Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Agee, 

JJ. 

UNION OF NEEDLETRADES, INDUSTRIAL 

 AND TEXTILE EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 032757 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

 November 5, 2004 

CECIL N. JONES 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF FREDERICKSBURG 

John W. Scott, Jr., Judge 

The dispositive issue in this appeal involving an action 

for common law defamation is whether the evidence adduced at 

trial shows that the alleged defamatory statement was false. 

BACKGROUND 

The extensive record in this case contains depositions, 

oral testimony, and lengthy exhibits introduced in evidence 

during a three-day jury trial. Because of the view we take 

regarding the dispositive issue presented on appeal, we will 

limit our recitation of the facts to those material to our 

resolution of that specific issue. 

Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees, 

AFL-CIO is an international union that resulted from a 1995 

merger of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union and 

the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union. Although many 

of the background events pertinent to this appeal occurred prior 

to this merger in 1995, for brevity we will refer to this union 

as “UNITE” throughout this opinion with the understanding that, 
2

in context, at times one of its predecessor unions is intended. 

In addition, it is to be understood that “Local 713” references 

a local union affiliate of UNITE or its predecessor. 

Local 713 originally represented workers at a Sylvania 

cellophane plant in the Fredericksburg area. In 1954, members 

of Local 713 formed Sylvania Employees, Inc. in order to 

purchase a local building to serve as a union hall. In addition 

to providing space for union offices and meetings, the building 

was sufficiently large to afford the union rental income from 

various commercial occupants. 

In 1973, UNITE hired Cecil N. Jones to work as a union 

organizer in the Fredericksburg area. Jones initially worked 

with R. Warwick Daniel, UNITE’s representative at Local 713, and 

in 1985 assumed the duties of union representative upon Daniel’s 

retirement. Jones remained union representative at Local 713 

until his own retirement in February 1997. During Jones’ term 

as the union representative at Local 713, he was directly 

responsible to Bruce A. Dunton, the director of UNITE’s MidAtlantic Regional Joint Board and a member of UNITE’s General 

Executive Board. 

In 1978, the Sylvania plant closed. Daniel and Jones 

successfully organized a new union shop at Webster Brick, which 

subsequently was acquired by General Shale Products Corp. 

(General Shale). The new union at Webster Brick/General Shale 
3

continued to be designated as “Local 713” and to use the union 

hall for its meetings and business operations. Thereafter, 

Sylvania Employees, Inc. was voluntarily dissolved, and by deed 

dated February 11, 1982 the union hall was conveyed in trust to 

Daniel and three officers of Local 713 at Webster Brick/General 

Shale. 

Daniel and Jones subsequently organized two other union 

shops at manufacturing plants in the Fredericksburg area. These 

local unions were both designated as “Local 713.” One of the 

disputes between the parties is whether these two local unions 

were independent of the local union at Webster Brick/General 

Shale, as Jones maintains, or whether all three shops were 

jointly organized and designated Local 713 as a single local 

union, as UNITE contends.1

 It is not disputed, however, that 

each local union was an affiliate of UNITE, and that its union 

dues and other monies were deposited in a single bank account 

maintained by Daniel and subsequently by Jones. Jones contended 

that the funds of each local union were separately accounted for 

 

1

 For purposes of our resolution of this appeal we need not 

resolve that dispute. We note it only because UNITE’s position 

that Local 713 was a multi-employer local was part of the basis 

for UNITE’s actions that ultimately spawned this defamation suit 

by Jones. 
4

in bookkeeping records of Local 713 at Webster Brick/General 

Shale. 

On May 15, 1985, the union members of Local 713 at Webster 

Brick/General Shale adopted a resolution regarding the future 

ownership of the union hall and certain bank accounts. In 

pertinent part, the resolution provided that these assets “shall 

continue under the control and ownership of the local . . . so 

long as Warwick Daniel and/or Cecil Jones shall maintain an 

active interest in the local and at such time as Daniel and/or 

Jones cease to be interested in the local then it is the intent 

of the membership that [the union hall] and funds being held by 

the local shall become the property of the Mid-Atlantic Regional 

Joint Board” of UNITE. 

Although it appears that for most of his employment with 

UNITE Jones maintained good relations with Dunton, beginning in 

1996 an apparent dispute arose between the two concerning Jones’ 

role in the control of the union hall and the accumulated union 

funds. In response, the officers of Local 713 at Webster 

Brick/General Shale, in a resolution and two letters to Dunton, 

expressed confidence in Jones as the local’s “business agent” 

and rejected a request from Dunton that Jones be required to 

turn over the keys to his office in the union hall. In January 

1997, while negotiations for a new contract were ongoing, 

General Shale, which by that time had acquired Webster Brick, 
5

withdrew recognition of Local 713 on the ground that the union 

no longer represented the majority of the employees at its 

plant. Although denied by Dunton, Jones would later maintain 

that Dunton had deliberately delayed contract negotiations with 

General Shale to enable the company to withdraw recognition of 

the union. 

During this same time, Dunton became concerned about the 

management of Local 713 because it appeared to him that the 

assets of Local 713 were under the control of Jones and the 

officers of the local union at General Shale, with no oversight 

by its members and with no input from the union members at the 

other two shops. Accordingly, on January 23, 1997, Dunton sent 

a letter to Jay Mazur, the President of UNITE, as a follow-up to 

a telephone conversation the two had concerning this matter. In 

that letter, Dunton stated that Jones would be retiring in about 

a month, that Jones “has had responsibility for [Local 713’s] 

funds and shop for many years,” and that “four (4) people 

control approximately $65,000, as well as the assets of the 

building, which should all be in the Region.” Dunton further 

stated that a “review of the Cash Reports indicates questionable 

expenditures.” Dunton recommended that UNITE temporarily take 

control of Local 713 by appointing an administrator as 

authorized by UNITE’s constitution. 
6

On January 30, 1997, the Executive Committee of UNITE’s 

General Executive Board adopted a resolution to appoint Harold 

L. Bock, the associate director of UNITE’s Mid-Atlantic Regional 

Joint Board, as administrator “to take possession of and 

administer the affairs, funds and property of Local 713 and to 

assume and perform the duties of its officers.” The resolution 

stated that “information has been made available to the [General 

Executive Board] indicating that financial malpractice has 

occurred with respect to the assets of Local 713.” The 

resolution also appointed a union official to serve as a hearing 

officer and directed him to conduct a hearing on the matter and 

to prepare a report for consideration by the General Executive 

Board. 

On the next day, UNITE’s secretary-treasurer sent a letter 

to the president and three other officers of Local 713 at 

General Shale advising them that UNITE had assumed control of 

the local union and its assets pending the review by the hearing 

officer. A copy of the resolution was enclosed with the letter. 

Neither the resolution nor the letter expressly identified Jones 

by name or otherwise indicated that he had committed “financial 

malpractice.” 

The hearing was conducted on November 18, 1997. The 

hearing officer, after noting that Local 713 was a “multiemployer local” and that General Shale was not under contract 
7

with UNITE, recommended that the administratorship be terminated 

after the election of new officers of Local 713. Although the 

hearing officer expressed “concerns about the finances of Local 

713,” he concluded that there was no evidence of financial 

malpractice, or wrongdoing, by Jones or anyone else. By the 

time this hearing concluded, Jones had retired from UNITE and, 

consistent with the previously described May 15, 1985 resolution 

of members of Local 713, the union hall and various bank 

accounts ultimately became the property of UNITE.2

On June 24, 1999, Jones filed a motion for judgment in the 

Circuit Court of the City of Fredericksburg (the trial court) 

against Dunton, Bock, and UNITE. In that pleading, Jones 

asserted that the statement in the January 30, 1997 resolution 

regarding “financial malpractice . . . with respect to the 

assets of Local 713” was “totally false,” “defamatory per se,” 

and “would be normally understood to apply to [Jones’] conduct 

and activities.” Jones further maintained that “Dunton and/or 

Bock were the only persons who presented or could have presented 

 

2

 Neither the authority of UNITE to appoint an administrator 

and temporarily assume control of the assets of Local 713 at 

General Shale nor the justification for doing so are at issue in 

this appeal. The union hall was eventually sold by UNITE and 

the proceeds from the sale as well as the other funds made 

available to the Regional Board. 
8

any information concerning ‘financial malpractice’ of Local 713 

to the General Executive Board.” Jones also alleged that the 

statements “were made with actual malice, knowledge of their 

falsity, and/or with reckless disregard for their truth.” Jones 

sought compensatory damages of $350,000 and punitive damages of 

a like amount.3

After a demurrer to the motion for judgment was denied, 

UNITE, Dunton, and Bock filed a joint grounds of defense. On 

February 12, 2001, the trial court entered an order dismissing 

Bock from the action with prejudice on Jones’ motion. The case 

then proceeded through protracted discovery and pre-trial 

motions until a jury trial commenced in the trial court on April 

2, 2003. In addition to the above-recited evidence, Jones 

presented evidence through his own testimony and that of three 

of the officers of the Local 713 at General Shale who had been 

sent copies of the January 30, 1997 resolution. In substance, 

that evidence was intended to show that Jones’ reputation had 

 

3

 Jones had alleged in a further count of his motion for 

judgment that Dunton and Bock conspired to injure his reputation 

in violation of Code § 18.2-499 and sought compensatory damages 

not to exceed $75,000 and treble damages not to exceed $75,000 

under Code § 18.2-500. However, after Jones stipulated in a 

pre-trial proceeding that Dunton and Bock were acting in their 

respective capacities as agents of UNITE, and thus could not be 

guilty of a conspiracy, the trial court granted summary judgment 

to the defendants on that issue. 
9

been damaged by the reference to “financial malpractice” in the 

resolution. The union officers testified that they interpreted 

this term to mean that Jones was a “crook,” because Jones was 

primarily responsible for managing the assets of Local 713. 

At the conclusion of Jones’ case-in-chief, UNITE and Dunton 

moved to strike the evidence. The trial court sustained the 

motion to strike as to Dunton, apparently agreeing with the 

argument made by his counsel that the statements made by Dunton 

in the January 23, 1997 letter to Mazur were matters of opinion 

or subject to a qualified privilege because they were made 

within an employment setting and that actual malice had not been 

proven by a preponderance of the evidence. After denying 

UNITE’s renewed motion to strike at the conclusion of the 

presentation of its evidence, the trial court permitted the case 

to go forward as to UNITE. 

The jury returned its verdict for Jones, awarding him 

$150,000 in compensatory damages and $350,000 in punitive 

damages. UNITE filed a motion to set aside the verdict arguing, 

among other points, that Jones had failed to prove that the 

statement at issue in the January 30, 1997 resolution was false. 

In a final order entered September 3, 2003, the trial court 

denied UNITE’s motion to set aside the verdict and entered 

judgment on the jury’s verdict, but reduced the amount of 

punitive damages to $150,000. We awarded UNITE this appeal. 
10

DISCUSSION 

The law of defamation with respect to a statement made by a 

non-media defendant allegedly defaming a private individual is 

well settled in Virginia. “At common law, defamatory words that 

prejudice a person in his or her profession or trade are 

actionable as defamation per se. A defamatory statement may be 

made by inference, implication or insinuation. However . . . 

speech which does not contain a provably false factual 

connotation, or statements which cannot reasonably be 

interpreted as stating actual facts about a person cannot form 

the basis of a common law defamation action.” Fuste v. 

Riverside Healthcare Association, Inc., 265 Va. 127, 132, 575 

S.E.2d 858, 861 (2003) (internal citations, emendation, and 

quotation marks omitted). Thus, the defendant is not required 

to plead and prove the truth of his statement as an affirmative 

defense. “Instead, the plaintiff must prove falsity, because he 

is required to establish negligence with respect to such 

falsity.” The Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 15, 325 

S.E.2d 713, 725 (1985). “The application of this negligence 

standard is expressly limited, however, to circumstances where 

the defamatory statement makes substantial danger to reputation 

apparent.” Id.

We frequently have addressed the issue of an alleged 

defamation within the context of an employment relationship, as 
11

is the case here. Typically in such cases, the allegedly 

defamatory statement is afforded a qualified privilege because 

the statement is made “between persons on a subject in which the 

persons have an interest or duty.” Larimore v. Blaylock, 259 

Va. 568, 572, 528 S.E.2d 119, 121 (2000). In such instances, 

the plaintiff must establish both that the statement was false 

and that the defendant acted with actual malice.4 Id.; see also

Fuste, 265 Va. at 134, 575 S.E.2d at 862-63. In this context, 

“actual malice” is “behavior actuated by motives of personal 

spite, or ill-will, independent of the occasion on which the 

communication was made.” Gazette, Inc., 229 Va. at 18, 325 

S.E.2d at 727; Fuste, 265 Va. at 134-35, 575 S.E.2d at 863. 

However, in every defamation action the plaintiff’s initial 

burden is to produce sufficient evidence to show that the 

allegedly defamatory statement was false. If the plaintiff does 

not establish the falsity of the statement by a preponderance of 

the evidence in his case-in-chief, he has not met this threshold 

 

4

 Within the context of defamation law, there is also an 

intermediate standard between simple negligence and actual 

malice, sometimes referred to as “New York Times malice,” 

wherein the plaintiff need show only that the statement was made 

with knowledge that it was false or with a reckless disregard 

for the truth, even if the defendant bore no ill-will toward the 

plaintiff. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 

280 (1964); Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 230 Va. 

142, 149, 334 S.E.2d 846, 851 (1985). 
12

burden, and the trial court should strike the evidence and grant 

summary judgment to the defendant. 

UNITE contends that the trial court erred in refusing to 

grant its motion to strike or its motion to set aside the jury 

verdict because Jones failed to meet his burden of proving that 

the statement in the January 30, 1997 resolution that 

“information has been made available to the [General Executive 

Board] indicating that financial malpractice has occurred with 

respect to the assets of Local 713” was false. UNITE contends 

that this statement did not affirmatively state that “financial 

malpractice” had occurred, but only that information had been 

provided to UNITE that indicated such might be the case. This 

statement was true, UNITE contends, because Dunton had provided 

such information to UNITE’s General Executive Board by way of 

his letter to Mazur. 

In support of that contention, UNITE maintains that the 

term “financial malpractice,” both in the broad meaning of 

“improper practice,” and as a term-of-art applicable to the 

specific circumstance of a trade union as found in federal law, 

see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 462, and in UNITE’s constitution, does 

not equate with criminal wrongdoing. Rather, UNITE maintains 

that the term imputes merely mismanagement or improper practice 

with respect to the fiduciary duties of a union officer. In 

that context, UNITE contends that the evidence establishes that 
13

the statement in the resolution was true because the control of 

Local 713 assets by Jones and the local union officers under the 

circumstances of this case indicated that financial malpractice 

had occurred with respect to those assets. 

Jones contends that the statement was false because no 

information indicating financial malpractice or wrongdoing at 

Local 713 had been presented to UNITE’s General Executive Board 

at the time the resolution was adopted. He further contends 

that UNITE’s construction of the term “financial malpractice” is 

unsupported by the record because no evidence was presented to 

show that the term connotes something other than corrupt or 

criminal practices. Rather, Jones contends that the only 

evidence regarding the meaning of the term came from the 

testimony of the local union members that it implied Jones was a 

“crook.” 

We agree with UNITE that the statement in the January 30, 

1997 resolution did not affirmatively assert that financial 

malpractice had occurred at Local 713, but rather, only stated 

that the General Executive Board had received information 

indicating that possibility. Moreover, it is clear from the 

context of the resolution as a whole that the Executive 

Committee of UNITE’s General Executive Board was exercising its 

power to appoint an administrator under UNITE’s constitution in 

order to investigate the validity of Dunton’s information. The 
14

question then becomes not whether financial malpractice had 

occurred in fact, but rather, whether at the time the resolution 

was adopted the General Executive Board had received credible 

information to warrant its action. 

The parties agree that, on this record, the only source of 

the information ultimately provided to UNITE’s General Executive 

Board was Dunton’s letter of January 23, 1997 to Mazur. As 

Dunton explained at trial, the “thrust” of that letter was that 

he had found a small group of people controlling the local’s 

assets without member oversight. In recommending that an 

administrator be appointed, Dunton undoubtedly drew on UNITE’s 

authority to do so under its constitutional provision to 

“prevent or correct corruption or financial malpractice” when he 

referred to financial malpractice. (Emphasis added). 

Significantly, Dunton did not include a reference or suggestion 

of “corruption” in his letter or otherwise suggest criminal 

wrongdoing. Dunton’s letter did not assert that financial 

malpractice, however defined, had in fact occurred. The 

information contained in Dunton’s letter, however, was 

sufficient to establish the truth of the statement in the 

resolution that UNITE’s General Executive Board had been 

provided with “information . . . indicating that financial 

malpractice has occurred.” The fact that this “information” 

subsequently only raised “concerns about the finances of Local 
15

713” in the inquiry by the hearing officer does not convert the 

statement, true at the time of its publication in the 

resolution, into one that was false and defamatory. 

While Jones undoubtedly desired the jury and the trial 

court to focus attention on the alleged efforts of Dunton to 

discredit him in order for UNITE to assume the operation of 

Local 713 and the control of its assets, his cause of action 

against UNITE was limited to the allegation that he had been 

defamed by the publication of the January 30, 1997 resolution. 

Jones failed to prove that the allegedly defamatory statement in 

that resolution was false. Accordingly, we hold that the trial 

court erred in failing to grant UNITE’s motion to strike Jones’ 

evidence. 

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the 

trial court and enter final judgment for UNITE. 

Reversed and final judgment.