J-S01039-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

J.G.B.

v.

K.G. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1264 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered August 25, 2020

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Civil Division at 

No(s): CI-16-07639

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 09, 2021

Appellant, K.G. (“Mother”), files this appeal from the order entered by 

the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas, awarding J.G.B. (“Father”)

primary physical custody of the parties’ minor son, G.G. (“Child”) and 

maintaining the parties’ shared legal custody. After careful review, we affirm.

Mother and Father are the biological parents of Child, who was born in 

March 2014. While Father was not initially involved in Child’s life, Father filed 

a Complaint for Custody on August 24, 2016. On February 2, 2017, the trial 

court awarded the parties shared legal custody and Mother primary physical 

custody. Subsequent to the filing of a petition to modify by Mother, 

September 6, 2017, the trial court awarded the parties shared physical 

custody on an alternating weekly basis and maintained shared legal custody.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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On August 1, 2019, subsequent to Mother’s petition to modify and by 

stipulation of the parties, the trial court modified the custody arrangement for 

shared physical custody, with Father to exercise physical custody one 

weekend per month based on the school calendar, with the option of a second 

weekend locally during the school year, and a large portion of the summer. 

On February 10, 2020, Father filed a petition for modification sought 

primary physical custody of Child, claiming Mother’s household was not safe 

due to the presence of Mother’s boyfriend, S.P.1 On August 17, 2020, the trial 

court held a hearing at which Mother and Father were each represented by 

counsel and testified on their own behalf. Father presented the testimony of

Mother’s former landlord, B.U.; Father’s sister, S.B.; Mother’s brother, R.G.;

and Mother’s grandmother, B.M. Mother presented the testimony of Mother’s

boyfriend, S.P.; and Mother’s friend, D.D.

On August 25, 2020, the trial court entered an order modifying the 

custody arrangement to award Father primary physical custody during the 

school year, but directing that the parties would maintain shared legal 

custody. The trial court granted Mother physical custody one weekend per 

month as well as the option of an additional weekend locally during the school 

year. Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 8/25/20, at 6-8. 

____________________________________________

1 Thereafter, on May 1, 2020, Mother, who moved with Child from Christiana, 

Pennsylvania (Lancaster County) to Chester, Pennsylvania (Chester County), 

filed a notice of proposed relocation. On May 5, 2020, Father responded with 

a counter-affidavit. As Mother agreed the exchange location would remain in 

Lewistown, Pennsylvania, the parties stipulated that the disputed issue 

remained primary physical custody, not relocation. See Order, 8/25/20, at 1.
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During the summer, the trial court provided that the parties will share 

physical custody on a two-week on/two-week off basis commencing the 

Sunday after school ends with exchanges Sundays at 5:00 p.m. Id. at 8. As 

both parties admitted to having altercations at custodial exchanges in 

Lewistown, Pennsylvania, the trial court directed that only Mother, Father, and 

Child should exit the vehicles during the exchanges. Id. The trial court also

set forth a holiday schedule. Id. at 8-9. 

On September 23, 2020, Mother, through counsel, filed a notice of 

appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The trial court issued a Rule 

1925(a) Opinion on October 26, 2020 in which it referenced its prior opinion.

On appeal, Mother raises the following issue for our review:

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by reversing a 6-year 

physical custody status quo based primarily on hearsay evidence 

and without sufficient evidence that the Child’s best interests were 

served by such a reversal?

Mother’s Brief at 9.

In custody cases under the Child Custody Act, (“the Act”), 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 5321-5340, our standard of review is as follows:

In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type 

and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept findings 

of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of 

record, as our role does not include making independent factual

determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility 

and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial 

judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand. 

However, we are not bound by the trial court’s deductions or 

inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether 
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the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the 

evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the trial 

court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in 

light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.

C.R.F. v. S.E.F., 45 A.3d 441, 443 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted).

This Court consistently has held:

[t]he discretion that a trial court employs in custody matters 

should be accorded the utmost respect, given the special nature 

of the proceeding and the lasting impact the result will have on 

the lives of the parties concerned. Indeed, the knowledge gained 

by a trial court in observing witnesses in a custody proceeding 

cannot adequately be imparted to an appellate court by a printed 

record. 

Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 540 (Pa.Super. 2006) (quoting Jackson 

v. Beck, 858 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa.Super. 2004)). In addition,

[a]lthough we are given a broad power of review, we are 

constrained by an abuse of discretion standard when evaluating 

the court’s order. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of 

judgment, but if the court’s judgment is manifestly unreasonable 

as shown by the evidence of record, discretion is abused. An 

abuse of discretion is also made out where it appears from a 

review of the record that there is no evidence to support the 

court’s findings or that there is a capricious disbelief of evidence.

M.A.T. v. G.S.T., 989 A.2d 11, 18-19 (Pa.Super. 2010) (en banc) (citations 

omitted).

The paramount concern in any custody case decided under the Act is 

the best interests of the child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5323, 5328, 5338. 

Section 5328(a) sets forth the best interest factors that the trial court must 

consider in awarding custody and provides as follows:

§ 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody
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(a) Factors.—In ordering any form of custody, the court shall 

determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant 

factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which 

affect the safety of the child, including the following:

(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit 

frequent and continuing contact between the child and another 

party. 

(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or 

member of the party’s household, whether there is a continued 

risk of harm to the child or an abused party and which party can 

better provide adequate physical safeguards and supervision of 

the child. 

(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1) and 

(2) (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement with 

protective services). 

(3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf 

of the child. 

(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s 

education, family life and community life.

(5) The availability of extended family.

(6) The child’s sibling relationships.

(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the 

child’s maturity and judgment.

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the 

other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where 

reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the child 

from harm.

(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable, 

consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate for 

the child’s emotional needs.
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(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily 

physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special 

needs of the child.

(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

(12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability 

to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the 

willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one 

another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by another 

party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate with 

that party.

(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or 

member of a party’s household.

(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or 

member of a party’s household.

(16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).2

In its Opinion accompanying its Order, the trial court thoroughly

addressed the custody factors pursuant to Section 5328(a) as follows: 

1. Which party is more likely to encourage and permit 

frequent and continuing contact between the child and 

another party: The Court finds that both Mother and Father are 

likely to permit frequent and continuing contact between the Child 

and the other party. Despite the contention that Mother withholds 

____________________________________________

2 Further, we have stated that “[a]ll of the factors listed in [S]ection 5328(a) 

are required to be considered by the trial court when entering a custody order. 

... The record must be clear on appeal that the trial court considered all the 

factors.” A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818, 822-23 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted). Section 5323(d) provides that a trial court “shall delineate the 

reasons for its decision on the record in open court or in a written opinion or 

order.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(d). 
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the Child from Father, the Court finds that while Mother can be 

difficult, aside from Father’s first Court-ordered weekend in 

September, Father was able to exercise his weekends with the 

Child. Despite the change in distance, Mother was committed to 

keeping the exchange location the same such that Father would 

not be required to drive farther to pick up the Child.

2. The present and past abuse committed by a party or 

member of the party’s household whether there is a 

continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and 

which party can better provide adequate physical 

safeguards and supervision of the child: The Court finds that 

both Mother and the Child are at a continued risk of abuse in 

Mother’s current household setting. Mother and her boyfriend 

have a tumultuous relationship where screaming, fighting, and 

emotional abuse is a regular occurrence. Mother testified that 

none of the abusive incidences have occurred with the Child 

present and that all fighting occurs outside of the presence of the 

Child. The Court does not find Mother credible on that issue. 

Mother demonstrated by her actions that at various junctions in 

the past year that she does not believe herself or the Child to be 

safe while she shares a residence with her boyfriend. While they 

co-habitated at her residence in Christiana, Mother left her 

residence or moved out of her residence in fear for her safety. 

Mother had family resources willing to help her, but instead of 

relying on them, Mother moved with the Child without Father’s 

consent from Christiana to Chester, PA to live in a home that is 

controlled by boyfriend and his family and further away from her 

familial resources. Since moving to Chester with her boyfriend, 

Mother again left the residence for fear for her safety and filed a 

PFA against her boyfriend. At the time of the custody hearing, 

Mother had resumed living with her boyfriend and attempted to 

paint a picture of a healthy home with a family that occasionally 

quarrels, but is otherwise wonderful and good for a [c]hild to grow 

up in. The Court again does not find Mother credible in this regard.

3. The parental duties performed by each party on behalf 

of the child: Both parties perform parental duties for the Child 

while he is in his or her household. Mother’s boyfriend does the 

majority of the cooking for her household because by her 

admission he is the better cook. Neither party supported any 

contention that the Child is neglected in either party’s household.
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4. The need for stability and continuity in the child’s 

education, family life and community life: The Court finds 

that the Child needs stability in his educational, familial, and 

community life and finds that Father is the party most likely to be 

able to provide this for the Child. Simply put, Mother is not stable 

at this time. Mother moved into a situation she admits has been 

abusive and the Court does not believe that the threat of abuse 

no longer exists. Mother is further away from family resources 

and has alienated many of her family resources due to her actions 

regarding the child and her boyfriend. Father presented as stable 

and surrounded by supportive family resources that will ensure

continued stability for the Child.

5. The availability of extended family: Father has the majority 

of his extended family in the Blairsville, PA. Mother has family in 

Coatesville and Ephrata. Mother does not have relatives in

Chester, but would likely rely on the family supports of her 

boyfriend’s family.

6. The child’s sibling relationships: The Child is an only child.

7. The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the 

child’s maturity and judgment: The Child did not present a 

well-reasoned preference due to his young age and maturity level. 

The Court is satisfied that, given the evidence presented, it has a 

clear picture of what is in the Child’s best interests regarding 

primary custody during the school year.

8. The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the 

other parent except in cases of domestic violence where 

reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the

child from harm: The Court finds that neither party has 

attempted to turn the party against the other parent. Both Mother 

and Father are guilty of subjecting the Child to disorderly custody 

exchanges where “adult” participants scream, fight, and threaten 

each other in the presence of the young [c]hild. Credible 

testimony was presented about the Child’s troubled demeanor 

after these tumultuous exchanges. The Court finds that such

conduct is not in the best interests of the Child and must stop.

9. Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable, 

consistent, and nurturing relationship with the child 

adequate for the child’s emotional needs: The Court finds that 

it is incredibly important for the emotional development of the
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Child to not be surrounded by dysfunction. The Court does not 

doubt that Mother is loving and nurturing to the Child, but finds 

that her inconsistencies and instability is detrimental to the Child’s

emotional needs. No evidence was presented that the home 

Father provides is anything but stable and loving.

10. Which party is more likely to attend to the daily 

physical, emotional, developmental, educational, and 

special needs of the child: The Child has no specific special 

needs though Mother has the Child in counseling to address issues 

related to custody. The Court finds that both parties presented as 

parents who are willing to attend to the Child’s daily physical, 

developmental, and educational needs. The Court has concerns

about emotional trauma that the Child is subjected to in Mother’s 

household. Mother stated that she believes that the screaming, 

fighting, intimidation, and name calling that goes on in her 

household is normal and the Court submits to her that it is not 

normal, not healthy, and implores her to address these skewed 

views of relationships with her counselor.

The Court notes that Father was not involved in the Child’s 

life until he was a toddler. While such an absence is regrettable, 

it does not diminish the fact that he has a good relationship with 

the Child and is the Child’s most stable option at this time.

11. The proximity of the residences of the parties: Father 

lives in Blairsville, PA. The parties lived approximately 4 hours 

apart when Mother lived in Christiana. Now that Mother lives in 

Chester, the parties reside approximately 5 hours apart. The 

parties agree to still meet for exchanges at the Burger King in 

Lewistown, PA[,] which is an approximate two-hour drive for 

Father.

12. Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability 

to make appropriate childcare arrangements: Both parties 

are available to care for the Child or make appropriate child-care; 

arrangements. Father utilizes family members for assistance with 

childcare and Mother utilizes after-school care programs, such as 

the YMCA, or her boyfriend to care for the Child.

13. The level, of conflict between the parties and the 

willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one 

another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by

another party is no evidence of unwillingness or inability to 
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cooperate with that party: The level of conflict between the 

parties is moderate. The Court finds that Mother’s boyfriend is 

the aggravating factor to the parties’ lack of cooperation for the

best interests of the Child. The Court finds that Mother’s direct 

testimony was lacking in candor as to what she does to contribute 

to the dysfunction at custody exchanges. The Court finds that 

Mother lacks the necessary self-control to refrain from responding 

to “smart comments” during custody exchanges. Father’s family 

members and their smart comments only serve to exacerbate the 

problem.

14. The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or 

member of a party’s household: Neither party presented 

evidence that either party or a member of their household have a

history of drug or alcohol abuse. Mother’s boyfriend has some 

prior drug charges and currently has a medical marijuana card 

that was prescribed for his mental health conditions. There was 

little credible testimony to support that there are current issues of

drug addiction in Mother’s household.

15. The mental and physical condition of a party or member 

of a party’s household: Neither party nor any member of their 

household have a physical condition that would hinder their ability 

to parent the Child. Mother’s boyfriend is a disabled veteran 

diagnosed with and treated for PTSD. Mother’s boyfriend takes 

medicine and receives counseling to manage his condition. 

Mother has been diagnosed with depression. Mother attends 

counseling and takes medication for her depression. Father has 

no diagnosed mental health conditions that affect his ability to 

parent the Child.

16. Any other relevant factor: The majority of the conflict in 

this case centers around Mother living in Chester with her 

boyfriend. Father does not approve of the Child residing in 

Chester due to his perception of it having higher crime and lower 

quality public schools. The Court will refrain from making findings 

regarding the quality of public schools because evidence to 

support that contention was not properly introduced. The Court 

recognizes that Mother’s current residence in Chester is vastly 

different from Mother’s prior residence in Christiana, but the Court 

does not count that as a negative. The rural/urban distinction 

testified to at the hearing was based on conjecture and biases and 

not concrete data upon which the Court can rely.
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The issue in this case that the Court finds troubling is Mother’s 

choice to subject herself and her son to a toxic home environment. 

Every witness with knowledge of Mother and her boyfriend 

testified to rampant dysfunction. Mother and boyfriend 

themselves admitted to their dysfunction though they used 

weaker terminology. Mother testified to having very heated 

arguments with her boyfriend which cause her to leave the house. 

Mother also acknowledged that she has sent messages to third 

parties where Mother states that she is fearful of her boyfriend for 

her and her Child’s safety. Most troubling is that Mother indicated 

that she believes emotional abuse in a relationship is normal and

that everyone does it. While the Court recognizes that Mother is 

free to live as she pleases, such decisions directly impact the best 

interests of the Child[,] which is paramount to the Court.

Mother’s stability is a cause for concern. Over the past six 

months, Mother has bounced around from living in Christiana, 

Coatesville, and Chester, PA. Mother testified that she cannot 

afford to rent by herself, which was one of the main reasons she 

moved to Chester, PA with her boyfriend. Mother alleges that this 

is partially due to the pandemic and her losing her job. Mother 

worked for and was laid off from her position as support staff for 

a doctor’s office. Mother now works as a receptionist for United 

Electrical. Mother has had ample opportunity to remediate the 

unstable housing situation with the aid of family, but she has 

instead elected to move into a situation where she appears to be 

more financially dependent on boyfriend. This decision is 

concerning to the Court given the nature of their relationship and 

its impact on Mother and the Child.

Opinion, 8/25/20, at 1-5.

Mother does not challenge any of the trial court’s specific determinations 

as to the Section 5328(a) factors, but claims the trial court lacked compelling 

evidence to disturb the status quo in which Mother had primary physical 

custody of Child since his birth. Mother argues that the trial court failed to 

consider how maintaining the status quo would have been in Child’s best 

interests to promote stability and continuity. Mother therefore contends that, 

as Child lived primarily with her and was doing well, the evidence presented
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did not support a need to modify the custody arrangement to award primary 

physical custody to Father. Mother’s Brief at 14-17. 

As noted above, the trial court is required to consider all of the Section 

5328(a) factors in entering a custody order. J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 

652 (Pa.Super. 2011). Although the trial court is required to give “weighted 

consideration to those factors which affect the safety of the child” pursuant to 

Section 5328(a), the amount of weight a court gives any one factor is almost 

entirely discretionary. M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 339 (Pa.Super. 2013). 

Critically, as we stated in M.J.M.:

It is within the trial court’s purview as the finder of fact to 

determine which factors are most salient and critical in 

each particular case. See A.D. v. M.A.B., 989 A.2d 32, 35-36 

(Pa.Super. 2010) (“In reviewing a custody order . . . our role does 

not include making independent factual determinations. . . . In 

addition, with regard to issues of credibility and weight of the 

evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed 

and assessed the witnesses first-hand.”). 

Id. (emphasis added). 

While Mother cites to this Court’s decision in E.B. v. D.B., 209 A.3d 451, 

466-67 (Pa.Super. 2019) to argue that a trial court cannot alter the status 

quo without compelling evidence, her reliance on this decision is misplaced. 

In E.B., this Court found the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the 

parties’ custody arrangement in an interim order on a temporary basis without 

providing the parties due process. This Court found specifically that:

In some circumstances entering an order without notice on a

temporary basis may be necessary to address a child's best

interest. ... In this case, it was an abuse of the trial court's
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discretion to alter the status quo without notice and an

opportunity to be heard after full preparation, without any

apparent emergency or change in circumstances, without any

explanation as to why it was in Child's best interest, and without

considering the effect of eliminating years of detailed prior orders

in exchange for an order not specifically tailored to the parties'

and Child's needs.

Id. at 465–66. As such, this Court provided that “trial courts should be wary 

of upending the status quo prematurely without substantial justification that 

the change was warranted by a child’s best interest. . . the ultimate polestar 

is a child’s best interest.” Id. at 465–66. 

Unlike in E.B., we are not dealing with a temporary custody order; the 

trial court reached its decision to modify the parties’ custody arrangement 

after a full evidentiary hearing at which both parties had notice and the 

opportunity to present evidence as to the Child’s best interests. 

Further, and more importantly, we find that the record supports the trial 

court’s findings and analysis of the custody factors and determinations as to 

Child’s best interests. In reaching its decision to modify the custody 

arrangement to award Father primary physical custody of Child, the trial court 

found a critical point of concern was Mother’s lack of stability. The trial court 

emphasized that when Mother needed to move from her residence for financial 

reasons, she rejected the resources of her supportive family and chose to 

move farther away from her family into a home controlled by her boyfriend, 

with whom she admitted was emotionally abusive. Mother does not 

acknowledge that the trial court was troubled by her decision to subject herself
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and Child to a toxic home environment in which her relationship with her 

boyfriend is characterized by Mother’s own family as rampant dysfunction. 

We interpret Mother’s challenge at its core as a dispute to the trial 

court’s findings of fact and determinations regarding credibility and weight of 

the evidence, as well as the weight attributed to certain factors. While not 

framed as such, Mother, in essence, questions the trial court’s conclusions and 

assessments and seeks for this court to re-find facts, re-weigh evidence, 

and/or re-assess credibility to her view of the evidence. This we cannot do. 

Under the aforementioned standard of review applicable in custody matters, 

the trial court’s findings of fact and determinations regarding credibility and 

weight of the evidence are not disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See

C.R.F., 45 A.3d at 443.

After a thorough review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion. As 

we determine that the trial court’s findings and determinations are supported 

by competent evidence in the record, we will not disturb them. 

In addition, Mother claims the trial court’s decision to award Father 

primary physical custody was improperly based on hearsay statements from 

Father and Maternal Great-Grandmother. Mother argues that the trial court’s 

decision must be overturned as she asserts that the trial court gave great 

weight to this hearsay evidence, which it allowed over Mother’s objection.

Specifically, Mother highlights the testimony of Father that he “heard 

that [Mother’s] boyfriend was abusing Child and Mother, and heard that 

[Mother’s boyfriend] was smoking marijuana in front of [Child].” Mother’s 
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Brief, at 18. Father further testified to receipt of a call from Mother’s family 

in February 2020, when Child was with Father, advising Father to not return 

Child as Mother had shown up to her brother’s home in the middle of the night 

and “was terrified of [her boyfriend] and how afraid -- she was terrified of the 

way [her boyfriend] treated [Child].” Id. at 19. Mother also references the 

testimony of Maternal Great-Grandmother that Child told her that Mother’s 

boyfriend hit him with a belt. Id. at 21-22.

With respect to issues of admissibility, this Court has held that:

. . . the decision of whether to admit or exclude evidence is within 

the sound discretion of the orphans’ court. Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 639 Pa. 196, 160 A.3d 127, 143 n.14 (2017), cert. 

denied sub. nom, Johnson v. Pennsylvania, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 

S.Ct. 508, 199 L.Ed.2d 393 (2017). A reviewing court will not 

disturb these rulings absent an abuse of discretion. Id. Discretion 

is abused if, inter alia, the orphans’ court overrides or misapplies 

the law. Commonwealth v. Batts, 640 Pa. 401, 163 A.3d 410, 

434 n.9 (2017).

In re A.J.R.-H., 647 Pa. 256, 273, 188 A.3d 1157, 1166–67 (2018).

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter 

asserted. Pa.R.E. 801. Hearsay is generally inadmissible unless it is subject 

to one of the hearsay exceptions set forth in the rules of evidence. Pa.R.E. 

802. However, this Court has also recognized that “. . .where the statement 

is being offered to show its effect on a listener, it is not being offered for the 

truth of the matter and is non-hearsay.” Schmalz v. Manufacturers & 

Traders Tr. Co., 67 A.3d 800, 803 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
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We agree with the trial court that the evidence raised by Mother to which 

she objected was non-hearsay as it was admitted, not for the truth of the 

matter asserted, but its effect on the listener. Father testified that he filed a 

petition seeking primary physical custody of Child because he had been 

informed that Mother’s boyfriend was verbally and physically abusive to Child 

and that Mother’s boyfriend used marijuana. N.T. at 9-11. 

Father testified that on a particular occasion in February 2020, he did 

not return Child to Mother’s custody because Mother’s family members had 

warned him not to give Child back for Child’s own safety. N.T. at 16-18. 

Father indicated that he took this course of action as Mother’s brother and 

mother had told him that Mother had showed up to her brother’s house in the 

middle of the night and had indicated that she was was “terrified” of her 

boyfriend and the way he treated Child. N.T. at 16-18. Maternal GreatGrandmother testified that she confronted Mother’s boyfriend after Child had 

told her that Mother’s boyfriend had hit him with a belt. N.T. at 137-140.

Nevertheless, even assuming such evidence was in fact hearsay, the 

testimony at issue was cumulative of other evidence admitted at trial. Mother 

admitted that she had heated arguments with her boyfriend, which her own 

counsel described as “world wars” in which Mother’s boyfriend called Mother

derogatory names, but Mother claimed that these arguments never occurred 

in front of Child. N.T. at 97-98. Mother admitted that her relationship with 

her boyfriend was emotionally abusive, but minimized the conflict as she felt 

that “we all do it ... [and] all talk mean to each other.” N.T. at 99. 
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In addition, Mother stipulated to the admission of a note that she wrote 

to her landlord indicating that she was giving thirty days notice that she was 

terminating the lease due to “an emergency situation with a boyfriend that 

was living” with her. N.T. at 96-97; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6. In that note, Mother 

states that “I can’t believe that I have to leave my home but I have no choice 

for our safety” and asks the landlord not to tell anyone about her current 

whereabouts. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6. 

In addition, Mother’s brother, R.G., offered uncontested testimony that 

when Mother sought refuge at his home after fights with her boyfriend on 

several occasions. R.G. testified that each time Mother arrived at his home 

distraught and upset, she revealed that she did not feel safe at her boyfriend’s 

home. N.T. at 110. R.G. indicated that he contacted Father to warn him as 

he did not feel it was safe for Child to be at Mother’s boyfriend’s home and 

described Mother’s boyfriend as “toxic.” N.T. at 112-14, 116-18. R.G. became 

frustrated and did not speak to Mother for a few months when Mother resumed

her relationship with her boyfriend. N.T. at 112-15. Mother did not object to 

any of R.G.’s testimony. In light of the evidence presented, we cannot find 

that the admission of the contested statements affected the trial court’s 

decision to award Father primary physical custody of Child.

As such, even if the challenged statements constituted hearsay, the trial 

court’s decision to admit this testimony was not reversible error. A.J.B. v. 

M.P.B., 945 A.2d 744, 751 (Pa.Super. 2008) (“[t]o constitute reversible 

error, an evidentiary ruling must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the 
J-S01039-21

- 18 -

complaining party”) (citation omitted). See also Childers v. Power Line 

Equip. Rentals, Inc., 681 A.2d 201, 206 (Pa.Super. 1996), appeal denied,

547 Pa. 735, 690 A.2d 236 (1997) (“[Evidentiary] ruling[s] must be shown 

not only to have been erroneous but harmful to the part[ies] complaining”) 

(citations omitted) (some brackets in original).

3

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 02/09/2021

____________________________________________

3 To the extent Mother challenges the weight attributed to any factor by the 

trial court, we likewise find no abuse of discretion. As stated above, the 

amount of weight that a trial court gives to any one factor is almost entirely 

within its discretion. See M.J.M., 63 A.3d at 339.