UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

In re: 

GREG MATTHEW ROLLISON, 

 Debtor. 

---------------------------------------------- 

KELVIN KNAUB; HOLLY KNAUB, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

GREG MATTHEW ROLLISON, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

No. 13-1503 

(BAP No. 13-028-CO) 

(BAP)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before HOLMES, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

 

 Kelvin and Holly Knaub appeal from a decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate 

Panel (BAP) reversing the bankruptcy court’s damages order and remanding for 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 9, 2014

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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further proceedings. Concerned that this court lacked jurisdiction, we asked the 

parties to file briefs on whether the BAP’s decision was final and appealable. The 

Knaubs have done so; the appellee, debtor Greg Matthew Rollison, has filed a notice 

of nonparticipation. Having reviewed the matter, we conclude that we lack 

jurisdiction. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. 

 The bankruptcy court conducted a bifurcated trial in an adversary proceeding 

that the Knaubs filed against Mr. Rollison. In the merits phase, the court determined 

that Mr. Rollison’s debt to the Knaubs was nondischargeable because it was based on 

false representations he made in 2007 regarding his ability to build a replacement 

home for one he had built for them in 2003, which had serious defects. The court 

then ruled against Mr. Rollison regarding the legal standard by which to measure the 

Knaubs’ damages, concluding that the “benefit of the bargain” rule applied, not the 

“out of pocket” rule. Thereafter, the parties stipulated that under the “benefit of the 

bargain” rule, the amount of damages was $162,000—the difference between the 

defective house’s value at the time of purchase and the amount the Knaubs actually 

paid for it. The bankruptcy court entered a damages order in that amount. 

 Mr. Rollison appealed the damages order to the BAP. The BAP concluded 

that the proper measure of damages was the “out of pocket” method, which concerns 

damages arising after—and proximately caused by—Mr. Rollison’s promise in 2007 

to build them a new house. By way of example, the BAP posited that the Knaubs 

might be able to recover damages for losses based on their belief and expectation that 
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Mr. Rollison would build the new house as promised, such as architect fees, soil 

tests, or materials purchased for upgrades. Observing that the bankruptcy court had 

taken no evidence on the amount of such damages, the BAP remanded for further 

consideration. The Knaubs then brought this appeal. 

 The Knaubs claim we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1), which in 

relevant part provides that circuit courts have jurisdiction over “all final decisions, 

judgments, orders, and decrees” entered by the BAP. A decision is not final if it 

“remands the case to the bankruptcy judge for significant further proceedings.” 

State Bank of Spring Hill v. Anderson (In re Bucyrus Grain Co.), 905 F.2d 1362, 

1365 (10th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A remand for significant 

further proceedings includes one requiring de novo hearings, additional findings of 

fact concerning the dispositive issue in the case, or a determination of the amount of 

a claim.” Jones v. Jones (In re Jones), 9 F.3d 878, 879 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993). But a 

decision is considered final “if the purpose of the remand is to effectuate a ministerial 

task,” to “conduct additional proceedings involving little judicial discretion,” or “[i]f 

the remanded matter is unlikely to spawn another appeal or affect the issue on 

appeal” from the remand order. Balcor Pension Investors v. Wiston XXIV Ltd. P’ship 

(In re Wiston XXIV Ltd. P’ship), 988 F.2d 1012, 1013 (10th Cir. 1993). 

 The Knaubs argue that the BAP’s remand is for the bankruptcy to conduct a 

ministerial task that requires little judicial discretion, as was the case in Rubner & 

Kutner, P.C. v. U.S. Trustee (In re Lederman Enterprises, Inc.), 997 F.2d 1321 
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(10th Cir. 1993), and Williamson v. Jones (In re Montgomery), 224 F.3d 1193 

(10th Cir. 2000). We disagree. In re Lederman involved a remand for the 

bankruptcy court to recompute a party’s fees without a twenty percent reduction, 

997 F.2d at 1323, and the remand in In re Montgomery required the bankruptcy court 

to make a “pro rata allocation of [Earned Income Credits] to pre- and post-petition 

segments of the year in question,” 224 F.3d at 1194 n.1. The task before the 

bankruptcy court in this case is to determine an amount of damages for which it has 

taken no evidence. It does not involve a simple mathematical calculation, as was the 

case in In re Lederman and In re Montgomery. Instead, it appears that the 

bankruptcy court will need to conduct a de novo proceeding and make additional 

findings of fact in order to determine the amount of the Knaubs’ damages. The 

Knaubs have provided nothing from which we can conclude that the result of that 

process “is unlikely to spawn another appeal.” In re Wiston XXIV Ltd. P’ship, 

988 F.2d at 1013. In their merits brief, they claim that it “will become clear in the 

argument portion of [the] brief [that] the amount of the ‘out-of-pocket’ damages is 

the same as the amount of the ‘benefit of the bargain damages.’” Aplt. Opening Br. 

at 2. But we see nothing in the argument substantiating this contention. 

For these reasons, we conclude that the BAP’s decision is not final. 

Consequently, we lack jurisdiction, and this appeal is dismissed. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Jerome A. Holmes 

 Circuit Judge