FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V E N T H C IR C U IT DE CEM B ER 23, 2005 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [D O N OT P U B L IS H] IN TH E U NITE D S TAT ES C OUR T OF AP PE ALS F OR TH E E LE V EN TH C IR C U IT

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 05- 1451 6 N on -A rg um en t C ale nd ar

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 04-00145 -CV -W CO- 2
GRE GO RY EA RL W HI TN ER , Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant,
ve rs us RICK M OORE, She rif

f of Habe rs ha m

Co un ty, i n d i v i du a l l y a n di n h i s o f f i c i a l c ap a c i t y, I S RA EL S EG A R S , i n d i v i du a l l y a n di n h i s o f f i c i a l c ap a c i t y,

D ef en da nts -Appe lle es .

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ Ap peal from the Un ited S tates D istrict C ourt fo r th e N or th er n D ist ri ct of Ge or gia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (D ec em be r 23, 200 5) Be fo re BL A C K, BA R KE TT , an d M A R C U S, C ir cu it Ju dg es . PE R C URIAM :Whit ner’ s complaint also named as a defenda nt Haber sham County

Sheriff Rick Moore and 1 a s s e rte d v io lati o n s o f th e F if th , N in th , an d F o u rte e n th A me n dme n ts a s to b o th d e f e n d an ts. I n the district court, af

ter the de fenda

nts filed their answe r and motion for summa ry j u d gm en t based on qualified immunit y , in his brief opposing summary judgme nt, Whi tner withdre w all claims except fo r t he F ourt h A me ndme nt c la im a g a ins t D e pu ty Se g ars . T hu s, that is the on ly c la im b e fo re us . 2 G re gor y E ar l Whitne r ap pe al s th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e ntr y of sum m ar y j udgm en t i n f a v o r o f Ha b e r s h a m Co u n t y D e p u t y Is r a e l S e g a r s b a s e do n q u a l i f i e di mm u n i t y. W hitner sued Deputy Segars, pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 , a lleging Segar s arre sted him a nd s ei ze d hi s pr ope rty w ith out pr oba ble c au se in viol at ionof his F ourth Am endm ent rights. O n appeal, W hitner argues that Deputy Segar s was not entitled 1 to qualified imm

unit y b ec au s e no reasonable office r w ould have believed that pr oba ble c au se , or

a rg uable pro ba bl e ca

use , e xis te d to a rr es t hi m und er the ci rc um stanc es of

thi s c as e. W e disag re e an d, a cc or din gly , a ff irm the e ntr y of
s u mm a ry ju d g men tb a s e do n q u a l i f i e di mm u n i t y. T he pa rt ie s are f

am ili ar w ith the ba ck gr ound

f ac ts, whi ch w er e tho ro ughl y described by

the d i s t ri ct co urt in its order, and w e do not recount th em again here. W e re vie w de nov o a distr ic t cour t’ s entr y of a sum

m ar y j udgm en t m oti on b as ed on qualified imm

unity , a pply ing th e sam e legal standards as the district c ourt. See Le e v. Fe rrar o, 284 F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir. 2002). W e re solve all issues of m aterial fa ct in fa vor of the pl ai nt iff

, a nd the n de te rm ine the le ga l qu es tio n of w he the r the de fe nda nt i s e nti tle d to qua lif ie d im m uni ty und er tha t ve rs ionof

the f ac ts. I d.3

A s w e obse rv ed

in L ee v. F er

raro : Q ua lif ie d im m uni ty of fe rs “ co m ple te pr ote ct ion fo r gove rn m en t officials sued in their indiv idua l capacities as lon g as ‘ their conduct violates no clear ly established statutory or co nstitu tional right s of which a re as ona ble pe rs on w oul d ha ve kno w n. ’ ” T hom as v. Ro be rt s, 261 F
. 3d 1160 , 1170 (11th Cir
. 2 0 0 1 ) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzger ald, 457 U. S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct
. 2 7 27, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982)) (additional quot at ion s om itt ed ). T he pur pose of this imm

uni ty is to a llo w gove rn m en t of

fi ci al s to carr

y out the ir dis cr et ion ar

y dut ie s w ith out

the fe ar of pe rs ona l l ia

bil ity or harassin g li tig at ion , se e A nde rs on v . Cr ei ght on, 483 U
. S. 635 , 638 , 107 S
. Ct
. 303 4, 3038 , 97 L
. E d. 2d 5 23 (1 987) , pr ote ct ing f

ro m sui t “ al l bu t t he pla inl y inc om pe te nt o r one w ho is know ing ly

vio la tin g th e fe de ra l l aw . ” W ill ing ha m v. L ough na n, 261 F. 3d 1 178, 118 7 ( 11 th C ir
. 200 1)
. Be ca use qua lif

ie d im m uni ty is a defense not onlyfrom

liability , but also from

suit, i t is “ im

portant for a co urt t o a sc er

ta in the va lid ity

of aqua lif ie d im m uni ty defen se a s e ar ly in the la w sui t a s po ssi ble
. ” G JR In vs. , In c. v. Co unt y of E sc am bia , 132 F.3 d 1 35 9, 1 37 0 (1 1t h C ir. 1 99 8) (ci ta ti on om it te d)
. 284 F. 3d a t 11 93- 94. T o be shi el de d fr om sui t by qua lif ie d im m uni ty , a publ ic of

fi ci al m us t first show that he wa s acting within the scope of his dis cretionary authority
. See Viny ard
v. W ils on, 311 F
. 3d 1 340, 133 6 ( 11t h C ir
. 200 2)
. If he doe s so, the bur de n th enshi ft s to the pla int if

f to s how , f

ir st, f ac ts e sta bli shi ng tha t a

c onst itu tio na l vi ola tio n
o c c u rr e d , a n ds e c o n d , t h a tt h e c o n s t i tu t i o n a l r i g h tw a s c l e a r l y e s t ab l i s h e da tt h e t i me of th e v io la ti on . Sau ci er v . Katz, 5 33 U.S. 19 4, 2 01 , 12 1 S. Ct
. 21 51 , 21 56 , 15 0 L. E d. 2d 2 72 ( 2001 ). H er e, it is undi sput ed

tha t D ep uty

S eg ar s w as a ct ing w ith in the
sc ope of his dis cr et ion ar

y auth or ity a t a ll m at er ia l t im es .4

O n th e fi rs t pr ong of

S au ci er , it is w el l- se ttl ed tha t a n a rr es t w ith out pr oba ble
ca use vio la te s th e Fo urth A m en dm en t. S ee D ur ru thy v. P as tor , 351 F. 3d 1080 , 108 8 (1 1th Ci r. 200 3) , c er

t. de nie d, 125 S
. Ct
. 45 ( 2004 ). Pr oba ble ca use to ar re st e xis ts whe n an arre st is “ ob

jecti ve ly rea so na bl e ba se d on th e to ta li ty of th e ci rcu m st an ces .” L ee v. Fe rrar o, 28 4 F
. 3d a t 11 95. “ T his standa rd is m et w he n th e fa ct s a nd ci rc um stanc es w ith in the of fi ce r’ s kn ow le dge , of

w hic h he or

she ha s r ea so na bly tr ust w orthy

inf orm at ion , w ould c au se apr ude nt p er son to b el ie ve , und er the ci rc um stanc es sho w n, tha t t he su sp ect ha s c om m itt ed , is co m

m itt ing , or

is ab out to
com m it an offense. ” Id. (citations and quo tation m arks om itted). An offic er is entitled to qualified imm unityif there wa s even “ arguable” pr oba ble c au se to ar

re st the de fe nda nt, re ga rd le ss of w he the r the f ac ts l at er e sta bli sh that pro b ab l e cause did not exist. Durr uthy , 351 F. 3d at 108 9. Whether the office r
ac te d w ith out

j ust if ic at ionis m ea sur ed by a pu rel y obj ec tiv e standa rd

of w ha t a
re as ona ble of fi ce r in the de fe nda nt ’s p os iti on w oul d ha ve pe rc ei ve d. S ee N oli n v. Is be ll, 207 F
. 3d 1253, 1256 n. 2 (11th C ir
. 200 0) ( obse rv ing “ the sub j ec tiv e int en t of
an off ic er d oe s n ot affe ct th e ex is te nc e o f a Fo ur th Am en dm en t v io la ti on ”). W hitne r ar gue s qu al if

ie d im m uni ty w as im pr ovi de ntl y

gr an te d be ca

use no
re as ona ble of fi ce r w oul d have be lie ve d th at pr oba ble c au se e xis te d to a rr es t hi m f or ob s t ruction of a law enforce m ent officer because his tractor- trailer vehicle wa s5

pa rk ed on a pr iva te , a s op pose d to apub lic , r oa d a t t he tim e of his c onf ro nta tio n w ith De putySegar s on A ugus t 15, 2003
. At the tim e of this confrontation, Deputy Segar s had been disp atched to the location in response to a call c oncerning a trailer par ked in the ro ad w ay

of Ch ie ft ai n T ra il. Upon his a rr iva l, ali ttl e af te r m idn igh t, D ep uty S e g a r s o b s e rv e da n u n i l l u m i n a t e df l a tb e dt r a i l e r

p a rk e da tl e a s tf

o u r f e e ti n t o t he
ro ad way , at a p oi nt wher e Ch i e f t ai n Tra il bro ke off

an d c ur ve d a way

fro m Sn owy River Pla ce. Segar s explained th at due to the configuration of t he roads -- the tr ailer
wa s parked j ust around a bend

-- h e wa s concerned it posed a safety hazar d since a
m ot or is t co m in g a ro un d t he be nd m ig ht fai l t o s ee t he tra il er u nt il it was t oo lat e. A ft er c al lin g aw re ck er

c om pa ny to towthe tr ai le r fr om the r oa d, D ep uty Segars e ncount ered Whitner at his nearby hous e and learned that the trailer belonged to W hitne r. D ep uty

S eg ar s a ske d Whitne r to m ove th e tra iler , w hic h, a ga in,
co nst itu te d ar oa d ha zard
. D ur ing the en sui ng exc ha nge , Whitne r re fu se d to m ove the tr ai le r fr om

the r oa d inr es pons e to num er ous re que sts by Se ga rs an d thre at en ed to s ue Se ga rs m ult ipl e tim es if

the ve hic le w as tow ed
. W hitne r al so p ro ce ed ed

to m ove the tractor portion of the vehicle from his driveway

onto th e road and hitch it to the trailer so that no w both the tractor and the trailer were on the bend in the road wher e Se gars pr ev iou sly

ha d in dic at ed

the tr ai le r w as a ro ad ha zard
. W hitne r the n lai d dow n in the ba ck of the tr ai le r af

te r a w re ck er

servic e w as c al le d, tol d S eg ar s to “ w ri te it [ the6

tractor- trailer] a ticket,” and again igno red Segars’ s request to m ove the vehicle after Segars told him

it wa s a road hazard. The tractor and trailer subsequentl y we re tow ed
an d S eg ar s a rr es te d Whitne r, c ha rg ing him wit h ob struc tio n of ala w e nf

or ce m en t of fi ce r an d w ri tin g hi m

ati ck et f or im pr ope r pa rk ing
. D ep uty Se ga rs m ai nta ins tha t he is enti tle d to qua lif ie d im m uni ty be ca use his belief t h at t h e road in question wa s a public road on which the traffic law s wer e
re qui re d to be e nf

or ce d w as ar ea sona

ble one a nd, a ft er

he a ske d Whitne r to m ove the vehicle, W

hitner’ s subs equent condu ct obstructed the perform ance of S eg er ’s law
en fo rc em en t du tie s. W e ag re e. A s th e dis tr ic t c our t pu t i t: A t be st, how ev er , the co urt fin ds tha t Whitne r be lie ve d C hie ft ai n T ra il wa s ap r i va t e r oa d a nd t ha tt he H a

be r sh a m S up e r i or C ou r to rder [d en y ing Whitne r’ s r eque st fo r m an da m us r el ie f dir ec tin g, int er

a lia , the Co unt y to m ai nta in C hie ft ai n T ra il] sup porte d hi s po sit ion
. Whil e W hitne r ar gue s th at

thi s in fo rm at ionobl iga te d S eg ar s to de te rm ine w he the r he ha d law fu l auth or ity , Whitne r ha s not cit ed a ny sta tut or y or case lawthat clear ly

provided Segars with “ fair and clear w aning” that se ek ing to re m ove th e tr ac tor a nd tra ile r fr om

Ch ie ft ai n T ra il an d ar re sti ng Whitne r fo r obstru ct ionvio la te d hi s F ourth A m en dm e n t r i ght s.

. . . I t w oul d a

ppe ar tha t t he pla int if

f in this c ase was un ha

ppy w ith a court ru l i n g invo lving Chieftain T rail. It w ould appear that he w as deliberately

endeavoring to set a trap for th e l aw en forcem ent officer , who apparently

had no kn owledge of the previous disp ute but believed th e ro ad to be pu bl ic
.I n April 2002, Whit ner had petitioned the Ha bersham County

Superior Court for a

writ of 2 mandamus direc ting the County to maintain Snowy River Place and Chieftain Trail, which w ere dirt and g rave l roads leading to Whit ner’ s house. The S uperior Court denied mandamus relief , noting that alth ou g h the ro a ds in q ue sti on we re pu bli c and “the re ha s never

been a ny limit to the public’s acc ess to use the roa d,” the County had not “a cce pted” the de dication and, thus, could not be or dere d, by a mandamus p et i t i on, to maintain it. I n any event, we are satisfied that De puty Seg ars’ s belief th a t t h e r o a d w a s p u b li c an d , th

u s , th e tr a f

f ic la w s w e r e e n f

o r c e a b le o n it , w a s a r e a s o n a

b le o n e . We note that under

Geor g ia law, Chiefta in Trail meets the de finition of a “public r oad” by virtue of the undisputed fac t that it is “open to the public a nd intended or use d fo r i t s enjoy ment and for

the passag e of ve hicles,” O .C.G.A. § 32-1-3( 24). The “ essential ele ments” of mis demea nor obst ruction of a law enforc ement off icer are : “(1) 3 knowing ly

and willingly

obstructing or hi ndering , (2) any law enforce ment office r, (3) in the lawful dis c ha rg e of his of fi c ia l dutie s. ” L ark in v . Stat e , 495 S.E .2 d 6 05 , 6 06 (G a . Ct . App . 1 99 8) ; se e a lso Berri an v. S tate , 6 08 S.E .2 d 5 40 , 5 41 (G a . Ct . App . 2 00 4) . “ ‘T he statut e wa s ma de purp os e fu lly broad to c over a ctions which mig ht not be otherwise unlawful, but which obst ructe d or hindere d law enfor ceme nt office rs in car rying out their

duties.’” Ber

rian, 608 S .E.2d at 541 (quoting Weidmann v. State, 476 S.E.2d 18 (Ga
. Ct. App. 1996)). I n this appeal, Whitner cha lleng es the last ele ment of the c ri me , a

rguin g tha

t Se g ars wa s n ot i n th e lawf ul d isc ha rg e of his du tie s bec a

us e Chi e ft a in T ra il was not a public r oad . We have dispense d with his arg ument conce rning the public nature of the road in the foreg oing footnote and, accor dingly , also conclude that Seg ars ha d a duty to enforc e the traff ic laws on Chieftain Tr ail. See O.C.G.A. § 32- 1-9 (imposing duty on law enf

orce ment office rs to enforc e tra ffic la

ws). 7 On this record, even if De puty Segars wa s m istaken a s to the private or public natu re of Ch ie ft ai n T ra il, w e co nc lud e tha t he ha d, a t t he ve ry le as t, a rg uable pr oba

ble c au se 2 to arr est W hitne r an d ha ve his ve hic le r em ove d a ft er Whitne r co m

m itt ed the
m is de m ean oroff

en se of o bs tru ct io n o f a l aw en fo rcem en t of fic er u nd er Geo rg ia law. 3 Si m ply put , ar ea sona

ble of fi ce r co uld

ha ve be lie ve d, in l i g h t

of the inf orm at ion Segars po ss e ss e d, t ha t he ha d pr ob abl e c a us e t o a rr e st f or ob str uc t i on of a law
en fo rc em en t of

fi ce r. S ee Mo nto ute v. Carr , 114 F
. 3d 1 81, 184 ( 11t h C ir
. 199 7) (h old ing tha t ar gua

ble pr oba ble ca use e xis ts w he n “ anof

fi ce r re as ona

bly c oul d ha veWe add that even if Whit ner could somehow m eet the first prong of Saucie r, he w ould not 4 su c c e e d und e r t

he se c on d p ro ng be c a

us e no law fr om the Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Court , th e Ge or g ia Supreme Court, or this Court clea rly established at the time of the incident that an off icer could not arr est an individual for obstruc tion of a law e nforc ement off icer u n d er t hese c ircumstance s. See Jenk ins by

Ha ll v . T a lla de g a

City B d. of Ed uc ., 11 5 F .3 d 8 21 , 8 26 n. 4 ( 11 th C ir . 1 99 7) (“In th is circ uit, the law can be clea rly established for qualified immunit y purposes only by decisions of the U.S. Supre me Court, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appe als, or the hig hest court of the state whe re the case arose .”) ( internal quotations omitted). 8 believed that probabl e cause e xisted, in ligh t of the inform ation the officer poss es se d” ). Ac co rd ing ly , Whitne r ha s no t st at ed avio la tio n of

his F ourth A m en dm en t rig hts , suf

fi ci en t to sati sf

y the fi rs t pron g of Sauc ie r. B as ed on o ur de 4

novo r ev ie w , the dis tr ic t co ur t di d not er r by gr an tin g su m

m ar y j udgm en t ba se d on q u a l i f i e di mm u n i t y. AFFIRMED.