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DLD-169 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-1455

___________

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TORRE RANDOLPH, 

Appellant

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Criminal No. 12-cr-00005)

District Judge: Honorable Gene E. K. Pratter

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Submitted for Possible Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

April 26, 2012

Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 15, 2012)

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OPINION

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PER CURIAM

Appellant Torre Randolph appeals from the District Court‟s order summarily 

remanding his case to the state court. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 

Randolph filed a notice of removal with the United States District Court for the 
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Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking removal of a criminal action from Pennsylvania

state court. After reviewing Randolph‟s removal petition, the District Court determined 

that it appeared Randolph was attempting to remove his case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1443.1 The District Court then held that the allegations of Randolph‟s notice were 

insufficient to support removal under §1443, denied the petition, and remanded the case 

to the state court. Randolph timely appealed.

“An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not

reviewable on appeal” unless the case was removed pursuant to § 1443. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1447(d). Thus, to the extent that Randolph challenges the District Court‟s remand

order with respect to any bases for removal other than § 1443, we will dismiss the appeal 

for lack of jurisdiction. Davis v. Glanton, 107 F.3d 1044, 1047 (3d Cir. 1997). We have 

jurisdiction to review the remand order to the extent that Randolph asserts that removal

was proper under § 1443. Id.

Section 1443(1) authorizes the removal of a state law action “[a]gainst any person 

who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law 

providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons 

within the jurisdiction thereof.” 28 U.S.C. § 1443. For this provision to apply, “a state 

court defendant must demonstrate both: (1) that he is being deprived of rights guaranteed 

by a federal law „providing for . . . equal civil rights‟; and (2) that he is „denied or cannot 

 

1 Randolph does not dispute the District Court‟s characterization of his petition. In any 

event, we are not aware of any other provision permitting removal of the State‟s criminal 
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enforce that right in the courts‟ of the state.” Davis v. Glanton, 107 F.3d at 1047 (quoting 

State of Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 788 (1966)). Under the first requirement, the 

defendant must allege a deprivation of rights guaranteed by a federal law “providing for 

specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality.” Id. (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). Under the second requirement, removal is available where the 

defendant‟s federal civil rights would “inevitably be denied by the very act of being 

brought to trial in state court.” Id. at 1949. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

The District Court correctly determined that Randolph did not allege in his petition

that the state court litigation involves issues of racial inequality, and he offers no 

argument on appeal to dispute that determination.

Randolph likewise failed to allege anything that might permit removal under 

§ 1443(2). Indeed, “[t]he second subsection of § 1443 confers a privilege of removal

only upon federal officers or agents and those authorized to act with or for them in 

affirmatively executing duties under any federal law providing for equal civil rights.” 

City of Greenwood, Miss. v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 824 (1966). Randolph does not 

purport to fall into any of those categories.

Accordingly, the District Court correctly determined that § 1443 did not apply to 

Randolph‟s removal petition and appropriately remanded the case to the state court. See

28 U.S.C. § 1455(b)(4).2

 

prosecution against Randolph.

2 Moreover, we agree with the District Court that the removal petition was not timely 
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For the these reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District 

Court. See Third Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. Appellant‟s “motion to dismiss based upon 

excessive and prejudicial delay between the criminal incident and arrest,” and motion for 

appointment of counsel, are denied.

 

filed. See id. at § 1455(b)(1).