. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, perhaps I can enlighten. 

I have some documents I would like placed in the record, Mr. 

Chairman. If I have unanimous consent to place those reinforcing 

documents in the record. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. May I ask a clarification to your question? 

Are you questioning him about the American Institute in Ukraine 

or about another——

Mr. KEATING. I am questioning, Mr. Chairman, about both. Because this hearing should be transparent, unlike——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Excuse me. Excuse me. What was the 

other organization you are asking about? 

Mr. KEATING. The other organization was the organization that 

our witness said the principals were indeed involved with that he 

mentioned, the same as the American Institution Group, and that 

is the Global Strategic Communications Group. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is he affiliated with that group? 

39

Mr. KEATING. Yes, he is. Let him answer. 

Yes or no, sir? 

Mr. SALVIA. Well, I think the question was, did one of——

Mr. KEATING. This is my time, by the way, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sure. 

Mr. KEATING. Can I reclaim the time——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, you may. 

Mr. KEATING [continuing]. That you interrupted me? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yeah. Right. 

Mr. SALVIA. The question was, did one of the members of the 

group have anything to do the former Prime Minister of the 

Ukraine——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No. Are you involved with that specific organization that he is asking about? 

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, with all due respect, it is my time 

to question. And I did question him, and he did indicate that. 

So I just want the public to know, I want the world to know that 

the comments you gave that conspicuously left out Russia for any 

involvement and pointed the finger at Washington and at the constitutionally elected Government of Ukraine, I want them to know 

who you and who this organization is. 

That is all I have to say. He answered my question, so I yield 

back, Mr. Chairman. 

Oh, Mr. Chairman, one other point of order. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Go right ahead. 

Mr. KEATING. Pending is my request, unanimous consent, to 

make this reinforcing information part of the committee hearing’s 

record. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Hearing no objection, whatever you would 

like to put in the record. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Are you a member of that organization? Are 

you an employee or an actual member of the organization he was 

referring to? 

Mr. SALVIA. Not an employee. Not an employee of the organization. But some of the guys in the group have——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No, no, I am talking about you, are you a 

member of that organization? 

Mr. SALVIA. No. 

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, point of order. You interrupted me. 

I have a document that I submitted where he is listed as the director for the Global Strategic Communications Group. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Mr. SALVIA. Oh, I thought you were talking about this Kaalbye—

I am sorry, I thought you were talking about this Kaalbye business 

or something. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The question is, are you a director of that organization. 

Mr. SALVIA. Global Strategic Communications Group does consulting, public advocacy consulting on behalf of clients, whatever 

they may be. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. So are you a director? 

Mr. SALVIA. Yeah, I have to do with it, yes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Thank you. That is important. 

40

Let me just again note, however, that my ranking member, while 

doing a very good job as, which is his profession, as a prosecutor, 

let me just note that we didn’t actually talk about any specific 

areas of disagreement. And, quite frankly, I am disappointed that 

instead of talking about ideas and information to find out accuracy, 

that instead we sought to attack the witness. 

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, if I may. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You may answer that. 

Mr. KEATING. Because it is point of personal privilege. 

Thank you for your continued cooperation in our relationship. 

And I am not disappointed in our relationship. But I must tell you, 

if we have a witness who is testifying that information and informing the public, we should know who that witness is. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. And you spent your time what we call 

poisoning the well. 

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I take point of personal privilege 

with that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Go right ahead. 

Mr. KEATING. What I did was, I think, uncover the cloud and the 

shroud that this witness had in terms of a prejudice, and the public 

should know that if we are to conduct the kind of transparent hearing that this Congress and this country is noted for. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, I think all things should be transparent, 

and I think when we have hearings that we should be focusing on 

ideas and information that can help us determine what the reality 

is and find different avenues to find solutions to the problems we 

face. And I think that no matter what witness we have, we can find 

our time spending our time trying to basically attack the witness 

or attack the ideas the witness is expressing. And I am not saying 

that attacking the witness’ credibility is not a viable methodology 

of dealing with political challenges like this. That is not the way 

I handle myself. But I think that it is better to confront ideas than 

it is to confront personalities. 

Your honor, would you like to——

Mr. POE. I suspect the chairman of the full committee ought to 

be next. I will wait my turn. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So ordered. 

Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Judge Poe. 

One of the advantages of having a vibrant press is that you get 

to watch on television things unfold not always as they were 

planned. And we saw in Kharkiv, we saw in that town a group of 

separatists who stormed the opera house, mistaking it for city hall. 

Now, one of two possibilities here. One is that people in the town 

are ambivalent about opera and civics and know neither where the 

opera house is or city hall is. But I think more likely, since the 

Russian camera crew was there filming this and filmed the Russian tricolor being put up on the opera house, and then one of the 

locals said, that is not city hall, and then you got to see them take 

it back down, run back across town, and you saw the so-called separatists in their masks and such go up and actually put it on city 

hall and, again, second take, for the Russian camera crew. 

41

The reality here seems to be that you do have a lot of foreign influence coming into the country, as reported to me and Judge Poe 

when we were in Dnepropetrovsk, that is in the business of putting 

up Russian flags and in the business of bringing in a great deal 

of heavy weaponry, as General Breedlove has shared with Congress. 

So the question I have, at the end of the day, and I would like 

each of the panelists to just give me their take, what do you believe 

President Putin’s goals are in Ukraine in all of this? Because this 

takes a considerable expenditure of resources from Russia in order 

to finance this kind of an operation. 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I would say, I would be interested in the fellow panelists, I would say Mr. Putin would like 

to have instability in Ukraine so that it cannot pursue the movement toward Europe, movement toward European institutions, that 

its President, elected overwhelmingly, its people in polls indicate 

that they would like to do. He would like to cause that instability 

and is fomenting that instability in Eastern Ukraine. 

Mr. ROYCE. I would like to hear the take on every member on 

the panel. 

Mr. ARON. If I may, could I read again from my testimony? 

Mr. ROYCE. Sure, Dr. Aron, go ahead. 

Mr. ARON. From the moment the regime of Viktor Yanukovich 

was overthrown in Kiev in the end of February, Russia, that is 

Vladimir Putin, has pursued three strategic goals. First, to punish, 

humiliate, destabilize, if possible, dismember, and ultimately derail 

a Europe-bound Ukraine. Second, to prevent the West from imposing meaningful, biting sanctions. And third, to continue to solidify 

Mr. Putin’s domestic political base by rallying it around the flag. 

And I also noted that from my point of view, of somebody who 

studies Russian politics, I think the third goal is the most important one, because Putin’s popularity, trust in him, and most importantly the desire to see him as reelected as President in 2018, by 

all objective public opinion polls were at record lows at the end of 

2013. Now all of those indicators are at record high. That of course 

is not Russia’s privileges. Countries at war rally around the leader. 

And I think these three goals will continue to motivate Putin. 

And which is why, answering Mr. Chairman’s call to reach the 

settlement with Russia, I think we should be realistic about what 

the goals are. And I think that settlement could be reached, but 

that would require Vladimir Putin to change the strategy. The 

problem with changing the strategy is that it is so now intimately 

and centrally tied to the legitimacy and popularity of his regime 

that it would be extremely hard for him to change the course. 

Mr. ROYCE. And for the remaining two speakers, I mean, watching Russian television and watching this projection of this image, 

they are beating you, they are beating ethnic Russian speakers, 

right, that is the theme. But it is not just the theme in Ukraine, 

it is the theme in the former Soviet states. You see this broadcast 

into other states, in Central Asia and in the Baltics and in Eastern 

Europe. So that is the other part of my question. It is not just that 

this message is directed in Ukraine, it is directed to Russian speakers who are listening across the——

42

Mr. ARON. I think you are absolutely right. I had a colleague returning recently from Kazakhstan. 

Mr. ROYCE. Yes. 

Mr. ARON. And as you know, northern Kazakhstan——

Mr. ROYCE. Right. 

Mr. ARON [continuing]. Is essentially ethnic Russian. And like 

Ukraine, Kazakhstan did not exist until the beginning of the Soviet 

Union. So Putin could say, as he said in his fiery speech following 

the annexation of Crimea on March 18th of this year to the joint 

session of the Federal Assembly, which is the Russian Parliament, 

he could say, well, there was no Kazakhstan. Those were all Russian lands. He said that about Ukraine. 

Mr. ROYCE. No. I followed that. But I also followed this story out 

of Russia that the Ukrainians had supposedly crucified a 3-year-old 

boy and drug his mother behind a tank. This kind of rhetoric is designed to fire up ethnic Russians to a point where they are thinking emotionally rather than logically. 

And it strikes me that because this is going on, not just in 

Ukraine but elsewhere, it is very important we engage with broadcasting some kind of surrogate—like we did with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in the day when we did it well, we need something that just broadcasts in perspective, a wider perspective on 

this. They are fueling a rage here which already has led to the 

downing of one jetliner by having inexperienced separatists who 

want to wage war, who shot down, I guess, probably 14 planes by 

now. But that kind of anger that is being generated is going to be 

a real problem for the region. 

Mr. SALVIA. On the question of what Putin would be seeking in 

Ukraine, I think certainly he wants an agreement on autonomy. In 

other words, let’s put it this way, I think the last thing he wants 

to do is introduce Russian forces into the country. I think that 

would be a disaster for him. I think it would be a costly, costly, 

costly, costly mistake, just in terms of financing it. But politically 

it would be even more horrendous in terms of poisoning his relationship with Europe, I think in terms of poisoning his relations 

with Kiev, because ultimately Russia has to have some kind of relationship with Kiev, once all this blows over, when they get back 

to some kind of normalcy. 

So I don’t think he wants to do that. I think what he would like 

to have is some kind of a negotiated thing—I think he has indicated this—an agreement on autonomy, widespread autonomy for 

the various regions of Ukraine, and things that would take Ukraine 

out of the equation as some kind of a problem for Russia. In other 

words, making non-NATO membership part of the Constitution—

neutrality or non-aligned status—things like agreement on language rights, so that language rights are protected. 

Mr. ROYCE. But all of that would be done by Poroshenko anyway. 

Poroshenko is in support of language rights, it is very clear. 

Mr. SALVIA. Yes. 

Mr. ROYCE. And certainly on the NATO issue as well. 

But, anyway, my time has expired. And thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And thank you for joining us, Mr. Chairman. 

Whereas there aren’t any, with permission, we could go straight 

to Judge Poe. 

43

Mr. POE. Thank the chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

I want to side my remarks first with the comments from Mr. 

Keating. It is always good to know the background of witnesses 

when you are asking witnesses questions to see if there is any motive. 

With that said, I would like to address the issues that I talked 

about in my opening statement, the broader issue, not just the airplane that was shot down, criminally, yes. Hold those people accountable. But going back to what Dr. Aron has said about the motives, the intent, rather, the intent of Putin and the Russians, longterm intent. A statement was made that Russians don’t want to 

put troops in Ukraine because it is expensive. They sure didn’t 

have any trouble putting troops in Georgia, and they are still there. 

Mr. Brzezinski, what do you see as the longer-term goal of Putin? 

I, too, believe that it is nationalistic. The Russians like this invasion of Ukraine. What is it, 40, 50 percent of them support the invasion or support the Russian movement? Putin backs off a little, 

maybe negotiates with the West, does that not look like weakness 

to the Russian people? I don’t know. I am asking your opinion on 

long-term goal. 

I talked to Moldavian members of Parliament. They think they 

are next. Maybe not today, maybe not tomorrow, but some day. 

They think they are next. And of course Poland has always got the 

problem with the Russians. 

Are these fears of Latvia and some of these other countries that 

they have expressed to Members of Congress, it is not real fears, 

or is there some substance to Putin’s long-term goal, which I think 

is to make the Russian empire bigger? Would you weigh in on that, 

please? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, sir, Chairman Poe. 

First, I would point out that the Russians are not just in Georgia, they are in Ukraine. There are 20,000 to 30,000 Russian troops 

occupying Crimea. Russian special forces are leading and fighting 

in Eastern Ukraine. Russian political operatives are the head of 

the separatist republics in Russia. So Russia is in Ukraine militarily and illegitimately in political ways. 

What is President Putin’s goal? President Putin’s goal is essentially a revanchist vision. He wants to reestablish Russian greatness. And he finds that greatness——

Mr. POE. Sort of like the czar. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sort of like the czar. Like Czar Peter. 

Mr. POE. Czar Vladimir, Czar Vladimir Putin. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. His vision is to recreate Russian influence over 

the sphere of the former Soviet Union, including the Warsaw Pact, 

for that matter. And what is particularly dangerous about that vision is he is reintroducing into Europe the principle of ethnic sovereignty. That he, that Russia, has a unilateral right to go in and 

redraw borders simply because there are ethnic Russians living 

across those borders. That is incredibly dangerous, that principle. 

Mr. POE. That is his so-called legal justification for invading his 

neighbors. Would you say that is right? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. That is correct. 

44

Mr. POE. He is not really going to promote humanitarian goals 

in Eastern Ukraine, he is going over there to take back Ukraine 

and make it part of Russia. I mean, is that oversimplification? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I think that is pretty accurate. I would put his 

priorities first in terms specifically with Ukraine is to subordinate 

Ukraine. 

Mr. POE. Long term, I have just a few minutes left, long term 

what do you see? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Subordinate Ukraine under Russian influence. If 

he can’t do that, keep Ukraine unstable, destabilized, so it can’t go 

to the West and in a minimum carve up parts of Ukraine that are 

strategically important to him, including Eastern Ukraine and 

Southern Ukraine. 

Mr. POE. Mr. Taylor, weigh in on the same question. Long term, 

what do you see Putin’s goals are? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think he is that strategic of a thinker. I think he is an opportunist. He saw an opportunity to go into Crimea and he did. He could do it and he did. He 

did it easily, quietly, illegally, totally illegally. I don’t think it is a 

legal rationale that he is trying to establish about protecting Russians. That is not legal. Indeed, that led to World War I when the 

Serbians tried to indicate——

Mr. POE. I am not saying he is right. He is trying to justify it 

to the world. 

Ambassador TAYLOR. He is trying to justify it, but it is not a 

legal justification. He may be trying make that case. 

So in answer to your question, Mr. Chairman, I don’t know what 

his long-term goals are. I am not sure he does. I think he is taking 

advantage of weakness. He is taking advantage of the fact that, so 

far, the West has not confronted him, and he is going to move until 

we confront him. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Aron, long-term goals. I appreciate your three bullet points, but what do you see down the road? 

Mr. ARON. Well, even a longer-term, wider context. A year ago 

I published an article in Foreign Affairs called ‘‘The Putin Doctrine.’’ And I think it is very simple. It is to recover geostrategic, 

economic, political, and cultural assets lost in the fall of the Soviet 

Union. 

In other words, he does not want to recreate the Soviet Union. 

It is silly, it is costly, it is risky. But he wants to recreate or take 

control of the assets inside the country. He already did. Over politics. Over the key aspects of the economy, oil and gas. Over culture. 

And in the broader sense, I think, in the territory of the former 

Soviet Union, is to establish Russia as being in control, not just 

hegemonic power, but in control of the former Soviet states. That 

does not involve occupation of every former Soviet state. It involves, as Ian pointed out, it involves keeping those states’ foreign 

policies, and sometimes even domestic policies, bound to approval 

or disapproval from Moscow. 

Mr. POE. Let me interrupt there, since I am out of time. 

Mr. ARON. I am done. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. So he would use a bigger approach than just militarily. 

He could use economic approach, like he is using in Eastern Europe and part of Western Europe with the monopoly of Gazprom, 

45

for example, because there is no competition. He can shut off the 

gas in Ukraine, which he has done, and I was there when he did 

it in the winter, and it was cold and it was dark. 

So that opportunity, United States, Western powers who think 

that this aggression should be stopped, maybe we should have 

some responses economically, as well as helping out Ukrainians 

militarily with helping them solve their own security crisis. Would 

you agree with that or not? 

Mr. ARON. In connection with economic measures, and also apparently there are going to be some serious sanctions rolled out, a 

word of caution. Precisely because, as I said in my testimony, war 

in Ukraine is a domestic Russian political issue. It has become one. 

It is at the center of this regime. It is responsible for a great deal 

of legitimacy and popularity. Don’t expect sanctions to work quickly. 

In fact, in the short term, I think they are going to cause Putin 

doubling down, if I know the man correctly, doubling down in 

Ukraine, rallying around the flag, his popularity even going higher. 

Long term, medium term, probably, probably they will force him to 

make choices. But don’t oversell economic sanctions for now. 

Mr. POE. I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Your Honor. 

Next we have Representative Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for having this 

important hearing. 

As I sat here and listened to the testimony and the questioning, 

I have to ask, what is the correct level of outrage from the free 

world to this tragedy? And have we seen it? We see global protest 

over Israel defending its right to exist and its self-defense, but we 

don’t see global outrage over the use of a weapon of war to shoot 

down a commercial airliner. 

And think about this: 300, plus or minus, passengers lost their 

lives, basically one-third of the total lives lost in Gaza, where is the 

world outrage? This is rhetorical, but what is the appropriate response from the free world? And what is, we will just say, the historic leader of the free world, what is the appropriate response to 

this egregious act of aggression which cost the lives, truly innocent 

lives on a commercial airliner? 

This act was committed with a very sophisticated weapon. If they 

could hold this sign back up real quick. This was an SA–11 missile, 

a weapon of war, and a sophisticated launcher. This isn’t Charlie 

Wilson’s war with Afghanis running up with shoulder-fired stingers, fire-and-forget missiles. This has sophisticated radar. It takes 

sophisticated training in order to operate it. This wasn’t some rebel 

that just happened to seize a weapon on the battlefield and use to 

it shoot down an airliner. I believe it took a little bit more than 

that. I believe Russia was involved in some way. This isn’t a fireand-forget weapon. 

And so I have to ask Mr. Brzezinski, is it likely that Russia 

would ever let such powerful weapons as this SA–11 out of its full 

control? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I think it is pretty clear it did. I mean, all reports indicate that Russia did transfer SA–11s to the separatists. 

I think it is an incredibly irresponsible act. Not only did a system 

46

like that put innocent airliners at risk, but it probably put Russians forces at risk. So I am stunned, but it is clear he did it. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I am, too. I really am stunned that they didn’t 

verify the target before they pulled the trigger. But that is sort of 

a debatable issue. 

Doesn’t that support the notion that Russia must have been 

aware what it was being used for? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. It is not clear exactly what the command-andcontrol arrangements were over those systems. But what is clear 

is that the transfer of the SA–11s was part and parcel of a broader 

effort by the Russians to intensify their support to the separatists. 

After each set of sanctions there has been an incremental increase 

in kind of material support and personnel support Russia has provided the separatists. It really intensified in the last couple of 

weeks where we have seen columns of APCs, mortars, and tanks 

cross the Russian-Ukrainian border into the separatists. 

And I think the Russians are being driven to do this in part because they see the separatists failing. So what they are trying do 

right now is desperately consolidate the territory the separatists 

have so they can lock this into a frozen conflict. And that would, 

one, perpetuate their ability to keep Ukraine destabilized. And if 

Ukraine is unstable, it is not going to be able to push its way forward into Europe. 

Mr. DUNCAN. So let me ask you this. What is the correct response? How should the Western world, the free world respond to 

this egregious act? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. We have to act, we have to respond with resolve 

and determination. A long time ago, we should have been imposing 

sectoral sanctions on Russia, body slamming the Russian economy, 

hitting its financial and energy sectors in particular. That hasn’t 

been done. We have had incremental sanctions, we have had hesitancy. Our military actions have been symbolic at best—a company 

in Poland, a company in the Baltics, a few planes here. 

The Russians mobilized over 100,000 people on the western military district, the western frontier, so to speak, when they began 

their invasion of Ukraine. That is how serious they were. The West 

hasn’t responded that way, and the result has been Putin has been 

continuously emboldened in his effort to subordinate and carve up 

Ukraine. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I visited Europe. I met with the Europeans last 

year. They have been concerned for well over a year at their reliance on Russian gas. Ukraine is definitely concerned about its reliance on gas. 

Can’t this administration and this government and the Western 

world with the expedition of LNG terminals and the export of natural gas, which we have an abundance of, not send the right economic signal that Europe is going to lessen its dependence on a foreign source of energy, Ukraine is going to end its dependence on 

a foreign source of energy, other than the United States? Wouldn’t 

that send the right signal? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, sir. Two points. One, LNG would be an important long-term effort to help Ukraine and for that matter Central Europe wean itself from its dependency upon Russian gas exports. In the near term it would be a strong political signal and it 

47

would create momentum that would kind of facilitate investment 

to build the necessary infrastructure for that. 

The second point I would make is what amazes me about the 

West’s response economically to this invasion in the Ukraine is the 

weakness of that response in light of the power balance between 

the West and Russia. The EU is a $12-trillion economy. It has got 

a $12-trillion annual GDP. It is globally integrated. It gets approximately 30 percent of its imported gas, not total use of gas, but imported gas from Russia. 

Russia is a $2-trillion gas station. It has only got one customer, 

the EU. It is dependent upon primarily the EU for foreign investment. The EU is also backed by a $16-trillion U.S. economy. So it 

is amazing how a $2-trillion gas station that is on weak legs can 

bully around the West, which has well over 6 times its economic 

magnitude. 

I can only explain that by strategic shortsightedness, moral 

fecklessness, to allow a major European country to be walked over, 

invaded by Russia, and corporate greed. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you for that. 

Chairman Poe, I am sorry that you were cold in Ukraine, but we 

cold take care of that by exporting gas from the United States to 

friends and allies around the world who want U.S. gas and lessen 

their dependence on Russia. And so you are spot on. The energy 

economics and energy politics play into this. And I think it is the 

right thing to do. 

Mr. POE. I agree with you. Amen. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now I would like to turn to Brad Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I have a question, but it would also apply to some 

of my colleagues from gas- and oil-producing States. But I will direct it to Mr. Brzezinski. 

Okay. We pay about $4 or $5 a unit for natural gas here. They 

pay $10 in Europe. And liquefied natural gas is sold in Asia for 

$15. I don’t know if any of my colleagues from oil-producing States 

can explain which companies headquartered in their districts want 

to sell the gas for $10 in Europe and forgo the $15 they can get 

in Asia. 

But the question for the witness is, do you sense that the American taxpayer, or the German taxpayer, or the German consumer 

wants to pay that additional $5? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. For gas from the United States, sir? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Probably not. But my sense is that LNG exports 

by the United States would be uninhibited, would probably flow 

mostly to Asia. There is no question about that. But the LNG market is increasingly globalized. That flow of U.S. LNG into Asia 

pushes excess, other LNG from other sources, over to Europe. And, 

in fact, it has already been the case to a certain degree. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Again, the world price is $15 for liquefied natural 

gas. It is $10 for Russian piped natural gas. Who is going to pay 

the extra $5? 

48

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. They will always go to the cheaper gas. But the 

benefits, the geopolitical benefits, geoeconomic benefits of uninhibited U.S.——

Mr. SHERMAN. Who pays? Are the Germans lining up to say, 

damn it, we want to pay Japanese prices rather than Russian 

prices, to pay the same price as Japan for liquefied natural gas? 

They could get liquefied natural gas from Qatar and other Arab 

states and they don’t take a single cubic foot of it because it costs 

50 percent more than the Russian natural gas. 

So if the German Government and the German people don’t want 

to pay the extra money, are you suggesting that the United States 

taxpayer pay the difference? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. No. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. 

Let me go on to another series of questions. Okay. 

Rebels had SA–11s or similar technology. They shot down the 

plane. They thought they were shooting down a Ukrainian plane. 

It seems to be viewed as almost cut and dry that they must have 

gotten the SA–11s as a gift from Moscow. But much of their other 

weaponry they have seized on the battlefield or just kind of walked 

into at military bases and taken equipment owned by the Ukrainian Government. 

So did the Ukrainian Government have SA–11s or similar technology capable of, even if it had to be a lucky shot, but capable of 

perhaps hitting a plane at 33,000 square feet? Does the Ukraine 

have that technology? Mr. Taylor? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Certainly, they have that technology. But 

they were nowhere near the area. 

Mr. SHERMAN. No. Well, are we certain that none of that technology fell into rebel hands at any time during this conflict, including knowing that the prior government of the Ukraine was proRussian and had most of its support on the same areas where the 

separatists enjoy support? 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Mr. Sherman, I think it is very clear that 

the separatists fired the weapon. 

Mr. SHERMAN. That is not my question. 

Ambassador TAYLOR. Where it came from is your question. And 

I don’t think we know precisely which piece actually came from the 

Ukrainians. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But are you certain that not a——

Ambassador TAYLOR. What we have seen has come across the 

border. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Some came across the border. Were others taken 

from the Ukrainian Government? Do we have a full accounting 

from the Ukrainian Government, hey, at separation of the Soviet 

Union, we had so many SA–11 systems, we acquired so many systems, we can account for all of those systems? Or are we just kind 

of taking it out of anger that you have these systems both in the 

Ukraine and in Russia, and it must have been the Russian systems 

that the separatists got their hand on? 

Mr. Salvia. 

Mr. SALVIA. I am afraid I just don’t know the answer to that. 

Sorry. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. My time has expired. Thank you. 

49

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I want to thank our witnesses today. 

What we will have now is just a summary from the chairmen and 

ranking members of the committees of jurisdiction. And we will 

start with Judge Poe. 

Mr. POE. I thank the chairman. 

Thanks again, gentlemen, for being here. 

It just seems to me that this whole operation in Ukraine and 

other places is driven by Putin. He is doing it, as you have stated, 

to help himself politically back home. It does sell. It does raise the 

Russian flag at home. And his quest for aggression—aggression, I 

think that is the best way to call this activity—he wants influence 

back in areas that belonged to the Soviet Union. But his motive 

goes back further. I think it goes back to the days of the czar. That 

is the way I see this. 

The U.S., West response has been weak, and it is shown because 

it hasn’t stopped the aggression. The United States, along with the 

West, freedom-loving folks, need to impose sanctions that actually 

work. And we also should, I think, help the Ukrainians defend 

their own country. 

I do believe that we should open up markets and give Western 

Europe, Eastern Europe alternatives to natural gas. In answer to 

the ranking member’s question, yes, there is a specific company in 

Houston, Texas, Accelerated Energy, that wants to sell natural gas 

to the Ukrainians and will be able to do that within a year if they 

could get permission to do so. 

We are flaring off natural gas in Texas and in the Dakotas to the 

amount of 1 million homes losing energy because we have so much 

natural gas. It is a world market. But they want the opportunity 

to sell more natural gas on the world market. But I think that it 

is part of the long-range strategy to buttress the aggression, not 

just with helping Ukraine militarily, but helping alternatives economically, including those economic. 

Putin has not been stopped. I don’t know that he will be stopped 

unless we actually want some answers and some results from the 

aggression. I think his plan is long term. But opportunities, when 

they arise, he will take advantage of those. So that is the way I 

see it. 

I will yield back to the chairman of the European Committee. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

And, Mr. Sherman, do you have a summary that you would like 

to offer? 

Mr. SHERMAN. As to the export of natural gas, the major reason, 

the major obstacle is the enormous economic cost of liquefying, 

transporting, and then regasifying the gas. There is a lot of natural 

gas in the Arab world. The Arabs will sell it for the highest price. 

They are driven by the exact same capitalist calculations as American oil companies. They sell it all to Asia and none to Europe. 

As to the fact that you need permission to export natural gas, 

you don’t need permission to export it to any country that has a 

free trade treatment with the United States, including South 

Korea. And in addition, the administration has licensed some export projects as being in the interests of the United States. 

I do not think that those who liquefy natural gas want to charge less than $15 a unit for it. And I don’t think there is anybody in 

50

Europe, EU or otherwise, that wants to pay more than the Russian 

price, which is basically $10. 

Looking at the Middle East as an analogy, we are urging Maliki 

to make the best possible offer to the Sunnis, even though you 

could probably argue that 51 percent of the Iraqi people would, if 

they had their druthers, give the Sunnis nothing. 

We need to urge Kiev to make the best possible offer to those 

who want autonomy. And that includes protection of the Russian 

language, that includes electing the governors of the oblasts, that 

includes local budgetary control, it includes the other elements that 

are part of the reasonable, nonseparatist political parties that are 

seeking autonomy for the various regions. And it is not enough to 

make vague statements, we need specifics. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Mr. Chairman, I think it is clear that this hearing 

has made a couple of major points, one of them being that this 

issue is not discrete to Ukraine. This is indeed an issue of high 

prominence to all of Europe in the future, and that includes efforts 

to establish rule of law, that includes efforts for economic growth 

and democracy. 

And it is also clear, I think, that much of Russia’s aggression 

isn’t quite as strategic in a long-term sense as it is reactionary. 

And one of the things that bears watching is what signals the European countries and the U.S. are giving back, because I think that 

will determine what actions Russia takes in the future as well. 

And along those lines, I think we also understand the importance 

of our economic progress together. And by that, even though it 

wasn’t mentioned today, I look at enhancement of the TTIP agreement, the free trade agreement with Europe as a very important 

object that we should continue to work forward with, because it is 

within that economic strength that we will be able to stabilize and 

move Europe forward. And that is our best way of countering these 

kind of senseless acts of aggression. 

Yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much. 

Well, I think this was a very worthwhile hearing. I am sorry that 

we didn’t actually get more specific suggestions, although I think 

that we have looked, taken a look at the situation a little closer 

than has been looked at in the last month or two as this crisis 

seems to be getting worse and worse. 

Let me just note, historically I have spent most of my life fighting communism and fighting the Soviet Union. And let me just 

note, same is true of Mr. Salvia, who was the executive assistant 

to the president for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty between 

1988 and 1993. 

I always think it is best to go specifically at the issues at hand, 

but people do have a right, and the ranking member certainly has 

a right to question the validity of witnesses. But I found you a very 

credible witness, and know of your background and the things you 

have done to help defeat communism during my time with the 

Reagan administration and before and after. 

Let me note that there seem to be some people in the United 

States who are hellbent to reignite the Cold War. I mean, they feel 

51

more comfortable with trying to go at Russia. After the Soviet 

Union fell, there was a tremendous potential to making Russia our 

friend. A tremendous potential. They withdrew their troops from 

Eastern Europe, the Russians were open to all kinds of interacting 

and becoming part of the world community. And a tremendous opportunity was squandered. 

Over the years there have been people, and I believe that, unfortunately, it has a lot to do with the political forces in our country 

that were pandering to the people who had a grudge against Russia. And I am talking about there is obviously a justified grudge 

that the people of Eastern Europe have had against Russia because 

under communism Russia committed so many crimes against those 

people, whether it be the Poles, the Czechs, the Bulgarians, or the 

Ukrainians in particular. We know the millions of people who lost 

their lives during the 1900s because the Russians came in with 

their communism, and millions of people died horrible deaths, 

Ukrainian people. And so we understand that there is a grudge out 

there blaming the Russian people for communism. That is understandable. 

But our job when the Soviet Union collapsed and people turned 

to become Russia, a democratic Russia, I think it was our job to 

try to not pay attention to those grudge and pander to those people 

who wanted to get even, but instead to try to build a new world. 

And I don’t think we did. I think we decided that there would 

be allies made politically, locally, where my Polish friends, my 

Ukrainian friends who can’t understand why I would want to make 

peace with Russia now, even after I spent my whole life fighting 

them. 

I think we lost a great opportunity there. And maybe it is not 

lost. But we have turned what was a potentially good friend into 

an adversary. And there is no other way to look at Russia now. 

They are an adversary. And what I am afraid of is now we are 

going to turn an adversary into an enemy, and we don’t want that. 

I don’t want that. I hope the American people, I don’t think they 

do either. 

I would hope that the testimony at the hearing today has at least 

motivated some people to reach out to each other. I would hope 

that the points about making the best possible offer by the Government of Ukraine, should be making the best possible offer to the 

separatists to try to find a way to end that violence, and that we 

should be supporting that type of positive move. 

And I would hope that after this hearing today that we try to 

take a look at what is going on with honesty and with a goal of 

creating a more peaceful region of that part of the world and thus 

a more peaceful world, rather than a belligerent approach to this, 

what is going on, that will end up creating a wholesale enemy out 

of the Russian people when right now we can possibly work with 

them to create some peace and offer some honest working together 

and cooperation toward that goal. 

So with that said, I want to thank the witnesses. Thank you all 

very much. And thank my ranking member for a spirited, a very 

spirited time period here. Thank you all. And this hearing is now 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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