I 

I 

Indochina Monographs 


The Khmer Republic at War 


and the Final Collapse 


Lt. Gen. Sak Sutsakhan 

U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY IllSTORY 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

t,­


-

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Oats 

Sal<: Sutsakhan. 

The Khmer Republic at war and the final collapse. 

(Indochina monographs) 

1. Cambodia--History--Civil War, 1970-1975. 

I. Title. II. Series. 

DS554.8.S24 959.704'34 79-607776 

This book is not copyrighted and may be reproduced in 

whole or in part without consulting the publisher 

First printing 1980 
Indochina Monographs 

This is one of a series published by the U.S. Army Center 

of Military History. They were written by officers who held 

responsible positions in the Cambodian, Laotian, and South 

Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. The General 

Research Corporation provided writing facilities and other necessary support under an Army contract with the Center of Military History. The monographs were not edited or altered and reflect the 

views of their authors--not necessarily those of the U.S. Army or 

the Department of Defense. The authors were not attempting to write 

definitive accounts but to set down how they saw the war in Southeast Asia. 

Colonel William E. Le Gro, U.S. Army, retired, has written a 

forthcoming work allied with this series, Vietnam: Cease-Fire 

to Capitulation. Another book, The Final Collapse by General Cao 

Van Vien, the last chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint General 

Staff, will be formally published and sold by the Superintendent 

of Documents. 

Taken together these works should provide useful source 

materials for serious historians pending publication of the more definitive series, the U.S. Army in Vietnam. 

JAMES L. COLLINS, JR. 

Brigadier General, USA 

Chief of Military History 

iii 
Preface 

On the chessboard that is the world of today, the geographical 

position of a country plays an all-important role. Whether rich or 

poor, at war or at peace, a country will be taken seriously only by 

its neighbors or by those with whom the country has dominating political and economic interests. By the rest of the world, such a 

country should expect nothing more than to be forgotten, misunderstood, 

or treated with indifference. Cambodia (the Khmer Republic from 1970 

to 1975), immersed for five years in the conflict known in that region 

as the Indochina War, was in the category of a forgotten country. 

The war we carried on during that period has been violently criticized 

by our enemies, ignored by some, and poorly understood by our 

friends. It is my hope that this monograph will serve to put these 

events into better perspective and to make clearer the Khmer point 

of view. 

As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, as Chi~f of the 

General Staff, FANK, as Ambassador, and as the last Chief of State 

of the Khmer Republic, I participated in making many of the major 

decisions of that country and was a witness to still others. In 

addition to my personal involvement, I have relied on documents in 

my possession and numerous conversations with the Khmer military 

community now in this country. 

In the preparation of this monograph, I am particularly indebted 

to Colonel Harry O. Amos, U.S. Army Retired, twice a Military Attache 

in Phnom Penh and long-time friend of Cambodia, for his help in 

translating and editing my original draft. My thanks go as well to 

Ms. Pham Thi Bong, a former Captain in the Republic of Vietnam Armed 

v 
Forces and also a former member of the Vietnamese Embassy staff, who 

spent long and arduous hours, in typing and editing, and in the 

administrative requirements for putting my manuscript into final form. 

McLean, Virginia Sak Sutsakhan 

20 November 1978 Lieutenant General, FANK 

vi 
.1'""' 


Contents 

Chapter 	 Page 

1. INTRODUCTION . 	. . . . . . . . . . . . 
 1 


The Sihanouk Era • • • • • • • • • • ­. . . 1 


Xhe Political Strategy of Neutrality 6 


Neutrality of 9 the Left • ••••• 


The Origins of the 	Khmer Republic 12 

II. CAMBODIA AND THE COMMUNISTS . . . . 	 18 


Vietnamese Communist Use of Khmer Territory 18 


Khmer Communist Political Origins • 22 


Khmer Communist Military Development 26 


III. THE ARMED FORCES OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC 	 32 


OPigi'YlS • • • • . . . • • . . • . • • • • 	 32 


I'""' 	 The Initial E:cpansion After March 18, 1970 38 


Military Organization •••• 46 


The u.s. Military Assistance Program 50 


Xhe Khmer Krom Uni ts • • • . 55 


IV. THE FIRST TWO 	 YEARS OF THE WAR 59 


The Initial Communist Attacks 59 


The Evacuation of .the Ratar0.kiri Garrison 63 


FANK Strategy • • . • • • • • • 67 


CHENLA I • • • . • . • • • • • • 69 


CHENLA II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 


Cooperation and Coordination UJith the RVNAF and the U. S. 80


.- V. THE POLITICO/MILITARY SITUATION IN CAMBODIA, 1972-1974 87 


Xhe Political Situation • • .• 87 


Enemy Strategy . . . . . . . . . 90 


General Mobilization -- The Plan for the Countryside 91 


Condition of the FANK • 94 


The End of u. S. Bombing • • . • . . 96 


vii 
Chapter 	 Page 

VI. MAJOR MILITARY OPERATIONS, 1972 THROUGH 1974 . . . . 99 


Operati017.8 in Mi Zitcuy Regions 1 and 2, and Agains t 

Phnom Penh, March-June 1972 • • • • • • • • • • • 101 

FANK Efforts to Eeep Lines of Communications Open, 

July-December 1972 • . • • • • • • • • ... • • • • 106 

The Enemy E7y-Season Offens~ve, January-July 1973 114 

The First Months Without u.s. Air Support, 

August-December 197J • • • • • • • • • • 122 

Dry Season Operations, January-July 1974 125 

The Wet Season, August-Decembei> 1974 140 

VII. 	 CLOSING MONTHS, JANUARY-APRIL 1975 149 

Peace Initiatives ••• 150 

Enemy Strategy • • • • 153 

FANK Change of Command 154 

Militcuy Operations •• 155 

The Departure of Lon Nol 158 

VIII. THE FINAL DAYS OF THE KHMER REPUBLIC 	 162 

Departure of the u.s. Embassy 162 

The Last Government • • • • • 164 

One More Effort to Negotiate 167 

The 17th of April 1975 168 

. IX. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 	 172 

Appendix 

A. 	 The Delegations to the Summit Conference of the Indochinese 

Peoples, April 25, 1970. 177 

B. The Members of FUNK and GRUNK . . . . . 	 179 

C. Major Items of U.S.-Furnished Equipment in FANK 	 182 

D. FANK Order of the Day,S October 1971 . ,. 184 

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 

Charts 

No. 1­FANK General Staff Organization After 1972 	 47 

2. FANK Organization After 1972 • . • • 	 51 

viii 
Maps 

No. 	 Page 

lo Cambodia and its Southeast Asian Neighbors •••• 	 4 

2. 	 Cambodian Government Information on Locations of 

Principal NVA/VC Base Areas in Cambodia in 1969 19 

3. FANK Information as to Deployment of VC/NVA in Cambodia, 

1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 	 29 

4. 	 Locations of Principal FARK Ground Units Prior to 

18 March 1970 • • • . . . . . . . . . . ... . . 34 

5. Locations of Principal FANK Infantry Units on 1 May 1970 44 

6. The Military Regions of the Khmer Armed Forces in 1971 49 

7. Initial Communist Attacks, March-April 1970 	 62 

8. FANK-Held Areas in Cambodia in August 1970 • • • • • • 64 

9. Area of FARK OPERATION TEST VC/NVA, November 1969 	 65 

10. FANK Strategic Concepts for Defense of the Khmer Republic 68 

11. OPERATION CHENLA I and Area of Operations ••••••• 70 

12. Concept for OPERATION CHENLA II and Area of Operations • 73 

13. 	 Enemy Attacks Against OPERATION CHENLA II Column, 26-31 

October 1971 • • • . • • • . • • • • • . . . . 76 

14. Locations of FANK Operations ANGKOR CHEY and PREK TA 100 

15. Areas of Operations, March-June 1972 •••• 	 102 

16. Points of Military Interest in Phnom Penh •••• 104 

17. Objective Area, OPERATION SORYA, July-August 1972 	 108 

18. Area of Operation Along Route 2, July-December 1972 109 

19. Angkor Wat/Angkor Thom Temple and Ruins Complex 	 110 

20. 	 Areas of the Mekong Controlled by the Enemy, 

February-Arpil 1973 • • • • • • • • • • • 117 

2lo Combat Areas Near Phnom Penh, July 1973 121 

22. Defense Sectors for Phnom Penh, January 1974 	 126 

23. Oudong Area of Operations, March 1974 	 131 

24. The Battle for Kampot, March-April 1974 	 135 

25. Operations Along the Bassac River, April-July 1974 137 

26. 	 Operations in the Bassac-Mekong Corridor, 

September-December 1974 •••••••• • 145

27. 	 Final Assault on Neak Luong and Closing of the Mekong, 

March 1975 . . . . . . ...... . 157 

28. The Battle for Phnom Penh, April 1975 . . . . . . 159 

Illustrations 

Destruction in TonIe Bet (on Mekong Opposite Kompong Cham) 

Following Communist Attacks in April 1970 • • • ••••• 31 

Ceremony at Phnom Penh in 1971 to Mark Return of FANK Special 

Forces Detachments from Training in Thailand •••••• 57 

Khmer Krom Unit, Newly Arrived from South Vietnam and Armed 

with the U.S. M-16 Rifle, Salutes 1st Military Region 

Commander During a Visit to TonIe Bet, November 1970 58 

A Planning Session for OPERATION CHENLA II •• • • • • 84 

Brigadier General Fan Muong, Commander 1st Military Region, 

Inspects a Squad in Kompong Cham Armed with the U.S. M-l 

Carbine, November 1970 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 85 

ix 
P~e 

FANK Recruits Move to the OPERA7ION CHENLA I Area on a 

Requisitioned Civilian Truck, Armed with the Communist 

Assault Rifle, AK-47, November 1970 • • • . • • • •• •. 86 

Marshal Lon Nol, President of the Khmer Republic, April 1972 98 

x 
CHAPTER I, 

Introduction 

The Sihanauk EM 

Cambodia's participation--or to put it more accurately its being 

dragged into the Indochinese conflice--dated rather far back in the 

political history of Cambodia. The dominant personality of this entire 

period was unquestionably Prince Norodom Sihanouk who, first as reigning 

King, and then as Chief of State, held nearly absolute power for more 

than 30 years in this tiny kingdom which shares over one half of its 

national boundaries with South Vietnam. 

WW II, and its origins, brought the Franco-Japanese conflict to 

Indochina, and the Japanese occupation from 1940 to 1945, the year of 

Japanese defeat. This was followed by the reconquest of Indochina by 

the allied forces, bringing with it the triumphal return of the French 

to that region. 

During the year of 1940 it should be noted that, after the brief 

struggle between the French protectorate and Thailand, which the 

latter country had arranged--as usual--to be on the ~nning side, Cambodia lost its entire province of Battambang and a part of the prOvince 

of Siem Reap. The Thai occupation in these provinces lasted from 1941 

to 1945. 

From 1945 to 1954, Cambodia had to face two great problems. The 

first was the political struggle with France for complete independence, 

a struggle led, it must be remembered, by Prince Sihanouk who was then 

King of Cambodia. This struggle against France had the near-total 

support of all segments of the population. The second problem was the 

danger from the expansion of the Vietnamese forces known by the name of 

Viet Minh, who carried out guerrilla operations against the French 

presence in Vietnam. 

1 ' 

---------------------,-------­
The Viet Minh troops in Cambodia continued to expand gradually as 

the political and military situation of the regime in power deteriorated. 

Under the pretext of bringing military assistance for independence in 

Cambodia, these Viet Minh forces established themselves more and more 

deeply in Cambo~ia. Their method was to move into certain frontier 

regions to facilitate taking over particular areas in the interior of 

Cambodia just before the signing of the Geneva agreements in 1954. 

These areas of Viet Minh control were then expanded according to the 

"oil spot" or "leopard spot" concept. 

At that time, the warring parties were divided into three camps: 

1. The combined Franco-Cambodian or purely Cambodian Forces 

2. The Viet Minh forces 

3. The Khmer Issarak or free Khner, forces which were both 

anti-Sihanouk and anti-Viet Minh. 

Out of the events described above, there was born a new feeling 

among the Cambodians, an awakening of belief in nationhood and a fear 

of the "expansionist" tendencies of its neighbors. 

The period from 1954 to 1970 saw three stages in the history of 

Cambodia, this newly independent state of the 20th Century: 

1. Its efforts to reCOver and consolidate its national 

institutions. 

2. Its struggles against the vicissitudes of national and 

international politics• 

.3. Its denouement or unwinding. By denouement I mean the 

change of the Kingdom of Cambodia into the Khmer Republic and its fall. 

What happened in Cambodia after 17 April 1975 in "Democratic Kampuchea" 

(the new name for present-day Cambodia) history itself will have to 

tell us. 

From the international pOint of view, the problem of the first 

Indochinese conflict was settled by the Geneva Accords of 1954, and the 

parties are to be congratulated on the results of that conference whose 

sessions lasted only from the 26th of April to the 21st of July 1954. 

The rapidity and efficiency of the effort presaged a durable peace under 

the triple guaranty of the major power participants, Great Britain, the 

2 
Soviet Union, and the People's kepublic of China. (The U.S. participatedbut chose not to adhere to the final declaration). An International Control Commission (ICC) consisting of India, Canada, and 

Poland, was placed in each of the three states of Indochina to ensure 

respect for the cease-fire. 

Cambodia lost no time in having the foreign troops evacuated from 

its territory. French war ships transported them to North Vietnam, 

and the evacuation was carried out within the time limits set by the 

accords. Unfortunately, it was realized a little too late that hundreds 

of Cambodian cadre affiliated with the Viet Minh had also been transported to the same destination. The final count indicated that there 

were more than three thousand of these Cambodian cadre who had escaped 

the vigilance of the Cambodian authorities. This was both the start 

of Communism in Cambodia and the secret establishment of the Khmer 

Communist Party. 

What then was the reaction of the interested countries to this 

new Indochina problem? 

Faced with the Khmer national will, the majority opinion of its 

own people, and that of the rest of the world, France could not do 

otherwise than to withdraw from Cambodia and accord independence to a 

country where she had been the law for almost a century. 

One of the countries participating in the Geneva Conference of 1954 

was the great People's Republic of China (PRC) , well known for its.total 

support of North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao. Beginning in 1955 the PRC 

began to act. While each of the newly independent co~ntries (Laos, 

Cambodia, Vietnam) undertook to make friends and worked actively in the 

political and diplomatic arenas, the inevitable nonetheless came to pass. 

To no great surprise the world witnessed the birth of two blocs, ideologically opposed: pro-Communist bloc, consisting of North Vietnam and 

the Pathet Lao; a pro-free world bloc, consisting of Cambodia, South 

Vietnam and Laos. It is not known what was going on in the Communist 

camp, but on the side of the free world France and the U.S. no longer 

concealed their rivalries, which brought them into opposition with each 

other on political, economic and military questions. Each country 

courted the three countries of Indochina. (;·:a?J 1) France, unwilling 

3 
-- _/ ./' , 

o Hanoi 

LAOS 

THAILAND 

Map 1 - Cambodia and its Southeast Asian Neighbors - CHINA 

V) "... '--­I - • I " (f 

BURMA 

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-


-


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-


o Bangkok 

CAMBODIA 

Phnom Penh 0 

OSaigon 
to accept the loss of everything without a struggle, sought by every 

means to regain the friendship of its former proteges. However, the 

U.S., richer and more powerful, held all the trumps. Laos and Vietnam perceived perfectly this difference in strength and wealth and 

arrayed themselves on the side of the more powerful. 

Cambodia, being more shrewd, said neither "yes" nor "no." Not 

wishing to risk the liberty it had gained with such difficulty, Cambodia 

preferred to keep its distance while extending the hand of friendship' 

to each of the two rival nations. Thus it was that Cambodia ensured 

its peace and stability. The experience of South Vietnam and Laos was 

otherwise; by their sudden movement into the American camp, these two 

countries had found themselves engaged immediately in a cold war which 

seemed to have no end. The great China, acting as discreetly as possible, equipped and trained the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao and 

pushed its two allies .to wage a struggle without mercy against their 

own compatriots. Armed movements were created and given the names 

"Movement for National Liberation" or "Front for National Liberation" 

(FNL). They urged liberation of their countries from the yoke of 

imperialism (free world bloc). In time, these movements became better 

and better organized, spreading their offensive, recruiting new elements, 

and in the space of several years they passed from the status of simple 

guerrilla cells to that of regular units (battalion, regiment, division) 

having either territorial or maneuver capabilities. ~ere was no ignoring their quality and operational capacity. 

The Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) profited from its enthusiasm 

for the free world by consolidating its foundations. The most remarkable 

was the development of its military institutions, a development so spectacular that it provoked admiration and jealousy. Its armed forces 

became one of the most powerful in Southeast Asia. 

As time passed, the acts of armed rebellion became more and more 

serious and more widespread. With its well-calculated and perfectly 

orchestrated system of propaganda and "psychological warfare," the 

Communists were able to establish "oil spots" throughout the population 

ar.d among the different segments of society. 

5 
Although on good terms with South Vietnam, Cambodia was disquieted 

nonetheless by the dimensions to which Communism had grown in that 

country; this was all the more so that within Cambodia itself two 

currents of opposition to the po11c~es· adopted by Sihanouk were beginning to surface. The first accused Sihanouk of heing "pro-free world"; 

the second criticized his dictatorial methods of governing the country. 

Political stirrings began with the dissolution of· the original Democrat 

Party snd the abdication of Sihanouk. The former king had chosen to be 

only the Chief of the Cambodian National Socialist Party. The Cambodian 

Communist movement took form in certain parts of the country, and in 

the 1960' s one heard mention for the first time of the "Khmer Serei" or 

Free Khmer, created under the aegis of Son Ngoc Thanh.and·supported by 

the U.S. CIA. 

Thus, Cambodia found itself at this time faCing two dangers: from 

the exterior in the form of the Khmer Serei movement and the expansion 

toward the south of North Vietnamese Communism; the other danger was 

from the outlawed Khmer Communist party. a movement made up of opponents of Sihanouk, the malcontent, the abused, and the persecutea of 

the various segments of society from governoent worker to student. 

During all of this troubled period when his antagonists deployed 

all of their skill and cunning in parallel with the eruption of local 

Communism, Prince Sihanouk was the only one in power to foresee events, 

and he seized on the slightest occasion to take the pulse of the two 

blocs or to measure the gulf which separated them in order to adopt an 

appropriate policy. 

The PolitiaaZ Strategy of Neutrality 

The general trends of political events in both Cambodia and its 

neighboring countries following 1955 pushed Cambodia to adopt the path 

of "neutrality" or "fair play" as a political strategy for dealing with 

all sides. It was a policy that Cambodia maintained until 1962. This 

strategy was calculated to not only calm the political stirrings within 

the country but also to permit Cambodia to maintain intact the separate 

6 
benefits to be drawn from dealing with the two power blocs. The 

blunders of the western bloc, whether intentional or not (and we will 

address them later), were among the factors causing the Cambodian ship 

of state to change course and take another direction. 

During the first years of experimenting with neutrality, the fact 

should be admitted that Cambodia was having numerous and quite serious 

difficulties with its immediate neighbors, Thailand to the west and 

South Vietnam to the east. These diffic~ties stemmed from border disputes that Prince Sihanouk described as "annexationist in design" on 

the part of our neighbors. Of these many disputes, the affair of Preah 

Vihear was the best known because the drawn-out legal battle for it was 

terminated only by a formal decision of the International Court of 

Justice at The Hague. l Relations with the Republic of Vietnam had also 

known some bad moments caused by many border incidents, themselves the 

result of pursuit operations carried out by the RVNAF against the VC 

and NVA. 

It should be noted that with each of these incidents, whether on 

the Thai or RVN border, the Royal Cambodian Government directed repre~ 

sentations and protests not only to the government concerned-but at the 

same time to the United States. This latter was done because Cambodia 

considered that the U.S. could exercise its political influence on Thailand and the RVN to halt the border incidents. Only nothing ever 

came of the Cambodian protests, and these border inci~ents, by then 

becoming more and more frequent, constituted one of the causes for the 

change in policy adopted by Prince Sihanouk during the years preceding 

the entry of Cambodia into the Indochina conflict. 

Encouraged by the visit to Phnom Penh of Prime Minister Nehru in 

1954 and by the conference of Ban Dung in April 1955, where he met Chou 

lprea Vihear is an ancient Khmer Temple located on the Cambodian-Thai 

border, almost directly north of Phnom Penh. For a number of years, 

there was a dispute between the two governments as to whether the 

temple was, in fact, in Cambodia or Thailand. Submitted to the International Court of Justice, the Court ruled in favor of Cambodia in 

early 1962. Dean Ach~son represented Cambodia. 

7 
En Lai, Prince Sihanouk saw, from the Cambodian point of view, indisputable advantages in a policy of strict neutrality, and in order to 

demonstrate the authenticity of the newly achieved Cambodian independence, a policy dictated by neither France nor the United States, 

Sihanouk denounced the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). 

Created in 1954, it was seen as a political instrument of the Free 

World which was anti-Communist not only in political and economic 

ideology but in deed as well; thus it was that certain members were 

seen directly engaged in the armed conflict in South Vietnam. Cambodia renounced the protection of the SEATO umbrella and to please 

the Communists denounced before the world the harmful effects of 

SEATO on the war in Vietnam and on Cambodia. For example, there was 

the attempted coup d'etat fomented by Brig. General Dap Chhuon, Commander of the 4th Military Region (Siem Reap) in 1959. The Ambassador 

of South Vietnam to Cambodia, Mr. Ngo Trong Hieu, was directly implicated, and by association, the U.S. There were also the numerous 

border incidents between the Cambodian forces on the one hand and 

·the forces of the Khmer Serei, of Sputh Vietnam, and of Thailand on 

the other. 

Cambodia believed itself to be sheltered from all danger by its 

policy of neutrality. This neutrality, however, ran counter to the 

interests of the South Vietnamese, the Thai, and the U.S., who sought 

to tear Cambodia away from its position of "wait and see" and its 

leaning toward Communism. As for the leaders of the red bloc, they 

did not remain inactive either; they did not fail to wave in the face 

of Cambodian authorities the dangerous game plan of the imperialists. 

Within Cambodia, anti-imperialist sentiment among the masses of poor 

reached the proportions of a cult and was reflected in the first-ever 

exchange of gun fire between the Khmer Rouge (Khmer Communists) and 

Cambodian authorities, this incident occurring in Battambang Province 

in 1967. 

In the eastern part of the country the same sort of confrontations 

were taking place in the new provinces of Mondolkiri and Ratanakiri 

where the majority of the population was comprised of the ethnic minorities known as Meo, Rna, Phno~4, Jarai. 

8 
NeutraZity of the Left 

During the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, Prince Sihanouk recommended a neutralized zone made up of Cambodia and Laos. The outcome 

of this conference left him disappointed, however, because not only 

was his idea rejected, he also saw Laos partitioned. The prospect of 

Cambodia turning into another Laos in the future deeply worried him 

and led him to adopt a new policy line which sought to strike a certain 

balance between the east and the west in Cambodia. 

During this same period, the situation in South Vietnam continued 

to deteriorate. And when the military coup against Ngo Dinh Diem's 

regime occurred in November 1963, during which the South Vietnamese 

president was killed, Prince Sihanouk was faced with a political 

dilemma of having to choose between two alternatives: Communism or 

the Free World. He found neither sufficiently reassuring for his regime 

and Cambodia's future. 

Sihanouk had been led to believe in the growing danger of u.S. aid 

from his visit to Peking in early 1963, during which the Chinese expressed their concern about the increasing American presence in Cambodia 

on the one hand and the presence of CIA-supported Khmer Serei troops on 

the other. As a result, at the conclusion of the Special National Congress which he convened on 19 November 1963, Sihanouk renounced U.S. 

aid altogether, apparently to avoid American in~erference in Khmer 

domestic affairs. 

Two days later, Prince Sihanouk unsuccessfully tried to initiate 

a limited international conference--with the participation of the U.S., 

South Vietnam and all countries directly involved in Cambodia's security-­

designed to guarantee Cambodia's sovereignty within its current national 

boundaries. His attempt was dictated by the uncertainty of South Vietnam's future and the more disquieting foreign aid that Vietnamese Communists were receiving. 

In his reasoning, Prince Sihanouk had said in effect: 

9 

Quite frankly, it is not in our interests to deal with 

the West, which represents the present but not the 

future. In 10 years time, there will probably be in 

Thailand, which always responds to the dominant wind, 

a pro-Chinese neutralist government, and South Vietnam 

will certainly be governed by Ho Chi Minh or his 

successor. Our interests are served by dealing with 

the camp that one day will dominate the whole of Asia 

--and by coming to terms before its victory--in order 

to obtain the best terms possible. 2 

Despite the fact that Prince Sihanouk saw his real enemies to be 

the Communists, his change of policy, and especially his derogatory 

remarks about the U.S., exasperated the u.S. government to the point 

that one day Secretary Dean Rusk reportedly summoned the Cambodian 

ambassador to his office and told him, "Mr. Ambassador, you've got to 

remember that small countries are not the only ones capable of outrage. 

Big countries can get mad too." 

Since the U.S. had not supported a conference such as the one 

suggested by Sihanouk, the Prince, it was reported, authorized a popular 

demonstration in March 1964 during which the U.S. and British embassies 

in Phnom Penh were seriously damaged. 

During his visit to Peking in September 1964, Sihanouk met with 

Pham Van Dong, North Vietnam's prime minister, and asked him to recognize 

Cambodia's territorial integrity. Dodging the issue, Dong in his turn 

asked Sihanouk to refer to the National Liberation Front (NLF) which 

could represent South Vietnam in this matter. 

In December 1964, American and Cambodian officials met in New Delhi, 

through the good offices of the Indian government. Although very cordi~l, 

this encounter failed to improve the already tense relations between 

Cambodia and the U.S. 

In early 1965, Great Britain and the U.S. finally decided on an 

international conference to guarantee Cambodia's national boundaries in 

an apparent effort to slow Cambodia's slide toward Communism. Unfortunately, this was too late because Sihanouk, who was now firmly on 

2Leifer, 11ichael, Cambodia, The Search for Security, :,ew York, 

F.A. Praeger, 1967. 

10 
Peking's side, insisted that the NLF represent South Vietnam in this 

conference. Obviously, this was unacceptable to the western powers. 

And so a further step had been taken, and on 3 May 1965 Sihanouk se3 vered diplomatic relations with Washington. 

In this period of Sihanouk's very active political maneuvering, 

during whic~he sought to keep in line with current international 

trends, in order ultimately to align Cambodia on the Communist side, 

several military events occurred in this part of Southeast Asia, particularly in South Vietnam, which seemed to justify Sihanouk's attitude if a parallel is drawn between them and the actions he had taken. 

By that time, the very famous He Chi Minh Trail which crossed 

the 18th parallel had already been well established along the entire 

length of Laos. The rights of the Pathet Lao in this country had 

been recognized since the 1962 Geneva Conference. In South Vietnam, 

the VC/NVA presence, which had caused serious turmoil and was barely 

under control by the government, continued to increase and expand its 

influence in most provinces. All of these events tended to confirm 

Sihanouk's thesis as to South Vietnam's fate in the first place and 

by way of Cambodia, that of the Indochinese peninsula in general. 

At the same time that the spirit of regional organization and solidarity was growing, the I!IOvement of "non-alignment" began to manifest 

itself on the international scene. The first conference of non-aligned 

nations opened in Belgrade in_1962. Cambodia was one of the first to 

identify itself with this movement and soon found itself in numerous 

company, as the newly independent states of Asia and Africa, the states 

of Eastern Europe, the underdeveloped states, and the emerging nations 

joined in. The movement grew in such a way as to admit the countries of 

the Communist and Socialist blocs. This political leap on the part of 

3Sihanouk had broken relations with Thailand in October 1961 and 

the Republic of Vietnam in August 1963. 

11 

the Communists gained points for them everywhere, whether on the local, 

regional, or international scene. The war in the Republic of Vietnam 

came to be qualified as "the ordering of Vietnamese internal affairs." 

The theatre of military operations passed into the hands of the great 

powers. The two camps began to match each other by providing materiel 

support for the battlefield with inevitable consequences. Each side 

paid the heavy price of its sacrifices. 

The slide of Cambodia into the Communist side of the international 

political balance was apparent from 1962 forward; in that year,Sihanouk 

initiated intense political contacts with the PRC. As a result the PRC 

agreed to aid Cambodia in all areas, economic, military, etc., without 

any prior conditions. The PRC asked only that in return Cambodia disassociate itself from the Free World for good, particularly from the 

u.s., and demonstrate its sympathy for the cause of anti-imperialism. 

The 01'igins of the Khmero Republic 

The political leadership of the Cambodia of 1970 clearly had one 

foot firmly planted in the Communist camp. The policy of "doubledealing" practices by Prince Sihanouk favored the Vietnamese and Khmer 

Communists with disastrous results for Cambodia, a fact not lost on 

Sihanouk who did not fail to vehemently denounce Defore all the worid 

and on many occasions the continuous infiltrations and subversion of 

the Communists and the peril for Cambodia which they posed. The divorce 

of Cambodia from the U.S. and its subsequent marriage with the PRe constituted before the world and within Southeast Asia a new level of Communist penetration into the Indochinese peninsula. It changed significantly the face of the war in South Vietnam and provoked in Cambodia's 

neighbors a sense of the danger of Communist expansion. Within Cambodia 

this marriage signified the victory of Communist factions, who began to 

appear little by little from their hiding, and the defeat of the proimperialist factions. 

The trickery of the political games played by Sihanouk from 1954 

to 1970 earned for him a certain standing on the international scene as 

12 

"leader of his country"; but in his own country these tactics met with 

total defeat. What was unpardonable in Khmer religious and intellectual 

circles was Sihanouk's practice of abruptly changing loyalties or a policy 

of "consistent inconsistency" (politique de constance dans l'inconstance) 

an expression used by Lt. General Sisowath Sirik Matak in an open letter 

to his cousin, Prince Sihanouk, dated August 27, 1973. This gap between 

reputation at home and abroad widened with time for the situation within 

Cambodia gave scarcely any reason for satisfaction. Actually, Vietnamese Communist forces had already occupied large portions of Khmer territory in the east, southeast, and south. The Cambodian population of ' 

these regions, weary of bearing the violent persecutions and exactions 

of the invading forces, were forced to abandon everything and seek 

refuge farther in the interior,away from the Vietnamese Communists. 

A silent rage began to spread through the population as the people 

came to realize the political trickery of Prince Sihanouk, a trickery 

which led to an aggravation of the situation. That peace of which 

Cambodia had prided itself on being the sole beneficiary in Southeast 

Asia was rapidly fading. In vain, Sihanouk publicly and repeatedly 

denounced the exactions of the Vietnamese Communists. Finally he 

announced to the nation that he would depart on January 6, 1970 for 

France to take the cures dictated by his physical condition, following 

which he would travel to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic 'of 

China to discuss economic and military aid. In intell~ctual circles 

in Cambodia there was general agreement that the two latter visits had 

no other real purpose than to find some way to resolve the political 

difficulties caused on the one hand by the Vietnamese Communists and by 

the activities of the Khmer Communists on the other, activities which 

were becoming more widespread all the time. 

Sihanouk's absence from Cambodia provided the pretext for several 

demonstrations. On the 8th and 9th of March 1970 there were demonstrations in the capitals of the provinces of Svay Rieng and Prey Veng. 

Even in Phnom Penh there were frankly violent demonstrations organized 

by university students against the Embassies of North Vietnam and the 

PRG and supported among intellectual circles. Mr. Cheng Heng, acting 
Chief of State, and General Lon Nol, Chief of Government (Prime Minister), 

tried in vain to make Prince Sihanouk aware of a situation which was 

worsening day by day in Cambodia. When the Prince refused to receive 

the delegation sent to brief him,' Lon Nol and Cheng Heng turned to the 

National Assembly and the Council of the Kingdom. 

The two legislative bodies assembled to consider the problem of 

Sihanouk's conduct and absence'. They were the saine two bodies which 

had ten years earlier, in 1960, designated the Prince as Chief of State. 

On March 18, 1970, after a long and historic debate, the two bodies by 

unanimous vote withdrew their confidence in Prince Sihanouk and removed 

him from office. The members accused him, among other things, of having 

authorized North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops 'to illegally occupy 

Khmer territory and establish bases (sanctuaries) during the latter 

half of the 1960's, an occupation in flagrant violation of Khmer neutrality as provided by the Geneva Accords of 1954. The occupation was 

characterized as well, as an attack on the independence, sovereignty, 

and territorial integrity of the country. 

Following action by the legislative bodies, the Prince Chief of 

State was tried by the High Court of Justice and condemned to death 

. 4 

in absentia for high treason. 

TWo important events which followed the removal of Sihanouk deserve 

noting at this point. The first was the meeting on March 16, 1970 . 

between representatives of the Cambodian Government (~nistry of Foreign 

Affairs and the General Staff of the Armed Forces) and representatives 

of the Embassies of North Vietnam and the PRG, a meeting which had as 

its purpose the securing of Communist agreement to evacuate their forces 

from Cambodia in accordance with the demand contained in the Cambodian 

government's official note of March 12, 1970. Unfortunately, the twohour meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs produced no results. 

The second event was the initiative of the PRC after having broken 

4In French: C:ondaJrmJ a mOY't par contumace paY' Ze ':'Y'ibunal de la 

Haute eTustiae pour i-zaute "tra:'lison. 

14 

diplomatic relations with Cambodia on May 5, 1970. Chinese Communist 

emmissaries sent from Peking for the express purpose declared to General 

Lon Nol, by then head of the government, that the "matter between 

Sihanouk and the Khmer government was nothing more than an internal 

problem" and'that Peking could overlook personalities involved so long 

as the Cambodian side accepted the following three conditions: 

1. Permit China to continue to use Khmer territory to 

resupply the NVA/VC with weapons, munitions, and materiel so as to 

continue the war against South Vietnam. 

2. Authorize the NVA/VC to establish their bases in 

Cambodia as before. 

3. Continue to support North Vietnam and the Viet Cong 

with propaganda. 

This demarche by China met with total rejection on the part of 

the Cambodian government. 

In a note dated March 25, 1970 the Khmer invited the North Vietnamese to discuss for a second time the problem of the evacuation of 

their forces. The meeting was set for the 27th of March. But on the 

25th of March the Republic of Poland advised the Khmer officially of 

the departure from Phnom Penh of the Embassies of North Vietnam and 

the Viet Cong, to take place on 27 March when the two groups would 

travel by ICC aircraft to Hanoi. 

Immediately after the armed aggression by NVA/VC' forces, which was 

launched against Cambodia from their sanctuaries along the South Vietnamese border, the Khmer Republic government made countless appeals to 

the United Nations (UN) Security Council for an end to that aggression. 

Instead of taking action on the Cambodian request, this international 

organ (the UN Security Council) merely replied that in view of Cambodia's 

being governed by the 1954 Geneva Accords, the Khmer Republic had better 

apply to the co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference (Soviet Union and 

Great Britain). 

On 31 March 1970, therefore, in a memorandum addressed to the 

ambassadors of the Soviet Union and Great Britain, the Cambodian government expressed its deep concern about increasingly flagrant and repeated 

15 

violations of the 1954 Geneva Accords by the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and those of the PRG of South Vietnam. 

These forces, the memorandum said, not only refused to withdraw from 

the Cambodian territory, they were now launching overt attacks against 

Khmer outposts and defense forces within the Khmer national boundaries. 

The Cambodian government then demanded the reinstallment of the International Control Commission on an urgent basis. 

On 6 April 1970, the United Nations Secretariat announced that 

Secretary General U Thant had decided "to deal with the authorities 

who effectively controlled the situation in Cambodia"; in other words, 

with the Phnom Penh government and not with the former Chief of State. 

This first and only positive response by the UN constituted, in effect, 

an answer to the claims made by Prince Sihanouk who, in a message 

addressed to His Excellency U Thant, represented himself as the only 

legal holder of Cambodian authority. 

In addition to the events described above, the chronology of 

political activities in Cambodia after March 18 can be established as 

follows: 

1. March 26 and 27. Trouble provoked by the Vietnamese 

Communists in Kompong Cham Province, and particularly in the provincial 

capital, where two deputies who tried to calm the demonstrators were 

knifed to death in broad daylight and in the midst of the crowd. The 

office of the governor was partially burned. 

2. March 29. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Embassies 

announced the unilateral rupture of diplomatic relations with Cambodia 

and their refusal to resume discussions concerning the withdrawal of 

their forces. 

3. March 29. Latmching of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong 

aggression in several Cambodian provinces. (The details are covered 

in the next chapter.) 

4. April 11. Popular manifestation called "The March of 

National Concord" at the National Sports Complex in Phnom Penh as a 

sign of support for the government of Lon Nol; the manifestation also 

demanded the establishment of a Republican regime for the country. 

16 

5. April 14. Lon Nol appealed to the countries of all world 

blocs to aid him in the fight against Vietnamese Communism. 

6. April 30. American and South Vietnamese troops launched 

their attacks against NVN and VC sanctuaries located along the frontier 

in the eastern provinces of Cambodia. 

7. May 5. The PRC broke diplomatic relations with Cambodia. 

8. May 13. Reestablishment of diplomatic relations with 

Thailand,which had been broken in 1961. 

9. May 16 and 17. Indonesia brought ten nations together at 

a conference in Djakarta,aimed at finding a way of restoring peace in 

Cambodia. 

10. May 19. Restoration of diplomatic relations with South 

Korea, broken since 1966. 

11. May 27. Restoration of diplomatic relations with the 

Republic of South Vietnam, broken since 1963. 

12. June 25. "General Mobilization" of Cambodia in order 

to deal with the invasion. 

13. June 30. Final date set for ending the cross-border 

operations of u.S. forces against NVA/VC sanctuaries in Cambodia. 

14. August 28. Mr. Spiro Agnew, Vice President of the U.S., 

made an official visit to Cambodia. 

15. September 15. Mr. Emory C. Swank, the first u.S. envoy 

of ambassadorial rank since resumption of diplomatic ,relations in 1969, 

presented his credentials to Mr. Chang Heng, Chief of State. Before 

that date, the u.S. Mission was presided over by Charge d'Affairs 

Lloyd M. Rives. 

16. October 9. Proclamation of the Khmer Republic. 

The above chronology explains in itself the initial reaction of 

certain nations to the entry of Cambodia into war. 

17 

CHAPTER II 

Cambodia and the Communists 

Vietnamese Col'I'U'mIJ'tist Use of Khmer Terri tory 

The penetration of Cambodia by Vietnamese Communist forces, 

complete with their logistic systems, took place along two separate 

axes. The first was across the Vietnamese borders· with Laos and South 

Vietnam, with the complicity of Khmer communist cells, cadred by the 

North Vietnamese. The second was by way of the Port of Sihanoukville 

or Kompong Som. 

As a matter of fact, communist forces began, as early as 1962, 

to infiltrate into the northern and eastern border provinces of Cambodia, 

particularly in Stung Treng, Ratanakiri, Kratie, Prey Veng, Svay Rieng, 

Takeo and Kampot. By 1969, these infiltrated forces were estimated at 

50,000 men installed in "sanctuaries" whose importance varied from a 

simple transit center to all types of bases, having complete military, 

logistic, and rest facilities, such as the bases in Ratanakiri, 

Mondolkiri, and Snoul. (Map 2) 

Because of his "double dealing," Prince Sihanouk' simply omitted, 

in all of his public statements, references to the existence of these 

infiltrations, and most particularly, the sanctuaries. He did this 

apparently to cover up his complicity with North Vietnam and the Viet 

Cong on the one hand, and to reject the pretext of "enemy pursuit" 

by U.S. and South Vietnam forces on ~he other. 

The incorporation of Cambodia into the communist supply system 

kept pace with the development of the flow of VC/NVA infiltration into 

Cambodia, and the development of political relations between Cambodia 

and the Provisional Revolutionary (Viet Cong) Government (PRG). 

From the communist viewpoint, the Ho Chi Minh Trail constituted 

in fact the only strategic route leading south. Under constant 

IS 
Map 2 - Cambodian Government Information on Locations 

of Principal NVANC Base Areas in Cambodia in 1969 

r 


\

, 

,

, 

I 

( 

THAILAND 

MR3 

MR 2 

LAOS 

LABANG SIEK 

MR 5 

Mondolkiri 

SNOUL .,/ ,..., • .1 

I 

(' 

\ 

1 

. I 4i'l 

SOUTH VIETNAM 

willi.iB.. NVANC Base Areas 

19 

surveillance and continuous bombings by the USAF and VNAF, this route 

did not lend itself easily to the transportation of the heavy equipment 

and materiel which were required for NVA troops in the south. If this 

route were completely interdicted by U.S. and RVN forces, it would be 

a real disaster for North Vietnam and the Viet Congo Therefore, it 

was mandatory ror the enemy to find an alternative to this vital 

lifeline, which would be less vulnerable to USAF/VNAF bombings. This 

explained why he turned toward Cambodia, 'or more particularly, toward 

its seaport of Kompong Som. It was a most propitious time for the 

enemy's diplomatic maneuvers. Since Sihanouk had repudiated U.S. aid, 

communist countries, and especially Red China were rushing in to fill 

this void. It became just a matter of increasing the volume of aid 

shipments to Cambodia, then routing the surplus to NVA/VC forces; the 

process passed almost undetected. This alternate route was deemed 

even more reliable because it was not exposed to the risks of U.S. 

bombings. 

In the meantime, Sihanouk seemed to have serious doubts about the 

viability of Cambodia and his regime. On the one hand he was harassed 

by unending border Violations, the result of the pursuit of Communist 

forces from South Vietnam into Cambodia; on the other hand, he was 

worried by the subversive maneuvers of the NVA/VC and the local Khmer 

Communists. He launched therefore "an appeal for the recognition and 

respect of Cambodia's territorial integrity within its present boundaries." To this appeal, only Nguyen Huu Tho, presid~nt of the NLF, 

and Pham Van Dong, North Vietnam's prine nin.ister responded favorably 

by their letters of 6 and 8 June 1967 respectively. The U.S. took 

nearly two years to respon~until 15 April 1969. All this resulted 

in a further consolidation of relations between Cambodia and the enemy 

which prompted Sihanouk on 13 June 1969 to extend formal recognition 

to the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam, 

created just 12 days earlier. 

The first formal cooperation agreement between Cambodia and the 

PRG was concluded soon after Nguyen Tan Phat, PRG prime minister, paid 

a 6-day official visit to Phnom Penh on 29 June 1969. Designated 

"Trade and Payment Agreement," it was signed in Phnom Penh on 25 

20 

-, 

September 1969. Thus were formalized the illegal activities that 

Prince Sihanouk had already authorized for several years. The seaport 

of Kompong Som was now wide open to receive shipments of supplies 

intended for NVA/VC troops. These supplies were subsequently moved by 

truck to their destinations via Route 4. Unloading and transportation operations were the exclusive activities of a certain Hak Ly who 

owned about 200 cargo trucks. From Kompong Som to Kompong Speu or 

Phnom Penh, the cargos were carried on trucks rented by Hak Ly. Then 

from these places to final destination, the transportation was provided 

by Hak Ly's own trucks, which usually unloaded at Snoul and Mimot. 

To rid himself of t~oublesome witnesses, Sihanouk ordered a 

black-listing of undesirable foreign correspondents, especially those 

of the free world. Finally, Citing financial difficulties and criticizing its inactivity, Sihanouk terminated the mandate of the International Control Commission (ICC) on 6 October 1969. On his official 

request, all members of this international organization left Cambodia 

by the end of the year. 

Thus it was accomplished that the Communists, by painstaking 

preparation, took advantage of the political uncertainties in that part 

of the world, and of the dile!lllDa of Sihanouk. What was the attitude 

of the Cambodian people toward this political change by Sihanouk? 

Generally speaking, there were two contrasting schools of thought: the 

corrupt,who were partisan and enthusiastiC; and the uncorrupt, who were 

disquieted. The first category consisted of courtiers' and businessmen 

to whom this new kind of business had brought substantial and significant 

profits. The second category was mostly made up of intellectuals who 

found this new game risky. While the dissidents did not wholly approve 

of Sihanouk, with regard to his cooperation with North Vietnam and the 

Viet Cong, their manifestations were not vocal either, and one might 

think that they were indifferent. But on examination it could be seen 

that their silence was justified by the facts described below. 

In the first place, Cambodia was the least endowed country in terms 

of materiel assets and particularly military equipment, as compared to 

its eastern or western neighbors. This was perhaps a result of its 

desire to stay away from either sphere of influence. Because of its 

21 

neutral stance, Cambodia did not have much attraction for rich and 

powerful countries, especially since its only resources came from 

agricultural products. Elsewhere in the world, industrial powers 

seemed always attracted ~y countries, with. rich underground resources. 

Cambodia, therefore, had been forsaken fora long time; it was almost 

completely ignored. 

Although Cambodia had received some foreign aid from certain 

friendly countries of the west since 1954, this aid was only dispensed 

at a trickling rate and after lengthy and complicated procedures. With 

the exception of rubber production, a French concession which was rather 

obsolescent, industry was non-existent, being at the level of handicraft 

and cottage enterprise. 

From his relations with the Communists, Sihanouk was therefore 

able to obtain at least something with which to equip his country, such 

as the Khmer-Russian Hospital, the Institute of Technology, cement, 

paper, glass and plywood production plants and some military equipment 

as well. With regard to military aid, Cambodia usually received a 

quota which was alloted in each cargo shipment unloaded at Kompong Som. 

All this largely explained the passivity and silence of dissident 

intellectuals. - Khmer Corrmwrist PoZitiaal Origins 

After the event of 18 March, Prince Sihanouk too~ refuge in Peking, 

where his activities led to the creation of FUNK (Front Uni National du 

KampuaheaJ and the formation of GRUNK (Government Royal d'Union National 

du Y~uaheaJ as well as the Indochina summit meeting in Canton in April 

1970.1 For the pro-communist Khmer, these events offered them the opportunity to pursue their goals more actively and more openly. With the 

lFUNK, Front of National Union of Kampuchea. GRUNK, Royal Government 

of National Union of Kampuchea. Kampuchea is a French rendering of an 

ancient name for Cambodia. The acronyms FUNK and GRUNK will be used 

throughout this monograph to designate these two entities. 

22 
help of the NVA/VC they were able to extend their influence and to 

develop rapidly, both politically and militarily. 

The political movement of the Khmer pro-Communists passed through 

several stages, marked by parallel transformations:

-

1. 1945-1954. During this period, there was development of the 

movement of Khmer Issarak in Cambodia, the Lao-Issarak in Laos and 

the Viet Minh in Vietnam, movements all affiliated with the Indochinese Communist Party, directed by He Chi Minh. 

2. 1950. This year marked the beginning of the disintegration 

of the Khmer Issarak movement as certain of the leaders rallied to 

Prince Sihanouk, then King of Cambodia. Certain other elements of 

the Khmer Issarak, however, remained true to their communist ideology, 

and under the leadership of Son Ngoc Minh, then in North Vietnam, went 

underground and continued their activities in Cambodia. 

3. 	 1951 saw the dissolution of the Khmer Issarakmovement and 

2 the formation of the "Prachea Chon Party" or Party of the People. 

4. In 1954, at the time of the conclusion of the Geneva Accords 

in 1954, it was the Prachea Chon Party that decided to send some 

5,000 communist sympathizers to North Vietnam for political indoctrination and military training. 

-


-


2According to the article by R. P. Paringaux, published 31 March 

1978 by the French newspaper Le Mande (weekly selection) this moveMent 

-

took the name of Parti Revolutionnaire du Peuple Cambodgien (Revolu­

-

tionary Party of the Cambodian People). 

-	

23 
5. In 1960, the Prachea Chon Party changed its name to "Workers 

Party" 	and constituted a central committee for the party at the con3 clusion of its first plenary session. 

6. The second plenary session of the Worker's Party in 1963 

continued in effect the decisions taken during the first plenary session 

in 1960. 

7. In 1965, Son Ngoc Minh decided to profit from the difficult 

relations between the U.S. and Cambodia, folloWing rupture of diplomatic 

relations in May of that year, by bringing about the return to Cambodia 

of a certain number of the Khmer Viet Minh who had been trained and indoctrinated in Hanoi. This corresponded with the sharp increase in Communist subversive activity noted during that period. These activities 

were brutally repressed by Prince Sihanouk, and this repression, carried 

out systematically, forced several dozen of these Khmer Communists and 

their sympathizers to go underground. 

8. In 1966, the principal red leaders, Khieu Sampaan, Hu Nim and 

Hou Yuon, disappeared from Phnom Penh; they had been involved, with 

the help of the Khmer Viet Minh cadres from Hanoi, in carrying out 

subversive activities in Prey Veng and Kompong Cham. During the same 

year, there was a proposal to change the name of the Workers Party to 

"Communist Party of Kampuchea" and to adopt the basic political line 

3In order to better understand this evolution, note the follOWing 

footnote to the article by Mr. Parengaux already cited: 

"According to Radio Phnom Penh of 20 March 1978, Mr. Pol Pot 

told a group of Yugoslavia journalists that he had become the 

secretary of the Khmer Communist Party par interim in 1962, 

after" ••• the secretary had been assassinated by the enemy: 

and that he had been confirmed in the position of secretary by 

the second party congress in 1963. Mr. Pol Pot added that he 

belonged to the anti-French underground from 1953 to 1954. 

Furthermore, according to official statements in Phnom Penh, 

the Khmer Communist Party was founded not in 1961, but on 

30 September 1960. 

24 

4 of the Marxists-Leninists. These proposals were destined to be approved during the 3d Plenary Assembly which would take place before 

1970. 

A study of the enemy would be incomplete without analysis of the 

various groups or tendencies among the enemy shortly after March 18, 

1970. 

Within the FUNK there existed three such tendencies: 

-

1. Those Khmer Communists and Khmer Viet Minh who had gone 

underground before March 18, 1970, and who were decided on a war of long 

duration. This extremist group opposed the nomination of Sihanouk as 

President of FUNK and also opposed to the continued practice of Buddhism. 

2. The group known as the Khmer Romaaa, who were loyal to 

Sihanouk. 

3. A moderate group within the Khmer revolutionary movement 

directed by intellectuals under the leadership of Khieu Samphan, Hu Nim, 

and Hou Yuon. 

There was little harmony among the three tendencies, especially as 

it concerned political tactics. The Khmer Rouge and the Khmer Viet 

Minh called for .all-out war until final victory, and for absolute noncooperation with Sihanouk and his partisans. Even though they were in 

agreement on this point, there was some misunderstanding between the two 

groups. In general, the Khmer Viet Minh had a superiority complex visa-vis the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Viet Minh were proud to have been 

educated abroad in a socialist country, and they underestimated the 

purely local Khmer Rouge, and the strategic and tactical competence of 

the latter for making revolutionary war. 

The Khmer revolutionaries of Khieu Samphan et aI, for their part, 

sided with Sihanouk on strategy shortly after the creation of FUNK and 

GRUNK, and were given key posts in these two entities. Khieu Samphan, 

Hu Yuon, and Hu Nim expected to make use ofSihanouk as they had done -

4Note how this contradicts the statements attributed to Pol Pot in 

the Le Monde article cited above. 

25 -
before; they organized behind h~, reinforced themselves, and even called 

for his return to power for a period of transition. This would have given 

them the time to prepare the final phase of their revolution, that is the 

overthrow of Sihanouk, and the taking of power by their party. One could 

notice that the first pro-Sihanouk movement created at the start of the 

conflict, lost its influence little by little, and was eclipsed by the 

progressive expansion of the Revolutionary Movement. 

Khmer Communist MiZitary DeveZopment 

Before 18 March 1970, there were two general periods in the development of Khmer communist military units and institutions. Between 1945 

and 1954, the presence of the Viet Minh in Cambodia contributed to the 

formation of an auxiliary Khmer-Viet Minh force estimated at several 

thousand. After the Geneva conference of 1954, this force was disbanded. 

One part, along with certain sympathizers, moved to Hanoi, while the 

rest either returned to a more or less normal life or went underground. 

Between 1965 and 1967, several dozen intellectuals, mostly teachers and 

discontented students from the Sihanoukist regime went underground. 

Together with former elements of the Khmer-Viet Minh, these intellectuals 

constituted an embryo force which began to confront the established order 

by force of arms. The zones of action of these elements were found in 

the provinces of Battambang, Kampot, Prey Veng and in the frontier zone 

from Kompong Cham to Kompong Thom. 

The concept for the organization of Khmer Communist forces after 

18 March 1970, waS established at the Indochinese summit, held in Canton 

in April 1970. There plans were made for a force of 50,000 regulars, 

including three divisions, all to be equipped by Communist China. They 

would be modeled after the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao as follows: 

1. Popular forces and auto-defense groups at village (Phum) and 

city (Khum) levels. 

2. Regular forces with a territorial mission, organized at the 

levels of county or district (Srok) and province(Khet). 

3. Regular forces, haVing no territorial responsibility, and 

functioning under the orders of the general military command. The above 

26 

forces were expected to undertake military tasks under the same conditions as units of the Viet Cong or Pathet Lao, with the support of North 

Vietnam. 

-

In practice, the first FUNK units were made up of: ex-Khmer-Viet 

Minh elements; some who had been Khmer Rouge prior to 18 March 1970; and 

certain individuals who deserted the FANK and the Provincial Guard immediately following the 18th of March. Because these cadre were of 

uneven military capability, the VC/NVA established special training 

centers for them and for new recruits, and located them throughout the 

regions they controlled in Cambodia and lower Laos. On leaving these 

training centers, the Khmer elements were incorporated into various 

VC/NVA units who trained them further in practical combat; As they 

became more accomplished, the Khmer elements participated more and more 

actively along side the VC/NVA in actions against the FANK. As the 

Khmer Communist infrastructure developed, autonomous FUNK units began 

to appear on the battlefield; these had been judged competent by the 

VC/NVA command and freed to operate more or less independently. The 

total strength of the FUNK was estimated at 12,000 to 15,000 by about 

the end of 1970; between 18 and 25,000 in November 1971; and between 

35 and 40,000 in 1972. 

The development of Khmer Communist forces took place in three 

discernible phases. 1970 to 1972 was a period of organization, recruitment and training, leading to the fielding of small units and cells' 

acting in the capacity of auxiliaries to Vietnamese CO,mmunist units. 

The period from 1972 to mid-1974 saw the formation and deployment of 

the Khmer Rouge units of battalion and regimental size, cadred by VC/NVA 

personnel, and operating in their assigned sectors according to orders 

received from COSVN. The Khmer units received support (operational, 

logistic and politico/military) from regular VC/NVA units. During this 

same phase, specialized Khmer sabotage and suicide units were also 

trained and deployed. The final phase, from mid-1974 to 1975 saw the 

appearance of Khmer Rouge Divisions. Each of the divisions and regiments 

was assigned to zones and sectors corresponding essentially to the 

Military Regions and Military Sub-divisions, of the Khmer Republic. 

-
 '27 

Considering the phases discussed above, it was to be expected 

that the major Communist military activities in Cambodia would be 

carried out initially by the VC/NVA using their central military command activity, COSVN, which was actually located in Cambodia. in the 

eastern part of Kratie Province. From the outset of hostilities, 

the following major Vietnamese Communist units were identified: 

1. The 1st NVA Division, operating in the area south and southeast 

of Phnom Penh. 

2. The 5th, 7th, and 9th NVA Divisions, located east of the Mekong, 

in areas north and east known as their sanctuaries. Note that the 9th 

Division often placed its units west of the Mekong for certain periods. 

3. An additional division of VC/NVA forces, called the C40 

Division, operating in the area north and northwest of the Tonle Sap 

Lake. 

4. A large base known as the B3 Base,established in the tri-border 

region of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. (Map J) The territory occupied 

by the Vietnamese units at the start of hostilities in Cambodia was 

turned over for administrative purposes to FUNK authorities, who, with 

the help of VC/NVA regional units designated FUNK regional units to 

ensure their defense and to see to the organization of the population. 

During this first phase, from March 1970 to 1972, an increase in the 

strength and proficiency of the FUNK forces was apparent. However, 

their actions were still limited, even incoherent, due probably to -the 

absence of a military high command and an overall str~tegy. During this 

Same period, specialized training centers were opened in various parts 

of Cambodia (Koflpong Thom, Kompong Speu, Siem Reap, Kompong Cham, Kratie 

and Kampot) with a view toward perfecting the specialized training of 

the elements of FUNK. The year 1972 thus marked the beginning of the 

so-called "Khmerization" of the war in Cambodia. 

Throughout the war, the Khmer Communist struggle was as much political as military. Among the various Khmer communist units the leaders 

struggled to gain influence among themselves and among the masses of 

the population located in the zones under their control. In this regard, 

despite a strong position among the key posts of FUNK, the Sihanoukist 

persuasion was distinctly under-represented in the lower echelons, ,,,here 

28 
Map 3 - FANK Information as to Deployment of VC/NVA in Cambodia, 1970 

~NO)f311V 

o 

o 

o 

lB" 

<I: 

>

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I29 

the majority of the positions were occupied by Khmer from the Khmer 

Rouge-North Vietnamese persuasion. For their part, Khmer revolutionaries, 

who had previously called for strategic and tactical cooperation with 

Sihanouk, actively undertook the task of unifying these diSSident 

factions within FUNK. Their efforts seem to have made progress, because 

during the years 1974 and 1975 there was observed the disappearance from 

circulation of tracts and other printed matter originated by the various 

factions, and in their place the appearance of a single overall FUNK 

line, both in written and spoken propaganda, a development which became 

more and more intense and widespread. 

Against the Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR), then in power, 

the political activities of FUNK were aimed particularly at bringing 

about a gradual diminution in the support of the population for the GKR. 

To achieve this end, the FUNK did not hesitate to use the following 

methods: the development of anti-governmental propaganda, both written 

and spoken; cutting the economic supply routes in order to create a 

climate of crisis and insecurity and to provoke divisions in the population, as manifested by the exodus from communist control toward the 

zones controlled by the GKR; carrying out of acts of sabotage, terrorism 

and assassination in those zones where the majority of the population 

remained loyal to the GKR. 

30 

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CHAPTER III 

The Armed Forces of the Khmer Republic 

OPigins 

Prior to the political event of March 1970, the Royal Khmer Armed 

Forces (Forces Armees Royales Khmeres--FARK) were just a small military 

organization whose strength did not even reach the authorized ceiling of 

35,000 men. They were distributed among three services--the Royal Khmer 

Army, the Royal Khmer Air Force, and the Royal Khmer Navy--all under the 

command of a Commander-in-Chief. 

The ·following review shows that at that time the FARK were insignificant as compared to NVA and VC forces, and there were several reaSons 

for this. 

Prior to the Geneva Accords of 1954, Cambodia received military aid 

from France. During that period, therefore, the FARK were equipped with 

French materiel. The French also provided training for all FARK cadres, 

most of whom were even sent to France for advanced course. In addition, 

under the guidance of French advisers, the FARK were structurally similar 

to a miniature French Army. France, which at that time had just emerged 

from the First Indochina war, did not have enough resources to make the 

FARK a strong and modern military force. This French policy was also 

partly justified by the fact that according to the 1954 Geneva Accords 

Cambodia was not supposed to make war. The FARK were thus organized and 

equipped somewhat in a pre-WWII style, a condition which obtained as late 

as 1954. 

Then came the U.S. and its more diversified aid, which included 

military assistance. The FARK were now subjected to transformation 

because, with new American equipment, the Command attempted to change 

the organization of the armed forces. Unfortunately, the quantity of 

equipment provided by the U.S. waS not enough to allow the modernization 

32 

of the FARK. And when Sihanouk renounced U. S. aid in November 1963, 

the FARK found themselves midway toward modernization. It was then that 

there surfaced the first difficulties resulting from the disparity of 

equipment and material in use -- French and American. 

After the rupture of relations with the U.S., the only countries 

that gave Cambodia military assistance were France (which continued to 

dispense it at a trickle) and, especially, those of the Communist bloc, 

first the Soviet Union and then China. The net result of this new 

assistance was a further aggravation of the existing difficulties, for 

the FARK now had to contend with three different types of materiel and 

equipment: French, American, and Communist. It goes without saying 

that the FARK encountered no end of problems. The divergence of its 

materiel affected the training of combat and technical personnel, maintenance, and especially the supply of spare parts and ammunition. 

All this explained why the FARK were never able to achieve the 

standardization of their units in order to become a strong and modern 

military force. Consequently, the primary mission of the FARK remained 

just territorial -- hence static -- defense. The Royal Khmer Army, which 

was the largest of the three services in terms of personnel and materiel, 

was thus assigned this responsibility. 

The Army consisted of some 30 infantry battalions, 13-15 separate 

infantry companies, support battalions (signal, transportation, engineer), 

one armored reconnaissance regiment (1st ARR), one field artillery battery, 

and one anti-air artillery battery. All these infantry and support units 

were under the control of the FARK General Staff whose chief was the 

Commander-in-Chief. As to technical services such as Medical, Ordnance, 

Quartermaster, Signal, they were the responsibility of the Service Directorates which came under the Ministry of National Defense. Army units 

were deployed throughout the country with major concentrations in the 

northeast (Ratanakiri Province) and around Phnom Penh. (Map 4) 

General reserve forces consisted only of two light infantry battalions and the combat support battalions (Signal, engineer, armor, 

artillery) . 

33 

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The Royal Air Force had a strength of 1,250 men, composed in great 

majority of flight crews (pilots, flight engineers, radio operators and 

flight mechanics) and aviation technicians. Its only airbase at Pochentong was placed under the control of the Commander-in-Chief. Because 

of its low strength and limited flying assets, the Air Force was far 

from being able to accomplish its primary mission which was to defend 

the national airspace. Although there were several airstrips other than 

Pochentong, they were only used temporarily as emergency landing strips 

and never as secondary airbases. Therefore, the Air Force was merely 

considered a combat support arm which provided air transport services 

to infantry units and occasionally close air support to combat operations. 

The Royal Khmer Navy, whose strength was similar to that of the 

Air Force, had a river base at Chruoy Chang War (Phnom Penh) and a naval 

base at Ream. As was the case with the Air Force, the Navy did not have 

very great capability. There was one marine company in the Navy. Most 

naval activity was confined to the Bassac River, the Mekong, and the 

Tonle Sap in the vicinity of the Great Lake. As far as naval missions 

on the high sea were concerned, the Navy was capable only of routine 

coastal patrols. 

Practically speaking, the FARK never had a corps of reserve units 

as in other armies. Starting about 1955, training was begun of reserve 

officers from among those high-ranking government officials who volUnteered to take a course of basic instruction at tQe M;litary Academy or 

officer school. This school was established in Phnom Penh after the 

French had accorded the Khmer a certain autonomy, an initial step prior to 

granting full independence. Instruction at the school was provided by 

French military personnel. Because of political considerations at the 

time, there was adopted for the first Khmer reserve officers an accelerated course of practical and theoretical instruction lasting one year. 

During the period of peace, from 1954 to 1969, this course was extended 

in length to two years. This was followed by the initiation of training 

of non-commissioned officers of the reserves, recruited this time from 

among the mid-level government officials; this course lasted only about 

six months. 

35 
For lack of a precise plan for the development of the armed forces, 


the reserve officers and non-commissioned officers were simply incorpor­


ated into the corps of active duty officers and non-commissioned offi­


cers. They were needed for expansion and to take the place of departing 


French cadre, as was the case of certain reserve officers in the terri­

·torial commands. Furthermore, certain civil servants were given military 

rank without having ever received military training of any sort; also 

their military grade was based on their civil rank. For example, the 

governor of a province or the president of a tribunal could become a 

Lt. Colonel or Colonel. This was done in a number of cases in order 

that the entire FARK might be Khmerized by the time of Cambodian independence. 

Thus, a number of reserve cadre were trained, but there were no 


reserve units. Many of the resel~e cadre, after their short periods 


of instruction, simply remained in the active armed forces and never 


returned to their civilian positions in the government. 


As the number of reserve cadre grew, the FARK command became more 

aware of the lack of reserve units; in other words, the need for some 

mission for the newly trained reserve cadre. From this came the idea 

to institute compulsory military service for all Khmer of age for such 

service. Several laws were issued, and several groups of young people 

were trained in haste; but no reserve units were ever organized and-, as 

in the case of the reserve officers and noncommission7d officers, the 

newly-trained recruits were used for fillers in the active units. By 

this time a number of the active forces were reaching the end of their 

periods of service or were ready for retirement. Now these errors were 

seen and understood by those in command, and several measures were 

adopted to fill this gap. Unfortunately, they met insurmountable 

obstacles, economic and financial, to mention only two. Cambodia could 

not afford to have a truly modern or "de luxe" armed force. This ,.,as the 

expression used over and over again by Prince Sihanouk, when addressing the nation, he launched for the first time the idea of the " .•• 

participation of the armed forces in the economic life of the country. " 

an idea called to mind by the picture Sihanouk formed of the "Grand Army" 

36 
of Red China during his visits to that country. The general slogan 

under which the FARK developed was thus," as for the economy, Cambodia 

will aid i tself • " 

With this changed situation, the impetus of the FARK toward orthodox military capability was essentially halted, and their efforts were 

devoted almost one hundred percent to the economy. FARK participated 

actively in the construction of roads, dykes, dams, etc., and the entire 

administrative and territorial organization of the country, neglecting 

for the most part military instruction and training. With the mission 

of FABK thus divided, their value as a defense force was reduced little 

by little. A battalion or company having a mission of.territorial 

security in the region of the South Vietnam border (Moudolkiri, Ratanakiri, Svay Rieng Provinces, for example) would continue to be devoted 

to road work and building of model villages rather than looking after 

the security of the frontier. It was not surprising during this period 

(1963-1969), described as the time of "The Great Economic Leap of 

Cambodia," to note the increase of VC/NVA infiltration into the frontier zones of Cambodia and, equally, the construc'tion of COIlllllUnist base 

areas to support their war in South Vietnam. Much of the equipment of 

the FARK was also used to support projects in the economic sector. All 

vehicles and mechanical equipment received through u.S. and French 

military assistance were rapidly worn out, and no solution to the problem of their replacement could be found. The same can be said for the 

condition of materiel in the Navy and Air Force. I remember that in 

1963, just prior to the Khmer rejection of U.S. military aid, the French 

Military Attache and the Chief, u.S. MAAG, Phnom Penh, called on me for 

the express purpose of registering their dismay and disapproval at the 

misuse of the equipment which their countries had granted to the FARK. 

We have seen how and under what conditions the FARK were conceived, 

organized, and developed. On the eve of Cambodia's entry into the 

Indochina conflict, the FARK were armed and equipped in a haphazard way. 

Training to prepare them for their task had not been pursued. Their 

cadres (especially the noncommissioned officers) had grown older and 

older, and the same was true for the private soldiers. In a word, the 

37 

FARK of 1970 were a sad lot compared to the VC/NVA, and their first combat against the latter staggered the FARK units despite their real determination to fight to safeguard their country. 

The Initial E:cpansion After Maroh 18, 1970 

The sudden attacks launched by the VC/NVA on 29 March 1970 profoundly shocked the units of the FANK (Forces Armees Nationales KhmeresJ involved and dispersed them to the point that by early May 1970 the Cambodian provinces along the RVN border were practically occupied by Vietnamese Communist forces. l 

In these very first hours, the Salvation Government (Gouvernement de 

SauvetageJ led by General Lon Nol called on the entire population -- from 

whatever sector -- to organize itself for resistance under the direction 

of the military command in order to meet the aggression. This was the 

beginning of the general mobilization of the country to fight a new war 

of independence. The slogan "National Resistance" was adopted, and it 

must be admitted that there was great enthusiasm, particularly among the 

students, teachers, and certain intellectual circles for the abolition 

of the monarchial regime and for its replacement by a republican regime. 

The appeal by the Lon Nol government did not go unheeded; groups of young 

men and women volunteered to serve in the armed forces. Faced with this 

situation, the FANK high command, having named Lon Nol chief, assumed 

the heavy responsibility of preparing for the expansion of the FANK to 

1The two acronyms used in this monograph to designate the Cambodian 

armed forces are based on both Cambodian usage and U.S. reporting practices. FARK stands for Forces Armees Royales Khmeres, the official 

French name for Khmer forces during the Sihanouk period. FANK stands 

for Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres, the official French name used by 

the Cambodians after 18 March 1970. It was standard U.S. reporting procedure, both before and after the departure of Sihanouk, to use FARK or 

FANK; no acronym based on an English translation (as in the case of RVNAF 

for Vietnamese forces) was ever developed to refer to the entire armed 

forces of Cambodia. 

38 

make it capable of carrying out the mission of defending the country. 

In the following paragraphs are described the initial decisions taken 

as the result of numerous meetings. 

In those areas still under the control of the Khmer government, 

the military and civil authorities were required to recount and verify 

the number of persons volunteering for military service, to house them, 

and to begin their military instruction immediately. At the same time, 

all available civil and military resources available locally were to be 

used to establish and equip temporary centers of instruction. Also, 

the personnel of units overrun during the first VC/NVA attacks and who 

had been able to reach friendly lines were either regrouped for reconditioning or were used as cadre for the training centers. At the same 

time, the units of the Provincial Guard (an arm of the National Police 

and under the direct orders of the various provincial governors) were 

disbanded and their personnel and equipment spread throughout the FANK. 

This was no simple operation since many of the Provincial Guard units 

were known to be pro-Sihanouk. Nevertheless, the transformation of 

these police into military personnel happily took place without any 

particular incident. Everywhere, there were efforts to create recruiting 

stations to serve the volunteers, the majority of whom were at this time 

drawn from the ranks of high school and university students. 

The FANK high command was surprised not only by the outbreak of 

war but it was surprised--even submerged--by the number of problems it 

had to face in the organization of the national defense. At the same 

time that the general enthusiasm was growing, the checks and defeats 

being suffered by certain FANK units increased to the point that by the 

month of May 1970 the north and northeast part of Cambodia (the provinces 

of Stung Treng, Ratanakiri, Kratie, and Mondolkiri) found themselves 

isolated and beyond the effective control of the FANK high command. 

The training centers were directed to cut the period of recruit 

training by 50 percent as a way of accelerating the formation of new 

units. Another problem concerned equipment and arms for the new soldiers; 

what stocks were available in unit supply rooms were quickly expended and 

without concern for uniformity. In a single combat unit were to be seen 

39 

an entire range of individual and crew-served weapons. The resupply 

and logistical support of FANK units as a whole became more burdensome 

and insoluble as the war developed. 

There was another way in which the number of FANK units was increased. This was. by means of incorporating directly into the FANK the 

armed villager forces, which had been in existence since the early days 

of Sihanouk's patriotic struggle for Cambodian independence from the 

French (1949-1953).2 They had received very little military training 

because they were essentially the village populations and their principal mission was the defense of their own villages or districts. They, 

were poorly armed with outmoded U.S., French, and English rifles which 

were not only ready for salvage but for which ammunition was no longer 

being produced. A third way in which the creation of new units was 

accelerated was by recalling the reservists to active duty who had not 

had the opportunity to remain in service after their initial training. 

It should be noted in passing that during peacetime these reservists, 

officers, and noncommissioned officers were never called to undergo 

periods of active duty for training. This situation, which was due to 

budgetary restrictions or the higher priority of the reservist's government service, caused a degradation of tl~ir military eff~ctiveness. 

In spite of the many problems encountered, during the first year 

of the war FAlUC made progress both in increases in strength and 

in the honing of its combat skills. Still, the capabilities of the 

VC/NVA were such that it was not unusual to see one of these new units 

(company or battalion), made up of 50 percent career cadre and 50 percent young recruits, completely decimated in its first engagement with 

the enemy. Further, there is no shame in admitting that during the 

period some of the original FARK units, which had earlier against the 

Vietminh acquired reputations as the most effective in FANK, were overrun or heavily damaged in their first encounters with the enemy of 1970­

1971. The 3d FARK Battalion at Kratie, the 1st FARK Battalion at Takeo, 

and the 9th FARK Battalion at Svay Rieng are examples. All of this 

2In French: Forces Vives or Forces des viZZageois a~ees. In Khmer: Chivcpol. 

40 
demonstrated the lack of training at every level and the poverty of 

logistic support. 

As part of general mobilization, there was in each military. 

region and military subdivision a recruiting station and a training 

center. Thus, there were created, day by da~ new battalions, regiments, 

and brigades. The new recruits were given training in individual 

weapons and tactics for several weeks. The units departed for the 

battlefront in old requisitioned civilian trucks. In those days they 

were referred to as "24 hour soldiers." 

There was a fourth way in which the strength of FANK was swelled. 

It was the practice of "unit doubling," whereby one-half the strength 

(officer and enlisted) was taken to form the framework of a new unit. 3 

The majority of the personnel of these units were hastily trained 

recruits. The decentralization of recruiting and the practice of doubling units in the ways described above did result in the organization 

of new units to support the military regions and military subdivisions 

which were directly menaced by Communist attacks. And while they were 

counted as successes by the FANK high command in those early days, the 

policies which led to their deployment could not avoid results which 

became more and more unfortunate for the FANK as time passed. These 

new units were routed, overrun, or completely destroyed by the enemy. 

The large number of new units not only posed problems of combat effectiveness but greatly taxed the logistic and financial resources of the 

government. 

In step with the increase in strength in the three services of 

FANK, there appeared the practice of rapid promotion of officers and 

noncommissioned officers to the point of provoking more and more profound feelings of jealousy within the armed forces; and this says nothing 

of the inevitable and increasingly serious drain on the budget resulting 

therefrom. It can be said, however, that the Navy and the Air Force 

were less affected by these bastardized recruiting practices,as these 

two services were made up of greater numbers of technicians than the 

3In French: Z 'Clperation de i)oubZement des Unites. 

41 
ground forces. Nevertheless, their morale was not helped by seeing 

their Army friends the recipients of unjustifiably rapid promotions. 

The unfortunate consequences of all these early policies were not lost 

on the high-ranking military and civilian members of the government 

and the FANK high command. They made manifest their disapproval and 

tried more than once to gUide military policy back to a more professional basis. Unfortunately, they met with little success. 

At the same time that the general reorganization of FANK structure was taking place--and always according to the concepts of General 

Lon Nol--there was carried out the organization of certain paramilitary 

units. The mission of these units was to ensure the defense of certain 

sensitive and strategic points designated by FANK. They were composed 

for the most part of students, civil servants, and local inhabitants 

who were not in the armed forces. Employed in this way, they would 

free the FANK from the static defense mission, ensure rear area security, and protect against an enemy fifth column. It must be granted 

that the appearance of this defense system, together with the surge of 

national awakening, gained for Cambodia both the admiration and the 

sympathy of foreign observers in general; but to the eyes of professional military observers, foreign and ~lmer, the difficulties of all 

sorts which beset the FANK every day were more than clear. 

Starting with 35,000, the FANK was expanded to 110,000 by 

June 1970, a level which was practicable and controllable. For his 

part, the initial force structure of 210,000 sought by General 

Lon Nol would have 200,000 for the Army and the remainder divided 

between the Navy and the Air Force. And he leaned on his own people 

in the General Staff aoo in the Military Regions to see that this 

higher level was reached by August 1970. Speaking now of the ground 

forces only, there would be two principal forces: the F~~ General 

Reserve and the Territorial Forces. The latter were under the direct 

command of the military region commanders. At the same time, there 

were several changes to the organization of units; battalions were 

grouped into regiments; then the regiment was abolished in favor of a 

brigade consisting of several battalions. By 1 May 1970, twelve 

42 
infantry brigades had been activated and deployed as follows: (Map 5) 

1st Inf. Brigade: 

2d Inf. Brigade: 

3d Inf. Brigade: 

4th Inf. Brigade: 

5th Inf. Brigade: 

6th Inf. Brigade: 

8th Inf. Brigade: 

10th Inf. Brigade: 

11th Inf. Brigade: 

12th Inf. Brigade: 

13th Inf. Brigade: 

14th Inf. Brigade: 

headquartered in Phnom Penh and constituting 

the general reserve. 

based in Kompong Cham and the main force 

unit of the 1st MR. 

activated in the 2d MR and based in the 

Kompong Som area. 

activated in Prey Veng (MR-l). This brigade 

was assigned the mission of defending the 

special zone of the Mekong River. It operated in the areas of Prey Veng and Neak Luong. 

composed basically of Muslim Khmers and intended for future deployment in the north. 

Located in Phnom Penh, it served as a reserve unit. 

also composed basically of Muslim Khmers. 

Its units operated in the Kampot area 

(MR-2) and in Kompong Cham (MR-l). 

composed of volunteers from the provinces of 

Takeo and Kandal. It was based in the border 

area of Takeo and Chau Doc (MR-2). 

activated in Siem Reap, then deployed to 

Kompong Thom (MR-4). Its units were 

stationed in Oudar Meachchey. 

activated with units stati~ned in Takeo (MR-2) 

and reinforced with volunteers from K2.ndal and 

Takeo. It defended Takeo and Route No.5. 

activated exclusively with volunteers from 

Battamhang and Siem Reap (MR-4). It defended 

Siem Riep. 

activated at Kompong Speu (MR-2) during this 

period, this brigade participated in the 

operation for the defense of Takeo-Angtasom. 

Later, it was redeployed permanently to Kompong Speu for the defense and protection of 

Route No.4. 

based at Tram Khnar (MR-2) along with elements 

of the antiaircraft artillery half-brigade. 

This brigade had been reconstituted after its 

defeat by enemy forces from Phuoc Long. 

43 
Map 5 - Locations of Principal FANK Infantry Units on 1 May 1970 

THAILAND LAOS 

Kompong Thorn 

10~ 

44 

From a military point of view -- and I do not speak here of political considerations -- one Can criticize General Lon Nol, Commander-inChief and Chief of the General Staff, FANK (later Marshal of the Khmer 

Armed Forces, and President of the Khmer Republic). The problem was 

his fairyland ambition to see the FMlK transformed overnight into a 

grand armed force made in the image of the RVNAF or even the U.S. forces, 

bypassing all of the fundamental principles of development and operation 

which animated those great institutions. This ambition was particularly' 

apparent when, in 1971, General Lon Nol did not hesitate to present to 

the U.S., through CINCPAC, a plan for the development of the FANK which 

envisaged an eventual total strength of 600,000 for the three services. 

In addition, there was a request for assistance in equipping an additional 53,000 so-called paramilitary forces. 

During the period 1970-1971, there was a distinct difference in 

outlook ben,een the level of decision-nakers on the one hand and that of 

implementers of decisions on the other. The decision-makers operated 

in what can best be described as a dream world where plans were based 

on unreality or interpretations of hist0ry. The implementers were 

guided by the facts of the world as it was. The decision-makers were 

General Lon Nol, his younger brother Lon Non, and a small inner circle 

of military personnel and civilian advisors. In the second group w~re 

found most of FANK, the civil servants, many private citizens, and 

members of the political parties in opposition to the party of Lon Nolo 

This second category saw themselves removed from key posts in the government or given foreign diplomatic assignments. There was general agreement as to the depth of this divergence and the resulting consequences 

for the war effort of the Khmer Republic. 

The FANK was severely criticized, not only at home but by foreign 

observers as well, particularly those of the friendly countries giving 

miliary and political aid to Cambodia. It must be acknowledged without 

shame that during the war period there existed a class of Cambodians who 

exploited the situation, who pursued their personal interests without 

concern for the ill effects procured by their acts. The FANK suffered 

45 

not only from losses at the hands of the enemy but from the system of 

"stealing" personnel spaces or the use of "phantom" personnel in certain 

units, producing an effect on the capability of the FANK not unlike that 

of inflation or lack of productivity on an economy.4 

Military Organization 

During the time of Sihanouk, the FARK General Staff was under the 

command and control of the Supreme Commander of the armed forces and the 

Chief of State,with Sihanouk holding both titles. Under the General 

Staff were most of the personnel and operational units of the FARK. 

This situation was complicated by the fact that the Ministry of National 

Defense, where the technical and administrative services of the FARK 

were located, was a part of the Government subject, in-theory, to the 

Prime Minister and was not under the control of the General Staff. 

Differences in point of view between the Minister of National Defense 

and the Chief of the General Staff were the order of the day. At the 

time of Sihanouk's departure, Lt. General Lon Nol was Chief of the 

General Staff, and the developmental needs of the FANK presented the 

high command with the problem of ~arrying out a complete reorganization 

of a system which had long since reached the limits of its capacity. A 

new concept was needed and without delay. 

In my position as Deputy Chief of the General S~aff during this 

period, I repeatedly suggested a reorganization of our armed forces in 

accordance with current thinking in other countries. But it was not 

until March 1975 that Lon Nol, by now convinced but still not happy, 

gave his consent to the idea. The command arrangements of the RVNAF 

were used as a point of departure, and a profound reorganization of the 

Levels of Ministry of National Defense and General Staff was carried out. 

The title of Supreme Commander was abolished, and from that time forward 

the Chief of General Staff of FANK reported to the Government and no 

longer to the President of the Republic. (::hc.rt 1 j 

4

In French: Voler les effeatifs or Z'Effeatif fantOme. 

46 
Chart 1 - FANK General Staff Organization After 1972 

GOVERNMENT 

MINISTER, 

Nat' Datansa 

+, 

" 
The General Staff controlled the three armed services: Army, 

Navy, and Air Force. The Navy and the Air Force had their own general 

headquarters (staff). The General Staff itself served as headquarters 

and staff for the Army. Before 1970, Cambodia was divided into six 

military regions (MR) each of them encompassing from two to five military subdivisions whose limits were essentially the territorial boundaries of provinces. These were: 

Headquarters 

located in: 

Provinces Making up 

Military Region 

1st MR: Kompong Cham Kompong Cham, Prey Veng, 

Rieng and Kandal 

Svay 

2d MR: Kompong Speu Kompong Speu, Kampot, Takeo, 

Kompong Som and Koh Kong 

3d MR: Battambang Battambang, 

Pursat 

Kompong Chhnang, 

4th MR: Siem Reap Siem Reap, Kompong Thom, 

Meanchay, Preah Vihear 

Oddar 

5th MR: Stung Treng Stung Treng, Ratanakiri 

6th MR: Kratie (created in 1969) Kratie, 

Mondolkiri 

In general, the MR commander commanded the infantry b'attalions and combat support companies deployed in his MR. As to technical service 

detachments, which were under the control of their parent Service Directorates, they were subordinate to the Military Region commander for 

operational control only. In addition to the FARK units and service 

detachments, the MR commander could in case of need also employ Royal 

Police forces which were subordinate to the local province governor. 

There was also a special zone around the capital having the status of a 

military region, and Shortly after the start of the war a special defense 

zone for the Mekong River between the capital and the RVN border was 

established. (Map 6) By 1973, the exigencies of combat led to the 

creation of three additional MRs, some of which had operational zones 

48 

( I 

'" • '" 

Senmonorom _ 

\ 

MILITARY REGION BOUNDARY 

PROVINCE BOUNDARY 

• Preah Vihear 

(temple ruins) eSamrong 

i 

I 

ODDAR MEANCHEY I ........ 

\ ''-.-'_,f; PREAH VIHEAR 

• SIEM REAP ,-

MR4'-. 

• Siem R:;:-- \ 

i'-'~ r/' BATTAMBANG 

, I,.....· / ' 

f 

8i1ttamhang. 

/~ 

, 

MR3 / KOMPONG THOM 

-:/ .~' Pursilt· 

PURSAT 

/ 

./ 

( Kompong Chhnang-

, 

( 

KOH KONG '\ KOMPONG 

• ,. Prey Veng( 

;' 

\ KOI-I KONG 

MR2 

-) .- ( (.Takeo 

I 

."\,.J KAMPOT ' .... TAKEO 

• 1,,,\ 

Knrnpong Sam , _ 

• Kampot 

• Kompong Thorn 

KOMPONG CHAM 

PREY,' 

VENG • 

•

I Svay 

,RiengMR5

, 

STUNG TRENG \ RATANAKIRI 

labang Siek -

• Stung Treng 

KRATIE 

\ 

') 

(' 

~ 

.Lomphat 

MONDOLKIRI 

s: 

01 

't:I 

'"

I 

;!

.. 


~ ~. 

-< 

jJ 

.g 

is 

..

:::1 

o

... 


g.

.. 


~ 

::r 

3

.. 


~ 

» 

3 

~ 

~ 

'T1 

o 

~ ,5" 

~ 

~ ~ 
independent of the MR commander and operating directly under the control 

of the high command. The subordination of major FANK units after 1972 

is shown on (Chart 2). 

Thi U.S. Military Assistance Program 

Without question, improvements in the material and financial situations of the FANK were due to the aid of friendly countries, of which 

I mention only the program of the U.S., the nation known as the great 

supporter of Cambodia during the hostilities in the same way that the 

great Communist China and its allies supported the cause of Sihanouk's 

GRUNK and the Khmer Rouge. 

The U.S. military assistance program was initially carried out 

through the intermediary of South Vietnam or at least via that country. 

Proof of this is to be seen in the rapidity with which the special 

forces of Khmer Krom personnel were sent to the aid of their compatriots, 

then in difficulty on all fronts; and note that they were sent at the 

same time as the launching of the RVNAF/U.S. incursion into Cambodia, 

intended to destroy the VC/NVA sanctuaries, and described as an operation 

which would relieve the enemy pressure on that part of Cambodia. Early 

aid was provided for or arranged through the Politico/Military Section 

of the U.S. Embassy which, according to my knowledge, was always in 

direct contact with COMUSMACV. For purposes of intelligence exchange 

and operational coordination, the FANK established a liaison officer at 

the RVNAF JGS; as time went on, the duties of this liaison officer were 

extended to include the monitoring of instruction given to FANK personnel 

in the RVNAF and U.S. training centers in RVN. 

Until the establishment of the Military Equipment Delivery Team, 

Cambodia (MEDTC) in the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh in 1971, there existed 

no real plans for U.S. military aid inasmuch as the U.S. Government and 

Congress were surprised by the abrupt change in the policies of the Cambodian government,following the events of 18 March 1970. Under those 

circumstances the first military aid, following President Nixon's decision 

to help Cambodia, were South Vietnamese air shipments of old model weapons, 

U.S. M-l Garand, etc., and ammunition, doubtless no longer needed by the 

50 

I 	 I 

Chart 2 - FANK Organization After 1972 

JOINT 

GENERAL STAFF 

AI R FORCE STAFF ARMY NAVY STAFF 

-1. J 	 -1. 

Ln 

I-' 

I"""-

I"""-

I"""-

r-

-

POCHENTONG AFB -

BATTAMBANG AFB IKOMPONG CHAM 

AFB IKOMPONG CHHNANG 

AFB - KONPONG SOM AFB -

IIII"""-

IL.-

-1 

Special - Armor Command 

Mil. Region rr-- Armor Brigada 

1st Mil Region rr-- Artillery Commend 

2nd Mil Region r- Artillary Brigada r3rd Mil Region - Enginee.. Command 

I4th Mil Region .- Engineers Brigade 

5th Mil Region r-- Signal Command Ir-- Signal Brigade 6th Mil Region <-

r-- Airborne Command 

8th Mil Region r- Airborne Brigade 

9th Mil Region "- Speciel Forces Cmd 

Special 

Mekong Zone 

Military Sub· 

oivisionfTakeo 

Note: 	 Military Regions have their own territorial Brigades and Battalions. 

In addition, they have their own self·defense force .. 

1st Inl Division 

2nd Inl Division 

3rd Inl Oivision 

7th Inl Divi~on 

9th Inl Division 

Independent 

Brigades 

t-­

r­

-

REAM 

Naval Basa 

CHRUOY CHANG WAR 

Naval Basa 

NEAK mEUNG 

River Base 

- KOMPONG CHHNANG 

River Base 
RVNAF following its modernization. Similar old model U.S. weapons and 

ammunition were brought in from Laos by Khmer aircraft. These initial 

shipments were followed by plane loads of VC/NVA weapons and ammunition 

captured by the RVNAF and U.S., both during the Cambodian Incursion and 

in RVN. In ~ddition, President Nixon authorized the use of some 

$10,000,000 of his contingency funds for military assistance to FANK 

prior to 1 July 1970. Beginning with the U.S. fiscal year 1971, military assistance for FANK was formalized under the U.S. Foreign Assistance ~, 

Act, becoming regular U.S. HAP. 5 

One of the first problems the FANK began to work on with MEDTC 

was the great disparity in equipment and weapons and the attendant problem of ammunition resupply. The training of FANK units in RVN was 

another step toward solution of these logistiC problems. These units, 

whether trained at U.S. or RVNAF bases, returned to Cambodia completely 

and uniformly equipped and armed with U.S. materiel. A program and 

schedule for the standardization of arms and equipment in the three 

services of the FANK was discussed between FANK and MEDTC and was adopted. 

Implementation, however, was made difficult, if not impOSSible, by'the 

necessity to replenish early heavy combat losses in certain units. 

During July 1972, a force structure coordinating committee, made 

up of members from FANK and the U.S. Military Equipment Delivery Team, 

Cambodia (MEDTC), agreed on the following force structure for FANK. 

ground units: 

Infantry Brigades 32 

Infantry Battalions: 202 

Territorial Infantry 

Companies: 465 

Within the above totals, 128 of the battalions formed the maneuver elements for the 32 brigades, of which 20 were independent and 12 were 

organized into 4 separate divisions with appropriate supporting arms, 

i.e., a l55-mm battery and an armored cavalry squadron. Each of the 

5For a more detailed discussion of the or1g1ns of u.s. Military 

Assistance for Ffu~, see the appendix by Colonel H.O. Amos in The 

Cambodian Incursion, this series. 

52 
brigades was to have an organic 105-DUIl howitzer battery. In addition, 

a separate artillery and armored brigade rounded out the combat elements 

of the force structure. The bulk of the army's 202,000-man slice of 

the MAP-approved FANK force structure of 220,000 personnel was located 

within the above units. 

While there was agreement that the headquarters above the battalion would be the brigade, FANK continued, after July 1972, to employ 

a variety of higher headquarters (regiments, groups, brigades, halfbrigades, brigade groups) to control these battalions. MEDTC and the 

U.S. Embassy considered both the variety of headquarters and the FANK 

practice of continuing to add battalions to the force structure for 

which there was no equipment to be unwise. Thus, in December 1972, 

three directives were issued by FANK to bring the FANK ground units 

more in line with the agreed force structure. The first limited FANK 

strength for 1973 to 250,000, suspended individual unit recruitment 

programs, and directed a manpower reapportionment. The second promulgated a standard TO&E for both intervention and territorial battalions. 

The third specifically spelled out how manpower was to be reapportioned 

and abolished all regiments, "brigade group" headquarters and numerous 

ineffectual battalions. 

The administration of the U.S. MAP for Cambodia was affected in 

a significant way by certain provisions of the U.S. military assistance 

legislation, which applied specifically to Cambodia •. In January 1971, 

the Cooper-Church amendment prohibited the assignment of U.S. advisors 

to the FANK. The Symington-Case amendment, passed in February 1972, 

ordered that the total number of official U.S. personnel in Cambodia-­

military and civilian--should not exceed 200. In addition, there could 

be not to exceed 85 third-country nationals (TCN) present in Cambodia 

who were being paid directly or indirectly from U.S. MAP funds. It 

should be noted that the ceiling for both official U.S. personnel and 

TCNs included not only those permanently assigned but those on TDY as· 

well. In late 1972, the military activities at the U.S. Embassy in 

Phnom Penh were allocated personnel as follows: 

53 

Cambodia Saigon 

MEDTC 74 10 

DAO 17 

Military Communications 


Facility 5 


Vinnel Corp. Contract 40 

In addition to the Vinnell Corporation contract, other TCN spaces were 

used to fill contracts with Air America, Bell Aircraft Company, AVCCLycoming Aircraft, and Helio Aircraft Corporation. 

The interface between the U.S. MILSTRIP system and the FANK logistic system was the FANK Foreign Assistance Office (FAO) in Phnom Penh. 

To accomplish the actual handling of materiel and its distribution to 

the three services, two warehouse operations were established, one in 

Phnom Penh and the other at Kompong Som. Some of the TCN personnel were 

assigned to the FAO and to the warehouses, where they monitored title 

transfer of equipment and worked to familiarize FANK personnel with the 

MILSTRIP system. Prior to the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in -., 

1973, the majority of MAP cargo arriving by sealift was processed and 

transshipped using the facilities at Newport, RVN. Likewise, retrograde 

cargo was processed through the same port. Airlift of general cargo was 

through the 8th Aerial Port at Tan Son Nhut, RVN. By March 1973, all 

logistic support activities for Cambodia MAP had been forced out of RVN 

by the provisions of the Paris Peace Accords and had been relocated to 

Thailand. MEDTC personnel previously located in Saigon were relocated 

to Camp Samae San, Thailand, and designated the Joint Liaison Office. 

Transshipping activities for MAP materiel arriving by sea were established at the port of Sattahip, Thailand, while aerial deliveries were 

usually by C-130 aircraft from Utapao, Thailand, to Phnom Penh. The 

Paris Peace Accords did not affect the supply of bulk POL to Cambodia 

through RVN, which continued to originate at Nha Be or Vung Tau, RVN, 

for movement to Phnom Penh via the Mekong. 

54 
Approximate dollar amounts in millions for MAP Cambodia were: 

FY71 FY72 FY73 FY74 FY75 

180 220 131 414 254 

The greatest single-item expenditure was always for ammunition. 

In FY72, ammunition costs comprised about 37 percent of MAP funds; in 

FY73, ammunition costs had risen to 65 percent of MAP funds and to 87 

percent in FY74. In Appendix C are shown densities of major U.S.-furnished equipment. 

-

The Khmer }{rom Uni ts 

"Khmer Krom" is a term used to designate ethnic Cambodians living 

in communities in certain provinces of South Vietnam (Chau Doc and Vinh 

Binh primarily) as Vietnamese citizens or Cambodians born in Vietnam. 

Dur:i:ng the 1963-65 period, U.S. Special Forces in South Vietnam expanded 

their Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CLOG), an indigenous paramilitary force composed mostly of Montagnards serving under U.S. control, 

by recruiting ethnic Cambodians to form additional light guerrilla companies. These "Khmer Krom" units were primarily deployed at border ClOG 

camps in the RVN's MR-3 and MR-4. 

-


In the absence of documents, I cannot say whether the deployment to 


Cambodia of these Khmer Krom forces was carried out pursuant to a bi­


lateral agreement, that is an agreement between the U.S. and Cambodia, 


or in accordance with a "tripartite" agreement between the U.S., Cambodia, and the RVN. What we knew at the time was that these "Special 

Forces" were under direct U.S. command in South Vietnam. In various 

ways the arrival of the Khmer Krom battalions was greeted with popular 

enthusiasm, while for the FANK authorities their arrival gave immediate 

help in reinforcing the combat units. Later there was a problem about -

-


how to integrate them into the FANK and to decide what rank their cadre 


would be given. A total of some 4,000 organized into eight battalions, 


were deployed to Cambodia during 1970. 


55 -
Concerning the use of these units in combat, there were, without 

question, some problems at the start. These resulted from their need 

to adapt to the FANK system of command, to acquaint themselves with the 

Cambodian outlook, and the problems of their integration into the body 

of Khmer military institutions. The high command would have preferred 

to spread the personnel of the Khmer Krom units from South Vietnam -­

that is those already trained by the U.S. Special Forces -- out among 

all FANK units. This was not possible because of problems of command. 

The final solution was to group the Khmer Krom personnel into separate 

units with their own Khmer Krom cadre. 

Whatever the administrative problems may have been, I must pay 

homage, here and now, to the Khmer Krom units who fought so effectively 

by the side of their Cambodian brothers against the VC/NVA Communists. 

Theirs was a spirit of great determination and a willingness to make 

the supreme sacrifice. According to information I have since received, 

these Khmer Krom units returned to South Vietnam after the fall of Cambodia on 17 April 1975. There, they continue the fight against the Communists with the fe~ means at their disposal in order to regain the 

South Vietnam lands of their families and ancestors. 

56 

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n-r lr_ tlnl<, /leVl1 A«h.d fro. Sou th VI...... and A....d 

vlth U.. U.S. 1+-16 lIn., Sa1ut.. bt Kilttal1' ..,lo~ Co_..... 

Our t". a VIsH to Tonl~ "". 110_.... 1910 

" 

--

--

--

CHAPTER IV 

The First Two Years of the War 

The InitiaZ COrmtU1'!ist Attacks 

An unsuccessful attempt to deal with the NVA/VC had been made on 

24 May 1969 when Prime Minister Lon Nol met officially for the first 

time with North Vietnam's representative, Nguyen Thuong, and the NLF 

delegate, Nguyen Van Hieu. The purpose of this meeting was to request 

the NVA/VC to desist from committing violations against Cambodian territory, violations which were frequent and becoming more and more 

serious. No positive result was obtained from this meeting; the enemy 

simply ignored Cambodia's request. 

Since NVA/VC forces continued to exert pressure on the local Khmer 

population, the inhabitants of Svay Rieng began in early March 1970 to 

manifest their dissatisfaction toward the intruders. These popular 

manifestations met with retaliations from the enemy and resulted in 

casualties. This in turn provoked a widespread feeling of discontent 

among the population which culminated in destructive rampages against 

the North Vietnamese and PRG embassies in Phnom Penh on .11 and 12 March 

1970. 

Amidst the gravity of this explosive situation, which pitted the 

Khmer population against the NVA/VC, the Cambodian government, by a 

diplomatic note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, formally requested 

the NVA/VC to withdraw all of their troops from Cambodian territory. 

The deadline set was dusk 15 March 1970. 

Once more, the NVA/VC did nothing to comply with the Cambodian 

request. NVA/VC representatives were therefore invited to participate 

in a working session with staff members of the Khmer Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs on 16 March 1970. Nothing positive was achieved, however. The 

59 
WA!VC representatives not only cited reasons of their own for noncompliance with the Cambodian request; they also asked in return that 

their governments be paid for damages caused to their embassies. Thus 

ended the working sess;l.on which wa,s also the last meeting between the 

Cambodian government and the WA!VC. 

On 25 March 1970, however, the Polish Embassy sent a memorandum to 

the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informing the latter among 

other things, of the availability of good office's concerning the evacuation of all North Vietnamese and PRG embassy personnel. On 27 March 

1970, all North Vietnamese and PRG embassy personnel took off by ICC 

aircraft for Hanoi. This departure marked the end of diplomatic relations between Cambodia and North Vietnam and the PRG. 

Well before the enemy launched attacks against Cambodia, he had 

initiated deceptive maneuvers aimed at creating a feeling of insecurity 

and internal crisis. This was to divide governmental forces in the 

first place, and then to isolate the government from popular support; 

finally it would lead both domestic and world opinion to believe that 

the war in Cambodia had been staged by Sihanouk followers against the 

new regime--in other words, that this war was only a civil war. 

AlL of this deception was but common Communist fare to those who 

were familiar with Communist strategy in Asia. However, to those 

ill-informed of this Communist practice, as was the case with several 

foreign observers, the enemy bait was palatable and for a certain time, 

questions arose as to whether or not Cambodian protests against the 

armed and overt aggression by WA!VC forces were in fact justified. 

How perfect the Communist screenplay was! 

In fact, under the pretext of helping Sihanouk return to power, an 

eventuality rather warmly welcomed by the majority of illiterate (illinformed common people who lived far from the nation's capital) the 

enemy was able to incite the civilian population to demonstrate against 

the legal government. On 26 March 1970, several bloody demonstrations 

erupted in the city of Kompong Cham; these were quelled only by the 

intervention of Khmer troops. 

On 27 March 1970, a second demonstration, more violent still, took 

place in Kompong Cham; but this time the army was forced to open fire. 

60 

--

In Takeo, similar demonstrations also compelled the Khmer army to 

intervene. The same thing happened to the inhabitants of Prey Veng 

who were stopped by Khmer troops only 15 kilometers from Phnom Penh. 

The question on the minds of many people at that time was whether 

or not these demonstrations had been organized by Sihanouk followers. 

To clarify the question, I think we should point out the fact that in 

its interventions, the Khmer forces had detained several NVA/VC cadre 

among the demonstrators; there was no doubt that it was they who had 

orchestrated the entire show. We may deduct with reasonable certainty 

that these cadres were members of the Vietnamese communist infrastructure 

because all of these demonstrations were staged in provinces adjacent 

to NVA/VC sanctuaries. 

Following this stage play, the NVA/VC suddenly began on 29 March 

1970 their overt aggression against Cambodia. These enemy forces were 

known to be NVA/VC regular units whose total strength was estimated at 

between 45,000 and 60,000. Meanwhile, the defending forces, our FANK, 

numbered merely 35,000. 

It was a very sudden and widespread attack conducted along the 

eastern and southeastern boundaries and coming from the sanctuary areas. 

The suddenness of these attacks did not cause much of a surprise to the 

FANK command because it had expected them all along. But the time 

available for defense preparations was so short (just two days, from 

27 to 29 March) that many isolated and weakly manned outposts succumbed 

under the violence of the first enemy assaults. From.the very first 

days, therefore, the FANK was driven back by the enemy push. In rapid 

succession, the following towns and cities fell into enemy hands: 

In MR-1: Snoul, Chup, Mimot, Krek, Saang, Koh Tham 

In MR-2: Kompong Trach 

In MR-5: Stung Treng (which had been heavily threatened) 

In MR-6: Mondulkiri, Kratie City 

In addition, other important towns were attacked. (Map 7) The 

FANK units in Ratanakiri were cut off from Phnom Penh by the enemy 

capture of Stung Treng and Kratie. 

During the month of August 1970, the situation stabilized a little 

but the enemy did not relent in his push. The FANK were found then holding 

61 

Map 7 ­ Initial Communist Attacks, March· April 1970 

THAILAND 

62 

SOUTH 

VIETNAM 

CAMBODIA 

MAJOR ROADS 

---­ Major road 

__....~ Enemy Attac.k 

6 Route Number 

o 25 50 Miles 

rl---,""'"-,---" 
a shrinking area which extended on both sides of the Bassac River and 

the TonIe Sap Great Lake from the northwest to the southeast. (Map 8) 

The Evacuation of the.Ratanakiri Garrison 

It is necessary to go back to 1969 in order to explain how it was 

that such a large portion of the FARK combat elements were in the relative 

isolation of Ratanakiri Province at the time of the Communist attacks. 

By 1969 the VC/NVA presence in that region was beginning to exert 

pressure on Khmer authorities and the local populations. Responding 

to this situation, the FARK high command launched OPERATION TEST VC/NVA 

in November 1969 in order to determine the size of the VC/NVA forces 

and to fix the extent of their bases and sanctuaries. (Map 9) It 

made use of the b~t of the FARK·units at the time, and I was placed 

in command. We were organized as follows: 

Colonel Sak Sutsakhan, Commander 

Colonel Pok Sam An, Chief of Staff 

Colonel Lay Chhay, Director of Materiel 

Lt. Colonel Chhuon Chhum, Commander 5th Military Region 

and Commander GT #1 

Lt. Colonel Um Savuth, Commander GT #2 

Lt. Colonel Hong Yung, Commander Sub Region 

Ratanakiri and Commander GT #3 

Major Dien Del, Commander GT #4 Reserve and Support Troops 

I remained in command in Ratanakiri until 11 March 1970, when I 

was called to Phnom Penh. During my stay there, a number of operations 

were launched against enemy base areas in the vicinity of Bokeo, Lomphat, 

Siem Pang, all in Ratanakiri Province. There was little success, however, 

because the VC/NVA units were under orders at that time, and for political 

reasons, to refuse direct combat with the FARK. They were content to 

leave the fighting for the moment to their auxiliary troops, the dis1 sident Khmer Loeu • These auxiliaries were used either to slow 

~iterally, "Upper Khmer." Unlike the Khmer Krom or "Lower Khmer," 

so called because of their habitat in the lower Mekong valley, the Khmer 

Loeu are not ethic Khmer. The term was developed during the Sihanouk era 

to facilitate the integration into Khmer society of the non-Khmer hill 

tribes living in northeast Cambodia. The Khmer Loeu were actually members 

of the same tribes found in the uplands of Vietnam, the Jarai, for example. 

63 

1oIop' _ FANK · _ "'-in er' 0;' in Auto>o. 1970 


TH ... ILAHO 

\ 

\

Ul 

') 

/''1 

I

• 

AEPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 

" 

Map 9 - Area of FARK OPERATION TEST VC/NVA, November 1969 

GTl 

ZONE 

m 

ZONE 

Ph

•

Lompou 

GT3 

ZONE 

LEGENO: 

I 

I 

Virachei 

I - Denotes limit of progress 

I ~Oirection of Khmer advance 

I 

m 

,

, 

~ Phum Tong \ 

Thya Nam . --.1 

Koh Piek I 

I 

• Lomphat 

'-­ _ .... "okheo 

~/ \ 

/

./ 

\ 

\ 

I 

I 

/ 

/ 

/ 

./ 

VIETNAM 

r- GT: Tactical Group (Khmer Meueuner element) 

o 10 20 

1 1 I 

MILES 

65 

the advance of FARK units or to divert them from the main centers of 

VC/NVA strength. However, the operations did permit the FARK to conclude 

that the VC/NVA presence on Cambodian soil was becoming greater and 

greater and moving toward the interior of the country. 

Shortly before the 29th of March, the high command recalled two 

. infantry battalions and one engineer battalion; these units were able 

to reach the capital by road. However, the attacks after the 29th of 

March isolated this major concentration of FARK units in Ratanakiri, 

and those in Kratie as well. The important question of how to evacuate 

these units was the subject of a meeting in Saigon in April 1970. and 

attended by representatives from FANK, RVNAF, and U.S. MACV, and presided 

over by General Abrams. On the Khmer side we gave our agreement in 

principle to the launching of such an operation, which was of interest 

to us in that some of our units might be saved for use in other areas 

of combat. We asked at the same time that the civil authorities and 

their families in the area be included in the evacuation. At the meeting 

it was decided that HQ MACV would take the lead in organizing and 

executing the evacuation, ensuring thereby the availability of both U.S. 

and RVNAF assets dedicated to the operation. On the FANK side we did 

not interest ourselves in the details, but in order to facilitate cooperation, particularly concerning the evacuation, the FANK established 

a liaison detachment in Saigon, directed by Brigadier General Pok Sam An, 

to stay in touch with U.S. and RVNAF authorities in Saigon, and the 

RVNAF II Corps commander. Pok Sam An also handled the liaison with 

Brigadier General Neak Sam, Commander, FANK 5th Military Region to 

designate and move FANK units toward a protected assemDly point at 

Bokeo in p 'paration for the move. The evacuation itself was carried 

out according to plan; however, several of the units at great distance 

from the assembly point (Stung Treng, Sumpang, Voeun Sai, etc.) did not 

get out. They were either overrun in their locations or ambushed and 

2 destroyed en route to Bokeo. 

2For a description of the operation as carried out by the RVNAF and 

the part played by the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, see Tran Dinh Tho, 

The Cambodian Incursion, this series. 

66 

-- It must be pointed out that this evacuation applied only to' our 

forces in Ratanakiri. There was no similar opportunity to save the 

smaller garrisons in Mondolkiri and Kratie Provinces. 

FANK strategy 

By about May 1970, following the initial enemy attacks, it was 

clear that the capital of Phnom Penh was in effect surrounded on three 

sides by territory in the hands of the enemy. Only the corridor along 

Route 5, running to Battambang and Thailand, was still under our control. 

Even the fall of Phnom Penh seemed possible. However, the U.S./RVNAF 

cross-border operations, and the combined FANK/RVNAF operations during 

May and June lead to a period of stability by the month of July. The 

enemy appeared to pause to recondition his units and receive reinforcements. The initial strategic concept developed for defense of the Khmer 

Republic took this situation into account. (Map 10) It was keyed to a 

line (A-B) running generally along Routes 6 and 7. The line came to be 

known as the Lon Nol line, and the strategy waS to be executed in three 

phases: 

1. Phase I: Survive south of the line 

2. Phase II: Consolidate all territory south of the line 

3. Phase III: Regain lost territory north of the line 

As the war progressed, it was necessary to r~vise strategic 

priorities in order to meet the increasingly critical'enemy threats to 

Cambodia. By late 1972, it was generally accepted that while trying to 

keep Route 5 open to Battambang, and Route 6 and Route 7 open to Kompong 

Cham, the priority of effort should go to the highly populated regions 

near and south of the capital, the area south of line C-D-E. 

Returning to the period July-August 1970, there were a number of 

factors in addition to the lull in enemy activity which prompted the 

FANK to consider offenSive action against the enemy for the first time. 

There was the acceleration of the formation of combat units, the reorganization of FANK, and the receipt of U.S. military aid. There was 

a need to regain the confidence of the public in the FANK and to raise 

the morale of the troops, themselves greatly shocked by the defeats of 

67 

Map 10 - FANK Strategic Concepts for Defense of the Khmer Republic 

104 106 

L A 

T H A 

o s 

, 

\ '-"l, 

? 

~ 

, .r 

~A -.: -'"\,../'" r 

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Line A-B: June 1970 

Line C-O-E: November 1972 

25 50 NautiQI Mi les 

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25 50 Kilometers 

68 

the early days of the struggle. Another important consideration was 

the desire to retake areas rich in rice and fish which had fallen under 

enemy control. The economic situation had deteriorated rapidly, and 

there was no longer sufficient rice-growing area under friendly control, 

and what was needed was to bring some of this rich land back under FANK 

control without delay. This would not only ensure more adequate rice 

stocks, it would also provide places to settle the growing numbers of 

refugees, by then streaming from the areas of communist control toward 

the population centers, and whose care and feeding constituted an 

increasingly heavy burden for the government. The FANK initiatives in 

1970 and 1971 which responded to these circumstances were primarily the 

operations known as CHENLA I and II, which I now discuss. 

CHENLA I 

The initial zone of operation for OPERATION CHENLA I was the 

triangle formed by the three villages Skoun - Kompong Thmar - Troeung 

the base of which was Route 7 connecting Skoun and Kompong Cham. 

(Map 11) Skoun had been repeatedly attacked during the initial fighting 

and had changed hands often. Just prior to this operation, it was 

under FANK control, and was developed as an advanced logistic base for 

CHENLA I, and for operations around Kompong Cham. All of the high command were in agreement that the final objective of CHENLA I should be 

Kompong Thmar, assuming that the U.S./RVNAF air support which we expected 

to have at FANK disposal would be able to neutralize a large part of 

the enemy combat power. The final objective of Kompong Thmar was to 

be achieved in three phases; however, any advance beyond the Phase One 

objective of Tang Kauk would depend on the enemy situation. 

Some ten to rwelve of the best FANK infantry battalions, with 

artillery and armor support were chosen for the operation, and all were 

placed under the command of Brigadier General Um Savuth. The operation 

was launched in late August 1970, and went entirely according to plan. 

Tang Kauk was retaken in early September without great difficulty and 

to the surprise of the enemy. This initial success was followed by a 

period of calm during which the civil and military authorities worked 

69 

KOMPONG THOM 

MAIN ATTACK:) • 

SECONDARY 

ATTACK: •• 

PHASE THREE ~~ompong Thmar 

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to revitalize the civilian communities around and south of Tang Kauk. 

Special efforts were made to resettle refugees, and to provide for their 

protection by the establishment of self-defense units, made up of local 

inhabitants, and cadred by active-duty personnel. 

In conjunction with the main advance north along Route 6 from 

Skoun, there was a secondary attack from Traung to Bos Khnaor. Pressure 

from units of the 9th NVA Division located in the rubber plantations 

east of Route 6 prevented advance of the CHENLA I column beyond Tang 

Kauk during 1970. 

While there was a general slowing of enemy attacks throughout the 

northern parts of the country following the recapture of Tang Kauk, the 

areas east of the Mekong, around Kompong Cham, and south of Phnom Penh 

were scenes of significant enemy initiative in November and December 

1970. The enemy reaction to CHENLA I was not directed at the column 

itself; rather VC/NVA elements carried out a series of attacks against 

FANK posts along Route 7, between Prey Totung and Kompong Cham, which 

had the effect of cutting the Route 7 LOC to Kompong Cham. When it 

appeared in December that the enemy was preparing for a major attack 

on Kompong Cham, the RVNAF conducted an airmobile operation into the 

airfield in Kompong Cham. Several days of FANK/RVNAF operations to 

the north and west produced little contact with the enemy but permitted 

the FANK to reopen Route 7. FANK units received help from RVNAF units 

east of the Mekong, and there was a major combined operation to reopen 

. 3 Route 4 by clearing enemy units from the Pich Nil Pass. It should be 

noted that the enemy carried out these operations while at the same time 

appearing to displace many of his major units toward his front in 

South Vietnam. 

But for the high command the most remarkable and also the most 

depressing enemy action came in January 1971, when a group of perhaps 

3

For descriptions of the two operations at Kompong Cham and Pich 

Nil Pass, see Tran Dinh Tho, op cit. 

71 

100 VC/NVA commandos mounted a spectacular attack on the Khmer Air Force 

base at Pochentong airfield west of Phnom Penh., Carried out during the 

night of 21-22 January, it destroyed practically all of the aircraft, 

including all of the MIG fighters. The attack on the air base was accompanied by attacks on villages located to the west and northwest of 

Pochentong. In this situation it was necessary for the high command to 

withdraw some of the units from the CHENLA column at Tang Kauk to reinforce the outskirts of the capital. On 5 February, the "State of 

Emergency" was extended for another six months. General Lon Nol spent 

the entire day of 8 February at the National Assembly, answering the 

questions of the legislators concerning the attack on the air base and' 

the defense of the country in general. That night he suffered a stroke 

which left him partially paralized and incapacitated. The following 

day the government announced that Lon Nol was incapacitated, and on 

14 February he was evacuated by U.S. military aircraft to TripIer 

General Hospital in Honolulu for treatment. 

CHENLA II 

Lon Nol returned to Phnom Penh on 12 April 1971, after making good 

progress during his hospitalization. As he became active in military 

matters again, there was concern for regaining the initiative, and a 

desire to return the enemy's "blow for blow", to take "eye for eye" 

and "tooth for tooth". A reactivation of the operation on Route 6, 

stalled since October 1970, and to be known as CHENLA II was decided on. 

It would also serve the purposes of Lon Nol's program of general mobilization of the population (!1obiZization Gene:roale) by returning additional 

civilians to friendly control. The concept this time called for reopening 

Route 6 all the way to Kompong Thom. (Map 12) The garrison in this 

provincial capital had been isolated from all land contact with the 

remainder of the country for almost a year; further it was at the center 

of another very rich rice-producing area. The relative calm in the year 

previous had permitted the build-up of large stocks of rice which could 

only be utilized in the remainder of the country if Route 6 were opened 

again to friendly truck traffic. 

72 
ttKOMPONG THOM 

Barai 

TANG KAUK 

PRAKHAM 

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At this point I leave the narration of events in order to discuss 

the divergence of opinion between the decision-makers in the high command and the technicians of the General Staff concerning the operational 

concept for CHENLA II. The extent of this divergence is summarized in 

the following two points of view: 

1. Lon Nol saw the need to rapidly liberate Route 6, join hands 

with the garrison at Kompong Thom, take certain key terrain features 

which controlled the road, organize these, and to operate from these 

points in order to extend the area under FANK control. 

2. The technicians of the General Staff did not dispute the 

overall objective of the operation Lon Nol proposed that they accomplish; 

what they took issue with was the way the operation would be carried out, 

given the actual enemy situation in the operational area, and, based on 

FANK experience, the entirely predictable enemy reaction to the 

proposed FANK initiative. The General Staff favored, first of all, a 

series of moves which would lead or draw the enemy into areas where 

they could be destroyed by air or ground action; this would take into 

account -the pres.!nce of enemy sanctuaries and command posts in the 

Chamker Andong rubber plantation. The rapidity with which Lon Nol would 

hurl the FANK units north along Route 6 would leave them highly vulnerable 

to fragmentation by flank attack and afterwards easy prey for the enemy. 

The technicians were guided as well by the prinCiple of economy of force: 

for some time it had been the same units which did most of the fighting 

on the various battlefields. The same units would have to be used again 

for CHENLA II. They were understrength, lacking in certain skills, and 

required refitting. 

Thus, the elaboration of concept into operational plan went forward 

with great difficulty, given these different points of view. But as 

always the final decision being with Lon Nol, the difficult birth of 

the CHENLA II plan was, in the end, carried out over the objections 

of these technicians who, for their part, watched with sinking hearts 

the launching of this operation on 20 August 1971. 

The first phase of the operation involved some hard fighting, but 

was a great success for the FANK. Again, the enemy was surprised. 

Prakham was retaken on the first day. By 24 August, FANK units were 

74 

attacking north of Rumlong and were able to retake Barai on 26 August. 

The recapture of Kompong Thmar on 1 September: was f.>llowed by a period 

of rest and consolidation of the liberated zones south of Kompong Thmar. 

On 2 September, one brigade of the 5th Brigade Group attacked south from 

Kompong Thom along Route 6 and east toward Phnom Santuk. There was 

heavy fighting itt these areas, and Tang Krasang was taken on 20 September. 

On 5 October FANK units advancing from north and south met in the vicinity 

of Kompong Thmar. On the same day, three brigades were committed to the 

capture of the key terrain of Phnom Santuk mountain from the south. 'The 

8th Brigade was moved by helicopter to a position from which it could 

attack southeast. The fighting was intense, including hand-to-hand' 

combat, as the enemy had time to prepare his defensive positions following FANK capture of Kompong Thmar. Phnom Santuk was taken, however, 

and on 25 October 1971, the first phase of ClIENLA II was declared 

officially at an end. Marshal Lon No1 marked the junction of FANK units 

on Route 6 with an "Order of the Day", dated 5 October, and there were 

numerous religious and military cerenonies on 25 and 26 October to mark 

the victory. 

The enemy gave our units little time to savor their accomplishments, 

however. Barely hours into the second phase of the operation, the enemy 

inflicted ort the FANK the greatest catastrope of the war, up to that 

time. On the night of 26 - 27 October 1971, enemy units, attacking out 

of the Chamkar Andong rubber plantation, launched a general assault' 

on our positions along Route 6, particularly that portion between Tang 

Kauk and Rumlong. (Map 13) I quote here extracts from the after-action 

report of Brigadier General Hou Hang Sin, commander of the operation, 

which indicate the circumstances and the conditions of the combat of the 

two sides. 

On the night of 26 - 27 October 1971, the 9th 

NVA Division, reinforced by the 205th and 207th 

regional regiments, launched a general attack against 

our static defense positions. About 0100, the enemy 

attacked in force the FANK 376th Battalion, located 

on Route 6 at INl15640, one km north of Rumlong. 

This greatly understrength unit was completely overrun 

at a single blow; about 20 were able to make their 

way to Barai, and some others got to Rumlong. 

75 
Map 13 - Enemy Attacks Against OPERATION CHENLA II Column, 26-31 October 1971. 

8 

7 

6 

ENEMY ATTACK: ~ 

TANG KAUK 

5 .. 

4 

Route 7 

wv 1 2 km 3 4 

76 

Simultaneously with the above attack, the enemy 

was able to encircle and isolate Rumlong, held by the 

14th FANK Battalion and the CP of 46th Infantry Brigade, 

reinforced by a platoon of 105-mm artillery. The 

bridge at Spean Dek at Kilometer Mark 54, Route 6 was 

blown by the enemy on the s~e night. 

The 21lth FANK Battalion at Damrei Slap (WU 134592) 

was heavily attacked on the night of 28 October 1971 

by enemy units using toxic gas shells. The majority 

of the FANK were overcome by the gas and retreated to 

Kreul. 

The 118th FANK Battalion at Kreul, after having 

suffered successive enemy attacks, retreated to Tang 

Kauk on 29 October 1971, in company with the 21lth 

Battalion. 

After having sustained successive attacks on 28 

and 29 October, the 61st Infantry Brigade (composed 

of the 63d and 425th Battalions) located at Kiri Andeth 

CWU 157642) was ordered to withdraw to-Treal, at that 

time held by the 22d Battalion. 

Having also been attacked at the same time as the 

211th Battalion, the 377th Battalion, at Neak Veang 

(WU 127608) retreated in turn on the night of 31 

October to Tang Kauk. 

During this critical period from 27 to 31 October 

1971, our side suffered numerous dead, wounded, and 

missing, both military and their families. 

From 28 to 31 October, the FANK counter attacks 

by two brigades to break the line of enemy resistance 

on Route 6 between Phum Svay and Rumlong did not produce the results hoped for. The combat was very difficult~ at times our units arrived just at the line 

of the enemy, only to have to withdraw because of 

losses. The following day the same terrain had to 

be retaken. We were on very unfavorable terrain; 

there was water everywhere, in the rice fields, and 

bordering Route 6 north of Rumlong. During the first 

five days of the counter-attack, our air support was, 

for a variety of reasons, insufficient. 

The troops were by this time very tired. Many 

of the cadre had been killed or wounded. The average 

FANK losses were estimated at 100 personnel put out 

of action per day. In spite of this, we tried to 

carryon; and orders were given to all those who continued to fight bravely to try to break through. But 
we were not able to succeed, due to difficulties 

on the battle field, irregular arrival of resupply, 

the air drops being intended one day for the counterattacking force, and the next day for the garrisons 

at Rumlong and Treal, which were surrounded. During 

this effort, our air support was reported to have 

strafed our own units, at the time in the process of 

infilt~ating toward Rumlong. We do not know who 

called for this strike, but the incident led to the 

discouragement of our troops in their efforts to 

relieve Rumlong. In order to accelerate resupply, 

an air strip for light aircraft was established 

north of Barai, and put into service on 25 November 

1971. We were not sufficiently mobile, due to insufficient helicopters and armor, which could have 

permitted us to move in force from one point to 

another. 

In contrast, the enemy, expert in this type of 

warfare, dug deep trenches in which their drugged and 

chained soldiers waited to strike us, all of which 

was synchronized with the fire of heavy weapons located 

in the Chamkar Andong Plantation, and directed by 

observers located everywhere. We found it impossible 

to carry out effective counter-battery fire, due to 

lack of sufficient weapons. 

In order to strike the enemy a heavy blow, 

we were able to obtain B-52 strikes in the Chamkar 

Andong area on the 1st and the 14th of November. 

We asked for additional strikes, but did not receive 

them. 

We see, therefore that during a period of only 15 days, the 

counterattacks of the VC/NVA caused such heavy losses in men and 

materiel as to completely demoralize the FANK units participating in 

the operation. I remember traveling to Skoun during that critical 

period in order to see first-hand the condition of the troops who 

retreated toward that base; it was not surprising to find the young 

soldiers and cadre sleeping, a sign of their loss of all sense of 

combat responsibility. One could say that they were all pursued by 

the spectre of war ••• reinforced in their minds, no doubt, by the 

spectacular atrocities and other horror which they had witnessed. Many 

waited for medical evacuation and air support to arrive from on high, 

which never arrived. 

78 

Certainly one cannot completely blame the high command insofar as 

reinforcements and resupply were concerned. At the same time that 

operation CHENLA II was in progress there were other places in the 

country where actions of the enemy required the attention of the FANK. 

It was a situation where everyone seemed to be trying to cover himself. 

In these circumstances Marshal Lon Nol presided at a conference on 14 

November 1971 which was attended by the senior commanders of CHENLA II. 

In the course of this meeting, important modifications were made to 

the initial plan of operation, now more urgent in view of the heavy 

enemy action to the west of Phnom Penh along Route 4. 

Another problem was that the CHENLA II column had been cut into 

several sections and all that they could do was to use their own means 

to escape from the grip of the VC/NVA. There was insufficient logistical 

support and what there was did not arrive in time. The large bridge on 

Route 6 southwest of Skoun (Kilometer Mark 54) had been blown; thus the 

logistic base for the operation which had been established in Skoun 

could not be resupplied except by aerial transport. 

During the entire month of November and until 3 December 1971, the 

final date of operation CHENLA II, there were bloody combat actions 

the entire length of Route 6 from Prakham to Phnom Santuk. Several of 

our units took heavy losses, some of them simply vanishing into the 

countryside, and others fighting courageously to regain friendly lines 

as best they could. The commander of the operation was no longer in 

control of the situation and seemed to adopt the solution of "every 

man for himself". Marshal Lon Nol, with the officers of the general 

staff, traveled to the CHENLA II front on 30 November 1971 in order 

to survey the situation as it actually was. Faced with the sad spectacle 

caused by the collapse of his troops Lon Nol could do nothing more than 

to conclude the tragic story of operation CHENLA II. In this operation 

FANK lost some of its best units of infantry as well as a good part of 

its armor aad a great deal of transport, both military and civil. There 

Was never an exact count, but the estimate was on the order of ten 

battalions of personnel and equipment lost plus the equipment of an 

additional ten. battalions. 

79 

Cooperation and Coordination with the RVNAF 

and the U.S. 

In early April 1970, General Lon Nol twice received very discreet, 

night visits by Nguyen Cao Ky, South Vietnam's Vice President. Though 

highly secret, these visits nevertheless can be seen as the first steps 

toward reestablishing diplomatic relations between South Vietnam and 

Cambodia on the one hand, and toward the initiation of military cooperation and assistance in the face of a common enemy on the other. It is 

not known exactly how the first of these visits was arranged. Very few 

people in Phnom Penh knew of them, and they were attended on the Khmer 

side by General Lon Nol and Prince Sirik Matak only. It is considered 

possible, however, that General Lon Nol's younger brother Lon Non played 

a part in the arrangements. Soon after the 18th of March, and before 

the reestablishment of formal diplomatic relations between the two 

countries, Lon Non was authorized to enter into liaison with South 

Vietnamese officials and with Son Ngoc Thanh, the anti-Sihanouk Khmer 

leader then living in South Vietnam. It is possible that the idea for 

such a meeting waS discussed between Lon Non and Son Ngoc Thanh, and 

4 then 	presented to General Ky by one or the other. 

In conjunction with these activities, President Nixon also issued 

a warning to the enemy when, announcing the next increment of U.S. troop 

withdrawal from South Vietnam, he referred to the enemy's escalation 

in Laos and Cambodia and declared on 20 April 1970: 

"The enemy would be taking grave risks if they 

attempted to use American withdrawals to jeopardize 

remaining U.S. forces in Vietnam by increased 

military action in Vietnam, in Cambodia, or in 

Laos; if they were to do so I shall not hesitate 

to take strong and effective measures to deal with 

that situation." 

4

At the same time as these contacts, the Cambodian government was 

also approached by other countries of the Free World, first Thailand, 

then the Republic of China (Taiwan), followed by South Korea shortly 

after. All offered to help in some way. 

80 

Ten days after issuing this warning, President Nixon announced 

on 30 April 1970 that U.S. forces, in cooperation with the Republic of 

Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) were goi~g to launch immediate attacks to 

destroy enemy sanctuaries along the Khmer-Vietnamese border. 

Toward the end of April 1970, simultaneously with an increase in 

military personnel attached to the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, contacts 

between the FANK General Staff and the JGS, RVNAF, as well as MACV, 

became more regular and increasingly solid, even though diplomatic relations were not established between Phnom Penh and Saigon until a month 

later, on 27 May 1970. 

At the same time, the FANK Command authorized the assignment of one 

RVNAF liaison officer to each Subdivision commander in the 1st and 2d 

Military Regions. The purpose of this arrangement was to exchange 

information and coordinate fire support. 

In May 1970, a RVN delegation headed by Vice President Nguyen Cao 

Ky, and including the GVN Minister of Defense, made an official visit 

to Phnom Penh. At the end of this visit, an agreement was concluded 

which created a l5-km deep zone on each side of the Cambodian-South 

Vietnamese border, in which Khmer and Vietnamese military authorities 

at the Province and District level could operate freely without prior 

clearance from either government. It was further understood that 

operations which might require a deeper penetration into Cambodia would 

be the object of special government agreement. However, the FANK never 

had the opportunity to make use of this agreement. 

In the same spirit of cooperation, the Cambodian government also 

authorized South Vietnam to establish an operational base at Neak Luong, 

on the Mekong. This base even received a visit by President Nguyen Van 

Thieu in June 1970. During this visit, President Thieu met for the 

first time with H. E. Cheng Heng, then Cambodia's Chief of State, who 

was accompanied by General Lon Nol and Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak. 

During the period of cross-broder operations conducted by U.S./RVN 

forces, very little was known by the FANK General Staff except for the 

fact that these operations were designed to destroy NVA/VC sanctuaries 

and COSVN headquarters in Cambodia. To my knowledge, only General Lon Nol 

81, 

had been informed to some extent of U.S. intentions concerning these 

operations. As to the FANK General Staff, the information it obtained 

was general and sketchy. It only knew that U.S. and RVN forces had been 

authorized to conduct a military operation across the Cambodian-South 

Vietnamese border during the period May-June 1970. The FANK had no 

detail whatsoever concerning the plans of this operation; it did not 

even know the size of forces committed. This lack of information extended 

equally to the results of these operations. No details of the results 

were ever communicated to the Cambodian government. 

Nevertheless, the ties between the military authorities of Cambodia, 

South Vietnam, and the U.S. were becoming closer. These were strengthened 

by instituting regular Tripartite meetings, initially at MACV headquarters 

or the JGS in Saigon. Here FANK, RVNAF and MACV delegations met each 

month. Because of its lack of facilities and material resources, the 

FANK General Staff was not able to host tripartite meetings until 1972. 

The objectives of these tripartite meetings were to: (1) exchange information concerning South Vietnam, Cambodia and a part of Laos; (2) study 

and plan for current military operations which were to be conducted 

either by Khmer forces alone or by combined forces (FANK~RVNAF) with U.S. 

air support; (3) study and plan for logistic support, and; (4) study 

and plan for the training of Khmer military personnel. 

In 1970, a liaison office was established by the RVNAF in Phnom Penh, 

following a parallel agreement to install a similar office by the FANK 

in Saigon. 

. As far as air support was concerned, cooperation was equally close. 

The Khmer Air Force, for example, installed an Air Support Coordination 

Detachment at Headquarters, U.S. 7th Air Force in Saigon, another at Tan 

Chau to accompany river convoys, and a detachment of observer-interpreters 

at Bien Hoa. In return, the Vietnam Air Force also installed an Air 

Support Coordination Detachment in Phnom Penh which dealt directly 

with the FANK General Staff in matters concerning air support. During 

this period of cooperation, the majority of daylight air support missions, 

especially reconnaissance support missions, were provided by the U.s. 

7th Air Force and the VNAF, both of which also flew night support 

82 
missions that only they could provide. As to the Khmer Air Force. it 

was responsible for transport missions within Cambodia and close air 

support in medium-scale operations. 

83 

II Pb""I "1; S...l on for Onlto\T10N ClII:IfI.A Ii 


Identified ••e: (l) Idt. Gen. So Suo; (2) 1,1,. Ceo . Hou lIul Sin; 


(3) Irlt. Cen. l1li Snu.b; (4) Irll. Gen. H Strng 

-

IrI...dl n "-_.d , ... "_I. eo-Oldu lot I'Il ll,..1' Rellon, 


''''P<KU • Sq...d 1n ~'" CIJ•• Ar_d " Ith the U.S. K-I Ca r b l .... 


""...._. 1970 


" 

'I 

FA!!!: R8c<uH. 110"", to the OPERATION CllftILA I A.ea on a 

R&qul.ltlonod Civilian T.uck, Anaod ~ith .~ eo..unl•• Aa.a"l t 

Rifle , Ai:-47; November 1970 

.. 

CHAPTER V 


The Politico/Military Situation in Cambodia, 

1972-1974 

The PoZitiaaZ Situation 

-

Before discussing the political situation itself, it is well to 

recall to mind the following dates and periods! 9 October 1970, date 

of the proclamation which transformed the Kingdom of Cambodia into the 

Khmer Republic; June to December 1971, the period during which the text 

of the constitution of the Khmer Republic was written; 10 March 1972, 

the date on which Mr. Cheng Heng, the Chief of State of Cambodia since 

the removal of Prince Sihanouk, resigned and transferred his powers to 

Marshal Lon Nol {the honor of "Marshal" was conferred on Lon Nol by the 

Khmer Parliament on 21 April 1971); 4 June 1972, the day on which 

Marshal Lon Nol was elected as the first President of the Khmer Republic 

after the text of the constitution had been adopted by a popular referendum on 30 April 1972. 

The period from 1972 through 1974 saw both an intensification of 

military activities and internal political activities in Cambodia. If 

the efforts at fighting the war merited a certain amount of respect 

during those years, the internal political maneuvering diminished these 

accomplishments, while the enemy concerned himself with a struggle to 

the end on both the political and diplomatic fronts. 

These internal political divergences grew not out of the proclamation 

of the Khmer Republic but rather during the time of the preparation and 

the putting into effect of the republican institutions themselves. With -

the promulgation of the constitution, the first signs of division were 

reflected in the political parties of which the three principal leaders 

of the events of 18 March 1970 (Lon Nol, Sirik Matak and In Tam) were 

also the founders. These three were never in agreement. Two principle 

87 

tendencies appeared from this discord. The first took as fundamental, 

the need for a respect for and strict application of the rules and 

principles announced in the new republican constitution. The second, 

while not opposed to these principles nevertheless insisted that 

certain of them were inadequate for a country at war and should be 

temporarily suspended, such as the prohibition against the participation 

of military personnel in elections, that is, the holding of political 

office, as came to pass in the election for President and for members 

of legislature. The second group also favored limitations on the for-· 

mation of political parties during the period of hostilities. By means 

of maneuvering which was more or less shady and calculated, the second 

tendency gave way to the first and thus, there were three political 

parties which came into being during the course of these troubled 

years. Marshal Lon Nol created his Socio-Republican Party backed by 

his young brother Lon Non, a Lieutenant Colonel in the FANK at the 

time; Lieutenant General Sirik Matak, who no longer exercised military 

command in view of his frequent use on political and diplomatic missions, 

formed and directed his Republican Party; Brigadier General In Tam, 

having both military and civil functions (President of the National 

Assembly on 18 March 1970 and Commander of the 1st Military Region at 

Kompong Cham and later Prime Minister and member of the High Political 

Council) was also the Director of the Democrat Party, having as his 

own strong right arm Mr. Chau Sau who in his turn became leader of the 

party after In Tam retired from the post, provoked doubtless by a 

difference of opinion between In Tam and Chau Sau. 

The years from 1972 on saw for these political parties an intensification of their individual political campaigns among which the 

mass of the population, the armed forces, the religious leaders, the 

civil servants and the young students. All of thes~who had already 

suffered greatly from the war, and from its propaganda campaigns now 

had to express their support for one or the other of the political 

parties, or even to submit to intimidation or to illegal force. The 

violent politics and criticisms which the political parties attempted 

to hurl more or less openly at each other only contributed to widen 

the gap between the governing group and those who were being governed. 

88 

-


-


-


-


The waves produced by all of those ardent political campaigns .shook 

the foundations of the FANK, already severely hurt by the enemy; and, 

if the foundation of the Armed Forces was not completely destroyed 

during this unhappy period .of struggle for internal influence this 

was thanks to the conduct of the majority' of the senior military 

leaders who placed their noble mission of "defense of the country 

in danger" above all personal and political ambition and above all 

other temptation. Unfortunately, and it must be admitted without 

shame, there were minorities, both civil and military, who let themselves 

be carried along more or less voluntarily and with enthusiasm by these 

currents of political evasion without actually realizing that by these 

acts they served only the interest of the enemy. Disruptions of the 

political, social, and economic order manifested themselves among the 

mass of students and against the regime of Lon Nol, certain of which 

manifestations lead to tragedy and death both among the demonstrators 

and on the side of the government. There were the tragic instances 

of the death of the Minister of National Education, Mr. Keo Sang Kim, 

and a well-known teacher, Mrs. Thach Chea. Certain of the student 

leaders were arrested, imprisoned and then brought before a military 

court. At the same time as these crises were being encountered there 

were other unhappy situations which intruded themselves into the arena 

of military command, such as the almost total dissatisfaction among 

the FANK because of the stoppage or slowing of the payment of salaries, 


the lack of sufficient rice, the totally unfair and partial way in 


which decorations and promotions were passed out to military personnel 


in com&at. 


In short, the seeds of democratization which had been thrown into 


the wind with such goodwill by the Khmer leaders returned for the 


Khmer Republic nothing but a poor harvest. The divisions among the 


republican leadership was a worse situation and the personal conflict 


between the leaders was irreconcilable at a time when the enemy had 


succeeded in uniting all of its forces into a single solid front and 


was marching toward the wide-swinging gates of the country. 


89 

Enemy Strategy 

During the years 1972 to 1974, the strategy practiced by the 

VC/NVA enemy, in Cambodia was marked by a movement toward "Khmerization" 

of the war, that is to say, the relief by Khmer communists forces, 

called Khmer Rouge, of VC/NVA units which had operated in Cambodia 

since 1970. This program to pass the military task to the Khmer 

Communists units was in line with decisions adopted at the Indochina 

Summit Conference, to which I have already referred. Within the 

space of two years the VC/NVA succeeded in forming the basis for a 

Khmer Communist armed force. There were created battalions, regiments, 

and even the beginning of establishment of divisions, these later 

observed shortly before the fall of the country. Within this Khmer 

Communist force, composed for the most part of Khmer, there existed 

nevertheless certain important Vietnamese Communist cadre, such as 

political counselors. 

The process of deploying the Khmer Communist units took place 

progressively on the various fronts in coordination with what appeared to be a general movement by regular VC/NVA units from the 

interior of Cambodia toward Vietnam. A good number of the battles 

of war involved Khmer Communist units in action against the FANK 

while the VC/NVA limited their action to providing the support of 

their weapon units. Certain specialized VC/NVA units acted in concert 

with the Khmer Rouge in order carry out commando raids against important 

military objectives, as well as to carry out acts of terrorism, particularly in the interior centers of friendly control. An example 

was the commando raid carried out on the night of 7 October 1972 

against the armored vehicle park situated in the north section of 

Phnom Penh. Two others were the big battle around Kompong Cham in 

September 1973 and the bombardment by rockets of the southeast 

suburbs of the capital, the latter causing several deaths and wounded 

among the civil population and the burning of more than 200 homes. 

In short, the major thrust of the enemy strategy was achieved 

by two routes: on the political side there was the almost complete 

90 
~ 

-


-


transformation of the face of the war itself from one of aggression 

carried out by foreign forces to one of civil war between the Khmer 

Republic and the Khmer Communists. This political transformation 

was extremely valuable to the enemy in consolidating his position in 

international opinion. On the military side, beyond the sabotage of 

the morale of the FANK provoked by the increase in intensity and 

frequency of battle, the enemy succeeded by the middle of 1974 in 

isolating the capital of Phnom Penh from its contact with the various 

provincial capitals. Thus, the fragmentation of the mass of the FANK 

into similar groups, cut off from each other, resulted in their 

inability to provide mutual support and left them more and more to 

defend in their own zones. 

GeneraZ Mobilization -­
 The PZan for the Countryside 


General Mobilizatio~was declared on June 25, 1970, to be followed 

on 7 November.by publication of the implementing directive for that law. 

It should be remembered that since its independence Cambodia had 

never had any clear idea of what general mobilization would consist of 

in time of war. It was imagined that it would be taken care of by the 

various responsible officials of the Ministry of National Defense but 

it was overlooked or even treated with indifference due primarily to 

the great confidence which Cambodia had in its policies of neutrality 

and peace. 

For a Cambodia at war it must be pointed out that the dominant 

figure in this sort of activity was none other than Marshal Lon Nol. 

When the law was first published it appeared that its application would 

be as straightforward as its application in other countries at war, 

simply the mobilization of all human resources, ~he mobilization of 

other resources such as industry, finance, property, private or semiprivate and their plaCing at the disposal of the state so that each 

might contribute to the war. But great was the surprise even among 

the responsible civil and military officials and equally among foreign 

and diplomatic observers in the country. 

-
 91 

For Cambodia the charter of its general mobilization was so broad 

and so complex that neither the decision-nakers who were assigned to 

manage general mobilization or the lower ranking people who were charged 

with its execu~ion were ever able to comprehend completely the complete 

sense of the program. If you analyze the various aspects at some depth 

it would seem that 'the general ideas for Cambodia's general mobilization 

were, in fact, excellent. The problem was that to make them work it 

would be necessary to carry out wide-spread instruction, education, and 

training among the mass of the population and to do this in time of 

peace. 

It was with good reason that Marshal Lon Nol gave to this law the 

name of "The Chessboard of General 110bilization".1 The law was, in fact, 

a sort of profound reform of Khmer institutions, touching all aspects 

of the organization of the state. For example, considering just the 

problem of defense, Cambodians woul~according to this plan for general 

mobilization, be required to organize themselves hierarchically from bottom to top, beginning with groups of 10 houses. These groups of 10 would 

be grouped together by 50; groups of 50 would be called a sub-cluster; 

sub-clusters would form clusters of sub-sectors of defense; and several 

sub-sectors or clusters would constitute a sector of defense. A sector 

of defense would correspond essentially to a municipality or a provfnce. 

If the concern waS only for defense organization, it was not bad and 

could have been carried out rather easily. But in the course of its 

application the organization just for defense became more and more 

complicated by the interjection of general or extraneous ideas and by 

overloading the defense organization ~ith additional missions such as 

the care of refugees and victims of war, the receipt of ralliers, the 

feeding of the population, instruction and social well being. 

I In French: L'Echiquier> dE la Mobilisation G€ner>ale. 

92 
--

-


Marshal Lon Nol was personally very attached to this raw; it was 

his masterpiece and he never informed himself of the difficulties and 

obstacles which presented themselves at every turn in our efforts to 

apply the law. His actions with res,pect to general mobilization were 

such as to create confusion both among the administrative authorities 

at various levels and between civil and military authorities. The 

confusion was less marked in those cases where the military chief 

exercised both civil administrative functions and his regular military 

responsibilities. On examination, it could be seen for example, that 

one person acting as chief of a group of 10 or a group of 50 houses 

would find himself the final authority in his group not only for matters of defense but for social well being, carrying out a c~nsus of 

refugees, collecting intelligence, feeding, and the distribution of 

food. And, to go further, this chief of group became himself a representative in his own sphere of various ministerial authorities in 

the central government. The decentralization and delegation of central powers to this extreme lead thus to the loss of authority on the 

part of the person responsible for general mobilization and it was 

unfortunately true that the chief of the Commissariat of General 

Mobilization did not know where to turn. 

Day-by-day the events of war brought crisis after crisis to the 

social, economic, and political order and crisis after crisis in 

questions of defense, for which the responsible authorities sought 

always to place the blame on each other. It was not surprising that 

the post of Commissioner of General Mobilization changed hands frequently, passing from military to civilian incumbent and vice versa. 

I remember how Marshal Lon Nol worked day and night for months 

to put his own ideas on general mobilization into the law. From my 

own knowledge I have the impression that Lon Nol's ideas were inspired 

by his own experiences while he was Royal Delegate for the province 

of Battambang during the "Crusade for Independence" of Prince Sihanouk 

in 1952, 1953. During this period he was the founder of the armed 

villagers of chivapols which I have mentioned earlier, in Chapter III. 

93 

It is recalled that the mission of these armed villagers was limited 

to the static defense of their village or to the participation in 

small combat actions in the rear areas or under the cover of regular 

units. Another source of inspiration for Lon Nol was doubtless the 

image he forme~of the organization of the Chinese Communist communities and of their system of defense during his visit in the people's 

Republic of China. Finally, as soon as war itself came to Cambodia, 

the desires of Marshal Lon Nol were equally tempted by the mechanism 

of the paCification program which the South Vietnamese had organized 

in certain vital areas and called "strategic hamlets", these operating within the framework of a general regional defense plan. Another factor which should be mentioned as having had influence on 

Lon Nolrs thinking was the doctrine of political warfare as developed 

by the Chinese on Taiwan, who were at that time considered expert in 

matters of anti-communist struggle. It seems to me therefore, that 

Marshal Lon Nol attempted to draw from all of these sources in the 

process of writing the law of general mobilization for Cambodia. 

All his efforts were devoted from the very first hours of the crisis' 

to the establishment of the system. But unfortunately all of the 

problems, social attitudes, time required, the enemy, etc. all acted 

to prevent him from achieving his desire. Thus for this "General 

Mobilization" the chessboard was set out, the squares were drawn, 

certain pieces were set into place, but not all of them. The great 

handicap was that the game in all its aspects (art, rule, moves of 

the pieces) had to be played in the face of enemy action. 

Condition of the FANK 

tole have seen in the preceeding chapters how the morale of the 

FANK became more and more beat down by the defeats of such battles 

as CHENLA II on Route 6. The enthusiasm on 18 March 1970 and its 

spirit of determination to struggle was no longer held to the same 

degree by the time of 1972 to 1974. The successes which FANK had 

had in certain battles and the incentives and decorations of in94 

dividuals and certain units were not sufficient to reverse the tide 

of ever-lowered morale. 

The deployment of hastily formed FANK units, trained in South 

Vietnam or in Thailand and newly armed and equipped, the great increase in the level of u.S. military and economic aid had seemed 

to give some general comfort and encouragement if only for a short 

time, in a climate greatly agitated by the opening of numerous military fronts and also by the jolts to political, economic, financial 

and social order. The intensification of combat and the losses suffered by FANK affected the recruitment campaign to the point that 

it became more and more difficult to organize new units. 

In all three services of the FANK, there were complaints about 

the lack of means, about the bankruptcy of efforts to improve social 

conditions, and about the injustice of the system itself. Whether 

true or not, there was no lack in either camp -- friendly or enemy 

of those willing to exploit these complaints. The shortages of food, 

particularly rice, and its improper distribution, the ever decreasing 

results from recruitment, the prolonged use of the same units in combat without relief, all gave yet another blow to the morale of the 

FANK. 

If these internal conditions, mentioned briefly above, were 

instrumental in destroying the morale of the FANK, it would be unjust 

on my part not to mention the various events on the international 

scene which also influenced in one way or another the general morale 

of Khmer troops. The signing of the cease-fire agreement in Paris in 

January 1973 by the u.S. and Hanoi, followed shortly by a series of 

declarations, about both the unilateral cease-fire which Lon Nol ordered the FANK to carry out, and the often repeated peace initiatives 

of the Khmer Republic during 1973 and 1974, plus the rumors of a cessation of U.S.-aid, rumors which were embellished by less than favorable comment on the Lon Nol government, all worked to lower the morale 

of military personnel. These factors provoked in a certain poorly-informed part of the FANK a sort of hypnotic spell which locked them into 

an attitude of opportunistic, day-to-day wait and see, hoping always for 

a well-deserved peace. 

95 
The End of u.s. Bombing 

In January 1973 the world opinion acclaimed the signing of the 

Paris Accords on a cease-fire in South Vietnam. And Cambodian opinion 

prepared itself for the shock of surprise which might create a disagreeable military consequence. Among the many meaSures which followed from 

the new policy of the United States, the cessation of U.S. air support 

in the Khmer theatre of operations provoked different reactions among 

different groups, both within the nation and among foreigners, the majority of which predicted the immediate collapse of the FANK and therefore the fall of the regime. 

On 15 August 1973, the U.S. announced officially the end of all its 

aerial operations in support of F&~K combat operations; thus all of these 

responsibilities fell on the shoulders of the Khmer Air Force (KAF). We 

remember that the KAF was almost completely destroyed by the VC/NVA commando attack on the January 21 - 22 1971. Following 1971 and until 1973 

the KAF was progressively reconstituted with U.S. aid. The formation and 

training of personnel and the deployment of aircraft was carried out in 

record time. It should be said that at the end of two years the KAF 

possessed a full, though on small scale, infrastructure, capable of inspiring confidence in their colleagues in the ground forces. The challenge for the KAF after 15 August 1973, therefore, was to provide the 

very large number of missions required to support military operations 

and also be available and prepared to support our civil sectors as required. Speaking only of military support, the KAF achieved brilliant 

results in the support of operations at Kampot and Prey Veng, at Lovek 

and at Kompong Thom, during which the I-28s were able to achieve a rate 

of 80 sorties per day, excluding missions of reconnaissance, liaison, 

and support of other fronts with the C-47s. As for the helicopters and 

transport aircraft, they were able to successfully transport three brigades of infantry in order to save the situation at Kampot City, at a 

time when a part of the city was already occupied by communist forces. 

In addition to this direct support of troops in combat both day and 

night, the KAF carried out a large number of transport missions for the 

benefit of the civil sector. 

96 
I 

I 

I 

I 

From the 15th of August 1973 forward, both foreign and Khmer observers witnessed the growing war between the Khmer themselves, that 

is between the FANK of the Khmer Republic and the forces of the Khmer 

Communists. The land, the high seas, the.rivers and lakes, the skies 

clear and cloudy were all criss-crossed by ships, vehicles, and aircraft flying the emblem of the Republic as they went in search of the 

enemy prey. It was also the date when the FANK began to operate independently of all assistance from foreign forces and it was for that 

reason that the date of 15 August was chosen as Armed Forces Day for 

the FANK, an occasion which the Khmer Republic celebrated for the 

first and last time on 15 August 1974 before the esplanade of the 

sacred Stoupa of the Great Teacher Buddha Sakhyamoui. 2 

2The Stoupa Sakhyamoui is located in Phnom Penh, in a large open 

square in front of the railroad station. It is considered by the Khmer 

to contain a relic of Buddha. 

97 
, . 

, 

, • f 

.. 

TIl, til... ,.un of 1912 th....U&h 1914 ...... 1""01od """'" ....tell 

co.... activit,. ...........r 1....o.,.rat throUiJbout tho.. portio... of 

c. 	·odl& .... tel> ......1........... friudl, toouol H tI>a 0104 of 1910. 

(Mlp I} It .... &1..., • ""rlO<1 4...-1.......ich OM D ..raIl 101.1tl.&.l.... 

""....d h ... til. PAlO( to tho YC/IIVA olld th... to tho 0.... eo-DJ.•• 

for.... A. t he 1Dit ta. lyo p••••" .... and .... (traly to tho co..ualo. 

IU., tbo , .... "U cone-rned ..... and ..u vtth OM dat."... of .. 1 tal 

-	 11.... of <_....,(111<1_. ,boo po,uLottOD c_..... and, U .... U, aBd 


"1>0'<1.&11, tho upltal of '10_ hDb it_If. Ourl... tilt. p.rlod ..... 


var boca. 1".,....t".I,. co........lo...l ,,, ...." ... . viti> both olde,
 r 

l•••nl". to ... lac....l".l, o .. ,hl••lco.o" .....'01 ,lid to "oplo, 

1 . . ... and 	.o.. cohu, ,.. <alliin unlu, to tho pot". tIIu by tho _114

r of 1914 tba....... both PAInt add. c... CO....,II.h' <livid..". '0 tho 

fiel", n.. ..,...tl.o... I ha_ d>o.... to dl.c.... ,,, tIIu .""ptoo . "­

,,_'ra'" 	th_ ..,....1 ...e .. d.o. o..: • .on I p.y nth.... t .. ,boo ..alor 

.od pa'rl"t'•• of the rANk a. ,,~l.. 0--,,1 •• all ot the 10.... &Pd 

dttHcuUI.., d'''l'lta thoe ...~-t1~ut!lnl c lra., tM tor... ot the 

Kh... lepubllc r-aal..d tD the field to the .nd. 

P0 1~01 the hl~ 1...1. of coaba' activity tha t cn.••c ••• I~.d 

the porlod of CHlHL.t. U, tho Hnt th.....nth. of U72 .... a ".Uad 

lull h "cOl.-tty, a. the VC/WA ......Id Out l"IIo.le a.chltl.. I .. 

rAla( p"rtlcll"'t.d 1m 0p,,,'lon PUI 'tA and ....'feW. ClIEY. (.'lap If) 

In ••••••0 Ko.pons Cham Provine • • RVNAF wlthd....l of tt. OPElATION 

ro....~ l\lA.~ ....Ita p~.ed .ha FAN!( CO w!tlId.... the 2201 I r l ••de 

fro. lult 00 10 J.nuary 1912 . and red.ploy It to the vl.t..lty of llo..1t 
Map 14 - Locations of FANK Operations ANGKOR CHEY and PREK TA 

T H A L 

,,, 

A iN 

I 

D 

( 

1

-

\ , .'

i 

:c·e 

L A 

• 

? 

') 

o 

. ,..! ,~ 

5 

,? 

\ '-"\, 

? 

<;

, 

..--._,..,........'""\,J-l.. ... --./~... """""""". ..J"#' 

/-­ I 'v" 

r-/; , .. -"'\... /'" r

.• ! ,~. ~ "---~.A::---=~':-==::--------------'~=f- ffc---7f=-~---''''ivv'''''''--" 

, \ OPERATION I 

,,...; ( ANGKOR CHEY 

t-'~\ i 

(

: t\ SIEM REAP~; -a ! -'90".... \ fJI.'\ :"'·6 

, ~I' 0.... \ ~ ' 

GULF 

OF 

"'.. 

, 

ARVN 

TOAN THANG 

withdrew 

units 

OPERA~~ from Krek {' 

on Route 7. prompting FANK 

to withdraw the 22nd Brigade ' 

from the same area on 10 \ 

January 1972. \ 

j --"' . ../' . 

;~__________~_~~~~_-L_~~~____~~, 

a

THAILAND i 

I (' c 

! a 

j

I I 0 25 50 Nautical Miles 

I I • 

l I , 

104 i 0 25 50 KilolT.eters '06 

o 

100 

Luong. These withdrawals left this part of the province in enemy 

hands, and it was never again reoccupied by the FANK. Operation 

PREK TA, a combined FANK(ARVN operation involving 11 battalions, 

was launched on. 10 January south of Route 1, between the Mekong 

and the RVN border. In Siem Reap Province, OPERATION ANGKOR CREY 

WaS launched on 29 January with the objective of encircling the 

Ankor Wat/Angkor Thorn temple complex and ruins, and interdicting 

the flow of enemy supplies into the Angkor area. The enemy had 

been able to create a sort of sanctuary there because of our hesitation to risk damaging these national treasures. Initially the 

operation waS marked by small-scale skirmishes along Route 6. east 

and west of Siem Reap. On 21 February FANK units ran into stiff 

resistance as they tried to route the enemy from fortified positions along the southern periphery of the temple complex. 

Operations in Military Regions 1 and 2. 

and Against Phnom Penh. MaI'Ch-June 1972 

The three-month lull was broken on 20 March 1972 when the 

enemy directed attacks against Prey Veng City and Neak Luong. 

(Map 15) Friendly positions in and near Prey Veng City were subjected to heavy 60-mm, 82-mm mortar, 75-mm recoilless, and l20-mm 

rocket fire, followed by ground actions further south along Route 

15 and approximately 20 km west of Prey Veng City. An allied POL 

and ammunition storage depot at Neak Luong was also destroyed by 

l22-mm rocket fire. Cumulative friendly casualties were 18 killed, 

60 wounded, and ten missing, while enemy losses were 33 killed. 

ARVN's operation TOAN TRANG VIII, which began on 9 March north 

of Svay Rieng City, ended on 29 March with significant results. 

Enemy losses were reported as 764 killed (583 by air), 29 captured; 

1,117 individual weapons and 37 crew served weapons captured. Additionally 871 tons rice, 49 tons salt, 73,000 meters of communication wire and 24,000 litres of gasoline were captured and other 

miscellaneous items destroyed. Friendly losses were nine killed 

and 67 wounded. 

101 ' 
Map 15 - Areas of Operations, March -June 1972 

1(>4 

T H A L 

\ 

\~ 

il 

D 

OF 

THAILAND 

a 25 50 Nautical Miles 

',,..._-.,_,,-Ijr---.....J' 

u 25 50 Kilometers 

102 

cOmbat action in Military Region 2 stepped up significantly on 

23 March, following several months of only small scale enemy harassments. 

ARVN's 93d Ranger Battalion and 12th Armored Regiment were involved in 

several engagements in the vicinity of Kompong Trach, including at least 

three enemy ground assaults, while receiving over 500 rounds of mixed 

rocket and mortar fire from 23 to 31 March. 

At the same time as the attacks at Prey Veng, the enemy launched 

what was to that date (March 20) its heaviest rocket and mortar attack 

against Phnom Penh. (Map 16) Seven separate areas within the city's 

west and northwest sector, as well as positions near Pochenton Airfield, 

received a total of about 200 rounds of l22-mm rocket fire and 75-mm 

recoilless rifle fire. The shellings, accompanied by a ground attack 

against the government's radio transmitting facility southwest of the 

city, left 102 friendly killed (mostly civilians), 208 wounded, and 

400 families homeless; additionally, one light aircraft and more than 

200 wooden homes were destroyed, while four small aircraft and the radio 

station were damaged. In response to the attack on Phnom Penh, several 

small-scale (two-four battalion) clearing operations were immediately 

launched by FANK on the capital's outer perimeter. Terrorist incidents 

also increased in the capital area. Grenade attacks against a military 

dependents' housing area on the 26th and against a bus carrying military 

personnel in Phnom Penh on the 28th left 11 persons dead and 66 others 

wounded. 

Following the attacks of 21 March, the enemy ·conducted a series of 

terrorist and sabotage actions, mostly targeted against Cambodian shipping. 

On 23 March, a cargo vessel was sunk and another damaged on the Mekong 

near the Chruoy Chang War Naval Base. A few days later, two POL barges 

moored in the same area were damaged by floating mines. On the 24th, 

a span of the Chruoy Chang War Bridge was damaged when a vehicle containing an estimated 200 kilos of explosives was detonated at mid-point 

of the structure, killing four and wounding seven persons. The bridge 

was repaired with Bailey bridging and opened to traffic by the 27th. 

About one month later, on 18-19 April, the enemy renewed attacks 

along Route 1 east of the Mekong. Ivithin three days, a total of 22 

government positions along the highway had been abandoned, leaving only 

103 

.' 

o 

I 

o 

., 

" 

Q 

/".....-'l 

( \ , \ 

/ / I 

, .-;

''-' 

o o 

'\Iaut!caJ .\!Illes - , 

, 

o 

• 

.. 

2 

I 

~ Kilomerers 

•, 

0 

Route 3 o , 

0 00 

f(

, 

0 

p 

D ' • 

.­ •• c 

C> 

~-

~ 

~ 1:,,11 I ~ 

';:'j

<.' 

'\ " 

"=:.. 

c; ·ca·5·d, 74. 

10-" 

-'--.--­
Neak Luong, Svay Rieng and Bavet Village (near the border) in friendly 

hands. In response to the attacks, Neak Luong and Svay Rieng were 

reinforced and a route-clearing operation was launched toward Kompong 

Trabek. However, FANK forces had made little headway in reopening the 

roadway by the end of April. Five FANK battalions were withdrawn from 

training in the RVN to augment forces which were stalled about 6 km 

west of Kompong Trabek. Five FANK battalions previously stationed along 

Route 1 were unlocated. In a related activity, Prey Veng City received 

17 separate rocket, mortar and recoilless rifle fire attacks during the 

month; casualties were light and no significant damage reported. The 

city was isolated on 7 April by an estimated two-battalion enemy force 

located on Route 15 midway between Banam and Prey Veng City. Attempts 

to reopen the roadway were halted when the 23d Brigade (originally from 

Pursat) was redeployed to Neak Luong for use along Route 1. Two battalions of the 15th-Brigade were subsequently assigned to Prey Veng City 

to augment the garrison there in anticipation of increased enemy pressure. 

In Military Region 2, FANK/RVNAF forces continued to engage what were 

probably elements of the 1st NVA Division in the vicinity of Kompong 

Trach. The town was surrounded by the enemy in mid-April, creating 

a serious situation which was eased only after RVNAF reinforcements 

from Ha Tien arrived on 24 April. 

On 6 May, the Phnom Penh area received its second major attack by 

fire in less than two months. TIlis time the city, Pochenton airfiel~, 

and Chruoy Chang War Naval Base received attacks by rocket, mortar, and 

recoilless rifle fire, killing 28 persons and wounding 96 others (2/3 

civilians). An aircraft was destroyed and four other planes and several 

houses were damaged. Enemy sapper raids, estimated at battalion strength, 

were conducted in the city's southern environs against the Monivong 

Bridge, electric power station, and the Caltex storage facility. The 

attackers were repulsed after causing only light damage. The city was 

lightly shelled again on 9, 10, and 11 May. Beginning 26 May, Svay 

Rieng City was subjected to enemy attacks by fire and small-scale ground 

assaults, with no major casualties or damage reported. This increased 

action was probably designed to keep FANK confined to the city's defense, 

thereby facilitating a new logistic push by the enemy in southeast 

105 
Cambodia. ARVN Ranger units, supported by artillery and tactical air 

strikes, reported killing 180 enemy southwest of Kompong Trabek on 31 

May, while suffering 6 killed and 33 wounded. In Military Region 2, 

enemy forces further expanded their control over key terrain in 

southern Kampot and Takeo Provinces. Folfowing the capture of Kompong 

Trach on 30 April, the enemy advanced north on Route 16, forcing FANK 

to abandon five outposts and burning several towns in the wake of their 

attacks. RVNAF units continued to conduct cross-border operations in 

the area east of Kompong Trach in an effort to curb the flow of enemy 

supplies and reinforcements into the delta region of RVN. 

The month of June 1972 was marked by an attack by fire on the 

Phnom Penh area--the third since March--and the ambush of two FANK battalions. Phnom Penh was shelled by 18 rounds of 122-mfu rocket fire, 

impacting in the vicinity of the water works, railroad station, Ministry 

of National Defense and Pochentong airbase. Positions at Takhmau, 10 km 

south of Phnom Penh, received 100 rounds of 75-mm RR fire, followed 

by enemy ground attacks in the vicinity. Pochentong airfield was again 

hit on 11 June, this time by three 122-mm rockets, with no damage or 

casualties reported. Also three 107-mm rockets were fired from a 

Volkswagen Microbus against the Ministry of National Defense building 

on 5 June. The situation near Svay Rieng eased substantially during 

the month as enemy forces directed efforts towards RVN. Southeast of 

Neak Luong, two battalions of the 48th Khmer Krom Brigade were ambushed 

on 25 June in the most significant action along Route 1 since its 

closure on 18-19 April. Only 13 soldiers returned to friendly lines 

while approximately 600 others were offiCially unaccounted for. A 

joint ARVN/FANK operation to retake Route 1, and scheduled to be 

launched on 24-25 June, was subsequently delayed until 4 July. 

FA!lK Effor>ts to Keep Lines of Communications Open, 


July-December> 1972 


During the first few days of July 1972, active military operations 

slowed markedly for the inauguration activities of President Lon Nol, 

and no enemy actions marred the 3-day holiday period. On 4 July, FA.~ 

106 

launched OPERATION SORYA, a combined operation with ARVN, to seize 

Kompong Trabek; this was accomplished on 24 July. (Map 17) Five 

battalions of the 11th FANK Brigade Group and three battalions of 

the FANK 66th Brigade were left to hold FANK positions on Route 1, 

pending phase II of OPERATION SORYA, planned for late August. In 

Military Region 2, the enemy encircled Ang Tassom. (Map 18) Ang 

Tassom was relieved on 11 July while funeral services were being held 

at Phnom Penh for Brigadier General Kong.Chhaith, Takeo Province 

Governor, killed while leading the earlier relief efforts. In Military 

Region 3, Khmer Communist activities were instrumental in closing 

Route 5 to rice convoy traffic for about two weeks. 

The enemy reacted to FANK/ARVN successes at Kompong Trabek by 

attacking friendly positions on Route 1 on 6 August. These attacks 

were supported by enemy armor and left him in control of a 7-km section 

of Route 1, isolating five battalions of the FANK 11th Brigade Group 

west of Kompong Trabek. This was the first use of enemy armor in 

the Cambodia conflict. An NVA prisoner captured at Kompong Trabek 

stated that the tanks came from the Chup Plantation and were to return 

there after completing their mission in the Route 1 area. As of 24 

August, a total of 31 armored vehicles had been destroyed or damaged. 

OPERATION SORYA II was launched on 11 August with the objective of 

clearing the road and relieving the five surrounded FANK battalions. 

After 10 days of artillery and air strikes on enemy strongholds along 

the highway, allied forces (ARVN from Neak Luong and RVN) succeeded 

in linking up with 11th Brigade Group elements. A FANK garrison was 

established at Kompong Trabek. However, there was no immediate plan 

to push eastward toward Svay Rieng. South Vietnamese forces assumed 

pOSitions south of Route 1 along the RVN-Cambodia border, and Route 

15 between Neak Luong and Prey Veng City was reopened by government 

forces on 13 August. A FANK helicopter carrying refugees was shot down 

on the 8th by a SA-7 misSile, killing 14 people. In Siem Riep, FANK 

OPERATION ANGKOR CREY was dealt a serious blow when elements of the 

203d VC/KC Regiment recaptured Phnom Bakheng mountain a key terrain 

feature which had been in FANK hands since May 19 (MaD 19) Enemy 

control of this high ground left the Siem Reap airfield exposed to 

107 

Map 17 - Objective Area, OPERATION SORYA, July _ August 1972 

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101 

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Objective of 

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SORYA 

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SOUTH VIETNAM 

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108 

Map 18 - Area of Operation Along Route 2, July - December 1972 

Phnom Penh 

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harassing fire and denied to friendly air operations. As a result, the 

FANK were forced to use the Tonle Sap Lake and the new airfield south 

of Siem Reap for supply deliveries. 

After FANK's hard-won battle to relieve the garrison at Kompong 

Trabek in August, many of the FANK general reserve forces returned to 

Phnom Penh. The enemy then attacked Kompong Trabek in strength on 8 

September, forcing three FANK battalions to evacuate to Neak Luong, 

with two 10S-mm artillery pieces reported destroyed and two more captured. Three days later, the enemy attacked FANK territorial units on 

Phnom Baphnum, forcing a withdrawal from this important high ground 

north of Route 1. FANK reinforced with elements of Colonel Lon Non's 

3d Brigade Group from Phnom Penh and after limited progress by the 

3d Brigade Group, the enemy counterattacked in force on 16 September, 

using a riot control agent to disorganize the FANK forces. FANK 

managed to hold the southwest corner of the hill until 26 September, 

when it launched its own counterattack. The attack, relying on a 

frontal assault, bogged down quickly and FANK prepared for a new offensive after a realignment of troops. In Military Region 3, Route S 

remained closed during September despite the efforts of a FANK l7-battalion relief force. This interruption in the rice supply provoked 

a "rice crisis" in the capital and a two-day period (7 - 8 September) 

of rice looting and demonstrations in which FANK soldiers were involved. 

A number of stores were broken into and rice was taken or bought at 

low prices. The government acted decisively to reestablish order; 

leaves and passes for FANK personnel were cancelled; mixed patrols of 

FANK soldiers and MP's circulated in the city; announcements of extraordinary measures to solve the rice shortage were made. This was followed by the first rice shipments to Phnom Penh 'by air, and these 

stabilized the situation within 48 hours; Phnom Penh was essentially 

calm after 12 September. In the capital area, the Prek Phnou POL storage 

facility received 30 rounds of mixed 82-mm and 7S-mm fire on 31 August. 

At the same time, enemy mortar and ground attacks against surprised 

F&~ personnel guarding two brigades near Prek Phnou left 2S killed, 

19 ',;ounded and 6 missing. On 4 August, the cargo vessel PACLOG DISPATCH 

was sunk while at anchor in the Phnom Penh port. On 27 September, 

111 

unknown terrorists attempted assassination of Mr. Enders, U.S. Charge 

d'Affaires; approximately 15 kilos of plastic were exploded near his 

car as he exited Independence Circle on the way tu the U.S. Embassy. 

Mr. Enders escaped unharmed, although his car was destroyed by the 

explosion and subsequent fire. A security outrider and a passing cyclist 

were killed. 

On 7 October, an enemy sapper force of about 100 infiltrated into 

the northern part of Phnom Penh and attacked the Chruoy Chang War Bridge 

and the M-113 APC parking area near the west end of the same bridge. A 

large cut was blown in the bridge, sufficient to prevent its use for 

the time being, and a total of seven M-113 APCs were destroyed. The 

FANK reaction force killed 83 of the attacking force and prevented the 

sappers from carrying out what appeared to be intended attacks on the 

Prek Phnou POL facility and the main municipal electrical power plant 

on Chruoy Chang War Peninsula. Again on 30 October, the enemy launched 

a series of attacks by fire against sensitive installations in the 

capital area. Ammunition in a storage facility near Pochentong airfield 

was destroyed, and the Komboul radio station was heavily damaged. by 

enemy indirect fire. In Military Region 2, elements of the 1st NVA 

Division put heavy pressure on FANK positions south of Takeo, systematically overrunning or forcing evacuation of Kirivong, Tun Loap, Nui 0 

Mountain, Kompong Chrey, Lovea, and Koh Andet. ARVN initiated crossborder operations on 11 October to break up what they viewed as a pr·elude to an important infiltration of troops and supplies, but the intervention was too late to save the FANK positions. The commander of 

the 15th Brigade Group, which had been operating in the area, was 

seriously wounded and the Brigade Group ceased to exist as an effective 

unit. FANK presence returned to the area following successful ARVN 

operations. In Military Region 3, despite strenuous efforts by the FANK, 

a five-km section of Route 5 remained in enemy hands during October, 

denying it to the movement of rice into the capital. 

During November, FANK gradually overcame enemy resistance on Route 

5 and a total of five convoys were able to make the trip (BattambangPhnom Penh) without incident. At Takeo, strong enemy pressure built up 

against the town early in the month; several positions on the outer 

112 

aefense belt fell beoween 5 and 8 November, thereby isolating Ang 

Tassom on Route 3 and Prey Sandek on Route 2. Nightly attacks by 

fire and probes against the town caused significant casualties among 

the civilian population. USAF units responded with daily air support 

as well as aerial resupply of ammunition. Beginning 16 November, the 

pressure on the town fell off gradually. Elements of three FANK battalions were helilifted into Takeo on KAF URIs at intervals during 

the month and, on 30 November, FANK launched the first phase of an 

operation to clear the enemy from central Route 2. 

During December, FANK units were able to open Route 4 after the 

enemy had closed it at the end of October. On Route 2, FANK units 

relieved the garrison at Prey Sandek on 4 December, breaking a" sixweek isolation. FANK engineers worked for several weeks to complete 

the repairs to Route 2, needed after the fighting on the road in 

October and November, and finished the task on 16 December. Repairs 

were also made on the roads from Takeo to Ang Tassom and to Prey 

Sandek, opening these villages to convoy resupply for the first time 

since October. FANK and ARVN forces then turned their attention to 

the last remaining section of Route 2 still under enemy control, the 

section from Prey Sandek to Tun Loap. In combined operations launched 

21 December with an A.~VN regiment, three Ranger battalions, armored 

cavalry support, and three FANK battalions and the Parachute brigade, 

the road was cleared by 23 December. Both FANK and ARVN Engineers 

began bridge reconstruction and road repair that day, while combat 

forces moved westward on 29 December to retake Kirivong. However, 

the major enemy offensive effort in December was directed against 

Kompong Thom, in Military Region 4, where an estimated 4,000-7,000 

mixed KC and NVA troops attacked on 7 December. The 3,000-man FANK 

garrison suffered heavy losses in the first owo days of fighting, 

giving up four defensive positions to the west and southwest of town, 

with over 400 listed as missing. USAF tactical air strikes helped 

to slow the offensive as F&~ readjusted its defensive perimeter. 

FANK and USAF also reacted with aerial resupply of vitally needed 

ammunition. Enemy effort then shifted to light ground probes and 

113 

nightly mortar attacks. FANK Hq began to reinforce Kompong Thom on 

19 December with 12th Brigade troops from Siem Reap. 77th Brigade 

troops from Phnom Penh were staged out of Kompong Chhnang in a helicopter shuttle. The enemy made another drive on 23-24 December but 

the attack was driven off by a strong defense with major assistance 

from USAF strikes. On 27 December, FANK shifted to the counterattack, 

expanding the Kompong Thom perimeter to the west and southwest and 

permitting the farmers to harvest rice ~long Route 6. At the end of 

the month, enemy pressure continued at a reduced level. On the Mekong, 

most significant was the increase of frogman activity in Phnom Penh 

Port, resulting in the sinking of the cargo ship Bright Stap on 7 

December (with all cargo still on board) and a POL barge on 15 December. 

The sinking of the ship resulted in the commander of the Khmer Navy 

being charged with responsibility for port security. The enemy harassed 

two of three scheduled northbound Mekong River convoys during December. 

The Enemy Dry-Season Offensive, JanuaPy-JuZy 1973 

We had hoped that the cease-fire in South Vietnam would also bring 

peace to Cambodia, that the enemy would respect the FANK unilateral 

suspension of offensive operations order by Marshal Lon Nol, effective 

29 January 1973. But this was not to be. While the VC/NVA activities 

in January were clearly directed toward the RVN, Khmer Communist units 

supported the VC/NVA with initiatives throughout Cambodia in January. 

The most continuous enemy pressure was exerted on Kompong Thom, but 

without success. The KC and VC/NVA initially achieved gains on Route 

1 and along the Mekong south of Neak Luong. Poor performance by FANK 

territorial units along the Mekong was compensated for somewhat by rapid 

and effective operations by two brigades of the 2d Division and the Khmer 

Navy, where working together, they quickly regained the lost position. 

F&~ kept all major LOCs open during the month except for a two-day 

period during uhicl, one ~[ekong convoy was delayed. A major FANK operation "as the relief of the battalion-size outpost at Romeas, southwest 

of Kom~ong Q,hnang. An unidentified enemy force estioated at 2-3 battalions, encircled the battalion outpost on 6 JanUary. Sasualties 

114 
mounted steadily inside the camp from probes and shellings until 13 

January when FANK committed some eleven battalions to the relief of 

the outpost. Two columns proceeding from Kompong Chhnang and Sala Lek 

Pram made slow progress against moderate resistance. Realizing relief 

would not arrive in time, FANK field commanders switched to an airmobile 

assault on 16 January. The 210 man force was intercepted and dispersed 

by the enemy prior to linkup with the camp. FANK then committed another 

750 men by helicopter on 19 and 21 January, with the combined group 

reaching Romeas on 23 January. USAF tactical strikes and aerial delivery 

of ammunition played a vital role in the defense and linkup operation. 

By early February, it was clear that the KC had no intention of 

accepting Lon I<ol's call for a cease-fire. During February, KC units 

launched a major offensive along the Mekong and made secondary efforts 

on Routes 2 and 3 and at Kompong Thom. These initiatives appeared to 

be aimed at exploiting the unilateral suSpension of offensive actions 

announced by President Lon Nol and the associated decrease in U.S. air 

operations in the Khmer Republic following 29 January. FANK reacted 

with effective U.S. air support, and contained the major enemy efforts. 

Active U.S. air support permitted the passage of two major convoys 

despite the presence of well over two KC regiments actively employed 

by the enemy on both banks of the Mekong. The major enemy effort of 

the month began 6 February with attacks on FANK positions in the Neak 

Luong-Banam-Prey Veng corridor. An early thrust made against Route "15 

between Prey Veng and Banam was repulsed by units under control of the 

Prey Veng commander. The enemy then shifted his efforts southward 

between Banam and Neak Luong, seizing Banam itself on 10 February and 

cutting Route 15. FANK's counterattack was unproductive. Four battalions moved up Route 15 and halted in place two km outside Banam. 

Two battalions from the 78th Brigade, committed by MNK craft to the 

west and north of Banam, suffered heavy casualties from enemy fire. 

These battalions refused further combat and were returned to Phnom Penh. 

The 78th Brigade, to which these battalions belonged, was a rapidly assembled collection of companies, battalions and fillers, brought together 

for the newly created 2d Division. Enemy pressure against FANK positions 

along the east bank of the Mekong remained constant during the month. 

115 

As a result of this pressure a 13-km section of the river bank below 

Neak Luong was not under FANK control by the end cf the month. Above 

Neak Luong, the river bank between parallels 50 and 56 remained under 

enemy control for the last three weeks of the month. (Map 20) Banam 

was retaken on 27 February by a volunteer force from the 43d Brigade, 

and the east bank was cleared by FANK on 29 February. USAF tactical 

sorties continued at a high level during February as a special USAF 

operation was mounted to break the enemy siege of Kompong Thom and to 

provide close air support for ground operations in the Route 15 and 

Routes 2 and 3 areas. Limited U.S. strategic air was used on pre-selected targets, generally in the Chup-Tapano Plantation area during 

one 24-hour period. 

In March, the general military situation reached a critical stage 

1 fur the FANK. Enemy efforts continued at a high level throughout the 

country, directed primarily at the Takeo area and the Mekong-Route 1 

corridor. Early in the month Prey Sandek, 9 km south of Takeo, was 

isolated. On 9-10 March, a two-company position east of Takeo was overrun, as were two positions on Route 2 north of Chambak. On 12 March, 

both Prey Sandek and Chambak were lost, and the three battalions at 

Chambak were dispersed. On 13 March, the 45th Brigade of the 7th Division was committed to attack east from Tram Khnar to retake Chambak and 

Samroang Yong. This mission was shared by elements of the 3d Division 

moving south along Route 2 from Phnom Penh. The 45th Brigade was stopped 6 km west of its objective with heavy casualties. On 16 March, 

Brigadier General Un Kauv, 7th Division commander took command of the 

operation and reinforced the 45th Brigade with the remaining elements 

of his division. His arrival, and four U.S. B-52 strikes, resulted in 

rapid progress against decreasing enemy resistance. The 7th Division 

reached Chambak on 18 March, followed by the 3d Division on 20 March, 

and the road was opened to Takeo on 23 March. On 31 Xarch, the enemy 

renewed his offensive, this time against the 7th Division positions. 

lThe situation was further complicated by an attempt on the life of 

President Lon ~ol, carried out by a former Khmer pilot on 17 Xarch, when 

he appropriated a T-28 and dropped two bombs near the Presidential Palace. 
Map 20 - Areas of the Mekong Controlled by the Enemy. February - April 1973 

J 

.4~ 

~ihe.r i!•.it: 

'suor ,,0 

~ 

i)Are.. of Mekong 

River controlled 

by enemy, FebApril, 1)97=!-~,,-

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I 

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9 

8 

7 

6 

5 

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CI-<:8-13 

117 

The enemy's action, primarily attacks by fire plus a costlY'ambush, led 

to the withdrawal of the 7th Division forces to Chambak; substantial ma2 teriel losses were incurred, including five 10s-mm howitzers. In spite 

of significant FANK reinforcements nprth of Takeo, air drops to isolated 

units and substantial u.s. air support, the enemy retained control of 

Route 2 south of Takeo and much of Route 2 to the north of Takeo City. 

In the Mekong-Route 1 corri40r, meanwhile, after safe passage of a 

Mekong convoy on 29 March, the enemy launched heavy attacks on both sides 

of the river, overrunning several FANK territorial company positions and 

controlling some 25 km of the east bank of the Mekong. On the west bank 

of the Mekong, the enemy was also successful in overrunning six FANK po­ ---. 

sitions along Route I, leaVing him in control of some 25 km of Route 1 

north of Neak Luong. On 31 March, Brigadier General Dien Del, Commander 

of the 2d FANK Division was given overall responsibility for the clearing 

of Route 1. 

During April, the enemy continued the offensive actions in southern 

Cambodia, begun in March, making his greatest sustained effort to take 

complete control of the Mekong and capture Takeo. Enemy forces approached 

to within artillery and mortar range of Phnom,Penh, where rationing of 

gasoline and electricity impressed many with the gravity of the situation. 

Several foreign embassies evacuated non-essential personnel and the U.S. 

Embassy evacuated its dependents. After initial FANK success in deploying 

troops along the Mekong corridor in early April, enemy forces again 'cut 

Route 1 and had occupied substantial portions of both banks of the Mekong 

at month's end. 3d Division elements were driven back north on Route 2 

to positions north of Siem Reap/Kandal, some 10 km from the outskirts of 

Phnom Penh. After Siem Reap was retaken, it was inexplicably abandoned 

by these same elements under no enemy pressure, thus opening the southern flank of the capital's defense. The high command ordered the town retaken and after a delay of two days, Siem Reap was occupied, once again with 

no resistance. Takeo continued to hold against heavy enemy attacks by fire 

and ground pressure, thanks to a very heavy application of air power, re2The 7th Division waS pulled off line on 1 April and replaced in 


Chambak by the 37th Brigade. On 2 April, the 37th Brigade was routed and 


Chambak fell, leaving an 11 km stretch of road between Chambak and Thnal 


Totung under enemy control. 


,U8 
"..... 

"..... 

-


inforcement by several battalions, and U.S. aerial resupply of ammunition. 

At southern Kampot Province, the sea resort of Kep fell on 16 April. At 

the beginning of April, FANK controlled only some 30 percent of the Mekong 

River bank. The last April convoy was delayed 12 days as FANK reinforced 

with elements of more than two brigades and then conducted clearing operations on the east and west banks. As the security situation improved in 

the Cambodian portions of the Mekong. it deteriorated in South Vietnam in 

the vicinity of Tan Chau. Because of heavy harassment in RVN, the convoy 

was only able to penetrate the border in two sections on successive days. 

The final section was only able to close Phnom Penh on 15 April. FANK 

maintained security of the Mekong through the passage of the next convoy 

on 24 April which again suffered heavy enemy attacks in the vicinity of 

the SVN border. Towards the end of the month, FANK gave up important 

portions on the east bank and Route 1 was closed again north of Neak 

Luong. In spite of a declining security situation on the Mekong, the 

Khmer Navy was able to transit at night one tug pulling an important ammunition barge. Enemy efforts against Mekong shipping during April resulted in the loss of one POL and one munitions barge, two cargo ships, 

and the damage of eight ships. The crew of one POL ship refused to sail 

and had to be replaced. Commodore Vong Sarendy, Commander Khmer Navy, 

was formally designated commander of the Mekong Special Zone. 

The enemy offensive continued into May, but slowed at month's end, 

due in part to high levels of U.S. air support. On the Mekong, the' 

enemy continued to control portions of both banks. Six merchant convoys 

(three each way) received 56 major hits, causing the loss of one ship. 

Relatively speaking, the month of June began on a positive note 

for the FANK, a carry-over from May. Route 5, which had been closed 

for two months, was reopened on 5 June. A Mekong convoy arrived in 

Phnom Penh without serious harassment. This breathing spell did not 

last, however, as the enemy launched an offensive on Route 4 only 

25 km from Phnom Penh. FAc,'K committed four brigades (7, 13, 28, 43), 

supported by two squadrons of M-113s and some 12 l05-mm howitzers. 

Both U.S. and Khmer air units provided air support as weather permitted, 

and FANK's superior numbers and firepower -- due to U.S. air support -­

119 

forced the enemy to withdraw. A FANK night attack against the remaining 

enemy position on 19 June permitted convoys to move on Route 4 the 

following day. Route 5 was reopened to traffic on 7 June, and three 

rice convoys reached Phnom Penh before the enemy closed the road again 

on 16 June. 

Although the military situation continued to deteriorate in July, 

the FANK were able to survive another month of the enemy offensive 

which had begun six months previously. The enemy appeared to shift 

from his earlier strategy of attacking major LaCs to one of more direct 

assault on the capital. As the month began, there were three active 

combat areas in the region of Phnom Penh: (Map 21) 

1. Route 2 and 3. Originally an adjunct to Route 4 operations 

in June, this LOC became a major combat area in July as the enemy offensive spread from Route 4 east into the near regions of the capital• . Early in June, the 3d Division (-) had initiated sweep operations south 

of the Prek Thnaot River which threatened the east flank of the enemy's 

Route 4 attack. Reacting sharply to the threat, the enemy drove the 

3d Division units back 5 kms to Route 3, with over 100 casualties. 

Following that, the 3d DiviSion (-) held to the road in a basically 

defensive posture, conducting only shallow sweeps away from the LaC. 

Two key positions held by the Division fell in mid and late June. 

Counterattacks proved ineffective but served to prevent the enemy from 

penetrating Phnom Penh's inner defenses. On 6 July, the enemy captured 

the Kompong Iuol Bridge, a district headquart~rs, and neighboring town, 

following a sharp attack. Casualties in the FANK 3d Division were 

high, and increased further as the 43d Brigade, cut off south of the 

Prek Thnaot River, exfiltrated to the north following an unsuccessful 

FANK airmobile operation to relieve it six days later. The 3d Division 

could not hold against subsequent attacks and fell back another four 

kms. U.S. air support stabilized the situation and the commander of 

the 3d Division was replaced. Despite U.S. air support on a 24-hour 

basis, F&~K was not able to push its defense line south to the Prek 

Thnaot River during July. 

2. The Phnom Baset approach. This area, northwest of Phnom Penh, 

was controlled by the F&~ 7th Division. Despite strong efforts by 

120 
Map 21 - Combat Areas Near Phnom Penh, July 1973 

-


-


-


-


/

COMBATAREA#3,­__________~~----_J: KOMPONG LUONG 

COMBAT AREA#2 

KOMPONG SPEU PREK THNAOT 
the enemy, which rendered ineffective the 72d Brigade (previously 

critically understrength), the 7th Division fought back aggressively 

and, in concert with U.S. air support, inflicted heavy casualties 

on the enemy and was in control by the end of July. Units from the 

7th Division, as well as others from the Phnom Penh and 2d Military 

Region were committed hastily to counter enemy threats northwest of 

Pochentong during the prior week. With the general reserve fully 

committed, FANK was forced to withdraw sorely needed units from other 

battlefields, notably Route 3 and Phnom Baset, to counter this developing threat. 

3. Phnom Del. The FANK were unable to hold on to its two 

remaining positions in the area north of the capital; they fell in 

quick succession on 6 and 9 July despite aerial resupply and reinforcement. The last chance to retain a friendly presence in this area 

disappeared when an airmobile operation by the Parachute Brigade was 

cancelled in order to send the parachutists to the more critical Route 

3 area. On 13 July, the enemy captured the ferry site at Prek Kdam. 

The First 	Months Without U.S. Air Support, 

August - Deaember 1973 

The enemy dry-season offensive against Phnom Penh came to an end 

in August and the capital area entered a period of lessened activity 

which lasted into December. The 3d Division reestablished control of 

the north bank of the Prek Thnaot River, and the 1st Division was able 

to clear Route 1 south to Neak Luong. 

However, north of Phnom Penh there was heavy fighting in the 

Route 6, Route 7, Kompon~ Cham areaS. (Map 12) With the fall of Tang 

Kouk, Skoun, Prey Totung and Traeung, FANK lost eight lOS-mm howitzers, 

two mortars, large stocks of ammunition, three battalions and 19 territorial companies to the enemy. By 16 August the enemy was able to 

direct all his efforts to capturing the first provincial capital of 

the war, Kompong Cham; a series of shelling attacks, followed by strong 

ground attacks caused the FANK defense line around Kompong Cham to be 

steadily threatened along with the loss of full use of the airfield. 

122 

FANK reinforced initially with the 79th Brigade, two battalions of the 

~ Parachute Brigade, two battalions of the 5th Brigade, and an additional 

battery of four 10S-mm howitzers. Efforts to restore or expand the 

~ perimeter were unsuccessful. The enemy's main effort to take the city 

came on 1 September with heavy mortar and 10S-mm fire, and multiple 

ground attacks which penetrated the FANK defensive line to within 1 km 

of the city. FANK forces were able to stop the enemy's momentum and 

stabilize the situation on 2 September. The two remaining battalions ~ 

of the 5th Brigade and the Parachute Brigade, two Special Forces 

Detachments, and 12 Navy craft were designated as additional reinfor­

~ cements for Kompong Cham. Major General Sar Hor, the commander, was 

given authority to give up the airfield in order to defend -the city 

-

~ proper. The situation continued to deteriorate despite the arrival 

of the remainder of the 5th Brigade. On 7 September, following the 

exfiltration of two Parachute Battalions from the airfield to the city, 

and the arrival of a l6-ship naval task force, FANK contained the enemy's 

advance and slowly began to push him back from within the city. The 

80th Brigade arrived by navy convoy on 10 September and was immediately 

inserted south of the city behind the enemy. By 14 September the enemy 

had been cleared from the city; link-up was made between the 80th 

Brigade elements and city defense forces, the university area had been 

- reoccupied, and FANK had gained offensive momentum which continued 

throughout the month. As FANK advanced and regained control of lost 

territory, enemy efforts diminished to attacks by fire and ground probes 

of friendly positions at the airfield. As the month ended, FANK reoccupied and controlled I'at Angkor Knong, the village of Boeng Kok, the 

-

textile factory, and were effecting linkup with friendly forces at the 

airfield. During the last week of September, approximately 100 Air 

Force personnel were heli-lifted to Kompong Cham airfield to bolster 

defenses against enemy ground attacks. 

During October there was again heavy fighting along the Prek 

Thnaot River. On 1 October the last elements of the 3d Division 

~ located south of the river were either withdrawn to the north bank or 

overrun. On 2 October, F&~ was forced to abandon Kompong Toul and 

Kompong Kantout, suffering casualties of 26 killed, 51 wounded, and 

123 -
30 missing. The 1st Division was ordered to reinforce on 3 October 

and committed its 1st Brigade in the zone of the 3d Division and its 

48th Brigade, reinforced by one M-113 squadron, to move along Route 

2. Between 4 and 20 October the FANK units conducted various maneuvers 

but no progress was made. Approximately two companies of enemy infiltrated north of the Prek Thnaot River in the 1st Brigade, 1st Division 

zone and remained lodged there as the month ended. A constant exchange 

of fire at long range and a lack of ground initiative by both forces 

characterized the combat action during October. During the last week, 

3d Division elements moved south across the Prek Thnaot River at night 

and established a foothold on the southern banks. The continuous daily 

shelling of friendly pOSitions by enemy indirect fire weapons caused 

casualties to already severely understrength FANK battalions which 

exceeded replacements received by the 1st and 3d Divisons. 

The most significant activities in November were the losses of 

Tram Khnar, Srang, Tuk Laak, and Vihear Suor. The garrison at Vihear 

Suor was overrun and occupied by the enemy on 30 November. (Map 20) 

FANK attempts to link-up with Vihear Suor since 11 November had faltered 

for many reasons. Losses at Vihear Suor were: two 10S-mmhowitzers, 

two 7S-mm howitzers, six 8l-mm mortars, six 82-mm mortars and an unknown 

amount of ammunition. 

December was highlighted by FANK efforts on Route 4. On 18 December 

units of the 13th Brigade, the 28th Brigade and one M-113 squadron demonstrated the ability to react rapidly when the enemy interdicted Route 

4 between Kompong Speu and Phnom Penh. FANK troops cleared the enemy 

from the road after 12 hours of fighting. On 3 December, the 1st 

Division was committed to the task of clearing the month-old interdiction 

of Route 4, west of Kompong Speu, extending from Sre Khlong (VT240S20) 

north to Moha Saing (VT38062l). In contrast to the action mentioned 

above, the 1st Division did not effectively use its available combat 

power. When the battle was joined with the enemy the commander complained 

of lack of air and artillery support. These assets were made available 

to him on a priority basis and the 20th Brigade waS also placed under 

the 1st Division operational control. During the last week of December, 

the 13th Brigade was assigned the task of securing the north flank of 

124 

the 1st Division to allow the 1st Division to concentrate force on a more 

narrow front. The Assistant Chief of Staff, FANK Operations, Major General Mao Sum Khem, was appointed overall commander of the Route 4 clearing ,.-­

operation. However, on 29 December, front-line units of the 1st Division 

withdrew approximately 2 km, giving up key terrain features previously 

secured. The situation was so tenuous in the 1st Division that Marshal 

Lon Nol saw fit to visit the front himself on 30 December 1973. Four newly 

arrived 155-mm howitzers, assigned to the 1st Division, were also displaced 

to provide more firepower to the defense effort. A third M-113 squadron 

was committed on 30 December, and Route 4 was reopened on 6 January 1974. 

Dry Season Operations. January - July 1974 

Military operations during the period January through July 1974 were 

highlighted by heavy enemy attacks northwest and northeast of Phnom Penh 

and with major FANK reactions to restore the defenses of the capital in 

these sectors. In addition, there was significant combat along the 

Bassac River corridor, and a major enemy effort against the city of 

Kampot. By this time the defenses of Phnom Penh were organized generally 

into four sectors. (Map 22) 

On the night of 5 January an estimated two enemy regiments moved 

into the northwest sector, approximately 5-6 km from Phnom Penh. FANK 

reacted on the morning of 6 January by committing the 28th Brigade, -reinforced with two 11-113 squadrons. Heavy fighting ensued on 6 and 7 January in the vicinity of VT8079 and 100 enemy were killed in action. On 

8 January the 1st Division was committed to the operation as its subordinate units became available from the Route 4 clearing operation. By 10 

January, over 300 enemy had been killed in action with friendly losses of 

2 killed and 56 wounded. Eleven prisoners were captured and 13 KC soldiers 

rallied at Bek Chan (VT727l) on 10 January. Fighting continued for 12 

more days as the 28th Brigade, moving from the south and the 1st Division 

moving from the east attempted to reduce the enemy penetration. One brigade of the 7th Division was also committed to the operation to move south 

toward VT7684 in an attempt to seal off the penetration. This force never 

125 
Map 22 - Defense Sectors for Phnom Penh, January 1974 

7 r----9e----r---------------~~~--------------_+-----------------------------90 

80 , 

PREK PHNQU 

NORT WEST SECTOR 

~.'i"'--""­

~'I.-----3 3 

90 

I 

NORTHEAST SECTOR 

7 

\

NAVAL 

BASE 

NORTHEAST 

CHROUY CHANG 

WAR BRIDGE 

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SOUTHWEST SECTOR I 

PHNOM PENH 

, 

I SOUTHEAST 

SECTOR 

\ 

\ 

" 

~ SOUTHWEST /

SECTOR 

SOUTHEAST ~;r,' '" 

J::,' 80 -\­ S~CTOR :i' VT -\­ _ ,?-..-/ 

70 5 6 7 km 90 ... r.~ r-----­ ---+-+-~~~~~~~~~~--~~~--~----~~--~--~--~.~ '~V~70 

Route 20' 

TAKHMAU ~ ~;' 

'~l' 

DEFENSE SECTOR: 

-XX-lCX­

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,

, 

, 

126 

joined battle with the enemy, nor did it succeed in sealing off the 

penetration. Using his penetration as a firing base, the enemy was able 

to fire approximately 20 rounds of 75-mm RR fire and five 122-mm rockets 

against targets in the northwest part of Phnom Penh and Pochentong Airport. Casualties were light and negligible damage was caused by these 

shellings. Supported by heavy air and artillery strikes, the 1st Divi­

·sion succeeded on 22 January in breaking through the shoulders of the 

penetration and the enemy withdrew to the west. Casualties from the 

northwest sector fighting in the 1st Division zone were: 31 friendly 

killed and 175 wounded; an estimated 200 enemy were killed, 26 POWs taken 

and 70 weapons captured. In the 28th Brigade zone casualties were: 35 

friendly killed and 268 wounded; an estimated 300 enemy were killed and 

121 weapons were captured. 

Attention shifted from the northwest to the southwest capital defense sector on 19 January when enemy elements infiltrated the 3d Division's frontline positions, causing the 334th Battalion to withdraw 

without orders. Adjacent battalions then withdrew from the south of 

Route 201 "long Grid Line 63 to positions north of the Prek Thnaot River. 

Within 24 hours, much of the 3d Division front had withdrawn to positions 

north of the Prek Thnaot River, despite the fact that very little enemy 

pressure had been exerted. At least two battalion commanders were absent 

during the initial action and a breakdown of command and control resulted 

in this withdrawal of units, composed mostly of inexperienced recruits. 

The battalions of the 51st Brigade, securing the Bak Bridge (VT9064) 

sustained several killed in action on 20 January, indicating that the 

enemy had been able to move a sizable force as far north as the Prek 

Thnaot River. The most threatened area during the initial enemy penetration was in the vicinity of Prey Veng (VT8266) where the 15th Brigade CP 

and four 105-mm howitzers were positioned. On 20 and 21 January, FANK 

high command reacted to the newly developed threat by attaching two additional battalions from the 1st Division to the 3d Division and directing 

the 20th Brigade to move from Route 4 to the southwest sector. Upon 

ar-iva1, the 20th Brigade was committed to reinforce the weakened 51st 

Brigade from VT8768 east to VT 8967. On 27 January, the 20th Brigade 

had a significant engagement with enemy forces at VT8867 but held its 

127 

positions and inflicted losses of 39 killed on the enemy. F~'iendly 

losses were 17 killed and 2S wounded. An additional two battalions 

of the 81st Brigade, 1st Division were committed on 20 - 21 January 

to counterattack to the so~th and east of Prey Veng from VT8366 to 

VT8S67. On 23 January the entire southwest sector was subdivided to 

significantly reduce the 3d Division's defensive sector and improve 

unity of command. The 1st Divisio~ was then committed to secure the 

Prek Thnaot from VT8466 east to VT9166. In an additional move to 

improve the command and control structure, FANK gave Brigadier General 

Yai Sindy responsibility for the area west of grid line 77 and formed 

a composite unit by placing the 12th, 23d and 28th Brigades under his 

command. On 30 January the situation had stabilized to the eX,tent 

that the 20th Brigade was withdrawn from its positions on the Prek 

Thnaot River and moved to Prey Pring (West of Pochenton) in preparation 

for a new operation. On 1 February 74, the 1st Division's 1st Brigade 

replaced the 20th Brigade on the Prek Thoat River and as January ended 

it appeared that FANK had contained the enemy in the southwest sector 

and reestablished control of its units. 

The FANK seized the dry season initiative from the enemy in 

February, pushing back the enemy in both the northwest and southern 

sectors of Phnom Penh. The KG, their penetration stopped by FANK in 

early February, shifted to lOS-rom howitzer attacks on the city. One 

attack, on 11 February, caused civilian casualties of over 200 kill..d 

and wounded, with some 10,000 rendered homeless. FANK counterattacks 

late in February forced out the enemy from his January gains. 

The 80th Brigade was moved to Phnom Penh on 6 February and committed on 9 February to clear the northwest sector in conjunction with 

the armor brigade, the 23d Brigade, the 28th Brigade and units of the 

7th Divisiom. Enemy resistance was very determined from 9-14 February, 

until the 80th Brigade, reinforced ,dth tI,e 1-I-ll3 squadron of the 7th 

Division, penetrated the enemy's primary defense lines. Once penetration occurred. the enemy effected an orderly withdrawal, while FANK 

units advanced methodically through the entire enemy-held area. Sweeps 

of the battle area after fighting ceased revealed that the enemy was 

equipped with M-72 light assault weapons (LAW), 7S-rom RR and 57-rom RR 

128 , 

and that much of the equipment was either new or in excellent condition. 

Fighting decreased progressively until 26 February when FANK units linked 

up north of Tuol Leap (VT7379). FANK losses during the period 6 - 25 

February were 66 killed and 515 wounded in the northwest sector of Phnom 

Penh defenses. 

The enemy continued to attack and harass convoy shipping throughout 

February and two incidents of mining occurred on the Mekong. Nine attacks 

by fire were reported on convoys which "resulted in two killed and seven 

wounded, with the most significant on 18 February when the tug Bannock 

and the ammunition barge Mt. Hood received 75-~ RR fire and 12.8-~ 

machine-gun fire at WT2121. This subsequently resulted in the loss of 

approximately 1.4 million dollars of munitions and severe damage to the 

barge. The tug Saigon 240 with ammunition barge 108-1 sustained several 

hits from B41 rockets which destroyed an estimated 50.3 tons of munitions. 

A total of 11 convoys transited the Mekong during. February (6 to Phnom 

Penh and 5 from Phnom Penh). TWelve new PBRs were delivered to the 

Navy under U.S. military assistance. 

During March, the major military activity shifted away from Phnom 

Penh and to the provincial capitals of Oudong and Kampot. The enemy was 

able to overrun Oudong, but the defenses of Kampot held. 

Enemy pressure on Kampot commenced on 26 February with attacks 

north of the city. During the first week of March, several territorial 

companies and units of the 12th Brigade and the 68th Battalion abandoned 

defensive positions without authority. These actions combined with a 

dwindling water supply (the enemy had captured the city water works) 

caused an exodus of over 50% of the civilian inhabitants from the city. 

Enemy directed l07-mm rockets, l20-mm mortars and other lower caliber 

attacks against both tactical units/facilities and the civilian populace 

in Kampot City also added to the rapidly deteriorating situation. The 

210th and the 68th Battalions were deactivated after approximately 

300 troops deserted during the period 26 February - 2 March 74; the 

remaining troops were reassigned to the 12th Battalion. Effective support from Navy, Air Force, and artillery units during this critical time 

provided the FANK high command enough time to reinforce. The 20th and 

12th Brigades were deployed to Kampot and directed to attack northeast, 

129 

parallel to Route 3 to retake the Chakrei Ting Cement Factory (VT2080). 

Virtually no advance was made by either unit, however; rather, a defense 

posture developed once enemy strengths and dispositions were fully 

developed. During the period 2 - 10 March two more Army battalions, 

some Navy personnel, and six 10S-mm howitzers were deployed to Kampot, 

and Major General Mhoul Khleng was sent to command all FANK units in 

Kampot. FANK/USAF aerial resupply operations increased appreciably; four 

new 10S-mm howitzers were sent to Kampot to replace four older weapons. 

Early rain during mid-March somewhat alleviated the water problem (the 

Navy continued to resupply water reguarly); and finally, KAF priorities 

(airlift and tactical air support) were realigned to help the beleaguered 

and dwindling enclave. As of 3 April FANK defensive positions near Hill 

169 (VS0767S2), which dominates the Kampot Airfield, had been abandoned 

after the enemy effectively isolated the positions. The 20th and 12th 

Brigades sustained significant casualties during the month, and by 2 

April their effective strengths had been reduced to 664 and 827 respectively. The FANK high command sent Major General Fan Moung, Assistant 

Chief of the General Staff for Operations, to Kampot on 2 April to assess 

the situation and immediately after his arrival it was decided to make 

an all out effort to further reinforce Kampot. F&~ losses in fighting 

at Kampot during March were lS8 killed, 828 wounded. The enemy suffered 

282 killed, 3 captured, and 2S weapons captured. 

But the most significant action during March ~as the fall of Udong, 

a place of religious and histotical significance.3 The attack commenced 

in earnest at 3:00 A.M. on 3 March and by 8:00 A.H. that same day, the 

territorial battalions defending Oudong had been forced to withdraw from 

positions northwest and southwest of the city in order to establish a small 

perimeter generally southeast of Oudong at VU7306. (Nap 23) Two 10S-mI!l howitzers were reportedly destroyed by FANK on 16 March in a small position at 

VU720S; when these howitzers were destroyed the F&\~ units at this position 

3Uudong was the Royal capital of Cambodia until the arrival of the 

French in the 19th Century. 

130 

Map 23 - Oudong Area of Operations, March 1974 

LOVEK LOGISTIC FACILITY 

AND TRAINING CENTER 

72 

vu 

'% ____~~~.~___ 09 ____+-____-L------~------L-----~-------L----~L-~+--4L---~~------~--~ 

131 

also withdrew north to join the previously mentioned perimeter at 

VU7306. Total troop strength at this location was then estimated 

at 700 troops, plus approximately 1500 civilians. An unknown number 

of civilians were killed or captured by the enemy upon entering the 

city. FANK reacted by moving the 45th Brigade, 7th Division to Lovek 

(VU72l2) on 16 March and the 80th Brigade up the TonIe Sap River to 

. debark in the vicinity of VU7807 and attack from east to west to attempt 

to link up with the then encircled position east of Oudong. Several 

delays were encountered in moving the 80th Brigade and heavy casualties 

were sustained by the brigade during the initial debarkation efforts. 

This action had a marked effect of the fighting spirit, attitude and 

overall performance of the 80th Brigade in the subsequent linkup effort. 

Enemy forces were waiting at the debarkation site and placed well aimed 

75-mm RR and B 40 rocket fire on the near-defenseless troops during 

debarkation (25 were killed, 86 wounded, and 13 drowned). One UHIG 

logistics helicopter WaS downed by enemy fire near Oudong on 16 March. 

After the initial units of the 80th Brigade debarked near VU.7808 the 

remainder of the brigade did not close until 19 - 20 March 1974. Continued enemy presence was sufficient to cause FANK to reinforce the 

80th Brigade during the period 20 - 28 March with three battalions of 

the 39th Brigade, one battalion from the 28th Brigade, four 10S-mm 

howitzers and one Ml13 squadron. Priority for tactical air support 

was assigned to the overall operation. The 80th Brigade commander 

allowed the forwardmost attacking units to become overcommitted as 

the linkup effort progressed from east to west and was unable to reinforce them because he had committed three battalions to rear area 

security. The FANK attack faltered during the period 24 - 27 March and 

FANK was in the process of further reinforcements on 28 March when the 

encircled position was overrun by the enemy. The final collapse of the 

encircled position waS accelerated when an enemy-fired 75-mm RR round 

which impacted directly the unprotected ammunition storage area near 

the northwest corner of the perimeter, and caused detonations of 81 and 

10S-mm ammunition. Other contributing factors were the arrival of approximately 2,500 refugees into the already overcrowded perimeter during 

the night of 27 - 28 March; there was inadequate food, water and medical 

132 

r 


supplies and a general atmosphere of fear that a recurrence of 

previous enemy attacks was inevitable. When the ammunition exploded, 

uncontrollable panic ensued, the perimeter was ruptured, and, within 

30 minutes, enemy ground attacks overwhe'lmed the defenders. A company commander, who escaped, related that as the enemy entered the 

perimeter, previously wounded FANK soldiers were machine gunned and 

I several FANK soldiers killed their oWn families and then themselves I 

to avoid being captured. The fate of 4,000 civilians was unknown; I 650 military and civilian personnel returned to safety. Lon Nol 

ordered that Oudong be retaken. However, the pressure at Kampot 

at month's end caused conflicting priorities, and the enemy remained 

in control of the Oudong area on 31 March 1974. Results of fighting 

prior to 28 March were as follows: 328 enemy killed in action, 91 

individual weapons and 15 crew served weapons captured; 50 FANK killed 

and 240 wounded. 

During April, the enemy continued his attacks north of Phnom Penh, 

focusing on Kompong Luong. Following the capture of Oudong in March, 

FANK forces remaining along the river were directed to establish a 

defensive position on the Tonle Sap. On 20 April; enemy ground pressure 

along the river bank increased sharply and several positions fell back. 

Pressure continued. On 21 April enemy infiltrators overran key 

friendly positions along the TonIe Sap River bank, effectively encircling the Kompong Luong garrison. FANK forces withdrew and by 

2:30 P.M. on 21 April the first elements linked up with the Lovek 

Garrison defenders. The defeat added valuable psychological momentum 

to the new provincial phase of the enemy's dry season offenSive and 

representd his second significant military victory of the dry season. 

FANK troop and materiel losses along the TonIe Sap in April were heavy: 

approximately 600 military personnel were unaccounted for: four 105-mm 

howitzers were lost; all heavy weapons (mortars and machine guns); 

two M-113's, one bulldozer, one POL truck, and several other pieces 

of engineering equipment were abandoned. Three Navy river craft were 

beached. Kompong Luong and a sizeable stock of ammunition was abandoned 

and later bombed by the Air Force. Subsequently, the FANK high command 

decided to withdraw the civilian population and military garrison from 

133 

Sala Lek Pram to Lovek, consolidating assets into a single defensive 

position. Approximately 15,000 civilians and 2,000 military personnel 

moved into the Lovek garrison on 26 April. The ~onth drew to a close 

with a highly vulnerable group of civilian and military personnel in 

that small isolated place. The population of 52,405 consisted of 

5,260 military, ,15,488 military dependents, 22,383 civilians, 8,383 

refugees, and 891 para-military personnel. Heavy enemy shelling on 

Lovek (by 105-mm howitzer, 75-mm RR and 82-mm mortar fire) began on 

30 April. 

In Kampot, April opened with FANK forces being pushed deeper into 

the city, giving up approximately three km on the north and west of 

the city. (Map 24) By 10 April, the western perimeter had collapsed 

to within 1.5 kms of the heart of the city. The Naval Infantry had 

given up the southeast sector, and the enemy had stopped the flow of 

supplies and reinforcements by sea to Kampot. During the same period, 

enemy artillery struck the 105-mm howitzer positions ammunition storage 

area, destroying approximately 3,500 105-mm howitzer rounds and rendering 

eight 105-mm howitzers inoperable. Two battalions of reinforcements a.rrived and their immediate deployment in the southeas t sector .appeared to 

SWitch the offensive mowentum from the enemy to FANK. After two days 

of heavy fighting on 8 and 9 April, the 28th Brigade reported 86 enemy 

killed, while the 20th Brigade in the west claimed another 100 enemy 

killed. Enemy initiatives diminished as fresh FANK ground forces began 

to slowly advance and push the enemy away from the city. The garrison 

military. strength increased from 3,018 on 1 April to 4,006 on 9 April. 

The two remaining battalions of the 28th Brigade arrived, along with 

replacements for losses in other units. By 25 April, the Kampot military 

strength exceeded 4,561. Enemy mortar attacks diminished in intensity 

and frequency as advancing government forces reestablished the northern 

perimeter, pushed the west perimeter out 2.5 km from the city, and on 

30 April, reoccupied Kbal Romeas on the east and reopened the river 

supply route. For the period 3 March to 3 May, in the Kampot area, 

FANK suffered 416 killed (25 civilians), 2,363 wounded (88 civilians) 

and 79 miSSing in action while the enemy suffered an estimated 2,363 

killed in action. 

134 
Map 24 - The Battle for Kampot, March-April 1974 

APPROXIMATE 

FANK DEFENSE LINE 

'fTTiIT nTTTT 

ON 10 APRIL 1974 

o 500 METERS I ! 

m 

'" "' fa 

0: 

KAMPOT 

CITY 

135 

After a lull of several months, enemy pressure increased sharply 

in April in the Bassac/Mekong corridor against units of the 2d Division 

and territorial forces of Kandal. (Map 25) The enemy forced FANK units 

out of Kbal Kaol and Prek Pau in the first week and by mid month, the 

enemy cleared Anlong .Chen Island, occupied Svay Rolum on Route 30, and 

Koh Krabie Krom. There was heavy fighting and enemy gains allowed 

occupation of 75-mm RR and 107-mm rocket positions from which fires were 

delivered on Takhmau and Phnom Penh. The new year holiday festivities 

(13 - 15 April) were interrupted by 11 107-mm rockets impacting in the 

capital, resulting in four killed, and 20 wounded. Takhmau was shelled 

by 75-mm rocket fire on 29 April which resulted in 9 killed, and 37 

civilians wounded. During this period (7 - 30 April) of intense combat, 

Kandal Province forces suffered 232 killed, and 354 wounded. The month 

ended with Kandal Province forces holding on the Bassac south bank and 

2d Division forces beginning to advance slowly on the north bank. 

The enemy operations begun during April in the Bassac/Mekong corridor continued into May. The 2d Division, reinforced by Kandal provincial units and three squadrons of M-113s, was forced to evacuate/abandon 

several positions along Robaoh Angkanh Trail, allowing the enemy to 

penetrate northwest of the trail to within five kms of Phnom Penh. From 

this point, enemy gunners fired l07-Mm rockets into Takhmau and the 

southern and central portion of the capital. Fighting was intense 

throughout the month and FANK reported sustaining 3,9 killed and 389 

wounded in the Bassac corridor. On 24 May, a small enemy element infiltrated behind FANK defensive positions and raided a village south 

of the Monivong Bridge, killing 12 civilians, wounding 23, and burning 

approximately 12 homes. By the end of the month, FANK forces had 

closed the gap and cleared the enemy from positions northwest of the 

Boraoh Angkanh Trail. 

In other actions in the southeast sector, Route 1 was interdicted 

on 21 May by an estimated battalion-size force for a day and a night; 

by 22 ~my, traffic had returned to normal. The 43d Brigade of the 2d 

Division reported 3 killed and 30 wounded in the clearing operation. 

Brigadier General Dien Del, Commanding General 2d Division, became 

governor of Kandal Province, in addition to his other duties, effective 

15 May. 

136 
Map 25 - Operations Along the Bassac River, April-July 1974 

" "' g-----+--------~--------------------------------f_~_t~--~-------g--~----, 

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137 

North of Phnom Penh, FANK was able to stabilize the situation 

during a month of hard fighting in May. The primary action was the 

FANK initiative of the 7th Division/5th Brigade conducting operations 

toward the north, along Route 5 in order to relieve enemy pressure on 

the isolated garrison at Lovek. FANK attacks and enemy counterattacks 

resulted in a seesaw battle between Kruos and Prek Taten during most 

of the month. On 25 May, ground forces overcame enemy flank pressures, 

penetrated the enemy forward defensive lines, and overran an enemy 

battalion CP as they advanced 2.5 km north of Prek Taten. Fighting 

was intense throughout the month with FANK sustaining 10 killed, 107 

wounded, while accounting for 144 enemy killed and 6 POWs. 

The highly vulnerable and densely populated garrison at Lovek 

was at the mercy of enemy gunners who shelled the garrison both day 

and night throughout May. Enemy ground attacks, primarily in the south 

and northwest, attempted to gain an early victory. The training center 

was lost on 4 May and the southwest defensive line was faltering when 

the 80th Brigade counterattacked to halt the enemy's advance. Ten days 

later on 14 May the training center and southern perimeter had been 

retaken. Limited friendly ground operations were conducted during the 

month in the most critical area along the southern defensive line. 

The military strength of the garrison, 4,305 troops, precluded maintaining a firm defensive posture in the northwest and southwest, while 

at the same time attacking east with the 80th Brigade to establish a 

beachhead on the Toole Sap. Evacuation of the 15,000 - 20,000 civilian 

refugees was dependent upon this operation; reinforcement of the 80th 

Brigade Was planned by the FANK high command; however, execution was 

not successfully accomplished. The arrival of Brigadier General Mey 

Sichan on 3 Mayas the Lovek operation commander resulted in rapid 

stabilization of the situation and a strengthening of the garrison's 

defensive posture. Both friendly and enemy initiated activities during 

the month resulted in 50 FANK killed, 319 wounded, and about 100 enemy 

killed. The month closed with enemy pressure diminishing and FANK attempting limited offensive action to the south and east. 

June saw continued FANK success north of the capital. In that 

area, the 5th Brigade, reinforced by the 7th Brigade, progressed slowly 

133 

-


north during the first 10 days of June. Between 10 and 14 June, ground 

forces moved north against decreasing enemy resistance with 50 enemy 

killed in action during the period and only light casualties reported 

by FANK. The high command dealt the enemy a decisive blow by reinforcing with the 15th Brigade on 15 June. On 19 June the 15th Brigade 

reoccupied Kompong Luong, leaving the enemy in disarray. The combined 

operations for the period 17 to 19 June netted FANK 314 enemy killed 

and, 21 POW's, while sustaining 21 killed and 47 wounded. During consolidation and reorganization, enemy reinforcements arrived and interdicted Route 5 on 28 June south of Kompong Luong in both the 15th 

and 7th Brigade zones. The 15th Brigade cleared the road on the same 

day, sustaining 5 killed and 14 wounded, and reporting 15 enemy killed. 

The major enemy force was located in the 7th Division zone and the 

high command again decided to mass combat power, reinforcing with two 

battalions and one M-113 squadron. FANK attacked on 28 June with 

elements from 3 brigades. Route 5 was cleared on 29 June, with an 

additional 114 enemy killed, 5 POW's and FANK units sustained a total 

of 4 killed, 13 wounded, and two M-113's damaged. A 5th Brigade 

operation on the TonIe Sap east bank at the same time accounted for 

10 additional enemy killed. The month closed with FANK forces firmly 

entrenched on Route 5 and in Kompong Luong. 

There was success as well at Lovek, whose garrison was able to 

end its isolation. A heavy enemy at~ack on 8 June against the-northwest and southwest sections of the Lovek perimeter was repulsed by 

the counterattacking 80th Brigade. On 12 June, Lovek forces attempted 

to move east to link up with ground forces who had established a 

beachhead for the evacuation of the civilian population to Kompong 

Chhnang. After two and one-half days of no progress, they broke through 

and reached the Tonle Sap. Consolidation of the beachhead at Pearn Lovek 

and evacuation of approximately 10,000 civilians was accomplished by 

24 June. 

FANK success north of the capital continued into July. The high­


light of the month was the breakthrough by the 7th Division and 4th 


Brigade of the enemy's defensive line north of Phnum Chetares (VU7503) 


on 6 July and the successful link-up with the forces from Lovek in 


139 

Oudong on 9 July. Total enemy losses during the period 22 April to 

9 July were 1,366 killed in action, 45 captured, 18 ralliers (to 

include the commander of the KC 114th Battalion and two of his 

lieutenants), 105 crew-served weapons and 308 individual weapons. 

Friendly losses ~ere 104 killed and 786 wounded. The loss of Oudong 

Was not only a tactical defeat for the enemy but a psychological defeat 

as well. Enemy reactions to this FANK victory were expected and FANK 

was prepared. On 16 July a major enemy force moved in behind two 

FANK battalions located southwest of Oudong and attempted to cut them 

off and destroy them. Fortunately, the 145th Brigade and the 2d M-113 

Squadron were located in Oudong; they struck the enemy force from 

behind, causing it to flee the battle area. Friendly losses were 

4 killed and 11 wounded, while enemy losses were 150 killed and 6 POW's 

and 43 weapons captured. During the period 16 - 23 July FANK forces 

along Route 5 were reinforced and consolidated their gains so that 

on 23 July an offensive west of Oudong could be launched in conjunction with the 80th Brigade and 8th M-113 Squadron attacking out of 

Lovek. On 23 - 24 July FANK forces moved more than 3 km west of 

Oudong against moderate enemy resistance. On 28 July, 2 battalions of 

the 28th Brigade moved by Navy craft to the east bank of the TonIe Sap 

River and secured a beachhead near Prek Kdam (VU7905). In conjuction 

with this move, forces from Lovek moved down the west bank of the 

TonIe Sap and linked up with the 36th Brigade, then sweeping north 

from Kompong Luong. No enemy contact was made. 

The Wet Season, August - Decembep 1974 

The 1974 wet season was, relatively speaking, a period of 

lessened military activity throughout Cambodia as a who~e, although 

there was some heavy fighting east and south of the capital. 

The northeast sector was a very active sector in August as 

enemy attacks occurred in almost all areas. The month began with an 

enemy force holding part of Route 61 fifteen kms northeast of Phnom Penh, 

and a government force at Muk Kampul (VT9897) encircled. On 2 August, 

140 

the 23d Brigade and 1st M-113 Squadron conducted a forceful attack 

against enemy positions astride Route 61 and, aided by effective 

air and artillery support, broke through the enemy's main defenses 

and linked up with the beseiged garrison at Muk Kampul on 3 August. 

Government losses in actions along Route 61 during the period 26 July 

to 3 August were 15 killed and 106 wounded, while enemy losses were 

212 killed and 45 weapons captured. As FANK forces were mopping up 

along Route 61 on 4 August, an enemy force struck four outposts on the 

east bank of the Mekong River, manned by unprepared and poorly trained 

troops from Vihear Suor Military Subdivision. These attacks were 

supported by attacks against Prek Tamerk (WT0198) and Khnar Kar 

(WT0783). The four outposts fell apparently without much resistance, 

as a result of poor leadership and curtailed basic training of unit 

personnel. A counterattack on 5 August by reinforcements from the 

Parachute Brigade, 23rd and 84th Brigades retook the positions on 

5 August with little or no enemy resistance. Friendly losses were: 

39 killed, nine wounded, 105 missing and 175 weapons lost. Additionally, 

four heavy pieces" of engineer equipment were damaged. No enemy 

casualties were reported. On 8 August, the enemy again attacked 

Muk Kampul and interdicted Route 61 south of this position. Quick 

reaction by elements of the 23rd Brigade, supported by M-1l3s, 

opened Route 61 that same day, leaving 121 enemy dead on the battlefield and capturing 16 weapons; friendly losses were only one killed 

and three wounded. Further enemy attacks against Route 61 and around 

Muk Kampul during the period 10 - 20 August were ineffective. 

After 20 August the enemy apparently gave up or postponed further 

offensive action against Muk Kampul and instead decided to attack 

Prek Tamerk on the east bank of the Mekong River northeast of Muk 

Kampul. FANK forces were well prepared and heavy enemy attacks 

against Prek Tamerk on the nights of 21 - 22, 26 - 27, and 30 - 31 

August resulted in over 80 enemy killed and 71 weapons captured. 

Friendly losses were 11 killed and 29 wounded. Reportedly, the enemy 

penetrated the outer defensive perimeter around Prek Tamerk on the 

night of 21 - 22 August by claiming to be refugees who desired 

141 
sanctuary. As August ended, government forces in the northeast 

sector returned Route 61 to government control and successfully 

countered determined enemy efforts to extend KC control in that area. 

August was also a very active month in the southeast sector, 

as both government and enemy forces launched offensives to secure 

control of key positions along the Bassac River and in the Bassac 

corridor. FANK objectives were to deny the enemy areas from which 

rocket attacks could be launched against the capital. On 7 August 

a joint 1st Division/2d Division operation was launched in the Bassac 

corridor. On 8 August, 1st Division units succeeded in moving south' 

from Route 1 to Prek Thmei (WT0067), a key enemy position on the 

Bassac River. During the night of 8 - 9 August, enemy gunners fired 

10 107-mm rockets from the Bassac corridor, but all landed far south 

of Phnom Penh. On 9 August the 1st Division units linked up with 

2d Division units advancing along the east bank of the Bassac, but 

enemy harassing attacks against the rear and flank of 1st Division units 

caused nine killed and five wounded. On 12 August an enemy attack 

forced the 2d Division elements out of Prek Thmei, and on 15 August 

forced 2d Division units back as far as two kms. However, the 2d 

Division was able to reconstitute a defense line and keep 107-mm 

rockets from reaching Phnom Penh and disrupting armed forces day 

celebrations. Another enemy attack on the west bank of the Bassac 

on the night of 20 - 21 August forced a 2d Division unit back about 

one km. 

FANK reinforcements moved into the area on 21 August for a 

major offensive along the Bassac River and stabilized the situation. 

This operation involved 17 infantry battalions and four M-l13 

squadrons from four divisions and was the first major FANK offensive 

action of the rainy season. The objective of the operation was to 

extend government control in the Bassac region and establish a new 

defensive line between Route 1 and the Bassac River further away from 

the capital. On 23 August, a brigade from the 1st Division established 

a beachhead on Anlong Chen Island in the Bassac River, against heavy 

enemy resistance. FANK forces on the island then made slow progress 

142 

against stiff enemy resistance, as did the government units along both 

banks of the Bassac River.- Meanwhile, elements of the 3rd Division, 

attacking south from Route 1, advanced ,toward the Bassac River and 

reported reaching the east bank on 29 August. Although enemy 

resistance was determined, the greatest obstacle to movement was 

the difficult terrain and flooding that inundated many areas and 

severaly restricted the use of vehicles and M-113s. As August came 

to a close, units attacking along the Bassac River were still over 

five kms from the elements that had reached the river from Route 1, 

and progress was disappointingly slow. Moreover, enemy counterattacks 

and harassing fire against advancing government units were beginning to 

produce significant government casualties, including one M~113 destroyed. 

However, the main objectives of the operation had been realized 

by the end of the month. 

In the northwest sector, the Route 5 operation was effectively 

terminated and the Lovek commander assumed command of forces in the 

Lovek/Oudong/Kompong Luong area; the 5th Brigade commander assumed 

responsibility for Route 5/Tonle Sap from Kruos (VT8293) north to 

Prek Kdam and the 7th Division commander assumed responsibility for 

the area west of Route 5 and northwest of Phnom Penh. In the latter 

part of August, activities in the northwest sector were centered 

west of Tuol Leap (VT3779). On 22 Augu3t,KC gunners fired four 107-mm 

rockets at the Kantuok ammunition depot (VT7873), west of Phnom Penh. 

The rockets failed to hit the depot and caused no damage but triggered 

a government operation to the west and south of Tuol Leap in order to 

expand the outer defensive perimeter and prevent the enemy from firing 

more rockets at this vital installation. On 30 August the enemy fired 

one l22-mm rocket from southeast of Tuol Leap at Kantuok. Again, the 

rocket missed the depot and caused no damage, but the fact that enemy 

rockets could reach Kantuok increased the pressure on the 23d Brigade 

and 7th Division to further expand FANK control to the west. Thus, 

as August drew to a close, government forces were attempting to push 

west of Tuol Leap. 

143, 

Enemy attacks against Mekong River convoys continued during 

August, but their intensity, by comparison with previous months, was 

lessened due to. more frequent clearing operations. The majority of 

the attacks came from the west bank in the vicinity of Phu My, 

and consiste~ of: 75-mm RR; B-40/B-41 rocket; 12.8-mm machine gun fire. 

The cargo ship HAY AN was sunk. 

In September, the Bassac operation in ti~ southeast sector continued 

to grind out slow progress -- progress often measured in meters per week. 

GJap 26) Severe flooding continued to hamper maneuver and resupply. 

The enemy was well entrenched in ideal defensive positions along most 

avenues of approach and had heavy automatic weapons, rocket and other 

fire support. By the end of the month Task Force Alpha, consisting 

of three brigades of the 1st and 2d Divisions, a battalion of the 7th 

Division, two Kandal provincial battalions, and one M-ll3 squadron had 

reached Russei Srok (WT040673) on the north bank, WT042667 on the 

island, and HT025660 on the south bank. Task Force Bravo, consisting 

of the 43rd Brigade of the 2d Division, two battalions and one M-113 

squadron were moving west across the corridor. They were stopped 

just short of the east bank at WT067653. This gap on the east bank 

between Russei Srok and Task Force Bravo provided the enemy a corridor 

through which he resupplied his units and infiltrated behind attacking 

forces. On 23 September, a reserve battalion of the 78th Brigade 

was driven from Prek Thmei (WT014625) by an enemy force in sampans, 

but th~ position was reoccupied the same day. 

Attacks against Mekong River convoys were at a lower level in 

September than August; four convoys reached Phnom Penh during the month. 

In October, the Bassac operation continued, making slow progress. 

On 2 October, an ene~y counterattack in the Task Force Bravo area 

caused FANK to withdraw 1 km to the east, and continued enemy pressure 

prohibited friendly progress on either axis. On 19 October, heavy enemy 

attacks were directed toward Task Force Bravo, in an u?parent attempt to 

cut the friendly locations at the Sophi bridge site. Repeated enemy 

ground attacks failed to dislodge the FANK defenders, as Khmer air 

support was of high order. On 24 and 25 October, elements of the 

144 
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43rd Brigade conducted a sweep operation near the Sophi bridge site 

and killed 81 enemy during the two-day operation. The enemy continued 

its ground attacks and she11ings against Task Force Bravo's area, 

failing however to take any friendly positions and paying a heavy 

price for their efforts. 

The use of the Mekong was again unrestricted in October. Four 

convoys made the round trip from Vietnam to Phnom Penh, sustaining 

nine attacks by fire, light cargo damage, and no personnel losses. 

During November, the northeast sector was the scene of a heroic 

defense by FANK of a position which blocked that area to the enemy for 

rocket positions. The FANK garrison at Barrong Khnar Kar, 14 kms 

northeast of the capital (WT070835) defeated an estimated 2-3 enemy 

regiments. The enemy, from Regiments 152, 153 and 182, (over 2,000 men 

as verified by prisoners and captured documents) hurled themselves 

against the small garrison on the morning of 10 November. The FANK 

defenders repulsed the first attack, suffering 4 killed and 28 wounded. 

However, on the following day, the determined enemy succeeded in 

overrunning two company-sized pOSitions on the northern portion of the 

perimeter. Thirty-nine FANK soldiers were reported missing, including 

an unknown number killed in action. FANK reinforced the garrison 

with elements of the 128th Battalion and the complete 2d and 4th airborne battalions. Enemy attacks were launched almost daily against 

friendly positions for the next 13 days; however, government defenders 

successfully defeated each one. Friendly artillery and air support 

largely were responsible for over 400 attackers killed during this 

period. On 25 November, the garrison undertook to retake those 

positions lost on the 11th. In two days of heavy fighting, another 

160 enemy were killed in action and the lost positions were retaken. 

November ended with FANK forces mopping up small pockets of resistance 

and with the enemy quitting the field. Final results of the 20-day 

battle were 558 enemy killed, 9 captured, 16 Fk~ soldiers killed 

and 185 FANK wounded. The defenders of Barrong Khnar Kar did themselves 

proud, and the KC incurred an expensive defeat. 

146 

In the southeast sector, the FANK operations in the Bassic area 

continued to "slug it out." On 5 November heavy enemy attacks against 

72nd Brigade elements in Task Force Bravo of the operaton resulted in 

3 battalions retreating 1 km to the north. Friendly casualties were 

not high; however,. the loss of terrain was significant. The enemy 

shifted his attention to Task Force Alpha on the east bank of the Bassac, 

which had taken 600 meters from the enemy during mid-month assaults. 

On the night of 24 November heavy enemy attacks into the rear of the 

78th Brigade of Task Force Alpha resulted in a retreat of 700 meters 

to the west of three of its battalions. FANK defensive positions were 

quickly consolidated but on the early morning of 27 November, enemy 

attacks against the 78th Brigade again forced it to retreat to the west. 

FANK reinforced the area with 2 battalions of the 28th Brigade, and by 

the end of the month the situation appeared to be under control. 

Total casualties for the Bassic Operation during the month of November 

were 94 FANK killed, 499 wounded, while only 34 enemy were killed. 

The enemy probably lost more; however, FANK inability to sweep the 

battlefield precluded an accurate body count. The enemy launched 

several 107-mm rocket attacks from the southeast sector towards the 

capital city; however, none impacted within the city limits during 

the month. 

Although there was some increase in harrassment of Mekong convoys 

during November, the combined efforts of the Navy, Air Force, and Naval 

Infantry made ~ossible four round-trip operations from RVN. On a 

resupply mission by river to Kompong Cham there were unfortunate 

losses, however. On 21 November, the enemy carried out a violent 

attack north of Phnom Penh. Of 316 tons of ammunition, 1,000 tons of 

rice, 50 tons of salt and 100 tons of POL shipped, only 25 tons of 

ammunition, 100 tons of POL and 25 tons of salt arrived. Enemy forces 

sank 2 ammunition junks, 1 USAID tug, 2 rice barges and 1 Navy monitor. 

Eight navy personnel were lost. 

The Bassac Operation in the southeast sector was again the scene 

of heavy fighting in December. Early in the month, the enemy attacked 

the 78th Brigade and succeeded in completely decimating it. F&~ 

147 
declared the unit ineffective and retired its colors, transferring 

remaining personnel to other units. The 24th Brigade, an independent 

brigade, was selected to replace the 78th Brigade in the 2d Division. 

A few days later the enemy attacked the ,24th Brigade, defending in 

the Task Force Bravo area between Route 1 and the Bassac, forcing that 

unit to retreat in disorder with heavy casualties. By the 20th of the 

month FANK had reinforced the Task Force Alpha units with elements 

of the Airborne Brigade, who moved aggressively and enjoyed great 

success against the enemy. By 24 December, a defensive line was 

consolidated between Route 1 and the east bank of the Bassac River. 

The main FANK effort was then directed along the west bank of the 

Bassac. In order to clear the region and finally end the. operation, 

four division commanders (1, 2, 3 and 7) cooperated in an operation 

which had their M-113 squadrons attacking abreast to sweep the last 

remainder of the enemy from the horseshoe portion west of the Bassac 

River, killing 63 enemy, and by 31 December terminating the Bassac 

Operation. 

There were five Mekong convoys to Phnom Penh during December, 

four of which were subjected to some enemy attack. Two ships 

sustained significant damage. 

148 

CHAPTER VII 

Closing Months, January - April 1975 

The year of 1975 opened on the most somber of notes for the 

young Khmer Republic. The war had gone on for five years, during 

which Cambodia the Monarchy and "oasis of peace" had become Cambodia 

the Republic and "oasis of war." It was a period when all of the 

unhappy things of the world had been poured out on Cambodia: a war 

of aggression carried out by foreign forces, the VC/NVA, and a civil 

war, pitting Khmer against Khmer. While we had gained some allies 

on the international scene, these could not compensate for our losses 

on the battlefield. The morale of the FANK sank lower and lower, as 

the great sacrifices of yesterday's battle brought no relief, but, 

rather, presaged even greater hardship. Each year had seen the circle 

tighten around the population centers and particularly around the 

capital. Each year had seen the military capabilities of the enemy 

more than keep pace with those of the FANK, notwithstanding heroic 

efforts and generous military assistance. 

By 1975 it was also clear to the various elements of the republican 

side that our internal political divisions could no longer be ignored 

if we were to have any hope of salvaging the situation for the Khmer 

Republic. The divisions between the political party in power, the 

Socio-Republican Party of Marshal Lon Nol, and the other parties were 

becoming deeper and deeper. No reconciliation was found. In his 

leadership Marshal Lon Nol was completely isolated from his companions 

of the early hours: General Sirik Matak, Mr. Cheng Heng, Mr. In Tam. 

The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, with their Presidents, 

expressed their disagreement over the way in which Marshal Lon Nol 

carried out his responsibilities as chief executive of the country. 

Throughout 1974 and into the beginning of 1975 this discontent on the 

149 

part of the legislative branch manifested itself by several investigations into the conduct of certain cabinet members. The criticism 

of military and administrative matters became more and more violent, 

followed by social crises manifested particularly by dishonesty 

in the supply of food and in the almost vertical rise in prices. 

But the greatest damage from this internal crisis was complete division 

or non-cooperation between civil and military authorities. These two 

groups accused each other, on the slightest pretext, of the ills of 

the century and placed all blame on each other. The principle of 

all for one and one for all, advocated by Marshal Lon Nol, produced 

no result and this great wound became more and more open. 

In this situation of political and military asphyxiation, 

the storm-tossed Khmer ship of state passed the helm to a new team 

and redoubled its efforts to find a negotiated settlement of the war. 

Peaae Initiatives 

The Paris .·cease fire agreement for South Vietnam was signed on 

the 27th of January 1973 and the Joint Communique of Paris of 13 June 

specified the obligation of all parties concerned in the South Vietnam 

cease-fire to apply strictly Article 20 of those accords, an article 

which pertained specifically to Cambodia. 

On the 29th of January 1973 Marshal Lon Nol seized the occasion 

to offer to the Khmer enemy a unilateral cease fire in place, as a 

means to finding a negotiated peace. In his radio message of 29 January 

he asked that the VC/NVA lay down their arms and that the Khmer 

communist forces rejoin their national community with a guarantee of 

general amnesty. The FANK for their part, suspended offensive operations 

against the enemy and limited themselves to defensive actions. The 

reactions to this peace offer varied. In certain national and foreign 

circles, the offer was seen as a "trial balloon", launched toward 

the Vietnamese Communists and the Khmer with a view to measuring the 

level of their goodwill and sincerity to observe the cease-fire 

agreement; it was also a gesture on the part of the Khmer Republic 

to demonstrate to international opinion its own desire to find national 

150 

reconciliation. For others this gesture toward peace was interpreted 

as a sign of weakness and was a factor which demoralized the FANK 

and caused them to loose their combat initiative. There was a feeling 

that it was useless to try -to negotiate with the other side unless 

the FANK were in a strong position and this seemed all the more 

useless as 1973 was also the time when the fundamental policy of the 

United States had already shown an intention to carry out progressive 

disengagement from the Indochinese Peninsula. 

As a result, this first peace initiative achieved no favorable 

response from the enemy who, rather, redoubled his political and 

military efforts at the expense of the Khmer Republic. If the FANK 

could congratulate themselves on the number of Khmer who rallied to 

the republican side during the years 1973 and 1974, giving thereby 

a favorable psychological lift to its cause, the same was not true 

in the practical world. The question of rallying created enormous 

social, economic, and political difficulty. The flood of refugees 

who fled the combat zones along with the ralliers drained the fragile 

economy of the Khmer Republic. Their feeding alone posed for the 

government an almost insoluble problem. This says nothing of the 

problem of security in the friendly camp, which was certainly 

endangered by the enemy practice of introducing its own agents among 

the groups of refugees. In a sense people viewed these massive 

rallyings to the Khmer Republic cause as a sort of bad joke, played 

on us by the Communists for the purpose of giving us more mouths than 

we could feed. At the same time the enemy could be freed from these 

groups who would be unable to play the role or make the contribution 

to the enemy effort which the enemy sought. 

For our part we accepted the refugees with open arms. Whether 

traitor or not, these refugees were first of all human beings and it 

was up to the authorities to judge whether they properly belonged to 

the friendly or enemy group. Nevertheless, what did seem to lend 

support to this off-hand judgment was the fact that the vast majority 

of these refugees and ralliers were almost entirely made up of old 

people, wounded people, women and young children. 

lSI 
Thus we have the results of our first peace initiative. If the 

effect of the Paris Accords was to bring a certain calm to South 

Vietnam, permitting the antagonists to begin the processes of the 

cease-fire, it was altogether different on the battlefield of Cambodia. 

Months went by and the level of combat mounted, while Marshal Lon Nol 

persisted in his efforts to achieve peace as shown by the following 

chronology: 

1. On 6 July 1973, he called for strict application of 

Article 20 of the Paris Accords, cease-fire between the forces of all 

parties, a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cambodian territory, 

as well as their weapons and ammunition, a reactivation of the 

International Control Commission (ICC) for Cambodia, and discussions 

between the Khmer parties with a view to finding national reconciliation. 

2. On the 9th of July 1974, the Khmer Government 

addressed once more an appeal to the Khmer Communist forces to commence 

peace talks without prior conditions. No favorable response came 

from the appeal of 9 July 1974, nor from appeals made at three additional times during 1974. Lon Nol reiterated his call for peace 

talks on 15 August during the course of Armed Forces Day celebrations, 

again on 9 October, on the occasion of the 4th anniversary of the 

Khmer Republic and finally on the 30th of November, after the 

victorious vote in the United Nations which maintained the seat of 

the Khmer Republic in the General Assembly and marked the adoption 

by that organization of a resolution asking the various parties to 

the Cambodia conflict to enter into negotiations. 

In the absence of any positive response to these peace offers, 


the Khmer Republic began during 1974 and into 1975 to enlarge its 


foreign contacts, in order to gain additional sympathizers for its 


cause. 	 Previously, the Khmer Republic had neglected this aspect of 

its diplomacy and there were many countries who simply did not understand the principle causes for the fighting in Cambodia. In line 

with this we made particular representations to the Arab nations and 

to the countries of Southeast Asia, and Latin America. We were, of 

course, greatly helped by the very effective work of the United States 

and its allies on our behalf. 

152 
Enemy Strategy 

The reactions of the enemy to our peace initiatives were in 

keeping with his overall strategy. The GRUNK of Prince Sihanouk 

became more intransigent as it found its international position 

reinforced amon~ non-aligned countries, in Africa, and among the 

European communist countries. It drew strength as well from those 

Khmer within Cambodia who by now had come· to be known as opportunists, 

those who would await and see what sort of deal might be made with the 

GRUNK in the event of the latter's victory. 

In Chapter VI, I discussed the campaigns carried out by the enemy 

during the period 1972 to 1974. The objective of the Khmer Communists, 

an objective supported by the VC/NVA even though these latter had 

signed the cease-fire agreement for South Vietnam, remained always 

to isolate Phnom Penh from the other zones held by the FANK. With 

this being accomplished the capital and the other provincial centers 

survived only with the resources at their own disposition; communications with the capital and resupply from outside were possible only' 

by air-drop. The zones of insecurity grew to the point that it 

prevented almost all normal activity by the population and by FANK 

forces who continued to hold certain important positions. After 

isolating the capital, the enemy massed the majority of his forces 

around the capital and began to carry out a campaign of harassment 

by rocket and mortar, both day and night. Beginning in January, the 

enemy carried out heavy attacks on Route 1, along the Mekong. During 

this same month the enemy was able to mine the Mekong, thereby blocking 

the passage of our resupply convoys and all Naval operations. At the 

same time, the air base at Po chentong was not spared; there, harassment of the airfield continued on a daily basis at the rate of some 

30 to 40 rounds per day. In spite of this pounding this remarkable 

air base remained in service to both civil and military aircraft until 

the 15th of April, two days before the fall of Phnom Penh. It should 

be noted that the shipments of U.S. aid in rice, gasoline and military 

equipment, were carried out by cargo aircraft beginning on 

153 
16 February 1975, and these continued until the end of the first 

week of April. 

FANK Change of Command 

I returned to Phnom Penh on 20 February 1975 from New York after 

my assignment as a member of the Delegation of Khmer Republic to 

the 29th Session of the United Nations of 1974. I should note here 

that since the summer of 1972 I had spent all of my time attached to 

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the capacity of roving ambassador, 

and much of my time traveling abroad. During these two or more years 

I had not had the opportunity to follow the military situation closely, 

nor had I had a great deal of contact with- the senior members of FANK. 

Thus, it was a great surprise to me that starting only days 

after my return a good number of FANK general officers, including 

division and military region commanders and directors of logistic 

services came to see me. They wanted to make me aware of the political 

situation within the country and more particularly the military 

problems at that time. The one theme in the conversations of these 

officers, who, I might add, came to see me at my house time after time, 

was the request that I accept the idea of returning to military 

command and taking the posts of Chief of the General Staff and 

Commander-in-Chief of FANK. They confessed to me that they could 

no longer carry out their responsibilities in such an atmosphere of 

internal division and disagreement between the civil and military 

authorities of the same regime; and, in the circumstances they dared 

not try to exercise their responsibility of command any longer. At 

the same time, I was contacted as well by civil authorities, such as 

Hr. Long Boret, Prime lf1nister, and certain members of his cabinet who 

held responsible positions in the Socio-Republican Party. These 

latter contacts had the same objective, that is, that I consent to 

assume the functions of Chief of the General Staff and Commander-inChief of FANK. 

These visits and entreaties went on for a month and I found myself 

in a real dilem~. Finally, with a clear conscience I agreed. Thus, 

154 

-


it was in a troubled atmosphere, charged with military and political 

tensions, that I relieved my friend, Lieutenant General Sosthene 

Fernandez, on 12 March 1975 at a ceremony presided over by !1arshal Lon 

Nol and carried out with complete simplicity. As an interested party 

to this change of command I abstain here from all comment and confine 

myself to the facts of the matter. Marshal Lon Nol was not a 

stranger to this question either, because on two occasions during the 

month of February 1975 he had sounded me out, and asked me to take 

on this new mission. I accepted this post with complete understanding of what lay before me but again in good conscience because 

I had told my military and civilian friends quite frankly that it was 

my conviction that I would not be able to redress the military 

situation which then existed. The picture of the Khmer Republic 

which came to mind at that time was one of a sick man who survived 

only by outside means and that, in its condition, the administration 

of medication, however efficient it might be, was probably of no 

further value. 

Thus, it was no great shock when I had my first briefing on the 

situation only hours following the change-of-command ceremony to 

see that the general military situation throughout Cambodia consisted 

of little more than defeats everywhere, due to various reasons: 

the lack of resupply; inefficiency; misunderstandings; and disconten~ 

provoked by the conduct of certain senior officers. 

Military Operations 

The fighting for Phnom Penh was by this time concentrated within 

a radius of some 15 kilometers of the capital. In the northwest, 

the 7th Division, whose units were primarily Khmer Krom, was in an 

increasingly difficult position. Its front had been cut in several 

places, particularly in the region of Toul Leap where the situation 

had changed hands several times. The 3rd Infantry Division, located 

on Route 4 in the vicinity of Bek Chan, some 10 kilometers west of 

Pochentong was cut off from its own command post at Kompong Speu. 

155 

In the south, the 1st Division handled the defense, along with the 

15th Brigade of Brigadier General Lon Non; it was the calmest part 

of the front at that time. In the region of Takhmau, Route 1, and 

the Bassac, the 1st Division was suhject to continued enemy pressure. 

East of the capital were the parachute brigade and the troops of the 

Phnom Penh Military Region. The Naval base and the Air Force base 

were defended by their own forces. The key position of Neak Luong 

on the east bank of the Mekong was completely isolated following 

many attacks. As for the state of the Air Force and the Navy, these 

two services were on their last gasp. Their best efforts simply could 

not satisfy the requirements stated by the ground forces. The general 

logistic situation for FANK was increasingly cri·tical· and the resupply 

of ammunition for the infantry could not be carried out except in a 

sporadic way. 

The rapidly worsening situation of March was capped on the 

night of 1 April by the fall of Neak Luong, despite ferocious resistance and following many days of siege. (Map 27) This development 

opened the gates of the capital to the south and two days later all 

friendly positions on Route 1 above Neak Luong and held by the mostly 

Khmer Krom 1st Division, fell one after the other, in the course of 

heavy combat. All intervention, whether by road or by the Mekong, was 

impossible. The Mekong itself was mined in several places, and the 

capture of six l05-mm howitzers at Neak Luong was a fur.ther menace 

to Phnom Penh. 

North of the capital, in the 7th Division area, enemy attacks 

came every day, and despite air support carried out day and night, 

there was no improvement in the situation there. Several counterattacks by FANK, carried out to retake certain lost positions, met 

with no success. The losses suffered by this division grew and grew 

every day and the evacuation of its sick and wounded by helicopter 

was no longer possible. The last reserves of the high command, reconstituted hastily by taking the battalior!s of the former Provincial 

Guard, were rushed to the north, only to be completely dispersed by 

the enemy after several hours of combat. Finally, a great breech was 

156 

Map 27 - Final Assault on Neak Luong and Closing of the Mekong, March 1975 

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157 
opened in the north defenses without hope of closing it. To the west, 

the troops of Brigadier General Chantaraingsei's 3rd Division, despite 

reinforcements, were unable to make junction with their own elements at 

Kompong Speu and to retake the position at Toul Leap. An error of 

computation which caused FANK artillery fire to land on 3rd Division 

elements during this operation had a very bad effect on the morale 

of that unit. 

The situation I have described above developed during the 

period from 3 to 12 April 1975, a period during which civilian refugees 

never ceased to flow toward the capital, coming from all directions. 

The authorities, civil and military as well, were submerged and no 

one knew where to lodge them. Schools, pagodas, public gardens were 

completely occupied by these refugees and there was no way for the 

authorities to determine who was friend and who was enemy. 

The unravelling of the five-year war of the Khmer Republic came, 

for all practical purposes, to its end on the day of 15 April when 

the town of Takhmau, the air base at Pochentong, and the dike running 

east/west to the north of Phnom Penh, all of which formed the last 

ring of defense around the capital, were overrun by enemy assault. 

(Map 28) The last units of the FANK, whose resupply of allll!lunition 

was no longer possible, the aerial resupply of U.S. assistance having 

been completely halted on 14 April, continued to fight to their last 

bullet. The intervention of the parachute brigade, brought back from 

the east of the Mekong, had no effect on the situation to the west 

of the capital. The brigade tried to move west but was able to get 

no further than 6 kilometers down Route 4. 

The Departure of Lon NoZ 

The departure of Marshal Lon Nol from Phnom Penh on 1 April 1975 

was, in effect, a final gesture on the part of all concerned in our 

efforts to move Cambodia toward peace. The various responsible elements 

in Cambodia, the National Assembly, the FANK, the leaders of Lon No1's 

own Socio-Republican Party, had begun to wonder in 1974 whether or not 

158 

Map' 28- The Banle for Phnom P e , nh April 1975

FANK 

OO~15 FANK 

" 

ENEMYA~ 

',0 

NK DEFENSE SECTOR 

FA XX _ -)(X-­

p 

Nautical MIles 

J 

2 Kilometer 

I 4 Chamcar Mon Palace . * 

- ,? 0 

­, ", , J 

0 

'" 

C. C8-0-6 71 


159 

Lon Nol's continued presence in Phnom Penh was perhaps an obstacle 

to peace. The peace initiatives which he had made in 1973 and 1974 

produced no positive results. The military situation was becoming 

desperate, and the country was torn with internal political strife, 

as I have already noted. All of this was insufficient, however, to 

move Lon Nol himself to suggest that he go. 

Finally, in January and February 1975, international opinion 

began to make itself felt. The countries of Southeast Asia, particularly those of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 

and Japan, all beean to make representations to our officials that 

they too considered that the absence of Lon Nol might help matters. 

The United States was interested as well, but appeared to prefer 

that the ASEMI countries take the lead in this. U,S. Ambassador 

Dean never discussed tllis question in any way with me, and I do not 

know whether Dean discussed it with anyone else in our government. 

In these circumstances, the question came to be discussed more 

and more explicitly by the above-mentioned groups, leading in March 

to the adoption of formal resolutions that Lon Nol leave the country 

on a temporary basis, while the terms of a cease-fire were worked 

out. In late March, following my assumption of command, a delegation 

called on Lon Nol to present the resolution; he was shocked that the 

country would thus turn its back on him, and asked for a few days 

to consider the proposal. During this time, Lon ~ol met separately 

with each member of the delegation in an effort to test the degree 

of unity among his detractors. Finding them both collectively and 

individually of one mind in support of the resolution as submitted, 

Lon Nol agree~ to leave, asking that those remaining work for an 

honorable peace -- not simply capitulate -- and, failing that, 

continue the struggle. 

The departure ceremony at the Chamcar Mon Palace was devoid of 

all fanfair and attended by Khmer only, the diplomatic corps having 

not been invited. From the grounds of Chamcar Mon, helicopters 

took Lon ::lol, his family and party to Pochentong, where they boarded 

an Air Cambodia craft. Ambassador Dean was at Pochentong when 

160 

the group arrived. From Phnom Penh, Lon Nol traveled to the U.S. 

base at Utapao, Thailand, where a plane sent by the Government of 

Indonesia waited to take him to Bali. After several days in Bali, 

during which Lon Nol had an interview with President Suharto, the 

President of the Khmer. Republic traveled to Hawaii to continue medical 

treatment for the effects of his 1971 stroke. 

161 

-------.~-------

• 
CHAPTER VIII 

The Final Days of th~ Khmer Republic 

My taking office, after the departure of Marshal Lon Nol, a departure desired by both the Khmer and the United States Embassy, gave evidence of a real effort on the part of both the Khmer Government and the 

United States to reach a peaceful and honorable solution to the struggle. 

The government called for a purge of certain key people. Although it 

was a little late in the game, this was carried out but not without difficulty. Everyone rejoiced, especially the civilian population from the 

highest placed to the most humble. It was thought, not unreasonably, 

that real negotiations would take place and that peace was at hand. The 

troops were tired of fighting, the ammunition supply was running low, 

supplies were increasingly difficult to deliver to the troops at the 

front as the battle raged around the besieged capital. People waited 

for a miracle which only the United States Congress could provide 

a favorable vote to continue military air support. Everyone hung on the 

radio listening for news from the United States. Alas, the decision 

-- a negative one -- was announced soon and caused an immediate and 

general panic. Nevertheless, President Ford did say that supplies would 

continue to be provided in accordance with the remaining credits of the 

original FY75 U.S. MAP. 

Departure of the u.s. Embassy 

On April 12, 1975, the American Embassy evacuated its staff, its 

Cambodian personnel, including their families, and Acting President 

Saukham Khoy (with whom Washington had some further plans) by helicopter 

in plain daylight. This spectacular evacuation, considered by many to 

162 

be a flight, as neither the Government nor the National Assembly knew 

about the mission of General Saukham Khoy, marked the beginning of the 

end for the Khmer Government. Not only was this a surprise, but it 

was also a moral shock of vital importance, as subsequent events proved. 

The u.s. plan was to evacuate certain other Khmer officials as well 

whose lives, according to u.s. Ambassador John Gunther Dean, were in 

danger. General Sisowath Sirik Matak was invited to join the exodus, 

as were General Lon Non, Mr. Long Boret, Pan Sothi, Long Botta, and 

General Saukham Khoy. General Sirik Matak courteously declined the 

invitation, as well as General Lon Non and Mr. Long Boret. All of 

these personalities were contacted separately by the U.S. Embassy. 

Mr. Long Boret, for example, did not know that General Saukham Khoy 

had been contacted or, if he had been, he thought that the latter had 

refused. 

To the great surprise of the Americans, the entire Cabinet and all 

other military and civilian leaders decided to stay with their people 

(only one lower echelon member of the government, Undersecretary of· 

Sports Mr. Long Botta, joined the fleeing party). The declaration of 

Prime Minister Long Boret, announcing the continuation of the fight, 

gave the keynote to the days to come. Even those who saw no more hope 

rejected the offer. Former Premier Sisowath Sirik Matak's widely circulated and moving letter explained eloquently why he chose to remain. 

And, indeed, all was not yet lost. Not only Phnom Penh but almost 

all provincial capitals (except those in the east occupied by the North 

Vietnamese) were in the hands of the government, packed with millions of 

refugees who voted against Communism with their feet. Some reliable 

estimates put the number of the population under government control at 

six million and under Khmer Rouge control at one million. The Phnom 

Penh airfield was still in friendly hands (there was also a smaller one 

used by military planes), and an aerial bridge, much smaller than that 

of Berlin, could still have had the necessary effect. In fact, considerable quantities of food, ammunition, and medical supplies were parachuted every day by American planes, even after the evacuation. 

163 

Events accelerated rapidly following the u.s. departure. On 12 

April at 8:30 a.m., the Council of Ministers met in the office of Prime 

Minister Long Beret. It was decided that a sort of general assembly 

should be convoked, consisting of the highest functionaries and military leaders, members of the Cabinet, the President of the Senate par 

interim (Mr. Tep Hun), the President of the National Assembly (Mr. Ung 

Bun Hor), the representative of the Republican Party (Mr. Op Kim Ang). 

The President of the Democratic Pary (Mr. Chau Sau), although invited, 

decided not to participate. From 2:00 p.m. the general assembly sat 

during the greater part of the day in the Chamcar Mon Palace. It 

finally adopted a unanimous resolution asking the transfer of power to 

the military and condemning Mr. Saukham Khoy for not handing over his 

office in a legitimate way. At 10:00 p.m. the Presidents of both Houses 

convoked all members to ask them to confirm the resolution, which they 

did unanimously. 

At 11:00 p.m. the general assembly continued its session, accepted 

the decision of the two Houses, and elected the members of the Supreme 

Committee: 

Lt. General Sak Sutsakhan 

Maj. General Thong Van Fanmuong 

Rear Admiral Vong Sarendy 

Brig. General Ea Chhong 

Mr. Long Boret, Prime Minister 

Mr. Hang Thun Hak, Vice Prime Minister 

Mr. Op Kim Ang, Representative of the Republican Party 

At 12 midnight I went to the General Staff to check the new developments at the front. The military situation had deteriorated sharplY 

during the day. The Khmer Rouge threatened the capital from all sides. 

The fall of Neak Luong on the Mekong, an important communication center, 

was particularly disturbing. In the north our front was cut at several 

points by the massive attacks of the Communists, in spite of the fierce 

resistance of certain of our units. The airport, Pochentong, was in 

164 

I 

immediate danger of being taken; therefore, the small military airport 

of Stung Mean Chey had to be designated as an emergency landing place 

for the planes and helicopters bringing ammunition and supplies. 

April 13th, the Cambodian New Year, would have been celebrated 

with public festivities, sermOns in the pagodas, family outings; this 

time, however, no official celebration took place. The Khmer Rouge 

continued to bombard Phnom Penh. At 9:00 a.m. the Supreme Committee of 

seven had its first session and elected me as its President. The vote 

was unanimous. The General Assembly sat from noon until late that night. 

It approved the election unanimously, and thus I had to assume power, 

being in a way both the head of the government and an interim Chief of 

State. I was fully conscious of the heavy responsibility laid upon me. 

was faced with a desperate Situation, one which in all sincerity 

exceeded my imagination. The progressive decline in morale among our 

soldiers during the previous weeks, as contrasted with the enthusiasm 

they showed during the five years of fighting, was frightening. 

But I was equally conscious that during these five cruel years 

too much blood nad been shed On Khmer soil, too many human lives had 

been sacrificed. So in the first hours of my assumption of power I 

arrived at the conviction that at any price I must find a way to an 

honorable peace immediately. It was in this spirit, completely devoid 

of illusions, bitterness or pride, that I decided to make our last peace 

offer to Prince Sihanouk. Late that night I called my first meeting of 

the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers--this time consisting of both the Supreme Committee and the Cabinet--composed a message to 

the nation to be read by me on Radio Phnom Penh. Other decisions included 

certain political and military measures, channeling the ever increasing 

stream of refugees into schools, pagodas, their feeding, the reshuffling 

of the cabinet, reinforcing the troops in Phnom Penh by flying in 

(through the smaller military airport) a few battalions from different 

provinces, etc. But one of the most important resolutions was the formation of an Ad Hoc Committee to prepare peace overtures with either Prince 

Sihanouk or the Khmer Rouge. Its chairman was Long Boret. 

165 

On April 14th the military situation was becoming increasingly 

precarious. That morning the Cabinet met at my office at the General 

Staff. It was important that I remain with my command post without 

interruption and equally important that the Cabinet follow the events 

closely, having contact with all fronts there. At 10:25 a.m., a tragic 

thing happened: a young Khmer pilot, won over by Communist propaganda, 

dropped four 250-pound bombs from his T-28 fighter bomber. Two of the 

bombs exploded about 20 yards from the office where we were meeting, 

but none of us were hurt. However, the bombs killed seven officers and 

N.C.O.s and wounded twenty others. The session continued. Our main 

task was to direct the refugees, now pouring in from all points of the 

compass, into hospitals, pagodas, schools, the university, etc. The 

atrocities committed against them in the neighboring villages left them 

no alternative other than to escape into the city. 

That afternoon another one of our bastions fell, Takhmau, the 

capital of Kandal Province, which was only 11 km from Phnom Penh. The 

loss of this key town, a key point in our defense perimeter, had a 

demoralizing effect. Several counterattacks were initiated but to no 

avail. Soon a fierce battle was in progress in the southern suburbs. 

The Cabinet met again that evening, as it had every night. The mood 

was gloomy. 

On 15 April almost everyone in Phnom Penh knew that President Ford 

had dropped his request for the $333 million additional aid for Cambodia, 

in anticipation of Phnom Penh's imminent fall. Even the front-line 

soldiers were able to hear Khmer-language broadcasts of the Voice of 

America. It is true that, seeing the determination of the people to 

continue the fight, he reversed his stand, but the damage could not be 

repaired by then. Even in this last moment the morale could have been 

boosted by active American help. Numerical strength was on the government's side. The air bridge was functioning (although faltering), and 

aid even as low as $50 million could have provided the army with ammunition, with about 20 surplus planes and a few dozen old tanks--all waiting 

to be delivered in Thailand. These could possibly have turned the tide 

of the battle. 

166 
The 15th began with the enemy pressing in from north and west. 

The number of the refugees quadrupled, quintupled, multiplied tenfold! 

Our police force was no longer sufficient to direct the refugees, despite 

the many students who offered their assistance. In fact, the Khmer Rouge 

used the terrorized people, peasants with their families, as a shield as 

they advanced. Rockets and shells rained on the city. In the north and 

west, fires started to flare up; depots of food, fuel and arms were on 

fire; and the population found itself in ever-increasing disarray. The 

fighting went on. The climax of the day's batt1e--so catastrophic for 

us!--was the fall of the Pochentong airport. Of course, at that time it 

could no longer be used by planes, but ammunition and food could still 

be dropped on it. Even greater were the consequences for the troops' 

morale. A few relief operations were undertaken but in vain. Our reinforcements did not arrive in time, and the enemy succeeded in cutting 

off the main arteries, preventing their use for relief operations. 

I could not maintain contact with my family during those days. 

Leaving at 7:00 a.m. and returning around 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. the following 

day, I saw practically nobody. Anyway, I was too tired to discuss anything with anybody in the family. Besides, starting at 6:00 a.m., visitors were announced regularly, visitors I could not refuse to see. I 

ate on the run at impossible hours and hardly slept. I did not eVfm 

visit my poor sick father, confined to his room. Always rushing, pressed 

and pushed from all sides, I just had time to tell my wife to be ready 

with the children for a forced departure. I did not think I would be 

able to join them for a long time. However, destiny decided differently. 

One More Effort to Negotiate 

On 16 April, our early morning Cabinet meeting was devoted entirely 

to the mechanics of sending the peace offer to Peking as quickly as possible. Prime Minister Boret drafted it, asking for peace from Prince 

Sihanouk, so that every problem could be discussed in an atmosphere of 

serenity. But above all, the Khmer people needed peace. To this end we 

were ready for an immediate ceasefire and transfer of power to GRUNK and 

167 

to FUNK. We had two channels to forward the offer. We used the good 

offices of the representative of the UN and the International Red Cross, 

Mr. Scheller; he promised to forward it personally to Peking via Geneva. 

The second channel was the representative of the France Press who had 

rapid access to Peking and who also promised to pass on the offer. 

In the meantime, the military situation was becoming worse. The 

morale of the population, of our functionaries, and of the military 

cadres was disastrously low. On the other hand, the leadership, aware 

of the peace offer they made, still nurtured some hope. 

All afternoon we waited for the answer from Peking. By 11:00 p.m. 

an answer still had not arrived. We realized then that the Khmer Rouge 

did not want to accept our offer. We decided to have another meeting 

of the Ministers at my command post. 

The 17th of April 1975 

It was already 2:00 a.m. on the 17th of April when we agreed that, 

as our appeal had not been accepted and we did not want to succumb to 

the Communists, we would establish a government in exile (i.e., outside 

of Phnom Penh but still in Cambodia). We would transfer the Cabinet, 

the Supreme Committee, and even members of the Assembly to the north to 

the capital of Oddar Mean Chey Province. We planned to continue resisting there. The only way to leave the capital was 'by helicopter. We 

agreed to rendezvous the members of the Government at 4:00 a.m. in the 

garden in front of the Pagoda Botum Vaddey. We waited there for over 

an hour, but the helicopters we ordered to report there did not show up. 

The dawn was breaking over the eastern horizon. We said to ourselves 

that our plan was ruined and were ready to leave when our liaison officer 

appeared and announced that there were no more helicopters. All of them 

had left the city on operational missions and were prevented from returning. Even the few still in Phnom Penh the day before had left during 

the night. 

Due to this shocking turn of events, we returned to Premier Long 

Boret's house. It was about 5:30 in the morning, and we decided to 

168 
resist to the death in Phnom Penh itself. After 6:00 a.m., while we 

held our meeting, the Minister of Information, Thong Lim Huong, brought 

the cable just arrived from Peking; our peace appeal had been rejected 

by Sihanouk. At the same time they branded the seven members of the 

Supreme Committee as chief traitors, in addition to the seven who had 

taken power in 1970. There was no longer any hope for peace for the 

Khmer people. 

A little before 8:00 a.m. a strange calmness descended on the 

house of Long Boret. The rest of the Cabinet, the Deputees and Senators 

all left the session without saying a word, leaving us alone, Long 

Boret and me. This was the moment when General Thach Reng arrived to 

plead with us to yield to reason, to face the facts and leave with him, 

as he still had his men of the Special Forces and a few helicopters at 

his disposal. It was exactly 8:00 a.m. when I sent my aide-de-camp to 

tell my wife to join me with the children and Mrs. Sisowath Sirik Matak 

at the Olympic Stadium on the Boulevard ex-Moniret, renamed Boulevard 

Samapheap after 1970. I left the house of the Prime Minister in 

my official car and Long Boret in his. I arrived at the stadium at 

8:10. My family was already there, and we boarded the helicopter General 

Thach Reng kept ready. When Long Boret arrived, he boarded our helicopter 

too, accompanied by Mr. Thong Lim Huong, Minister of Information. Both 

joined us while the pilot (without a copilot and used to flying only transport planes) tried to start the motor -- without success. It was decided to 

exchange the battery with that of another of the helicopters standing 

nearby. At this moment, Mrs. Long Boret, their two children, his sister 

and the family of Mrs. Diep Dinar, General Secretary of the Senate, and 

a good friend of the couple, arrived in the center of the stadium, loaded 

with luggage. Mr. Long Boret-, followed by his faithful companion, Thong 

Lim Huong, left us to join the newcomers in another helicopter. His 

decision was normal, and I did not try to detain him; there were still 

two more helicopters and two pilots ready to take charge. At 8:30 a.m. 

our machine took off, and while we gained altitude I saw Mr. Long Boret 

and his family wander from one helicopter to the other. This was my 

169 

last view of our Prime Minister. I never knew exactly what happened to 

him afterwards. 

We should have landed at Kompon& Chhnang to get fuel, but the base 

radioed us not to land. So we continued our flight. Later, a little 

after my arrival in Thailand, I understood that the base was in the 

hands of defeatist officers and 'N.C.O.s who arrested all personalities 

of the Republican regime. I escaped this way a fate which would have 

cost my life. At 9:30 a.m. we arrived in Kompong Thom for refueling 

and to change pilots. Through establishing contact by radio with 

Phnom Penh, we understood that the enemy penetrated into the Headquarters 

of the General Staff and was engaged in the act o~ ordering all the personnel present to undress. Afterwards I heard the voice of General Mey 

Sichan who addressed the nation and all the troops in my name asking 

them to hoist the white flag as the sign of peace. Mey Sichan was interrupted while delivering his short message by a Khmer Rouge who yelled 

that they came as victors, as masters, and not as negotiators. 

The troops in Kompong Thom and Siemreap were still loyal to their 

commanders and decided to resist. But the Governnor, General Teap Ben, 

and his family had to leave the city with us. There were two helicopters 

leaving Kompong Thom. In Siemreap the Governor and Commanders of the 

Military Region promised to protect our trip towards the frontier. He 

planned to join us later, but we heard that he was killed the same 

night. 

At 1:30 p.m. we arrived in Oddar Meanchey, the last stop before 

crossing the Thai border. After a gloomy lunch and a short meeting with 

a11 the officers present, General Teap Ben offered to make the necessary 

steps to obtain entry visas for all those who wanted to leave. He returned to the Headquarters of the region at about 5:30 p.m. It was 

almost dark. Departure was scheduled for next morning very early. There 

were other groups which came from Kompong Som, Kampot, Phnom Penh, and 

Kompong Thom. They were mostly members of families of Air Force officers. 

However, the night brought another alarming surprise for us. The 

nightmare began at about 10:00 p.m. and lasted until the early hours of 

the next morning. No one closed his eyes; all were on the watch waiting 

170 

for the least noise. The population of the place, after getting wind 

of my presence, demanded that the governor hand me over into their 

custody. Finally, a compromise was reached, and Colonel King Saman 

came to see me to get my assurance that he might first accompany his 

own family to ~he frontier. His wife and his numerous children then 

left in the middle of the night by car. The Colonel returned afterwards 

to the gathering of the region's civilia~ authorities and calmed them 

down by some miracle I cannot even imagine. This made it possible for 

us to carry out our original plan. 

On April 18 the expedition began at 5:00 a.m. sharp. The only 

incident occurred when the guards at the airport did not want the groups 

walking on foot to pass. But they became reasonable after they received 

a large sum of money. In total darkness, the C-123 took off with a 

cargo of people weary from grief, lack of sleep, and fear. The trip 

was sad and silent, all of us lost in our thoughts, barely aware of 

what we had just experienced. The arrival at Utapao marked the end of 

the nightmare, but only for us, a few individuals. 

171 

CHAPTER IX 

Analysis and Conclusions 

During the early hours of its war, the Khmer Republic entertained the hope of resolving this grave problem by peaceful means, 

especially those means that could be undertaken by that great 

international organization, the United Nations. As a full member of 

the United Nations, Cambodia had, in fact, hoped that this organization 

would do for Cambodia what it had done for South Korea and Israel by 

committing its own security troops for the maintenance of peace. 

Unfortunately, our hopes did not come true. Of the five years of 

agony, and the many relevant events, both internal and external to 

Cambodia, I believe it useful to comment here on two decisions taken 

by the United States for reasons which related as much to the situation 

in that country as to the situation in Cambodia. They are not the 

decisions of initiative, the decisions to send U.S. troops into the 

communist sanctuary areas of Cambodia in 1970, or to accord the FANK 

a very generous military assistance; rather they are decisions of 

termination, the decisions to terminate its cross-border operations 

on 30 June 1970 and to terminate its presence in Phnom Penh on 

12 April 1975. In both cases, the significance to Cambodia far 

exceeded their importance to the United States. 

When President Nixon announced his decision to commit U.S. 

forces in Cambodia, an intervention which was designed to destroy 

the war potential of NVA/VC forces installed in Cambodia there was 

reason for the Cambodian leadership to feel immediately relieved 

and content. Indeed we witnessed, in the wake of this intervention, 

a marked, though temporary, decrease in combat capabilities on the 

part of the enemy. Knowing, however, that this important intervention 

172 

by U.S. forces was both limited in time and scope, the enemy avoided 

confrontation and was thus able to conserve his main forces while 

waiting out the deadline for u.S. withdrawal, only 60 days later. If 

a careful analysis were made of this aspect of the problem and from 

an enemy viewpoint, one might say that the enemy made a wellcalculated move when his forces took the areas east of the Mekong 

River (Stung Treng, Kratie, Kompong Cham, Prey Veng and Svay Rieng) 

and used them as sanctuaries, firmly established this time deep in 

Cambodian territory. For friendly troops no longer occupied this part 

of Cambodia and in a certain sense intervention operations by U.S. 

and RVN forces in Cambodia merely pushed these mobile and viable enemy 

sanctuaries deeper inside this abandoned part of Cambodia. 

On the Cambodian side, we observed that these operations consisted 

of frontal, rather than enveloping maneuvers. This gave the enemy 

ample opportunity for seeking refuge deeper inside Cambodia. Therefore, 

this part of Cambodia was effectively cut off and isolated from the 

rest of the country. The local population who stayed behind were 

thus caught in the grip and remained under the total control and 

domination of the enemy. Although the U.S. Air Force continued 

to apply its efforts to this region, enemy forces were nevertheless 

able to bring in reinforcements, organize themselves and eventually 

change the outlook of this war of aggression against Cambodia into 

one of civil war between Communist and Republican Khmer. If, in 

fact this operation was conducted solely within the framework of 

Vietnamization as the U.S. command had intended it, then it might 

be considered a success, because it largely contributed to the 

achievement of Vietnamization within the time limits imposed by the 

U.S. Government. On the other hand, the withdrawal of U.S. troops 

would be possible only if the RVNAF were capable of taking over. 

It was difficult at the time to tell that the RVNAF had that capability. 

For one thing, the NVA/VC sanctuaries were solidly anchored along the 

entire western border of South Vietnam. For another, the armed forces 

of South Vietnam were compelled to extend themselves precariously in 

order to fill the voids created by the departure of u.S. combat units. 

173 

As far as the FANK Command was concerned, however, and within the 

framework of its war efforts against the NVA/VC forces, the destruction 

or even occupation of that part of Cambodia which was under enemy 

control, if done on a temporary basis only, did not end the problem 

for FANK. For, while these temporary effects were sought by the U.S. 

command, in view of their absolute necessity for Vietnamization to 

succeed, their repercussions fell with all their weight onto the FANK, 

who were from the beginning not sufficiently prepared to confront 

an enemy of this size. To avoid massive bombings by U.S. and RVN 

forces, the enemy fell back deeper and deeper inside the Cambodian 

territory. These bombings and attacks by friendly forces also caused 

the complete evacuation of these areas by the civilian population, 

whereupon the enemy immediately moved in. The result of all this was 

that a sizable part of the Cambodian territory was lost to the enemy. 

But if the destruction of these enemy sanctuaries had been followed 

by the permanent U.S. occupation ·of the recovered territory, it would have 

been much more beneficial to Cambodia, as well as to South Vietnam 

because, as we can now see, the enemy was able ·to reconstitute his 

forces and renew his activitiee from the destroyed sanctuaries. In 

addition, we have also to consider the psychological impact created by 

this operation which marked the last episode of the presence of U.S. 

combat troops in South Vietnam. The publicity with which the 

U.S. disengagement was made largely benefited the enemy, who took 

advantage of it to sap the morale of the civilian population and troops 

alike in Cambodia, as well as in South Vietnam. As a result, there 

was a certain lowering in morale on our side; during the same period, 

the other side, encouraged by evez-increasing support and assistance, 

became more aggressive and began to prepare for its eventual and final 

victory. The departure of U.S. troops on 30 June 1970, in the midst 

of this critical period, and during which the last decisive card was 

to be played thus resulted in a void so great on the allied side 

that neither the FANK nor the RVNAF were ever able to fill it. 

Turning now to 12 April 1975, the departure of the u.s. Embassy 

was based on a U.s. judgment that the fall of Phnom Penh was imminent. 

174 

Clearly, the defense of Phnom Penh was related both to the will of 

the FANK to resist and their means to do so. Up to that point, the 

u.s. had been supplying the means. But here the internal situation 

in the U.S. came into play. The needs of the FANK were jeopardized by 

the most unfortunate Watergate scandal, which considerably weakened 

the prestige of the u.s. Executive Branch of government vis-a-vis the 

u.s. Congress and the American public. In a certain sense, the 

departure of President Nixon sealed the fate of the non-communist 

side in Indochina. Note that the U.S. Congress would not grant 

credits for additional help to Cambodia or South Vietnam in April 1975, 

even though this was known to be vital. 

While I had no illusions about the situation or my ability to 

influence events when I accepted military command in March, I came 

to have some hope a little later, after taking office. It seemed 

that if there had been a little time and had the U.S. Government 

supported me, there never would have been a 17th of April so bloody and 

barbaric; in fact, there would have been no 17th of 'April. I still 

had several loyal and patriotic comman~ers of battalions who wanted, 

like I did, to purge the country of its most unhealthy elements. The 

young people, idealistic as everywhere, also approached me. The 

population saw a new ray of sunshine rise on the horizon, - warm, 

promising, stable and comforting after all the devastating storms 

that had raged since the beginning of the war. Morale began to 

surface, slowly, still hesitant but confident and hopeful of a better 

future. And it is appropriate to remind the Western reader that a 

few days before the catastrophe, a far-away people, small, because 

epic struggles in the past had weakened it, and great by its works 

of art, was still resisting, almost in its entirety, a foreign 

ideology which brought destruction to its social and cultural fabric 

and death to millions of its citizens. 

With the fall of Cambodia there died a millennial civilization 

and -- irony of fate -- there was reborn -- in this 20th century 

a cynical demagoguery. While our plane hovered over the western plains 

of my country, I realized that it was not a question only of a little 

175 

nation, submerged under a murderous rule, but world totalitarianism, 

engulfing new territories on its march for the domination of the 

world. Will humanity stand still and simply watch the genocide 

committed against one poor, defenseless nation after the other, without 

reacting at all? 

176 

APPENDIX A 

The Delegations to the Summit Conference 1 

of the Indochinese Peoples, April 25, 1970 

(The Canton Summit) 

Joint Deolaration of the Summit Conference of the 


Indoohinese Peoples, April 25, 1970 


The summit conference of the Indochinese peoples was held on April' 

24 and 25, 1970, in a locality of the Lao-Vietnam-China border area, on 

initiative of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, Head of State of Cambodia and 

President of the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK). The three 

peoples of Indochina were represented by four delegations: 

The delegation of the Cambodian people comprised: 

Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, Head of State of Cambodia, President of 

the National United Front of Kampuchea, head of delegation. 

Samdech Penn Nouth, private advisor to the Head of State, delegate 

of FUNK, deputy head. 

Mr. Huot Sambath, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, 

delegate of FUNK. 

Mr. Sarin Chhak, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, 

delegate of FUNK. 


Mr. Chau Seng, delegate of FUNK. 


Mr. Thiounn Mumm, delegate of FUNK 


Mr. Roeurng Mach, delegate of FUNK 


The delegation of the Lao people comprised: 

His Highness Prince Souphanouvong, President of the Lao Patriotic 

Front, head of delegation. 

Mr. Khamsouk Keola, Chairman of the Committee of the Alliance of 

Lao Patriotic Neutralist Forces, deputy head. 

Mr. Phoumi Vonvichit, Secretary General of the Central Committee 

of the Lao Patriotic Front, deputy head. 

Mr. Khamphay Boupha, Member of the Central Committee of the Lao 

Lao Patriotic Front. 

Mr. Oun Heuan Phounsavath, Deputy Director of the Information 

Bureau of the Lao Patriotic Front in Hanoi. 

lQuoted in Caldwell, Malcolm and Lek Tan, Cambodia in the Southeast 

Asian War, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1973. (pgs. 363-365). 

177 
The delegation of the people of the Republic of South Vietanm 

comprised: 

Lawyer Nguyen Huu Tho, President of the Presidium of the Central 

Committee of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, 

President of the Advisory Council of the Provisional Revolutionary 

Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, head of delegation. 

Lawyer Trinh Dinh Thao, Chairman of the Central Committee of the 

Vietnam Alliance of National, Democratic and Peace Forces, 

Vice-President of the AdviSOry Council of the-Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, deputy head. 

Mrs. Nguyen Dinh Chi, Vice Chairman of the Thau Thien-Hue Revolutionary People's Committee, Vice Chairman of the Committee of the 

Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces for Hue City, 

member of the Advisory Council of the Provisional Revolutionary 

Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. 

Mr. Le Quang, member of the Central Committee of the South Vietnam 

National Front for Liberation, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs 

of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of 

South Vietnam. 

Professor Nguyen Van Hieu, member of the Central Committee of the 

South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, Ambassador of the 

Republic of South Vietnam to Cambodia. 

Mr. Vo Dong Giang, member of the Central Committee of South Vietnam 

National Front for Liberation. 

The delegation of the people of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 

comprised: 

Mr. Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of 

Vietnam, head of delegation. 

Mr. Hoang Quoc Viet, Member of the Presidium of the Central Committee 

of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, deputy head. 

Mr. Hoang Minh Giam, Member of the Presidium of the Central Committee 

of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, Minister of Culture of the 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 

Mr. Nguyen Co Thach, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 

Mr. Nguyen Thuong, Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 

to Cambodia. 

178 

APPENDIX B 


1 The Members of FUNK and GRUNK 

Government of the National United Front of Cambodia (FUNK): 

Head of State and President: Samdech Norodom Sihanouk 

Political Bureau of the Central Committee: 

President: Samdech Penn Nouth 

General Secretary: Thiounn Prasith 

Members: Chan Youran 

Chau Seng 

Chea San 

General Duong Sam 01 

Hou Yuon 

Hu Nim 

Huot Sambath 

Khieu Samphan 

Sarin Chhak 

Thiounn Mumm 

Central Committee: 

Ang Kim Khoan General Duong Sam 01 

Chan Youran Hak Seang Layny 

Chau Seng Han Mat 

Chea San Hay Kim Seang 

Chem Snguon Hou Yuon 

Chou Chet Heng Pich 

Hu Nim Ong Meang 

Huot Sambath Samdech Penn Nouth 

Mme Ieng Thirith Poc Doeus Komar 

In Sokan Ros Thol 

Kiet Chhon Sarin Chhak 

Keo Meas Seng Chongkal 

Khieu Samphan Sien An 

Kong Sodip Sor Thouk 

Koy TOllin Suong Sikoeun 

Krin Lean Thiounn Mmmn 

Ly On Thiounn Prasith 

1

Quoted in Caldwell, op. cit. (pgs. 384-386). 

179 
Princess Monique Sihanouk Tiv 01 

Ngo Rou Toch Kham Doeun 

Ngo Taing Tykea Ung Panharith 

Ok Sakun Van Pinny 

Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (GRUNK) 

Prime Minister: Samdech Penn Nouth 

Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense: 

Khieu Samphan 

Minister Delegate to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers: 

Kiet Chhon 

Minister of Foreign Affairs: Sarin Chhak 

Minister of Information and Propaganda: Hu Nim 

Minister of Interior, Communal Reforms, and Cooperatives: 

Hou Yuon 

Minister of Economy and Finance: Thiounn Mumm 

Minister in charge of Special Missions: Chau Seng 

Minister in charge of the Coordination of Struggle for the 

National Liberation: Thiounn Prasith 

Minister of Popular Education and Youth: Chan Youran 

Minister of Equipment and Military Armament: General Duong 

Sam 01 

Minister of Justice. and Judiciary Reforms: Chea San 

Minister of Public Works, Telecommunication, and Reconstruction: Huot Sambath 

Minister of Public Health, Religious, and Social Affairs: 

Ngo Rou • 

Minister without Portfolio: H.R.H. Norodom Phourissara 

Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs: Poc Doeus Komar 

Vice-Minis ter of National Defense: Kong Sodip 

Vice-Minister of Interior and National Security: Sor Thouk 

Vice-Minister of Information and Propaganda: Tiv 01 

Vice-Minister of Economy and Finance: Koy Thuon 

Vice-Minister of Popular Education and Youth: Mme Ieng Thirith 

Vice-Minister of Public Health, Religious, and Social Affairs: 

Chou Chet 

High Military Command of the People's National Liberation Armed 

Forces of Cambodia 

President: Khieu Samphan, Commander-in-Chief 

Vice President: Salot Sar, Chief of the !filitary Conduct of 

the Army 

Vice President: Nuon Chea, Chief of the Political Conduct of 

the Army 

Vice President: So Vanna, Deputy Chief of the :lilitary Conduct 

of the Army 

~embers: Thieun Chhith, Chief of the Conduct of the !!ilitary 

~Iateriel 

Son Sen, Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

180 

Committee of FUNK of Phnom Penh, Capital of Cambodia 

President: H.R.H. Norodom Phourissara 

Vice-President: Thiounn Thieunn 

Vice-President: Mme Khieu Ponnary, Women's Representative 

!fembers: Toch Phoeun, Civil Servants' Representative 

Phouk Chhay, Youth and Students' Representative 

Nguon Eng, Workers' Representative 

Ros Chet Thor, Writers and Journalists' Representative 

181 

APPENDIX C 

Major Items of U.S.-Furnished Equipment in FANK 

(Total Inventory by Year) 

Army Item 1972 1973 1974 

Rifle M-16 41,351 69,224 15~,1l5 

Carbine, Cal 30 52,616 83,515 83,515 

Machine Gun M-60 18 18 859 

Machine Gun Cal 30 2,278 4,531 6,220 

Mortar 60-mm 815 1,170 2,223 

Mortar 81-mm 97 196 503 

Grenade Launcher M-79 6,971 7,735 20,481 

Recoilless Rifle 106-mm 7 33 304 

Howitzer 75-mm 20 47 57 

Howitzer 105-mm 69 134 208 

Howitzer 155-mm 0 0 24 

Ambulance 1/4T & 3/4T 41 139 380 

Truck Dump 2-1/2T & 5T 0 24 76 

Truck 2-1/2T Cargo 496 982 1,838 

Truck 3/4T Cargo 0 441 758 

Truck 1/4T Utility 220 647 1,264 

Personnel Carrier Ml13 21 46 185 

Personnel Carrier Ml06 3 7 17 

Telephone TAl & TA312 1,037 4,298 9,629 

Radio AN/PRC 10 2,206 4,750 4,843 

Radio AN/PRC 25 1,975 3,207 5,023 

Radio AN/URC 46, 47 85 152 320 

182 ' 

Navy Item 

Patrol Boat River (PBR) 

Armored Troop Carrier (ATC) 

ATC (Refueler) 

ATC (Recharge~) 

Command & Communications Boat (CCB) 

Monitor with Flamethrower (ZIPPO) 

Assault Support Patrol Boat (ASPB) 

Minesweeper River (MSR/MSM) 

Monitor 

Landing Craft Medium (LCM6) 

Landing Craft Medium (LCM8) 

Combat Salvage Boat (CSB) 

Landing Craft Utility (LCU/YFU) 

Patrol Craft Fast (PCF) 

Floating Crane (YD) 

Mobile Support Base (MSB) 

Infantry Landing Ship (LSIL/LCI) 

Patrol Craft (YTL) 

Yard Tug Light (YTL) 

Drydock 

Total Craft 

Air Force Item 

T-28B/D 

0-lD/A 

AU-24 

AC-47 

C-47 

U-lA 

C-123K 

UH-1H 

UH-1GS 

T-41 

Total 

183 

1972 

39 

2 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

o 

19 

o 

o 

1 

o 

o 

1 

2 

2 

2 

1 

69 

1972 

16 

17 

o 

3 


10 


16 


o 

14 


o 


o 


76 


1973 


43 


14 


2 


1 

1 

1 

4 

6 

5 

22 

5 

1 

4 

4 

1 

2 

2 

2 

2 

1 

123 

1973 

48 

31 

14 

6 

15 

7 

o 

19 

o 

14 

154 

1974 


64 


14 


3 


1 

2 

1 

4 

5 

6 

30 

5 

1 

4 

20 

1 

2 

2 

2 

3 

1 

171 

1974 

64 

37 

14 

14 

11 

1 

8 

34 

10 

18 

211 
APPENDIX D 

FANK Order of the Day,S October 1971 

Officers, 

Noncommissioned Officers, 

Men, 

of CHENLA II 

In order to liberate our compatriots from the yoke of the enemy, 

and to fall upon the communist VC/NVA aggressors, CHENLA II was launched 

the 20th of August last on my instructions. 

In six weeks of violent combat, during which you confirmed once 

more your determination to defend Khmer soil, you have overcome the enemy 

and destroyed his finest regiments. 

The enemy has been put to flight, leaving on the field irreparable 

losses: four VC/NVA regiments were practically put out of action, and 

the materiel captured is even more considerable. 

The losses inflicted on the enemy bear witness to the importance of 

your vic tory: 

- 3,634 VC/tNA put out of action, of which 952 bodies were left on 

the battlefield 

- 287 weapons captured, including 18 crew-served, of which two were 

75-mm 


- A large quantity of ammunition 


- An important stock of food and fuel 


- A great number of vehicles 


- An important stock of latex 


The morale of the enemy is, therefore, surely very low, and from 

this moment more than 100,000 of our compatriots return to the peace 

of the Khmer family, and the quietude of republican law. 

Officers, 


Noncommissioned Officers, 


Men, 

Your exploits have exceeded our hopes, and you have held high the 

flag of the Republic. You have earned the praise of the Fatherland. 

Humbly do r bow before your dead. Their sacrifices are not in vain. 

r salute your colors, and r address to you my most affectionate 

congratulations. 

184 
Nevertheless, still further sacrifices will be asked of you that 

the Nation may survive. 

Now, forward, to victory. 

Done at Phnom Penh, 5 October 1971 

Marshal Lon Nol, Commander-in-Chief 

and Chief of the General Staff, FANK 

/s/ Lon Nol 

185 

ARVN 

ASEAN 

CINPAC 

COMUSMACV 

COSVN 

DAO 

DATT 

DRV 

FANK 

FARK 

FAO 

FNL 

GKR 

GVN 

ICC 

KAF 

KC 

MAAG 

MACV 

MAP 

MEDTC 

MILSTRIP 

Glossary 

Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

Association of Southeast Asia Nations 

Commander-In-Chief, Pacific 

Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

Central Office (for) South Vietnam 

Defense Attache Office 

Defense Attache 

Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam 

Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres (Khmer Armed Forces 

after 18 March 1970) 

Forces Armees Royales Khmeres (Khmer Armed Forces 

prior to 18 March 1970) 

Foreign Assistance Office (FANK) 

Front for National Liberation 

Government of the Khmer Republic 

Government of (South) Vietnam 

International Control Commission (First Indochina 

War) 

Khmer Air Force (after 18 March 1970) 

Khmer Communists 

Military Assistance Advisory Group 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 

Military Assistance Program (U.S. grant 

military assistance) 

Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia 

Military Standard Requisitioning Procedures (U.S.) 

~!arine ~ationale KhI!lere (Khl!ler :Iavy after 

18 :!arch 1970) 

186 

MR 

MRK 

NLF 

NVA 

POL/MIL 

PRC 

PRG 

RVN 

RVNAF 

SEATO 

TCN 

UN 

USAF 

USAID 

USN 

VC/NVA 

VNAF 

VNN 

Military Region 

Marine Royale Khmere (Khmer Navy prior to 

18 March 1970) 

National Liberation Front 

North Vietnamese Army 

Politico/Military Counselor 

People's Republic of China 

Provisional Revolutionary Government (Viet Cong) 

Republic of Vietnam 

Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 

South East Asia Treaty Organization 

Third-Country National 

United Nations 

United States Air Force 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

United States Navy 

Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army 

Vietnam Air Force 

Vietnam Navy 

187