IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-10-00300-CR

KAREN MITCHELL MARTIN,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 249th District Court

Johnson County, Texas

Trial Court No. F44317

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After Appellant Karen Mitchell Martin made an open plea of guilty to the offense 

of delivery of a controlled substance in an amount of one gram or more but less than 

four grams, the trial court assessed her punishment at fifteen years’ confinement. In 

one issue, Martin contends that her sentence was disproportionate to the offense for 

which she was convicted.

Generally, a sentence within the statutory range of punishment for an offense is 

not excessive, cruel, or unusual punishment. Winchester v. State, 246 S.W.3d 386, 389 
Martin v. State Page 2

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d); Alvarez v. State, 63 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). A narrow exception to this rule is recognized where the 

sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense. See Moore v. State, 54 S.W.3d 529, 542 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 

1004-05, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2707, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy. J., concurring); Solem v. 

Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3010-11, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983); McGruder v. 

Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1992).

In conducting a proportionality analysis, we first make a threshold comparison 

of the gravity of the offense against the severity of the sentence. Moore, 54 S.W.3d at 

542; see Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-91, 103 S.Ct. at 3010; McGruder, 954 F.2d at 316. If we 

determine that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense, we must then 

compare the sentence received to sentences for similar crimes in this jurisdiction and 

sentences for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Alvarez, 63 S.W.3d at 581; see Solem, 

463 U.S. at 291-92, 103 S.Ct. at 3010; McGruder, 954 F.2d at 316.

In this case, the charged offense of delivery of a controlled substance in an 

amount of one gram or more but less than four grams is a second-degree felony 

punishable by a term of imprisonment between two and twenty years and a fine up to 

$10,000. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(a), (c) (West 2010); TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 12.33 (West 2011). Martin’s sentence of fifteen years’ confinement is 

within this statutory range.

Martin argues that her sentence is disproportionate because “[m]itigating factors 

existed within the evidence presented at trial.” Martin points out that she admitted her 
Martin v. State Page 3

guilt and did not place responsibility for her actions on anyone else and that the 

methamphetamine she pled guilty to delivering weighed only 1.67 grams, which is on 

the low end of the range for a second-degree felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 

ANN. § 481.112(a), (c). Even considering these facts, however, the record does not reflect 

that the punishment was grossly disproportionate to the offense. Investigator Mark 

Goetz testified that methamphetamine is now the primary illicit drug in the area and 

that it directly contributes to the criminal society in Johnson County. Goetz stated that, 

before being indicted, Martin was given the opportunity to cooperate with him and the 

Stop the Offender Program Special Crimes Unit but that she expressed no interest in 

doing so. Goetz testified that Martin was a “meth addict” who had been involved in 

the distribution of methamphetamine for about ten years. Martin had both a prior 

misdemeanor and felony drug-related conviction.

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Martin’s punishment was not 

excessive or grossly disproportionate. We thus overrule Martin’s sole issue and affirm 

the trial court’s judgment. 

REX D. DAVIS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed March 28, 2012

Do not publish

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