alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-20159

Summary Calendar

 

DANIEL RAYMOND STOREMSKI,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOHNNY KLEVENHAGEN, sheriff, ET AL.,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-96-CV-45

- - - - - - - - - -

March 1, 1999

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Johnny Klevenhagen appeals the district court’s denial of

his motion for summary judgment. The court held that Klevenhagen

was not protected by the defense of qualified immunity in Daniel

Storemski’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. His failure to provide

Storemski with his medication and to transfer him to a

psychiatric hospital pursuant to court order did not involve

discretionary functions.
No. 98-20159

-2-

This court reviews the denial of a motion for summary

judgment de novo using the same criteria applied by the district

court in the first instance. Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494,

498 (5th Cir. 1991). The first inquiry in examining a defense of

qualified immunity asserted in a motion for summary judgment is

to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged “the violation of

a clearly established constitutional right.” Siegert v. Gilley,

500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991). The second step is to “decide whether

the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable” in light of

the legal rules clearly established at the time of the incident. 

Spann v. Rainey, 987 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir. 1993).

Storemski’s § 1983 claim addressed by the district court in

its denial order rests on the allegation that by violating the

state-court order, Klevenhagen violated his constitutional

rights. A remedial order cannot serve as a substantive basis for

a § 1983 claim because such orders to not create “‘rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’”

Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1123 (5th Cir. 1986), quoting

§ 1983. Remedial decrees “are the means by which

unconstitutional conditions are corrected but they do not create

or enlarge constitutional rights.” Green, 788 F.2d at 1123. As

a result, Storemski has not established a violation of a “clearly

established constitutional right” that would allow recovery under

§ 1983. The judgment is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED.
Exhibit 99.1

                                   Vicom, Inc.


                Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350
                             As Adopted Pursuant to
                  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

     In  connection  with  this  Quarterly  Report  Form  10-Q, Vicom, Inc. (the
"Company")  for  the  period  ended  June  30,  2002,  I,  James L Mandel, Chief
Executive  Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350,  as  adopted  pursuant  to  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

1.   This  Periodic Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
     or  15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d));
     and
2.   The  information  contained  in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
     Company.


Date:  August  14,  2002           By:         /s/  James  L.  Mandel
                                               Chief  Executive  Officer

     In  connection  with  this  Quarterly  Report  Form  10-Q, Vicom, Inc. (the
"Company")  for the period ended June 30, 2002, I, Steven M. Bell, Secretary and
Treasurer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted  pursuant  to  Section  906  of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, that:

1.   This  Periodic Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a)
     or  15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d));
     and
2.   The  information  contained  in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
     Company.

Date:  August  14,  2002           By:       /s/ Steven  M.  Bell
                                             Chief  Financial  Officer

                                       16
Editorial Note on Part 70
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 70 appear by T.D. ATF-450, 66 FR 29022-29030, May 29, 2001.

§ 70.145 Purchasers, holders of security interests, mechanic's lienors, and judgment lien creditors. ( a ) *Invalidity of lien without notice.* The lien imposed by 26 U.S.C. 6321 is not valid against any purchaser (as defined in § 70.143(f) of this part), holder of a security interest (as defined in § 70.143(a) of this part), mechanic's lienor (as defined in § 70.143(b) of this part), or judgment lien creditor (as defined in § 70.143(g) of this part) until a notice of lien is filed in accordance with § 70.148 of this part. Except as provided by 26 U.S.C. 6323, if a person becomes a purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgment lien creditor after a notice of lien is filed in accordance with § 70.148 of this part, the interest acquired by such person is subject to the lien imposed by 26 U.S.C. 6321.
( b ) *Cross references.* For provisions relating to the protection afforded a security interest arising after tax lien filing, which interest is covered by a commercial transactions financing agreement, real property construction or improvement financing agreement, or an obligatory disbursement agreement, see §§ 70.232, 70.233, and 70.234 of this part, respectively. For provisions relating to the protection afforded to a security interest coming into existence by virtue of disbursements, made before the 46th day after the date of tax lien filing, see § 70.146 of this part. For provisions relating to priority afforded to interest and certain other expenses with respect to a lien or security interest having priority over the lien imposed by 26 U.S.C. 6321, see § 70.147 of this part. For provisions relating to certain other interests arising after tax lien filing, see § 70.231 of this part.
(26 U.S.C. 6323)
(No. 73-CC-448

#### Joseph L. Donahue, Claimant, *vs.*State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

*Opinion filed September 20, 1973.*

Asher, Greenfield, Gubbins & Segall, Attorney for Claimant.

William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

Per Curiam.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

DAY HIGH

 13,499

 14,441

 15,464

 15,342

 14,690

 15,946

 16,140

 16,227

 16,276

 16,502

 16,358

 17,117

 18,333

 20,370

 18,680

 19,144

 17,593

 18,642

 19,897

 17,957

 17,535

 18,021

 18,389

 19,598

 20,378

 22,720

 23,813

 21,803

 22,989

 19,810

 3,018

 3,743

 4,270

 4,849

 5,267

 6,807

 7,882

 8,244

 8,024

 7,526

 7,104

 7,433

 8,350

 8,259

 7,989

 7,802

 7,952

 8,141

 9,101

 9,389

 8,805

 8,619

 9,119

 9,819

 9,668

 10,429

 11,172

 11,416

 11,156

 10,688

 8,785

 9,283

 9,967

 10,235

 10,842

 11,630

 12,448

 12,372

 12,265

 12,389

 12,245

 12,605

 13,728

 14,662

 14,002

 14,403

 13,852

 14,439

 15,704

 14,433

 13,353

 13,479

 13,602

 14,335

 15,009

 15,402

 17,393

 16,696

 17,514

 16,137

LOW MEAN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION-CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT-CALIFORNIA

NOVEMBER 2019 WATER QUALITY REPORT RUN DATE: December 11, 2019

ELECTRICAL CONDUCTIVITY, UMHOS 

Comments:

0 reading indicates that the station was out of service.

PORT CHICAGO TOP IN SUISUN BAY
§ 226.52 Total annuity subject to maximum. The total annuity amount which is compared to the maximum monthly amount to determine if a reduction for the railroad retirement family maximum applies is determined by adding together the amounts in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section. A hypothetical spouse annuity amount is included from the beginning date of the employee annuity if the spouse is not entitled to an annuity at the time the maximum calculation is made. ( a ) *Employee annuity amounts.* The following amounts are added together— ( 1 ) The employee tier I amount, effective on the date the employee's tier I benefit begins or, if later, on the date a reduction for other disability benefits begins or ends, as shown in § 226.71 of this part. This amount is before any reduction for age or social security benefits but after including any delayed retirement credits, after any reduction for other disability benefits, and after rounding; and
( 2 ) The employee tier II rate before reduction for the railroad retirement family maximum, effective on the employee's annuity beginning date and, if later, on the date the tier II is first reduced for a vested dual benefit, as shown in § 226.11 of this part; and
( 3 ) The initial supplemental annuity rate effective on the date the supplemental annuity begins, before any reduction for a private pension, as shown in part 227 of this chapter.
( b ) *Spouse annuity amounts.* The following amounts are added together— ( 1 ) The spouse tier I amount, which is or would be effective on the date the employee's annuity or tier I benefit begins, as shown in § 226.30. This amount is before any reduction for other disability benefits, age, or social security benefits, but after any reduction for a government pension or employee annuity; and
( 2 ) The spouse tier II rate which is or would be effective on the employee's annuity beginning date, the date the employee's tier I benefit begins, or the date the employee's tier II rate is reduced for a vested dual benefit, as shown in § 226.11. This rate includes the restored amount but does not include any cost-of-living increase in the tier II original rate or restored amount. It is the rate before reduction for the railroad retirement family maximum or age minus any cost-of-living increases.
#### § 225.41 How a cost-of-living increase is determined and applied.

Depending on the condition of the social security trust funds, the increase can be based on rises in either the consumer price index as published by the Department of Labor or the average wage index which is the average of the annual total wages used for computing a PIA. The increase is payable when the appropriate index for the third calendar quarter of one year shows an increase of at least three percent over the same index for the third calendar quarter of the previous year (or the last calendar quarter within which a legislated general benefit increase became effective). No increase is payable for the calendar year that immediately follows a year in which a legislated general benefit increase was effective. The increase amount is determined by multiplying the PIA by the percentage increase in the appropriate quarter of a previous year.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

DAY

 62,660

 63,321

 63,472

 63,554

 63,439

 63,624

 63,733

 63,884

 64,027

 63,640

 63,384

 63,288

 63,246

 63,598

 64,035

 64,195

 63,989

 63,930

 63,926

 63,779

 63,682

 63,804

 63,909

 63,771

 63,577

 63,436

 63,292

 63,183

 63,111

 62,948

 96,402

 97,471

 97,349

 97,313

 97,277

 97,119

 97,119

 97,205

 97,241

 97,219

 97,205

 97,277

 97,399

 97,499

 97,219

 97,133

 97,277

 97,435

 97,443

 97,428

 97,593

 97,715

 97,600

 97,571

 97,542

 97,521

 97,535

 97,593

 97,636

 97,672

STORAGE - A.F. 

 159,062

 160,792

 160,821

 160,867

 160,716

 160,743

 160,852

 161,089

 161,268

 160,859

 160,589

 160,565

 160,645

 161,097

 161,254

 161,328

 161,266

 161,365

 161,369

 161,207

 161,275

 161,519

 161,509

 161,342

 161,119

 160,957

 160,827

 160,776

 160,747

 160,620

3,475

3,983

4,370

4,903

4,534

4,382

3,836

3,683

3,473

3,280

2,976

2,496

2,394

2,129

2,015

2,386

2,182

1,887

1,599

1,701

1,470

1,186

2,232

210

1,240

1,248

1,348

1,093

1,015

1,033

5,017

4,855

4,385

4,926

4,458

4,396

3,891

3,802

3,563

3,074

2,840

2,484

2,434

2,357

2,094

2,423

2,151

1,937

1,601

1,619

1,504

1,309

2,227

126

1,128

1,166

1,282

1,067

1,000

969

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION-CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT-CALIFORNIA

JUNE 2003 FULL NATURAL FLOW AT NEW MELONES DAM RUN DATE: 07/17/2003

TOTALS +4,617 76,085

* October 1, 150,915

 666.8

 676.5

 685.2

 694.9

 703.8

 712.5

 720.2

 727.8

 734.8

 740.9

 746.6

 751.5

 756.3

 761.0

 765.1

 769.9

 774.2

 778.1

 781.2

 784.4

 787.4

 790.0

 794.4

 794.7

 796.9

 799.2

 801.8

 803.9

 805.9

 807.8

DONNELLS

RES

BEARDSLEY

RES

2002 TO DATE

NEW

MELONES

INFLOW

C.F.S

NATURAL

RIVER

C.F.S

ACCUM *

FULL

NATURAL

1000 A.F.

RESERVOIR

TOTAL

+3,059

+1,730

+29

+46

-151

+27

+109

+237

+179

-409

-270

-24

+80

+452

+157

+74

-62

+99

+4

-162

+68

+244

-10

-167

-223

-162

-130

-51

-29

-127

CHANGE

A.F. C.F.S.

+1,542

+872

+15

+23

-76

+14

+55

+119

+90

-206

-136

-12

+40

+228

+79

+37

-31

+50

+2

-82

+34

+123

-5

-84

-112

-82

-66

-26

-15

-64
#### Everett J. Konz, Plaintiff, v. Theodore Bedell, Jr., as Comptroller of Nassau County, et al., Defendants.

Submission of a controversy on an agreed statement of facts. By a local law duly enacted December 16, 1946 (Local Laws, 1946, Yo. 3 of County of Yassau), the Board of Supervisors of Yassau County amended certain sections of the Yassau County Government Law (L. 1936, ch. 879, as amd. by L. 1937, ch. 618) by striking out salary limitations contained therein for the county executive, the comptroller, the county clerk, and the sheriff. Pursuant to the authority contained in the sections as thus amended, the Board of Supervisors by ordinance thereafter fixed the *778salaries of the officers mentioned at sums in excess of the limitations previously-contained in the County Government Law, the increases to become effective at the beginning of the next ensuing term of office. The question presented is whether the local law amending the County Government Law and the ordinance enacted pursuant thereto, are valid. We are of opinion (1) that the Board of Supervisors may by local law amend the County Government Law with respect to local matters, and (2) that the salaries of county officers payable from the county treasury are matters of local legislation. Judgment is unanimously directed for defendants, without costs, declaring the local law and ordinance valid. Present — Hagarty, Acting P. J., Carswell, Johnston, Adel and Sneed, JJ. [See *post,*p. 811.]
#### § 10.902 Does every employee's death due to injuries incurred in connection with his or her service with an Armed Force in a contingency operation qualify for the death gratuity?

Yes. All such deaths that occur on or after January 28, 2008 (the date of enactment of Public Law 110-181 (2008)) qualify for the death gratuity administered by this subpart.
§ 202.13 Electric railways. ( a ) The Deputy General Counsel will require the submission of information pertaining to the history and operations of an electric railway with a view to determining whether it is an employer and will inquire into and make his recommendations upon the following considerations: ( 1 ) Whether the electric railway is more than a street, suburban or interurban electric railway; or
( 2 ) Whether it is operating as a part of a general steam-railroad system of transportation; or
( 3 ) Whether it is part of the national transportation system.
( b ) If in the opinion of the Deputy General Counsel an electric railway has the characteristic set forth in either paragraphs (a)(1), (2), or (a)(3) of this section, he will conclude that it is an employer under the act and if the operator concurs in such opinion, the decision will be made final by the Board. If the operator does not concur in the conclusion reached the question will be submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission for determination.
(45 U.S.C. 231f(b)(5))
[4 FR 1478, Apr. 7, 1939, as amended at 48 FR 51448, Nov. 9, 1983]
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Willie DUMAS, III, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 05—4640.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: June 21, 2006.

Decided: July 18, 2006.

Marc L. Resnick, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, Acting United States Attorney, Miller A. Bushong, III, Assistant United States Attorney, BecMey, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:

Willie Dumas, III, appeals his conviction and 262-month sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2000). Dumas pleaded guilty but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence and statements. We affirm.

The factual findings underlying a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error, *311while the legal determinations are reviewed de novo. *See Ornelas v. United States,*517 U.S. 690, 691, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); *United States v. Rusher,*966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir.1992). When a suppression motion has been denied, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. *See United States v. Seidman,*156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir.1998).

To assert a Fourth Amendment challenge to the Government’s use of evidence obtained during the search of the plastic shopping bag, Dumas must establish that he had “a legitimate expectation of privacy” in the bag. *See Raleas v. Illinois,*439 U.S. 128, 148-49, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). “A subjective expectation of privacy is legitimate if it is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” *Minnesota v. Olson,*495 U.S. 91, 95-96, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990). The defendant has the burden of showing that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. *See Rawlings v. Kentucky,*448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the district court correctly denied Dumas’ motion to suppress evidence and statements.

We grant Dumas’ motion to file a pro se supplemental brief. We have considered the arguments presented in that brief and find them to be without merit. We therefore affirm Dumas’ conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

D.A.L.

v.

ST. JOSEPH PARISH AND THE ROMAN

CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF PITTSBURGH

PETITION OF: THE ROMAN CATHOLIC

DIOCESE OF PITTSBURGH AND ST.

JOSEPH PARISH :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 82 WM 2019

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 15th day of November , 2019, the Application for Extraordinary

Relief is DENIED.
#### Bert C. Shaefer, Inc., Respondent, v. Rawnel Holding Company, Inc., Appellant.

Present— Carswell, Johnston, Adel, Taylor and Lewis, JJ.
### subpart 4—fees relating to animal drugs

#### Termination of Subpart

For termination of subpart by section 2307(a), (b) of Pub. L. 118–15, see Termination Date note set out under section 379j–11 of this title and Effective and Termination Dates note set out under section 379j–13 of this title.
#### § 258.5 Exhibits.

Copies of all exhibits admitted in evidence at any hearing held pursuant to the provisions of this part shall be furnished by the party offering the same to all other parties participating in the proceedings.
2009 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit 4-28-2009 

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w . vi l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2009/1421UN I TED STATES CO UR T OF A PP EALS F O R T H E T H IR D C IR C U IT

_____________________ N o: 05- 3621

_____________________ WAYNE BE RRI ER; BRENDA G REGG, in their own right and as pare nts and natura l gua

rdians of A shley

Be rrier , a minor, Ap pe lla

nts v. SIMPL I CI TY MANUF ACTURI NG, I NC., Third-Party

Plaintiff v. S US I E S HOFF; ME LVI N S HOFF, Th ird- Part

y De fend ants

____________________ A p p ea l from the U n it ed S tat es D istri ct C o u rt f o r T h e E a ste rn D istric t o f P e n n sy lv a n ia ( C i vi l A ct i on N o. 04- C V - 00097) D istric t C o u rt: H o n . L e g ro m e D . D a v is

____________________ A r gued: J anuary8, 2007 Be f o r e : M c KEE , AM BRO, a n d F I S HER

C i r cui tJ udges

_____________________ OR DE R A M E ND I NG OP I NI ON I T I S HEREBY O RDERED th a t th e O p in io n f iled in th is c a se o n A p ril2

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