the doors closed. Appellant and Anthony Thorns, who witnessed the

altercation, approached the vehicle after the undercover officers left the scene, entered the vehicle, and drove away. Thorns drove the vehicle, while appellant rode in the passenger seat. A recording device in the vehicle captured a conversation between appellant and Thorns in which Thorns told appellant that they needed to figure out what to do with the vehicle. Appellant responded that they would take it to a "chop shop." At a designated location, police officers remotely shut off the Chevy Tahoe's engine. Appellant and Thorns exited the vehicle through the driver's side window and fled but were captured a short time later.

Appellant claims that he cannot be convicted of grand larceny because the vehicle was owned by a corporation rather than a person. However, NRS 193.0205 defines "person" as including "this State or any other state, government or country which may lawfully own property within this State whenever it is used to designate a party whose property may be the subject of an offense." We conclude that this definition encompasses the circumstances here where the LVMPD owned the vehicle that was stolen. The jury could reasonably infer from the evidence presented that appellant was guilty of burglary and grand larceny auto. 

### See NRS 205.060(1) (defining burglary in pertinent part as occurring when "[a] person who, by day or night, enters any. . . vehicle. . . with the intent to commit grand or petit larceny"); NRS 205.228.

Appellant next argues that his sentence of 12 to 36 months in prison for grand larceny constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because he was never in actual or physical control of the vehicle and because he was wrongfully convicted of the offense, as the vehicle was

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA

(0) 1947A . 41 7' 1 2taken from a corporation rather than a person. Regardless of its severity,

a sentence that is within the statutory limits is not 'cruel and unusual punishment unless the statute fixing punishment is unconstitutional or the sentence is so unreasonably disproportionate to the offense as to shock
the conscience." Blume v. State, 112 Nev. 472, 475, 915 P.2d 282, 284 (1996) (quoting Culverson v. State, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 596 P.2d 220, 221-22 (1979)); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000-01 (1991) (plurality opinion) (explaining that Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence; it forbids only an extreme sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the crime). The sentence imposed is within the parameters provided by the relevant
statute, see NRS 205.228, and appellant does not allege that the statute is unconstitutional. We are not convinced that the sentence imposed is so grossly disproportionate to the crime as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

To the extent appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing, we conclude that his claim lacks merit. We note that appellant neglected to include a transcript of the sentencing hearing and therefore the basis of the district court's sentencing decision is unknown. This court will refrain from interfering with the sentence imposed "[510 long as the record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence." Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976). Appellant does not allege that the district court relied on impalpable or highly suspect evidence and as

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA

(0) 1947A 3Hardesty



# AA Parraguirre 

## V Cherry observed above, the sentence falls within the parameters of the relevant

statutes. Having considered appellant's arguments and concluded that they lack merit, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

cc: Hon. Rob Bare, District Judge Law Office of Betsy Allen Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

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