HIGH-CONTAINMENT 

LABORATORIES 

Recent Incidents of 

Biosafety Lapses 

Statement of Nancy Kingsbury, Ph.D. Managing 

Director, Applied Research and Methods 

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Investigations, Committee on 

Energy and Commerce, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected 10:00 a.m. ET

Wednesday, July 16, 2014

GAO-14-785T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-785T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations, Committee on Energy and 

Commerce, House of Representatives

July 16, 2014

HIGH-CONTAINMENT LABORATORIES

Recent Incidents of Biosafety Lapses

Why GAO Did This Study

Recent biosecurity incidents—such as 

the June 5, 2014, potential exposure of 

staff in Atlanta laboratories at the 

Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC) to live spores of a 

strain of anthrax—highlight the 

importance of maintaining biosafety 

and biosecurity protocols at highcontainment laboratories. This 

statement summarizes the results of 

GAO’s past work on the oversight of 

high-containment laboratories, those 

designed for handling dangerous 

pathogens and emerging infectious 

diseases. Specifically, this statement 

addresses (1) the need for 

governmentwide strategic planning for 

the requirements for high-containment 

laboratories, including assessment of 

their risks; (2) the need for national 

standards for designing, constructing, 

commissioning, operating, and 

maintaining such laboratories; and (3) 

the oversight of biosafety and 

biosecurity at high-containment 

laboratories. In addition, it provides 

GAO’s preliminary observations on the 

potential exposure of CDC staff to 

anthrax. For this preliminary work,

GAO reviewed agency documents, 

including a report on the potential 

exposure, and scientific literature; and 

interviewed CDC officials. 

What GAO Recommends

This testimony contains no new 

recommendations, but GAO has made 

recommendations in prior reports to 

responsible agencies. We provided a 

draft of this statement to CDC for 

technical review and addressed their 

comments in the body of our statement 

where appropriate.

What GAO Found

No federal entity is responsible for strategic planning and oversight of highcontainment laboratories. Since the 1990s, the number of high-containment 

laboratories has risen; however, the expansion of high-containment laboratories 

was not based on a government-wide coordinated strategy. Instead, the 

expansion was based on the perceptions of individual agencies about the 

capacity required for their individual missions and the high-containment 

laboratory activities needed to meet those missions, as well as the availability of 

congressionally approved funding. Consequent to this mode of expansion, there 

was no research agenda linking all these agencies, even at the federal level, that 

would allow for a national needs assessment, strategic plan, or coordinated 

oversight. As GAO last reported in 2013, after more than 12 years, GAO has not 

been able to find any detailed projections based on a government-wide strategic 

evaluation of research requirements based on public health or national security 

needs. Without this information, there is little assurance of having facilities with 

the right capacity to meet the nation’s needs.

GAO’s past work has found a continued lack of national standards for designing, 

constructing, commissioning, and operating high-containment laboratories. As 

noted in a 2009 report, the absence of national standards means that the 

laboratories may vary from place to place because of differences in local building 

requirements or standards for safe operations. Some guidance exists about 

designing, constructing, and operating high-containment laboratories. 

Specifically, the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories 

guidance recommends various design, construction, and operations standards, 

but GAO’s work has found it is not universally followed. The guidance also does 

not recommend an assessment of whether the suggested design, construction, 

and operational standards are achieved. As GAO has reported, national 

standards are valuable not only in relation to new laboratory construction but also 

in ensuring compliance for periodic upgrades.

No one agency is responsible for determining the aggregate or cumulative risks 

associated with the continued expansion of high-containment laboratories; 

according to experts and federal officials GAO interviewed for prior work, the 

oversight of these laboratories is fragmented and largely self-policing. 

On July 11, 2014, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)

released a report on the potential exposure to anthrax that described a number of 

actions that CDC plans to take within its responsibilities to avoid another incident 

like the one in June. The incident in June was caused when a laboratory scientist 

inadvertently failed to sterilize plates containing samples of anthrax, derived with 

a new method, and transferred them to a facility with lower biosecurity protocols. 

This incident and the inherent risks of biosecurity highlight the need for a national 

strategy to evaluate the requirements for high-containment laboratories, set and 

maintain national standards for such laboratories’ construction and operation, 

and maintain a national strategy for the oversight of laboratories that conduct 

important work on highly infectious pathogens. 

View GAO-14-785T. For more information, 

contact Nancy Kingsbury at (202) 512-2700 or 

kingsburyn@gao.gov.
Page 1 GAO-14-785T 

Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member DeGette, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to participate in today’s hearing to address 

recent biosecurity incidents. On June 5, 2014, staff in Atlanta laboratories 

at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) were potentially 

exposed to live spores of the Ames strain of anthrax (Bacillus anthracis or 

B. anthracis). On July 1, 2014, at the Bethesda, Maryland, National 

Institutes of Health (NIH), vials of potentially live smallpox (variola) virus 

were unexpectedly discovered. Public attention is once again focused on 

the importance of maintaining biosafety and biosecurity protocols at highcontainment laboratories.1

My statement summarizes the results of our past work on the oversight of 

high-containment laboratories and our preliminary assessment of the 

recent incident in Atlanta. Since 2007, we have reported on several 

issues associated with the proliferation of high-containment laboratories 

and risks posed by past biosafety incidents. The public is concerned 

about these laboratories because exposing workers and the public to 

dangerous pathogens, whether deliberate or accidental, can have 

disastrous consequences. Highly publicized laboratory errors and 

controversy about where high-containment laboratories should be located 

have raised questions about whether the governing framework, 

standards, and oversight for biosafety and biosecurity measures are 

adequate.

This testimony is primarily based on GAO’s past work on highcontainment laboratories. The issues in this work covered (1) the need for 

governmentwide strategic planning for the requirements for highcontainment laboratories, including assessment of their risks; (2) the need 

for national standards for designing, constructing, commissioning, 

operating, and maintaining such laboratories; and (3) the oversight of 

 1

High-containment laboratories—commonly referred to as biosafety level (BSL)-3 and 

BSL-4 laboratories—are designed for handling dangerous pathogens (which might 

accidentally or intentionally be released into the environment) and emerging infectious 

diseases for which risks may not be clearly understood. Some use “high- and maximumcontainment laboratories” to refer to BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories. “Animal biosafety level 

(ABSL)-3 and ABSL-4” mean laboratories that work with animals infected with indigenous 

or exotic agents. “BSL-3 Ag” describes laboratories where studies employ large 

agricultural animals. In this statement, “high-containment laboratories” refers to all these 

types of laboratories.
Page 2 GAO-14-785T 

biosafety and biosecurity at high-containment laboratories. Each report 

cited in this statement provides detailed information on our work’s 

objectives, scope, and methodology (the reports are listed at the end of 

this statement). For our preliminary observations, on the June 5–13, 2014

biosafety incident at CDC’s laboratories we interviewed CDC officials and

reviewed agency documents and scientific literature. We provided a draft 

of this statement to CDC for technical review and addressed their 

comments in the body of our statement where appropriate. We also 

reviewed CDC’s July 11, 2014, Report on the Potential Exposure to 

Anthrax. The work this statement is based on was conducted in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions, based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provided a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The number of biosafety level (BSL)-3 and BSL-4 laboratories (highcontainment laboratories) began to rise in the late 1990s, accelerating 

after the anthrax attacks throughout the United States. The laboratories 

expanded across federal, state, academic, and private sectors. 

Information about their number, location, activities, and ownership is 

available for high-containment laboratories registered with CDC’s Division 

of Select Agent and Toxins (DSAT) or the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture’s (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 

as part of the Federal Select Agent Program. These entities register 

laboratories that work with select agents that have specific potential 

human, animal, or plant health risks.

Other high-containment laboratories work with other pathogens that may 

also be dangerous but are not identified as “select agents” and therefore 

these laboratories are not required to register with DSAT or APHIS.2

 2

A select agent is a biological agent or toxin that (1) potentially poses a severe threat to 

public health and safety, animal or plant health, and animal or plant products and (2) is 

regulated by select agent rules for possession, use, and transfer (7 C.F.R. Part 331, 9 

C.F.R. Part 121, and 42 C.F.R. Part 73). CDC and USDA maintain a list of select agents 

and toxins.

We 

reported in 2009 that information about these non-select agent 

laboratories is not known.

No Federal Entity

Is Responsible for 

Expansion and 

Oversight of HighContainment 

Laboratories
Page 3 GAO-14-785T 

Our work has found that expansion of high-containment laboratories was 

not based on a government-wide coordinated strategy. The expansion 

was based on the perceptions of individual agencies about the capacity 

required for their individual missions and the high-containment laboratory 

activities needed to meet those missions, as well as the availability of 

congressionally approved funding. Decisions to fund the construction of 

high-containment laboratories were made by multiple federal agencies 

(e.g., Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of 

Defense, USDA), in multiple budget cycles. Federal and state agencies, 

academia, and the private sector (such as drug companies) considered 

their individual requirements, but as we have previously reported a robust 

assessment of national needs was lacking.

Since each agency or organization has a different mission, an 

assessment of needs, by definition, was at the discretion of the agency or 

organization. We have not found any national research agenda linking all 

these agencies, even at the federal level, that would allow for a national 

needs assessment, strategic plan, or coordinated oversight. As we last 

reported in 2013, after more than 12 years, we have not been able to find 

any detailed projections based on a government-wide strategic evaluation 

of research requirements based on public health or national security 

needs. Without this information, there is little assurance of having facilities 

with the right capacity to meet our national needs. This deficiency may be 

more critical today than 5 years ago when we first reported on this 

concern because current budget constraints make prioritization essential.

Our work on this issue has found a continued lack of national standards 

for designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating highcontainment laboratories. These laboratories are expensive to build, 

operate, and maintain. For example, we noted in our 2009 report that the 

absence of national standards means that the laboratories may vary from 

place to place because of differences in local building requirements or 

standards for safe operations. In 2007, while investigating a power outage 

at one of its recently constructed BSL-4 laboratory, CDC determined that 

construction workers digging at an adjacent site had some time earlier cut 

a critical grounding cable buried outside the building. CDC facility 

managers had not noticed that cutting the grounding cable had 

compromised the electrical system of the facility that housed the BSL-4 

laboratory. It became apparent that the building’s integrity as it related to 

the adjacent construction had not been adequately supervised. In 2009, 

CDC officials told us that standard procedures under local building codes 

did not require monitoring of the new BSL-4 facility’s electrical grounding.

National Standards 

for Designing, 

Constructing, 

Commissioning, 

Operating, and 

Maintaining HighContainment 

Laboratories Are 

Needed
Page 4 GAO-14-785T 

This incident highlighted the risk of relying on local building codes to 

ensure the safety of high-containment laboratories in the absence of 

national standards or testing procedures specific to those laboratories.3

Some guidance exists about designing, constructing, and operating highcontainment laboratories. The Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical 

Laboratories guidance, often referred to as BMBL recommends various 

design, construction and operations standards, but our work has found it 

is not universally followed.4 It also does not recommend an assessment 

of whether the suggested design, construction, and operations standards 

are achieved. As we have recommended, national standards would be 

valuable for not only new laboratory construction but also periodic 

upgrades. Such standards need not be constrained in a “one-size fits all”

model but could help specify the levels of facility performance that should 

be achieved.

Our work has also found that no executive or legislative mandate directs 

any federal agency to track the expansion of all high-containment 

laboratories. While federal agency officials and experts agree that 

operating high-containment laboratories is always associated with some 

risk, no one agency is responsible for determining the aggregate or 

cumulative risks associated with the continued expansion of these 

laboratories. According to the experts and federal officials we have 

interviewed for our prior work, the oversight of these laboratories is 

fragmented and largely relies on self-policing. For example, if an entity is 

registered under the Federal Select Agent Program, CDC DSAT or 

APHIS provides oversight. However, if an entity receives federal funding 

from the National Institutes of Health for recombinant deoxyribonucleic 

acid (rDNA) research, the NIH Office of Biotechnology Activities provides 

oversight. DOD also separately funds and inspects high-containment 

laboratories. These agencies assume that risks will be dealt with by the 

entities’ self-regulation, consistent with the laboratory practice guidelines 

 3 GAO recommended in our 2013 report that the Executive Office of the President, Office 

of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) examine the need to establish national 

standards relating to designing, constructing, commissioning, maintaining, and operating 

high-containment laboratories. OSTP concurred.

4 Department of Health and Human Services (Washington, D.C., 2007), Biosafety in 

Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 5th ed. HHS has developed and provided 

biosafety guidelines outlined in this manual.

Risks Associated with 

Expanding HighContainment 

Laboratories and 

Oversight Challenges
Page 5 GAO-14-785T 

developed by the funding or regulatory agencies. In 2013, we reported 

that another challenge of this fragmented oversight is the potential 

duplication and overlap of inspection activities in the regulation of highcontainment laboratories.5

According to most experts that we have spoken to in the course of our 

work, a baseline risk is associated with any high-containment laboratory.

Although technology and improved scientific practice guidance have 

reduced the risk in high-containment laboratories, the risk is not zero (as 

illustrated by the recent incidents and others during the past decade).

According to CDC officials, the risks from accidental exposure or release 

can never be completely eliminated and even laboratories within 

sophisticated biological research programs—including those most 

extensively regulated—has and will continue to have safety failures. Many 

experts agree that as the number of high-containment laboratories has 

increased, so the overall risk of an accidental or deliberate release of a 

dangerous pathogen will also increase.

We recommended that CDC and APHIS work 

with the internal inspectors for Department of Defense and Department of 

Homeland Security to coordinate inspections and ensure the application 

of consistent inspection standards.

6

Oversight is critical in improving biosafety and ensuring that highcontainment laboratories comply with regulations. However, our work has 

found that aspects of the current oversight programs provided by DSAT 

and APHIS depend on entities’ monitoring themselves and reporting 

incidents to the regulators. For example, with respect to a certification that 

a select agent had been rendered sterile (that is, noninfectious), DSAT 

officials told us, citing the June 2014 updated guidance, that “the burden 

 5

High-Containment Laboratories: Assessment of the Nation’s Need Is Missing,

GAO-13-466R (Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2013).

6

The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), Executive Office of the President, 

disagreed with our assessment in our 2013 report of the increased overall risk associated 

with the expansion of high-containment laboratories. Officials did not agree that there was 

an increased risk. Our assessment is based on probability theory, and we make no 

assumptions about the magnitude (size or extent) of the increase. The risk associated with 

any single laboratory is nonzero, for example, as laboratory accidents happen. Even 

where newer safety controls reduce the risk of an accident for any individual laboratory, 

and even if the number of accidents at any laboratory is small, when the number of 

laboratories increases, each laboratory’s risk adds to the overall risk of an accident’s 

happening nationwide. Because laboratories operate independently, the risk is not 

increased for each laboratory. The risk at each laboratory leads to an overall increased 

risk with expansion.
Page 6 GAO-14-785T 

of validating non-viability and non-functionality remains on the individual 

or entity possessing the select agent, toxin, or regulated nucleic acid.” 7

While DSAT does not approve each entity’s scientific procedure, DSAT 

strongly recommends that “an entity maintain information on file in 

support of the method used for rendering a select agent non-viable . . . so 

that the entity is able to demonstrate that the agent . . . is no longer 

subject to the select agent regulations.” Biosafety select agent regulations 

and oversight critically rely on laboratories promptly reporting any 

incidents that may expose employees or the public to infectious 

pathogens. Although laboratories have been reasonably conscientious 

about reporting such incidents, there is evidence that not all have been 

reported promptly.

The June 2014 incident in which live anthrax bacteria were transferred 

from a BSL-3 contained environment to lower-level (BSL-2) containment 

laboratories at CDC in Atlanta resulted in the potential exposure of tens of 

workers to the highly virulent Ames strain of anthrax. According to CDC’s 

report, on June 5, a laboratory scientist in the BSL-3 Bioterrorism Rapid 

Response and Advanced Technology (BRRAT) laboratory prepared 

protein extracts from eight bacterial select agents, including Bacillus 

anthracis, under high-containment (BSL-3) conditions.8

 7 National Select Agent Registry. “Non-viable Select Agents and Nonfunctional Select 

Toxins and Rendering Samples Free of Select Agents and Toxins.” June 16, 2014. It is 

guidance for the inactivation of select agents and toxins.

These samples 

were being prepared for analysis by matrix-assisted laser 

desorption/ionization time-of-flight (MALDI-TOF) mass spectrometry, a 

relatively new technology that can be used for rapid bacterial species 

identification. Also, according to CDC officials that we spoke to this 

protein extraction procedure was being evaluated in a preliminary 

assessment of whether MALDI-TOF mass spectrometry could provide a 

cheaper and faster way to detect a range of pathogenic agents, including 

anthrax, compared to conventional methods and thus could be used by 

emergency response laboratories. According to CDC officials, the 

researchers intended to use the data collected in this experiment to 

submit a joint proposal to CDC’s Office of Public Health Preparedness 

and Response to fund further evaluation of the MALDI TOF method 

8 CDC.” Report on the Potential Exposure to Anthrax.” July 11, 2014.

The June 2014 

Incident at the CDC 

Laboratories and 

GAO’s Preliminary

Observation
Page 7 GAO-14-785T 

because MALDI TOF is increasingly being used by clinical and hospital 

laboratories for infectious disease diagnostics.

The protein extraction procedure was chemically based and intended to 

render the pathogens noninfectious, which alternative extraction 

procedures would have done using heat, radiation, or other chemical 

treatments that took longer. The procedure that was used to extract the 

proteins was not based on a standard operating procedure that had been 

documented as appropriate for all the pathogens in the experiment and 

reviewed by more senior scientific or management officials. Rather, the 

scientists used a procedure identified by the MALDI TOF equipment 

manufacturer that had not been tested for effectiveness, in particular, for 

rendering spore-forming organisms such as anthrax noninfectious.

Following that procedure, the eight pathogens were exposed to chemical 

treatment for 10 minutes and then plated (spread on plates to test for 

sterility or noninfectious status) and incubated for 24 hours. According to 

CDC, on June 6, when no growth was observed on sterility plates after 24 

hours, the remaining samples, which had been held in the chemical 

solution for 24 hours, were moved to CDC BSL-2 laboratories for testing 

using the MALDI TOF technology. Importantly, the plates containing the 

original sterility samples were left in the incubation chamber rather than 

destroyed as would normally occur because of technical problems with 

the autoclave that would have been used for destruction.

According to CDC officials, on June 13, a laboratory scientist in the 

BRRAT laboratory observed unexpected growth on the anthrax sterility 

plate, possibly indicating that the sample was still infectious. (All the other 

pathogen protein samples showed no evidence of growth.) That scientist 

and a colleague immediately reported the discovery to the CDC Select 

Agent Responsible Official (RO) in accordance with the BRRAT 

Laboratory Incident Response Plan. That report triggered a response that 

immediately recovered the samples that had been sent to the BSL-2 

laboratories and returned them to BSL-3 containment, and a response 

effort that lasted a number of days was implemented to identify any CDC 

employees who might have been affected by exposure to live anthrax 

spores. (The details of the subsequent actions and CDC’s lessons 

learned and proposed actions are described in CDC’s July 11, 2014, 

Report on Potential Exposure to Anthrax. That report indicates that none 

of the potentially affected employees experienced anthrax-related 

adverse medical symptoms.)

Our preliminary analysis indicates that the BRRAT laboratory was using a 

MALDI-TOF MS method that had been designed for protein extraction but 
Page 8 GAO-14-785T 

not for the inactivation of pathogens and that it did not have a standard 

operating procedure (SOP) or protocol on inactivation. We did not find a 

complete set of SOPs for removing agents from a BSL-3 laboratory in a 

safe manner. Further, neither the preparing (BRRAT BSL-3) laboratory 

nor the receiving laboratory (BRRAT BSL-2) laboratory conducted sterility 

testing. Moreover, the BRRAT laboratory did not have a kill curve based 

on multiple concentration levels.9

When we visited CDC on July 8, it became apparent to us, that a major 

cause of this incident was the implementation of an experiment to prepare 

protein extractions for testing using the MALDI TOF technology that was 

not based on a validated standard operating procedure.10

In response to a 2004 inadvertent exposure to anthrax spores at 

Children’s Hospital Oakland Research Institute in California, where 

laboratory workers were evaluating the immune response of mice to B.

anthracis, CDC conducted an investigation along with the California 

Department of Health Services. This investigation found that workers in a 

research laboratory unknowingly received and used a suspension from a 

contract laboratory that likely contained viable B. anthracis organisms, 

although the pathogen was supposed to have been inactivated. CDC’s 

investigation report of that incident stated that inactivated suspensions of 

B. anthracis should be cultured both at the preparing laboratory before 

shipment and at the research laboratory receiving the suspension before 

use to ensure sterility (that the material is noninfectious). The hospital 

CDC officials 

acknowledged that significant and relevant studies in the scientific 

literature about chemical procedures studied for preparing protein 

samples for use in the MALDI TOF technology, were successful in 

rendering tested pathogens noninfectious, except for anthrax. The 

literature clearly recommends an additional filtering step before 

concluding that the anthrax samples are not infectious. Our preliminary 

work indicates that this step was not followed for all the materials in this 

incident.

 9

A kill curve is a graph in which the number of viable organism is plotted against time. A 

kill curve’s shape depends on the concentration of chemicals that the organisms are 

exposed to.

10Validating a procedure or method provides a defined level of statistical confidence in the 

results of the procedure or method.
Page 9 GAO-14-785T 

staff did not perform sterility testing on the suspension received in March 

2004.

CDC’s 2004 report further stated that “Research laboratory workers 

should assume that all inactivated B. anthracis suspension materials are 

infectious until inactivation is adequately confirmed [using BSL-2 

laboratory procedures].” These recommendations are relevant to the June 

2014 incident in Atlanta but were not followed. The laboratories receiving 

the protein extractions were BSL-2 laboratories, but the activities 

associated with testing with the MALDI TOF technology were conducted 

on open laboratory benches, not using biocontainment cabinets otherwise 

available in such laboratories.

CDC’s July 11, 2014, Report on the Potential Exposure to Anthrax

describes a number of actions that CDC plans to take within its 

responsibilities to avoid another incident like the one in June. However, 

we continue to believe that a national strategy is warranted that would 

evaluate the requirements for high-containment laboratories, set and 

maintain national standards for such laboratories’ construction and 

operation, and maintain a national strategy for the oversight of 

laboratories that conduct important research on highly infectious 

pathogens.

This completes my formal statement, Chairman Murphy, Ranking 

Member DeGette and members of the committee. I am happy to answer 

any questions you may have.

For future contacts regarding this statement, please contact Nancy 

Kingsbury at (202) 512-2700 or at kingsburyn@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 

found on the last page of this statement. Sushil Sharma, Ph.D., Dr.PH, 

Assistant Director; and Elaine L. Vaurio also made key contributions to 

this statement.

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 1 GAO-14-785T 

High-Containment Laboratories: Assessment of the Nation’s Need Is 

Missing. GAO-13-466R. Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2013.

Biological Laboratories: Design and Implementation Considerations for 

Safety Reporting Systems. GAO-10-850. Washington, D.C.: September 

10, 2010.

High-Containment Laboratories: National Strategy for Oversight Is 

Needed. GAO-09-1045T. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2009.

High-Containment Laboratories: National Strategy for Oversight Is 

Needed. GAO-09-1036T. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2009.

High-Containment Laboratories: National Strategy for Oversight Is 

Needed. GAO-09-574. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2009.

Biological Research: Observations on DHS’s Analyses Concerning 

Whether FMD Research Can Be Done as Safely on the Mainland as on 

Plum Island. GAO-09-747. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2009.

High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories: DHS Lacks Evidence to 

Conclude That Foot-and-Mouth Disease Research Can Be Done Safely 

on the U.S. Mainland. GAO-08-821T. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008.

High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories: Preliminary Observations on 

the Oversight of the Proliferation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 Laboratories in the 

United States. GAO-08-108T. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2007.

Biological Research Laboratories: Issues Associated with the Expansion 

of Laboratories Funded by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious 

Diseases. GAO-07-333R. Washington, D.C.: February 22, 2007.

Homeland Security: CDC’s Oversight of the Select Agent Program

GAO-03-315R. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 2002.

Related GAO Products

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