### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00054- CV NO. 03-05-00055- CV

F r ank D . M e ndic ino , A ppe lla nt

v. Texas Workforce Com m ission , Adecc o USA Inc. and Celest ica Inc., Appellees & Texas Workforce Com m ission , Adecc o USA Inc., Celest ica Inc., and T ALX, Appellees

F ROM THE COUNTY COURTS AT LAW NO. 2 & 3 O F WILLI AMSO N COUNTY NOS. 04 -1095 -CC 2 & 0 4-036 0-CC 3, HO NORAB LE DONALD HI GGINB OTH AM, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N

These a ppeals a rise fr om the Texas Workforce Commi ssion’s denials of F ra n kD. Mendicino’s c laims for unemploy ment benef

its. Mendicino contends that the trial c ourt committed pr oc e dura l and evi den ti ary e rr or s w he n g ra

nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f a pp e lle e s o n h is

c la ims . We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nts
. Me nd ic ino was a ssi g ne d b y Ad e c c o U SA, I nc ., a

te mpo ra ry pe rs on ne l se rv ic e , to work at its client company , Celestica, Inc., a s a m at er i al s handler be g inning on January 23, 2003. He wa s terminated on Oc tober 31, 2003.Mendicino ca lls Adecc o and Celestica his joint or co- employ ers, but th e s t y l e o f the 1 proce eding befor e the Commission i ndicates that his claim was made a g ainst Adec co. Parag raph se ven of the Adec co Associate A gr e e me nt f o r A s s ig nme nts a t C e le s ti c a , a

ttached 2 to t he Com mis sio n’ s mo tio n f or su mma ry jud g me nt, pr ov ide s a s f

oll ow s: Duri ngand

/or a ft e r my pe rf

or manc e of se rv ic e s for Ce le sti c a , I wi ll m a int a in i n confide nce a

nd will not use or disclose, except as nece ssary in the perf

ormanc e of ob lig ati on s to A de c c o, Ce le sti c a I nf or ma tio n, that I

have a c qu ir e d o r w ill acquir e (w hether

or not deve loped by

me) duringmy

perf ormanc e of se rvice s for or re lated to Celestica. The ter m “Celestica

I nformation” use d in this Agre ement mea ns any information identified by

the Celestica a s confidential or any other tec hnical , b u siness or financ ial information, the use or disclosur e of which might re asonably be construed to be contra

ry to the interest of the Celestica. Whe n t h e C elesti ca I nformation becomes gene rally available to the publ ic other tha n by my acts or omissions , it is no l ong er subject to the restrictions in this para g raph. Disclosure of Ce le sti c a

I nf or ma tio n to any on e ou tsi de the Ce le sti c a or Adec c o ( in conn e c ti o nw it

h A d e c c o ’ s o b li g a ti o n s r e late d to Ce le s ti c a ) mu s t b e a

u th o r ized b y t h e C el es t i cai nwr i t i n g. 2 Mendicino soug ht unemploy ment benef

its both initi ally

afte r his termination and for the period betwee n Dec ember 21, 2003, throug h J anuar y 3, 2004. Mendicino’s c laim was denie d. At an a d m i nistrative hea ring , Adec co prese nted evidenc e that it discharg ed Mendic ino for

1 misconduct for usinghis personal e -mail ac count for Ce lestica c o m p an y business in violation of

c omp any po lic y . T he Ad e c c o sup e rv iso r on- sit e a t Cele sti c a , Ama lia Mo se s, te sti fi e d b y

a ff ida vit that sh e tol d M e nd ic ino in h is o rie ntatio n th a t he wa s n ot a uth or ize d to us e the int e rn e t or his persona l e-mail at wor

k. The company policy she cited was a confide ntiality policy contained in a broade r employ

ment ag ree ment signe d by Mendicino. Moses also testified that, af ter Mendic ino 2 used his persona l e-mail ac count t o s e nd confide ntial information to a Celestica ma nag er, she war

ned him not to use hi s persona l e-ma il acc ount for business purposes. She also testified t hat, on Octobe r3

6, 20 03 , s he wa

rn e d Me nd ic ino that us e of the int e rn e t and his pe rs on a l e -m a il a c c ount a t wo rk to do his job was a “ser ious infrac tion of t he poli cy .” She stated t hat, although Mendicino c ould have te le ph on e d o r w a lke d in to h e r o ff ic e to s pe a k w ithhe r, he a g a in a c c e sse d t he int e rn e t to us e his persona l e-mail to ask her a question about his continued employ ment. Mendicino conte nded that his use of the int erne t and per sonal e-ma il for work pur poses was know n and condone d by Celestica

su pe rv iso rs a nd

wa s mo re e ff

ic ie nt. The a ppeal trib u n al af

firmed the de nial of Mendicino’ s orig inal claim for

un e mpl oy me nt b e ne fi ts, c on c lud ingthat he wa s d isq ua lif ie d b y be ingdis c ha

rg e d f or mis c on du c t. See Te x. L a

b. Cod e Ann. § 20 7. 04 4 (We st 20 06 ). Th e Com mis sio n a ff ir me d th e de nia l of

be ne fi ts. The C o m m i s s i o nal s o d en i edM en d i ci n o ’s s ec o n d cl ai m fo r u n em p l o y

m en tb en ef

i t s , co n cl u d i n g that h e w a s n o t a v a il a

b le f o r w o r k b e tw e e n D e c e mb e r 2 1 , 2 0 0 3 an d Ja n u ary 3, 2004. See id

. § 207.021(a) (4). Me ndicino filed suits challeng ing t h e Commissi on’s deter minations that he was dis c ha rg e d f or mis c on du c t (a

pp e llate c a

us e numbe r 03- 05 -0 00 55 -C V) and that he wa s unava ila ble for wor k in late 2003 and e arly

2004 (appe llate ca

use number 03- 05-00054-CV). The trial c ourt set a hearing on the m erits of the original claim for Octobe r 13, 2004, then rec essed to g ive Mendicino, proc eedingpro se, a n opportunity

to familiarize himself with trial proce dures. The Commi ssion then filed a mot ion for summ ary judgme nt, later adopted by Adec co, contending that Mendic ino was ac corde d due proc ess and that substantial evide nce suppor ted the Commi ssion’s conclusion that he wa s ineligible f or ben efits bec ause he had bee n discharg ed for misconduct. The tria l court held a hear ing on the motions for summary judgme nt on Dece mber 16, 20 04 . M e nd ic ino a

pp e are d at th is h e ari ng . Th e c ourt g ra nte d the mot ion s for su mma ry jud g me nt,Me nd ici no fi led a br ie f c on c e rn ingthe jud g me nt a g a ins t hi s o ri g ina l c la im i n a pp e llate 3 c a us e numbe r 03 -0 5- 00 05 5- CV . T he Com mis sio n a nd Ad e c c o f ile d b ri e fs in r e sp on se . A ft e r t his Court c on so lid a te d th e tw o a

pp e a ls f or c on sid e ratio n and inv ite d su pp le me nta l br ie fi ngre le va nt t o appellate cause number 03-05-00054-CV, Mendicino did not fil e anothe r brief . The Commission, la te r j oin e d b y

Ad e c c o, fi le d s up ple me nta l bri e fs re ite ra tin g the ir c on te nti on that the se c on d c la im for unemploy

ment benef

its wa s moot ba sed on the trial court’s aff irmance of t h e C ommissi on’s denial of the orig inal claim for be nefits in appellate cause number 03-05- 00055-CV. 4 aff irming the Commi ssion’s order deny i n g the orig inal claim for une mploy ment benef

its. I n the judgme nt, the trial court a lso dismi ssed Mendicino’s c laims ag ainst Celestica a nd TAL X. On De c e mbe r 2 1, 20 04 , th e Co mm is si on mov e d to dis mis s th e se c on d s uit , contendingthat Mendicino’s denial of benefits in the orig inal suit disqualified him from obtaining subsequent benef

its in the second suit. See Tex. L ab. C ode Ann. § 207.044(b). The Commis sion also as k ed that Mendicino take nothing and that the tria l court af firm the Commissi on’s dec ision. Adec co filed a

simil ar motion. The motio n s to dismi ss were set for he aringon Marc h 31, 2005. Howeve r, on Mar ch 28, 2005, the court struck throug h the trial cour t cause number in the c aption of the fi na l jud g me nt in the or ig ina l c a us e and ins e rt e d th e se c on d c a

us e numbe r. Th e jud g me nt i n this sec ond cause was file-stampe d on Marc h 28, 2005, althoug h the cour t did not chang e either

the text of the judg ment or the “ signe d on” date in the judgme nt from Dec ember 16, 2004. On appe al, Mendicino c ontends that the j udg ments wer e erroneous. H e foc uses on the denial of t he original claim for benefits. He contends that the cour t erre d by allowing a hea

ring 3 to proce ed without all four a ppellees ( Celestica a

nd TAL X wer e not pr esent). He argues that the trial court de nied him a trial de novo a nd due proc ess. He c omplains that the cour t’s judgme nt is based on clea rly fra udulent, inadmissible evidence and re lies on the law to the e x clusion of the fa cts.5 J udicial review of the Commiss ion’s decisions on unemploy ment benef

its is by trial de novo under the substantial e vidence standard. Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 212.202(a) (West 2006). The a ction of the Commission carries a presumption of validity , and the pa rty seeking to set aside its decision has the burde n of showing that it was not supported by substantial e vidence

. Merc er v. Ro ss , 701 S.W .2d 830, 831 (Tex. 1986)

. Although substantial e vidence is more than a me re sc intill a, the e vid e nc e in the re c or d may a c tua lly pr e po nd e ra te a g a ins t the a g e nc y ’s de c isi on and no ne the le ss amount to substantial evidenc e. See State v . Public Util. Comm’n , 883 S.W .2d 190, 204 (Tex. 1994). This judicial reviewis not subject to the admini strative proc edure s act. Merc er , 701 S.W .2d at 831. The trial c ourt examines whether the evidenc e introduce d at the trial c ourt shows fac ts in ex istence at the time of the Commi ssion’s decision that rea sonably support the dec ision. Colli ngsworth Gen. Hos p. v . H un nic utt , 9 8 8 S. W. 2 d 7 0 6 , 7 0 8 ( T e x. 1 9 9 8 )

. T h e r e v ie w in g c o u rt ma y n o t s e t aside a decision of the Commission merely beca use the court would have rea ched a differ ent result, but may do so on ly if it fi nd s that the Com mis sio n’ s de c isi on wa s ma de wi tho ut re g ard to t he law o r t

he fa c ts and wa s theref

ore unr easona

ble, ar bitrary , or ca

pricious. Merc er , 701 S.W .2d at 831. We r e v ie w a s u mm ar

y ju d g me n t d e n o v o . Va len ce Ope ra tin g Co . v . D or se tt , 164 S

. W

. 3 d 6 5 6 , 6 6 1 (T ex . 2 0 0 5 ). W e ta k e a s t ru e a l l ev i d en ce fa v o rab l e t o t h e n o n m o v an tan d i n d u l ge

ever y rea sonable infe renc e and r esolve a ny doubts in the no n m o v an t’s favor

. Id . Summary jud g me nt i s p ro pe r w he n th e re are no dis pu te d is su e s o f m a te ri a l f a c t and the mov ant is en tit le d to jud g me nt a s a

ma tte r o f l aw. Te x. R. C iv. P. 1 66 a (c ); Pr ov ide nt Life& Ac c ide nt I ns . Co . v . Kn ott , 128 S.W .3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003).6 Mend i ci n o co mp l ai n s t h at t h e ab s en ce o f r ep re s en t ati ves of Cele stica and TA L X from

a tr ia l c ourt he ari ng de pr ive d the tr ia l c ourt of jur isd ic tio n. He c ite s Texas Employm ent Commission v. Gant, Inc

. for the pr oposition that all parties to the proceeding s befor e the Commission m ust be made pa rties to the suit in order to invest the re viewing court with jur isdiction ove r the matter

. See 60 4 S.W.2 d 211 , 213 (T e x. Civ . App .— San A nto nio 19 80 , n o w ri t) ; se e als o Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 212.201(b) (West 2006)

. We f ind no harmful er

ror in the a

bsence of Celestica

and TALX from the Dec ember

16 hear ing. I f Celestica an d T ALX were ne cessa ry parties, the tr ial court ha d jurisdic ti o n b e c a

u s e a p p e ll an t ma d e Ce le s ti c a an d T A L X d e f e n d an ts
. T h e c o u rt d id n o t lo se the p o we r t o co n s i d er

th e c as e b ec au s e r ep re s en t at i v es o f c er t ai np ar t i es d i d n o tat t en d

a h ea ri n g. I n addition, C el es t ica a

nd TAL X wer e not nec essar y parties. The administrative proce eding from which this ca se ar ose involved cla imant Mendicino and “the pe rson for w hich [the] claimant last worke d.” See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 212.051-.052 (West 2006). The por tions of the ad m i n i s t rative recor d on file her e show Ade cco a s Mendicino’s employ er. A lthough Me ndicino d es cr i b es C el es t i ca an d Ad ec co as h i s “j o i n t em p l o y er s , ” ot h er s , i n cl u d i n g th e C o m m i s s i o nt h ro u gh its hearing s office r and at trial, descr ibe Celestica a s Adec co’s client. Although Mendicino said at the Octobe r trial cour

t hear ing that TAL X was “ the only party that responde d” to the Commissi on’s discovery requ es t s conce rning his claim for be nefits, the Commissi on char acte rized TAL X as “ a

c omp any wh o r e pr e se nts e mpl oy e rs be fo re the Com mis sio n, ” no t as a litig ant. Th e re c or d s up po rt s a finding that Adec co and the Commi ssion were the only nece ssary defe ndants in the trial de novo,

and that th e a bs e nc e of oth e r p art ie s fr om a he ari ng a t wh ic h the su it a g a ins t th e m w a s d ism iss e d d id not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the c ase.Mendicino also alleg es that seve ral pe o p l e, including the assistant attorney g ener al 4 repr esenting the Commiss io n , “w ere clea rly acc omplices is involved in fraudulently avoiding contributions or pay

ment of benefits.” He suppli es no rec ord refer ence s supporting his alleg ation that any on e e lse e nc oura g e d, pa rt ic ipate d in , o r k

ne w o f a ny pe rj ur y by Mo se s. 7 Mendicino ar g ues that the trial court err ed by basing its decision only on the law a

nd not on the fac ts. He asser ts that the trial court’s err or is ma nifest in its decision to file a conc lusion of l aw w it

h o u t f in d in g s o f

f a c t. Su b s ta n ti a l e v id e n c e r e v ie w p e r mi ts r e v e r s a l w h e nth e d e c ision under r eview w as m ad e wi t h o u t rega rd to the law or

fac ts. See M

erce r , 701 S.W .2d at 831. Although c ourts must review the f acts whe n conductinga substantial evidenc e re view, the deter mination of whether substantial e vidence supported the Commiss ion’s decision is a question of law. See G ilder v. Me no , 926 S.W .2d 3 5 7 , 3 6 5 (T ex . App.—Austin 1996, writ denied) . The decision to g rant summary judgme nt is also a matter of la w. Kno tt , 1 2 8 S. W. 3 d a t 2 1 7 ( c it in g T e x. R. Civ. P . 166a(c )). The court’s de cision to make no finding s of fac t a nd only one conc lusion of law do e s n ot p ro ve tha

t it fa ile d to re vie w fa c ts or did so inc or re c tly in g ra

nti ng su mma

ry jud g me nt i n a substantial evidenc e re view.

Mendicino complains that the trial court based i ts decision on “c lear ly fra udulent and inadmissib le e v ide nce.” He c ontends that conflicts in evide nce f rom Adec co super

visor Moses show that she committed perjur y that undermines the judgme n t
. He a rg ues that there are signific ant 4 i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s a m o n g an e - m a i l , an a f f i d a v i t , an d h e r t e s t i m o n y a t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e h e ar i n g . In he r e- ma il t o a

Ce le sti c a su pe rv iso r o n th e mor

nin g Me nd ic ino wa s f

ir e d, Mo se s w ro te , “ My

la st

conver sation with Fra

nk with r eg ards to the inter net and PC use for busine ss only was on 10/6/03 and he use d the computer to acc ess Yahoo at 8:13 am today

. ” T h i s unsworn stateme nt is not8

nece ssarily

inconsistent with Moses’s statement in he r aff idavit that Mendicino “wa s not authorized to use the interne t or his personal e -mail ac count at work.” The e -mail does not g ive the deta ils of the contents of that “last conversation.” Nor are either of these inconsistent with Moses’s testimony befor e the a

ppeal tribuna l that, in the e-mail t hat l ed to his termination, Mendicino i nquired a bout continued employ

ment at Celestica a

nd that she for

war ded the e-ma il to a Ce lestica human r esourc es

mana g e r “ a sk ingif

we wo uld be a

ble to of fe r F ra nk a min i pay inc re a se .” Pa ssi nga lon g an e -m a il

se nt b y Me nd ic ino on

his pe rs on a l a c c ount do e s no t c ha ng e wh e the r Me nd ic ino wa s a uth or ize d to

s e n d i to r i g i n a l l y.

The re cord doe s not contain an a dminist rative or judicial fi n d i n g of per

jury , fra ud,

or c on sid e ra

tio n o f i na dmi ssi ble e vi den ce, no r doe s th e re c or d s up po rt su c h. A p e rs on

c omm its p e r j u r y
i f, wi t h i n t en tt o d ec ei v e a n d wi t h kn o wl ed ge o f t h e s t at em en t ’s m ea n i n g: (1) he make s a fa lse statement under oath or swea rs t o the t ruth of a false statement previously

made a nd the statement is re quired or authorized by law to be made under oath; or (2) he make s a fa lse unsworn de clar ation under Chapte r 132, Civil P ra ct i ce and Remedies Code.

Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 37.02 (West 2003). Even if the comparison prove d one or more of Moses’s statements to be fa lse, Mendicino points to no evidence of dec eptive intent by Moses. Nor ha s he shown that the evidenc e wa s inadmissibl e or that any objection to the admissibilit y was pre serve d for a ppellate r eview. See Te x. R. App

. P. 3 3. 1 ( pr e se rv a tio n) ; se e als o , e.g. , Tex. R. Evi d. 103 (r uli ng s o n e vid e nce), 402 (r e le va nt e vid e nc e a dmi ssi ble ). Me nd ic ino ha s sh ow n at mo stTh e a dmi nis tr a tiv e c od e pr ov ide s a s f oll ow s: 5 Subpoenas to compel the attendanc e of w itnesses and the pr oduction of re cords for a ny hear ing of

an appea l ma

y be issued at the dire ction of the Commission or its de sig ne e or

a n a pp e a l tr ibu

na l. A sub po e na may be iss ue d e ith e r at th e re qu e st of a party or on the motion of the Commi ssion or its de signe e o r t h e a p p eal tribunal. The party reque sting a subpoena sha ll state the nature of the infor mation de sir e d, inc lud ingname s of any wi tne sse s and

the re c or ds that th e re qu e sto r f e e ls are nece ssary

for the pr oper presentation of t he case. The reque st shall be g rante d only to the extent the recor ds or the testimony of t he requested witnesses appea rs to be re levant to the issues on appe al. 40 Tex. Admin. C ode § 815.18(1) (A) ( 2004). 9 inconsistency , which we ighs on c redibility rathe r than a dmi s s i b i l i t y , and is better r esolved by the fac t-finder

than an a ppellate c ourt. See Mo ntg om e ry In de

p. Sc h. Di st. v . D av is , 34 S.W .3d 559, 567 (T e x. 20 00 ); cf. Tex. R. Evi d. 607. We conclude that the re co rd d o es not support Mendicino’s alleg ation that the judg ment is based on fr audulent and ina dmissibl e evide nce.

Mendicino also complains that he was denied due proce ss beca use the Commission’s decision wa s bas ed o n “w rongdoing ” such a s the Commis sion’s ref usal to issue subpoenas a nd imp ro pe r a

pp lic a tio n o f t

he bu rd e n of pr oo f. We f

ir st n ote tha

t th e Com mis sio n is no t r e qu ir e d to issue subpoenas on de mand. See 4 0 T ex . Ad m i n . C o d e § 81 5

. 1 8 (1 )( A) (2 0 0 4 ). Ne x t , t h e h ea ri n gs 5 examiner ’s statement that he persona lly had the bur den to find the truth does not show that the examiner failed to require proof that Mendicino wa s disqualified from re ceivingbenef its. Further , reg ardle ss of whethe r Mendicino wa s acc orded due proce ss at the ag ency level, the tria l de novo pr ov ide d d

ue pr oc e ss. A tri a l de nov o on th e iss ue s p a sse d o n b y the a g e nc y

mit ig a te s d

ue pr oc e ss

v i o l at i o n s at the administrative leve l. Texas Employm ent Comm’n v . Remington Y ork, Inc

. , 9 48 S.W .2d 352, 358 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no pe t.); Francis co v. Bo ar d o f D e nta l E

x am ’r s , 14910

S.W .2d 619, 622 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1941, writ re f’d) . Mendicino has not shown that he was de nie d a ny re qu e ste d d isc ov e ry a t the tr ia l de nov o, no r doe s he al le g e any de pr ivatio n o f d ue pr oc e ss at the trial c ourt other than its af firmanc e of the Commi ssion’s decision. Mendicino conte nds that the trial court denied him a trial de novo bec ause it fa iled to file timely

finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law a nd, when it did file such, filed f indings a nd conclusions that trac ked the Comm i ssion’s proposals. He a sserts that this shows either that the Commi ssion, the attorney g ener al, and the assistant attorney s g ener al presided over the trial or that they conspired w ith the trial court in dec iding the c ase.

This case was de cided on summary j u d gm en t
. The Commission and Adecc o filed motions for summary judgme nt, and Mendicino did not file a response . Normally , finding s of fa ct and conclusions of lawhave no pla ce in summary judgme nt proce eding s, Linw ood v. NCNB Texas , 885 S.W .2d 102, 103 (Tex. 1994), and the f ailure to m ak e s u ch finding s is not error. Cotton v. Ratholes, Inc. , 699 S.W. 2d 20 3, 20 4 ( Te x. 19 85 ). Th e tr ia l c ourt a c kn ow le dg e d th is b y

fi lin g on ly the conclusion of law that substantial evidenc e supported the Commi ssion’s decision. Resemblanc e

or eve n identity

betwee n the proposed findings and conclusions and those sig ned by the trial cour

t does not show err or. Mendicino had the oppor tunity to reque st additional findings a nd conclusions to addre ss a

ny defic iencies. The rec ord does not c ontain such a reque st. Nor doe s simil arity betwee n the proposed c onclusion and the c ourt’s docume nt show conspirac y betwee n parties a

nd the trial judge . Nothing in the r ecor d supports Mendicino’s alleg ation of such a conspirac y . Mendicino had the opportunity

to respond to the motion fo r s u m m ar y judgme nt and appe are d and ar g ued at the11

summary judgme nt hear ing. T his satisfies the re quirement for trial de novo. The somewhat be lated fi lin g of a c on c lus ion

of law d oe s n ot s ho w a

ny de pr ivatio n o f d

ue pr oc e ss r ig hts

. Mendicino conte nds that the trial court err ed by g ranting the Commiss ion’s motion for summary

judgme nt. He contends that the evidence submi tted by the Commiss ion was incre dible, perjure d, and unreasonable and that it did not show that he wa s g uilty of misconduct. As discussed above, t h e re co rd d oes not show that the evide nce is pe rjured. N or does our revie w show it to be incre dible or unre asonable

.

We must determine whether the rec ord supports as a matter of la w the conc lusion that the Commiss ion’s finding of misconduct wa s supported by substantial evidence

. The labor code define s misconduct as “mismanag ement of a position of employ

ment by action or ina ction, neg lect that jeopar dizes the life or proper ty of another , intentional w rong doing or malfe asanc e, intentional vio la tio n of a law, or vio la tio n of a pol ic y or ru le a do pte d to e ns ur e the or de rl y wo rk and the sa fe ty of employ ees.” Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 201.012(a) (West 2006)

. Mendicino contends that the re cord shows t h at h e did not commit m isconduct by using his per sonal e-ma il because other e mploy ees

rec eived a

nd sent e-ma ils to hi s private a ccount a n d h i s C elestica supervisor wa s awa

re of and approve d of this usag e. This e vidence was counter ed by evidenc e that Mendicino was not authorized to use the i nterne t or hi s persona l e-ma il at work, that he had been reminded of that policy less than a month befor e he w as fire d, an d t h at h e used his personal e- mail the morning that he wa s terminated. This competing evidenc e re g ardingwhether Mendicino committed misconduct by violating a

company policy rea sonably supports the C ommissi on’s decision and shows that it was12

not unrea sonable, a

rbitrar y , or ca pricious. Thus, the rec ord shows the absenc e of a g enuine issue of materia l fac t conce rning whether substantial evidenc e supported the C ommissi on’s dec ision. The tr ia l c ourt did no t e rr by g ra nti ngthe Com mis sio n’ s mo tio n f or su mma ry jud g me nt. Me n d ic in o c o n te n d s th a t th e tr ia l c o u rt e r r e d b y g r an ti n g A d e c c o ’ s mo ti o nfor summary judgme nt beca

use it adopted the Commissio n ’s motion. He contends that this motion violates the labor code and shows conspirac y . The labor code section he cites co n ce rn s the repr esentation of the Commis sion by the a t t o rn ey

g ener al’s off

ice. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 213.001 (West 2006)

. The fa ct that the par ty who pre vailed at the Commission and desires to have that decision af

firmed by the trial cour

t j o i n s an d ad o pts the Commi ssion’s motion for summary judgme nt doe s not me an that the pa rty or its attorney

is ill icitly repr esenting the Commiss ion. Nor is such adoption evidenc e of conspirac y . The trial court did not err by g ranting Adec co’s motion for

su mma ry jud g me nt. Havingconsidere d all of the issues ra ised by Mendicino and c oncluded they prese nt

no e rr or , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nts of

the tr ia l c ourt
.

G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pembe rton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: May

19, 2006