No. 83-151 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1983 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

SHARON M. GARST, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

and 

ORAH W. GARST 

Respondent and Appellant. 

Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Powder River, 

The Honorable A. B. Martin, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

James J. Sinclair, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent : 

Lucas & Monaghan; A. Lance Tonn, Miles City, 

Montana 

- 

Submitted on Briefs: July 7, 1983 

Decided: September 29, 1983 

Filed: SEP 2 9 1983 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Orah W. Garst appeals from the judgment of the Sixteenth 

Judicial District Court, Powder River County, apportioning 

marital property. We modify and affirm the District Court's 

j udgment . 

The issues on appeal are: 

(1) Did the District Court err in its valuation of the 

marital ranch property? 

(2) Did the District Court abuse its discretion by 

ordering an inequitable division of marital property? 

(3) Did the District Court err by granting the wife a 

lien on marital property or its proceeds in a specific dollar 

amount? 

Sharon M. Garst (Sharon) filed a petition for 

dissolution of marriage on July 1, 1980. Trial was held July 

17, 1981 and the District Court issued findings and 

conclusions on September 10, 1981. Sharon appealed from that 

judgment and this Court affirmed in part, reversed in part 

and remanded the case for redetermination of the net marital 

estate and reapportionment of marital property. Garst v. 

Garst (Mont. 1982), 649 P.2d 450, 39 St.Rep. 1477. 

Trial was held December 15, 1982. The principal issue 

at trial wa.s the value of the net marital estate, which 

turned upon valuation of marital ranch property and 

improvements and upon other matters not challenged on appeal. 

All other assets and all liabilities were found to have been 

conclusively determined in the first trial. 

Orah W. Garst (Dub) testified that the ranch consisted 

of the following types and amounts of acreage: 

hay land 186 acres 

crop land 340 acres 
improved pasture 120 acres 

grazing land 2,603.63 acres 

TOTAL 3,249.63 acres 

Dub testified that the value of the ranch was $100 per acre 

or approximately $325,000, including improvements. 

Dub testified that the "improved pasture" was originally 

grazing land, which had been plowed and planted for the 

purpose of growing sufficient crops to pay for a tractor for 

the ranch. After one or two crops were harvested, the land 

was replanted to grass and used for grazing. Dub testified 

that this pasture would support no more cattle than other 

grazing land and was worth no more than other grazing land. 

Sharon's expert appraiser, Dennis Jurica, testified that the 

improved pasture should be valued as farm land rather than 

grazing land. 

Jurica testified that the ranch and improvements were 

worth approximately $500,000. His appraisal was based upon 

several different methods of valuation. He valued the 

improvements alone at approximately $75,000. Sharon 

testified that she felt the ranch and improvements were worth 

$500,000. 

Dub's expert appraiser, M. L. Watson, testified that the 

farm land was worth $367.50 per acre and the grazing land was 

worth $70.44 per acre. Watson's appraisal, prepared before 

trial, was based upon acreage figures different from those 

testified to by Dub at trial. Watson testified that these 

differences affected the valuation of the ranch. The acreage 

figures testified to by Dub at trial were substantiated by 

Jurica's testimony. Sharon's counsel stated to the Court 

that she was willing to accept Dub's acreage figures. Watson 

further testified that ranch improvements were worth $55,000, 

and the ranch, $387,000, including improvements. 
The District Court found that the value of the ranch and 

improvements was $485,804.69. The Court accepted the acreage 

figures supplied by Dub and the values per acre supplied by 

Watson. The Court accepted Jurica's testimony regarding 

value of the 120 acres of improved pasture, valuing that land 

at the higher farm land figure. Ranch value was calculated 

by the District Court as follows: 

340 acres farmland and 

120 acres farmland returned to 

pasture, at $367.50 per acre: $169,050.00 

186 acres hayland at $367.50 

per acre: 68,355.00 

2,603.63 acres range land 

at $70.44 per acre: 183,399.69 

Total $420,804.69 

To this value, the Court added a compromise value for 

improvements of $65,000, for a total ranch value of 

$485,804.69. 

The Court found there was a net marital estate of 

$204,374, to which each party was equally entitled. The 

Court ordered that all ranch assets be distributed to Dub, 

who in return was to pay Sharon $102,187 or half of the net 

marital estate. Because it was doubtful that Dub could raise 

that amount by borrowing against the ranch, the Court ordered 

that if no payment agreement was worked out within 90 days, 

the ranch property was to be sold. The Court granted Sharon 

a lien upon the ranch property or proceeds in the amount of 

$102,187. Dub appeals. 

Dub first contends that the District Court erred in its 

valuation of marital ranch property. He argues the District 

Court rejected, without stating reasons, the opinions of both 

experts, and that the Court's valuation figure was thus 

chosen arbitrarily and is not supported by the evidence. 
However, the record clearly shows these contentions are 

without merit. 

It is well-settled that this Court will not disturb the 

fact findings of the District Court if they are based upon 

substantial credible evidence. Kowis v. Kowis (Mont. 1983) , 

658 P.2d 1084, 1087, 40 St.Rep. 149, 152. In Kowis, we 

stated that although conflicts may exist in the evidence 

presented, it is the duty of the trial judge to resolve such 

conflicts. His findings will not be disturbed on appeal 

where they are based on substantial though conflicting 

evidence, unless there is a clear preponderance of evidence 

against such findings. 658 P.2d at 1087, 40 St.Rep. at 152. 

We find there is substantial credible evidence to 

support the District Court's valuation of the marital ranch 

property. 

In reaching its determination of ranch value, the 

District Court used Dub's acreage figures and the values 

supplied by Dub's appraiser, Watson. The Court did not 

reject the testimony of Watson. The record clearly shows 

that the acreage figures used by Watson in preparation of his 

appraisal were erroneous. The Court applied Watson's values 

per acre to the acreage figures testified to by Dub at trial. 

Those figures were supported by Jurica's testimony, and 

Sharon indicated to the Court that they were acceptable to 

her. The Court questioned the witnesses with respect to 

acreage figures. 

The District Court was not bound to accept either all or 

none of the testimony of any witness. In Goodmundson v. 

Goodmundson (Mont. 1982), 655 P.2d 509, 39 St.Rep. 2295, we 

stated: 

"In adopting proposed values or in setting its own, 

the District Court is free in its discretion to 

adopt the recommendation of a party or a layman 
over that of an expert. - Dickerson v. Dickerson 

(1980), Mont. , 614 P.2d 521, 37 St.Rep. 

1286. Also, the District Court may average the 

values given by experts to arrive at an eqGitable 

solution. . .. In Re the Marriage of Jensen 

(19811, Mont . , 631 P.2d 700, 38 St.Rep. 

1109. 

"Here, the District Court adopted some findings 

supported by the wife's valuations, some findings 

that were averages of values set by experts, and 

some findings based on the husband's testimony and 

that of his appraisers. The husband claims this is 

illogical and inconsistent. . .. 

"We disagree with the husband simply because the 

findings are supported by the evidence and that is 

the determinative test." 655 P.2d at 511-12, 39 

St.Rep. at 2297. 

Here, as in Goodmundson, the District Court's valuation was 

based on selected portions of the testimony of various 

witnesses. Each step of the District Court's valuation 

process was supported by substantial credible evidence. 

Dub argues that the District Court committed reversible 

error in failing to state its reasons for rejecting the 

valuation of the expert witnesses, citing Marriage of 

Peterson (Mont. 1981), 636 P.2d 821, 823, 38 St.Rep. 1723, 

1726. Peterson is distinguishable, however. There, we stated 

that we were unable upon review of the record to say that the 

District Court properly exercised its discretion, without 

some indication of its reasoning. 636 P.2d at 824, 38 

St.Rep. at 1726. Here, the reasons are clear from the record 

for the Court's acceptance or rejection of various testimony. 

There is no merit in Dub's contention that the District Court 

committed reversible error in accepting the testimony of Dub 

and his expert witness. 

Dub contends that the District Court erroneously valued 

the 120 acres of improved pasture as farm land rather than 

grazing land. The testimony was in conflict on this 

question. Dub testified that the improved pasture was worth 

no more than the grazing land. But Jurica testified that the 
property should be valued as farm land. The land in question 

had been farmed by Dub for at least one or two seasons, and 

crops were harvested. The District Court's finding that this 

land should be valued as farm land is supported by 

substantial credible evidence. 

We find no error in the District Court's valuation of 

the marital ranch property. 

11. 

Dub next contends that the District Court abused its 

discretion by ordering an inequitable method of division of 

marital property. More specifically, he argues that the 

Court erred in ordering that the marital ranch property be 

sold so that Sharon will receive her share of the net marital 

estate. We reject this argument. 

The District Court has far-reaching discretion in making 

property divisions. The reviewing court does not substitute 

its judgment for that of the trial court, and will not alter 

a judgment unless it finds an abuse of discretion, i.e., that 

the trial court acted arbitrarily without employment of 

conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason 

resulting in substantial injustice. Kowis, 658 P.2d at 1087, 

40 St.Rep. at 153. 

Dub argues that Montana follows the rule that a family 

ranch should be kept intact wherever there is a reasonable 

means of providing the other spouse with his or her equitable 

share of marital property short of selling the land, citing 

Biegalke v. Biegalke (1977), 172 Mont. 311, 564 P.2d 987. He 

notes that in furtherance of this policy, Montana courts 

allow one spouse to buy out the equitable share of the other 

spouse in a lump sum or according to installment schedules 

established by the court or the parties. Marriage of 

Jacobson (1979), 183 Mont. 517, 600 P.2d 1183. Dub argues 
that the District Court here failed to reasonably and 

realistically consider his ability to buy Sharon's equitable 

interest in the ranch through the ranch's income-producing or 

borrowing capacity. 

These general principles of property division are not 

disputed. However, the policy of keeping a family ranch 

intact cannot be used to deprive a spouse of his or her 

equitable share of the marital estate. Marriage of Owen 

(Mont. 1980), 609 P.2d 292, 295, 37 St.Rep. 616, 619. 

In resolving this issue it is important to consider the 

District Court's finding number 8: 

"The Court finds that [Dub] is without financial 

means to pay [Sharon] her one-half share, and the 

Court has been advised by counsel that there is 

doubt if [Dub] can raise that amount by further 

encumbering the ranch property. In the event [Dub] 

is unable to pay [Sharon] the amount awarded or 

cannot arrive at an agreement with [Sharon] for 

installment payments within 90 days from date of 

judgment, all ranch property belonging to the 

marital estate shall be sold. . .." 

Clearly, the District Court recognized the principles urged 

by Dub. The Court gave Dub 90 days to arrange financing or 

to work out an agreement with Sharon for purchase of her 

interest. However, the Court found it was doubtful whether 

such an arrangement was possible. The marital ranch 

liabilities were substantial, making it unlikely that Dub 

could obtain additional financing against the ranch assets. 

Dub concedes that the ranch is already subject to "tremendous 

liabilities." The District Court's order is an equitable and 

fair decision with respect to both parties. If Dub is able 

to arrange financing, he can preserve the ranch. However, if 

he cannot, Sharon's interest is protected. 

On this record, we cannot say that the trial court acted 

arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or 

exceeded the bounds of reason. Finding no abuse of 
discretion, the District Court's order that the ranch be sold 

if no purchase agreement is reached within 90 days is 

af firmed. 

Finally, Dub contends that the District Court erred in 

granting Sharon a lien on ranch property or proceeds in the 

specific amount of $102,187, after stating the property was 

to be divided equally. The substance of this contention is 

that the percentage split of the net marital estate will not 

be 50-50 if the ranch sells for either more or less than the 

value determined by the District Court. He argues that to 

grant the lien for a specific amount under these 

circumstances is to act arbitrarily and. without employment of 

conscientious judgment. We agree. 

The lien amount of $102,187 is based upon the entire net 

marital estate of the parties. If the ranch property sells 

for more than $485,804 or if other ranch assets are sold for 

more than the values set by the District Court, the lien 

amount will be less than half the net marital estate, and 

Sharon will receive less than her share. On the other hand, 

if assets are sold for less than the values determined by the 

Court, the lien amount will be greater than half, and Dub 

will receive less than his share. 

This problem is easily corrected by modifying the decree 

to state that the lien shall be in the amount of $102,187 or, 

in the event that property is sold for more or less than the 

value determined by the District Court, the lien shall be 

adjusted accordingly so that the lien is for one-half of the 

net marital estate. We order that the judgment be so 

modified. 

Finally, we note that the trailer home included in the 

District Court's valuation of the net marital estate has 
apparently been distributed to Sharon. If this is so, the 

value of the trailer must be subtracted from the amount of 

the net marital estate due Sharon from Dub, and the trailer 

should be paid for with proceeds of the sale of marital 

assets. Similar adjustments are to be made for any other 

items included in the net marital estate and already 

distributed. 

With the modifications noted above, we affirm the 

judgment of the District Court. 

We Concur: 

?A& &.Q+JQ 

Chief ~usfice