Wireless Network Security

802.11, Bluetooth and Handheld Devices

Tom Karygiannis

Les Owens

Special Publication 800-48

NIST Special Publication 800-48 Wireless Network Security

802.11, Bluetooth and Handheld Devices

Recommendations of the National

Institute of Standards and Technology

Tom Karygiannis and Les Owens

C O M P U T E R S E C U R I T Y

Computer Security Division

Information Technology Laboratory

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8930

November 2002

U.S. Department of Commerce

Donald L. Evans, Secretary

Technology Administration

Phillip J. Bond, Under Secretary for Technology

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Arden L. Bement, Jr., Director
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Note to Readers

This document is a publication of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and is not

subject to U.S. copyright. Certain commercial products are described in this document as examples only.

Inclusion or exclusion of any product does not imply endorsement or non-endorsement by NIST or any

agency of the U.S. Government. Inclusion of a product name does not imply that the product is the best or

only product suitable for the specified purpose.

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to express their sincere thanks to numerous members of government, industry, and

academia who have commented on this document. First, the authors wish to express their thanks to the

staff at Booz Allen Hamilton who contributed to this document. In particular, their appreciation goes to

Rick Nicholson, Brendan Goode, Christine Kerns, Sharma Aditi, and Brian Miller for their research,

technical support, and contributions to this document. The authors express their appreciation to Bill Burr,

Murugiah Souppaya, Tim Grance, Ray Snouffer, Sheila Frankel, and John Wack of NIST, for providing

valuable contributions to the technical content of this publication. The authors would also like to express

their thanks to security experts Russ Housley, Markus Jacobsson, Jan-Ove Larsson, Simon Josefsson,

Stephen Whitlock, Brian Seborg, Pascal Meunier, William Arbaugh, Joesph Kabara, David Tipper, and

Prashanth Krishnanmurthy for their valuable comments and suggestions. Finally, the authors wish to

thank especially Matthew Gast, Keith Rhodes, and the Bluetooth Special Interest Group for their critical

review and feedback during the public comments period. Contributions were also made by Rick Doten,

Jerry Harold, Stephen Palmer, Michael D. Gerdes, Wally Wilhoite, Ben Halpert, Susan Landau, Sandeep

Dhameja, Robert Moskowitz, Dennis Volpano, David Harrington, Bernard Aboba, Edward Block, Carol

Ann Widmayer, Harold J. Podell, Mike DiSabato, Pieter Kasselman, Rick E. Morin, Chall McRoberts,

and Kevin L. Perez.
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Table of Contents

Executive Summary................................................................................................................. 1

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1-1

1.1 Authority ................................................................................................................ 1-1

1.2 Document Purpose and Scope .............................................................................. 1-1

1.3 Audience and Assumptions ................................................................................... 1-2

1.4 Document Organization ......................................................................................... 1-2

2. Overview of Wireless Technology................................................................................ 2-1

2.1 Wireless Networks................................................................................................. 2-1

2.1.1 Wireless LANs ........................................................................................... 2-1

2.1.2 Ad Hoc Networks ....................................................................................... 2-1

2.2 Wireless Devices ................................................................................................... 2-2

2.2.1 Personal Digital Assistants......................................................................... 2-2

2.2.2 Smart Phones ............................................................................................ 2-3

2.3 Wireless Standards................................................................................................ 2-3

2.3.1 IEEE 802.11............................................................................................... 2-3

2.3.2 Bluetooth.................................................................................................... 2-3

2.4 Wireless Security Threats and Risk Mitigation ....................................................... 2-4

2.5 Emerging Wireless Technologies........................................................................... 2-6

2.6 Federal Information Processing Standards ............................................................ 2-6

3. Wireless LANs ............................................................................................................... 3-8

3.1 Wireless LAN Overview ......................................................................................... 3-8

3.1.1 Brief History ............................................................................................... 3-8

3.1.2 Frequency and Data Rates ........................................................................ 3-9

3.1.3 802.11 Architecture.................................................................................... 3-9

3.1.4 Wireless LAN Components ...................................................................... 3-11

3.1.5 Range ...................................................................................................... 3-11

3.2 Benefits ................................................................................................................3-12

3.3 Security of 802.11 Wireless LANs.........................................................................3-13

3.3.1 Security Features of 802.11 Wireless LANs per the Standard.................. 3-13

3.3.2 Problems With the IEEE 802.11 Standard Security.................................. 3-17

3.4 Security Requirements and Threats......................................................................3-19

3.4.1 Loss of Confidentiality .............................................................................. 3-20

3.4.2 Loss of Integrity........................................................................................ 3-21

3.4.3 Loss of Network Availability...................................................................... 3-22

3.4.4 Other Security Risks ................................................................................ 3-22

3.5 Risk Mitigation ......................................................................................................3-22

3.5.1 Management Countermeasures............................................................... 3-23

3.5.2 Operational Countermeasures ................................................................. 3-23

3.5.3 Technical Countermeasures .................................................................... 3-24

3.6 Emerging Security Standards and Technologies ..................................................3-36

3.7 Case Study: Implementing a Wireless LAN in the Work Environment..................3-37

3.8 Wireless LAN Security Checklist...........................................................................3-40

3.9 Wireless LAN Risk and Security Summary ...........................................................3-42

4. Wireless Personal Area Networks................................................................................ 4-1
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4.1 Bluetooth Overview................................................................................................ 4-1

4.1.1 Brief History ............................................................................................... 4-3

4.1.2 Frequency and Data Rates ........................................................................ 4-3

4.1.3 Bluetooth Architecture and Components .................................................... 4-4

4.1.4 Range ........................................................................................................ 4-4

4.2 Benefits ................................................................................................................. 4-5

4.3 Security of Bluetooth.............................................................................................. 4-6

4.3.1 Security Features of Bluetooth per the Specifications ................................ 4-7

4.3.2 Problems with the Bluetooth Standard Security........................................ 4-13

4.4 Security Requirements and Threats......................................................................4-14

4.4.1 Loss of Confidentiality .............................................................................. 4-14

4.4.2 Loss of Integrity........................................................................................ 4-17

4.4.3 Loss of Availability.................................................................................... 4-17

4.5 Risk Mitigation ......................................................................................................4-17

4.5.1 Management Countermeasures............................................................... 4-17

4.5.2 Operational Countermeasures ................................................................. 4-18

4.5.3 Technical Countermeasures .................................................................... 4-18

4.6 Bluetooth Security Checklist .................................................................................4-20

4.7 Bluetooth Ad Hoc Network Risk and Security Summary .......................................4-22

5. Wireless Handheld Devices........................................................................................ 5-26

5.1 Wireless Handheld Device Overview ....................................................................5-26

5.2 Benefits ................................................................................................................5-27

5.3 Security Requirements and Threats......................................................................5-28

5.3.1 Loss of Confidentiality .............................................................................. 5-28

5.3.2 Loss of Integrity........................................................................................ 5-30

5.3.3 Loss of Availability.................................................................................... 5-30

5.4 Risk Mitigation ......................................................................................................5-31

5.4.1 Management Countermeasures............................................................... 5-31

5.4.2 Operational Countermeasures ................................................................. 5-32

5.4.3 Technical Countermeasures .................................................................... 5-33

5.5 Case Study: PDAs in the Workplace.....................................................................5-36

5.6 Wireless Handheld Device Security Checklist.......................................................5-36

5.7 Handheld Device Risk and Security Summary......................................................5-38

Appendix A— Common Wireless Frequencies and Applications .....................................A-1

Appendix B— Glossary of Terms ........................................................................................B-1

Appendix C— Acronyms and Abbreviations ......................................................................C-1

Appendix D— Summary of 802.11 Standards.....................................................................D-1

Appendix E— Useful References.........................................................................................E-1

Appendix F— Wireless Networking Tools........................................................................... F-1

Appendix G— References ....................................................................................................G-1
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List of Figures

Figure 2-1. Notional Ad Hoc Network ..................................................................................... 2-2

Figure 3-1. Fundamental 802.11b Wireless LAN Topology .................................................. 3-10

Figure 3-2. 802.11b Wireless LAN Ad Hoc Topology ........................................................... 3-10

Figure 3-3. Typical Range of 802.11 WLAN.......................................................................... 3-11

Figure 3-4. Access Point Bridging ........................................................................................ 3-12

Figure 3-5. Wireless Security of 802.11b in Typical Network................................................. 3-13

Figure 3-6. Taxonomy of 802.11 Authentication Techniques................................................ 3-14

Figure 3-7. Shared-key Authentication Message Flow ......................................................... 3-15

Figure 3-8. WEP Privacy Using RC4 Algorithm.................................................................... 3-16

Figure 3-9. Taxonomy of Security Attacks............................................................................ 3-19

Figure 3-10. Typical Use of VPN for Secure Internet Communications From Site-to-Site...... 3-33

Figure 3-11. VPN Security in Addition to WEP ..................................................................... 3-34

Figure 3-12. Simplified Diagram of VPN WLAN..................................................................... 3-35

Figure 3-13. Agency A WLAN Architecture ........................................................................... 3-39

Figure 4-1. Typical Bluetooth Network—A Scatter-net ........................................................... 4-2

Figure 4-2. Bluetooth Ad Hoc Topology.................................................................................. 4-4

Figure 4-3. Bluetooth Operating Range................................................................................... 4-5

Figure 4-4. Bluetooth Air-Interface Security............................................................................ 4-6

Figure 4-5. Taxonomy of Bluetooth Security Modes................................................................ 4-8

Figure 4-6. Bluetooth Key Generation from PIN ...................................................................... 4-9

Figure 4-7. Bluetooth Authentication .................................................................................... 4-10

Figure 4-8. Bluetooth Encryption Procedure......................................................................... 4-12

Figure 4-9. Man-in-the-Middle Attack Scenarios................................................................... 4-16
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List of Tables

Table 3-1. Key Characteristics of 802.11 Wireless LANs ....................................................... 3-8

Table 3-2. Key Problems with Existing 802.11 Wireless LAN Security ................................. 3-18

Table 3-3. Wireless LAN Security Checklist ......................................................................... 3-40

Table 3-4. Wireless LAN Security Summary ........................................................................ 3-43

Table 4-1. Key Characteristics of Bluetooth Technology ........................................................ 4-2

Table 4-2. Device Classes of Power Management................................................................. 4-5

Table 4-3. Summary of Authentication Parameters .............................................................. 4-11

Table 4-4. Key Problems with Existing (Native) Bluetooth Security ....................................... 4-13

Table 4-5. Bluetooth Security Checklist................................................................................ 4-21

Table 4-6. Bluetooth Security Summary............................................................................... 4-23

Table 5-1. Wireless Handheld Device Security Checklist ...................................................... 5-37

Table 5-2. Handheld Device Security Summary................................................................... 5-38

Table D-1. Summary of 802.11 Standards .............................................................................D-1
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Executive Summary

Wireless communications offer organizations and users many benefits such as portability and flexibility,

increased productivity, and lower installation costs. Wireless technologies cover a broad range of

differing capabilities oriented toward different uses and needs. Wireless local area network (WLAN)

devices, for instance, allow users to move their laptops from place to place within their offices without the

need for wires and without losing network connectivity. Less wiring means greater flexibility, increased

efficiency, and reduced wiring costs. Ad hoc networks, such as those enabled by Bluetooth, allow data

synchronization with network systems and application sharing between devices. Bluetooth functionality

also eliminates cables for printer and other peripheral device connections. Handheld devices such as

personal digital assistants (PDA) and cell phones allow remote users to synchronize personal databases

and provide access to network services such as wireless e-mail, Web browsing, and Internet access.

Moreover, these technologies can offer dramatic cost savings and new capabilities to diverse applications

ranging from retail settings to manufacturing shop floors to first responders.

However, risks are inherent in any wireless technology. Some of these risks are similar to those of wired

networks; some are exacerbated by wireless connectivity; some are new. Perhaps the most significant

source of risks in wireless networks is that the technology’s underlying communications medium, the

airwave, is open to intruders, making it the logical equivalent of an Ethernet port in the parking lot.

The loss of confidentiality and integrity and the threat of denial of service (DoS) attacks are risks

typically associated with wireless communications. Unauthorized users may gain access to agency

systems and information, corrupt the agency’s data, consume network bandwidth, degrade network

performance, launch attacks that prevent authorized users from accessing the network, or use agency

resources to launch attacks on other networks.

Specific threats and vulnerabilities to wireless networks and handheld devices include the following:

! All the vulnerabilities that exist in a conventional wired network apply to wireless technologies.

! Malicious entities may gain unauthorized access to an agency’s computer network through wireless

connections, bypassing any firewall protections.

! Sensitive information that is not encrypted (or that is encrypted with poor cryptographic techniques)

and that is transmitted between two wireless devices may be intercepted and disclosed.

! DoS attacks may be directed at wireless connections or devices.

! Malicious entities may steal the identity of legitimate users and masquerade as them on internal or

external corporate networks.

! Sensitive data may be corrupted during improper synchronization.

! Malicious entities may be able to violate the privacy of legitimate users and be able to track their

movements.

! Malicious entities may deploy unauthorized equipment (e.g., client devices and access points) to

surreptitiously gain access to sensitive information.

! Handheld devices are easily stolen and can reveal sensitive information.

! Data may be extracted without detection from improperly configured devices.
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! Viruses or other malicious code may corrupt data on a wireless device and subsequently be

introduced to a wired network connection.

! Malicious entities may, through wireless connections, connect to other agencies or organizations for

the purposes of launching attacks and concealing their activities.

! Interlopers, from inside or out, may be able to gain connectivity to network management controls and

thereby disable or disrupt operations.

! Malicious entities may use third-party, untrusted wireless network services to gain access to an

agency’s or other organization’s network resources.

! Internal attacks may be possible via ad hoc transmissions.

This document provides an overview of wireless networking technologies and wireless handheld devices

most commonly used in an office environment and with today’s mobile workforce. This document seeks

to assist agencies in reducing the risks associated with 802.11 wireless local area networks (LAN),

Bluetooth wireless networks, and handheld devices.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) recommends the following actions:

Agencies should be aware that maintaining a secure wireless network is an ongoing process that

requires greater effort than that required for other networks and systems. Moreover, it is

important that agencies assess risks more frequently and test and evaluate system security controls

when wireless technologies are deployed.

Maintaining a secure wireless network and associated devices requires significant effort, resources, and

vigilance and involves the following steps:

! Maintaining a full understanding of the topology of the wireless network.

! Labeling and keeping inventories of the fielded wireless and handheld devices.

! Creating backups of data frequently.

! Performing periodic security testing and assessment of the wireless network.

! Performing ongoing, randomly timed security audits to monitor and track wireless and handheld

devices.

! Applying patches and security enhancements.

! Monitoring the wireless industry for changes to standards that enhance security features and for the

release of new products.

! Vigilantly monitoring wireless technology for new threats and vulnerabilities.

Agencies should not undertake wireless deployment for essential operations until they have

examined and can acceptably manage and mitigate the risks to their information, system

operations, and continuity of essential operations. Agencies should perform a risk assessment and

develop a security policy before purchasing wireless technologies, because their unique security

requirements will determine which products should be considered for purchase.
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As described in this document, the risks related to the use of wireless technologies are considerable. Many

current communications protocols and commercial products provide inadequate protection and thus

present unacceptable risks to agency operations. Agencies must actively address such risks to protect their

ability to support essential operations, before deployment of wireless technologies. Furthermore, many

organizations poorly administer their wireless technologies. Some examples include deploying equipment

with “factory default” settings, failing to control or inventory access points, not implementing the security

capabilities provided, and not developing or employing a security architecture suitable to the wireless

environment (e.g., one with firewalls between wired and wireless systems, blocking of unneeded

services/ports, use of strong cryptography). To a large extent, most of the risks can be mitigated.

However, mitigating these risks requires considerable tradeoffs between technical solutions and costs.

Today, the vendor and standards community is aggressively working toward more robust, open, and

secure solutions for the near future. For these reasons, it may be prudent for some agencies to simply wait

for these more mature solutions.

Agencies should be aware of the technical and security implications of wireless and handheld device

technologies.

Although these technologies offer significant benefits, they also provide unique security challenges over

their wired counterparts. The coupling of relative immaturity of the technology with poor security

standards, flawed implementations, limited user awareness, and lax security and administrative practices

forms an especially challenging combination. In a wireless environment, data is broadcast through the air

and organizations do not have physical controls over the boundaries of transmissions or the ability to use

the controls typically available with wired connections. As a result, data may be captured when it is

broadcast. Because of differences in building construction, wireless frequencies and attenuation, and the

capabilities of high-gain antennas, the distances necessary for positive control for wireless technologies to

prevent eavesdropping can vary considerably. The safe distance can vary up to kilometers, even when the

nominal or claimed operating range of the wireless device is less than a hundred meters.

Agencies should carefully plan the deployment of 802.11, Bluetooth, or any other wireless

technology.

Because it is much more difficult to address security once deployment and implementation have occurred,

security should be considered from the initial planning stage. Agencies are more likely to make better

security decisions about configuring wireless devices and network infrastructure when they develop and

use a detailed, well-designed deployment plan. Developing such a plan will support the inevitable tradeoff

decisions between usability, performance, and risk.

Agencies should be aware that security management practices and controls are especially critical to

maintaining and operating a secure wireless network.

Appropriate management practices are critical to operating and maintaining a secure wireless network.

Security practices entail the identification of an agency’s or organization’s information system assets and

the development, documentation and implementation of policies, standards, procedures, and guidelines

that ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information system resources.

To support the security of wireless technology, the following security practices (with some illustrative

examples) should be implemented:

! Agency-wide information system security policy that addresses the use of 802.11, Bluetooth, and

other wireless technologies.
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! Configuration/change control and management to ensure that equipment (such as access points) has

the latest software release that includes security feature enhancements and patches for discovered

vulnerabilities.

! Standardized configurations to reflect the security policy, to ensure change of default values, and to

ensure consistency of operation.

! Security training to raise awareness about the threats and vulnerabilities inherent in the use of

wireless technologies (including the fact that robust cryptography is essential to protect the “radio”

channel, and that simple theft of equipment is a major concern).

Agencies should be aware that physical controls are especially important in a wireless environment.

Agencies should make sure that adequate physical security is in place. Physical security measures,

including barriers, access control systems, and guards, are the first line of defense. Agencies must make

sure that the proper physical countermeasures are in place to mitigate some of the biggest risks such as

theft of equipment and insertion of rogue access points or wireless network monitoring devices.

Agencies must enable, use, and routinely test the inherent security features, such as authentication

and encryption, that exist in wireless technologies. In addition, firewalls and other appropriate

protection mechanisms should be employed.

Wireless technologies generally come with some embedded security features, although frequently many

of the features are disabled by default. As with many newer technologies (and some mature ones), the

security features available may not be as comprehensive or robust as necessary. Because the security

features provided in some wireless products may be weak, to attain the highest levels of integrity,

authentication, and confidentiality, agencies should carefully consider the deployment of robust, proven,

and well-developed and implemented cryptography.

NIST strongly recommends that the built-in security features of Bluetooth or 802.11 (data link level

encryption and authentication protocols) be used as part of an overall defense-in-depth strategy. Although

these protection mechanisms have weaknesses described in this publication, they can provide a degree of

protection against unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized network access, and other active probing attacks.

However, the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2, Security Requirements for

Cryptographic Modules, is mandatory and binding for federal agencies that have determined that certain

information be protected via cryptographic means. As currently defined, the security of neither 802.11 nor

Bluetooth meets the FIPS 140-2 standard.

In the above-mentioned instances, it will be necessary to employ higher level cryptographic protocols and

applications such as secure shell (SSH), Transport-Level Security (TLS) or Internet Protocol Security

(IPsec) with FIPS 140-2 validated cryptographic modules and associated algorithms to protect that

information, regardless of whether the nonvalidated data link security protocols are used.

NIST expects that future 802.11 (and possibly other wireless technologies) products will offer Advanced

Encryption Standard (AES)-based data link level cryptographic services that are validated under FIPS

140-2. As these will mitigate most concerns about wireless eavesdropping or active wireless attacks, their

use is strongly recommended when they become available. However, it must be recognized that a data

link level wireless protocol protects only the wireless subnetwork. Where traffic traverses other network

segments, including wired segments or the agency or Internet backbone, higher-level FIPS-validated, endto-end cryptographic protection may also be required.
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Finally, even when federally approved cryptography is used, additional countermeasures such as

strategically locating access points, ensuring firewall filtering, and blocking and installation of antivirus

software are typically necessary. Agencies must be fully aware of the residual risk following the

application of cryptography and all security countermeasures in the wireless deployment.
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1. Introduction

Wireless technologies have become increasingly popular in our everyday business and personal lives.

Personal digital assistants (PDA) allow individuals to access calendars, e-mail, address and phone number

lists, and the Internet. Some technologies even offer global positioning system (GPS) capabilities that can

pinpoint the location of the device anywhere in the world. Wireless technologies promise to offer even

more features and functions in the next few years.

An increasing number of government agencies, businesses, and home users are using, or considering

using, wireless technologies in their environments. Agencies should be aware of the security risks

associated with wireless technologies. Agencies need to develop strategies that will mitigate risks as they

integrate wireless technologies into their computing environments. This document discusses certain

wireless technologies, outlines the associated risks, and offers guidance for mitigating those risks.

1.1 Authority

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed this document in furtherance of its

statutory responsibilities under the Computer Security Act of 1987 and the Information Technology

Management Reform Act of 1996 (specifically 15 United States Code [U.S.C.] 278 g-3 (a)(5)). This is not

a guideline within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. 278 g-3 (a)(3).

Guidelines in this document are for federal agencies that process sensitive information. They are

consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130.

This document may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis. It is not subject to

copyright.

Nothing in this document should be taken to contradict standards and guidelines made mandatory and

binding upon federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority. Nor should these

guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce,

the Director of the OMB, or any other federal official.

1.2 Document Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this document is to provide agencies with guidance for establishing secure wireless

networks.1 Agencies are encouraged to tailor the recommended guidelines and solutions to meet their

specific security or business requirements.

The document addresses two wireless technologies that government agencies are most likely to employ:

wireless local area networks (WLAN) and ad hoc or—more specifically—Bluetooth networks. The

document also addresses the use of wireless handheld devices. The document does not address

technologies such as wireless radio and other WLAN standards that are not designed to the Institute of

Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 standard. These technologies are out of the scope of

this document.

Wireless technologies are changing rapidly. New products and features are being introduced

continuously. Many of these products now offer security features designed to resolve long-standing

weaknesses or address newly discovered ones. Yet with each new capability, a new threat or vulnerability

is likely to arise. Wireless technologies are evolving swiftly. Therefore, it is essential to remain abreast of

 

1

 See also NIST Special Publication 800-46, Security for Telecommuting and Broadband Communications.
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the current and emerging trends in the technologies and in the security or insecurities of these

technologies. Again, this guideline does not cover security of other types of wireless or emerging wireless

technologies such as third-generation (3G) wireless telephony.

1.3 Audience and Assumptions

This document covers details specific to wireless technologies and solutions. The document is technical in

nature; however, it provides the necessary background to fully understand the topics that are discussed.

Hence, the following list highlights how people with differing backgrounds might use this document. The

intended audience is varied and includes the following:

! Government managers who are planning to employ wireless networked computing devices in their

agencies (chief information officers, senior managers, etc.)

! Systems engineers and architects when designing and implementing networks

! System administrators when administering, patching, securing, or upgrading wireless networks

! Security consultants when performing security assessments to determine security postures of wireless

environments

! Researchers and analysts who are trying to understand the underlying wireless technologies.

This document assumes that the readers have some minimal operating system, networking, and security

expertise. Because of the constantly changing nature of the wireless security industry and the threats and

vulnerabilities to these technologies, readers are strongly encouraged to take advantage of other resources

(including those listed in this document) for more current and detailed information.

1.4 Document Organization

The document is divided into five sections followed by six appendices. This subsection is a roadmap

describing the document structure.

! Section 1 is composed of an authority, purpose, scope, audience, assumptions, and document

structure.

! Section 2 provides an overview of wireless technology.

! Section 3 examines 802.11 WLAN technology, including the benefits and security risks of 802.11 and

provides guidelines for mitigating those risks.

! Section 4 examines Bluetooth ad hoc network technology, including its benefits and security risks and

provides guidelines for mitigating those risks.

! Section 5 discusses the benefits and security risks of handheld wireless devices and provides

guidelines for mitigating those risks.

! Appendix A shows the frequency ranges of common wireless devices.

! Appendix B provides a glossary of terms used in this document.

! Appendix C lists the acronyms and abbreviations used in this document.
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! Appendix D describes the differences between the various 802.11 standards.

! Appendix E provides a list of useful Universal Resource Locators (URL).

! Appendix F provides a list of useful wireless networking tools and URLs.

! Appendix G contains the references used in the development of the document.
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2. Overview of Wireless Technology

Wireless technologies, in the simplest sense, enable one or more devices to communicate without physical

connections—without requiring network or peripheral cabling. Wireless technologies use radio frequency

transmissions as the means for transmitting data, whereas wired technologies use cables. Wireless

technologies range from complex systems, such as Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) and cell

phones to simple devices such as wireless headphones, microphones, and other devices that do not

process or store information. They also include infrared (IR) devices such as remote controls, some

cordless computer keyboards and mice, and wireless hi-fi stereo headsets, all of which require a direct

line of sight between the transmitter and the receiver to close the link. A brief overview of wireless

networks, devices, standards, and security issues is presented in this section.

2.1 Wireless Networks

Wireless networks serve as the transport mechanism between devices and among devices and the

traditional wired networks (enterprise networks and the Internet). Wireless networks are many and diverse

but are frequently categorized into three groups based on their coverage range: Wireless Wide Area

Networks (WWAN), WLANs, and Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPAN). WWAN includes wide

coverage area technologies such as 2G cellular, Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD), Global System for

Mobile Communications (GSM), and Mobitex. WLAN, representing wireless local area networks,

includes 802.11, HiperLAN, and several others. WPAN, represents wireless personal area network

technologies such as Bluetooth and IR. All of these technologies are “tetherless”—they receive and

transmit information using electromagnetic (EM) waves. Wireless technologies use wavelengths ranging

from the radio frequency (RF) band up to and above the IR band.2 The frequencies in the RF band cover a

significant portion of the EM radiation spectrum, extending from 9 kilohertz (kHz), the lowest allocated

wireless communications frequency, to thousands of gigahertz (GHz). As the frequency is increased

beyond the RF spectrum, EM energy moves into the IR and then the visible spectrum. (See Appendix A

for a list of common wireless frequencies.) This document focuses on WLAN and WPAN technologies.

2.1.1 Wireless LANs

WLANs allow greater flexibility and portability than do traditional wired local area networks (LAN).

Unlike a traditional LAN, which requires a wire to connect a user’s computer to the network, a WLAN

connects computers and other components to the network using an access point device. An access point

communicates with devices equipped with wireless network adaptors; it connects to a wired Ethernet

LAN via an RJ-45 port. Access point devices typically have coverage areas of up to 300 feet

(approximately 100 meters). This coverage area is called a cell or range. Users move freely within the cell

with their laptop or other network device. Access point cells can be linked together to allow users to even

“roam” within a building or between buildings.

2.1.2 Ad Hoc Networks

Ad hoc networks such as Bluetooth are networks designed to dynamically connect remote devices such as

cell phones, laptops, and PDAs. These networks are termed “ad hoc” because of their shifting network

topologies. Whereas WLANs use a fixed network infrastructure, ad hoc networks maintain random

network configurations, relying on a master-slave system connected by wireless links to enable devices to

communicate. In a Bluetooth network, the master of the piconet controls the changing network topologies

of these networks. It also controls the flow of data between devices that are capable of supporting direct

links to each other. As devices move about in an unpredictable fashion, these networks must be

 

2 Appendix A provides an overview of wireless frequencies and their use.
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reconfigured on the fly to handle the dynamic topology. The routing that protocol Bluetooth employs

allows the master to establish and maintain these shifting networks.

Figure 2-1 illustrates an example of a Bluetooth-enabled mobile phone connecting to a mobile phone

network, synchronizing with a PDA address book, and downloading e-mail on an IEEE 802.11 WLAN.

Laptop

Bluetooth Network

Mobile Phone Network

IEEE 802.11 Network

Mobile Phone

PDA

Laptop

Bluetooth Network

Mobile Phone Network

IEEE 802.11 Network

Mobile Phone

PDA

Figure 2-1. Notional Ad Hoc Network

2.2 Wireless Devices

A wide range of devices use wireless technologies, with handheld devices being the most prevalent form

today. This document discusses the most commonly used wireless handheld devices such as textmessaging devices, PDAs, and smart phones.3

2.2.1 Personal Digital Assistants

PDAs are data organizers that are small enough to fit into a shirt pocket or a purse. PDAs offer

applications such as office productivity, database applications, address books, schedulers, and to-do lists,

and they allow users to synchronize data between two PDAs and between a PDA and a personal

computer. Newer versions allow users to download their e-mail and to connect to the Internet. Security

administrators may also encounter one-way and two-way text-messaging devices. These devices operate

on a proprietary networking standard that disseminates e-mail to remote devices by accessing the

corporate network. Text-messaging technology is designed to monitor a user’s inbox for new e-mail and

relay the mail to the user’s wireless handheld device via the Internet and wireless network.

 

3

 It should be noted, however, that the lines between these devices are rapidly blurring as manufacturers incorporate and

integrate increased capabilities and features.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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2.2.2 Smart Phones

Mobile wireless telephones, or cell phones, are telephones that have shortwave analog or digital

transmission capabilities that allow users to establish wireless connections to nearby transmitters. As with

WLANs, the transmitter's span of coverage is called a “cell.” As the cell phone user moves from one cell

to the next, the telephone connection is effectively passed from one local cell transmitter to the next.

Today’s cell phone is rapidly evolving to integration with PDAs, thus providing users with increased

wireless e-mail and Internet access. Mobile phones with information-processing and data networking

capabilities are called “smart phones.” This document addresses the risks introduced by the informationprocessing and networking capabilities of smart phones.

2.3 Wireless Standards

Wireless technologies conform to a variety of standards and offer varying levels of security features. The

principal advantages of standards are to encourage mass production and to allow products from multiple

vendors to interoperate. For this document, the discussion of wireless standards is limited to the IEEE

802.11 and the Bluetooth standard. WLANs follow the IEEE 802.11 standards. Ad hoc networks follow

proprietary techniques or are based on the Bluetooth standard, which was developed by a consortium of

commercial companies making up the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG). These standards are

described below.

2.3.1 IEEE 802.11

WLANs are based on the IEEE 802.11 standard, which the IEEE first developed in 1997. The IEEE

designed 802.11 to support medium-range, higher data rate applications, such as Ethernet networks, and

to address mobile and portable stations.

802.11 is the original WLAN standard, designed for 1 Mbps to 2 Mbps wireless transmissions. It was

followed in 1999 by 802.11a, which established a high-speed WLAN standard for the 5 GHz band and

supported 54 Mbps. Also completed in 1999 was the 802.11b standard, which operates in the 2.4 - 2.48

GHz band and supports 11 Mbps. The 802.11b standard is currently the dominant standard for WLANs,

providing sufficient speeds for most of today’s applications. Because the 802.11b standard has been so

widely adopted, the security weaknesses in the standard have been exposed. These weaknesses will be

discussed in Section 3.3.2. Another standard, 802.11g, still in draft, operates in the 2.4 GHz waveband,

where current WLAN products based on the 802.11b standard operate.4

Two other important and related standards for WLANs are 802.1X and 802.11i. The 802.1X, a port-level

access control protocol, provides a security framework for IEEE networks, including Ethernet and

wireless networks. The 802.11i standard, also still in draft, was created for wireless-specific security

functions that operate with IEEE 802.1X. The 802.11i standard is discussed further in Section 3.5.

2.3.2 Bluetooth

Bluetooth has emerged as a very popular ad hoc network standard today. The Bluetooth standard is a

computing and telecommunications industry specification that describes how mobile phones, computers,

and PDAs should interconnect with each other, with home and business phones, and with computers

using short-range wireless connections. Bluetooth network applications include wireless synchronization,

e-mail/Internet/intranet access using local personal computer connections, hidden computing through

automated applications and networking, and applications that can be used for such devices as hands-free

 

4

 See http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/802/11/Reports/tgg_update.htm.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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headsets and car kits. The Bluetooth standard specifies wireless operation in the 2.45 GHz radio band and

supports data rates up to 720 kbps.5 It further supports up to three simultaneous voice channels and

employs frequency-hopping schemes and power reduction to reduce interference with other devices

operating in the same frequency band. The IEEE 802.15 organization has derived a wireless personal area

networking technology based on Bluetooth specifications v1.1.

2.4 Wireless Security Threats and Risk Mitigation

The NIST handbook An Introduction to Computer Security generically classifies security threats in nine

categories ranging from errors and omissions to threats to personal privacy. 6 All of these represent

potential threats in wireless networks as well. However, the more immediate concerns for wireless

communications are device theft, denial of service, malicious hackers, malicious code, theft of service,

and industrial and foreign espionage. Theft is likely to occur with wireless devices because of their

portability. Authorized and unauthorized users of the system may commit fraud and theft; however,

authorized users are more likely to carry out such acts. Since users of a system may know what resources

a system has and the system’s security flaws, it is easier for them to commit fraud and theft. Malicious

hackers, sometimes called crackers, are individuals who break into a system without authorization,

usually for personal gain or to do harm. Malicious hackers are generally individuals from outside of an

agency or organization (although users within an agency or organization can be a threat as well). Such

hackers may gain access to the wireless network access point by eavesdropping on wireless device

communications. Malicious code involves viruses, worms, Trojan horses, logic bombs, or other unwanted

software that is designed to damage files or bring down a system. Theft of service occurs when an

unauthorized user gains access to the network and consumes network resources. Industrial and foreign

espionage involves gathering proprietary data from corporations or intelligence information from

governments through eavesdropping. In wireless networks, the espionage threat stems from the relative

ease with which eavesdropping can occur on radio transmissions.

Attacks resulting from these threats, if successful, place an agency’s systems—and, more importantly, its

data—at risk. Ensuring confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and availability are the prime objectives of

all government security policies and practices. NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-26, Security SelfAssessment Guide for Information Technology Systems, states that information must be protected from

unauthorized, unanticipated, or unintentional modification. Security requirements include the following:

! Authenticity—A third party must be able to verify that the content of a message has not been

changed in transit.

! Nonrepudiation—The origin or the receipt of a specific message must be verifiable by a third party.

! Accountability—The actions of an entity must be traceable uniquely to that entity.

Network availability is “the property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorized

entity.”

 

5

 Next generation of Bluetooth will have a theoretical throughput of up to 2 Mbps.

6

 The NIST Handbook, Special Publication 800-12, An Introduction to Computer Security.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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The information technology resource (system or data) must be available on a timely basis to meet

mission requirements or to avoid substantial losses. Availability also includes ensuring that

resources are used only for intended purposes.7

Risks in wireless networks are equal to the sum of the risk of operating a wired network (as in operating a

network in general) plus the new risks introduced by weaknesses in wireless protocols. To mitigate these

risks, agencies need to adopt security measures and practices that help bring their risks to a manageable

level. They need, for example, to perform security assessments prior to implementation to determine the

specific threats and vulnerabilities that wireless networks will introduce in their environments. In

performing the assessment, they should consider existing security policies, known threats and

vulnerabilities, legislation and regulations, safety, reliability, system performance, the life-cycle costs of

security measures, and technical requirements. Once the risk assessment is complete, the agency can

begin planning and implementing the measures that it will put in place to safeguard its systems and lower

its security risks to a manageable level. The agency should periodically reassess the policies and measures

that it puts in place because computer technologies and malicious threats are continually changing. (For

more detailed information on the risk mitigation and safeguard selection process, refer to NIST SP 800-

12, An Introduction to Computer Security, and 800-30, Risk Management Guide for IT Systems.) To date,

the list below includes some of the more salient threats and vulnerabilities of wireless systems:

! All the vulnerabilities that exist in a conventional wired network apply to wireless technologies.

! Malicious entities may gain unauthorized access to an agency’s computer or voice (IP telephony)

network through wireless connections, potentially bypassing any firewall protections.

! Sensitive information that is not encrypted (or that is encrypted with poor cryptographic techniques)

and that is transmitted between two wireless devices may be intercepted and disclosed.

! Denial of service (DoS) attacks may be directed at wireless connections or devices.

! Malicious entities may steal the identity of legitimate users and masquerade as them on internal or

external corporate networks.

! Sensitive data may be corrupted during improper synchronization.

! Malicious entities may be able to violate the privacy of legitimate users and be able to track their

physical movements.

! Malicious entities may deploy unauthorized equipment (e.g., client devices and access points) to

surreptitiously gain access to sensitive information.

! Handheld devices are easily stolen and can reveal sensitive information.

! Data may be extracted without detection from improperly configured devices.

! Viruses or other malicious code may corrupt data on a wireless device and be subsequently

introduced to a wired network connection.

! Malicious entities may, through wireless connections, connect to other agencies for the purposes of

launching attacks and concealing their activity.

! Interlopers, from inside or out, may be able to gain connectivity to network management controls and

thereby disable or disrupt operations.

 

7 ISO/IEC 7498-2.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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! Malicious entities may use a third party, untrusted wireless network services to gain access to an

agency’s network resources.

! Internal attacks may be possible via ad hoc transmissions.

As with wired networks, agency officials need to be aware of liability issues for the loss of sensitive

information or for any attacks launched from a compromised network.

2.5 Emerging Wireless Technologies

Originally, handheld devices had limited functionality because of size and power requirements. However,

the technology is improving, and handheld devices are becoming more feature-rich and portable. More

significantly, the various wireless devices and their respective technologies are merging. The mobile

phone, for instance, has increased functionality that now allows it to serve as a PDA as well as a phone.

Smart phones are merging mobile phone and PDA technologies to provide normal voice service and email, text messaging, paging, Web access, and voice recognition. Next-generation mobile phones, already

on the market, are quickly incorporating PDA, IR, wireless Internet, e-mail, and global positioning system

(GPS) capabilities.

Manufacturers are combining standards as well, with the goal to provide a device capable of delivering

multiple services. Other developments that will soon be on the market include global system for mobile

communications-based (GSM-based) technologies such as General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Local

Multipoint Distribution Services (LMDS), Enhanced Data GSM Environment (EDGE), and Universal

Mobile Telecommunications Service (UMTS). These technologies will provide high data transmission

rates and greater networking capabilities. However, each new development will present its own security

risks, and government agencies must address these risks to ensure that critical assets remain protected.

2.6 Federal Information Processing Standards

FIPS 140-2 defines a framework and methodology for NIST's current and future cryptographic standards.

The standard provides users with the following:

! A specification of security features that are required at each of four security levels

! Flexibility in choosing security requirements

! A guide to ensuring that the cryptographic modules incorporate necessary security features

! The assurance that the modules are compliant with cryptography-based standards.

The Secretary of Commerce has made FIPS 140-2 mandatory and binding for U.S. federal agencies. The

standard is specifically applicable when a federal agency determines that cryptography is necessary for

protecting sensitive information. The standard is used in designing and implementing cryptographic

modules that federal departments and agencies operate or have operated for them. FIPS 140-2 is

applicable if the module is incorporated in a product or application or if it functions as a standalone

device. As currently defined, the security of neither 802.11 nor Bluetooth meets the FIPS 140-2 standard.

Federal agencies, industry, and the public rely on cryptography to protect information and

communications used in critical infrastructures, electronic commerce, and other application areas.

Cryptographic modules are implemented in these products and systems to provide cryptographic services

such as confidentiality, integrity, nonrepudiation, identification, and authentication. Adequate testing and

validation of the cryptographic module against established standards is essential for security assurance.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Both federal agencies and the public benefit from the use of tested and validated products. Without

adequate testing, weaknesses such as poor design, weak algorithms, or incorrect implementation of the

cryptographic module can result in insecure products.

In 1995, NIST, established the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) that validates

cryptographic modules to FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, and other FIPS

cryptography-based standards. The CMVP is a joint effort between NIST and the Communications

Security Establishment (CSE) of the Government of Canada. Products validated as conforming to FIPS

140-2 are accepted by the federal agencies of both countries for the protection of sensitive information.

Vendors of cryptographic modules use independent, accredited testing laboratories to test their modules.

NIST’s Computer Security Division and CSE jointly serve as the validation authorities for the program,

validating the test results. Currently, there are six National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program

(NVLAP) accredited laboratories that perform FIPS 140-2 compliance testing.8

 

8

 These labs are listed on the following Web site: http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140-1/1401labs.htm.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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3. Wireless LANs

This section provides a detailed overview of 802.11 WLAN technology. The section includes

introductory material on the history of 802.11 and provides other technical information, including 802.11

frequency ranges and data rates, network topologies, transmission ranges, and applications. It examines

the security threats and vulnerabilities associated with WLANs and offers various means for reducing

risks and securing WLAN environments.

3.1 Wireless LAN Overview

WLAN technology and the WLAN industry date back to the mid-1980s when the Federal

Communications Commission (FCC) first made the RF spectrum available to industry. During the 1980s

and early 1990s, growth was relatively slow. Today, however, WLAN technology is experiencing

tremendous growth. The key reason for this growth is the increased bandwidth made possible by the IEEE

802.11 standard. As an introduction to the 802.11 and WLAN technology, Table 3-1 provides some key

characteristics at a glance.

Table 3-1. Key Characteristics of 802.11 Wireless LANs

Characteristic Description

Physical Layer

Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS), Frequency Hopping Spread

Spectrum (FHSS), Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM),

infrared (IR).

Frequency Band 2.4 GHz (ISM band) and 5 GHz.

Data Rates 1 Mbps, 2 Mbps, 5.5 Mbps (11b), 11 Mbps (11b), 54 Mbps (11a)

Data and Network

Security

RC4-based stream encryption algorithm for confidentiality, authentication,

and integrity. Limited key management. (AES is being considered for

802.11i.)

Operating Range Up to 150 feet indoors and 1500 feet outdoors.9

Positive Aspects

Ethernet speeds without wires; many different products from many

different companies. Wireless client cards and access point costs are

decreasing.

Negative Aspects Poor security in native mode; throughput decrease with distance and load.

3.1.1 Brief History

Motorola developed one of the first commercial WLAN systems with its Altair product. However, early

WLAN technologies had several problems that prohibited its pervasive use. These LANs were expensive,

provided low data rates, were prone to radio interference, and were designed mostly to proprietary RF

technologies. The IEEE initiated the 802.11 project in 1990 with a scope “to develop a Medium Access

Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specification for wireless connectivity for fixed, portable, and

moving stations within an area.” In 1997, IEEE first approved the 802.11 international interoperability

standard. Then, in 1999, the IEEE ratified the 802.11a and the 802.11b wireless networking

communication standards. The goal was to create a standards-based technology that could span multiple

physical encoding types, frequencies, and applications. The 802.11a standard uses orthogonal frequency

division multiplexing (OFDM) to reduce interference. This technology uses the 5 GHz frequency

spectrum and can process data at up to 54 Mbps.

 

9

 These numbers will vary immensely depending on the operating environment (obstacles and material construction) and the

equipment used. Outdoor ranges, with high gain directional antennas, can exceed 20 miles.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Although this section of the document focuses on the IEEE 802.11 WLAN standard, it is important to

note that several other WLAN technologies and standards are available from which consumers may

choose, including HiperLAN and HomeRF. For information on the European Telecommunications

Standards Institute (ETSI) developed HiperLAN, visit the HiperLAN Alliance site.10 For more

information on HomeRF, visit the HomeRF Working Group site.11 This document does not address those

technologies.

3.1.2 Frequency and Data Rates

IEEE developed the 802.11 standards to provide wireless networking technology like the wired Ethernet

that has been available for many years. The IEEE 802.11a standard is the most widely adopted member of

the 802.11 WLAN family. It operates in the licensed 5 GHz band using OFDM technology. The popular

802.11b standard operates in the unlicensed 2.4 GHz–2.5 GHz Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM)

frequency band using a direct sequence spread-spectrum technology. The ISM band has become popular

for wireless communications because it is available worldwide. The 802.11b WLAN technology permits

transmission speeds of up to 11 Mbits per second. This makes it considerably faster than the original

IEEE 802.11 standard (that sends data at up to 2 Mbps) and slightly faster than standard Ethernet. A

summary of the various 802.11 standards is provided in Appendix D.

3.1.3 802.11 Architecture

The IEEE 802.11 standard permits devices to establish either peer-to-peer (P2P) networks or networks

based on fixed access points (AP) with which mobile nodes can communicate. Hence, the standard

defines two basic network topologies: the infrastructure network and the ad hoc network. The

infrastructure network is meant to extend the range of the wired LAN to wireless cells. A laptop or other

mobile device may move from cell to cell (from AP to AP) while maintaining access to the resources of

the LAN. A cell is the area covered by an AP and is called a “basic service set” (BSS). The collection of

all cells of an infrastructure network is called an extended service set (ESS). This first topology is useful

for providing wireless coverage of building or campus areas. By deploying multiple APs with overlapping

coverage areas, organizations can achieve broad network coverage. WLAN technology can be used to

replace wired LANs totally and to extend LAN infrastructure.

A WLAN environment has wireless client stations that use radio modems to communicate to an AP. The

client stations are generally equipped with a wireless network interface card (NIC) that consists of the

radio transceiver and the logic to interact with the client machine and software. An AP comprises

essentially a radio transceiver on one side and a bridge to the wired backbone on the other. The AP, a

stationary device that is part of the wired infrastructure, is analogous to a cell-site (base station) in cellular

communications. All communications between the client stations and between clients and the wired

network go through the AP. The basic topology of a WLAN is depicted in Figure 3-1.

 

10 For more information see the HiperLAN Alliance site http:///www.hiperlan.com.

11 For more information see the HomeRF Working Group site http://www.homeRF.org.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Access Point

Access Point

Station

Station

To Other Network 

Segments / Internet

Router

Hub

Access Point

Access Point

Station

Station

To Other Network 

Segments / Internet

Router

Hub

Figure 3-1. Fundamental 802.11 Wireless LAN Topology

Although most WLANs operate in the “infrastructure” mode and architecture described above, another

topology is also possible. This second topology, the ad hoc network, is meant to easily interconnect

mobile devices that are in the same area (e.g., in the same room). In this architecture, client stations are

grouped into a single geographic area and can be Internet-worked without access to the wired LAN

(infrastructure network). The interconnected devices in the ad hoc mode are referred to as an independent

basic service set (IBSS). The ad hoc topology is depicted in Figure 3-2 below.

Laptop

Figure 3-2. 802.11 Wireless LAN Ad Hoc Topology
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3-11

The ad hoc configuration is similar to a peer-to-peer office network in which no node is required to

function as a server. As an ad hoc WLAN, laptops, desktops and other 802.11 devices can share files

without the use of an AP.

3.1.4 Wireless LAN Components

A WLAN comprises two types of equipment: a wireless station and an access point. A station, or client, is

typically a laptop or notebook personal computer (PC) with a wireless NIC.12 A WLAN client may also

be a desktop or handheld device (e.g., PDA, or custom device such as a barcode scanner) or equipment

within a kiosk on a manufacturing floor or other publicly accessed area. Wireless laptops and

notebooks—“wireless enabled”—are identical to laptops and notebooks except that they use wireless

NICs to connect to access points in the network. The wireless NIC is commonly inserted in the client's

Personal Computer Memory Card International Association (PCMCIA) slot or Universal Serial Bus

(USB) port. The NICs use radio signals to establish connections to the WLAN. The AP, which acts as a

bridge between the wireless and wired networks, typically comprises a radio, a wired network interface

such as 802.3, and bridging software. The AP functions as a base station for the wireless network,

aggregating multiple wireless stations onto the wired network.

3.1.5 Range

The reliable coverage range for 802.11 WLANs depends on several factors, including data rate required

and capacity, sources of RF interference, physical area and characteristics, power, connectivity, and

antenna usage. Theoretical ranges are from 29 meters (for 11 Mbps) in a closed office area to 485 meters

(for 1 Mbps) in an open area. However, through empirical analysis, the typical range for connectivity of

802.11 equipment is approximately 50 meters (about 163 ft.) indoors. A range of 400 meters, nearly 1⁄4

mile, makes WLAN the ideal technology for many campus applications. It is important to recognize that

special high-gain antennas can increase the range to several miles.

Open-space

400-meter range

In-building

50-meter

Application Space

• Small Office

• Home

Application Space

• Healthcare and Hospital

• University Campus

• Business

• Retail Mall

• Other campus use

Open-space

400-meter range

In-building

50-meter

Application Space

• Small Office

• Home

Application Space

• Healthcare and Hospital

• University Campus

• Business

• Retail Mall

• Other campus use

Figure 3-3. Typical Range of 802.11 WLAN

APs may also provide a “bridging” function. Bridging connects two or more networks together and

allows them to communicate—to exchange network traffic. Bridging involves either a point-to-point or a

multipoint configuration. In a point-to-point architecture, two LANs are connected to each other via the

 

12 Notebook computers are basically the same as laptop computers, except that they are generally lighter in weight and smaller

in size.
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LANs’ respective APs. In multipoint bridging, one subnet on a LAN is connected to several other subnets

on another LAN via each subnet AP. For example, if a computer on Subnet A needed to connect to

computers on Subnets B, C, and D, Subnet A’s AP would connect to B’s, C’s, and D’s respective APs.

Enterprises may use bridging to connect LANs between different buildings on corporate campuses.

Bridging AP devices are typically placed on top of buildings to achieve greater antenna reception. The

typical distance over which one AP can be connected wirelessly to another by means of bridging is

approximately 2 miles. This distance may vary depending on several factors including the specific

receiver or transceiver being used.13 Figure 3-4 illustrates point-to-point bridging between two LANs. In

the example, wireless data is being transmitted from Laptop A to Laptop B, from one building to the next,

using each building’s appropriately positioned AP. Laptop A connects to the closest AP within the

building A. The receiving AP in building A then transmits the data (over the wired LAN) to the AP

bridge located on the building’s roof. That AP bridge then transmits the data to the bridge on nearby

building B. The building’s AP bridge then sends the data over its wired LAN to Laptop B.

Wireless transmissions

Laptop A Laptop B

A

B

Figure 3-4. Access Point Bridging

3.2 Benefits

WLANs offer four primary benefits:

! User Mobility—Users can access files, network resources, and the Internet without having to

physically connect to the network with wires. Users can be mobile yet retain high-speed, real-time

access to the enterprise LAN.

! Rapid Installation—The time required for installation is reduced because network connections can

be made without moving or adding wires, or pulling them through walls or ceilings, or making

modifications to the infrastructure cable plant. For example, WLANs are often cited as making LAN

installations possible in buildings that are subject to historic preservation rules.

! Flexibility—Enterprises can also enjoy the flexibility of installing and taking down WLANs in

locations as necessary. Users can quickly install a small WLAN for temporary needs such as a

conference, trade show, or standards meeting.

! Scalability—WLAN network topologies can easily be configured to meet specific application and

installation needs and to scale from small peer-to-peer networks to very large enterprise networks that

enable roaming over a broad area.

 

13 See Bridging at ftp://download.intel.com/support/network/Wireless/pro201lb/accesspoint/bridging.pdf for more information

on access point bridging.
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Because of these fundamental benefits, the WLAN market has been increasing steadily over the past

several years, and WLANs are still gaining in popularity. WLANs are now becoming a viable alternative

to traditional wired solutions. For example, hospitals, universities, airports, hotels, and retail shops are

already using wireless technologies to conduct their daily business operations.

3.3 Security of 802.11 Wireless LANs

This section discusses the built-in security features of 802.11. It provides an overview of the inherent

security features to better illustrate its limitations and provide a motivation for some of the

recommendations for enhanced security. The IEEE 802.11 specification identified several services to

provide a secure operating environment. The security services are provided largely by the Wired

Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol to protect link-level data during wireless transmission between clients

and access points. WEP does not provide end-to-end security, but only for the wireless portion of the

connection as shown in Figure 3-5.

Router Hub

AP

Wired LAN

No Security or security is provided through other means 802.11 Security

Router Hub

AP

Wired LAN

No Security or security is provided through other means 802.11 Security

Figure 3-5. Wireless Security of 802.11 in Typical Network

3.3.1 Security Features of 802.11 Wireless LANs per the Standard

The three basic security services defined by IEEE for the WLAN environment are as follows:

! Authentication—A primary goal of WEP was to provide a security service to verify the identity of

communicating client stations. This provides access control to the network by denying access to client

stations that cannot authenticate properly. This service addresses the question, “Are only authorized

persons allowed to gain access to my network?”

! Confidentiality—Confidentiality, or privacy, was a second goal of WEP. It was developed to provide

“privacy achieved by a wired network.” The intent was to prevent information compromise from

casual eavesdropping (passive attack). This service, in general, addresses the question, “Are only

authorized persons allowed to view my data?”

! Integrity—Another goal of WEP was a security service developed to ensure that messages are not

modified in transit between the wireless clients and the access point in an active attack. This service

addresses the question, “Is the data coming into or exiting the network trustworthy—has it been

tampered with?”
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3-14

It is important to note that the standard did not address other security services such as audit, authorization,

and nonrepudiation. The security services offered by 802.11 are described in greater detail below.

3.3.1.1 Authentication

The IEEE 802.11 specification defines two means to “validate” wireless users attempting to gain access to

a wired network: open-system authentication and shared-key authentication. One means, shared-key

authentication, is based on cryptography, and the other is not. The open-system authentication technique

is not truly authentication; the access point accepts the mobile station without verifying the identity of the

station. It should be noted also that the authentication is only one-way: only the mobile station is

authenticated. The mobile station must trust that it is communicating to a real AP. A taxonomy of the

techniques for 802.11 is depicted in Figure 3-6.

802.11 Authentication

Non-cryptographic

Does not use RC4

Cryptographic

Uses RC4

Open System Authentication Shared-key Authentication

A station is allowed to join

a network without any identity 

verification. 

A station is allowed to join network if

it proves WEP key is shared.

(Fundamental security based on 

knowledge of secret key)

2-stage Challenge-Response

(Required)

1-stage Challenge-Response

(Not required)

802.11 Authentication

Non-cryptographic

Does not use RC4

Cryptographic

Uses RC4

Open System Authentication Shared-key Authentication

A station is allowed to join

a network without any identity 

verification. 

A station is allowed to join network if

it proves WEP key is shared.

(Fundamental security based on 

knowledge of secret key)

2-stage Challenge-Response

(Required)

1-stage Challenge-Response

(Not required)

Figure 3-6. Taxonomy of 802.11 Authentication Techniques

With Open System authentication, a client is authenticated if it simply responds with a MAC address

during the two-message exchange with an access point. During the exchange, the client is not truly

validated but simply responds with the correct fields in the message exchange. Obviously, with out

cryptographic validatedation, open-system authentication is highly vulnerable to attack and practically

invites unauthorized access. Open-system authentication is the only required form of authentication by the

802.11 specification.

Shared key authentication is a cryptographic technique for authentication. It is a simple “challengeresponse” scheme based on whether a client has knowledge of a shared secret. In this scheme, as depicted

conceptually in Figure 3-7, a random challenge is generated by the access point and sent to the wireless

client. The client, using a cryptographic key that is shared with the AP, encrypts the challenge (or

“nonce,” as it is called in security vernacular) and returns the result to the AP. The AP decrypts the result

computed by the client and allows access only if the decrypted value is the same as the random challenge

transmitted. The algorithm used in the cryptographic computation and for the generation of the 128-bit

challenge text is the RC4 stream cipher developed by Ron Rivest of MIT. It should be noted that the

authentication method just described is a rudimentary cryptographic technique, and it does not provide

mutual authentication. That is, the client does not authenticate the AP, and therefore there is no assurance

that a client is communicating with a legitimate AP and wireless network. It is also worth noting that

simple unilateral challenge-response schemes have long been known to be weak. They suffer from
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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numerous attacks including the infamous “man-in-the-middle” attack. Lastly, the IEEE 802.11

specification does not require shared-key authentication.

AP

Authentication request

Wireless station

Challenge

Response

Confirm success

Generate random number to challenge station

Decrypt response to recover challenge

Verify that challenges equate

Encrypt challenge using RC4 algorithm

AP

Authentication request

Wireless station

Challenge

Response

Confirm success

Generate random number to challenge station

Decrypt response to recover challenge

Verify that challenges equate

Encrypt challenge using RC4 algorithm

Figure 3-7. Shared-key Authentication Message Flow

3.3.1.2 Privacy

The 802.11 standard supports privacy (confidentiality) through the use of cryptographic techniques for the

wireless interface. The WEP cryptographic technique for confidentiality also uses the RC4 symmetrickey, stream cipher algorithm to generate a pseudo-random data sequence. This “key stream” is simply

added modulo 2 (exclusive-OR-ed) to the data to be transmitted. Through the WEP technique, data can be

protected from disclosure during transmission over the wireless link. WEP is applied to all data above the

802.11 WLAN layers to protect traffic such as Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP),

Internet Packet Exchange (IPX), and Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP).

As defined in the 802.11 standard, WEP supports only a 40-bit cryptographic keys size for the shared key.

However, numerous vendors offer nonstandard extensions of WEP that support key lengths from 40 bits

to 104 bits. At least one vendor supports a keysize of 128 bits. The 104-bit WEP key, for instance, with a

24-bit Initialization Vector (IV) becomes a 128-bit RC4 key. In general, all other things being equal,

increasing the key size increases the security of a cryptographic technique. However, it is always possible

for flawed implementations or flawed designs to prevent long keys from increasing security. Research has

shown that key sizes of greater than 80-bits, for robust designs and implementations, make brute-force

cryptanalysis (code breaking) an impossible task. For 80-bit keys, the number of possible keys—a

keyspace of more than 1026—exceeds contemporary computing power. In practice, most WLAN

deployments rely on 40-bit keys. Moreover, recent attacks have shown that the WEP approach for privacy

is, unfortunately, vulnerable to certain attacks regardless of keysize. However, the cryptographic,

standards, and vendor WLAN communities have developed enhanced WEP, which is available as a

prestandard vendor-specific implementations. The attacks mentioned above are described later in the

following sections.

The WEP privacy is illustrated conceptually in Figure 3-8.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Radio

Interface

Plaintext Input

Payload bits

XOR with

keystream

Keystream

Shared

Key

RC4

Algorithm

IV

Generation 

Algorithm 

Payload

CRC

Generation

Algorithm

24-bits

Keystream

Concatenate

IV and key

Shared

Key

Per packet

Key

IV

Plaintext Output

IV

Radio

Interface

RC4

Algorithm

CRC Payload

Per packet

key

Wireless station AP

Ciphertext

Concatenate

IV and key

CRC Payload

Packet Packet

Radio

Interface

Plaintext Input

Payload bits

XOR with

keystream

Keystream

Shared

Key

RC4

Algorithm

IV

Generation 

Algorithm 

Payload

CRC

Generation

Algorithm

24-bits

Keystream

Concatenate

IV and key

Shared

Key

Per packet

Key

IV

Plaintext Output

IV

Radio

Interface

RC4

Algorithm

CRC Payload

Per packet

key

Wireless station AP

Ciphertext

Concatenate

IV and key

CRC Payload

Packet Packet

Figure 3-8. WEP Privacy Using RC4 Algorithm

3.3.1.3 Integrity

The IEEE 802.11 specification also outlines a means to provide data integrity for messages transmitted

between wireless clients and access points. This security service was designed to reject any messages that

had been changed by an active adversary “in the middle.” This technique uses a simple encrypted Cyclic

Redundancy Check (CRC) approach. As depicted in the diagram above, a CRC-32, or frame check

sequence, is computed on each payload prior to transmission. The integrity-sealed packet is then

encrypted using the RC4 key stream to provide the cipher-text message. On the receiving end, decryption

is performed and the CRC is recomputed on the message that is received. The CRC computed at the

receiving end is compared with the one computed with the original message. If the CRCs do not equal,

that is, “received in error,” this would indicate an integrity violation (an active message spoofer), and the

packet would be discarded. As with the privacy service, unfortunately, the 802.11 integrity is vulnerable

to certain attacks regardless of key size. In summary, the fundamental flaw in the WEP integrity scheme

is that the simple CRC is not a “cryptographically secure” mechanism such as a hash or message

authentication code.

The IEEE 802.11 specification does not, unfortunately, identify any means for key management (life

cycle handling of cryptographic keys and related material). Therefore, generating, distributing, storing,

loading, escrowing, archiving, auditing, and destroying the material is left to those deploying WLANs.

Key management (probably the most critical aspect of a cryptographic system) for 802.11 is left largely

as an exercise for the users of the 802.11 network. As a result, many vulnerabilities could be introduced

into the WLAN environment. These vulnerabilities include WEP keys that are non-unique, never

changing, factory-defaults, or weak keys (all zeros, all ones, based on easily guessed passwords, or other

similar trivial patterns). Additionally, because key management was not part of the original 802.11

specification, with the key distribution unresolved, WEP-secured WLANs do not scale well. If an

enterprise recognizes the need to change keys often and to make them random, the task is formidable in a

large WLAN environment. For example, a large campus may have as many as 15,000 APs. Generating,

distributing, loading, and managing keys for an environment of this size is a significant challenge. It is

has been suggested that the only practical way to distribute keys in a large dynamic environment is to

publish it. However, a fundamental tenet of cryptography is that cryptographic keys remain secret. Hence
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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we have a major dichotomy. This dichotomy exists for any technology that neglects to elegantly address

the key distribution problem.

3.3.2 Problems With the IEEE 802.11 Standard Security

This section discusses some known vulnerabilities in the standardized security of the 802.11 WLAN

standard. As mentioned above, the WEP protocol is used in 802.11-based WLANs. WEP in turn uses a

RC4 cryptographic algorithm with a variable length key to protect traffic. Again, the 802.11 standard

supports WEP cryptographic keys of 40-bits. However, some vendors have implemented products with

keys 104-bit keys and even 128-bit keys. With the addition of the 24-bit IV, the actual key used in the

RC4 algorithm is 152 bits for the 128 bits WEP key. It is worthy to note that some vendors generate keys

after a keystroke from a user, which, if done properly, using the proper random processes, can result in a

strong WEP key. Other vendors, however, have based WEP keys on passwords that are chosen by users;

this typically reduces the effective key size.

Several groups of computer security specialists have discovered security problems that let malicious users

compromise the security of WLANs. These include passive attacks to decrypt traffic based on statistical

analysis, active attacks to inject new traffic from unauthorized mobile stations (i.e., based on known plain

text), active attacks to decrypt traffic (i.e., based on tricking the access point), and dictionary-building

attacks. The dictionary building attack is possible after analyzing enough traffic on a busy network.14

Security problems with WEP include the following:

1. The use of static WEP keys—many users in a wireless network potentially sharing the identical

key for long periods of time, is a well-known security vulnerability. This is in part due to the lack

of any key management provisions in the WEP protocol. If a computer such as a laptop were to

be lost or stolen, the key could become compromised along with all the other computers sharing

that key. Moreover, if every station uses the same key, a large amount of traffic may be rapidly

available to an eavesdropper for analytic attacks, such as 2 and 3 below.

2. The IV in WEP, as shown in Figure 3-8, is a 24-bit field sent in the clear text portion of a

message. This 24-bit string, used to initialize the key stream generated by the RC4 algorithm, is a

relatively small field when used for cryptographic purposes. Reuse of the same IV produces

identical key streams for the protection of data, and the short IV guarantees that they will repeat

after a relatively short time in a busy network. Moreover, the 802.11 standard does not specify

how the IVs are set or changed, and individual wireless NICs from the same vendor may all

generate the same IV sequences, or some wireless NICs may possibly use a constant IV. As a

result, hackers can record network traffic, determine the key stream, and use it to decrypt the

cipher-text.

3. The IV is a part of the RC4 encryption key. The fact that an eavesdropper knows 24-bits of

every packet key, combined with a weakness in the RC4 key schedule, leads to a successful

analytic attack, that recovers the key, after intercepting and analyzing only a relatively small

amount of traffic. This attack is publicly available as an attack script and open source code.

4. WEP provides no cryptographic integrity protection. However, the 802.11 MAC protocol uses

a noncryptographic Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) to check the integrity of packets, and

acknowledge packets with the correct checksum. The combination of noncryptographic

checksums with stream ciphers is dangerous and often introduces vulnerablities, as is the case for

 

14 Borisov, N., Goldberg, I., and D. Wagner, http://www.isaac.cs.berkley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.html.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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WEP. There is an active attack that permits the attacker to decrypt any packet by systematically

modifying the packet and CRC sending it to the AP and noting whether the packet is

acknowledged. These kinds of attacks are often subtle, and it is now considered risky to design

encryption protocols that do not include cryptographic integrity protection, because of the

possibility of interactions with other protocol levels that can give away information about cipher

text.

Note that only one of the four problems listed above depends on a weakness in the cryptographic

algorithm. Therefore, these problems would not be improved by substituting a stronger stream cipher. For

example, the third problem listed above is a consequence of a weakness in the implementation of the RC4

stream cipher that is exposed by a poorly designed protocol.

Some of the problems associated with WEP and 802.11 WLAN security are summarized in Table 3-2.

Table 3-2. Key Problems with Existing 802.11 Wireless LAN Security

Security Issue or Vulnerability Remarks

1. Security features in vendor

products are frequently not

enabled.

Security features, albeit poor in some cases, are not enabled when

shipped, and users do not enable when installed. Bad security is

generally better than no security.

2. IVs are short (or static). 24-bit IVs cause the generated key stream to repeat. Repetition

allows easy decryption of data for a moderately sophisticated

adversary.

3. Cryptographic keys are

short.

40-bit keys are inadequate for any system. It is generally accepted

that key sizes should be greater than 80 bits in length. The longer

the key, the less likely a comprise is possible from a brute-force

attack.

4. Cryptographic keys are

shared.

Keys that are shared can compromise a system. As the number of

people sharing the key grows, the security risks also grow. A

fundamental tenant of cryptography is that the security of a system

is largely dependent on the secrecy of the keys.

5. Cryptographic keys cannot

be updated automatically

and frequently.

Cryptographic keys should be changed often to prevent brute-force

attacks.

6. RC4 has a weak key

schedule and is

inappropriately used in

WEP.

The combination of revealing 24 key bits in the IV and a weakness

in the initial few bytes of the RC4 key stream leads to an efficient

attack that recovers the key. Most other applications of RC4 do not

expose the weaknesses of RC4 because they do not reveal key bits

and do not restart the key schedule for every packet. This attack is

available to moderately sophisticated adversaries.

7. Packet integrity is poor. CRC32 and other linear block codes are inadequate for providing

cryptographic integrity. Message modification is possible. Linear

codes are inadequate for the protection against advertent attacks on

data integrity. Cryptographic protection is required to prevent

deliberate attacks. Use of noncryptographic protocols often

facilitates attacks against the cryptography.

8. No user authentication

occurs.

Only the device is authenticated. A device that is stolen can access

the network.

9. Authentication is not

enabled; only simple SSID

identification occurs.

Identity-based systems are highly vulnerable particularly in a

wireless system because signals can be more easily intercepted.

10. Device authentication is

simple shared-key

challenge-response.

One-way challenge-response authentication is subject to “man-inthe-middle” attacks. Mutual authentication is required to provide

verification that users and the network are legitimate.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Security Issue or Vulnerability Remarks

11.The client does not

authenticate the AP.

The client needs to authenticate the AP to ensure that it is legitimate

and prevent the introduction of rogue APs.

3.4 Security Requirements and Threats

As discussed above, the 802.11 WLAN—or WiFi—industry is burgeoning and currently has significant

momentum. All indications suggest that in the coming years numerous organizations will deploy 802.11

WLAN technology. Many organizations—including retail stores, hospitals, airports, and business

enterprises—plan to capitalize on the benefits of “going wireless.” However, although there has been

tremendous growth and success, everything relative to 802.11 WLANs has not been positive. There have

been numerous published reports and papers describing attacks on 802.11 wireless networks that expose

organizations to security risks. This subsection will briefly cover the risks to security—i.e., attacks on

confidentiality, integrity, and network availability.

Figure 3-9 provides a general taxonomy of security attacks to help organizations and users understand

some of the attacks against WLANs.

Attacks

Passive Attacks Active Attacks

Eavesdropping Traffic

Analysis

Masquerade Replay Message

Modification

Denial-ofService

Attacks

Passive Attacks Active Attacks

Eavesdropping Traffic

Analysis

Masquerade Replay Message

Modification

Denial-ofService

Figure 3-9. Taxonomy of Security Attacks

Network security attacks are typically divided into passive and active attacks. These two broad classes are

then subdivided into other types of attacks. All are defined below.

! Passive Attack—An attack in which an unauthorized party gains access to an asset and does not

modify its content (i.e., eavesdropping). Passive attacks can be either eavesdropping or traffic

analysis (sometimes called traffic flow analysis). These two passive attacks are described below.

– Eavesdropping—The attacker monitors transmissions for message content. An example of this

attack is a person listening into the transmissions on a LAN between two workstations or tuning

into transmissions between a wireless handset and a base station.

– Traffic analysis—The attacker, in a more subtle way, gains intelligence by monitoring the

transmissions for patterns of communication. A considerable amount of information is contained

in the flow of messages between communicating parties.
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! Active Attack—An attack whereby an unauthorized party makes modifications to a message, data

stream, or file. It is possible to detect this type of attack but it may not be preventable. Active attacks

may take the form of one of four types (or combination thereof): masquerading, replay, message

modification, and denial-of-service (DoS). These attacks are defined below.

– Masquerading—The attacker impersonates an authorized user and thereby gains certain

unauthorized privileges.

– Replay—The attacker monitors transmissions (passive attack) and retransmits messages as the

legitimate user.

– Message modification—The attacker alters a legitimate message by deleting, adding to,

changing, or reordering it.

– Denial-of-service—The attacker prevents or prohibits the normal use or management of

communications facilities.

The risks associated with 802.11 are the result of one or more of these attacks. The consequences of these

attacks include, but are not limited to, loss of proprietary information, legal and recovery costs, tarnished

image, and loss of network service.

3.4.1 Loss of Confidentiality

Confidentiality is the property with which information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized

individuals, entities, or processes. This is, in general, a fundamental security requirement for most

organizations. Due to the broadcast and radio nature of wireless technology, confidentiality is a more

difficult security requirement to meet in a wireless network. Adversaries do not have to tap into a network

cable to access network resources. Moreover, it may not be possible to control the distance over which the

transmission occurs. This makes traditional physical security countermeasures less effective.

Passive eavesdropping of native 802.11 wireless communications may cause significant risk to an

organization. An adversary may be able to listen in and obtain sensitive information including proprietary

information, network IDs and passwords, and configuration data. This risk is present because the 802.11

signals may travel outside the building perimeter or because there may be an “insider.” Because of the

extended range of 802.11 broadcasts, adversaries can potentially detect transmission from a parking lot or

nearby roads. This kind of attack, performed through the use of a wireless network analyzer tool or

sniffer, is particularly easy for two reasons: 1) frequently confidentiality features of WLAN technology

are not even enabled, and 2) because of the numerous vulnerabilities in the 802.11 technology security, as

discussed above, determined adversaries can compromise the system.

Wireless packet analyzers, such as AirSnort and WEPcrack, are tools that are readily available on the

Internet today. AirSnort is one of the first tools created to automate the process of analyzing networks.

Unfortunately, it is also commonly used for breaking into wireless networks. AirSnort can take advantage

of flaws in the key-scheduling algorithm that was provided for implementation of RC4, which forms part

of the original WEP standard. To accomplish this, AirSnort requires only a computer running the Linux

operating system and a wireless network card. The software passively monitors the WLAN data

transmissions and computes the encryption keys after at least 100 MB of network packets have been

sniffed.

15 On a highly saturated network, collecting this amount of data may only take three or four hours;

if traffic volume is low, it may take a few days. For example, a busy data access point transmitting 3,000

 

15 See “Tools Dumb Down Wireless Hacking,” The Register, August 2001 (www.theregister.co.uk).
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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bytes at 11 Mbps will exhaust the 24-bit IV space after approximately 10 hours.16 If after ten hours the

attacker recovers two cipher texts that have been using the same key stream, both data integrity and

confidentiality may be easily compromised. After the network packets have been received, the

fundamental keys may be guessed in less than one second.17 Once the malicious user knows the WEP key,

that person can read any packet traveling over the WLAN. Such sniffing tools’ wide availability, ease of

use, and ability to compute keys makes it essential for security administrators to implement secure

wireless solutions. Airsnort may not be able to take advantage of the enhanced key-scheduling algorithm

of RC4 in a pre-standard implementation.

Another risk to loss of confidentiality through simple eavesdropping is broadcast monitoring. An

adversary can monitor traffic, using a laptop in promiscuous mode, when an access point is connected to a

hub instead of a switch. Hubs generally broadcast all network traffic to all connected devices, which

leaves the traffic vulnerable to unauthorized monitoring. Switches, on the other hand, can be configured

to prohibit certain attached devices from intercepting broadcast traffic from other specified devices. For

example, if a wireless access point were connected to an Ethernet hub, a wireless device that is

monitoring broadcast traffic could intercept data intended for wired and wireless clients. Consequently,

agencies should consider using switches instead of hubs for connections to wireless access points.18

WLANs risk loss of confidentiality following an active attack as well. Sniffing software as described

above can obtain user names and passwords (as well as any other data traversing the network) as they are

sent over a wireless connection. An adversary may be able to masquerade as a legitimate user and gain

access to the wired network from an AP. Once “on the network,” the intruder can scan the network using

purchased or publicly and readily available tools. The malicious eavesdropper then uses the user name,

password, and IP address information to gain access to network resources and sensitive corporate data.

Lastly, rogue APs pose a security risk. A malicious or irresponsible user could, physically and

surreptitiously, insert a rogue AP into a closet, under a conference room table, or any other hidden area

within a building. The rogue AP could then be used to allow unauthorized individuals to gain access to

the network. As long as its location is in close proximity to the users of the WLAN, and it is configured

so as to appear as a legitimate AP to wireless clients, then the rogue AP can successfully convince

wireless clients of its legitimacy and cause them to send traffic through it. The rogue AP can intercept the

wireless traffic between an authorized AP and wireless clients. It need only be configured with a stronger

signal than the existing AP to intercept the client traffic. A malicious user can also gain access to the

wireless network through APs that are configured to allow access without authorization.19 It is also

important to note that rogue access points need not always be deployed by malicious users. In many

cases, rogue APs are often deployed by users who want to take advantage of wireless technology without

the approval of the IT department. Additionally, since rogue APs are frequently deployed without the

knowledge of the security administrator, they are often deployed without proper security configurations.

3.4.2 Loss of Integrity

Data integrity issues in wireless networks are similar to those in wired networks. Because organizations

frequently implement wireless and wired communications without adequate cryptographic protection of

data, integrity can be difficult to achieve. A hacker, for example, can compromise data integrity by

deleting or modifying the data in an e-mail from an account on the wireless system. This can be

detrimental to an organization if important e-mail is widely distributed among e-mail recipients. Because

the existing security features of the 802.11 standard do not provide for strong message integrity, other

 

16 10 hours = (3,000 bytes x ((8 bits/byte)/(11 x 106 bits/sec)) x 24) = 36,600 seconds.)

17 For more information from AirSnort, visit their Web page at http://airsnort.shmoo.com.

18 See Internet Security Systems, “Wireless LAN Security: 802.11b and Corporate Networks.”

19 See http://iss.net.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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kinds of active attacks that compromise system integrity are possible. As discussed before, the WEPbased integrity mechanism is simply a linear CRC. Message modification attacks are possible when

cryptographic checking mechanisms such as message authentication codes and hashes are not used.

3.4.3 Loss of Network Availability

A denial of network availability involves some form of DoS attack, such as jamming. Jamming occurs

when a malicious user deliberately emanates a signal from a wireless device in order to overwhelm

legitimate wireless signals. Jamming may also be inadvertently caused by cordless phone or microwave

oven emissions. Jamming results in a breakdown in communications because legitimate wireless signals

are unable to communicate on the network. Nonmalicious users can also cause a DoS. A user, for

instance, may unintentionally monopolize a wireless signal by downloading large files, effectively

denying other users access to the network. As a result, agency security policies should limit the types and

amounts of data that users are able to download on wireless networks.

3.4.4 Other Security Risks

With the prevalence of wireless devices, more users are seeking ways to connect remotely to their own

organization’s networks. One such method is the use of untrusted, third-party networks. Conference

centers, for example, commonly provide wireless networks for users to connect to the Internet and

subsequently to their own organizations while at the conference. Airports, hotels, and even some coffee

franchises are beginning to deploy 802.11 based publicly accessible wireless networks for their

customers, even offering VPN capabilities for added security.

These untrusted public networks introduce three primary risks: 1) because they are public, they are

accessible by anyone, even malicious users; 2) they serve as a bridge to a user’s own network, thus

potentially allowing anyone on the public network to attack or gain access to the bridged network; and 3)

they use high-gain antennas to improve reception and increase coverage area, thus allowing malicious

users to eavesdrop more readily on their signals.

By connecting to their own networks via an untrusted network, users may create vulnerabilities for their

company networks and systems unless their organizations take steps to protect their users and themselves.

Users typically need to access resources that their organizations deem as either public or private.

Agencies may want to consider protecting their public resources using an application layer security

protocol such as Transport Layer Security (TLS), the Internet Engineering Task Force standardized

version of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). However, in most agencies, this is unnecessary since the

information is indeed public already. For private resources, agencies should consider using a VPN

solution to secure their connections because this will help prevent eavesdropping and unauthorized access

to private resources.

Lastly, as with any network, social engineering and dumpster diving are also concerns. An enterprise

should consider all aspects of network security when planning to deploy the wireless network.

3.5 Risk Mitigation

Government agencies can mitigate risks to their WLANs by applying countermeasures to address specific

threats and vulnerabilities. Management countermeasures combined with operational and technical

countermeasures can be effective in reducing the risks associated with WLANs. The following guidelines

will not prevent all adversary penetrations, nor will these countermeasures necessarily guarantee a secure

wireless networking environment. This section describes risk-mitigating steps for an agency, recognizing

that it is impossible to remove all risks. Additionally, it should be clear that there is no “one size fits all
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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solution” when it comes to security. Some agencies may be able or willing to tolerate more risk than

others. Also, security comes at a cost: either in money spent on security equipment, in inconvenience and

maintenance, or in operating expenses. Some agencies may be willing to accept risk because applying

various countermeasures may exceed financial or other constraints.

3.5.1 Management Countermeasures

Management countermeasures for securing wireless networks begin with a comprehensive security

policy. A security policy, and compliance therewith, is the foundation on which other countermeasures—

the operational and technical—are rationalized and implemented. A WLAN security policy should be able

to do the following:

! Identify who may use WLAN technology in an agency

! Identify whether Internet access is required

! Describe who can install access points and other wireless equipment

! Provide limitations on the location of and physical security for access points

! Describe the type of information that may be sent over wireless links

! Describe conditions under which wireless devices are allowed

! Define standard security settings for access points

! Describe limitations on how the wireless device may be used, such as location

! Describe the hardware and software configuration of all wireless devices

! Provide guidelines on reporting losses of wireless devices and security incidents

! Provide guidelines for the protection of wireless clients to minimize/reduce theft

! Provide guidelines on the use of encryption and key management

! Define the frequency and scope of security assessments to include access point discovery.

Agencies should ensure that all critical personnel are properly trained on the use of wireless technology.

Network administrators need to be fully aware of the security risks that WLANs and devices pose. They

must work to ensure security policy compliance and to know what steps to take in the event of an attack.

Finally, the most important countermeasures are trained and aware users.

3.5.2 Operational Countermeasures

Physical security is the most fundamental step for ensuring that only authorized users have access to

wireless computer equipment. Physical security combines such measures as access controls, personnel

identification, and external boundary protection. As with facilities housing wired networks, facilities

supporting wireless networks need physical access controls. For example, photo identification, card badge

readers, or biometric devices can be used to minimize the risk of improper penetration of facilities.

Biometric systems for physical access control include palm scans, hand geometry, iris scans, retina scans,

fingerprint, voice pattern, signature dynamics, or facial recognition. External boundary protection can

include locking doors and installing video cameras for surveillance around the perimeter of a site to

discourage unauthorized access to wireless networking components such as wireless APs.
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It is important to consider the range of the AP when deciding where to place an AP in a WLAN

environment. If the range extends beyond the physical boundaries of the office building walls, the

extension creates a security vulnerability. An individual outside of the building, perhaps “war driving,”

could eavesdrop on network communications by using a wireless device that picks up the RF emanations.

A similar consideration applies to the implementation of building-to-building bridges. Ideally, the APs

should be placed strategically within a building so that the range does not exceed the physical perimeter

of the building and allow unauthorized personnel to eavesdrop near the perimeter. Agencies should use

site survey tools (see next paragraph) to measure the range of AP devices, both inside and outside of the

building where the wireless network is located. In addition, agencies should use wireless security

assessment tools (e.g., vulnerability assessment) and regularly conduct scheduled security audits.

Site survey tools are available to measure and secure AP coverage. The tools, which some vendors

include with their products, measure the received signal strength from the APs. These measurements can

be used to map out the coverage area. However, security administrators should use caution when

interpreting the results because each vendor interprets the received signal strength differently. Some AP

vendors also have special features that allow control of power levels and therefore the range of the AP.

This is useful if the required coverage range is not broad because, for example, the building or room in

which access to the wireless network is needed happens to be small. Controlling the coverage range for

this smaller building or room may help prevent the wireless signals from extending beyond the intended

coverage area. Agencies could additionally use directional antennas to control emanations. However,

directional antennas do not protect network links; they merely help control coverage range by limiting

signal dispersion.

Although mapping the coverage area may yield some advantage relative to security, it should not be seen

as an absolute solution. There is always the possibility that an individual might use a high-gain antenna to

eavesdrop on the wireless network traffic. It should be recognized that only through the use of strong

cryptographic means can a user gain any assurance against true eavesdropping adversaries. The following

paragraphs discuss how cryptography (Internet Protocol Security [IPsec] and VPNs) can be used to thwart

many attacks.

3.5.3 Technical Countermeasures

Technical countermeasures involve the use of hardware and software solutions to help secure the wireless

environment.20 Software countermeasures include proper AP configurations (i.e., the operational and

security settings on an AP), software patches and upgrades, authentication, intrusion detection systems

(IDS), and encryption. Hardware solutions include smart cards, VPNs, public key infrastructure (PKI),

and biometrics.21 It should be noted that hardware solutions, which generally have software components,

are listed simply as hardware solutions.

3.5.3.1 Software Solutions

Technical countermeasures involving software include properly configuring access points, regularly

updating software, implementing authentication and IDS solutions, performing security audits, and

adopting effective encryption. These are described in the paragraphs below.

 

20 The classification of a countermeasure into one of the two categories is, in some instances, arbitrary, since the two may

actually overlap. 21 It should be noted that the software and hardware countermeasures identified in this document could arguably fit into either

category.
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3.5.3.1.1 Access Point Configuration

Network administrators need to configure APs in accordance with established security policies and

requirements. Properly configuring administrative passwords, encryption settings, reset function,

automatic network connection function, Ethernet MAC Access Control Lists (ACL), shared keys, and

Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) agents will help eliminate many of the vulnerabilities

inherent in a vendor’s software default configuration.

Updating default passwords. Each WLAN device comes with its own default settings, some of which

inherently contain security vulnerabilities. The administrator password is a prime example. On some APs,

the factory default configuration does not require a password (i.e., the password field is blank).

Unauthorized users can easily gain access to the device if there is no password protection. Administrators

should change default settings to reflect the agency’s security policy, which should include the

requirement for strong (i.e., an alphanumeric and special character string at least eight characters in

length) administrative passwords. If the security requirement is sufficiently high, an agency should

consider using an automated password generator. An alternative to password authentication is two-factor

authentication. One form of two-factor authentication uses a symmetric key algorithm to generate a new

code every minute. This code is a one-time use code that is paired with the user’s personal identification

number (PIN) for authentication. Another example of two-factor authentication is pairing the user’s smart

card with the user’s PIN. This type of authentication requires a hardware device reader for the smart card

or an authentication server for the PIN. Several commercial products provide this capability. However,

use of an automated password generator or two-factor authentication mechanism may not be worth the

investment, depending on the agency’s security requirements, number of users, and budget constraints.

Given the need to ensure good password authentication and policies, it is important to note the critical

importance of ensuring that the management interface has the proper cryptographic protection to prevent

the unauthorized disclosure of the passwords over the management interface. Numerous mechanisms

exist that can be exploited to ensure that encrypted access protects those critical “secrets” in transit.

Secure Shell (SSH) and SSL are two such mechanisms.

Establishing proper encryption settings. Encryption settings should be set for the strongest encryption

available in the product, depending on the security requirements of the agency. Typically, APs have only

a few encryption settings available: none, 40-bit shared key, and 104-bit shared key (with 104-bit shared

key being the strongest). Encryption as used in WEP, simple stream cipher generation, and exclusive-OR

processing does not pose an additional burden on the computer processors performing the function.

Consequently, agencies do not need to worry about computer processor power when planning to use

encryption with the longer keys. However, it should be noted that some attacks against WEP yield

deleterious results regardless of the key size. It is important to note that products using 128-bit keys will

not interoperate with products that use 104-bit keys.

Controlling the reset function. The reset function poses a particular problem because it allows an

individual to negate any security settings that administrators have configured in the AP. It does this by

returning the AP to its default factory settings. The default settings generally do not require an

administrative password, for example, and may disable encryption. An individual can reset the

configuration to the default settings simply by inserting a pointed object such as a pen into the reset hole

and pressing. If a malicious user gains physical access to the device, that individual can exploit the reset

feature and cancel out any security settings on the device. The reset function, if configured to erase basic

operational information such as IP address or keys, can further result in a network DoS, because APs may

not operate without these settings. Having physical access controls in place to prevent unauthorized users

from resetting APs can mitigate the threats. Agencies can detect threats by performing regular security

audits. Additionally, reset can be invoked remotely over the management interface on some products. For
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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this reason, there is a greater need to have proper password administration and encryption on the

management interface.

Using MAC ACL functionality. A MAC address is a hardware address that uniquely identifies each

computer (or attached device) on a network. Networks use the MAC address to help regulate

communications between different computer NICs on the same network subnet. Many 802.11 product

vendors provide capabilities for restricting access to the WLAN based on MAC ACLs that are stored and

distributed across many APs.22 The MAC ACL grants or denies access to a computer using a list of

permissions designated by MAC address. However, the Ethernet MAC ACL does not represent a strong

defense mechanism by itself. Because MAC addresses are transmitted in the clear from a wireless NIC to

an AP, the MAC can be easily captured. Malicious users can spoof a MAC address by changing the actual

MAC address on their computer to a MAC address that has access to the wireless network. This

countermeasure may provide some level of security; however, users should use this with caution. This

may be effective against casual eavesdropping but will not be effective against determined adversaries.

Users may want to consider this as part of an overall defense-in-depth strategy—adding levels of security

to reduce the likelihood of problems. However, users should weigh the administrative burden of enabling

the MAC ACL (assuming they are using MAC ACLs) against the true security provided. In a medium-tolarge network, the burden of establishing and maintaining MAC ACLs may exceed the value of the

security countermeasure. Additionally, most products only support a limited number of MAC addresses in

the MAC ACL. The size of the access control list may be insufficient for medium-to-large networks.

Changing the SSID. The SSID of the AP must be changed from the factory default. The default values of

SSID used by many 802.11 wireless LAN vendors have been published and are well-known to would-be

adversaries. The default values should be changed (always a good security practice) to prevent easy

access. Although an equipped adversary can capture this identity parameter over the wireless interface, it

should be changed to prevent unsophisticated adversary attempts to connect to the wireless network.

Maximize the Beacon Interval. The 802.11 standard specifies the use of “Beacon frames” to announce

the existence of a wireless network. These beacons are transmitted from APs at regular intervals and

allow a client station to identify and match configuration parameters in order to join a wireless network.

APs may not be configured to suppress the transmission of the Beacon frames and its mandatory SSID

field. However, the interval length may be set to its highest value that results in approximately a 67

second interval. While the security improvement is marginal, it does make it somewhat more difficult to

passively “find a network” because the AP is quieter and the SSID is not transmitted as frequently. Using

a longer Beacon interval forces an adversary to perform what is referred to as “active scanning” using

Probe messages with a specific SSID. Hence, where possible, wireless networks should be configured

with the longest beacon interval.

Disable broadcast SSID feature. The SSID is an identifier that is sometimes referred to as the “network

name” and is often a simple ASCII character string. The SSID is used to assign an identifier to the

wireless network (service set). Clients that wish to join a network scan an area for available networks and

join by providing the correct SSID. The SSID, typically a null-terminated ASCII string, has a range from

0 to 32 bytes. The zero-byte case is a special case called the “broadcast” SSID. A wireless client can

determine all the networks in an area by actively scanning for APs with the use of broadcast Probe

Request messages with a zero SSID. The broadcast SSID probe triggers a Probe Response from all

802.11 networks in the area. Disabling the broadcast SSID feature in the APs causes the AP to ignore the

message from the client and forces it to perform active scanning (probing with a specific SSID).

 

22 Dave Molta, “WLAN Security On the Rise,” http://www.networkcomputing.com.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Changing default cryptographic keys. The manufacturer may provide one or more keys to enable

shared-key authentication between the device trying to gain access to the network and the AP. Using a

default shared-key setting forms a security vulnerability because many vendors use identical shared keys

in their factory settings. A malicious user may know the default shared key and use it to gain access to the

network. Changing the default shared-key setting to another key will mitigate the risk. For example, the

shared key could be changed to “954617” instead of using a factory default shared key of “111111.” No

matter what their security level, agencies should change the shared key from the default setting because it

is easily exploited. In general, agencies should opt for the longest key lengths (e.g., 104 bits). Finally, a

generally accepted principle for proper key management is to change cryptographic keys often and when

there are personnel changes.

Using SNMP. Some wireless APs use SNMP agents, which allow network management software tools to

monitor the status of wireless APs and clients. The first two versions of SNMP, SNMPv1 and SMPv2

support only trivial authentication based on plain-text community strings and, as a result, are

fundamentally insecure. SNMPv3, which includes mechanisms to provide strong security are highly

recommended. If SNMP is not required on the network, the agency should simply disable SNMP

altogether. If an agency must use a version of SNMP besides version 3, they must recognize and accept

the risks. It is common knowledge that the default SNMP community string that SNMP agents commonly

use is the word “public” with assigned “read” or “read and write” privileges. Using this well-known

default string leaves devices vulnerable to attack. If an unauthorized user were to gain access and had

read/write privileges, that user could write data to the AP, resulting in a data integrity breach. Agencies

that require SNMP should change the default community string, as often as needed, to a strong

community string. Privileges should be set to “read only” if that is the only access a user requires.

SNMPv1 and SNMPv2 message wrappers support only trivial authentication based on plain-text

community strings and, as a result, are fundamentally insecure and are not recommended. Agencies

should use SNMPv3.23

Changing default channel. One other consideration that is not directly exploitable is the default channel.

Vendors commonly use default channels in their APs. If two or more APs are located near each other but

are on different networks, a DoS can result from radio interference between the two APs. Agencies that

incur radio interference need to determine if one or more nearby AP(s) are using the same channel or a

channel within five channels of their own and then choose a channel that is in a different range.24 For

example, channels 1, 6, and 11 can be used simultaneously by APs that are close to each other without

mutual interference. Agencies must perform a site survey to discover any sources of radio interference.

The site survey should result in a report that proposes AP locations, determines coverage areas, and

assigns radio channels to each AP.

Using DHCP. Automatic network connections involve the use of a Dynamic Host Control Protocol

(DHCP) server. The DHCP server automatically assigns IP addresses to devices that associate with an AP

when traversing a subnet. For example, a DHCP server is used to manage a range of TCP/IP addresses for

client laptops or workstations. After the range of IP addresses is established, the DHCP server

dynamically assigns addresses to workstations as needed. The server assigns the device a dynamic IP

address as long as the encryption settings are compatible with the WLAN. The threat with DHCP is that a

malicious user could easily gain unauthorized access on the network through the use of a laptop with a

wireless NIC. Since a DHCP server will not necessarily know which wireless devices have access, the

server will automatically assign the laptop a valid IP address. Risk mitigation involves disabling DHCP

and using static IP addresses on the wireless network, if feasible.

 

23 See http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-snmpv3-rfc2570bis-03.txt for an explanation on why using SNMPv3

instead of SNMPv1 or SNMPv2 is strongly recommended. 24 See Tyson Macaulay, “Hardening IEEE 802.11 Wireless Networks.”
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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This alternative, like the MAC ACL countermeasure, may only be practical for relatively small networks,

given the administrative overhead involved with assigning static IP addresses and the possible shortage of

addresses. Statically assigning IP addresses would also negate some of the key advantages of wireless

networks, such as roaming or establishing ad hoc networks. Another possible solution is to implement a

DHCP server inside the wired network’s firewall that grants access to a wireless network located outside

of the wired network’s firewall. Still another solution is to use APs with integrated firewalls. This last

solution will add an additional layer of protection to the entire network. All users should evaluate the need

for DHCP taking into consideration the size of their network.

3.5.3.1.2 Software Patches and Upgrades

Vendors generally try to correct known software (and hardware) security vulnerabilities when they have

been identified. These corrections come in the form of security patches and upgrades. Network

administrators need to regularly check with the vendor to see whether security patches and upgrades are

available and apply them as needed. Also, many vendors have “security alert” e-mail lists to advise

customers of new security vulnerabilities and attacks. Administrators should sign up for these critical

alerts. Lastly, administrators can check with the NIST ICAT25 vulnerability database for a listing of all

known vulnerabilities in the software or hardware being implemented. For specific guidance on

implementing security patches, see NIST Special Publication 800-40, Applying Security Patches.

An example of a software or firmware patch is the RSA Security WEP security enhancement. In

November 2001, RSA Security, Inc., developed a technique for the security holes found in WEP. This

enhancement, referred to as “fast packet keying,” generates a unique key to encrypt each network packet

on the WLAN. The Fast Packet Keying Solution uses a hashing technique that rapidly generates the per

packet keys. The IEEE has approved the fast packet keying technology as one fix to the 802.11 protocol.

Vendors have started applying the fix to new wireless products and have developed software patches for

many existing products. Agencies should check with their individual vendors to see if patches are

available for the products they have already purchased.

Another example of a software or firmware patch that will be available as early as late 2002 is WiFi

Protected Access (WPA). 26 WPA, which is being promoted by the WiFi Alliance, is an interim security

solution that does not require a hardware upgrade in existing 802.11 equipment. WPA is not a perfect

solution but is an attempt to quickly and proactively deliver enhanced protection–to address some of the

problems with WEP– prior to the full-blown security techniques of IEEE 802.11 TGi. WiFi Protected

Access, a subset of the TGi solution, includes two main features:

! 802.1X

! Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP)

The 802.1X port-based access control provides a framework to allow the use of robust upper layer

authentication protocols. It also facilitates the use of session keys–since cryptographic keys should change

often. TKIP includes four new algorithms to enhance the security of 802.11. TKIP extends the IV space,

allows for per-packet key construction, provides cryptographic integrity, and provides key derivation and

distribution. TKIP, through these algorithms, provides protection against various security attacks

discussed earlier, including replay attacks and attacks on data integrity. Additionally, it addresses the

critical need to change keys. Again, the objective of WPA is to bring a standards-based security solution

to the marketplace to replace WEP while giving the IEEE 802.11 Task Group i enough time to complete

 

25 See http://icat.nist.gov/icat.cfm.

26 WiFi means “wireless fidelity” and is a synonym for 802.11b.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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and finalize the full 802.11i Robust Security Network (RSN), an amendment to the existing wireless LAN

standard. RSN, to be available in the 4th quarter of 2003, will also include the Advanced Encryption

Standard (AES) for confidentiaility and integrity. The RSN solution will require hardware replacements.

For additional information, refer to Section 3.6.

3.5.3.1.3 Authentication

In general, effective authentication solutions are a reliable way of permitting only authorized users to

access a network. Authentication solutions include the use of usernames and passwords; smart cards,

biometrics, or PKI; or a combination of solutions (e.g., smart cards with PKI).27 When relying on

usernames and passwords for authentication, it is important to have policies specifying minimum

password length, required password characters, and password expiration. Smart cards, biometrics, and

PKI have their own individual requirements and will be addressed in greater detail later in this document.

All agencies should implement a strong password policy, regardless of the security level of their

operations. Strong passwords are simply a fundamental measure in any environment. Agencies should

also consider other types of authentication mechanisms (e.g., smart cards with PKI) if their security levels

warrant additional authentication. These mechanisms may be integrated into a WLAN solution to enhance

the security of the system. However, users should be careful to fully understand the security provided by

enhanced authentication. This does not in and of itself solve all problems. For example, a strong password

scheme used for accessing parameters on a NIC card does nothing to address the problems with WEP

cryptography.

3.5.3.1.4 Personal Firewalls

Resources on public wireless networks have a higher risk of attack since they generally do not have the

same degree of protection as internal resources. Personal firewalls offer some protection against certain

attacks.28 Personal firewalls are software-based solutions that reside on a client's machine and are either

client-managed or centrally managed. Client-managed versions are best suited to low-end users because

individual users are able to configure the firewall themselves and may not follow any specific security

guidelines. Centrally managed solutions provide a greater degree of protection because IT departments

configure and remotely manage them. Centrally managed solutions allow organizations to modify client

firewalls to protect against known vulnerabilities and to maintain a consistent security policy for all

remote users. Some of these high-end products also have VPN and audit capabilities. Although personal

firewalls offer some measure of protection, they do not protect against advanced forms of attack.

Depending on the security requirement, agencies may still need additional layers of protection. Users that

access public wireless networks in airports or conference centers, for example, should use a personal

firewall. Personal firewalls also provide additional protection against rogue access points that can be

easily installed in public places.

3.5.3.1.5 Intrusion Detection System (IDS)

An intrusion detection system (IDS) is an effective tool for determining whether unauthorized users are

attempting to access, have already accessed, or have compromised the network. IDS for WLANs can be

host-based, network-based, or hybrid, the hybrid combining features of host- and network-based IDS. A

host-based IDS adds a targeted layer of security to particularly vulnerable or essential systems. A hostbased agent is installed on an individual system (for example, a database server) and monitors audit trails

 

27 See Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 196, Entity Authentication Using Public Key Cryptography at

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/index.html. 28 See case study on the use of firewalls on laptops for telecommuters at

http://www.techrepublic.com/article.jhtml?id=r00520010328law01.htm.
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and system logs for suspicious behavior, such as repeated failed login attempts or changes to file

permissions. The agent may also employ a checksum at regular intervals to look for changes to system

files. In some cases, an agent can halt an attack on a system, although a host agent's primary function is to

log and analyze events and send alerts. A network-based IDS monitors the LAN (or a LAN segment)

network traffic, packet by packet, in real time (or as near to real time as possible) to determine whether

traffic conforms to predetermined attack signatures (activities that match known attack patterns). For

example, the TearDrop DoS attack sends packets that are fragmented in such a way as to crash the target

system. The network monitor will recognize packets that conform to this pattern and take action such as

killing the network session, sending an e-mail alert to the administrator, or other action specified. Hostbased systems have an advantage over network-based IDS when encrypted connections—e.g., SSL Web

sessions or On-VPN connections—are involved. Because the agent resides on the component itself, the

host-based system is able to examine the data after it has been decrypted. In contrast, a network-based

IDS is not able to decrypt data; therefore, encrypted network traffic is passed through without

investigation. (For more information about IDS, see NIST Special Publication 800-21, Intrusion

Detection Systems.)

IDS technology on wired networks can have the following limitations if used to protect wireless

networks:

! Network-based IDS sensors that have been placed on the wired network behind the wireless access

point will not detect attacks directed from one wireless client to another wireless client (i.e., peer to

peer) on the same subnet. The wireless access point switches traffic directly between wireless clients.

The traffic does not enter the wired network, it is WEP encrypted, and wired-network IDS sensors do

not have an opportunity to capture clear-text packets for analysis. As a result, an adversary that

successfully connects an unauthorized wireless client to the network can perform discovery and attack

against other wireless hosts without detection by the network-based IDS sensor. In this scenario, the

data on the other wireless clients is at risk and information gathered from the other clients may be

used to form an attack on the wired network.

! IDS sensors on the wired network usually will not detect attempts to “deassociate” (to end an

association relationship with) a legitimate client from the wireless network and will not detect the

association of an unauthorized wireless client with the wireless network. Flooding, jamming, and

other DoS attacks against wireless devices use physical and data-link layer techniques that are not

visible to the IDS sensor at a packet level and generally would not be routed onto the wired network.

! IDS technology for wired networks generally only detects attacks once packets are directed at hosts

on the wired network from a compromised wireless client. At that point, the wireless network has

already been compromised, and risk to the wired network is imminent. An important goal is to detect

and send an alarm on unauthorized wireless activity before it affects the wired network.

! IDS technology on wired networks will not identify the physical location of rogue access points

within the building. These rogue access points can act as entry points for unauthorized wireless access

from remote locations.

! IDS technology will not detect an authorized wireless device communicating peer-to-peer with an

unauthorized wireless device. This scenario can create a bridge into the wired network by allowing an

adversary to connect to a wireless device that is operating in “ad hoc” mode. The ad hoc mode allows

a wireless device to be used to relay traffic to the network and creates a number of potential attack

scenarios.

Expansion of a wired network by connecting one or more wireless networks significantly expands the

network’s security perimeter and introduces risk that may not be addressed by existing intrusion detection
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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devices on the wired network. Agencies that want to expand network functionality by adding a wireless

capability should examine the existing IDS architecture and consider additional solutions to address the

above-mentioned risks. Agencies should consider implementing a wireless IDS solution that provides the

following capabilities:

! Identification of the physical location of wireless devices within the building and surrounding

grounds

! Detection of unauthorized peer-to-peer communications within the wireless network that are not

visible to the wired network

! Analysis of wireless communications and monitoring of the 802.11 RF space and generation of an

alarm upon detection of unauthorized configuration changes to wireless devices that violate security

policy

! Detection of and alarming for when a rogue access point goes live within the agency’s security

perimeter

! Detection of flooding and deassociation attempts before they successfully compromise the wireless

network

! Provision of centralized monitoring and management features with potential for integration into

existing IDS monitoring and reporting software to produce a consolidated view of wireless and wired

network security status.

Agencies that require high levels of security should consider deploying an IDS because it provides an

added layer of security. Agencies that currently employ IDSs should consider the addition of the

capabilities above to supplement their existing capabilities. The deployment of IDS obviously comes at a

cost and should be considered if financially feasible. In addition to the cost of the system itself, an IDS

requires experienced personnel to monitor and react to IDS events and to provide general administration

to the IDS database and components. Agencies should also consider using a correlation engine, which

receives standard real-time security events from a variety of sensors, such as IDS, firewall, and virus

systems. Correlation engines combine in real-time and analyze a wide variety of threats. These threats can

include several classes of attacks, such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.

3.5.3.1.6 Encryption

As mentioned earlier, APs generally have only three encryption settings available: none, 40-bit shared

key, and 104-bit setting. The setting of none represents the most serious risk since unencrypted data

traversing the network can easily be intercepted, read, and altered. A 40-bit shared key will encrypt the

network communications data, but there is still a risk of compromise.29 The 40-bit encryption has been

broken by brute force cryptanalysis using a high-end graphics computer and even low-end computers;

consequently, it is of questionable value.30 In general, 104-bit encryption is more secure than 40-bit

encryption because of the significant difference in the size of the cryptographic keyspace. Although this is

not true for 802.11 WEP because of poor cryptographic design using IVs, it is recommended nonetheless

as a good practice. Again, users of 802.11 APs and wireless clients should be vigilant about checking

with the vendor regarding upgrades to firmware and software as they may overcome some of the WEP

problems.

 

29 This is also a threat for 128-bit encryption but just harder to break.

30 See Basgall, M., “Experimental Break-Ins Reveal Vulnerability in Internet, Unix Computer Security,” (January 1999) at

http://www.dukenews.duke.edu/research/encrypt.html.
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3.5.3.1.7 Security Assessments

Security assessments, or audits, are an essential tool for checking the security posture of a WLAN and for

determining corrective action to make sure it remains secure. It is important for agencies to perform

regular audits using wireless network analyzers and other tools. An analyzer, again, sometimes called a

“sniffer,” is an effective tool to conduct security auditing and troubleshoot wireless network issues.

Security administrators or security auditors can use network analyzers, to determine if wireless products

are transmitting correctly and on the correct channels. Administrators should periodically check within

the office building space (and campus) for rogue APs and against other unauthorized access. Agencies

may also consider using an independent third party to conduct the security audits. Independent third-party

security consultants are often more up-to-date on security vulnerabilities, better trained on security

solutions, and equipped to assess the security of a wireless network. An independent third-party audit,

which may include penetration testing, will help an agency ensure that its WLAN is compliant with

established security procedures and policies and that the system is up-to-date with the latest software

patches and upgrades.31 For more information on network security, see NIST Draft Special Publication

800-42, Guideline on Network Security Testing.

32 It is worth noting that agencies should take a holistic

approach to the assessment process. It is important to ensure that the wireless portion of the network is

secure, but it is also important for the wired portion to be secure.

3.5.3.2 Hardware Solutions

Hardware countermeasures for mitigating WLAN risks include implementing smart cards, VPNs, PKI,

biometrics, and other hardware solutions.

3.5.3.2.1 Smart Cards

Smart cards may add another level of protection, although they also add another layer of complexity.

Agencies can use smart cards in conjunction with username or password or by themselves. They can use

smart cards in two-factor authentication (see above). Agencies can also combine smart cards with

biometrics.

In wireless networks, smart cards provide the added feature of authentication. Smart cards are beneficial

in environments requiring authentication beyond simple username and password. User certificate and

other information are stored on the cards themselves and generally require the user only to remember a

PIN number. Smart cards are also portable; consequently users can securely access their networks from

various locations. As with an authentication software solution, these tamper-resistant devices may be

integrated into a WLAN solution to enhance the security of the system. Again, users should be careful to

fully understand the security provided by the smart card solution.

3.5.3.2.2 Virtual Private Networks

VPN technology is a rapidly growing technology that provides secure data transmission across public

network infrastructures. VPNs have in recent years allowed corporations to harness the power of the

Internet for remote access. Today, VPNs are typically used in three different scenarios: for remote user

access, for LAN-to-LAN (site-to-site) connectivity, and for extranets. VPNs employ cryptographic

techniques to protect IP information as it passes from one network to the next or from one location to the

next. Data that is inside the VPN “tunnel”—the encapsulation of one protocol packet inside another—is

encrypted and isolated from other network traffic. A VPN for site-to-site connectivity is illustrated in

 

31 See “Clinic: What are the biggest security risks associated with Wireless technology? What do I need to consider if my

organization wants to introduce this kind of technology to my corporate LAN?”, 2001, at http://www.itsecurity.com. 32 See http://csrc.nist.gov.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Figure 3-10. In this scenario, traffic communicated from Site A to Site B is protected as it moves across

the Internet. Confidentiality, integrity, and other security services are provided as discussed below.

Internet Internet

Site B

Site A

IPsec Protection Protection 

Provided Provided 

VPN device

Internet Internet

Site B

Site A

IPsec Protection Protection 

Provided Provided 

VPN device

Figure 3-10. Typical Use of VPN for Secure Internet Communications From Site-to-Site

Most VPNs in use today make use of the IPsec protocol suite. IPsec, developed by the Internet

Engineering Task Force (IETF), is a framework of open standards for ensuring private communications

over IP networks. It provides the following types of robust protection:

! Confidentiality

! Integrity

! Data origin authentication

! Traffic analysis protection.

Connectionless integrity guarantees that a received message has not changed from the original message.

Data origin authentication guarantees that the received message was sent by the originator and not by a

person masquerading as the originator. Replay protection provides assurance that the same message is not

delivered multiple times and that messages are not out of order when delivered. Confidentiality ensures

that others cannot read the information in the message. Traffic analysis protection provides assurance that

an eavesdropper cannot determine who is communicating or the frequency or volume of communications.

The Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP) header provides privacy and protects against malicious

modification, and the Authentication header (AH) protects against modification without providing

privacy. The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Protocol allow for secret keys and other protection-related
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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parameters to be exchanged prior to a communication without the intervention of a user.33 IKEv1 is in the

process of being replaced by IKEv2.34

The use of IPsec with WLANs is depicted in Figure 3-11. As shown, the IPsec tunnel is provided from

the wireless client through the AP to the VPN device on the enterprise network edge. With IPsec, security

services are provided at the network layer of the protocol stack. This means all applications and protocols

operating above that layer (i.e., above layer 3) are IPsec protected. The IPsec security services are

independent of the security that is occurring at layer 2, the WEP security. As a defense-in-depth strategy,

if a VPN is in place, an agency can consider having both IPsec and WEP applied. With a configuration as

in Figure 3-11, the VPN encrypts (and otherwise protects) the transmitted data to and from the wired

network.35

Internet Protocol Security ( Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) 

WEP Security

VPN Device Wireless client Wireless client

AP

Internet Protocol Security ( Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) 

WEP Security

VPN Device Wireless client Wireless client

AP

Figure 3-11. VPN Security in Addition to WEP

Figure 3-12 illustrates another example of a wireless network with the “VPN overlay.” As shown, with

wireless devices with VPNs, clients can connect securely to the enterprise network through a VPN

gateway on the enterprise edge. Wireless clients establish IPsec connections to the wireless VPN

gateway—in addition to or instead of WEP. Note that the wireless client does not need special hardware;

it just needs to be provided with IPsec/VPN client software. The VPN gateway can use preshared

cryptographic keys or digital (public-key based) certificates for wireless client device authentication. The

reader should recognize that an organization that uses preshared keys for a VPN solution will encounter

the same scalability and key distribution problems present in WEP. Additionally, user authentication to

the VPN gateway can occur using remote authentication dial-in user service (RADIUS) or one-timepasswords (OTP). The VPN gateway may or may not have an integral firewall to restrict traffic to certain

locations within the enterprise network. Today, most VPN devices have integrated firewalls that work

together to protect both the network from unauthorized access and the user data going over the network.

Integrated VPNs and firewalls save costs and reduce administrative burden. Additionally, the VPN

gateway may or may not have the ability to create an audit journal of all activities. An audit trail is a

chronological record of system activities that is sufficient to enable the reconstruction and examination of

the sequence of environments and activities. A security manager may be able to use an audit trail on the

VPN gateway to monitor compliance with security policy and to gain an understanding of whether only

authorized persons have gained access to the wireless network.

 

33 For more information on IPsec protocol security—including discussion of the IPsec authentication header, Encapsulating

Security Payload (ESP) header, and Internet Key Exchange (IKE)—refer to the NIST ITL Bulletin “An Introduction to

IPsec (Internet Protocol Security),” March 2001. 34 For more information on IKEv2, see http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-ipsec-ikev2-02.txt.

35 See “Identifying the Weakest Link,” Wireless Internet Magazine, November/December 2001, at

http://www.wirelessinternetmag.com.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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It should be noted that although the VPN approach enhances the air-interface security significantly, this

approach does not completely address security on the enterprise network. For example, authentication and

authorization to enterprise applications are not always addressed with this security solution. Some VPN

devices can use user-specific policies to require authentication before accessing enterprise applications.

Agencies may want to seek assistance in developing a comprehensive enterprise security strategy.

VPN Gateway

RADIUS 

Server

Corporate Corporate 

Users

Enterprise Network

VPN Gateway

RADIUS 

Server

Corporate Corporate 

Users

Enterprise Network

Figure 3-12. Simplified Diagram of VPN WLAN

3.5.3.2.3 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

PKI provides the framework and services for the generation, production, distribution, control, and

accounting of public key certificates. It provides applications with secure encryption and authentication of

network transactions as well as data integrity and nonrepudiation, using public key certificates to do so.

WLANs can integrate PKI for authentication and secure network transactions. Third-party manufacturers,

for instance, provide wireless PKI, handsets, and smart cards that integrate with WLANs.

Users requiring high levels of security should strongly consider PKI. It provides strong authentication

through user certificates, which can be used with application-level security, to sign and encrypt messages.

Smart cards provide even greater utility since the certificates are integrated into the card. Smart cards

serve both as a token and a secure (tamper-resistant) means for storing cryptographic credentials. Users

requiring lower levels of security, on the other hand, need to consider carefully the complexity and cost of

implementing and administering a PKI before adopting this solution.

3.5.3.2.4 Biometrics

Biometric devices include fingerprint/palm-print scanners, optical scanners (including retina and iris

scanners), facial recognition scanners, and voice recognition scanners. Biometrics provide an added layer

of protection when used either alone or along with another security solution. For example, for agencies

needing higher levels of security, biometrics can be integrated with wireless smart cards or wireless

laptops or other wireless devices and used in lieu of username and password to access the wireless

network. Additionally, biometrics can combine with VPN solutions to provide authentication and data

confidentiality.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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3.6 Emerging Security Standards and Technologies

Like the security industry, standards organizations have responded to the flurry over insecurities in 802.11

WLANs. Activity is occurring in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the IEEE. The IEEE is

currently working on three separate initiatives for improving WLAN security. The first involves the IEEE

802.11 Task Group i (TGi) which has proposed significant modifications to the existing IEEE 802.11

standard as a long-term solution for security. The TGi is defining additional ciphers based on the newly

released Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The AES-based solution will provide a highly robust

solution for the future but will require new hardware and protocol changes. TGi currently has design

requirements to address many of the known problems with WEP including the prevention of forgeries and

detection of replay attacks.

The second initiative for improving WLAN security is the TGi’s short-term solution—WiFi Protected

Access (WPA)—to address the problems of WEP. The group is defining the Temporal Key Integrity

Protocol (TKIP) to address the problems without requiring hardware changes—that is, requiring only

changes to firmware and software drivers. The third initiative from IEEE is the introduction of a new

standard, IEEE 802.1X-2001, a generic framework for port-based network access control and key

distribution, approved in June 2001. By defining the encapsulation of EAP (defined in RFC 2284) over

IEEE 802 media, IEEE 802.1X enables an AP and station to mutually authenticate one another. See also

Section 3.5.3.1.2 for a brief discussion on WPA and TKIP.

Since IEEE 802.1X was developed primarily for use with IEEE 802 LANs, not for use with WLANS, the

IEEE 802.11i draft standard defines additional capabilities required for secure implementation of IEEE

802.1X on 802.11 networks. These include a requirement for use of an EAP method supporting mutual

authentication, key management, and dictionary attack resistance. In addition, 802.11i defines the

hierarchy for use with the TKIP and AES ciphers and a “four way” key management handshake used to

ensure that the station is authenticated to the AP and a back-end authentication server, if present. As a

result, to provide adequate security, it is important that IEEE 802.1X implementations on 802.11

implement the IEEE 802.11i enhancements, as well as the basic IEEE 802.1X standard.

IEEE 802.1X can be implemented entirely on the AP (by providing support for one or more EAP methods

within the AP), or it can utilize a backend authentication server. The IEEE 802.1X standard supports

authentication protocols such as RADIUS, Diameter, and Kerberos. RADIUS, described in RFC 2865-

2869, and RFC 3162, enables authentication, authorization, and accounting for Network Access Server

(NAS) devices, including dial-up, xDSL, and 802.11.

The 802.1X standard can be implemented with different EAP types, including EAP-MD5 (defined in

RFC 2284 and supporting only one-way authentication without key exchange) for Ethernet LANs and

EAP-TLS (defined in RFC 2716, supporting fast reconnect, mutual authentication and key management

via certificate authentication). Currently a new generation of EAP methods are being developed within

the IETF, focused on addressing wireless authentication and key management issues. These methods

support additional security features such as cryptographic protection of the EAP conversation, identity

protection, secure ciphersuite negotiation, tunneling of other EAP methods, etc. For the latest

developments on the status of each specification, the reader is encouraged to refer to the IEEE 802.11

standards web site.36

 

36 See http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802 for the latest developments on the IEEE 802.11 standards.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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3.7 Case Study: Implementing a Wireless LAN in the Work Environment

Agency A is considering implementing a WLAN so that employees may use their laptop computers

anywhere within the boundaries of their office building. Before deciding, however, Agency A has its

computer security department perform a risk assessment in accordance with NIST Special Publication

800-30.37 The security department first identifies WLAN vulnerabilities and threats. The department,

assuming that threat sources will try to exploit WLAN vulnerabilities, determines the overall risk of

operating a WLAN and the impact a successful attack would have on Agency A. The manager reads the

risk assessment and decides that the residual risk exceeds the benefit the WLAN provides. The manager

directs the computer security department to identify additional countermeasures to mitigate residual risk

before the system can be implemented.

Using the risk assessment as its basis, the computer security department concentrates on four areas for

risk mitigation: physical security, AP location, AP configuration, and security policy. Analysis of

physical security reveals that nonemployees are able to gain access to the building after checking in at the

main desk. To ensure that only authorized employees and guests may access the building, the security

department recommends that Agency A adopt the use of photo identification, card badges, or biometric

devices. The security team will physically secure the APs by installing them within the secured building

facility, which requires users to have proper identification to enter. Additionally, only network

administrators have access to the network devices.

The computer security department wants to minimize the possibility that unauthorized users will access

the WLAN from outside the building. The security department evaluates each AP to determine the

network vulnerabilities such as eavesdropping. Network engineers conduct a site survey to determine the

best physical location for the APs, to reduce the threat of eavesdropping. This involves physically

mapping where users have wireless access to the network. The security department realizes that with a

high-gain antenna, attackers will still be able to eavesdrop on wireless network traffic. To offset this risk,

the department proposes placing the WLAN outside the firewall and passing traffic through a VPN that

supports high-level encryption. This configuration will greatly reduce the risks associated with

eavesdropping.

Next, the computer security department focuses on vulnerabilities related to AP configuration. Because

many APs retain the original default factory password setting, the computer security department chooses

a robust password to ensure a higher level of assurance. In conjunction with management and network

administrators, the security department develops a security policy that requires passwords to be regularly

updated and have a minimum length of eight alphanumeric characters. The policy includes the provision

to change the encryption setting from “no encryption” to 104-bit encryption. The policy further deals with

MAC ACL usage. To provide an additional level of access security, the department allows the use of

MAC ACLs whenever possible. The policy also addresses the use of SNMP. The computer security

department decides to disable remote SNMP because of the related threat and only allows it from internal

hosts. Finally, since many vendors use default shared authentication keys, unauthorized devices can gain

access to the network if they know the default key. Consequently, the security department stipulates the

use of username and password as supplemental authentication to APs.

The security department adds additional policies to address software upgrades and use of the network.

The policy requires system administrators to test and update security patches and upgrades, as soon as the

vendor makes them available. Frequent patches and upgrades will help reduce the possibility of attack on

the older, faulty version of the software. The NIST ICAT Vulnerability Database or an equivalent source

for a comprehensive list of known vulnerabilities in major software packages and hardware products is

 

37 See NIST SP 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems, at http://csrc.nist.gov.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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checked. The policy also strongly discourages users from processing proprietary or employee personal

data when connected from their laptops to the WLAN, thus helping to reduce the risk of personnel data

exploitation. Also, the policy states that if a laptop is lost or stolen, the employee to whom the laptop

belongs will promptly notify the security department. This will ensure that the security department can

quickly identify the IP address assigned to the laptop and prevent that IP address from accessing the

network.

As an additional security measure, the security department recommends that Agency A incorporate the

use of an IDS. The IDS would help determine whether unauthorized users are attempting to access, have

already accessed, or have compromised the network. The department views an IDS as a useful tool in

protecting Agency A's network and, more importantly, the data that traverses it. The IDS is aprt of an

overall defense-in-depth strategy and is not relied on to detect all attacksagainst or misuse of the network.

The security department presents the manager with the risk assessment, which includes the

countermeasures described above (and listed below) and a diagram (see Figure 3-13) of the proposed

WLAN. The risk assessment also includes an update of the residual risk with the proposed measures in

place. Realizing that the benefits of system operation now outweigh the residual risks, the manager agrees

to implement the WLAN. However, the security department warns that although the risk assessment is

thorough, WLAN technology is continually changing along with the security vulnerabilities that

malicious users expose. They offer encryption algorithms as an example. As encryption-breaking

programs become more sophisticated, malicious users may expose more software flaws in vendor

programs or weaknesses in encryption algorithms. They also point out that users always represent the

weakest link in a security chain. The agency must continue to educate the user community about the risks

that wireless technologies pose, reiterating, for example, how important it is not to give others their

usernames and passwords and not to execute programs that come from unknown sources. In conclusion,

the security department conveys that the strategy is one of defense-in-depth. They cite, for example, that

WEP encryption will be enabled with random keys, MAC ACLs will be used, and an IPsec-based VPN

overlay will be deployed. They also note that they will monitor the appropriate standards organizations

and the availability of products such that the optimal security solution, the solution that is most secure and

cost-effective, for the enterprise can be determined.

Agency A’s proposed countermeasures follow:

! Adopt personal identification system for physical access control.

! Disable file and directory sharing on PCs.

! Ensure that sensitive files are password protected and encrypted.

! Turn off all unnecessary services on the AP.

! If practical, power off the AP(s) when not in use.

! If the AP supports logging, turn it on and review the logs regularly.

! Secure AP configuration as follows:

– Choose robust password to ensure a higher level of security.

– Use 128-bit encryption.

– Create MAC ACLs and enable checking in APs.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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– Change SSID from default setting and suppress its broadcast.

– Change WEP keys from default settings.

– Disable remote SNMP.

! Conduct site survey and strategically place wireless APs.

! Deploy VPN overlay (gateway and client) with integral firewall.

! Establish comprehensive security policies regarding use of wireless devices.

! Deploy personal firewalls and antivirus software on the wireless clients.

! Investigate 802.11 products with best long-term wireless security strategy and longevity in

marketplace.

! Select products with SNMPv3 (or other encrypted management capabilities) on the APs and the

integrated firewall-VPN device.

! Seek expert assistance in conducting a security assessment after deployment.

Router

Hub

AP

Wired LAN

Authenticate users and terminate Authenticate users and terminate IPsec 

Authenticate gateway Authenticate gateway 

and terminate and terminate IPsec 

VPN Gateway

RADIUS 

Server Server

Router

Hub

AP

Wired LAN

Authenticate users and terminate Authenticate users and terminate IPsec 

Authenticate gateway Authenticate gateway 

and terminate and terminate IPsec 

VPN Gateway

RADIUS 

Server Server

Figure 3-13. Agency A WLAN Architecture
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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3.8 Wireless LAN Security Checklist

Table 3-3 provides a WLAN security checklist. The table presents guidelines and recommendations for

creating and maintaining a secure 802.11 wireless network. For each recommendation or guideline, three

columns are provided. The first column, the Best Practice column, if checked, means this is recommended

for all agencies. The second column, the “Should Consider” column, if checked, means the

recommendation is something that an agency should carefully consider for three reasons. First,

implementing the recommendation may provide a higher level of security for the wireless environment by

offering some sort of additional protection. Second, the recommendation supports a defense-in-depth

strategy. Third, it may have significant performance, operational, or cost impacts. In summary, if the

“Should Consider” column is checked, agencies need to carefully consider the option and weigh the costs

versus the benefits. The last column, the “Status” column, is intentionally left blank and allows an agency

to use this table as a true checklist. For instance, an individual performing a wireless security audit in an

802.11 environment can quickly check off each recommendation for the agency, asking “Have I done

this?”

Table 3-3. Wireless LAN Security Checklist

Checklist

Security Recommendation Best

Practice

Should

Consider

Status

Management Recommendations

1. Develop an agency security policy that addresses the use of wireless

technology, including 802.11.

!

2. Ensure that users on the network are fully trained in computer security

awareness and the risks associated with wireless technology.

!

3. Perform a risk assessment to understand the value of the assets in the

agency that need protection.

!

4. Ensure that the client NIC and AP support firmware upgrade so that

security patches may be deployed as they become available (prior to

purchase).

!

5. Perform comprehensive security assessments at regular and random

intervals (including validating that rogue APs do not exist in the 802.11

WLAN) to fully understand the wireless network security posture.

!

6. Ensure that external boundary protection is in place around the perimeter

of the building or buildings of the agency.

!

7. Deploy physical access controls to the building and other secure areas

(e.g., photo ID, card badge readers).

!

8. Complete a site survey to measure and establish the AP coverage for the

agency.

!

9. Take a complete inventory of all APs and 802.11 wireless devices. !

10. Ensure that wireless networks are not used until they comply with the

agency’s security policy.

!

11. Locate APs on the interior of buildings instead of near exterior walls and

windows as appropriate.

!

12. Place APs in secured areas to prevent unauthorized physical access and

user manipulation.

!

Technical Recommendations

13. Empirically test AP range boundaries to determine the precise extent of the

wireless coverage.

!
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Checklist

Security Recommendation Best

Practice

Should

Consider

Status

14. Make sure that APs are turned off during when they are not used (e.g.,

after hours and on weekends).

!

15. Make sure that the reset function on APs is being used only when needed

and is only invoked by an authorized group of people.

!

16. Restore the APs to the latest security settings when the reset functions are

used.

!

17. Change the default SSID in the APs. !

18. Disable the broadcast SSID feature so that the client SSID must match that

of the AP.

!

19. Validate that the SSID character string does not reflect the agency’s name

(division, department, street, etc.) or products.

!

20. Ensure that AP channels are at least five channels different from any other

nearby wireless networks to prevent interference.

!

21. Understand and make sure that all default parameters are changed. !

22. Disable all insecure and nonessential management protocols on the APs. !

23. Enable all security features of the WLAN product, including the

cryptographic authentication and WEP privacy feature.

!

24. Ensure that encryption key sizes are at least 128-bits or as large as

possible.

!

25. Make sure that default shared keys are periodically replaced by more

secure unique keys.

!

26. Install a properly configured firewall between the wired infrastructure and

the wireless network (AP or hub to APs).

!

27. Install antivirus software on all wireless clients. !

28. Install personal firewall software on all wireless clients. !

29. Disable file sharing on wireless clients (especially in untrusted

environments).

!

30. Deploy MAC access control lists. !

31. Consider installation of Layer 2 switches in lieu of hubs for AP connectivity. !

32. Deploy IPsec-based Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology for wireless

communications.

!

33. Ensure that encryption being used is sufficient given the sensitivity of the

data on the network and the processor speeds of the computers.

!

34. Fully test and deploy software patches and upgrades on a regular basis. !

35. Ensure that all APs have strong administrative passwords. !

36. Ensure that all passwords are being changed regularly. !

37. Deploy user authentication such as biometrics, smart cards, two-factor

authentication, and PKI.

!

38. Ensure that the “ad hoc mode” for 802.11 has been disabled unless the

environment is such that the risk is tolerable. Note: some products do not

allow disabling this feature; use with caution or use different vendor.

!

39. Use static IP addressing on the network. !

40. Disable DHCP. !

41. Enable user authentication mechanisms for the management interfaces of

the AP.

!
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Checklist

Security Recommendation Best

Practice

Should

Consider

Status

42. Ensure that management traffic destined for APs is on a dedicated wired

subnet.

!

43. Use SNMPv3 and/or SSL/TLS for Web-based management of APs. !

Operational Recommendations

44. Configure SNMP settings on APs for least privilege (i.e., read only).

Disable SNMP if it is not used. SNMPv1 and SNMPv2 are not

recommended.

!

45. Enhance AP management traffic security by using SNMPv3 or equivalent

cryptographically protected protocol.

!

46. Use a local serial port interface for AP configuration to minimize the

exposure of sensitive management information.

!

47. Consider other forms of authentication for the wireless network such as

RADIUS and Kerberos.

!

48. Deploy intrusion detection agents on the wireless part of the network to

detect suspicious behavior or unauthorized access and activity.

!

49. Deploy auditing technology to analyze the records produced by RADIUS

for suspicious activity.

!

50. Deploy an 802.11 security product that offers other security features such

as enhanced cryptographic protection or user authorization features.

!

51. Enable utilization of key-mapping keys (802.1X) rather than default keys so

that sessions use distinct WEP keys.

!

52. Fully understand the impacts of deploying any security feature or product

prior to deployment.

!

53. Designate an individual to track the progress of 802.11 security products

and standards (IETF, IEEE, etc.) and the threats and vulnerabilities with

the technology.

!

54. Wait until future releases of 802.11 WLAN technologies incorporate fixes to

the security features or provide enhanced security features.

!

55. When disposing access points that will no longer be used by the agency,

clear access point configuration to prevent disclosure of network

configuration, keys, passwords, etc.

!

56. If the access point supports logging, turn it on and review the logs on a

regular basis.

!

3.9 Wireless LAN Risk and Security Summary

Table 3-4 lists security recommendations for 802.11 wireless LANs. For each recommendation, narrative

is provided that addresses the security need, requirements or justification for that rcommendation.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Table 3-4. Wireless LAN Security Summary

Security Recommendation Security Needs, Requirements, or Justification

1. Develop an agency security policy that

addresses the use of wireless technology,

including 802.11.

A security policy is the foundation on which other

countermeasures—the operational and technical

ones—are rationalized and implemented. A

documented security policy allows an organization to

define acceptable architecture, implementation, and

uses for 802.11 wireless technologies.

2. Ensure that users on the network are fully

trained in computer security awareness and

the risks associated with wireless technology

(e.g., 802.11).

A security awareness program helps users to establish

good security practices to prevent inadvertent or

malicious intrusions into an organization’s information

systems.

3. Perform a risk assessment to understand the

value of the assets in the agency that need

protection.

Understanding the value of organizational assets and

the level of protection required is likely to enable more

cost-effective wireless solutions that provide an

appropriate level of security.

4. Ensure that the client NIC and AP support

firmware upgrades so that security patches

may be deployed as they become available

(prior to purchase).

Wireless products should support upgrade and patching

of firmware to be able to take advantage of wireless

security enhancements and fixes.

5. Perform comprehensive security assessments

at regular and random intervals (including

validating that rogue APs do not exist in the

802.11 WLAN) to fully understand the wireless

network security posture.

Security assessments, or audits, are an essential tool

for checking the security posture of a WLAN and for

determining corrective action to make sure it stays

secure. Random checks ensure that the security

posture is maintained beyond periods of assessment.

6. Ensure that external boundary protection is in

place around the perimeter of the building or

buildings of the agency.

The external boundaries should be secured to prevent

malicious physical access to an organization’s

information system infrastructure such as a fence or

locked doors.

7. Deploy physical access controls to the building

and other secure areas (e.g., using photo IDs

or card badge readers).

Identification badges or physical access cards help to

ensure that only authorized personnel have access to

gain entry to a facility.

8. Complete a site survey to measure and

establish the AP coverage for the agency.

Proper placement of Access Points will help ensure that

there is adequate wireless coverage of the environment

while minimizing exposure to external attack. The site

survey should result in a report that proposes AP

locations, determines coverage areas, and assigns

radio channels to each AP and that ensures that the

coverage range does not expose APs to potential

malicious activities.

9. Take a complete inventory of all APs and

802.11 wireless devices.

A complete inventory list of APs and 802.11 wireless

devices can be referenced when conducting an audit for

unauthorized use of wireless technologies.

10. Ensure that wireless networks are not used

until they comply with the agency’s security

policy.

Security policy enforcement is vital for ensuring that

only authorized APs and 802.11 wireless devices are

operating in compliance with the organization’s wireless

security policy.

11. Locate APs on the interior of buildings instead

of near exterior walls and windows.

Locating APs near exterior walls and windows provides

a better range of access to potential external malicious

users. Choosing the location wisely to balance security

and coverage should be considered.

12. Place APs in secured areas to prevent

unauthorized physical access and user

manipulation.

Physically securing the APs, putting them “out of

reach,” prevents unauthorized access by potential

malicious users.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Security Recommendation Security Needs, Requirements, or Justification

13. Empirically test AP range boundaries to

determine the precise extent of the wireless

coverage.

By empirically testing the AP coverage range for an

agency, a level of risk associated with the access range

by potential malicious users can be better understood.

14. Make sure that APs are turned off while they

are not being used (e.g., after hours,

weekends).

Shutting down APs when not in use minimizes potential

exposure to malicious activity.

15. Make sure that the reset function on APs is

being used only when needed and is only

invoked by an authorized group of people.

The reset function allows an individual to negate any

security settings administrators have configured on an

access point.

16. Restore the APs to the latest security settings

when the reset functions are used.

Security settings are lost after a reset function.

Therefore, the appropriate personnel should restore the

latest security settings after a reset.

17. Change the default SSID in the APs. Many default SSIDs used by vendors are published and

well known. Malicious users often try to connect to

802.11 networks using the default SSID.

18. Disable the broadcast SSID feature so that the

client SSID must match that of the AP.

Malicious users can more easily detect and exploit APs

that are broadcasting the SSID. Disabling the broadcast

SSID feature minimizes exposure of the AP to malicious

users.

19. Validate that the SSID character string does

not reflect the agency’s name (division,

department, street, etc.) or products.

The SSID should be somewhat difficult for malicious

users to use to determine the organization or agency

that owns the AP. The SSID should also be long and

difficult to guess.

20. Ensure that AP channels are at least five

channels different from any other nearby

wireless networks to prevent interference.

Radio interference between APs can result in a denial

of service. So, using channels in a different range

ensures service availability.

21. Understand and make sure that all default

parameters are changed.

Because default settings are generally known and not

secure, these settings should be changed and should

comply with organizational security policy.

22. Disable all insecure and nonessential

management protocols on the APs.

Management protocols that are enabled on APs but not

used present a potential avenue of attack. Disabling all

insecure and nonessential management protocols

minimizes potential methods that a hostile entity can

use when attempting to compromise an access point.

23. Enable all security features of the WLAN

product, including the cryptographic

authentication and WEP privacy features.

Enabling built-in security features provides greater

security than the default settings.

24. Ensure that encryption key sizes are at least

128 bits or as large as possible.

Brute force attacks on encryption key sizes become

more difficult as the key sizes increase. The addition of

a single bit doubles the key space. A 128-bit provides

an “intractable” key space against cryptanalysis, if the

algorithm and implementation are sound.

25. Make sure that default shared keys are

periodically replaced by more secure unique

keys.

Changing default shared keys periodically decreases

the likelihood that a malicious user can exploit a

compromised key. A changed key increases the

adversary’s difficulty.

26. Install a properly configured firewall between

the wired infrastructure and the wireless

network (AP or hub to APs).

A firewall can enforce a security policy on the

information flow between the wired network and the

wireless network.

27. Install antivirus software on all wireless clients. Antivirus software helps ensure that the wireless client

does not introduce known worms and viruses to the

wired network while protecting the wireless client from

viruses that originate on the wired network.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Security Recommendation Security Needs, Requirements, or Justification

28. Install personal firewall software on all wireless

clients.

Personal firewalls help to protect against wireless

network attacks.

29. Disable file sharing on wireless clients

(especially in untrusted environments).

Malicious users can potentially exploit wireless clients

enabled for file sharing.

30. Deploy MAC access control lists. The use of access control lists based on MAC hardware

addresses provides a layer of security that ensures that

only authorized wireless devices are allowed to connect

to the wired network.

31. Consider installation of Layer 2 switches in lieu

of hubs for AP connectivity.

The use of layer 2 switches segments network traffic

and minimizes potential for a hostile user to monitor

traffic by connecting to a hub.

32. Deploy IPsec-based Virtual Private Network

(VPN) technology for wireless

communications.

The use of IPsec-based VPN provides an overlay

protection to the standard link encryption (e.g., WEP)

provided by the wireless connecting hosts.

33. Ensure that encryption being used is sufficient

with the sensitivity of the data on the network

and the processor speeds of the computers.

Sensitive data transmission should be encrypted. The

level of encryption provided must be balanced between

data security requirement and overhead cost related to

processor capability.

34. Fully test and deploy software patches and

upgrades regularly.

Newly discovered security vulnerabilities of vendor

products should be patched to prevent malicious and

inadvertent exploits. Patches should also be fully tested

before implementation to ensure that they work.

35. Ensure that all APs have strong administrative

passwords.

Administrator passwords on APs should not be easy to

guess. This minimizes the risk of an unauthorized user

gaining access by guessing or cracking administrative

passwords.

36. Ensure that all passwords are being changed

regularly.

Passwords should changed regularly to reduce the risk

of a compromised password being exploited.

37. Deploy user authentication such as biometrics,

smart cards, two-factor authentication, or PKI.

Implementing strong or two-factor authentication

whenever possible minimizes the vulnerabilities

associated with simple username and password

authentication.

38. Ensure that the “ad hoc mode” for 802.11 has

been disabled unless the environment is such

that the risk is tolerable. Note: some products

do not allow disabling this feature; use with

caution or use a different vendor.

The “ad hoc mode” for 802.11 can be exploited. Users

of hosts with “ad hoc mode” enabled may

unintentionally allow users to inadvertently or

maliciously connect to those systems.

39. Use static IP addressing on the network. Using static IP addressing makes it more difficult for a

hostile user to connect to the network.

40. Disable DHCP. If DHCP is disabled, then hosts are forced to use a

static IP address.

41. Enable user authentication mechanisms for the

management interfaces of the AP.

User authentication mechanisms should be enabled to

ensure that only authenticated users are allowed

access to the management interfaces of an AP.

42. Ensure that management traffic that is

destined for APs is on a dedicated wired

subnet.

Passing management traffic over an “out of band’

network or management subnet protects management

traffic, interfaces, and passwords from organizational

and outside users.

43. Use SNMPv3 and/or SSL/TLS for Web-based

management of APs.

SNMPv3 has enhanced security features relative to its

predecessor SNMP protocol. SNMPv3 and SSL/TLS

provide for secure authentication and encryption for

Web-based management access of APs.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

3-46

Security Recommendation Security Needs, Requirements, or Justification

44. Configure SNMP settings on APs for least

privilege (i.e., read only). Disable SNMP if it is

not used. SNMPv1 and SNMPv2 are not

recommended.

Agencies that require SNMP should change the default

community string, as often as needed, to a strong

community string. Privileges should be set to “read

only” if that is the only access a user requires. SNMPv1

and SNMPv2 message wrappers support only trivial

authentication based on plain-text community strings

and so are fundamentally insecure and not

recommended. Agencies should use SNMPv3.

45. Enhance AP management traffic security by

using SNMPv3 or equivalent cryptographically

protected protocol.

AP management traffic should be cryptographically

protected. SNMPv3 provides cryptographic

mechanisms to provide strong security.

46. Use a local serial port interface for AP

configuration to minimize the exposure of

sensitive management information.

By using a local serial port interface for AP

configuration ensures that sensitive management

information do not traverse the network as well as

minimizing the risk of unauthorized users gaining

access via a network protocol used to manage the AP.

47. Consider other forms of authentication for the

wireless network such as RADIUS and

Kerberos.

Use of authentication mechanisms such as RADIUS

and Kerberos can improve the security and simplify

user management.

48. Deploy intrusion detection agents on the

wireless part of the network to detect

suspicious behavior or unauthorized access

and activity.

Intrusion detection agents (e.g., host-based or networkbased agents) deployed on the wireless network can

detect and respond to potential malicious activities.

49. Deploy auditing technology to analyze the

records produced by RADIUS for suspicious

activity.

If RADIUS is used, the audit records should be

manually or automatically processed to determine if

malicious activity has been directed at the

authentication server.

50. Deploy an 802.11 security product that offers

other security features such as enhanced

cryptographic protection or user authorization

features.

During product selection, ensure that the product

provides enhanced cryptographic protection or user

authorization features.

51. Enable use key-mapping keys rather than

default keys so that sessions use distinct WEP

keys.

The use of distinct WEP keys provides more security

than default keys and reduces the risk of key

compromise.

52. Fully understand the impacts of deploying any

security feature or product prior to deployment.

To ensure a successful deployment, an organization

should fully understand the technical, security,

operational, and personnel requirements before

implementation.

53. Designate an individual to track the progress of

802.11 security products and standards (IETF,

IEEE, etc.) and the threats and vulnerabilities

with the technology.

An appointed individual designated to track the latest

technology enhancements, standards, and risks will

help to ensure the continued secure implementation of

wireless technology.

54. Wait for future releases of 802.11 WLAN

technologies that incorporate fixes to the

security features, or provide enhanced security

features.

Upgrade to the latest versions and avoid purchasing the

versions of the 802.11 products with major security

vulnerabilities that have not been fixed.

55. When disposing of access points that will no

longer be used by the agency, clear access

point configuration to prevent disclosure of

network configuration, keys, passwords, etc.

Sensitive or proprietary configuration settings should be

cleared from access points before removing them from

use or disposing to prevent inadvertent disclosure of the

information to potentially malicious users.

56. If the access point supports logging, turn it on

and review the logs on a regular basis.

Ensure that the APs are set to perform logging. Also,

review of audit and logging data helps to ensure user

accountability.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Security Recommendation Security Needs, Requirements, or Justification

57. If the access point supports logging, turn it on

and review the logs on a regular basis.

Access point logs should be enabled and regularly

reviewed for malicious activity.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

4-1

4. Wireless Personal Area Networks

This section provides a detailed overview of Bluetooth technology—an ad hoc networking technology. As

mentioned earlier, ad hoc networks are a relatively new paradigm of wireless communications in which

no fixed infrastructure exists such as base stations or access points. In ad hoc networks, devices maintain

random network configurations formed “on the fly,” relying on a system of mobile routers connected by

wireless links that enable devices to communicate with each other. Devices within an ad hoc network

control the network configuration, and they maintain and share resources. Ad hoc networks are similar to

peer-to-peer (P2P) networking in that they both use decentralized networking, in which the information is

maintained at the end user location rather than in a centralized database. However, ad hoc and P2P

networks differ in that P2P networks rely on a routing mechanism to direct information queries, whereas

ad hoc networks rely on the device hardware to request and share the information.

Ad hoc networks allow devices to access wireless applications, such as address book synchronization and

file sharing applications, within a wireless personal area network (PAN). When combined with other

technologies, these networks can be expanded to include network and Internet access. Bluetooth devices

that typically do not have access to network resources but that are connected in a Bluetooth network with

an 802.11 capable device can achieve connection within the corporate network as well as reach out to the

Internet.

4.1 Bluetooth Overview

Ad hoc networks today are based primarily on Bluetooth technology. Bluetooth is an open standard for

short-range digital radio. It is touted as a low-cost, low-power, and low-profile technology that provides a

mechanism for creating small wireless networks on an ad hoc basis. Bluetooth is considered a wireless

PAN technology that offers fast and reliable transmission for both voice and data. Untethered Bluetooth

devices will eliminate the need for cables and provide a bridge to existing networks.

Bluetooth can be used to connect almost any device to any other device. An example is the connection

between a PDA and a mobile phone. The goal of Bluetooth is to connect disparate devices (PDAs, cell

phones, printers, faxes, etc.) together wirelessly in a small environment such as an office or home.

According to the leading proponents of the technology, Bluetooth is a standard that will ultimately—

! Eliminate wires and cables between both stationary and mobile devices

! Facilitate both data and voice communications

! Offer the possibility of ad hoc networks and deliver synchronicity between personal devices.

Bluetooth is designed to operate in the unlicensed ISM (industrial, scientific, medical applications) band

that is available in most parts of the world, with variation in some locations. The characteristics of

Bluetooth are summarized in Table 4-1. Bluetooth-enabled devices will automatically locate each other,

but making connections with other devices and forming networks requires user action.

As with all ad hoc networks, Bluetooth network topologies are established on a temporary and random

basis. A distinguishing feature of Bluetooth networks is the master-slave relationship maintained between

the network devices. Up to eight Bluetooth devices may be networked together in a master-slave

relationship, called a “piconet.” In a piconet, one device is designated as the master of the network with

up to seven slaves connected directly to that network. The master device controls and sets up the network

(including defining the network’s hopping scheme). Devices in a Bluetooth piconet operate on the same

channel and follow the same frequency hopping sequence. Although only one device may perform as the
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

4-2

master for each network, a slave in one network can act as the master for other networks, thus creating a

chain of networks. This series of piconets, often referred to as scatter-nets, allows several devices to be

internetworked over an extended distance. This relationship also allows for a dynamic topology that may

change during any given session: as a device moves toward or away from the master device in the

network, the topology and therefore the relationships of the devices in the immediate network change.

Table 4-1. Key Characteristics of Bluetooth Technology

Characteristic Description

Physical Layer Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS).

Frequency Band 2.4 – 2.4835 GHz (ISM band).

Hop Frequency 1,600 hops/sec.

Data Rate 1 Mbps (raw). Higher bit rates are anticipated.

Data and Network Security

Three modes of security (none, link-level, and service level), two

levels of device trust, and three levels of service security. Stream

encryption for confidentiality, challenge-response for

authentication. PIN-derived keys and limited management.

Operating Range About 10 meters (30 feet); can be extended to 100 meters.

Throughput Up to approximately 720 kbps.

Positive Aspects

No wires and cables for many interfaces. Ability to penetrate walls

and other obstacles. Costs are decreasing with a $5 cost

projected. Low power and minimal hardware.

Negative Aspects Possibility for interference with other ISM band technologies.

Relatively low data rates. Signals leak outside desired boundaries.

Scenario 1 (Piconet 1): Laptops of separate users in a meeting

Sharing files and contact information (e.g., meeting attendee list).

User C’s PDA

Laptop

Bluetooth 

Piconet 3

Laptop

User C’s Laptop

Master of Piconet 3

User B’s PDA

Bluetooth 

Piconet 2

User B’s Laptop

Master of Piconet 2

User B’s

Mobile Phone

User A’s Laptop Laptop D

Master of Piconet 1

Laptop E

Bluetooth Piconet 1

Remote Laptop (Laptop E) is connected to 

Piconet 1 through router (Laptop D).

Scenario 2 and 3 (Piconet 2 and 3): User’s B and C

share contact information with personal devices.

Scenario 1 (Piconet 1): Laptops of separate users in a meeting

Sharing files and contact information (e.g., meeting attendee list).

User C’s PDA

Laptop

Bluetooth 

Piconet 3

Laptop

User C’s Laptop

Master of Piconet 3

User B’s PDA

Bluetooth 

Piconet 2

User B’s Laptop

Master of Piconet 2

User B’s

Mobile Phone

User A’s Laptop Laptop D

Master of Piconet 1

Laptop E

Bluetooth Piconet 1

Remote Laptop (Laptop E) is connected to 

Piconet 1 through router (Laptop D).

Scenario 2 and 3 (Piconet 2 and 3): User’s B and C

share contact information with personal devices.

Figure 4-1. Typical Bluetooth Network—A Scatter-net
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

4-3

Mobile routers in a Bluetooth network control the changing network topologies of these networks. The

routers also control the flow of data between devices that are capable of supporting a direct link to each

other. As devices move about in a random fashion, these networks must be reconfigured on the fly to

handle the dynamic topology. The routing protocols it employs allow Bluetooth to establish and maintain

these shifting networks.

Bluetooth transceivers operate in the 2.4 GHz, ISM band, which is similar to the band WLAN devices and

other IEEE 802.11 compliant devices occupy. Bluetooth transceivers, which use Gaussian Frequency

Shift Keying (GFSK) modulation, employ a frequency hopping (FH) spread spectrum system with a

hopping pattern of 1,600 times per second over 79 frequencies in a quasi-random fashion. The theoretical

maximum bandwidth of a Bluetooth network is 1 Mbps. However, in reality the networks cannot support

such data rates because of communication overhead. The second generation of Bluetooth technology is

expected to provide a maximum bandwidth of 2 Mbps.

Bluetooth networks can support either one asynchronous data channel with up to three simultaneous

synchronous speech channels or one channel that transfers asynchronous data and synchronous speech

simultaneously.

Bluetooth uses a combination of packet-switching technology and circuit-switching technology. The

advantage of using packet switching in Bluetooth is that it allows devices to route multiple packets of

information by the same data path. Since this method does not consume all the resources on a data path, it

becomes easier for remote devices to maintain data flow throughout a scatter-net.

4.1.1 Brief History

The original architect for Bluetooth, named after the 10th century Danish king Harald Bluetooth, was

Ericsson Mobile Communication. In 1998, IBM, Intel, Nokia, and Toshiba formed the Bluetooth SIG,

which serves as the governing body of the specification. The SIG began as a means to monitor the

development of the radio technology and the creation of a global and open standard. Today more than

2,000 organizations are part of the Bluetooth SIG, comprising leaders in the telecommunications and

computing industries that are driving development and promotion of Bluetooth technology. Bluetooth was

originally designed primarily as a cable replacement protocol for wireless communications. However,

SIG members plan to develop a broad range of Bluetooth-enabled consumer devices to enhance wireless

connectivity. Among the array of devices that are anticipated are cellular phones, PDAs, notebook

computers, modems, cordless phones, pagers, laptop computers, cameras, PC cards, fax machines, and

printers. Bluetooth is now standardized within the IEEE 802.15 Personal Area Network (PAN) Working

Group that formed in early 1999. The Bluetooth SIG Web site provides numerous links to other Web sites

with additional information.38 The IEEE Web site provides updates on the IEEE 802.15 Working Group.39

This is the Working Group that develops Personal Area Networking consensus standards for short

distance wireless networks, or WPANs.

4.1.2 Frequency and Data Rates

The designers of Bluetooth like those of the 802.11 WLAN standard designed Bluetooth to operate in the

unlicensed 2.4 GHz–2.4835 GHz ISM frequency band. Because numerous other technologies also operate

in this band, Bluetooth uses a frequency-hopping spread-spectrum (FHSS) technology to solve

interference problems. The FHSS scheme uses 79 different radio channels by changing frequency about

1,600 times per second. One channel is used in 625 microseconds followed by a hop in a pseudo-random

 

38 For more information, see the Bluetooth Web site at http://www.bluetooth.com.

39 For more information, see the IEEE Web site at http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/802/15/.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

4-4

order to another channel for another 625 microsecond transmission; this process is repeated continuously.

As stated previously, the ISM band has become popular for wireless communications because it is

available worldwide and does not require a license.

In the ISM band, Bluetooth technology permits transmission speeds of up to 1 Mbps and achieves a

throughput of approximately 720 kbps. Although the data rates are low compared to those of 802.11

wireless LANs, it is still three to eight times the average speed of parallel and serial ports, respectively.

This rate is adequately fast for many of the applications for which Bluetooth was conceived. Moreover, it

is anticipated that even faster data rates will be available in the future.

4.1.3 Bluetooth Architecture and Components

As with the IEEE 802.11 standard, Bluetooth permits devices to establish either P2P networks or

networks based on fixed access points with which mobile nodes can communicate. In this document,

however, we only discuss the ad hoc network topology. This topology is meant to easily interconnect

mobile devices that are in the same area (e.g., in the same room). In this architecture, client stations are

grouped into a single geographic area and can be inter-networked without access to the wired LAN

(infrastructure network). The basic Bluetooth topology is depicted in Figure 4-2. As shown in this

piconet, one of the devices would be a master, and the other two devices would be slaves.

Laptop

Mobile Phone

PDA

Figure 4-2. Bluetooth Ad Hoc Topology

Unlike a WLAN that comprises both a wireless station and an access point, with Bluetooth, there are only

wireless stations or clients. A Bluetooth client is simply a device with a Bluetooth radio and Bluetooth

software module incorporating the Bluetooth protocol stack and interfaces.

4.1.4 Range

Bluetooth provides three different classes of power management. Class 1 devices, the highest power

devices, operate at 100 milliwatt (mW) and have an operating range of up to 100 meters (m). Class 2

devices operate at 2.5 mW and have an operating range of up to 10 m. Class 3, the lowest power devices,

operate at 1 mW and have an operating range of from 1/10 meter to 10 meters. These three levels of

operating power are summarized in Table 4-2.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

4-5

Table 4-2. Device Classes of Power Management

Type Power Power Level Operating Range

Class 1 Devices High 100 mW (20 dBm) Up to 100 meters (300 feet)

Class 2 Devices Medium 2.5 mW (4 dBm) Up to 10 meters (30 feet)

Class 3 Devices Low 1 mW (0 dBm) 0.1–10 meters (less than 30 feet)

The three ranges for Bluetooth are depicted in Figure 4-3. As shown, the shortest range may be good for

applications such as cable replacement (e.g., mouse or keyboard), file synchronization, or business card

exchange. The high-powered range can reach distances of 100 m, or about 300 ft. Additionally, as with

the data rates, it is anticipated that even greater distances will be achieved in the future.

Class 1 

100-meter range

Class 3

0.1 to 10-meter

Class 2

10-meter

Class 1 

100-meter range

Class 3

0.1 to 10-meter

Class 2

10-meter

Figure 4-3. Bluetooth Operating Range

4.2 Benefits

Bluetooth offers five primary benefits to users. This ad hoc method of untethered communication makes

Bluetooth very attractive today and can result in increased efficiency and reduced costs. The efficiencies

and cost savings are attractive for the home user and the enterprise business user.

Benefits of Bluetooth include—

! Cable replacement—Bluetooth technology replaces cables for a variety of interconnections. These

include those of peripheral devices (i.e., mouse and keyboard computer connections), USB at 12

Mbps (USB 1.1) up to 480 Mbps (USB 2.0); printers and modems, usually at 4 Mbps; and wireless

headsets and microphones that interface with PCs or mobile phones.

! Ease of file sharing—Bluetooth enables file sharing between Bluetooth-enabled devices. For

example, participants of a meeting with Bluetooth-compatible laptops can share files with each other.

In another example, a Bluetooth-compatible mobile phone acts as a wireless modem for laptops.

Using Bluetooth, the laptop interfaces with the cell phone, which in turn connects to a network, thus

giving the laptop a full range of networking capabilities without the need of an electrical interface for

the laptop–to–mobile phone connection.40

! Wireless synchronization—Bluetooth provides automatic wireless synchronization with other

Bluetooth-enabled devices. For example, personal information contained in address books and date

books can be synchronized between PDAs, laptops, mobile phones, and other devices.

 

40 See An Overview of Bluetooth Security, February 22, 2001, at http://www.sans.org.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

4-6

! Automated wireless applications—Bluetooth supports automatic wireless application functions.

Unlike synchronization, which typically occurs locally, automatic wireless applications interface with

the LAN and Internet. For example, an individual working offline on e-mails might be outside of their

regular service area—on a flight, for instance. To e-mail the files queued in the inbox of the laptop,

the individual, once back in a service area (i.e., having landed), would activate a mobile phone or any

other device capable of connecting to a network. The laptop would then automatically initiate a

network join by using the phone as a modem and automatically send the e-mails after the individual

logs on.

! Internet connectivity—Bluetooth is supported by a variety of devices and applications. Some of

these devices include mobile phones, PDAs, laptops, desktops, and fixed telephones. Internet

connectivity is possible when these devices and technologies join together to use each other’s

capabilities. For example, a laptop, using a Bluetooth connection, can request a mobile phone to

establish a dial-up connection; the laptop can then access the Internet through that connection.

Bluetooth is expected to be built into office appliances (e.g., PCs, faxes, printers, and laptops),

communication appliances (e.g., cell phones, handsets, pagers, and headsets), and home appliances (e.g.,

DVD players, cameras, refrigerators, and microwave ovens). Applications for Bluetooth also include

vending machines, banking, and other electronic payment systems; wireless office and conference rooms;

smart homes; and in-vehicle communications and parking.

4.3 Security of Bluetooth

This section helps the reader to understand the built-in security features of Bluetooth. It provides an

overview of the inherent security features to better illustrate its limitations and provide a motivation for

some of the recommendations for enhanced security. Security for the Bluetooth radio path is depicted in

Figure 4-4.

Router

Wired LAN

Bluetooth Security

Bluetooth Security

Bluetooth Security

Router

Wired LAN

Bluetooth Security

Bluetooth Security

Bluetooth Security

Figure 4-4. Bluetooth Air-Interface Security

As shown in the illustration, security for Bluetooth is provided on the various wireless links—on the radio

paths only. In other words, link authentication and encryption may be provided, but true end-to-end
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

4-7

security is not possible without providing higher layer security solutions on top of Bluetooth. In the

example provided, security services are provided between the PDA and the printer, between the cell

phone and laptop, and between the laptop and the desktop.

Briefly, the three basic security services defined by the Bluetooth specifications are the following:

! Authentication—A goal of Bluetooth is the identity verification of communicating devices. This

security service addresses the question “Do I know with whom I’m communicating?” This service

provides an abort mechanism if a device cannot authenticate properly.

! Confidentiality—Confidentiality, or privacy, is another security goal of Bluetooth. The intent is to

prevent information compromise caused by eavesdropping (passive attack). This service, in general,

addresses the question “Are only authorized devices allowed to view my data?”

! Authorization—A third goal of Bluetooth is a security service developed to allow the control of

resources. This service addresses the question “Has this device been authorized to use this service?”

As with the 802.11 standard, Bluetooth does not address other security services such as audit and

nonrepudiation. If these other security services are desired or required, they must be provided through

other means. The three security services offered by Bluetooth and details about the modes of security are

described below.

Also worthwhile to note, Bluetooth provides a frequency-hopping scheme with 1,600 hops/second

combined with radio link power control (to limit transmit range). These characteristics provide Bluetooth

with some additional, albeit small, protection from eavesdropping and malicious access. The frequencyhopping scheme, primarily a technique to avoid interference, makes it slightly more difficult for an

adversary to locate the Bluetooth transmission. Using the power control feature appropriately forces any

potential adversary to be in relatively close proximity to pose a threat to the Bluetooth network.

4.3.1 Security Features of Bluetooth per the Specifications

Bluetooth has three different modes of security. Each Bluetooth device can operate in one mode only at a

particular time. The three modes are the following:

! Security Mode 1—Nonsecure mode

! Security Mode 2—Service-level enforced security mode

! Security Mode 3—Link-level enforced security mode

In Security Mode 1, a device will not initiate any security procedures. In this nonsecure mode, the

security functionality (authentication and encryption) is completely bypassed. In effect, the Bluetooth

device in Mode 1 is in a “promiscuous” mode that allows other Bluetooth devices to connect to it. This

mode is provided for applications for which security is not required, such as exchanging business cards.

In Security Mode 2, the service-level security mode, security procedures are initiated after channel

establishment at the Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP) level. L2CAP resides in the

data link layer and provides connection-oriented and connectionless data services to upper layers. For this

security mode, a security manager (as specified in the Bluetooth architecture) controls access to services

and to devices. The centralized security manager maintains polices for access control and interfaces with

other protocols and device users. Varying security polices and “trust” levels to restrict access may be

defined for applications with different security requirements operating in parallel. Therefore, it is possible
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

4-8

to grant access to some services without providing access to other services. Obviously, in this mode, the

notion of authorization—that is the process of deciding if device A is allowed to have access to service

X—is introduced.

In Security Mode 3, the link-level security mode, a Bluetooth device initiates security procedures before

the channel is established. This is a built-in security mechanism, and it is not aware of any application

layer security that may exist. This mode supports authentication (unidirectional or mutual) and

encryption. These features are based on a secret link key that is shared by a pair of devices. To generate

this key, a pairing procedure is used when the two devices communicate for the first time.

The Bluetooth modes are depicted in Figure 4-5.

Security Modes

Security Mode 1

No security

- Insecure -

Security Mode 2

Service Level Security

- Flexible / Policy-based -

Security Mode 3

Link Level Security

- Fixed -

Authentication Confidentiality Authorization Authentication Confidentiality 

Security Modes

Security Mode 1

No security

- Insecure -

Security Mode 2

Service Level Security

- Flexible / Policy-based -

Security Mode 3

Link Level Security

- Fixed -

Authentication Confidentiality Authorization Authentication Confidentiality 

Figure 4-5. Taxonomy of Bluetooth Security Modes

4.3.1.1 Link Key Generation—Bluetooth Bonding

The link key is generated during an initialization phase, while two Bluetooth devices that are

communicating are “associated” or “bonded.” Per the Bluetooth specification, two associated devices

simultaneously derive link keys during the initialization phase when a user enters an identical PIN into

both devices. The PIN entry, device association, and key derivation are depicted conceptually in Figure 4-

6. After initialization is complete, devices automatically and transparently authenticate and perform

encryption of the link. It is possible to create a link key using higher layer key exchange methods and then

import the link key into the Bluetooth modules. The PIN code used in Bluetooth devices can vary

between 1 and 16 bytes. The typical 4-digit PIN may be sufficient for some applications; however, longer

codes may be necessary.41

 

41 Bluetooth Security White Paper is available at http://www.bluetooth.com.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

4-9

PIN

E2

Link Key

Encryption Key

PIN

Link Key

Encryption Key

For Authentication 

procedure

E2

E3 E3

For Encryption 

procedure

Bluetooth Device 1 Bluetooth Device 2

Combination – pairwise key

Unit – unit-specific key

Initialization – used during initialization only

Master – used for broadcast

Semi-permanent

PIN

E2

Link Key

Encryption Key

PIN

Link Key

Encryption Key

For Authentication 

procedure

E2

E3 E3

For Encryption 

procedure

Bluetooth Device 1 Bluetooth Device 2

Combination – pairwise key

Unit – unit-specific key

Initialization – used during initialization only

Master – used for broadcast

Semi-permanent

Figure 4-6. Bluetooth Key Generation from PIN

4.3.1.2 Authentication

The Bluetooth authentication procedure is in the form of a “challenge-response” scheme. Two devices

interacting in an authentication procedure are referred to as the claimant and the verifier. The verifier is

the Bluetooth device validating the identity of another device. The claimant is the device attempting to

prove its identity. The challenge-response protocol validates devices by verifying the knowledge of a

secret key—a Bluetooth link key. The challenge-response verification scheme is depicted conceptually in

Figure 4-7. As shown, one of the Bluetooth devices (the claimant) attempts to reach and connect to the

other (the verifier).
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

4-10

Radio

Interface

(Claimant) (Claimant) (Verifier) (Verifier)

E1

Algorithm

Link Key E1

Algorithm

Random Number

Generator

(RNG)

AU_RAND

ACO

Address

Link Key

ACO

=?

Yes

No Abort

Connection

Allow

Connection

Bluetooth Device 1 Bluetooth Device 2

BD_ADDR

SRES

Radio

Interface

(Claimant) (Claimant) (Verifier) (Verifier)

E1

Algorithm

Link Key E1

Algorithm

Random Number

Generator

(RNG)

AU_RAND

ACO

Address

Link Key

ACO

=?

Yes

No Abort

Connection

Allow

Connection

Bluetooth Device 1 Bluetooth Device 2

BD_ADDR

SRES

Figure 4-7. Bluetooth Authentication

The steps in the authentication process are the following:

Step 1. The claimant transmits its 48-bit address (BD_ADDR) to the verifier.

Step 2. The verifier transmits a 128-bit random challenge (AU_RAND) to the claimant.

Step 3. The verifier uses the E1 algorithm to compute an authentication response using the

address, link key, and random challenge as inputs. The claimant performs the same computation.

Step 4. The claimant returns the computed response, SRES, to the verifier.

Step 5. The verifier compares the SRES from the claimant with the SRES that it computes.

Step 6. If the two 32-bit SRES values are equal, the verifier will continue connection

establishment.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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If authentication fails, a Bluetooth device will wait an interval of time before a new attempt can be made.

This time interval will increase exponentially to prevent an adversary from repeated attempts to gain

access by defeating the authentication scheme through trial-and-error with different keys. However, it is

important to note that this “suspend” technique does not provide security against sophisticated adversaries

performing offline attacks to exhaustively search PINs.

Again, the Bluetooth standard allows both uni-directional and mutual authentication to be performed. The

E1 authentication function used for the validation is based on the SAFER+ algorithm.42

The Bluetooth address is a public parameter that is unique to each device. This address can be obtained

through a device inquiry process. The private key, or link key, is a secret entity. The link key is derived

during initialization, is never disclosed outside the Bluetooth device, and is never transmitted over the airinterface. The random challenge, obviously a public parameter, is designed to be different on every

transaction. The random number is derived from a pseudo-random process within the Bluetooth device.

The cryptographic response is public as well. With knowledge of the challenge and response parameters,

it should be impossible to predict the next challenge or derive the link key.

The parameters used in the authentication procedure are summarized in Table 4-3.

Table 4-3. Summary of Authentication Parameters

Parameter Length Secrecy Characteristic

Device address 48 bits Public

Random challenge 128 bits Public, unpredictable

Authentication (SRES) response 32 bits Public

Link key 128 bits Secret

4.3.1.3 Confidentiality

In addition to the authentication scheme, Bluetooth provides for a confidentiality security service to

thwart eavesdropping attempts on the air-interface. Bluetooth encryption is provided to protect the

payloads of the packets exchanged between two Bluetooth devices. The encryption scheme for this

service is depicted conceptually in Figure 4-7.

As shown in Figure 4-8, the Bluetooth encryption procedure is based on a stream cipher, E0. A key stream

output is exclusive-OR-ed with the payload bits and sent to the receiving device. This key stream is

produced using a cryptographic algorithm based on linear feedback shift registers (LFSR).43 The encrypt

function takes as inputs the master identity (BD_ADDR), the random number (EN_RAND), a slot

number, and an encryption key, which initialize the LFSRs before the transmission of each packet, if

encryption is enabled. Since the slot number used in the stream cipher changes with each packet, the

ciphering engine is also reinitialized with each packet although the other variables remain static.

As shown in Figure 4-8, the encryption key provided to the encryption algorithm is produced using an

internal key generator (KG). This key generator produces stream cipher keys based on the link key,

random number (EN_RAND again), and the ACO value. The ACO parameter, a 96-bit authenticated

 

42 A family of SAFER algorithms was developed by James Massey and used in Cylink Corporation products. SAFER stands

for Secure And Fast Encryption Routine. The SAFER algorithms are iterated block ciphers (IBC). In an IBC, the same

cryptographic function is applied for a specified number of rounds. 43 LFSRs are used in coding (error control coding) theory and cryptography. LFSR-based key stream generators (KSGs),

comprised of exclusive-OR gates and shift registers, are common in stream ciphers and are very fast in hardware.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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cipher offset, is another output produced during the authentication procedure shown in Figure 4-7. As

mentioned above, the link key is the 128-bit secret key that is held in the Bluetooth devices and is not

accessible to the user. Moreover, this critical security element is never transmitted outside the Bluetooth

device.

Radio

Interface

Plaintext Input

Keystream

Key Generator

(KG)

Radio

Interface

Packet

Slave Master

Ciphertext

E0

Algorithm

Link Key

Keystream

Key Generator

(KG)

E0

Algorithm

Random Number

Generator

(RNG)

EN_RAND ACO ACO

Master Identity

Slot

Number

Slot

Number

Link Key

Plaintext Output

Packet

Encryption Key, KC

Encryption Key, KC

Plaintext Output

Payload bits

XOR with

keystream

Packet Ciphertext

Payload bits

XOR with

keystream

Plaintext Input

Packet

BD_ADDR

Bluetooth Device 1 Bluetooth Device 2

Radio

Interface

Plaintext Input

Keystream

Key Generator

(KG)

Radio

Interface

Packet

Slave Master

Ciphertext

E0

Algorithm

Link Key

Keystream

Key Generator

(KG)

E0

Algorithm

Random Number

Generator

(RNG)

EN_RAND ACO ACO

Master Identity

Slot

Number

Slot

Number

Link Key

Plaintext Output

Packet

Encryption Key, KC

Encryption Key, KC

Plaintext Output

Payload bits

XOR with

keystream

Packet Ciphertext

Payload bits

XOR with

keystream

Plaintext Input

Packet

BD_ADDR

Bluetooth Device 1 Bluetooth Device 2

Figure 4-8. Bluetooth Encryption Procedure

The encryption key (KC) is generated from the current link key. The key size may vary from 8 bits to 128

bits and is negotiated. The negotiation process occurs between master devices and slave devices. During

negotiation, a master device makes a key size suggestion for the slave. In every application, a “minimum

acceptable” key size parameter can be set to prevent a malicious user from driving the key size down to

the minimum of 8 bits, making the link totally insecure.

The Bluetooth specification also allows three different encryption modes to support the confidentiality

service:

! Encryption Mode 1—No encryption is performed on any traffic.

! Encryption Mode 2—Broadcast traffic goes unprotected (not encrypted), but individually addressed

traffic is encrypted according to the individual link keys.

! Encryption Mode 3—All traffic is encrypted according to the master link key.

4.3.1.4 Trust Levels, Service Levels, and Authorization

In addition to the three security modes, Bluetooth allows two levels of trust and three levels of service

security. The two levels of trust are “trusted” and “untrusted.” Trusted devices are ones that have a fixed
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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relationship and therefore have full access to all services. Untrusted devices do not maintain a permanent

relationship; this results in a restricted service access. For services, three levels of security have been

defined. These levels are provided so that the requirements for authorization, authentication, and

encryption can be set independently.

The security levels can be described as follows:

! Service Level 1—Those that require authorization and authentication. Automatic access is granted

only to trusted devices. Untrusted devices need manual authorization.

! Service Level 2—Those that require authentication only. Access to an application is allowed only

after an authentication procedure. Authorization is not necessary.

! Service Level 3—Those that are open to all devices. Authentication is not required, and access is

granted automatically.

Associated with these levels are the following security controls to restrict access to services: authorization

required (this always includes authentication), authentication required, and encryption required (link must

be encrypted before the application can be accessed).

The Bluetooth architecture allows for defining security policies that can set trust relationships in such a

way that even trusted devices can get access only to specific services and not to others. It is important to

understand that Bluetooth core protocols can authenticate only devices and not users. This is not to say

that user-based access control is not possible. The Bluetooth security architecture (through the security

manager) allows applications to enforce their own security policies. The link layer, at which Bluetooth

specific security controls operate, is transparent to the security controls imposed by the application layers.

Thus it is possible to enforce user-based authentication and fine-grained access control within the

Bluetooth security framework.

4.3.2 Problems with the Bluetooth Standard Security

This section provides an overview of some of the known problems with Bluetooth at this writing. The

Bluetooth security checklist addresses these vulnerabilities.

Table 4-4. Key Problems with Existing (Native) Bluetooth Security

Security Issue or Vulnerability Remarks

1 Strength of the challenge-response pseudorandom generator is not known.

The Random Number Generator (RNG) may produce

static number or periodic numbers that may reduce

the effectiveness of the authentication scheme.

2 Short PINS are allowed. Weak PINs, which are used for the generation of link

and encryption keys, can be easily guessed.

Increasing the PIN length in general increases the

security. People have a tendency to select short

PINs.

3 An elegant way to generate and distribute

PINs does not exist.

Establishing PINs in large Bluetooth networks with

many users may be difficult. Scalability problems

frequently yield security problems.

4 Encryption key length is negotiable. The Bluetooth SIG needs to develop a more robust

initialization key generation procedure.

5 Unit key is reusable and becomes public

once used.

Use a unit key as input to generate a random key.

Use a key set instead of only one unit key.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Security Issue or Vulnerability Remarks

6 The master key is shared. The Bluetooth SIG needs to develop a better

broadcast keying scheme.

7 No user authentication exists. Device authentication only is provided. Applicationlevel security and user authentication can be

employed.

8 Attempts for authentication are repeated. The Bluetooth SIG needs to develop a limit feature to

prevent unlimited requests. The Bluetooth

specification requires a time-out period between

repeated attempts that will increase exponentially.

9 E0 stream cipher algorithm is weak. The Bluetooth SIG needs to develop a more robust

encryption procedure.

10 Key length is negotiable. A global agreement must be established on minimum

key length.

11 Unit key sharing can lead to eavesdropping. A corrupt user may be able to compromise the

security between (gain unauthorized access to) two

other users if that corrupt user has communicated

with either of the other two users. This is because the

link key (unit key), derived from shared information, is

disclosed.

12 Privacy may be compromised if the

Bluetooth device address (BD_ADDR) is

captured and associated with a particular

user.

Once the BD_ADDR is associated with a particular

user, that user’s activities could be logged, resulting

in a loss of privacy.

13 Device authentication is simple shared-key

challenge-response.

One-way-only challenge-response authentication is

subject to man-in-the-middle attacks. Mutual

authentication is required to provide verification that

users and the network are legitimate.

14 End-to-end security is not performed. Only individual links are encrypted and authenticated.

Data is decrypted at intermediate points. Applications

software above the Bluetooth software can be

developed.

15 Security services are limited. Audit, nonrepudiation, and other services do not exist.

If needed, these can be developed at particular points

in a Bluetooth network.

4.4 Security Requirements and Threats

Bluetooth offers several benefits and advantages. However, agencies must not only address the security

threats associated with Bluetooth before they implement the technologies; they must also assess the

vulnerabilities of the devices they allow to participate in the Bluetooth networks. Specifically, agencies

need to address security concerns for confidentiality, data integrity, and network availability. Moreover,

since Bluetooth devices are more likely to be managed by users that are less security conscious than

administrators, they are more likely to contribute to involuntary security lapses. This subsection will

briefly cover some of the risks to security, i.e., attacks on confidentiality, integrity, and network

availability.

4.4.1 Loss of Confidentiality

See Figure 3.9 in the 802.11 wireless section for a general taxonomy of security attacks, to understand

some of the attacks against Bluetooth.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Threats to confidentiality involve, first of all, compromised Bluetooth devices. When a Bluetooth device

that is part of a piconet becomes compromised (e.g., is in the possession of an unauthorized user), it may

still receive information that the malicious user should not access. Moreover, the compromised device

may still have network or information privileges, resulting in a compromise of the wider network as well.

In the latter case, the compromised device may not only receive normal proprietary traffic but may also

request that information as part of a targeted network attack. A trait of Bluetooth that makes this

compromise unique is that the Bluetooth network requires device—and not user—authentication to access

resources. Once the device is authenticated, it is automatically connected to resources without the need

for subsequent authentication.44

Bluetooth devices themselves have inherent security vulnerabilities. For example, malicious users can use

wireless microphones as bugging devices. Although such attacks have not been documented because

Bluetooth is not yet commercially prevalent, incidents have been recorded of successful attacks on PCs

using programs such as Back Orifice and Netbus. If a malicious user has a program such as Back Orifice

installed on a device in the Bluetooth network, that user could access other Bluetooth devices and

networks that have limited or no security. These same programs could be used against Bluetooth devices

and networks. Bluetooth devices are further vulnerable because the system authenticates the devices, not

the users. As a result, a compromised device can gain access to the network and compromise both the

network and devices on the network.

Authorized remote users pose a threat to Bluetooth networks. Remote users are not always subject to the

same security requirements as users onsite. They frequently use nonsecure links, whether at home or on

travel. In the process of connecting, they transmit user IDs and passwords, which a malicious user can

capture using a network sniffer. Without the secure perimeter typically provided in an office environment,

the malicious user does not have to be in close proximity to the user to intercept traffic. Once the device

or link is compromised, all devices in that Bluetooth network are vulnerable to attacks. For example, a

compromised link allows a malicious user to monitor data traffic, while a compromised device allows the

malicious user to request and receive sensitive data. If in addition the malicious user obtains knowledge

of the user IDs and password of the targeted network, then a compromised device can be used to gain

access to the network. This scenario requires a number of security lapses before a malicious user can gain

access to the network. Using Bluetooth secure links and additional layers of security on top of Bluetooth

would mitigate the risk of such an attack.

The man-in-the-middle attack poses an additional threat to Bluetooth devices that rely on unit keys,

typically the more simple “dumb” devices. In this attack, the man-in-the-middle (Device C) obtains the

security encryption key that a network device (Device A) uses to monitor traffic between itself and

another network device (Device B). All the attack requires is that Device A separately share its unit key (a

static key unique to each device) with Device C and Device B. The reasons for the connections between

Devices A and B and between Devices A and C may be completely unrelated, and the level of

confidentiality may even be different. However, once Device C knows the unit key, it can use a fake

device address to calculate the encryption key and monitor traffic between Devices A and B without their

knowledge. The man-in-the-middle attack does not require costly or special equipment. A knowledgeable

malicious user who has access to the unit key and who can mimic a Bluetooth address to generate the

encryption key can conduct the attack. Attacks such as these use a priori knowledge of the targeted

Bluetooth devices. Although this does not necessarily preclude malicious users from randomly attacking

 

44 Devices are authenticated through the Bluetooth chip at the link level. The Bluetooth authentication scheme is essentially a

challenge-response strategy, where a two-move protocol is used to check whether the other party knows a shared identical

secret key (a symmetric key). Basically the protocol checks that both devices have the same key, and if they do

authentication is successful. This process is sometimes invisible to the device user, since the devices can automatically

authenticate once they are within the transmission range. (See www.palowireless.com/bluearticles/cc1_security1.asp for

more information.)
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Bluetooth devices as they enter the transmission range, no instances of such attacks have been

documented.

Figure 4-9 illustrates the attack. A trusted PDA (Device A) shares proprietary information with a trusted

laptop (Device B). During the connection with Device B, Device A connects to an untrusted PDA (Device

C) to share personal contacts in A’s PDA address book. Once Device C makes the connection to A, C

now becomes the man-in-the-middle and can monitor the traffic between Devices A and B by using

Device A’s unit key and a fake address. The biggest danger in such monitoring is that the owner(s) of

Device A or B may never realize that the information is being compromised.

LAPTOP

“Untrusted Device”

Step 1a: Device A shares

Unit Key with Device C

Step1: Device A shares

Unit Key with Device B

PDA 1

PDA 2

Device A

Device B Device C PDA 1 Shares “contact information” with PDA 2

(i.e. Non- Proprietary Address Book)

PDA 1 Shares “proprietary information”

with Laptop (trusted device)

Step 2: Device C fakes device 

address to defeat encryption

Step 3: Device C monitors 

traffic between Device A or B

“Trusted Device”

LAPTOP

“Untrusted Device”

Step 1a: Device A shares

Unit Key with Device C

Step1: Device A shares

Unit Key with Device B

PDA 1

PDA 2

Device A

Device B Device C PDA 1 Shares “contact information” with PDA 2

(i.e. Non- Proprietary Address Book)

PDA 1 Shares “proprietary information”

with Laptop (trusted device)

Step 2: Device C fakes device 

address to defeat encryption

Step 3: Device C monitors 

traffic between Device A or B

“Trusted Device”

Figure 4-9. Man-in-the-Middle Attack Scenarios

To date, no software is available for monitoring such intrusions, and Bluetooth devices are invisible to

network administrators.45 Although different participants from different organizations may enforce

different security policies, in an ad hoc network this has little bearing. Every device participating in the ad

hoc network is susceptible to the security risks of every other device. Since Bluetooth devices are unlikely

to be administered by network administrators, users should be aware of the security implications of their

use in environments that process sensitive data. Although privacy violations are not directly a security

threat, agencies need to consider the potential for privacy violations when implementing Bluetooth

technologies. Each Bluetooth device is equipped with its own unique address (BD_ADDR), and this

address is used to log each device’s participation in the network. Secure logging ensures device

authentication (i.e., we have no proof who was operating the device, therefore, an individual can deny

participation in the network since the address that is logged belongs to the device and not an individual).

However, it also allows organizations to monitor and track what an individual does on the network.46

Nonrepudiation of individuals requires strong authentication, such as client digital signatures that can be

verified in a PKI (Public Key Infrastructure).

 

45 See “Security in a Mobile World—Is Bluetooth the Answer?” Computers and Security, Vol. 20 (2001). 46 See “Bluetooth Security: An Oxymoron?” November 28, 2000, at http://www.mcommercetimes.com.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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4.4.2 Loss of Integrity

Violations of integrity result from the corruption of an organization’s or user’s data. The immediate effect

is similar to that of a confidentiality, or disclosure, threat: a compromised network. However, integrity

threats extend beyond this, involving the alteration, addition, or deletion of information, which is then

passed through the network without the user’s or network administrator’s knowledge. Information that is

subject to corruption includes files on the network and data on user devices. For example, a malicious

user might employ an untrusted device, such as a PDA, to access the address book of another PDA or

laptop. However, instead of just monitoring the information, as would be the case with a disclosure threat,

the malicious user alters the contact information without the owner’s knowledge or may even delete the

information completely. If undetected, such attacks could result in the agency (or user) losing confidence

in its data and system. Users should verify that their Bluetooth product does not allow automatic data

synchronization to prevent the alteration of any information without the acknowledgement of the device

user.

4.4.3 Loss of Availability

DoS and DDoS attacks cause in the loss of network availability and “usability upon demand” for

authorized users and devices. DoS attacks block authorized user access to system resources and network

applications. Besides the typical DoS attacks (e.g., those involving flooding techniques) directed against

LANs and Internet services, Bluetooth devices are also susceptible to signal jamming. Bluetooth devices

share bandwidth with microwave ovens, cordless phones, and other wireless networks and thus are

vulnerable to interference. Malicious users can interfere with the flow of information (i.e., disrupt the

routing protocol by feeding the network inaccurate information) by using devices that transmit in the

2.4 GHz ISM band. Disrupting the routing protocol prevents ad hoc network devices from negotiating the

network’s dynamic topologies. Remote users may encounter jamming more frequently than on-site users.

Remote users must contend with the same interference that users experience in the office. Further, since

the remote environment is uncontrolled, remote devices are more likely to be in close proximity to

devices (e.g., other Bluetooth and ISM band devices) that are intentionally or unintentionally jamming

their signals.

Another threat associated with ad hoc devices is a battery exhaustion attack. This attack attempts to

disable a device by draining its battery. A malicious user continually sends requests to the device asking

for data transfers (assuming the user is part of the network topology) or asking the device to create a

network.47 Although this type of attack does not compromise network security, it ultimately prevents the

user from gaining access to the network, because the device cannot function.

4.5 Risk Mitigation

Bluetooth is a relatively new standard and has yet to become prevalent in the marketplace. However,

countermeasures are available to help secure Bluetooth networks. These measures include management

countermeasures, operational countermeasures, and technical countermeasures.

4.5.1 Management Countermeasures

The first line of defense is to provide an adequate level of knowledge and understanding for those who

will deal with Bluetooth-enabled devices. Agencies using Bluetooth technology need to establish and

document security policies that address the use of Bluetooth-enabled devices and the user’s

responsibilities. The policy document should include a list of approved uses for Bluetooth networks, the

 

47 See “Bluetooth Security,” May 2000, at http://www.niksula.cs.hut.fi/~jiitv/bluesec.html.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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type of information that may be transferred in the network, and any disciplinary actions that may result

from misuse. The security policy should also specify a proper password usage scheme.

4.5.2 Operational Countermeasures

Since Bluetooth devices do not register when they join a network, they are invisible to network

administrators. Consequently, it is difficult for administrators to apply traditional physical security

measures. However, there are some security approaches that can be applied, including establishing spatial

distance and securing the gateway Bluetooth devices that connect remote Bluetooth networks or devices.

Establishing spatial distance requires setting the power requirements low enough to prevent a device

operating on the agency’s premises from having sufficient power to be detected outside a physical area

(e.g., outside the office building). This spatial distance in effect creates a more secure perimeter.

Currently, Bluetooth devices have a useful range of approximately 30 feet (with a class 3 device).

Agencies that require both high levels of security and low levels of security should maintain a secure

perimeter so that on-site network users can maintain secure connections in their office spaces. Agencies

with requirements for high levels of security should also restrict unauthorized personnel from using

PDAs, laptops, and other electronic devices within the secure perimeter.

4.5.3 Technical Countermeasures

As with WLANs, Bluetooth technical countermeasures fall into one of two categories: software security

solutions and hardware security solutions. Bluetooth software solutions focus on PIN and private

authentications, while hardware solutions involve the use of the Bluetooth device address and link keys

that reside at the link level. Again, it should be noted that hardware solutions, which generally have

software components, are listed simply as hardware solutions.

4.5.3.1 Software Solutions

Software solutions inherent in Bluetooth technology include the Bluetooth PIN and private authentication.

Bluetooth enforces Bluetooth PINs at the link level. PINs may be 1 to 16 octets (8 bits to 128 bits) in

length, depending on the degree of security selected by the device user. Bluetooth devices use the PIN, in

effect, for device authentication: the PIN acts as a variable in the initialization key generation process. For

authentication between two devices, Bluetooth has the option of storing and retrieving the PIN

automatically and directly from memory or having a user enter the PIN into the device when the device is

initializing. To generate keys between two devices, the devices can use the PIN from a single device or

use the Bluetooth PIN of both devices. Because the PINs are necessary for authentication and for link

security, administrators should ensure that Bluetooth devices use PINs other than the default, or lowest,

setting (e.g., 0000).

According to the Bluetooth specification, the Bluetooth PIN is not a value that comes with a device,

except if fixed PINS are used. In this case, the fixed PIN must be used. This is a weak procedure, but it is

allowed for devices that do not have a user interface. Normally, when two devices pair, they use the same

PIN number, which is generated ad hoc and forgotten immediately afterwards and not used again. If two

devices have different fixed PINs, they cannot pair.

Since Bluetooth devices can store and automatically access link-level PINs from memory, a Bluetooth

device should employ device authentication as an extra layer of security. Incorporating application-level

software that requires password authentication to secure the device will add an extra layer of security.

Agencies with both high-end users and low-end users should incorporate application-level software that
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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requires password authentication in Bluetooth devices. Again, passwords are fundamental measures,

adding an extra layer of security.

Additionally, some of the software solutions identified for 802.11 WLANs may be appropriate for

Bluetooth devices as well. These software solutions are outlined in Section 3. Because Bluetooth is a

relatively new wireless communications technology, supplemental software solutions (e.g., application

security tool kits, robust IPsec VPN overlay) have not appeared in the marketplace. Moreover, if

Bluetooth is intended for less critical and short-range applications, such as simple printer cable

replacements, the enhanced security may be expensive and unnecessary.

4.5.3.2 Hardware Solutions

Hardware security solutions for Bluetooth devices are inherent in the design of the standard itself. As

mentioned above, the link layer provides its own form of security. Bluetooth uses a device address that is

unique to each device. The device address, a 48-bit identifier—note that this is a 6-byte public

parameter—serves several purposes such as generating 128-bit link keys and encryption keys. For

example, a key-generating algorithm (defined by the Bluetooth standards) with a randomly generated

number and the Bluetooth device address creates the unit and combination keys.

Link keys, the 128-bit random numbers that form the basis of Bluetooth security, are in the form of a unit

key, a master link key, or a combination key. Only dumb devices use unit keys. More advanced devices

establish combination keys with peers. Master devices generate master link keys that are transported to

slaves protected by pair-wise link keys. A device in the network generates the unit key (a key that rarely

changes) when the new device first comes into operation. This unit key may then become the device’s

link key for the network. However, since the sharing of unit keys represents a vulnerability, agencies

should regulate the exchange of unit keys with untrusted devices. Combination keys, pair-wise unique

link keys, are derived from information from two communicating devices. The combination key,

however, becomes a unique link key for those devices only. Even if the unit key of one of the devices is

compromised, the link is still not compromised. The unit key and combination keys are functionally

indistinguishable; the difference is merely in the ways they are generated. Hence, a Bluetooth device may

have either a unit key or a combination key, but not both.

Another hardware solution, inherent in the Bluetooth design, is the use of frequency-hopping schemes.

Frequency-hopping schemes allow devices to communicate even in areas where a great deal of

electromagnetic interference occurs. Frequency-hopping schemes also offer protection from burst errors

by continually moving signals in and out of the interference band and by making bit error corrections

using FEC. Frequency-hopping schemes have been thought to protect authorized users from malicious

users by transmitting the signal with a pseudo-random sequence that moves the signal arbitrarily around

the bandwidth, making it very difficult to track. However, this technique provides only minimal

protection in reality and should not be relied upon solely.

A hardware solution for securing devices in the network (and indirectly providing more security for the

Bluetooth network) is biometrics, and more specifically, voice authentication. Biometrics can be a part of

a multi-factor authentication whereby the user is required to provide more than one form of

authentication. Some devices that have Bluetooth applications, especially mobile phones and PDAs,

already employ a form of voice authentication. Voice authentication can help agencies prevent malicious

users from compromising remote Bluetooth devices and networks. The hosting devices of Bluetooth

devices and networks should be secured in the same manner as PDAs, cell phones, and WLANs and

related devices. Information on securing WLANs and devices, PDAs, and cell phones can be found in

Sections 3 and 5.
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Bluetooth is still a relatively new standard. Given that a number of vulnerabilities have been discovered,

the standard is likely to continue to evolve and improve the built-in hardware security mechanisms. Many

of the problems cannot be simply fixed by the user. The security problems, or possible security problems

(security is not known fully), will exist until the Bluetooth SIG addresses them. Products that are released

into the market now may exhibit some vulnerabilities. Some of the hardware solutions outlined for 802.11

WLANs in Section 3 may also be appropriate for Bluetooth devices.

Because Bluetooth-enabled devices are not yet widely available, the market has not developed robust

security solutions. Trusted third-party (TTP) authentication should be considered when it becomes

available. TTP centralizes authentication, and as long as the TTP remains secure and trusted, the

trustworthiness of the devices is not a concern. Centralized key management authority, which is similar to

TTP authentication, is another possibility. Centralized key management, unlike TTP, maintains and

distributes keys, so that only trusted devices have access to the secure keys.

Jini is an emerging technology that allows for instant recognition of new devices in a network. It can be

viewed as the next step (after the Java programming language) toward making a network look like one

large computer. Jini promises to make devices capable of attaching to a network independent of an

operating system. Equipped with its own, special-purpose operating system, the device could connect to a

network and immediately be shared by devices with different operating systems (e.g., Windows,

Macintosh, and UNIX). Mobile devices could easily connect to a network so that others could use the

device.

In the Jini architecture, each new device that is added to the network immediately defines itself to the

network device registry. Thus, when users plug in devices such as printers, storage devices, and speakers,

every other computer, device, and user on the network immediately knows that a new device has been

added and is now available. In the future, Jini may serve as a form of TTP, operating on a host device

(e.g., a laptop computer or PDA) to authenticate devices on the network. Jini may also monitor device

usage by tracking device authentication and network access.

As Bluetooth technology matures over the next few years, the built-in security features will mature and

additional add-on solutions will appear in the market.

4.6 Bluetooth Security Checklist

Table 4-5 provides a Bluetooth security checklist. The table presents guidelines and recommendations for

creating and maintaining a secure Bluetooth wireless network. For each recommendation or guideline,

three columns are provided. The first column, the Best Practice column, if checked, means that this entry

represents something recommended for all agencies. The second column, the “Should Consider” column,

if checked, means that the entry’s recommendation is something that an agency should carefully consider

for three reasons. First, implementing the recommendation may provide a higher level of security for the

wireless environment by offering some additional protection. Second, the recommendation supports a

defense-in-depth strategy. Third, it may have significant performance, operational, or cost impacts. In

summary, if the “Should Consider” column is checked, agencies should carefully consider the option and

weigh the costs versus the benefits. The last column, the “Status” column, is intentionally left blank and

allows an agency to use this table as a true checklist. For instance, an individual performing a wireless

security audit in a Bluetooth environment can quickly check off each recommendation for the agency,

asking, “Have I done this?”
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Table 4-5. Bluetooth Security Checklist

Checklist

Security Recommendation Best

Practice

Should

Consider

Status

Management Recommendations

1 Develop an agency security policy that addresses the use of wireless

technology including Bluetooth technology.

!

2 Ensure that users on the network are fully trained in computer security

awareness and the risks associated with wireless technology (i.e.,

Bluetooth).

!

3 Perform a risk assessment to understand the value of the assets in the

agency that need protection.

!

4 Perform comprehensive security assessments at regular intervals to

fully understand the wireless network security posture.

!

5 Ensure that the wireless “network” is fully understood. With piconets

forming scatter-nets with possible connections to 802.11 networks and

connections to both wired and wireless wide area networks, an agency

must understand the overall connectivity. Note: a device may contain

various wireless technologies and interfaces.

!

6 Ensure external boundary protection is in place around the perimeter of

the building or buildings of the agency.

!

7 Deploy physical access controls to the building and other secure areas

(e.g., photo ID, card badge readers).

!

8 Ensure that handheld or small Bluetooth devices are protected from

theft.

!

9 Ensure that Bluetooth devices are turned off during all hours when they

are not used.

!

10 Take a complete inventory of all Bluetooth-enabled wireless devices. !

11 Study and understand all planned Bluetooth-enabled devices to

understand any security idiosyncrasies or inadequacies.

!

Technical Recommendations

12 Change the default settings of the Bluetooth device to reflect the

agency’s security policy.

!

13 Set Bluetooth devices to the lowest necessary and sufficient power

level so that transmissions remain within the secure perimeter of the

agency.

!

14 Ensure that the Bluetooth “bonding” environment is secure from

eavesdroppers (i.e., the environment has been visually inspected for

possible adversaries before the initialization procedures during which

key exchanges occur).

!

15 Choose PIN codes that are sufficiently random and avoid all weak

PINs.

!

16 Choose PIN codes that are sufficiently long (maximal length if possible). !

17 Ensure that no Bluetooth device is defaulting to the zero PIN. !

18 Configure Bluetooth devices to delete PINs after initialization to ensure

that PIN entry is required every time and that the PINs are not stored in

memory after power removal.

!
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Checklist

Security Recommendation Best

Practice

Should

Consider

Status

19 Use an alternative protocol for the exchange of PIN codes, e.g., the

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange or Certificate-based key exchange

methods at the application layer. Use of such processes simplifies the

generation and distribution of longer PIN codes.

!

Operational Recommendations

20 Ensure that combination keys are used instead of unit keys. !

21 Invoke link encryption for all Bluetooth connections regardless of how

needless encryption may seem (i.e., no Security Mode 1).

!

22 Ensure that encryption is enabled on every link in the communication

chain.

!

23 Make use of Security Mode 2 in controlled and well-understood

environments.

!

24 Ensure device mutual authentication for all accesses. !

25 Enable encryption for all broadcast transmissions (Encryption Mode 3). !

26 Configure encryption key sizes to the maximum allowable. !

27 Establish a “minimum key size” for any key negotiation process. !

28 Ensure that portable devices with Bluetooth interfaces are configured

with a password to prevent unauthorized access if lost or stolen.

!

29 Use application-level (on top of the Bluetooth stack) encryption and

authentication for highly sensitive data communication. For example, an

IPsec-based Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology can be used for

highly sensitive transactions.

!

30 Use smart card technology in the Bluetooth network to provide key

management.

!

31 Install antivirus software on intelligent, Bluetooth-enabled hosts. !

32 Fully test and deploy software Bluetooth patches and upgrades

regularly.

!

33 Deploy user authentication such as biometrics, smart cards, two-factor

authentication, or PKI.

!

34 Deploy intrusion detection agents on the wireless part of the network to

detect suspicious behavior or unauthorized access and activity.

!

35 Fully understand the impacts of deploying any security feature or

product prior to deployment.

!

36 Designate an individual to track the progress of Bluetooth security

products and standards (perhaps via the Bluetooth SIG) and the threats

and vulnerabilities with the technology.

!

37 Wait until future releases of Bluetooth technology incorporate fixes to

the security features or offer enhanced security features.

!

4.7 Bluetooth Ad Hoc Network Risk and Security Summary

Table 4.6 lists areas of concern for Bluetooth devices, the security threats and vulnerabilities associated

with those areas, and the risk mitigations for securing the devices from these threats and vulnerabilities.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Table 4-6. Bluetooth Security Summary

Security Recommendation Security Need, Requirement, or Justification

1. Develop an agency security policy that addresses

the use of wireless technology including Bluetooth

technology.

A security policy is the foundation on which other

countermeasures—the operational and technical

ones—are rationalized and implemented. A

documented security policy allows an organization

to define acceptable implementations and uses for

Bluetooth technology.

2. Ensure that users on the network are fully trained in

computer security awareness and the risks

associated with wireless technology (e.g.,

Bluetooth).

A security awareness program helps users to

establish good security practices in the interest of

preventing inadvertent or malicious intrusions into

an organization’s automated information system.

3. Perform a risk assessment to understand the value

of the assets in the agency that need protection.

Understanding the value of organizational assets

and the level of protection required enables the

engineering of a wireless solution that provides an

appropriate level of security.

4. Perform comprehensive security assessments at

regular intervals (including validating the secure

configuration of Bluetooth technology) to fully

understand the wireless network security posture.

Wireless products should support upgrade and

patching of firmware to be able to take advantage

of wireless security enhancements and fixes.

5. Make sure the wireless “network” is fully understood.

With piconets forming scatter-nets with possible

connections to 802.11 networks and connections to

both wired and wireless wide area networks, an

agency must understand the overall connectivity.

Note: a device may contain various wireless

technologies and interfaces.

A thorough understanding of the functionalities

and configurations of the deployed wireless

network technologies allows an organization to

identify possible risks and vulnerabilities. These

risks and vulnerabilities can then be addressed in

the wireless security policy and enforced

appropriately.

6. Ensure that external boundary protection is in place

around the perimeter of the building or buildings of

the agency.

To prevent malicious physical access to an

organization’s information system infrastructure,

the external boundaries should be secured

through means such as a fence or locked doors.

7. Deploy physical access controls to the building and

other secure areas (e.g., photo ID, card badge

readers).

Identification badges or physical access cards

should be deployed to ensure that only authorized

personnel have physical access to a facility.

8. Make sure that handheld and small Bluetooth

devices are protected from theft.

The organization and its employees should be

responsible for its wireless technology

components because theft of those components

could lead to malicious activities against the

organization’s information system resource.

9. Make sure that Bluetooth devices are turned off

during all hours when they are not used.

Shutting down Bluetooth devices when not in use

minimizes exposure to potential malicious

activities.

10. Take a complete inventory of all Bluetooth-enabled

wireless devices.

A complete inventory list of Bluetooth-enabled

wireless devices can be referenced when

conducting an audit that searches for

unauthorized use of wireless technologies.

11. Study and understand all planned Bluetooth-enabled

devices to understand the security implications.

An understanding of the security implications of

Bluetooth will help the organization better address

the associated risks.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Security Recommendation Security Need, Requirement, or Justification

12. Change the default settings of the Bluetooth device

to reflect the agency’s security policy.

Because default settings are generally not secure,

a careful review of those settings should be

performed to ensure that they are in compliance

with the company security policy.

13. Set Bluetooth devices to the lowest necessary and

sufficient power level so that transmissions remain

within the secure perimeter of the agency.

Setting Bluetooth devices to the lowest necessary

and sufficient power level ensures a secure range

of access to authorized users.

14. Ensure that the Bluetooth “bonding” environment is

secure from eavesdroppers (i.e., the environment

has been visually inspected for possible adversaries

before the initialization procedures during which key

exchanges occur).

The key exchange is a vital security function and

requires that users maintain a security awareness

of possible eavesdroppers.

15. Choose PIN codes that are sufficiently random and

avoid all weak PINs.

PIN codes should be random so that it would not

be easily guessed by malicious users.

16. Choose PIN codes that are sufficiently long

(maximal length if possible).

PIN codes with maximum lengths of 16 bytes

make them more resistant to brute force attacks.

17. Ensure that no Bluetooth device is defaulting to the

zero PIN.

Bluetooth devices defaulting to the zero PIN (e.g.,

0000) essentially provide no security.

18. Configure Bluetooth devices to delete PINs after

initialization, to ensure that PIN entry is required

every time and that PINs are not stored in memory

after power removal.

Requiring PIN entry after re-initialization prevents

the possibility of a PIN being recovered from the

memory of a stolen device.

19. Use an alternative protocol for the exchange of PIN

codes, e.g., the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange or

Certificate-based key exchange methods at the

application layer. Use of such processes simplifies

the generation and distribution of longer PIN codes.

The overhead associated with key exchange can

be minimized by using an alternative protocol

such as the Diffie-Hellman or certificate-based key

exchange.

20. Ensure that combination keys are used instead of

unit keys.

The use of shared unit keys can lead to

successful man-in-the-middle attacks.

21. Invoke link encryption for all Bluetooth connections

regardless of how needless encryption may seem

(i.e., no Security Mode 1).

Link encryption should be used to secure all data

transmissions during a Bluetooth connection.

22. Make sure that encryption is enabled on every link in

the communication chain.

Every link should be secured because one

unsecured link results in compromising the entire

communication chain.

23. Use Security Mode 2 in controlled and wellunderstood environments.Security Mode 2 provides authorized access to

services.

24. Ensure device mutual authentication for all

accesses.

Mutual authentication is required to provide

verification that all users and the network are

legitimate.

25. Enable encryption for all broadcast transmissions

(Encryption Mode 3).

Broadcast transmissions secured by link

encryption provide a layer of security that protects

these transmissions from user interception for

malicious purposes.

26. Configure encryption key sizes to the maximum

allowable.

Using maximum allowable key sizes provides

protection from brute force attacks.

27. Establish a “minimum key size” for any key

negotiation process.

Establishing minimum key sizes ensures that all

keys are long enough to be resistant to brute force

attacks.

28. Ensure that portable devices with Bluetooth

interfaces are configured with passwords to prevent

unauthorized access if lost or stolen.

Authenticating users to a portable Bluetooth

device is a good security practice in the event the

device is stolen, which provides a layer of

protection for an organization’s Bluetooth network.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Security Recommendation Security Need, Requirement, or Justification

29. Use application-level (on top of the Bluetooth stack)

encryption and authentication for highly sensitive

data communication. For example, an IPsec-based

Virtual Private Network (VPN) technology can be

used for highly sensitive transactions.

Application-level encryption and authentication

provide security on top of the Bluetooth link

encryption; the overlay increases the security of

communication.

30. Use smart card technology in the Bluetooth network

to provide key management.

The use of smart card technology can simplify the

distribution and management of keys while

maintaining strong security.

31. Install antivirus software on intelligent, Bluetoothenabled hosts.Antivirus software should be installed on a

Bluetooth-enabled host to insure that known

worms and viruses are not introduced to the

Bluetooth network.

32. Fully test and deploy software Bluetooth patches

and upgrades on a regular basis.

Newly discovered security vulnerabilities of vendor

products should be patched to prevent malicious

and inadvertent exploits. Patches should be fully

tested before implementation to ensure that they

work.

33. Deploy user authentication such as biometrics,

smart cards, two-factor authentication, or PKI.

Implementing strong authentication mechanisms

can minimize the vulnerabilities associated with

passwords and PINs.

34. Deploy intrusion detection agents on the wireless

part of the network to detect suspicious behavior or

unauthorized access and activity.

Intrusion detection agents (e.g., host-based or

network-based agents) deployed on the wireless

network can detect and respond to potential

malicious activities.

35. Fully understand the impacts of deploying any

security feature or product prior to deployment.

To ensure a successful deployment, an

organization should fully understand the technical,

security, operational, and personnel requirements

prior to implementation.

36. Designate an individual to track the progress of

Bluetooth security products and standards (perhaps

via Bluetooth SIG) and the threats and

vulnerabilities with the technology.

An appointed individual designated to track the

latest technology enhancements, standards

(perhaps via Bluetooth SIG), and risks will help to

ensure the continued secure use of Bluetooth.

37. Wait until future releases of Bluetooth technology

incorporate fixes to the security features or offer

enhanced security features.

Upgrade to the latest versions and avoid

purchasing the versions of the Bluetooth products

with major security vulnerabilities that have not

been fixed.
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5. Wireless Handheld Devices

Section 5 covers text-messaging devices, PDAs, and smart phone—PDA products because these are the

devices most commonly used by the mobile work force in a business environment. This section describes

the security threats and vulnerabilities associated with these devices and also recommends

countermeasures that help mitigate the risks they introduce. However, network administrators can apply

many of the security measures and recommendations discussed below to wireless handheld devices that

are not covered in this section.

5.1 Wireless Handheld Device Overview

Wireless handheld devices range from simple one- and two-way text messaging devices to Internetenabled PDAs, tablets, and smart phones. These devices are no longer viewed as coveted gadgets for

early technology adopters. Instead they have become indispensable tools and competitive business

advantages for the mobile work force. The use of these devices introduces new security risks to an

agency’s existing network. Moreover, as these devices begin having their own IP addresses, the devices

themselves can become the targets of attacks. Handheld devices have different capabilities and different

uses from those of desktop and laptop computers. The differences between handheld devices and desktop

and laptop computers that affect the agency’s security are summarized below.

! The small size, relatively low cost, and constant mobility of handheld devices make them more likely

to be stolen, misplaced, or lost.

! Physical security controls that protect desktop computers do not offer the same protection for

handheld devices. Security guards are more likely to check the contents of a laptop carrying case or

check the laptop itself for proper identification than to physically search people for handheld devices.

A thief can more easily conceal a handheld device than a laptop or desktop computer.

! The devices themselves have limited computing power, memory, and peripherals that make existing

desktop security countermeasures impractical for handheld devices. Limited processing power, for

example, may render encryption with long key lengths too time-consuming.

! Synchronization software allows PCs to back up and mirror data stored on a handheld device and

allows the handheld device to mirror data stored on desktop applications. The PC and the handheld

device face different threats and require different security mechanisms to mitigate risk, but both must

provide the same level of security to protect sensitive information.

! Members of an organization often purchase and use handheld devices without consulting with or

notifying the organization’s network administrator. Wireless handheld devices are often used for both

personal and business data. Users that purchase these devices on their own often do not consider the

security implications of their use in the work environment.

! Handheld devices offer multiple APs such as the user interface, expansion modules, wireless

modems, Bluetooth, IR ports, and 802.11 connectivity. These access points present new risks that

must be addressed separately from an existing wired network.

! Many users have limited security awareness or training with the use of handheld devices and are not

familiar with the potential security risks introduced by these devices.

! Handheld device users can download a number of productivity programs, connectivity programs,

games, and utilities—including freeware and shareware programs—from untrusted sources. The

programs can be easily installed without network administrators being notified. These programs may
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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contain Trojan horses or other “malware” that can affect the user’s handheld device, PC, or other

network resources.

! There are few, if any, auditing capabilities or security tools available for many of these devices. In

some cases, neither the user nor the administrator can audit security-relevant events related to the use

of these devices. However, as networked PDAs become more affordable and more popular, vendors

are beginning to offer more stand-alone and enterprise security solutions.

! Users often subscribe to third-party Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISP) and access the

Internet through wireless modems. Users can download or upload data to and from other computers

without complying with the organization’s firewall policy.

! There are several new handheld operating systems and applications that have not been thoroughly

tested by the market to expose potential vulnerabilities.

! Handheld devices have a number of communication ports from which they can send and receive data,

but they have limited capabilities in authenticating the devices with which they exchange data.

5.2 Benefits

One- and two-way text messaging systems have become popular for keeping in touch with colleagues and

friends while traveling. They are light, inexpensive, easy to use, reliable, and text-messaging services are

widely available. The pager was the first, commercially successful one-way text messaging system. Twoway text messaging systems, which have become a popular way to send and receive e-mail, excel at

providing a reliable and inexpensive way to communicate, but they do not support any other office

productivity applications. Many users prefer text-messaging to telephone calls because it allows for

asynchronous communication, provides an electronic copy of the communication, costs less, requires no

dial-up connection, fosters brevity, and allows users to communicate in public places without having their

conversations overheard.

PDAs were first introduced to the market in the 1980s as handheld or palm-size computers that served as

organizers for personal information and are gradually replacing the traditional leather-bound organizer.

PDAs provide users with office productivity tools for accessing e-mail, agency network resources, and the

Internet. These capabilities are quickly becoming a necessity in today's business environment. In addition,

data that users have entered into their PDAs can be synchronized with a PC. Synchronization allows users

to easily back up the information on their PDA and transfer data from the PC to the PDA. PDAs can also

conveniently transfer data to other handheld devices by sending, or “beaming,” the information through

IR ports. The most common operating systems for PDAs are the Palm OS, PocketPC, Linux, and

Symbian EPOC. This section provides general recommendations for network administrators that can be

applied to all handheld devices using these or other operating systems.

Although text-messaging devices and PDAs can help improve the efficiency of a mobile workforce,

certain situations require a voice conversation between two or more parties to accurately and quickly

convey certain information in the right context. As the emerging mobile and networked workforce began

carrying laptops and fumbling with PDAs and cell phones at the same time, handheld device

manufacturers began responding by introducing devices that combine a PDA and a cell phone on the

same device. These devices are referred to as smart phones. Smart phones incorporate the capabilities of a

typical PDA and a digital cellular telephone that provides voice service as well as e-mail, text messaging,

Web access, and voice recognition. Many smart phones are available that can run programming languages

such as C or Java and offer telephony application programming interfaces (API) that allow third-party

developers to build new productivity tools to help the mobile work force. Cell phone security has

primarily focused on protecting carriers from fraudulent charges and users from eavesdropping. Typical
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cell phones use simplified operating systems that have no information-processing capabilities and

therefore present few information security risks. Smart phones, however, have more sophisticated

operating systems capable of running applications and supporting network connectivity with other

computing devices. This section focuses on the security risks introduced by the information-processing

and networking capabilities of smart phones. This section does not address the underlying security of

TDMA, CDMA, GSM, or GPRS protocols.

5.3 Security Requirements and Threats

Although handheld devices have not generally been viewed as posing security threats, their increased

computing power and the ease with which they can access networks and exchange data with other

handheld devices introduce new security risks to an agency’s computing environment. As handheld

devices begin supporting more networking capabilities, network administrators must carefully assess the

risks they introduce into their existing computing environment. This section describes how the security

requirements for confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and availability for handheld device computing

environments can be threatened.

5.3.1 Loss of Confidentiality

Information stored on handheld devices and on handheld device storage modules and mirrored on a PC

must remain confidential and be protected from unauthorized disclosure. The confidentiality of

information can be compromised while on the handheld device, the storage module, or the PC or while

being sent over one of the Bluetooth, 802.11, IR, USB, or serial communication ports. Moreover, most

handheld devices are shipped with connectivity that is enabled by default. These default configurations

are typically not in the most secure setting and should be changed to match the agency’s security policy

before being used.

PDAs can beam information from an IR port to another PDA IR port to easily exchange contact

information such as telephone numbers and mailing addresses. This capability is a useful feature, but

some concerns might arise about the data being transmitted. The data is unencrypted, and any user who is

in close proximity to the handheld device and has the device pointed in the right direction can intercept

and read the data. This is known as data leakage. Users familiar with PDA beaming should recognize that

they often must have the PDA within a few inches of the other device and also make an effort to align the

ports properly. The probability of data leakage occurring without the victim's knowledge is relatively low

because it requires the intercepting device to be within a few feet and often within a few inches.

Nonetheless, agencies should not overlook the threat because it could result in a compromise of sensitive

information. No attack has been documented of a malicious user being able to pull information out of an

IR port because the IR beaming protocol can only issue a request to send information that must be

approved by the device user before the information is sent. There is no equivalent request to receive

information. However, a Bluetooth device that is not configured properly is susceptible to having a user

with a Bluetooth-enabled device pull data from the device. An 802.11-enabled device with an insecure

P2P setting may also expose data to another 802.11-enabled device.

The ability of either the handheld device or the PC to initiate synchronization presents additional risks. A

rogue compromised handheld device may attempt to synchronize with a PC; alternatively, a compromised

PC may try to synchronize with a PDA. This type of attack is often referred to as “hijacking” and relies

on hijacking software that is available today.48 A malicious user could obtain personal or organizational

data, depending on what is stored on the PDA or PC. For this type of attack to be successful, either the PC

 

48 See “A Whole New World for the 21st Century,” March 2001, at http://www.sans.org.
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or the handheld device has been compromised, or a malicious user has been able to create a rogue

handheld device or PC and gain access to the user’s network.

PDAs can also remotely synchronize with a networked PC using dial-up connections, dialing either

directly to a corporate facility or through a WISP. The modems allow users to dial into an access server at

their office or use a third-party WISP. Dial-up capability, however, also introduces risks. Dialing into a

corporate facility requires a handheld device synchronization server; otherwise, the remote PDA must

derive synchronization service by connecting to a PC that is logged on using the remote client's ID and

password. If the PC is not at least configured with a password-protected screensaver, it is left vulnerable

to anyone with physical access to the PC. Moreover, since the WISP is an untrusted network, establishing

a remote connection requires additional security mechanisms to ensure a secure connection. The PDA

would require a VPN client and a supporting corporate system to create a secure tunnel through the WISP

to the agency. Modem-enabled PDAs are still relatively new, and an agency may not have the security

services in place to support them. Agencies may want to restrict their use until they have either adapted

their existing VPN capabilities or put the required services in place.

Another means for synchronizing data is through an Ethernet connection. Users can synchronize data

from any networked work space. The data that crosses the network is as secure as the network itself and

may be susceptible to network traffic analyzers or sniffers. PDA users can also synchronize through their

agency’s wireless network. This entails accessing the agency’s 802.11-compliant APs to connect to the

agency’s wired network. Many PDA vendors support or are beginning to support VPN connections using

802.11 APs.

Analog phones using first generation (1G) technologies are more susceptible to eavesdropping than are

digital cell phones. Individuals or organizations can intercept unencrypted analog cell phone transmission

using simple radio scanners. In contrast, many digital phones have built-in security through spread

spectrum technologies that use pseudo-random code sequences and forms of encryption. However, when

digital phones are roaming (i.e., using other service providers), they frequently must connect to analog

networks for coverage. When this connection occurs, the digital device becomes as vulnerable as the

analog phone. Digital cellular telephones may also be vulnerable to eavesdropping, but the equipment

required to eavesdrop on a digital cellular telephone is much more expensive. TDMA and GSM offer

built-in encryption, but its use is at the discretion of the cellular service provider.

Smart phones can support wireless location services by using an on-board GPS integrated circuit or by

having service providers analyze the cell phone signal received at cellular antenna sites.49 GPS-enabled

phones can identify the phone’s location to within a few meters and also relay position information. Thus,

in the case of emergency, a user who may be injured or threatened can relay his location to the proper

authorities. These devices are subject to security threats associated with networked computing devices but

also have a new set of privacy concerns as the user’s location can be disclosed to third parties. Advertisers

and other service providers would like to access user location information through agreements with the

cellular telephone provider. Users should carefully read cellular phone companies’ privacy policies and

opt out of any unwanted wireless location services.

Security officers and administrators must also be aware of the threats posed by visitors carrying handheld

devices. Many wireless sniffing tools run on handheld devices that can be used by malicious users to help

them gather information that might be useful in a future attack. Moreover, many handheld devices come

equipped with audio and video recording capabilities that can be used to record sensitive conversations or

records images of people or facilities. As the handheld devices become smaller and more capable, some

 

49 GPS is a Department of Defense (DoD) system of 24 satellites that provides positioning for a receiving unit through

triangulation of three satellites’ signals.
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agencies should consider not allowing users to bring handheld devices into their facilities if they pose a

potential security risk.

5.3.2 Loss of Integrity

The integrity of the information on the handheld device and the integrity of the handheld device

hardware, applications, and underlying operating system are also security concerns. Information stored

on, and software and hardware used by, the handheld device must be protected from unauthorized,

unanticipated, or unintentional modification. Information integrity requires that a third party be able to

verify that the content of a message has not been changed in transit and that the origin or the receipt of a

specific message be verifiable by a third party. Moreover, users must be accountable and uniquely

identifiable. The integrity of the information can be compromised while in transit or while stored on the

handheld device or add-on storage modules. The integrity of the handheld hardware must be protected

against the insertion or replacement of critical read-only memory (ROM) or other integrated circuits or

upgradeable hardware. Handheld applications must be ensured to protect against the installation of

software from unauthorized sources that may contain malware. The integrity of add-on modules must be

ensured to protect the handheld device from rogue hardware add-on modules.

5.3.3 Loss of Availability

The purpose of a DoS attack is to make computational or network resources unavailable or to severely

limit their availability by consuming their resources with an inordinate amount of service requests. DoS

attacks are typically associated with networked devices with fixed IP addresses for attackers to target.

Most handheld devices access the Internet intermittently and do not have fixed IP addresses, but as

networking technologies become more widespread, “always-on” connectivity will be commonplace

within the next few years. As a result, many handheld devices already support the use of personal

firewalls to protect themselves against certain DoS attacks and other types of attacks.

Handheld devices can also be the targets of DoS attacks through other means. Trojan horses, worms,

viruses, and other malware can affect the availability of a network and, in many instances, also

compromise the network’s confidentiality and integrity.50 A virus that, for example, sends documents

from a user’s PC to e-mail addresses found in the user’s electronic address book can burden the network

with a flood of e-mails, send out confidential information, and even alter the information sent, all while

giving the appearance that it was intentionally sent from the user’s account. Viruses have not been widely

considered a security threat in PDAs because of the PDA’s limited memory and processing power.

Moreover, users typically synchronize their data with their PCs, and they can recover any lost or

corrupted data simply by synchronizing with their PCs. Consequently, even a virus such as the Liberty

Crack, which wipes out data on a PDA, has not been considered a serious threat.51 PDA antivirus

protection programs have only been on the market for a few years, and most PDAs do not have antivirus

protection either because they do not support networking or the software simply has not been installed.

However, a virus on a handheld device could contain a payload designed to compromise a desktop PC,

which in turn could directly affect the local network. As PDAs become more powerful, malicious users

will develop viruses designed to achieve more harmful results. PDAs that share the same operating

system as a PC may be particularly susceptible to a new strain of viruses. Although offering users

additional benefits of sharing documents developed using the same applications, the common operating

systems may invite new security threats. With both of the devices running the same applications, the

methods for the virus to launch its attack and spread to other parts of the network increase.

 

50 See SP 800-28, Guidelines on Active Content and Mobile Code, October 2001, for more information on malware. 51 See PDA/Wireless Communication Pains, November 17, 2000, at http://www.sans.org.
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Smart phones may lose network connectivity not only when they travel outside a cell coverage area but

also when cell phone jammers are used. Many restaurants and movie theaters, for example, now use

commercially available jammers to block cell phone communications often without notifying the cell

phone users. Users expecting important messages are not able to receive those messages because the

jammers block them from accessing network resources. Malicious users may also use cell phone jamming

devices. Jamming devices can carry out these attacks by broadcasting transmissions on cellular

frequencies that nullify the actual cellular tower transmissions. The jammed cell phone will not be able to

communicate unless other means of communications are available on the phone or in that region (e.g., a

dual-band cell phone that can operate at different frequencies and also operate on an analog signal).

Cell phones, smart phones, and text pagers are able to send text messages, from 110 to 160 characters in

length depending on the carrier, to other cell phones by using Short Message Service (SMS). To send and

receive SMS text messages, phone users usually have to pay a monthly fee to their service provider or a

small fee for each text message beyond a preset monthly limit. Text messages can also be sent from a

cellular service provider's Web page, by visiting Web sites that allow users to send text messages free of

charge from e-mail applications. Text-messages rely on the service provider’s network and are not

encrypted, and no guarantees exist on quality of service. Cell phones and text-messaging devices can be

spammed with text messages until their mailbox is full, and the user is no longer able to receive new text

messages unless previously stored e-mails are deleted.

As 3G development progresses and 3G phones become more prevalent, agencies will need to be aware of

the security issues that arise. One potential security issue is that a 3G mobile device, when connected to

an IP network, is in the “always-on” mode. This mode alleviates the need for the device to authenticate

itself each time a network request is made. However, the continuous connection also makes the device

susceptible to attack. Moreover, because the device is always on, the opportunity exists to track users’

activities, and this may violate their privacy.

5.4 Risk Mitigation

As the use of handheld devices increases and technology improves, attacks can be expected to become

more sophisticated. To control and even reduce the security risks identified above, agencies need to

implement management, operational, and technical countermeasures to safeguard handheld devices and

the agency’s networks.

5.4.1 Management Countermeasures

Information security officers and network administrators should conduct a risk assessment before

handheld devices are introduced into the agency’s computing environment. The agency should educate

the users about the proper use of their handheld devices and the security risks introduced by their use by

providing short training courses or educational materials to help users use these devices more

productively and more securely. Moreover, network administrators should establish and document

security policies that address their use and the users’ responsibilities.52, The policy document should

include the approved uses, the type of information that the devices may store, software programs they can

install, how to store the devices and associated modules when not in use, proper password selection and

use, how to report a lost or stolen PDA, and any disciplinary actions that may result from misuse.

Agencies should also perform random audits to track whether devices have been lost or stolen.

 

52 See SP 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems, January 2002, at

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/index.html.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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5.4.2 Operational Countermeasures

Operational countermeasures require handheld device users to exercise due diligence in protecting the

handheld devices and the networks they access from unnecessary risks. Most operational countermeasures

are common sense procedures that require voluntary compliance by the users. Operational

countermeasures are intended to minimize the risk associated with the use of handheld devices by wellintentioned users. Although a determined malicious user can find ways to intentionally disclose

information to unauthorized sources, the handheld security policy and the agency’s operational

countermeasures should make clear the user’s responsibilities.

The back of the PDA device should always be labeled with the owning agency’s name, address, and

phone number in case it is lost. Handheld device users should be provided with a secure area to store the

device when not in use. A desk with drawers that lock or a file cabinet with locks are available in most

offices and should provide sufficient physical security against theft from within the office environment.

Galvanized steel cables and locks are also available to secure handheld devices to the user’s desktop if

other physical controls are not available. Although these measures cannot ensure that a determined thief

will not cut these cables or locks, it does prevent an opportunistic thief from walking away with an

unattended handheld device. While on travel, room safes should be used, if available, to store handheld

devices when not in use.

Security administrators should have a list of authorized handheld device users, to enable them to perform

periodic inventory checks and security audits. Individuals that use their handheld devices for other than

business uses should comply with the agency’s security policy or be restricted from accessing the

agency’s network. Handheld devices should be distributed to the users with security settings that comply

with the agency’s security policy and should not be distributed with “out-of-the-box” default settings. A

configuration management policy should be established. Such a policy frees security administrators from

having to focus on many different configurations and allows them to concentrate on the configurations

that have been adopted for the agency. Handheld devices should have a PIN code or password to access

the device. Some handheld devices already use voice authentication for authenticating users to the device

or to network resources. Voice authentication should be coupled with password authentication. A number

of security tools are currently available to help mitigate the risks related to the use of PDAs, including

password auditing, recovery/restoration, and vulnerability tools.53

In general, users should not store sensitive information on handheld devices. However, if sensitive

information is stored on the handheld device, users should be encouraged to delete sensitive information

when no longer needed. This information can be archived on the PC during synchronization and

transferred back to the PDA when needed. Users can disable IR ports during periods of nonuse to deter

them from leaking information from their handheld devices. Users with access to sensitive information

should have approval from their management and network security administrators before storing sensitive

information on their handheld device to ensure they have the appropriate security countermeasures in

place.

Some handheld devices allow users to mark certain records as “private” and hide them unless the device

password is entered. Thus, if a malicious user gained access to an unattended device without knowledge

of the device password, that malicious user would not be able to see the private data. Depending on the

underlying operating system, however, some of these private data fields can be read directly from

memory.

 

53 See “Research Tools” at http://www.atstake.com.
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5.4.3 Technical Countermeasures

This section describes technical countermeasures for securing wireless handheld devices. Technical

countermeasures should address the security risks identified during the risk assessment and should ensure

that the agency’s security policy is being enforced. As noted in the 802.11 and Bluetooth sections,

hardware solutions, which generally have software components, are listed simply as hardware solutions.

5.4.3.1 Authentication

Identification and authentication (I&A) form the process of recognizing and verifying valid users,

processes, or devices. Handheld device users must be able to authenticate themselves to the handheld

device by providing a password, a token, or both. At the most basic level, agencies should require PDAs

to be password protected. Security administrators should educate users on the selection of strong

passwords. Password-cracking tools for handheld devices are available for network administrators and

users to audit their PC’s synchronization application password.54 Password protection is already included

with most handheld devices, but is usually not enabled in the default setting. Several Web sites offer

software that prompts a user to enter a password when the user has turned the PDA off and turned it back

on again.55 Users should be prompted for a password when accessing the handheld device or the desktop

PC synchronization software.

Biometric user authentication technologies are also available for handheld devices. Fingerprint readers

can be attached to the handheld devices through a serial or USB port and can be set to lock the whole

device, to lock an individual application, or to connect to a remote database over a network or dial-up

connection. Tamper-proof smart cards, which contain unique user identifying information such as a

private key, can also be used to authenticate the user to the device. Users insert the smart card into a

peripheral slot on the device and provide a password to authenticate themselves. Malicious users must

have possession of the smart card and knowledge of the user’s password to gain access to the device.

Unique device identifiers, when available, can be used as part of an authorization mechanism to

authenticate and provide network access to a handheld device. Handheld devices can take advantage of

several methods to identify a unique handheld device, including flash ID, device ID, and Electronic Serial

Number (ESN). Unique device identifiers can be used to authenticate the handheld device for network

access or allow the handheld device itself to be used as a physical token for two-factor authentication.

Although it might be possible for an unauthorized user to copy the shape of a signature, many

handwriting recognition programs measure aspects that are more difficult to copy, such as the rhythm and

timing of the signature. The user can select a password to write instead of a signature, which is more

widely available on paper documents distributed in the normal course of business.

5.4.3.2 Encryption

Some files on the device may require a higher level of security than password protection can offer. For

example, user passwords are required to access all sorts of automated services in our everyday lives.

During the course of a single day, a user may need to use passwords to withdraw money from an

automatic teller machine (ATM), to enter a building by typing an access code, to listen to voice mail, to

browse favorite Web sites, to purchase goods online, to access online trading accounts, to make a phone

call using a calling card, and to access personal and business e-mail accounts. Using the same password to

 

54 See http://www.atstake.com/research/tools/index.html for PDA security assessment tools. 55 The following Web sites offer PDA software tools: www.pdacentral.com; www.tucows.com; www.download.com.

Vendors, for example, Palm (www.palm.com/software) and Microsoft

(www.microsoft.com/mobile/pocketpc/downloads/default.asp), also offer software tools for their specific products.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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access different services is discouraged because if this single password were compromised, an

unauthorized user would be able to access all of the user’s accounts. However, many PDA users store

many of these passwords in a file on the PDA, possibly even naming the file “mypasswords.” Once a

single password has been given, other user accounts can be identified through various means ranging

from dumpster diving to simply reviewing a user’s Web browser history file. Encryption software can be

used to protect the confidentiality of sensitive information stored on handheld devices and mirrored on the

desktop PC. The information on add-on backup storage modules should also be encrypted and the

modules securely stored when not in use. This additional level of security can be added to provide an

extra layer of defense to further protect sensitive information stored on handheld devices. Many software

programs are freely available to help users encrypt these types of files for an added layer of security.

However, if the data is sensitive, the encryption implementation should be FIPS140-2 validated.

Encrypting the file protects it from brute-force password guessing if the file falls into the wrong hands.

Handheld device users may elect to encrypt files and messages before the files and messages are

transferred through a wireless port.

Smart phones use digital technologies to deter unencrypted voice traffic from being intercepted. FEC

(Forward Error Correction) coding and spread-spectrum techniques add more robust communication error

protection and complexity. Agencies should upgrade their analog phones to digital smart phones that offer

more capabilities at the application level (e.g., Web browsing, networking) and the ability to use more

security mechanisms with those applications.

5.4.3.3 Antivirus Software

Antivirus software is another important security measure for handheld devices.56 All agencies, regardless

of their security requirements, should incorporate PDA antivirus applications to scan e-mail and data files

and to remove malware from files upon transmission to the device. The software should scan all entry

ports (i.e., beaming, synchronizing, e-mail, and Internet downloading) as data is imported into the device,

provide online signature update capabilities, and prompt the user before it deletes any suspicious files.

The agency should further require regular updates to the antivirus software and require associated

workstations (i.e., the PCs with which users synchronize their PDAs) to have current, properly working

virus-scanning software. Most major PC antivirus software vendors have handheld device antivirus

software that can be downloaded directly from their Web sites.

5.4.3.4 PKI

Many handheld devices are beginning to offer support for PKI technologies. PKI is one of the best

available methods for meeting confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity security requirements.57 A PKI

uses an asymmetric encryption method, commonly known as the “public/private key” method, for

encrypting and ensuring the integrity of documents and messages. A certificate authority issues digital

certificates that authenticate the claimed identity of people and organizations over a public network such

as the Internet. The PKI also establishes the encryption algorithms, levels of security, and the key

distribution policy for users. PKI support is often integrated into common applications such as Web

browsers and e-mail programs by validating certificates and signed messages. The PKI can also be

implemented by an organization for its own use to authenticate users that handle sensitive information.

The use of PKI counters many threats associated with public networks but also introduces management

overhead and additional hardware and software costs that should be evaluated while performing the risk

assessment and selecting the appropriate countermeasures to meet the agency’s security requirements. If

PKI has already been deployed to provide security services in the wired network of an agency, users

 

56 See http://csrc.nist.gov/virus/ for useful links for more information on viruses.

57 See SP 800-32, Introduction to Public Key Technology and the Federal PKI Infrastructure, February 2001, at

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/index.html.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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should be provided a separate and distinct public/private key pair for use on PDAs. This will prevent

compromise of the enterprise data in the event of a lost or stolen PDA.

5.4.3.5 VPN and Firewalls

Organizations in a wide variety of industries are using handheld devices for remote access to patient

records, merchandise inventory, and shipping logistics. Secure remote access for desktop and laptop

computers has been successfully enabled by the use of firewalls and VPN over the last few years.58

Handheld devices are beginning to offer support for personal firewalls and VPN technologies and to offer

network administrators effective countermeasures against threats to the confidentiality, integrity, and

authenticity of the information being transferred. A packet filter firewall, for example, screens Internet

traffic based on packet header information such as the type of application (e-mail, ftp, Web, etc.) and by

the service port number. A VPN creates a virtual private network between the handheld device and the

organization’s network by sharing the public network infrastructure. VPN technology offers the security

of a private network through access control and encryption, while taking advantage of the economies of

scale and built-in management facilities of large public networks. Network administrators should look for

the following features when purchasing VPN technologies: interoperability with existing infrastructure,

support for wireless and dial-up networking, packet-filtering or stateful-inspection firewall, automatic

security updates, and a centralized management console.

5.4.3.6 Enterprise Solutions

Enterprise handheld device management software allows network administrators to discover handheld

devices, install and remove applications, back up and restore data, collect inventory information,

synchronize data with corporate servers and databases, and perform various configuration management

functions from a central location. Enterprise security solutions have been introduced that allow the

organization to set policies on all handheld devices under the organization’s control. Some of the options

that are available include defining the type of encryption to use, which application databases to encrypt,

password protection, and port protection.

5.4.3.7 Miscellaneous

Third-party developers have introduced a number of security tools to help protect handheld devices.

These security tools are fairly inexpensive and typically offer simple yet practical security

countermeasures to protect against malicious users that are more likely to steal the device than to crack an

encrypted file or eavesdrop on their wireless communications. Some of these security tools delete

applications and their data after a preset number of unsuccessful login attempts. Authorized users simply

have to resynchronize the PDA with their PCs to recover the deleted information. This countermeasure is

particularly effective and applicable in instances where PDAs are holding sensitive information. Users

must be cautioned that all data entered on the PDA since the last synchronization will be lost. A malicious

user could purposely enter several incorrect passwords to delete the data on an unattended handheld

device, but this risk can be mitigated by frequent synchronization with the user’s PC. Another simple

security tool is to add an application that auto-locks the PDA after it is idle for a selected period of time.

The user can usually set this time-out period. This solution mitigates risks that arise when users leave

PDAs unattended. Users simply enter a password to regain access to the PDA. This solution is similar to a

screen saver password for a desktop PC.

 

58 See Special Publication 800-46, Security for Telecommuting and Broadband Communications, at

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/index.html.
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5.5 Case Study: PDAs in the Workplace

Agency C is considering purchasing PDAs for its 150 employees. Before making a decision to purchase

the PDAs, the computer security department performs a risk assessment. A canvas of user attitudes

reveals that most of the agency’s users do not appreciate the implications of losing a PDA and the loss of

sensitive agency data. The network administrators test the devices and set up a one-hour training course

for the employees that will be using the PDAs. During the training course, the users are given the security

policy and documentation explaining the security risks associated with the devices. The security team also

recommends instituting security policies that address the appropriate uses of PDAs, the use of random

inventory and security audits, and the users’ responsibilities and liabilities. The security policy specifies

the type of information that users can store on the PDA, proper handling of PDAs, password requirements

(e.g., frequency of change, minimum character length), procedures for reporting a lost or stolen PDA, and

any disciplinary actions that may result from misuse.

The security department completes its risk assessment and cautions that even though it has done a

thorough analysis of the PDAs, risks still exist with the fast pace of PDA evolution and the likelihood that

malicious users will try to exploit any new or existing vulnerability. Agency C determines that the

operational benefits outweigh the residual risks of the PDAs and moves forward with the purchase.

Agency C considers the protection of sensitive information paramount. Encryption software is used to

encrypt database files stored on the PC and the PDA. Users are encouraged to synchronize their handheld

devices every other day; consequently, Agency C does not purchase backup storage modules. The

security department realizes that IR beaming has important benefits and decides not to prohibit IR

beaming completely. However, it does recommend that users keep IR ports closed during periods of

nonuse. The employees also need to update the agency’s database from the field and to access their email. It is decided that access to corporate resources will be through a VPN.

Before issuing the PDAs to its employees, the security department ensures that the default settings of the

Bluetooth cards are changed to comply with the agency’s security policy. The security team upgrades its

existing antivirus software to allow it to screen data being transferred to the PC during synchronization.

The security team also installs software that automatically prompts the users to enter a password to access

the device after 5 minutes of inactivity on all the PDAs. The security team labels the devices and issues

them to users with the proper security settings. The security team performs regular audits and follows

vendor sites and security mailing lists for security news about handheld devices and applications.

5.6 Wireless Handheld Device Security Checklist

Table 5-1 provides a security checklist for PDAs and smart phones. The table presents guidelines and

recommendations for creating and maintaining a secure environment that uses these handheld devices.

For each recommendation or guideline, three columns are provided. The first column, the Best Practice

column, if checked, means that the entry represents something recommended for all agencies. The second

column, the “Should Consider” column, if checked, means that the recommendation is something that an

agency should carefully consider for three reasons. First, implementing the recommendation may provide

a higher level of security for the wireless environment by offering some sort of additional protection.

Second, the recommendation supports a defense-in-depth strategy. Third, it may have significant

performance, operational, or cost impacts. In summary, if the “Should Consider” column is checked,

agencies need to carefully consider the option and weigh the costs versus the benefits. The last column,

the “Status” column, is intentionally left blank and allows an agency to use this table as a true checklist.

For instance, an individual performing a handheld device security audit can quickly check off each

recommendation for the agency wireless environment, asking, “Have I done this?”
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Table 5-1. Wireless Handheld Device Security Checklist

Checklist

Security Recommendation Best

Practice

Should

Consider

Status

Management Control

1. Develop an agency security policy that addresses the use of all

handheld devices.

!

2. Ensure that users on the network are fully trained in computer security

awareness and the risks associated with handheld devices.

!

3. Perform a risk assessment to understand the value of the assets in the

agency that need protection.

!

4. Conduct ongoing, random security audits to monitor and track devices. !

5. Ensure that external physical boundary protection is in place around the

perimeter of the building or buildings of the agency.

!

6. Deploy physical access controls to the building and other secure areas

(e.g., photo ID, card badge readers).

!

7. Minimize the risk of loss or theft through the use of physical locks and

cables.

!

8. Label all handheld devices with the owner and agency's information. !

9. Ensure that users know where to report a lost or stolen device. !

10. Ensure that devices are stored securely when left unattended. !

11. Make sure that add-on modules are adequately protected when not in

use to prevent against theft.

!

12. Enable a “power-on” password for each handheld device. !

13. Ensure proper password management (aging, complexity criteria, etc.)

for all handheld devices.

!

14. Ensure that desktop application-mirroring software is passwordprotected.

!

15. Store data on backup storage modules in encrypted form. !

16. Review vendor Web sites frequently for new patches and software

releases.

!

17. Install patches on the affected devices and workstations. !

18. Review security-related mailing lists for the latest security information

and alerts.

!

19. Ensure that all devices have timeout mechanisms that automatically

prompt the user for a password after a period of inactivity.

!

20. Synchronize devices with its corresponding PC regularly. !

21. Avoid placing sensitive information on a handheld device. If necessary

to do so, delete sensitive data from the handheld device and archive it

on the PC when no longer needed on the handheld.

!

22. Turn off communication ports during periods of inactivity when possible. !

23. Install antivirus software on all handheld devices. !

24. Install personal firewall software on all networked handheld devices. !
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Checklist

Security Recommendation Best

Practice

Should

Consider

Status

Technical Control

25. Ensure that PDAs are provided with secure authorization

software/firmware.

!

26. Install VPN software on all handheld devices that transmit data

wirelessly.

!

27. Ensure that a user can be securely authenticated when operating

locally and remotely.

!

28. Use robust encryption and password protection utilities for the

protection of sensitive data files and applications.

!

29. Use enterprise security applications to manage handheld device

security.

!

30. Ensure that security assessment tools are used on handheld devices. !

31. When disposing handheld devices that will no longer be used by the

agency, clear configuration settings to prevent the disclosure of

sensitive network information.

!

5.7 Handheld Device Risk and Security Summary

Table 5.2 lists security recommendations for handheld devices. For each recommendation, narrative is

provided that addresses the security need, requirements or justification for that rcommendation.

Table 5-2. Handheld Device Security Summary

Security Recommendation Security Need, Requirement, or Justification

1. Develop an agency security policy that

addresses the use of all handheld devices.

A security policy is the foundation on which other

countermeasures—the operational and technical ones—

are rationalized and implemented. A documented security

policy allows an organization to define acceptable

implementations and uses for handheld devices.

2. Ensure that users on the network are fully

trained in computer security awareness and

the risks associated with handheld devices.

A security awareness program helps users to establish

good security practices in the interest of preventing

inadvertent or malicious intrusions onto an organization’s

automated information system.

3. Perform a risk assessment to understand the

value of the assets in the agency that need

protection.

The risk assessment can help the organization identify

and determine the value of their information system and

data assets, thus allowing the organization to allocate the

appropriate level of resources for protection of those

systems and assets.

4. Conduct ongoing, random security audits to

monitor and track devices.

Security policy enforcement is vital for ensuring that only

authorized handheld wireless devices are operating in

compliance with the organization’s wireless security

policy. Random security audits provide a realistic view of

the security environments.

5. Ensure that external boundary protection is

in place around the perimeter of the building

or buildings of the agency.

To prevent malicious physical access to an organization’s

information system infrastructure, the external boundaries

should be secured through means such as a fence or

locked doors.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Security Recommendation Security Need, Requirement, or Justification

6. Deploy physical access controls to the

building and other secure areas (e.g., photo

ID, card badge readers).

Identification badges or physical access cards should be

deployed to ensure that only authorized personnel have

physical access to a facility.

7. Minimize the risk of loss or theft through the

use of physical locks and cables.

As with any portable device, use physical locks and

cables to minimize the risk of loss or theft.

8. Label all handheld devices with the owner’s

and agency's information.

As with any portable device, label all handheld devices

with the appropriate owner and agency information.

9. Ensure that users know where to report a

lost or stolen device.

As with any portable device, a label should be on the

device indicating how it can be returned to the rightful

owner.

10. Ensure that devices are stored securely

when left unattended.

Handheld devices should be stowed in locked rooms and

cabinets especially when left unattended for long periods

such as a night.

11. Ensure that add-on modules are adequately

protected when not in use to prevent against

theft.

Add-on modules are sometimes as much a target as the

primary handheld device. So, it too should also be

secured from risk of theft.

12. Enable a “power-on” password for each

handheld device.

Requiring user authentication helps prevent unauthorized

device access and potential theft of data.

13. Ensure proper password management

(aging, complexity criteria, etc.) for all

handheld devices.

Proper password management helps to ensure security of

devices and data contained.

14. Ensure that desktop application mirroring

software is password protected.

Unauthorized access to all handheld components and

related software should be prevented through the use of

passwords and encryption where feasible.

15. Store data on backup storage modules in

encrypted form.

In case the backup storage is stolen, the information

should be stored encrypted.

16. Fully test and deploy software patches and

upgrades regularly.

Newly discovered security vulnerabilities of vendor

products should be patched to prevent malicious and

inadvertent exploits. Patches should also be fully tested

before implementation to ensure that they work.

17. Install patches on the affected devices and

workstations.

Newly discovered security vulnerabilities of vendor

products should be patched to prevent malicious and

inadvertent exploits. Patching peripheral devices and

workstations related to the handheld device will minimize

the risk of attack. Patches should also be fully tested

before implementation to ensure that they work.

18. Review security-related mailing lists for the

latest security information and alerts.

Proactively search reports on newly discovered wireless

handheld risks and vulnerabilities.

19. Ensure that all devices have timeout

mechanisms that automatically prompt the

user for a password after a period of

inactivity.

Time-out mechanisms requiring the user to login after a

period of inactivity should be implemented to protect them

from inadvertent or malicious activities of third-party

users.

20. Synchronize devices with their

corresponding PCs regularly.

Synchronization of handheld devices with their

corresponding PCs ensures data availability.

21. Avoid placing sensitive information on a

handheld device. If necessary to do so,

delete sensitive data from the handheld

device and archive it on the PC when no

longer needed on the handheld.

Because of the portability of handheld devices and greater

threat to loss and theft, sensitive information stored on the

device should be off-loaded to the PC and deleted form

the handheld device, if possible.

22. Turn off communication ports during periods

of inactivity when possible.

Turning off unused communication ports minimizes the

risk of malicious access.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

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Security Recommendation Security Need, Requirement, or Justification

23. Install antivirus software on all handheld

devices.

Antivirus software ensures that the handheld device does

not introduce known worms and viruses to the wired

network. Also, the handheld device is protected from its

communicating hosts.

24. Install personal firewall software on all

networked handheld devices.

The handheld device is a potential target for malicious

users.

25. Ensure that PDAs are provided with secure

authorization software/firmware.

Only secured authorization software and firmware should

be used with the PDA.

26. Install VPN software on all handheld devices

that transmit data wirelessly.

All wireless communication, if possible, should use strong

cryptography, have robust key management, and have

strong user authentication.

27. Ensure that a user can be securely

authenticated when operating locally or

remotely.

Users should be required to authenticate when operating

locally and remotely.

28. Use robust encryption and password

protection utilities for the protection of

sensitive data files and applications.

Sensitive data and application data files should be

encrypted with the appropriate encryption techniques.

29. Use enterprise security applications to

manage handheld device security.

Handheld devices should also be managed by enterprise

security applications.

30. Ensure that security assessment tools are

used on handheld devices.

Handheld devices should undergo security assessments

to identify security vulnerabilities.

31. When disposing handheld devices that will

no longer be used by the agency, clear

configuration settings to prevent the

disclosure of sensitive network information.

Sensitive or proprietary configuration settings should be

cleared to prevent inadvertent disclosure of the

information to potentially malicious users.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

A-1

Appendix A—Common Wireless Frequencies and Applications

EM Band Designation Frequency Range Wireless Device/Application

VLF: Very Low Frequency 9 kHz–30 kHz

LF: Low Frequency 30 kHz–300 kHz

MF: Medium Frequency 300 kHz–3 MHz AM radio stations (535 kHz–1 MHz)

HF: High Frequency 3 MHz – 30 MHz

VHF: Very High Frequency 30 MHz–300 MHz FM radio stations

VHF television stations 7–13, NTSC Standard (174

MHz–220 MHz)

Garage door openers (~40 MHz)

Standard cordless telephones (40 MHz–50 MHz)

Alarm Systems (~40 MHz)

Paging Systems (50 MHz–300 MHz)

UHF: Ultra High Frequency 300 MHz–3 GHz Paging systems (300 MHz–500 MHz)

1G mobile telephones (824 MHz–829 MHz)

2G mobile telephone (800 MHz–900 MHz)

Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM)

Enhanced Data Rates for Global Evolution (EDGE)

(800/900/1800/1900 MHz bands)

3G Mobile telephones (international standard) (1,755

MHz–2200 MHz)

Bluetooth devices (2.4-2.4835 GHz)

Home RF (2.4 GHz ISM Band)

WLAN (2.4, 5 GHz)

SHF: Super High

Frequency

3 GHz–30 GHz Applications in the short range, point-to-point

communications including remote control systems,

PDAs, etc.

WLAN (5.8 GHz).

Local Multipoint Distribution Services (LMDS), a fixed

wireless technology that operates in the 28 GHz band

and offers line-of-sight coverage over distances up to 3

to 5 kilometers.

EHF: Extremely High

Frequency

30 GHz–300 GHz Satellite communications

IR: Infrared 300 GHz Remote controls for home audio-visual components

IR links for peripheral devices

PDA and cellular telephone IR links
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

B-1

Appendix B—Glossary of Terms

Advanced Encryption

Standard (AES)

The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is an encryption algorithm for

securing sensitive but unclassified material by U.S. Government agencies.

Data Encryption Standard

(DES)

A National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standard secret

key cryptography method that uses a 56-bit key encryption. DES is based

on an IBM algorithm, which was further developed by the U.S. National

Security Agency. It uses the block cipher method, which breaks the text into

64-bit blocks before encrypting them. There are several DES encryption

modes. The most popular mode exclusive-OR-s each plain-text block with

the previous encrypted block. DES decryption is very fast and widely used.

The secret key may be kept completely secret and reused again, or a key can

be randomly generated for each session, in which case, the new key is

transmitted to the recipient using a public key cryptography method such as

RSA. Triple DES (3DES) is an enhancement of DES that provides

considerably more security than standard DES, which uses only one 56-bit

key. There are several 3DES methods. EEE3 uses three keys and encrypts

three times. EDE3 uses three keys to encrypt, decrypt, and encrypt again.

EEE2 and EDE2 are similar to EEE3 and EDE3, except that only two keys

are used, and the first and third operations use the same key.

Dynamic Host

Configuration Protocol

(DHCP)

The protocol used to assign Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to all nodes on

the network.

Hash Function A computationally efficient algorithm that maps a variable-sized amount of

text into a fixed-sized output (hash value). Hash functions are used in

creating digital signatures.

Industrial, Scientific, and

Medical (ISM) Band

The ISM band refers to the government-allotted bandwidth at 2.450 ± .050

gigahertz (GHz) and 5.8 ± 0.75 GHz.

Infrared (IR) An invisible band of radiation at the lower end of the electromagnetic

spectrum. It starts at the middle of the microwave spectrum and extends to

the beginning of visible light. Infrared transmission requires an

unobstructed line of sight between transmitter and receiver. It is used for

wireless transmission between computer devices, as well as for most

handheld remotes for TVs, video, and stereo equipment.

Institute of Electrical and

Electronics Engineers

(IEEE)

A worldwide professional association for electrical and electronics

engineers that sets standards for telecommunications and computing

applications.

International

Electrotechnical

Commission (IEC)

An organization that sets international standards for the electrical and

electronics fields.

International Organization

for Standardization (ISO)

A voluntary organization responsible for creating international standards in

many areas, including computers and communications.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

B-2

Jini An approach to instant recognition that would enable manufacturers to

make devices that can attach to a network independently of an operating

system. Jini can be viewed as the next step after the Java programming

language toward making a network look like one large computer. Each

pluggable device in a network will define itself immediately to a network

device registry. Using the Jini architecture, users will be able to plug

printers, storage devices, speakers, and any other kind of device directly

into a network, and every other computer, device, and user on the network

will know that the new device has been added and is available through the

network registry. When a user wants to use or access the resource, his/her

computer will be able to download the necessary programming from it to

communicate with it. In this way, devices on the network may be able to

access and use other devices without having the drivers or other previous

knowledge of the device.

Local Area Network

(LAN)

A network that connects computers in close proximity via cable, usually in

the same building.

Medium Access Control

(MAC)

On a local area network, the sublayers that control which device has access

to the transmission medium at a particular time.

Open Systems

Interconnection (OSI)

A model developed by ISO to allow computer systems made by different

vendors to communicate with each other.

Personal Digital Assistant

(PDA)

A handheld computer that serves as an organizer for personal information.

It generally includes at least a name-and-address database, a to-do list, and a

note taker. PDAs are pen-based and use a stylus to tap selections on menus

and to enter printed characters. The unit may also include a small on-screen

keyboard that is tapped with the pen. Data is synchronized between a user’s

PDA and desktop computer by cable or wireless transmission.

Request for Comments

(RFC)

A series of numbered documents (RFC 822, RFC 1123, etc.) developed by

the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) that set standards and are

voluntarily followed by many makers of software in the Internet

community.

Smart Card A credit card with a built-in microprocessor and memory that is used for

identification or financial transactions. When inserted into a reader, the card

transfers data to and from a central computer. A smart card is more secure

than a magnetic stripe card and can be programmed to self-destruct if the

wrong password is entered too many times.

Spoofing “IP spoofing” refers to sending a network packet that appears to come from

a source other than its actual source.

Virtual Private Network

(VPN)

A means by which certain authorized individuals (such as remote

employees) can gain secure access to an organization's intranet by means of

an extranet (a part of the internal network that is accessible via the Internet).
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

B-3

Wireless Application

Protocol (WAP)

A standard for providing cellular telephones, pagers, and other handheld

devices with secure access to e-mail and text-based Web pages. Introduced

in 1997 by Phone.com, Ericsson, Motorola, and Nokia, WAP provides a

complete environment for wireless applications that includes a wireless

counterpart of TCP/IP and a framework for telephony integration, such as

call control and telephone book access. WAP features the Wireless Markup

Language (WML) and is a streamlined version of HTML for small-screen

displays. It also uses WMLScript, a compact JavaScript-like language that

runs in limited memory. WAP also supports handheld input methods, such

as keypad and voice recognition. Independent of the air interface, WAP

runs over all the major wireless networks in place now and in the future. It

is also device-independent, requiring only a minimum functionality in the

unit to permit use with a myriad of telephones and handheld devices.

Wired Equivalent Privacy

(WEP)

Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) is a security protocol, specified in the

IEEE Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) standard, 802.11, that is designed to provide

a wireless local area network (WLAN) with a level of security and privacy

comparable to what is usually expected of a wired LAN.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

C-1

Appendix C—Acronyms and Abbreviations

1G First Generation

2G Second Generation

2.5G Two-and-a-Half Generation

3DES Triple Data Encryption Standard

3G Third Generation

ACL Access Control List

ACO Authenticated Cipher Offset

AES Advanced Encryption Standard

AH Authentication Header

AMPS Advanced Mobile Phone System

AP Access Point

API Application Programming Interfaces

ATM Automatic Teller Machine

BSS Basic Service Set

CDMA Code Division Multiple Access

CERT Computer Emergency Response Team

CIO Chief Information Officer

CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check

DDoS Distributed Denial of Service

DES Data Encryption Standard

DHCP Dynamic Host Control Protocol

DoD Department of Defense

DoS Denial of Service

DSSS Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum

EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol

ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography

EDGE Enhanced Data GSM Environment

EM Electromagnetic

ESN Electronic Serial Number

ESP Encapsulating Security Protocol

ESS Extended Service Set

ETSI European Telecommunications Standard Institute

FCC Federal Communications Commission

FDMA Frequency Division Multiple Access

FEC Forward Error Correction

FH Frequency Hopping

FHSS Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum

FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard

GFSK Gaussian Frequency Shift Keying

GHz Gigahertz

GPRS General Packet Radio System
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

C-2

GPS Global Positioning System

GSM Global System for Mobile Communications

HTML HyperText Markup Language

HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol

I&A Identification and Authentication

IBSS Interdependent Basic Service Set

ICAT Internet Categorization of Attack Toolkit

IDC International Data Corporation

IDS Intrusion Detection System

IEC International Electrotechnical Commission

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers

IETF Internet Engineering Task Force

IKE Internet Key Exchange

IMT-2000 International Mobile Telecommunication 2000

IP Internet Protocol

IPsec Internet Protocol Security

IPX Internet Packet Exchange

IR Infrared

ISM Industrial, Scientific, and Medical

ISO International Organization for Standardization

ISS Internet Security Systems

IV Initialization Vector

Kbps Kilobits per second

KG Key Generator

KHz Kilohertz

KSG Key Stream Generator

L2CAP Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol

L2TP Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol

LAN Local Area Network

LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol

LFSR Linear Feedback Shift Register

MAC Medium Access Control

Mbps Megabits per second

MHz Megahertz

mW Milliwatt

NIC Network Interface Card

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

OFDM Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OSI Open Systems Interconnection

OTP One-Time Password

P2P Peer to Peer
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

C-3

PAN Personal Area Network

PC Personal Computer

PCMCIA Personal Computer Memory Card International Association

PDA Personal Digital Assistant

PHY Physical Layer

PIN Personal Identification Number

PKI Public Key Infrastructure

PPTP Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol

RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-in User Service

RF Radio Frequency

RFC Request for Comment

ROM Read Only Memory

RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adelman

RSN Robust Security Networks

SIG Special Interest Group

SMS Short Message Service

SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol

SRES Signed Response

SSH Secure Shell

SSID Service Set Identifier

SSL Secure Sockets Layer

TCP Transmission Control Protocol

TDMA Time Division Multiple Access

TGI Task Group I

TKIP Temporal Key Integrity Protocol

TLS Transport Layer Security

TTP Trusted Third Party

UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service

USB Universal Serial Bus

USC United States Code

UWC Universal Wireless Communications

VPN Virtual Private Network

WAP Wireless Application Protocol

WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy

WEP2 Wired Equivalent Privacy 2

WG-1000 Wireless Gateway 1000

WI-FI Wireless Fidelity

WISP Wireless Internet Service Provider

WLAN Wireless Local Area Network

WML Wireless Markup Language

WTA Wireless Telephony Application

WTP Wireless Transaction Protocol

WWAN Wireless Wide Area Network

WPAN Wireless Personal Area Networks

WPA Wi-Fi Protected Access
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

D-1

Appendix D—Summary of 802.11 Standards

Table D-1 provides a summary of the various 802.11 standards. For each of the eight standards, a

description of the standard, purpose keywords and remarks about the standard, and when the standard and

products will be available are provided.

Table D-1. Summary of 802.11 Standards

Standard Description Purpose Keywords

and Other Remarks Availability

802.11a

A physical layer standard in the 5

GHz radio band. It specifies eight

available radio channels (in some

countries, 12 channels are

permitted). The maximum link rate is

54 Mbps per channel; maximum

actual user data throughput is

approximately half of that, and the

throughput is shared by all users of

the same radio channel.

The data rate decreases as the

distance between the user and the

radio access point increases.

Higher Performance.

In most office environments, the

data throughput will be greater

than for 11b. Also, the greater

number of radio channels (eight

as opposed to three) provides

better protection against possible

interference from neighboring

access points.

Conformance is shown by a WiFi5 mark from WiFi Alliance.

Standard was

completed in 1999.

Products are available

now.

802.11b

This is a physical layer standard in

the 2.4 GHz radio band. It specifies

three available radio channels.

Maximum link rate is 11 Mbps per

channel, but maximum user

throughput will be approximately half

of this because the throughput is

shared by all users of the same

radio channel. The data rate

decreases as the distance between

the user and the radio access point

increases.

Performance.

Products are in volume production

with a wide selection at

competitive prices.

Installations may suffer from

speed restrictions in the future as

the number of active users

increase, and the limit of three

radio channels may cause

interference from neighboring

access points.

Standard was

completed in 1999.

A wide variety of

products have been

available since 2001.

802.11d

This standard is supplementary to

the Media Access Control (MAC)

layer in 802.11 to promote worldwide

use of 802.11 WLANs.

It will allow access points to

communicate information on the

permissible radio channels with

acceptable power levels for user

devices. The 802.11 standards

cannot legally operate in some

countries; the purpose of 11d is to

add features and restrictions to allow

WLANs to operate within the rules of

these countries.

Promote worldwide use.

In countries where the physical

layer radio requirements are

different from those in North

America, the use of WLANs is

lagging behind. Equipment

manufacturers do not want to

produce a wide variety of countryspecific products, and users that

travel do not want a bag full of

country-specific WLAN PC cards.

The outcome will be countryspecific firmware solutions.

Work is ongoing, but

see 802.11h for a

timeline on 5 GHz

WLANs in Europe.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

D-2

Standard Description Purpose Keywords

and Other Remarks Availability

802.11e

This standard is supplementary to

the MAC layer to provide QOS

support for LAN applications. It will

apply to 802.11 physical standards

a, b, and g. The purpose is to

provide classes of service with

managed levels of QOS for data,

voice, and video applications.

Quality of service.

This standard should provide

some useful features for

differentiating data traffic streams.

It is essential for future audio and

video distribution.

Many WLAN manufacturers have

targeted QOS as a feature to

differentiate their products, so

there will be plenty of proprietary

offerings before 11e is complete.

This standard will be greatly

affected by the work of Tgi.

The finalized standard

is expected in the

second half of 2002.

Products will be

available in the second

half of 2003 or later.

802.11f

This is a "recommended practice"

document that aims to achieve radio

access point interoperability within a

multivendor WLAN network. The

standard defines the registration of

access points within a network and

the interchange of information

between access points when a user

is handed over from one access

point to another.

Interoperability.

This standard will work to increase

vendor interoperability. Currently

few features exist in the AP work.

802.11f will reduce vendor lock-in

and allow multivendor

infrastructures.

Completed standard is

expected in the second

half of 2002. Products

will be available in the

first half of 2003 or

later.

802.11g

This is a physical layer standard for

WLANs in the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz

radio band. It specifies three

available radio channels. The

maximum link rate is 54 Mbps per

channel whereas 11b has 11 Mbps.

The 802.11g standard uses

orthogonal frequency-division

multiplexing (OFDM) modulation but,

for backward compatibility with 11b,

it also supports complementary

code-keying (CCK) modulation and,

as an option for faster link rates,

allows packet binary convolutional

coding (PBCC) modulation.

Performance with 802.11b

backward compatibility.

Speeds similar to 11a and

backward compatibility may

appear attractive but modulation

issues exist: Conflicting interests

between key vendors have

divided support within IEEE task

group for the OFDM and PBCC

modulation schemes. The task

group compromised by including

both types of modulation in the

draft standard. With the addition of

support for 11b's CCK modulation,

the end result is three modulation

types. This is perhaps too little,

too late, and too complex relative

to 11a. However, advantages

exist for vendors hoping to supply

dual-mode 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz

products, in that using OFDM for

both modes will reduce silicon

cost. If 802.11h fails to obtain panEuropean approval by the second

half of 2003, then 11g will become

the high-speed WLAN of choice in

Europe.

Completed standard is

expected in the second

half of 2002.

Products will be

available in the first

half of 2003 or later.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

D-3

Standard Description Purpose Keywords

and Other Remarks Availability

802.11h

This standard is supplementary to

the MAC layer to comply with

European regulations for 5 GHz

WLANs. European radio regulations

for the 5 GHz band require products

to have transmission power control

(TPC) and dynamic frequency

selection (DFS). TPC limits the

transmitted power to the minimum

needed to reach the farthest user.

DFS selects the radio channel at the

access point to minimize

interference with other systems,

particularly radar.

European regulation

compliance.

This is necessary for products to

operate in Europe.

Completion of 11h will provide

better acceptability within Europe

for IEEE-compliant 5 GHz WLAN

products. A group that is rapidly

dwindling will continue to support

the alternative HyperLAN

standard defined by ETSI.

Although European countries such

as the Netherlands and the United

Kingdom are likely to allow the

use of 5 GHz LANs with TPC and

DFS well before 11h is completed,

pan-European approval of 11h is

not expected until the second half

of 2003 or later.

The standard is

expected to be

finalized by the second

half of 2002.

Products will be

available in the first

half of 2003 (firmware

implementation), with

high availability in the

second half of 2003.

802.11i

This standard is supplementary to

the MAC layer to improve security. It

will apply to 802.11 physical

standards a, b, and g. It provides an

alternative to Wired Equivalent

Privacy (WEP) with new encryption

methods and authentication

procedures. IEEE 802.1X forms a

key part of 802.11i.

Improved security.

Security is a major weakness of

WLANs. Vendors have not

improved matters by shipping

products without setting default

security features. In addition, the

numerous Wired Equivalent

Privacy (WEP) weaknesses have

been exposed. The 11i

specification is part of a set of

security features that should

address and overcome these

issues by the end of 2003.

Solutions will start with firmware

upgrades using the Temporal Key

Integrity Protocol (TKIP), followed

by new silicon with AES (an

iterated block cipher) and TKIP

backwards compatibility.

Finalization of the TKIP

protocol standard is

expected to occur in

the second half of

2002.

Firmware will be

available in the first

half of 2003.

New silicon with an

AES cipher is expected

to occur by the second

half of 2003 or later.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

E-1

Appendix E—Useful References

Name URL Description / Remarks

802.11 Planet http://http://www.80211-planet.com Source for WiFi business and technology

information

802.11b Networking News http://80211b.weblogger.com News and features about the 802.11b

networking standard

Air Defense http://www.airdefense.net/products/i

ndex.shtm

This site contains lists of many of the major

security products by category.

Air Jack Site http://802.11ninja.net Air Jack code and slides from wireless

presentation at the 2002 BlackHat Briefings

AirSnort http://airsnort.shmoo.com AirSnort is a wireless LAN (WLAN) tool which

recovers encryption keys.

AirTraf http://airtraf.sourceforge.net AirTraf is a wireless 802.11 network sniffer.

Cellular Network

Perspectives

http://www.cnp-wireless.com Source of technical information about wireless

standards and technology

Cellular

Telecommunications &

Internet Association

http://www.wow-com.com Cellular Telecommunications & Internet

Association Web site

Cquire.net http://www.cqure.net/tools08.html This is a link to the WaveStumbler wireless

network mapping tool.

Dachb0den Labs http://www.dachb0den.com/projects/

bsd-airtools.html

Wireless BSD tools

Federal Communications

Commission

http://www.fcc.gov Federal Communications Commission web site

Globecom Site http://www.globecom.net/ietf This site allows the search of Internet

Engineering Task Force documents.

Guidance http://www.amc.army.mil/amc/ci/mat

rix/guidance/guidance3_mainpage.h

tm

This is a military site with many URLs to various

publications.

IEEE http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802 IEEE 802.11 site

JM Projects http://www.jm-music.de/projects.html Link to Wavemon, a monitoring application for

wireless network devices. Wavemon currently

works under Linux with devices that are

supported by the wireless extensions by Jean

Tourrilhes (included in Kernel 2.4 and higher),

e.g., the Lucent Orinoco cards.

Kismet http://www.kismetwireless.net Kismet wireless network sniffer site

Mognet http://chocobospore.org/mognet Mognet is a free, open source wireless Ethernet

sniffer/analyzer written in Java.

Netstumbler.com http://www.netstumbler.com Netstumbler 802.11 discovery tool

Prisimstumbler http://prismstumbler.sourceforge.net Prismstumbler is a wireless LAN (WLAN) that

scans for beacon frames from access points.

Prismstumbler operates by constantly switching

channels and monitors any frames received on

the currently selected channel.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

E-2

Name URL Description / Remarks

Sniffer technologies http://www.sniffer.com/products/wirel

ess/default.asp?A=5

Sniffer® Wireless was designed in accordance

with the IEEE 802.11b interoperability standard.

It includes network monitoring, capturing,

decoding, and filtering—all of the standard

Sniffer® Pro features.

Snort http://www.snort.org Snort is an open source intrusion detection

system.

Sonar-Security http://www.sonar-security.com StumbVerter is a standalone application that

allows users to import Network Stumbler's

summary files into Microsoft's MapPoint 2002

maps.

Sourceforge.net http://sourceforge.net/projects/wifisc

anner

Link to a passive 802.11b scanner

Talisker Network Security http://www.networkintrusion.co.uk/wi

reless.htm

Wireless security tools

Talisker Network Security http://www.networkintrusion.co.uk This is a independent site that maintains an

extensive list of current security products.

WEPcrack http://wepcrack.sourceforge.net WEPCrack is an open source tool for breaking

802.11 WEP secret keys.

WiFi http://www.wifi.com/OpenSection/index.aspWiFi Web site

WildPackets http://www.wildpackets.com/product

s/airopeek

This is a link to WildPackets’ wireless protocol

analyzer, Airopeek.

Wireless LAN Association http://www.wlana.com WLANA provides a clearinghouse of information

about wireless local area applications, issues,

and trends and serves as a resource for

customers and prospective customers for

wireless local area products and wireless

personal area products and for industry press

and analysts.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

F-1

Appendix F—Wireless Networking Tools

Tool Capabilities Website

Linux{ XE

"Linux" }/Unix{

XE "Unix" }

Win32 Cost

Aerosol{ XE

"Aerosol" }

Wireless

Sniffer

http://www.sec33.com/sniph/aerosol.php " Free

Aerosol{ XE "Aerosol" } is a freeware{ XE "freeware" } wireless LAN{ XE "LAN" } sniffer tool, which can

also crack WEP encryption keys. Aerosol operates by passively monitoring transmissions, computing the encryption key

when enough packets have been gathered.

AirSnort{

XE

"AirSnort" }

Wireless

Sniffer

http://airsnort.shmoo.com/ " Free

AirSnort{ XE "AirSnort" } is a freeware{ XE "freeware" } wireless LAN{ XE "LAN" } sniffer tool, which

recovers encryption keys. AirSnort operates by passively monitoring transmissions, computing the encryption key when

enough packets have been gathered.

Kismet{ XE

"Kismet" }

Wireless

Sniffer

http://www.kismetwireless.net/ " Free

Kismet{ XE "Kismet" } is an 802.11b{ XE "802.11b" } wireless network sniffer{ XE "network sniffers" }. It

is capable of sniffing using almost any wireless card supported in Linux{ XE "Linux" }.

Netstumbler Wireless

Sniffer

http://www.netstumbler.com " Free

Netstumbler is a 802.11b tool that listens for available networks and records data about that access point. A version is

available for the Pocket PC.

Sniffer

Wireless{

XE "Sniffer

Wireless" }

Wireless

Sniffer

http://www.sniffer.com/ " $

A Sniffer Wireless{ XE "Sniffer Wireless" } is a commercial wireless LAN{ XE "LAN" } sniffer that provides network

monitoring, capturing, decoding, and filtering capabilities.

WEPCrack{

XE

"WEPCrack" }

WEP

encryption

cracker

http://sourceforge.net/projects/wepcrack/ " Free

WEPCrack{ XE "WEPCrack" } is a tool that cracks 802.11 WEP encryption keys using the latest discovered weakness of

RC4 key scheduling.

WaveStumbler

{ XE

"WaveStumbl

er" }

Wireless

Network

Mapper

http://www.cqure.net/tools08.html " Free

WaveStumbler{ XE "WaveStumbler" } is a freeware{ XE "freeware" } console based 802.11 network mapper for

Linux{ XE "Linux" }. It reports the basic wireless network characteristics including channel, WEP, ESSID, MAC etc.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

G-1

Appendix G—References

Print Publications and Books

1. NIST Special Publication 46, Security for Telecommuting and Broadband Communications,

National Institute for Standards and Technology.

2. Norton, P., and Stockman, M. Peter Norton’s Network Security Fundamentals. 2000.

3. Wack, J., Cutler, K., and Pole, J. NIST Special Publication 41, Guidelines on Firewalls and

Firewall Policy, January 2002.

4. Gast, M. 802.11 Wireless Networks: The Definitive Guide Creating and Administering Wireless

Networks, O’Reilley Publishing, April 2002.

Articles and Other Published Material

1. 3Com. 11 Mbps Wireless LAN Access Point 6000 User Guide, Version 2.0. May 2001.

5. Arbaugh, W.A., Shankar, N., and Wan, Y.C. “Your 802.11 Wireless Network Has No Clothes.”

March 30, 2001.

6. Basgall, M. “Experimental Break-Ins Reveal Vulnerability in Internet, Unix Computer Security.”

http://www.dukenews.duke.edu/research/encrypt.html, January 1999.

7. Cam-Winget, N., and Walker, J. “An Analysis of AES in OCB Mode.” May 2001.

8. Ismadi, A., and Sukaimi, Y.B. Smart Card: An Alternative to Password Authentication. SANS,

May 26, 2001.

9. Lucent Technologies. ORINOCO Manager Suite Users Guide. November 2000.

10. Menezes, A. “Comparing the Security of ECC and RSA.” January 2000.

11. Cagliostro, C. Security and Smart Cards. www.scia.org, 2001.

12. Cardwell, A., and Woollard, S. “Clinic: What are the biggest security risks associated with

wireless technology? What do I need to consider if my organization wants to introduce this kind

of technology to my corporate LAN?” www.itsecurity.com, 2001.

13. Ewalt, D. M. “RSA Patches Hold in Wireless LANs: The fix addresses problems with the

Wireless Equivalent Privacy protocol, which encrypts communication over 802.11b wireless

networks.” Information Week, (www.informationweek.com), December 2001.

14. Leyden, J. “Tool Dumbs Down Wireless Hacking.” The Register, www.theregister.co.uk, August

2001.

15. Marek, S. “Identifying the Weakest Link.” Wireless Internet Magazine

www.wirelessinternetmag.com, November/December 2001.
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

G-2

16. Rysavy, P. “Break Free With Wireless LANs.” Network Computing, Mobile and Wireless

Technology Feature, October 29, 2001.

General Internet Resources

1. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications (NIST, Computer Security Resource Center)

2. http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/IEEE/ (Unofficial 802.11 security Web site)

3. http://its.med.yale.edu/computing_services.html (Yale University School of Medicine provides

information on wireless applications and future uses)

4. http://xforce.iss.net (X-Force Web site provides information on leading computer threats and

vulnerabilities)

5. http://www.cisco.com (Cisco Web site provides information on securing wireless networks)

6. http://www.computeruser.com/resources/dictionary/dictionary.html (reference for technical

terms)

7. http://www.computerworld.com (provides white papers, surveys, and reports related to security of

wireless networks)

8. http://www.eet.com (technical Web site that serves as a primer for different technologies and

applications)

9. http://www.gcn.com (Government Computer News provides up-to-date information on wireless

and mobile devices and their related security issues)

10. http://www.informationweek.com (provides information on wireless networks, wireless

communications, and security solutions in the form of articles and other documents)

11. http://www.infosecuritymagazine.com (provides white papers, surveys, and reports on wireless

network security)

12. http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.html (University of California at Berkeley

provides “frequently asked questions” on WEP setup, problems, and attacks)

13. http://www.networkcomputing.com (provides white papers, surveys, and reports on wireless

network security)

14. http://www.nwfusion.com (Network World Fusion Web site provides white papers, surveys, and

reports on wireless network security)

15. http://www.pdadefense.com (PDADefense Web site provides articles and guidance on PDA

security)

16. http://www.sans.org/newlook/home.htm (SANS Institute Web site maintains articles, documents,

and links on computer security and wireless technologies)
WIRELESS NETWORK SECURITY

G-3

17. http://www.scmagazine.com (SC Magazine Web site, an information security online magazine

provides information on wireless security issues)

18. http://www.zdnetindia.com (ZDNet India Magazine Web site provides white papers, surveys, and

reports on wireless network security)