THE INSPECTORS GENERAL 

OF THE 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

1903-1939 
Maj. Gen. Eli A. 1/e/mick lnsJJeCting Batte1y A, 41st Coast Artil!eJy. 

at Fort Kame/I{J/1/e/w, Hawaii, in June 1925 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL 

OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 

1903-1939 

by 

joseph W A. Whitehorne 

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL 

AND CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

WASHINGTON, D. C., 1998 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Whitehorne, Joseph W. A., 1943-

The inspectors general of the United States Army, l 903- l 939 I 

by Joseph W. A. Whitehorne. 

p. cm.- (CMH pub : 70- 68) 

Includes bibliographical references and index. 

l. Military inspectors general- United States- History. 2. United 

States. Army. Office of the Inspector General- History. 

I. Title. II. Series. 

UB243.W49 1998 

355.6'85'0973- dc21 98- l 0976 

CIP 

First Printing- CMH Pub 70- 68- l 
Foreword 

As the companion work to The Inspectors General of the United States 

Army, 1777- 1903, this volume continues the story of the Inspector 

General's Department and its corps of inspectors during the years from 

1903 to 1939. The period was a time of revolutionary reform and reorganization, with the department shifting to the detail system and adapting 

to the newly created General Staff. The challenges it confronted were 

even greater as the inspection system became one of the key elements in 

helping the Army deal with the crises of World War I, with postwar 

adjustments, and, fi11ally, with a decade of economic depression. 

The Inspectors General of the United States Army, 1903- 1939, 

recounts how the inspectorate became one of the most consistent and 

important agents for change within the War Department, providing the 

analyses, much of the criticism, and most of the description of the 

Army's metamorphosis. During this critical period of modernization 

virtually all of the principles under which the modern inspectorate 

operates were confirmed or established. While explaining the precedents of modern policies, this history provides a deeper insight into the 

need for the Army inspectorate. 1 urge you to read this volume, which 

serves not only as a tribute to the exceptional group of dedicated soldiers who sustained a proud tradition but also as an inspiration to those 

who carry it on. 

Washington, D.C. 

30 January 1998 

v 

LARRY R. JORDAN 

Lieutenant General, USA 

The Inspector General 

Preface 

Any reference to an inspector general, or "1-Gee," usually elicits little 

more than a polite nod and, perhaps, a perplexed look from the general public. In truth, few have heard of or know anything about the Army 

Inspector General System, which grew out of a recognized need for an 

independent inspection office, one without affiliation or responsibility 

for the command inspected. Yet within most military services an 

inspector general is a well-known figure, functioning as a confidential 

representative of his commander. He is responsible for making 

inquiries into matters affecting mission performance and the state of 

discipline, economy, and efficiency of the organization to which he is 

assigned. Because he often deals with matters of considerable sensitivity, he serves on his commander's personal staff and normally enjoys 

direct access to him. Most of his time, however, is spent in assisting unit 

members in improving organizational and individual conditions. 

Traditiona lly, the inspectors general have been informal h·ainers 

and advisers to soldiers at every level. From the beginning they have 

divided their time between matters of training, efficiency, and conduct 

as required by their conunanders. The scope of their inquiries has 

ranged from unit mission capabilities and funds expenditures to the 

welfare and morals of unit members. Commanders as different as Maj. 

Gen. Anthony Wayne and General William T. Sherman have called the 

inspectors their "alter ego," bringing to light their subordinates' various 

concerns that needed command attention. 

Like any group with a function that has lasted over an extended period within a larger bureaucratic sh·ucture, the inspectors have developed 

various procedures and forms of organization both effective and precedent-setting. The growth of interest in inspection activities at every level 

of government has made the articulation of this body of experience 

increasingly important. As the oldest of its type, the Army Inspector 

General System has provided an example on which later inspectorates 

have often chosen to model themselves. To better assist such efforts, Lt. 

Gen. Richard G. Trefry, The Inspector General, 1977- 1983, inaugurated a formal project to document the Army's extensive experience and 

established procedures so that it could be shared and defended. Trefry's 

vii 
interest was fully sustained by his successors, Lt. Gen. Nathaniel R. 

Thompson, Jr., 1983- 1986, and Lt. Gen. Henry Doctor, Jr., 1986- 1990. 

The result of their generous support is this second volume on the history of the inspectorate, taking the record from 1903 to 1939. 

This work was written with serving inspectors general in mind. 

Although few are historians, certainly all recognize the value of the 

experience of their predecessors. This history hopefully will serve the 

practical purpose of explaining how the inspection system in the Army 

has evolved and why things are done the way they are. Above all, it 

explains the reasons for a separate inspectorate, for its traditions, and 

for its place in history, providing a guide and inspiration to meet the 

challenges of the present. 

This study was made possible only with the assistance of many 

people. Special thanks go to General Trefry for reading the several 

drafts, including the final, and for his valuable comments. I am equally grateful to Dr. Daniel R. Beaver for his comments on the manuscript 

and the many fruitful discussions we have enjoyed on the era of the 

Great War. Additional thanks are due General Thompson, Dr. Edward 

M. Coffman, and Dr. Edgar F. Raines for reading and commenting on 

the final dmft. The assistance given and interest shown by archivists 

Charles A. Shaughnessy, Timothy K. Nenninger, and Fred W Purnell of 

the National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C., 

and archivists John J. Slonaker, Richard J. Sommers, and David Keough 

of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, 

Pennsylvania, have been indispensable, sustaining me through many 

rough points. A very special thanks goes to Sharon M. Daugherty, Pat 

Smith, Susan S. Sparks, Ellen M. Whitehorne, and Shotzy Wright for 

superb typing and computer support. Words cannot express my appreciation for their selfless dedication. Other talented individuals deserving of recognition are Arthur S. Hardyman and Beth F. MacKenzie for 

their masterful design, cartographic, and desktop publishing support, as 

well as Florence Brodkey for her efforts in preparing the useful index. 

Finally, this work would never have achieved the precision, clarity, and 

consistency it has without the commitment and skill of Joanne M. 

Brignolo, one of the finest editors an author could hope for. She pulled 

it from the brink, for which I am most grateful. 

All of these good people have made a major contribution to what 

merits this work may have. I alone claim full responsibility for any 

shortcomings. 

Cedarville, Virginia 

30 January 1998 

viii 

JOSEPH W. A. WHITEHORN£ 
Contents 

INTRODUCTION: VON STEUBEN'S LEGACY 

PART ONE 

Experiment and Reform, 1903- 1917 

Chapter 

Page 

3 

1. INSPECTION AND REFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 

The Root Reforms and the New Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 

The !GD s Role in Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 

IGD Strength and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 

Conflict With the General Staff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 

The Army in the Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 

The National Defense Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 

The Punitive Expedition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 

2. SHAPING THE NEW ARMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 

In::.JJection Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 

Education and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 

Garrison and Unit Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 

Tactical Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 

Field Artille1y Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 

Business Methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 

Funds Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 

Depot Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 

Inspection of the Militia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 

3. THE QUALITY OF LIFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 

Recruiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 

Rations and Quarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 

Post Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 

ix 
Chapter Page 

Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 

Complaints and Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 

Race Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 

Corruption in the Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 

Militcuy Prisoners and Prisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 0 I 

Homes and Cemeteries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 

PART TWO 

World War I and the Inspectorate, 1917- 1919 

4. THE GREAT WAR APPROACHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 

Girding for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ill 

IGD Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 

Confronting Chaos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 

Inspecting the New Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 

Field ArtilleiJ' Problems Continue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 

The Inspection System Matures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 

Officer Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 

Morale and We/fctre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 

Army Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 

5. THE INSPECTORATE IN FRANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 

Adjusting to Overseas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 

The Evolution of the inspectorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160 

Quality and Turbulence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 

Training Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 

Discipline and Race Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 

Services of Supply Established . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 

Funds inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 

Bases, Districts, and Depots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 

The Burden ofRoutine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 

6. THE AEF IN COMBAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 

First Stresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 

Medical Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 

X 
Chapter Page 

The Final Push . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J 97 

St. Mihiel (J 2- 16 Septembe1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 

Meuse-A1gonne (26 September- 3 Octobe1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 

Meuse-A1gonne (4 October- !! Novembe1) ..... ......... 2 15 

Transport and Supply Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 

Replacement Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 

Culling the Officer C01ps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 

7. FROM WAR TO PEACE ........................... 233 

Armistice Aftermath . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 

01ganizational Inspections and Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 

Complaints and Grievances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242 

We(fttre Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246 

Problems of Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 

Railroads After the Armistice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254 

Special Administrative inquiries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 

Embarkation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 

Base Section No. 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 

8. THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA . . . . 27 1 

An Army of Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 

01ganizing the Inspectorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278 

Inspectors' Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283 

Officers and Soldiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287 

International Complications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291 

American Expeditions to Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 

Impectorate in Northwestern Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300 

Americans in Siberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 

PART THREE 

Neglect and Privation, 1919-1939 

9. THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE ....................... 313 

Future of the IGD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313 

National Defense Act and the Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321 

xi 
Chapter Page 

Diminishing Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327 

Retrenchment and Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330 

Gospel of Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336 

IGs in the C01ps Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342 

Inspecting U.S. Forces Overseas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344 

I 0. THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355 

lntemal Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355 

Decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359 

Paperwork, Paperwork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364 

Economic Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371 

Depots ......................................... 379 

Property Disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382 

Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384 

The Air C01ps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387 

II. THE STATE OF THE ARMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393 

Investigations Continue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393 

Recruiting and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397 

Army Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402 

Morale Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406 

Legal Issues ..................................... 413 

Post Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417 

Officer Conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420 

Homes and Cemeteries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423 

Parks and Monuments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427 

12. GUARDSMEN AND CIVILIANS .................... 431 

Inspecting the Reserve Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431 

NCO Instructor Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435 

Another Scandal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437 

The Army and the CCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444 

CCC Special Investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452 

The IGD and the CCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 457 

xii 
Page 

ENVOI: UNCHANGING PRINCIPLES fN CHANGING 

TIMES ................ .. ......... .... ....... . .... 467 

APPENDIXES 

A. Commands, Headquarters, and Inspectors, 190 1- 1940 4 7 1 

B. Roster of Inspectors, Headquarters, AEF and AFIG . . . . . . 489 

C. Biographical Notes on Significant Senior Inspectors . . . . . 492 

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 17 

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 538 

INDEX 543 

Tables 

No. 

I. Typical Corps Area Inspections and Investigations . . . . . . . . . 343 

2. National Battlefield Parks and Monuments Subject to 

Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429 

Maps 

l. Services of Supply, AEF, March 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J 78 

2. Western Front, March- November 19 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 

3. American Zone of Occupation, December 1918 . . . . . . . . . . . 273 

4. Northwestern Russia, 1918- 1919 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 

5. Eastern Siberia, 19 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 

6. Corps Areas, December 1920 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322 

Illustrations 

Maj. Gen. Eli A. Helmick Inspecting Battery A, 41st Coast 

Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Paperback Cover/Frontispiece 

Brig. Gen. George H. Burton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 

Brig. Gen. Ernest A. Garlington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 

Troop E, 6th Cavalry, Standing for Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 

Inspecting Battery C, lOth Com1ecticut Field Artillery . . . . . . . . 32 

Picket Line Outside Brick Stables at Fort Myer . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 

xiii 
Page 

Coming Home Aboard the SS Grand Duchess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 

Maj. Gen. John L. Chamberlain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 

Brig. Gen. William T. Wood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 

Inspecting 27th Division Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 

Geneml Helmick's Guide for the Rapid lmpection of 

La1ge Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 

27th Division Field Artillery Trai.ns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 

Maj. Gen. AndreW. Brewster ........................... 159 

Col. Jacob C. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 

Col. Alexander T. Ovenshine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 

Saint Nazaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 

Maj. G. Edward Buxton, Jr . ......... .... ......... . . . . .. 201 

General Brewster With Col. Joseph A. Baer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 

Discussing Training With the 77th Division Inspector . . . . . . . . 209 

Lt. Col. Robert G. Peck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 

YM.C.A ............................................ 247 

Col. Alvan C. Read . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279 

General Chamberlain Inspecting an AFIG Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288 

Maj. Howard N. Scales ............ .. .................. 302 

Col. Willis V Morris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306 

Maj. Gen. Eli A. Helmick .......... . ................... 319 

Maj. Gen. William C. Rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337 

Inspecting an AFIC Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 

Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Drum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357 

Maj. Gen. John F. Preston . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363 

Sgt. John B. Tyler and His Truck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385 

The Quality ofLife .................................. 411 

Post Exchange, I 02d Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419 

Maj . Gen. Walter L. Reed ........ . ..................... 437 

Sawbill CCC Camp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449 

Illustrations courtesy of the following sources: pp. 15, 25, 32, 78, 

122, 127, 137, 319, 337, 357, 363, 385, 437, and 449, Office ofThe 

Inspector General; paperback cover/frontispiece and pp. 99 and 288, 

U.S. Army Military History Institute; p. 279, U.S. Military Academy 

Archives; pp. 4 11 and 4 19, Joseph W. A. Whitehorne; p. 345, Maj. Gen. 

John L. Deane, Sr.; pp. 159, 170, 174, 20 l, 204, 209, 302, and 306, 

National Archives and Records Administration; pp. 53 (oil by Irma 

Maduro Peixotto ), 66 (ink by Charles Johnson Post), 179 (pencil by J. 

xiv 
Andre Smith), and 247 (watercolor by J. Andre Smith), Army Art 

Collection; and p. 213, Fort Sheridan Association, Histo1y and 

Achievement of the Fort Sheridan Officers' Training Camps (N.p., 

1920), p. 203. 

XV 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL 

OF THE 

UNITED STATES ARMY 

1903-1939 

INTRODUCTION 

Von Steuben's Legacy 

Combat and planning for combat are the primary subjects that attract 

most students of military history. Too often they exhibit less interest in 

the extensive support activities that are necessary to sustain the battle 

and in the broad institutional developments that make the requisite support available. Yet even during wartime, armies spend far more time off 

the battlefield than they do in combat. In peacetime, only a small part 

of the soldier's day is devoted to preparing for battle. To sustain itself, 

any army must deal with myriad routine tasks-morale, supply, health, 

finances, development, and training. None of these issues are particularly dramatic, and most are difficult to document after the fact. 

Despite this lack of the dramatic, it is essential that these tasks be 

performed well. They maintain an army in peacetime and sustain it in 

battle. If properly done, they arc the key to its readiness to wage war 

when necessary. The record of any organization, but particularly a 

military force, is very large ly a tale of its administrative and structural development. Countless dedicated professionals are necessary 

to keep an army functioning and focused for its rare encounters with 

crises. Armies have long since become too large and complex for any 

one man, with only a small staff, to command. They require the aid 

of numerous specialists, and commanders in turn need to monitor 

their specialists in order to obtain information on the condition of 

their forces. 

Early in the history of the U.S. Army, the requirement for oversight 

resulted in the establishment of the senior position of Inspector 

General.' The Army's inspection system, first suggested by General 

George Washington, began in December 1777 with a resolution of the 

Continental Congress. Washington assessed that he needed a principal 

' For a detailed study of the founding and growth of the inspectorate, see David A. 

Clary and Joseph W. A. Whitehornc, The Inspectors Geneml of the United States Army. 

1777 1903 (Washington, D.C.: Office ofThe Inspector General and U.S. Army Center 

of Military History, 1987). 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

assistant to aid him in the training, discipline, and development of his 

growing forces, who had gone into winter quarters at Valley Forge after 

a series of humiliating defeats fought in defense of Philadelphia that 

summer. His generals were for the most part brave and tactically competent. However, they were inexperienced in doctrine and training, and 

often too sensitive to their rights and prerogatives. Washington recognized that his senior inspector had to be outside the chain of command, 

mindful that his often feisty subordinates would perceive that their 

positions were in jeopardy. At the same time, the officer had to be professionally competent so that he could meet Washington's training 

objectives while earning the respect of the rest of the Army. 

Although Maj. Gen. Friedrich W. A. von Steuben was preceded 

briefly by three Inspectors General, he is credited with establishing the 

high standards desired by Washington- integrity, knowledge, and loyalty 

to conscience-that have been the measure of the inspection system ever 

since. Steuben developed the inspector's role as the confidential assistant 

of his commander. Chief tasks were training and assisting the chain of 

command in carrying out its mission in the most efficient manner. 

However, a second tradition, conflicting with Steuben's legacy, was 

launched by Alexander Hamilton when he became Inspector General 

during the quasi-war with France in 1798. A large force was authorized 

by Congress to be raised in the event of a French invasion. Washington 

was asked to command the force. In the meantime, a senior officer was 

needed to attend to the various administrative preparations then under 

way, and Hamilton was appointed and given the title. In actual practice, 

Hamilton assumed the role and functions more closely associated with 

a deputy commander or chief of staff, and in so doing he created a tenacious tradition that competed with Steuben's version of the inspectorate 

throughout the nineteenth century. Normally, in peacetime the 

Inspectors General performed in the Steuben role, visiting units and 

reporting on conditions throughout the Army. But when war broke out, 

the senior inspectors took to the field to serve in various executive 

capacities, terminating the flow and processing of information so vital 

to the commanders' understanding of conditions within their forces. 

Despite these problems, the value of the inspectorate was recognized during every early conflict. In 1821, as a result of legislation 

requested by Secretary of War John C. Calhoun, the Office of the 

Inspector General finally was made permanent, with an unbroken chain 

of inspectors thereafter detailed to various staff levels. Nevertheless, it 

had to wait some forty years, until the Civil War, before becoming an 

official staff component ofthe War Department. With the promotion to 

brigadier general in 1878 of Inspector General Randolph B. Marcy, the 

4 
INTRODUCTION 

office assumed the status of a full-fledged department, equal to comparable War Department elements. [n the 1890s the influence of 

Steuben's inspection philosophy grew, and the Hamiltonian tradition 

disappeared after the War with Spain in 1898. Many problems in supply, health, and transportation were identified by unit inspectors general during that brief war, and yet, with most of the Inspectors General 

absent performing line duties, little action could be taken. The resulting 

criticism of the Inspector General 's Department briefly threatened its 

continued existence. However, it survived, partly because of the able 

defense mustered by Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Breckinridge, the Inspector 

General, and partly because of the perception of its value by members 

of Congress and the War Department. 

The inspectorate entered the twentieth century as an object of criticism during a time of reform and reorganization tlu-oughout the Army. 

The detail system was used to bring it, like other staff elements, into 

closer contact with the rest of the Army. At the same time, the functions 

of the Inspector General's Department had to undergo a period of 

experimentation as it accommodated itself to the newly created General 

Staff, headed by a chief of staff. Its experience was a part of the modernization effort. Within a decade, however, the inspectorate became a 

powerful extension of the Chief of Staff and one of the most consistent 

and important agents for change within the War Department. 

Throughout the period that followed, the inspectorate provided a 

tmique view of the Army as it entered a new era with unprecedented challenges. The able group of men who came and went through the ranks of 

the Inspector General's Department provided the analyses, much of the 

criticism, and most of the description of the Army's metamorphosis. The 

inspectors general were often instrumental in keeping the Army's individual leaders informed about the nature and health of the overall establislunent.In the words of General Breckinridge, they were "to touch most 

firmly those things the generals most needed to know."2 

The inspectors general were a central force in that mass of unsung 

professionals who sustained the Army since its inception. They helped 

ready it for war. When war came, they assisted in assuring that the mission was met as effectively as possible. Their view of the Army is 

unique, and in many ways this work is a history written from their perspective. But, most of all, it is the story of a vital staff element that has 

served the Army well. 

2 Ltr, Breckinridge to Garlington, 19 Sep 10, Entry 35, Record Group 159, National 

Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. 

s 

PART ONE 

EXPERIMENT AND REFORM 

1903-1917 

1 

Inspection and Reform 

The era between the War with Spain and World War I was a time of 

dynamic change in the U.S. Army. The activities of the Inspector 

General's Department (IGD), the collective designation of the Office of 

the Inspector General (OIG) and the inspectorate, consisting of those 

officers detailed as inspectors general at each echelon of command, 

touched the Army at every point of its daily life and training. Inspectors 

were charged to examine staffs, units, and personnel to determine 

whether they could perform their wartime missions and whether they 

were administering themselves and their resources in the most effective 

manner. Throughout the period, official inspection reports traced the 

progress of reform. 

Inspectors oversaw myriad routine tasks as well. At each level of 

command they devoted a large part of their efforts to the examination 

of supplies, animals, and equipment, determining their condition and 

recommending their disposition or condemnation. Extensive money 

accountability inspections and audits were made on all funds controlled 

or disbursed by War Department members. At the top, the Inspectors 

General performed many special inquiries or investigations into matters 

of discipline and justice affecting the efficiency or well being of the 

entire Army. The variety and scope of all this work gave them a unique 

perspective and potential fo r influence dw·ing the years when a struggle both of principles and of powerful individuals reshaped the Army 

into a more modern form. 

The Root Reforms and the New Army 

In July 1899 President William McKinley appointed Elihu Root as 

Secretary of War to replace the discredited Russell A. Alger, scapegoat 

for the Army's shortcomings as revealed in the War with Spain. Root, 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

a successful corporation lawyer, soon became involved in Army 

reform, among many other activities, and played a central role in the 

process of reOiganization.' 

When Root took office, the Army was an administrative anomaly, 

violating many basic principles of the emerging science of management. The position of Commanding General had no legislative sanction, and the Commanding General's duties and relationships with the 

Secretary of War and the rest of the Army were unclear, particularly in 

peacetime. Support for line, or the Army in the field, was provided by 

a group of War Department technical and administrative bureaus, the 

Adjutant General's Department (AGO) and the Inspector General's 

Department among them. With few exceptions, the bureaus worked 

directly for the Secretary of War. While secretaries came and went, 

bureau chiefs remained, becoming over the course of time virtually 

autonornous. Their independence was fmther enhanced by their lifetime appointments. Thus, although drawn originally from the line, 

bureau chiefs, not unsurprisingly, had become increasingly unresponsive to troops in the field. 

The Army's "invertebrate" structure has been likened by historians to the larger inchoate American society of the period. Root's 

efforts to create a more rational organization were part of a general 

progressive impulse that gave its name to tbe whole era. Root set out 

to eliminate the separate status of the bureaus and to form a hierarchical structure in which the Secretary of War and his senior general 

could manage both the bureaus and the line whi lc anticipating the 

Army's future requirements. 2 

His efforts resulted in congressional passage in February 190 I of 

an act that significantly altered the appointment of bureau staffs. 

Officers were to be selected- that is, detailed- from the line to serve 

a specified period and then return to duty in their basic branch. The 

intent of the lawmakers was to link the bureaus with the rest of the 

Army and to eliminate the permanent members of the bureaus by attrition. The bureau chiefs fought the change, arguing that detailed officers 

would lack the necessary expertise. Events were to demonstrate that 

' Richard W. Leopold, £/i!tu Roof and rile Conservative Tmdirion (Boston: Little, 

13rown and Co., 1954), p. 32. 

l Ibid.; Philip C. Jessup, £/ilm Roor, 2 vols. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1938), 

1:2 15; Russell F. Weiglcy, "The Elihu Root Reforms and the Progressive Era," in 

Command and Commmule1:~ in Modern ll'rufare: The Proceedings of rite Second 

lvlilitmy History Symposium, U.S. Air Force Academy, 2- 3 May 1968, ed. William 

Geffen, 2d ed., enl. (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, lleadquarters 

USAF, and U.S. Air Force Academy, 1971), pp. 11- 13 (quoted word, p. 12). 

10 
INSPECTION AND REFORM 

there was some validity to their c.laim, and as a result the new system 

was slightly modified for some of the teclmical branches at a later date. 3 

The capstone of Root's efforts came with the General Staff bill, 

passed by Congress in February 1903. The new act eliminated the position of Commanding General, replacing it with the position of Chief of 

Staff and creating the General Staff, to be supported by a group of 

detailed officers. Lt. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, the incumbent Commanding 

General, opposed the bill strongly, forcing Root to delay submitting it 

for a year. Even when he resubmitted it, he was compelled to withdraw 

provisions eliminating the Inspector General's Department and transferring its functions to the General Staff because of Inspector General 

Breckinridge's eloquent defense before Congress. Additional pressure 

on Root also secured the continued independent existence of the Record 

and Pension Office, headed by Brig. Gen. Fred C. Ainsworth.4 

When Root introduced his General Staff bill, he justified it as an 

effort to put the War Department on an economical, businesslike basis 

with a single, clear chain of command. His key word was "efficiency."5 

The General Staff was to be a vehicle to eliminate the functional constraints placed on the Army by the bureaus. Root hoped to assert the 

primacy of so-called professional values, as opposed to the parochial 

technical values of the bureaus. Although he was less than specific, all 

indications are that Root intended the Chief of Staff to remain aloof 

from daily activities, controlling them without becoming involved. The 

General Staff was expected to be a nerve center, providing direction for 

the Army while focusing on major issues and contingencies. 

But Root failed to anticipate the effects of human nature and daily 

requirements upon his concept. It proved irnpossib.le for the General 

Staff to maintain its aloof position of watchful supervision over the 

bureaus. Many of the capable young officers detailed to the Staff did 

not understand the principles upon which their positions were based. As 

they attempted to exercise the ir supervisory functions, some intervened 

3 Olto L. Nelson, Jr., National Security and the General Staff (Washington, D.C.: 

Infantry Journal Press, 1946), p. 106; Memo, OIG, 25 Jun 01, sub: Act of February 2, 

190 I, Entry 24, Record Group (RG) 159, National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C. 

• Philip L. Semsch, "Elihu Root and the General Staff," J\1/ilitaiJ' A.ffairs 27 (Spring 

63): 23; Nelson, National Security, p. 58. For a detailed discussion of Breckinridge's 

success in preserving the IGD, see David A. Clary and Joseph W. A. Whitehorne, The 

inspectors General of the United States Army, I 777- 1903 (Washington, D.C.: Office of 

The Inspector General and U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987)(hereafter cited 

as IGs 1777-1903). 

' Semsch, "Elihu Root," p. 22. 

II 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

in the routine affairs of the bureaus. Others, trying to avoid associating 

themselves too closely with the bureaus, lost control by failing to follow through on Staff directives. Jn the end, the Chief of Staff himself 

was doomed to become involved in matters that were not specifica lly in 

his charter.

6 The result was constant tension between the bureau chiefs 

and the Chief of Staff, manifested in power plays that were anathema to 

the rational hierarchical structures Root had envisioned. 

Such problems were, for example, effectively exploited by General 

Ainsworth, who was able to have his Record and Pension Office 

excluded from direct General Staff supervision. Under Root's concept, 

the paperwork generated by the Commanding General function went to 

the Adjutant General while that from the planning elements moved to 

the General Staff.7 Other bureau administrative functions were theOJ·etically untouched. 

llowever, Root was impressed by Ainsworth's administrative abilities and wanted to improve the War Department's efficiency. He thus 

directed that the historical and personnel records branches of the 

Adjutant General's Department, because of arrears in operations, be 

transferred to Ainsworth's office, thus eviscerating the department. The 

Adjutant General's remaining vestige followed on 23 April I 904, when 

Congress passed an act that created a Military Secretary's Office and 

appointed Ainsworth a major gencral. 8 

The result was a bureaucratic Frankenstein. The Military 

Secretary's Office was larger than the nine other permanent bureaus 

combined. Root had favored the term Militmy Secretary to stress the 

point that advice and control, not administration, was now a General 

Staff function. The justification for merging the Adjutant General's 

Department with the Record and Pension Office was to create an even 

better administrative agency, capable of lifting the burden from the 

General Staff. But the end result, given the Staff's unavoidable entanglement with administrative detail, produced only conflict between the 

Military Secretary and the Chief of Staff over areas of interest and 

responsibility.9 

• Weigley, "Elihu Root Reforms," p. 20; James E. Hewes, Jr., "The United States 

Army General Staff, 1900- 19 17," Mi/iuuyA.fftlirs 38 (Apr 74): 68. 7 Mabel E. Deutrich, Struggle for Supremacy: The Career of Geneml Fred C. 

Ainsworth (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1962), p. 8 1. 

' Idem, "Fred C. Ainsworth: The Story of a Vennont Archivist," Vermont 1/istoiJ' 27 

(Jan 59): 29. 

• Siert F. Riepma, "Portrait of an Adjutant General: The Career of Major General 

Fred C. Ainsworth," Jouma/ of the American Milit(//y HistOI)' Foundation 2 (Spring 

38): 34. 

12 
INSPECTION AND REFORM 

Ainsworth's power and influence were further enhanced when he 

received the title of Adjutant General, conferred upon him by Congress 

in the Army Appropriation Act of 2 March 1907. The change was also 

significant symbolically: The implementing general order specified that 

the title of the head of the resurrected department would be preceded by 

the word The- hence, The Adjutant General, which conveyed the prestige and authority of the position that was lacking in the term Militcuy 

Secretcuy. Ainsworth might not have been as successful in expanding his 

power had not Root left office in 1904, to be replaced by the less dynamic and more pliable William H. Taft, who was also an admirer of 

Ainsworth's administrative expertise. What occurred was predictable: 

The Chief of Staff functioned in isolation, while Ainsworth, with the 

Secretary of War's compliance, virtually ran the Anny. 10 

Root's efforts to impose modern managerial methods on the Army's 

traditiona l structure seemed to be constrained without the presence of 

a strong chief of staff, supported by a strong secretary of war. This conclition was met with the appointment of Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood as 

Chief of Staff in 1910 and Henry L. Stimson as Secretary of War shortly afterward. As a showdown with The Adjutant General took shape, 

their best ally among the bureau chiefs was the inspector General. 

The IGD,s Ro le in Re form 

The Inspector General's Department had developed rapidly during the 

era of reform. When Root was appointed Secretary of War, the small 

department was virtually dormant because of contl ict between 

Generals Breckinridge and Miles. Inspector General Breckinridge was 

a Civil War veteran with a distinguished combat record. A conservative, 

his focus was largely on the improvement of unit-level operations and 

speci fie items of individual equipment. He was an effective defender of 

the functions of his organization and consequently opposed many of the 

Root reforms.•• 

The relationship of the Inspector General to the War Department 

leadership changed as a result of Root's efforts to have the General 

Staff bill passed. Breckinridge successfully argued before Congress 

against the elimination of his department, and Root was forced to yield. 

•• I lewes, "General Staff," p. 69. 11 Dcutrich, S1ruggle, p. 78; "Recent Deaths: Joseph Cabell Breckinridgc," Army and 

Navy Journal, 28 Aug 20, p. 1578: Nalional Cyclopedia of American Biogmpl~l , vol. 9, 

and Who Was IV!to in America, vol. I, s.v. "Brcckinridge, Joseph Cabell." For more information, sec Clary and Whitehorne, !Gs 1777 1903, and Appendix C of this volume. 

13 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Having achieved his own aims, Breckinridge accepted promotion to 

major general and early retirement in April 1903. His replacement, 

Brig. Gen. George H. Burton, was known to be more sympathetic to 

Root's views and the problems of the line Army. When Burton reached 

mandatory retirement age in October 1906, he was in turn succeeded 

by Brig. Gen. Ernest A. Garlington, brother-in-law to the incumbent 

Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell.'

2 

Known as a cultured, considerate officer of great integrity, sensitive to the welfare of soldiers, Garlington was sympathetic to innovations that would improve conditions in the Army. Thus, at the time of 

the struggle for authority in the War Department, the Office of the 

lnspector General, charged with being the eyes and ears of the Chief of 

Staff and the Secretary of War, was headed by a series of general officers receptive to reform. When properly supported, the OIG proved to 

be a powerful instrument in assuring the accomplishment of War 

Department policies and unit compliance with directives. 13 

Wood and Stimson together formed a progressive team. Their intent 

was to modernize the Army and to clarify the role of their positions in 

relation to the rest of the Army. Both men were aggressive, yielding 

nothing to their opponents' views. General Ainsworth tenaciously 

defended the status quo and traditional ways of doing things, and his 

bureaucratic knowledge and abilities, combined with great political 

influence built up over the years, made him seem virtually unassailable. 

Yet Wood was determined to "settle the command confusion." He recognized that the best way to upstage Ainsworth was with his own 

weapons- administrative tactics, working through matters of routine. 14 

The conflict between the two officers reached a c limax when 

President Taft's Committee on Economy and Efficiency reported its 

find ings. Ainsworth led a War Department board that reviewed the 

committee's recommendations, the majority of which were rejected. 

However, a General Staff representative on the board filed a minority 

report, pressing for the elimination of the muster roll as a desirable 

administrative reform. On 15 December 1911 Wood sent a memorandum to Ainsworth requesting his views on the matter. Ainsworth's 

" "Further Promotion to General Officers," Army and Navy Jouma/, 2 1 Feb 03, p. 

607; Edgar F. Raines, "Major General J. Franklin Bell and Military Reform: The Chief of 

Staff Years, 1906- 191 0" (Ph. D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1976), p. 148. 

u See Appendix C. 

,. Archibald Butt, Tajl and Roosevelt: The Intimate Leiters oj'Archie Butt. Milita'J' 

Aide (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1971 ), p. 781; Jack C. Lane, Armed 

Progressive: General Leonard Wood (San Francisco: Presidio Press, 1978), p. 157 (quotation); Deutrich, Stmggle, p. 112. 

14 
INSPECTION AND REFORM 

Brig. Gen. Ge01ge H. Burton Brig. Gen. Ernest A. Garlington 

answer was "scorching and contemptuous," stressing the need to keep 

the roll and questioning the intelligence and abilities of those recommending otherwise. Stimson, considering Ainsworth's reply "grossly 

insubordinate," relieved him and prepared court-martial charges. 15 

Ainsworth, instead of facing trial, requested early retirement, rather 

than continue the struggle with his superiors. His departure assured 

Wood's personal supremacy in the War Department. It also appeared to 

reconfirm Root's concept of the governance of the Army. Stimson 

believed that no important challenge to the authority of the Chief of 

Staff could be mounted in the future. Greater harmony soon developed 

for Stimson began to include the bureau chiefs more deeply in the decision-making process. Wood and Stimson saw themselves as instrumental in overcoming the inertia ofthe old guard in the Army and Congress, 

and in preparing the Army for the demands of a new era.16 

Yet the two paid a high price for their victory. Ainsworth had been 

popular with many officers, who maintained that he had done the Army 

a great deal more good than harm. He also had many congressional 

•s Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On A clive Service in Peace and War (New 

York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 34 (quoted words); Deutrich, Slruggle, p. I 19. 

•• Stimson and Bundy, On Aclive Service, p. 37. 

IS 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

supporters, who immediately protested his dismissal. The affair thus 

discredited Wood politically. Regardless of Wood's motives, his actions 

were viewed by many as an abuse of his authority and an example of 

the ruthlessness with which he frequently was charged. To some critics 

he seemed to be trying to achieve the sort of personal direction of the 

Army sought earlier by the past commanding generals. Ainsworth hjmsclf remained in close touch with key members of Congress, often foiling reform initiatives sponsored by Wood and his successors. In such 

matters Wood and Stimson often demonstrated remarkably little political sense, while Ainsworth displayed the opposite, wielding informal 

influence for many years through his congressional connections. " 

Wood found that he was unable to push his subsequent programs 

through Congress, losing a battle to close marginal posts and lacking 

support to create an expansible Army with trained reserves. What little 

political influence he retained further faded with the election of 

Democratic President Woodrow Wilson i11 1913. Despite these setbacks 

Wood continued to upgrade the Army's efficiency, for many of his and 

Stimson's objectives could be realized by using their administrative 

authority, without recourse to Congress. They continued to improve 

unit administration, schools, and training programs through the use of 

existing military channels, and the Inspectors General also served as a 

means to implement and enforce their directives. 

The Inspectors General in turn appear to have been motivated by a 

mixture of self-interest and altruism. Beginning with Breckinridge, 

they a ll argued for the continued existence of their department, hoping 

to retain the prestige and trappings of a separate agency. However, they 

also displayed a sincere conviction that their activities were beneficial 

to the Army. They stressed the need for a disinterested observer within 

the command structure, capable of investigating a situation and having 

no vested interest in the conclusions to be reached. Additionally, they 

saw a need for competent third parties with the time to review matters, 

such as individual soldier amenities, which otherwise might be missed 

by more hard-pressed commanders and staff officers." 

The situation created by the Root reforms and extended by the 

Wood-Ainsworth struggle caused the Chief of Staff and the Inspector 

General to draw closer in a mutually supporting relationship. Gradually, 

" Butt, Taji and Roosevelt, p. 780; Lane, Armed Progressive, p. 166; "Newton D. 

Baker on Executive Influence in Military Legislation;• American Political Science 

Review 50 (Sep 56): 700-70 I. 

" U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, 1/earings on tl Bill To 

Increase the Efficiency of the Army. 58th Cong., lsl Sess., 1902, p. 41. 

16 
INSPECTION AND REFORM 

the Inspector General came to be considered as an extension of the 

Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, exercising considerable delegated authority in the process. This supportive lateral coordination was 

enhanced by an upward flow of ideas. Many of Wood's reforms originated in the reports of the inspectors in the field, which covered virtually every aspect of military operations and living, and the recommendations and findings appearing in the inspectors' reports often were 

quoted verbatim in the annual reports of the Chief of Staff and the 

Secretary of War. 19 

Beginning in 1903, the Office of the Inspector General once again 

monitored militia inspections, easing Wood's later efforts to impose his 

preparedness policy. In 1905 the OIG directed that the developing system of service schools at Forts Monroe, Riley, and Leavenworth be 

inspected annually. Over the years this work assisted the efforts of successive chiefs of staff to impose-independent of legislative actionstandards on curricula, attendance procedures, and school organization, 

influencing not only individual careers and attitudes but also doctrine 

and programs. 20 

The effects of budget limitations were offset partially by the inspectors' concern for waste; the economy measures they recommended 

were often adopted, sometimes with significant results. In 1905 the 

Secretary ofWar directed that unit business practices be made a routine 

item of annual inspection. Wood, who in 1910 had begun his term as 

Chief of Staff by stressing a more businesslike, efficient way of operating, favored similar reforms. He restructured the General Staff along 

functional lines and streamlined numerous administrative procedures, 

saving money and improving effectiveness. He was able to implement 

many of his ideas through the Army's inspection system because of the 

practices and procedures that had evolved since 1903.21 

General Wood expanded his influence further in 1911 by directing 

that troops be inspected in the field. Subsequently, inspectors routinely 

evaluated the proficiency of individuals and units in the field, as well 

,. Marcellus G. Spinks, "Major Problems of the Inspector General, AEF, and Their 

Solution" (Lecture delivered at G- 1 Course No. 5, Army War College, Washington, 

D.C., 9 Oct 33), in Army War College Curriculum Papers, U.S. Army Mi litary History 

Institute (MI II), Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Sec also U.S. War Department, Annual Report 

o.f t!te Secretary ofiJI(JI; 1912 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing OfTicc, 1913) p. 

24 (hereafter cited as ARSIV): idem, Annual Report of the Inspector General. 1903 

(Washington, D.C.: Government Prinling Office, 1903), pp. 447-48. 451 (hereafter 

cited as A RIG); ARIG 1905, p. 452. 

,. IIRSIV 1904, pp. 28- 29; ARJG 1905, p. 448; A RIG 1906, p. 638. 11 ARIG 1909, p. 293; ARIG 1911, p. 271 ; ARIG 1914, p. 202. 

17 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

as the creation of balanced tactical divisions. ConcLmently, the Army's 

emergency responsiveness was greatly improved by creating a structure 

for orderly call-ups. The success of Wood's efforts was revealed by the 

increasing smoothness of large-unit operations. Wood also began a successful system of civilian training camps as part of his philosophy of 

preparedness. 22 

These reforms made it possible to manage the concomitants of the 

crises of the time. They also had imp! ications for the internal structure 

of the General Staff. While the role of The Adjutant General was limited largely to the mechanics of administration, the functions of the 

Inspector General expanded to the point that anything affecting the 

Army's efficiency, including the effectiveness of its leaders, became 

subject to the IGD's oversight and appraisal. 

IGD Strength and Organization 

Despite its growing influence, the Inspector General's Department 

remained small. The new detail system had little practical effect, 

although seven majors were assigned on 28 February 1901 as the first 

group of detailed officers. On 2 1 May 1903 the Chief of Staff accepted a policy that the details from the different anns, or branches, would 

be "equalized"- in other words, would be proportional to line strength. 

Whenever a vacancy occurred, the Inspector General submitted to the 

Chief of Staff three names in nomination, one from each branch. By 

1915, however, the average strength of the department was only twenty-one, including four acting inspectors.23 

The structure of the Inspector General's Department remained the 

same throughout the prewar period. Small in size, the Office of the 

Inspector General oversaw the activities of inspectors in the field, as 

well as conducted War Department- level inspections and investigations. On average, eleven OIG civilians supported the inspectorate, 

working in the Mail and Records Division and the Examining (later, in 

1905, Money Accounts) Division. In the Examining Division an expert 

accountant and his clerk inspected and assisted in the management of 

all Army disbursements worldwide. The Mail and Records Division, 

whose archives went back to the 1820s, was headed by a series of chief 

clerks, some of whom had forty years experience. The division, in addi11 ARfG /911 , pp. 265, 267; ARegs 887 and 888, 19.13; Hermann Hagedorn, 

Leonard Wood: A Biography, 2 vols. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 193 1 ), I: 126. 13 IGD, " History for 1912," 14 Jan 13; Memo (quoted word), Sotw to WOOS, 2 1 

May 03, sub: Detail of Officers to Staff Bureaus. Both in Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 

18 
INSPECTION AND REFORM 

tion to conducting the daily business of the office, monitored and 

processed current investigation and inspection reports.24 

The inspectors in the field were distributed among the various geographical departments, commanded by general officers. In the United 

States one inspector general was assigned to each department until 

1904, when the Army was divided geographically into five large divisions, each with two or more departments subordinate to it. The objective was to free the echelon of command closest to the troop units from 

excessive administrative requirements so that it could concentrate on 

training. But problems resulted in several areas, inspection among 

them. Inspectors were removed from department staffs, except in the 

Philippines, and concentrated at division levels. But this practi.ce 

proved unsatisfactory to department commanders, who had their own 

needs for inspection and investigation. After the divisions were abolished in 1906, inspectors were once again assigned on the basis of one 

for each geographical department. 2

s 

In 1911 the division concept was revived, with a better alignment 

of duties. Three large divisions were headquartered at New York, 

Chicago, and San Francisco, while the Philippine Division continued in 

Manila. The Eastern Division had five inspectors, while the others each 

had four. The Inspector General decided where particular inspectors 

would be assigned, his objective being to have a balanced mix of grades 

and expertise. Normally, the next senior-most IG was assigned to the 

Eastern Division at Fort Jay, New York, after a tour as the Philippine 

Division senior inspector. At Fort Jay he was groomed and available to 

become Inspector General of the Anny at the appropriate time.26 

The Inspector General maintained standards and oversaw his 

inspectors by a variety of means. All newly assigned inspectors continued to be brought to the Washington office for a two- or three-week 

training period. There, they underwent a general orientation and exposure to numerous regulations and policy statements. The brief appren2

' Fi le 306, inspector General's Office, July 1903, and File 6650, IGD Organization, 

1905, Entry 22, RG 159, NARA; ARJG 1905, p. 471 ; ARIG /908, p. 444. The dedicated performance of OJG employees inspired both Generals Burton and Garlington to 

recommend the development of proper retirement, pension, and assignment plans for 

all War Department c ivilians. 

'' ARSW 1904, p. 5; ARSW 1907, p. 25; ARIG 1906, p. 653; WO GO 65,22 Dec 03; 

IGD, "Names and Stations of Inspectors General," Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. See a lso 

copy of Eli A. Helmick, "From Revei lle to Retreat: Autobiography of Major General 

Eli A. Helmick," MH I. 

'• Memo, Wood to TAG, 29 May II , Entry 5, RG 165, NARA; Ltr, Mills to 

Chamberlain, 23 Apr 09, Stephen C. Mills Papers, MHI. 

19 
T HE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

ticeship also gave them a chance to meet and work under their 

Washington colleagues. No less important was the 1908 publication of 

A Guide for the Use of Officers of the Inspector General~· Department, 

a referenced compilation of all policies and regulations affecting an 

inspector's duties. Known as the Yellow Book, because of the color of 

its cover, it underwent several printings and assured a standard interpretation and training reference for inspectors. General Garlington 

believed that the guide would improve "the thoroughness and uniformity of the inspection service" and would compensate for the relative 

inexperience of officers detailed to the inspectorate. 

27 

The OIG's chief clerk also kept all inspectors informed of policy 

changes, new regulations, and orders in the War Deparhnent. This procedure allowed the inspectors to advise their conunanders often before 

any official word came from the General Staff- a bit of one-upmanship 

that enhanced the local prestige of the inspectorate. The notice of 

change went out under the signature of the Inspector General, who 

often added his own advice as to how inspectors should handle a particular situation. The Office of the Inspector General also published its 

own series of blank forms to serve as guides for inspecting a particular 

organization, such as the militia, or function, such as monetary 

accounts. The forms not only served as a means of standardizing 

inspector performance but also were in demand throughout the Army as 

guides for organization and administration. The OIG's requirement for 

monthly reports from inspectors helped to tighten central control. ~ 

Improving efficiency in IGD operations brought the department 

increasing respect throughout the Army. General Thomas H. Barry, 

commanding the Army of Cuban Pacification in 1908, considered his 

inspector general to be one of his most important staff officers and 

insisted on having a fully qualified officer assigned to the post as long 

as he remained in Cuba. The proximity of inspectors to senior officers 

acted as a magnet to some ambitious individuals, who worked for 

appointments to the inspectorate; others, awed by the professionalism 

demanded of an inspector, shied away. Maj. Eli A. Helmick had just 

deployed to the Mexican border with his regiment in 1911, when he 

was notified of his detail. He hesitated to take the appointment, feeling 

that he lacked the professional knowledge or powers of observation that 

he attributed to all of the inspectors he had encountered. Eventually, on 

21 Helmick, "Autobiography," MI-n; Ltr, Garlington to TAG, 6 Feb 09, and Memo 

(quotation), Garlington to Cot'S, WD, 16 May 08, sub: The Inspector General's 

Department of the Army, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 28 File 46, Matters Pertaining to Blank Forms, 1916, Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 

20 
INSPECTION AND REFORM 

the advice of senior officers, he took the job despite his misgivings and 

performed exceptionally well, ultimately passing through division command to become Inspector General in 1921. By the end of the century's 

first decade the inspectorate thus had established a unique role for 

itself. As retired General Breckinridge later told Garlington, the 

"department is the Army's litmus paper, making a test of our conditions 

and status- and the public is often the final court of appeals."29 

Conflict With the General Staff 

Despite its contribution to reform and its usefulness to the chief of staff, 

the inspectorate was confronted almost until World War I with attempts 

by staff members and their allies in Congress to transfer some or all of 

its functions elsewhere. General Burton set the tone for the defense of 

the inspectorate as early as October 1903, when a bill was under consideration in Congress to transfer the inspection of money accounts 

from Army officers to the Treasury Department. Burton argued that 

since War Department rules governed Army funds and since the War 

Department was responsible for the conduct of its members, it should 

be equally responsible for investigating them. He considered it essential to good discipline that commanders should be able to investigate 

their own people without having to call in an "alien agency."30 The fundamental issues of confidentiality and command control would underlay most subsequent efforts to justify the continued existence of the 

Inspector General's Department. 

Yet the fact that department members were forced to present the 

argument repeatedly indicated a lack of understanding of the inspectorate's role on the part of many General Staff members. Continued 

sniping at the existence of an independent inspectorate caused General 

Garlington in 1908 to present the Chief of Staff with an overview of his 

department's performance since the inception of the General Staff. He 

stressed that the Office of the Inspector General was the only War 

Department element that, because of its duties, had a comprehensive 

feel for unit efficiency, supply operations, and Army finances. 

Additionally, its performance of many delicate special investigations 

29 Ltr, Mills to Garlington, 27 Mar 09, Mills Papers, MHl; Ltrs, Barry to Garlington, 

26 Dec 19, and Liggett to Garlington, 25 Feb 07, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA; He lmick, 

"Autobiography," MHl; Ltr (quotation), Breckinridgc to Garlington, 19 Sep 10, Entry 

35, RG 159, NARA 10 Memo, Burton to CotS, WD, 4 Oct 03, sub: Proposed Bill S:39 17 and HR: 11 350, 

Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 

21 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

had assured the maintenance of high standards. Garlington emphasized 

that the Inspector General's Department touched the Army at every 

point of its daily life and training as no other staff element could.)' 

Despite the apparent usefulness of the department many officers 

did not consider it necessary, especially now that a General Staff was 

functioning. In 1 909 Chief of Staff Bell favored merging both The 

Adjutant General's Department and Inspector General's Department 

into the General Staff. Bell claimed that the latter agency duplicated 

the inspection responsibility of the General Staff, which could perform the task better. The General Staff's efficiency, he opined, was 

impaired by its lack of direct access to the records controlled by The 

Adjutant General and the full power of inspection enjoyed by the 

Inspector General. 32 

Bell's attitude was one of frustration, influenced, perhaps, by his 

inability to make the General Staff as effective as he thought it should 

be. Seeking to create a single point of unquestioned authority, he failed 

to recognize the numerous activities of the two deparhnents that were 

routine and administrative in nature, beyond the charter of the General 

Staff. Such work as IG investigations and money inspections would 

have buried the General Staff in daily matters, taking it further from the 

policy planning for which it had been established. 

General Garlington stressed such duties, pointing out that, in addition to the traditional comprehensive concern for Army efficiency, the 

specific other responsibilities of the Inspector General's Department 

freed the General Staff to perform its main function. Such arguments, 

however, fa iled to persuade many line officers, from whom the General 

Staff membership was drawn. Many junior line officers resented the 

time that they were obliged to devote to pleasing the inspectors. It was 

their contention that they were already so burdened with administrative 

requirements that it was nearly impossible to conduct proper training. 

The stress on tactical readiness, which intensified with the 1911 mobilization of the first maneuver division, heightened their resentment. 33 

In the spring of 19 I 1 the move to consolidate functions gained new 

momentum with the submission of a bill to the House Military Affairs 

Committee by the General Staff through Secretary of War Jacob M. 

31 Memo, Garlington to Cots, WD, 16 May 08, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 31 Memo, Bell to SotW, 29 Nov 09, sub: The Incorporation Into the General Staff 

Corps of the Adjutant General's and the Inspector General's Departments, 29 Nov 09, 

Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. 33 Memo, Garlington to President's Cleveland Commission [Committee on Economy 

and Efficiency, t 9 l I], Entry 22, RG l 59, NARA. 

22 
INSPECTION AND REFORM 

Dickinson. The bill proposed merging the two departments with the 

office of the Chief of Staff, making them a bureau and a part of the 

General Staff Corps. Secretary Dickinson favored this on the premise 

that it would result in greater efficiency by reducing personnel and 

costs. The plan called for the assignment of the permanent AGO and 

lGD members to the new bureau and the return of all those on detail to 

the line. 3

'

1 

Fortunately, the proposal had enemies in high places. General 

Wood opposed the measure, which he saw as contrary to the intent of 

the 1903 law creating the General Staff. Congressman James Hay, 

chairman of the committee and a friend of Adjutant General Ainsworth, 

also felt that many of the tasks performed by both departments exceeded the planning and supervision role to be played by the General Staff. 

New statutes, altering the missions envisioned by Secretary Root, 

would have been necessary. Yet the bi II remained under consideration 

for some time, obliging General Garlington to justify his department 

once again. He pointed out that statutory and regulatory inspection 

requirements made it necessary to assign twenty-one officers, regardless of where the inspection function was placed. Passage of the bill 

would neither reduce the demands on the line for details nor alter the 

mechanics of the tasks. 

An inspection service, to be of any value, had to be independent, 

according to Inspector General Garlington, because the Secretary of 

War needed an unbiased view ofthcArmy. "In other words, the inspector making the report shOllld be entirely independent of the men or element reported upon." Garlington believed that such a principle prevailed both in civil business and in some form in other armies. The 

same should hold for the General Staff. He concluded with the recommendation that the General Staff should concentrate on the higher 

issues for which it was created, rather than conceming itself with minor 

structural arrangements within the War Department. In the face of 

1nany objections, the consolidation bill faded away, in part because the 

crisis with The Adjutant General was climaxing at this time, overshadowing other concerns of Hay's committee while bringing the Chief of 

Staff and the Inspector General closcr. 35 

u Llr, Dickinson to Chair, Mil ArTs Cmlc, HofRcps, 20 May II , Entry 5, RG 165, 

NARA; U.S. Congress, House, Commitlcc on Military Affairs, Hearing on Sta.fl· 

Service of the Army. Terms of Enlistment in the Army. General Service Corps in the 

Army. Consolidation of Certain Branches of the War Deptwtmenl and the Army, 62d 

Con g., I st Sess., 191 I. 

" Memo, Garlington to CofS, WD, 6 May 12, Entry 24. RG 159, NARA. 

23 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

This did not mean that General Garlington could lower his guard. 

A committee on the General Staff had been studying the lessons of the 

191 1 mobilization. The eventual result of its efforts was a detailed 

report, "The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States." 

Among many other structural changes, the report contained the perennial recommendation that The Adjutant General's Department and the 

Inspector General's Department be merged with the General Staff. The 

committee considered inspection as more appropriate to Staff planning. 

It reconunended that military inspections be made by the Chief of Staff 

or subordinate commanders and routine inspections by Genera l Staff 

officers or expert accountants. The strength of the General Staff would 

be increased permanently by direct transfer of IGD personnel and 

authorizations. Perhaps secure in the support of General Wood, 

Garlington told his staff not to be unduly concerned. Reaction to the 

report eventually led to several reforms in the field forces, but no major 

changes took place in the War Department staff structme.36 

Despite the repeated failures of the consolidation attempts, the 

General Staff forwarded still another bill to Congress in February 1914. 

The new proposal would have appointed all permanent AGD and IGD 

officers to a specialist corps in the line Army. Positions in the former 

bureaus would be filled by General Staff detail. Reaction to the proposal was negative throughout the Army, because of the effect the movement of senior officers into the line would have had on promotions.J7 Yet 

the issue refused to die. Consolidation was considered during discussions in late 1915 that ultimately led to the National Defense Act of 

1916. Again, the increasingly close relationship between the Chief of 

Staff and the Inspector General not only assured the continued existence 

of the Inspector General's Department but also provided for its growth 

under legislation enacted the next year. The inspectorate had proven its 

valu and much of that value rested precisely upon its independence. 

The Army in the Field 

The ultimate objective of many of General Wood's reforms was the 

development and training of large tactical units, composed of all anns 

and services. A series of tactical exercises began during the tenure of 

16 "The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States," 3 Jut 12, IG copy in 

Entry 24, RG 159, NARA; Charles D. McKenna, "The Forgotten Reform: Field 

Maneuvers in the Development of the United States Army, 1902- 1920" (Ph.D. diss., 

Duke University, 1981), pp. 148- 50. 

J> Ltr, Chamberlain to Garlington, 18 Feb 14, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 

24 
INSPECTION AN D REFORM 

Troop E, 6th Cava!Jy, Standingfor Inspection at Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1906 

Secretary Root, the first in 1902 at Fort Riley, Kansas, where Col. 

Stephen C. Mills served as TG of the new maneuver division.38 Limited 

often by funding, the maneuvers became a regular feature of the training cycle by 1909 and included elements of the National Guard. At each 

exercise inspectors identified weaknesses and codified remedies. 

By 1910 the General Staff had developed a plan for a field army, 

combining both Regular Army and National Guard elements. The plan 

remained theoretica l that year, for funds were not available to test it. But 

political turbulence endangering American interests, both in Mexico and 

along the border it shared with the United States, prompted the mobilization in March 191 J of a so-called field maneuver division, to be concentrated in the San Antonio area. This action marked the first effort to 

create a division-size tactical unit, a product of the concepts and lessons 

learned that were recorded since 1902. Under the leadership of Maj. 

Gen. William H. Carter, the troops embarked upon an extended training 

program until August, when the division was disbanded. 39 

.1$ McKenna, "Forgotten Reform," Ph.D. diss., pp. 62- 64. 

'

9 William A. Ganoe, The 1-fistOJy r~(the United States Army (New York: D. Appleton 

and Co., J 924), pp. 434, 437, 439, 443; Clarence C. Clendenen, Blood on the Border: 

The Un ited States Army and the Mexican Irregulars (London: Collier-Macmillan, 

1969), pp. 146-50; Memo, CoS, WD, to IG, Jan I 1, sub: Emergency Supply Depots, 

Roll I 2, Microfilm 912, Indexes to War College Division Records, RG 165, NARA. 

25 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

The Office of the Inspector General reported comprehensively on 

the mobilization. Lt. Col. George Bell, Jr., was assigned as IG of the 

maneuver division. He was assisted in the inspection of field artillery 

units by Maj. William Lassiter for the first two months and later by Lt. 

Col. James B. Erwin, who also covered the separate cavalry brigade for 

the last month of the exercise. Bell observed everything he could until 

the division was disbanded. Additionally, he continued to make inspections of disbursing accounts and condemned unserviceable property 

whenever required. Although no formal unit inspections were made, 

Bell paid numerous informal visits to division elements in camp and on 

the march. He noted not only unit performance but also problems of 

organization and equipment. 

Many of his conclusions were necessarily tentative because of the 

novelty of the situation. Senior officers were for the first time dealing 

with units of such size. Most of the regiments arrived at half strength 

and spent their time assimilating an influx of recruits while conducting 

basic training. The resulting paperwork caused many line officers to 

conclude that excessive administration was one of the greatest detriments to progress. One commander estimated that from orderly room 

to War Department, each soldier was accounted for nineteen times 

before his status was finalized in The Adjutant General's rccords. 0 

Colonel Bell noted the negative effects of bringing in large numbers of recruits to raise units to war strength. He estimated that unit 

efficiency actually declined despite the increase in personnel. Bell further cited problems in strategic rail transportation, which delayed bringing son1e units to the mobilization sites for several weeks after being 

alerted. For example, bids had to be let in most cases before transportation arrangements were implemented. He also joined commanders 

in criticizing the elaborate administrative requirements imposed on the 

supply system. He recommended that all administrative procedures be 

simplified and made the same for peace and war. Bell further discussed 

issues in perso1mel and artillery training, which he believed adversely 

affected tactical readiness. 1 

General Carter, founding genius of the General Staff and no friend 

of the inspectorate, did not receive Bell's report with grace. He forwarded the report, citing Bell as earnest and industrious but also as 

one whose "mental processes tend to magnify unimportant matters 

into affairs of magnitude." Despite Carter's lack of enthusiasm, many 

"' Arthur Ruhl, "What Is the Matter With the U.S. Army?" Collier :f Magazi11e, 15 

Apr II, pp. 17, 39-41. 

•• Ltr Rpt, Bell to Maneuver Div Adj, 6 Jul II, Entry 26, RG 11 2, NARA. 

26 
INSPECTION AND REFORM 

of Bell's recommendations were adopted, especially those pertaining 

to the structure of medical organizations. (He especially praised the 

high quality of field sanitation, but suggested that the Medical 

Department should consider motorizing its ambulance service.) The 

problems he found, such as equipment variations amongst similar 

units and the need for better infantry training and physical conditioning, were treated seriously when brought up to the War Department. 

His report remains a balanced overview of the operations and problems of the maneuver division, and provided part of the substance for 

further changes and reforms.42 

In 1912 the General Staff prepared an organization scheme for 

field armies. In case of full mobilization a large force was contemplated, consisting of four field armies of three divisions each, with two 

divisions in reserve. Each division would have an inspector general 

(lieutenant colonel), while each army would have an inspector general 

(colonel) and an assistant inspector (major). Inspectors were identified 

for service in the first field army and its elements, and a total of twenty-six more were to be authorized automatically ifthe units were activated. In this way, the principle recommended in 1898 by Inspector 

General Breckinridge-automatically authorizing at least one inspector 

for each senior general officer command at its activation- became 

established as a matter of policy.43 

A board of officers, headed by Secretary Stimson, created the necessary divisions and component brigades. As a result, in 1913, the 

peacetime structure of the Army was again reorganized, this time into 

four large geographical departments in the United States, plus one each 

in the Philippines and Hawaii. Department boundaries were adjusted so 

that each included the units that would form a single tactical division, 

an effort to compensate for the scattering of forces over twenty-four 

states in forty-nine posts, with an average strength of700 men.-14 

In February of that year a second concentration of troops took place 

along the Mexican order. It was a smooth operation by comparison with 

its predecessor in 1911, but problems sti II were noted. Although all the 

tmits assembled without difficulty, many were understrength and ineffective, the result of low manning authorizations imposed by a budgetconscious Congress as well as problems in the prevalent recruiting and 

reserve systems. Although horses and mules to move the field army 

•z Ibid. and End (quotation); A RIG 1911, p. 268; Ltr, SG Torney to TAG, 3 l Aug II, 

Entry 26, RG I 12, NARA. 

•J Ltr, Mills to IG, 25 Mar I 2, and Reply, same date, Entry 296, RG I 65, NA RA. 

"' Ganoe, HistOI:J', pp. 444-45. 

27 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

were in short supply, there were too few men available to care for those 

on hand. 

The situation made the inspectorate one of the strongest advocates of motorization. General Garlington noted the experimental use 

of a truck and some motorcycles in 1911, saying they had fully 

proven their value. Other inspectors added their recommendations, 

urging that the Army replace wagons with motor vehicles to the maximum extent. The growing difficulty in procuring satisfactory horses 

further justified the change. These recommendations provided the 

necessary impetus for the Quartermaster General to begin serious 

testing to produce a suitable truck. By the time of the I 913 mobili zation, motor vehicles had become a significant part of the Army's 

transportation system. Inspectors continued to push for similar 

improvements, such as motor ambulances and mobile kitchens, after 

each major field problem.'15 

The General Staff slowly began to appreciate the value of the 

inspectorate in the mobilization process. Indeed, the work of the 

inspectors had made them indispensable. One result, however, was that 

the planners proposed curtailing several of the traditional regulatory IG 

duties, such as inspections of condemned property, to allow more time 

for unit inspections. General Garlington, ever alert to any challenge to 

the scope of the Inspector General's authority, successfully warded off 

such proposals, arguing that procedures should not be changed because 

of unique temporary demands.4(' 

While clinging to old duties, however, the Office of the Inspector 

General failed to specifY the duties of tactical unit inspectors. At the 

time of the troop concentrations on the Mexican border in 1913 and 

during the occupation ofYera Cruz in 1914, the OIG had developed few 

guidelines or instructions for the inspectors with the fi eld organizations. Hence, inspectors assigned to the new units were forced to develop their own methods of operation. They combined their traditional 

duties, such as inspecting money accounts, with an increased stress on 

evaluating the proficiency, or readiness, of their units.~7 

The intense activity along the Mexican border taxed the limited 

resources of the small lG office of the Southern Department, from 

'

1 AR!G 1913, p. 279; AR1G 1916, p. 304; James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: 

Army Logistics. 1775- 1953 (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 

United States Army, 1966), p. 298. 

"' Memo, Hodges to Chief, War College Div, WDGS, 16 Feb 14, Entry 296, RG 165, 

N/\RA . 

., Helmick, "Autobiography," Mill; A RIG /914, p. 197. 

28 
INSPECTION AND REFORM 

which most of the tactical unit inspectors were drawn. The inspectors, 

who were few in number compared to the volume of their commitments 

and tasks, were almost continually out of the headquarters, which prevented them from developing a close relationship with the department 

commander. The situation was so demanding that the two department 

inspectors and their detailed assistants were always on the road, returning only to file their reports and then leave again. As a result, they often 

were not sufficiently familiar with the commander's views and policies, 

either to represent him properly or to present uniform standards 

throughout the department. Inspectors would encounter some situation 

in the field that seemed improper and fi le lengthy reports; however, 

their recommendations would be impracticable because higher headquarters had issued orders of which they were unaware or because the 

larger tactical situation was unknown to thern.~8 

When Brig. Gen. Tasker H. Bliss became the Southern 

Department commander, he concluded that his inspectors were necessary to his command success but that they were too overworked to 

be fu lly effective. Hence, he suggested to General Garlington that IG 

officer strengths be increased so that an inspector could always be 

available at the headquarters. This way the commander wou ld have a 

channel to issue new information to the traveling inspectors while 

also having an IG present for special inquiries. 9 Such requests by 

Bliss and other general officers helped keep the inspectorate intact 

and growing as the Army entered the final major reorganization 

before the World War. 

The National Defense Act 

Two crises- the sinking of the steamship Lusitania by a German submarine, and continued unrest in Mexico-prompted President Wilson in 

July 1915 to request that more thorough military preparedness plans be 

developed. The War College Division of the General Staff already had 

worked on preparing contingency plans, which envisioned a large 

increase in the size of the Regular Army and the virtual elimination of the 

National Guard in favor of a federa lly controlled "Continental Army" 

reserve of 400,000 men. Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison concurred in the proposal but ran into opposition in Congressman Hay,s 

Military Affairs Committee. Hay objected to the dissolution of the 

... Ltr, Bliss to Garlington, 10 Sep 14, Entry 35, RG 159, NARA. 

•• Ibid. 

29 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

National Guard and believed that a legal basis existed for establishing 

complete federal control over the Guard in an emergency.50 

Chairman Hay offered a counterplan that left the Guard as the 

mainstay of any emergency Army expansion. President Wilson ultimately accepted Hay's plan when it became apparent that the Military 

Affairs Committee was adamantly opposed to the Continental Army 

scheme. Secretary Garrison, in fact, had become so closely associated 

with the Continental Army idea that he resigned on 10 February 1916, 

and was replaced on 7 March by Newton D. Baker. The House approved 

Hay's plan on 23 March and it went to the Senate. There for a time the 

War College Division proposal seemed to be favored. However, a compromise bill emerged in May and was approved by the President on 3 

June as the National Defense Act of 1916.51 

Even during the months of debate it became evident that, regardless 

of the plan adopted, the Regular Army would undergo a major expansion. Hay's bill contemplated a substantial increase in line strength and 

an overage of 1,000 officers for duty on staffs, as instructors, and in 

other nonregimental slots. The Secretary of War's office sent a confidential memorandum to the bureau chiefs in October 1915, asking them 

to translate the bill's implications into specific manpower needs. General 

Garlington replied that, assuming only the increase in units with no 

territorial changes, his department would need five officers to fill 

inspection positions in new units- a departmental strength increase to 

twenty-six officers. It was the Inspector General's view that in wartime 

the character ofiG duties would not change, only the volume.52 

The passage of the National Defense Act as well as events in 

Mexico dominated the inspectorate 's development up to the declaration 

of war with Germany in April 1917. The act provided for the expansion 

of the Regular Army from an average strength of65,000 to 175,000 over 

a five-year period, its increase nearly doubling annually until the ceiling 

was reached. An organized reserve was authorized, and the Regular 

50 ArthurS. Link, Woodrow Wilson and tile Progressive Era, 1910- /91 7 (New York: 

Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 179- 88. 5

' George C. Herring, Jr., " James Hay and the Preparedness Controversy, 

191 5- 1916," Journal ofSoutllem HistOJy 25 (Nov 64): 383-402. 51 Memos, Breckinridge [Acting SofW] to Bureau Chiefs, 12 Oct 15, sub: Increase 

in Personnel, Commissioned and Enlisted, of Staff Departments; Garlington to Acting 

SofW, 14 Oct 15, sub: Increase in Personnel of the Inspector General's Department in 

Connection With Revision of Army Reorganization Act, etc.; and TAG to J.G, 3 Nov 15, 

sub: War Department Organization and Administration. All in Entry 25, RG 159, 

NARA. See also Memo, Brewster to TAG, 5 Nov 15, sub: Organization and 

Administration of the IGD, Entry 296, RG 165, NA RA. 

30 
INSPECTION AND REFORM 

Army was organized into tactical divisions and brigades. The National 

Guard was thoroughly integrated into a federal defense structure and 

authorized to expand over the five-year period to a ceiling of 425,000 

men. The Guard was made subject to much closer federal control and 

scrutiny through a requirement for periodic IGD inspections. The act 

created the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) Program, as well 

as provided for volunteer civilian training camps patterned on a system 

begun by General Wood at Plattsburg Barracks, New York, in 1915.53 

The Inspector General's Department was affected by the act in 

many different ways. The mere fact that it sw-vived intact and with 

expanded responsibilities precluded further substantial General Staff 

sniping for the foreseeable future. The first and most obvious consequence of the law was a rise in authorized strength. Twelve new activeduty authorizations over five years were specified, bringing the department's strength to a maximum of thirty-three inspectors. The act also 

provided for an IG Reserve Corps of sixteen majors, who were required 

to be "of good character" and under forty-five years of age, with at least 

one year of active service and "sound" civilian experience. Each of the 

thirteen tactical divisions envisaged would be assigned an IG officer in 

the rank of major; higher commands, more senior officers. Within a 

month The Adjutant General was soliciting names for these positions.5

• 

In August 1916, because of the rapid increase in IG strength, the 

Office of the Inspector General hired six civilian clerks, raising the 

number to thirteen, plus the three messengers and the expert accountant 

already on board. The act also prevented General Starr officers from 

inspecting schools with military detachments. The job of doing so 

reverted to the inspector General's Department at a time when the creation of ROTC added to the number of schools requiring inspection. 

Every aspect of the National Guard required inspection. At General 

Garlington's suggestion, the accounts and records of disbursing in each 

state also had to be inspected annually. Citizen training camps were 

totally new organizations also needing careful inspection.55 

The sudden demand for inspectors had to be met by temporary 

details until the number of permanent inspectors could be increased. 

1

' Ganoe, HisiOI:V, p. 456; Link, Woodrow Wilon , p. 188. 

"ARIG /916, p. 295 (quoted words); Ltr, TAG to IG, 5 Jul 16, sub: Formation of 

Divisions. and Reply, 6 Jul 16, Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 

$$ Ltr, Brewster to Chief Clerk, WD, 28 Aug 16, and Memos, Garlington to TAG, II 

Jan 17, sub: History of the IGD for CY 1916; TAG to Dept Cdrs, 16 Dec 16, sub: 

Inspection of Records and Accounts of Property and Disbursing Officers; and Brewster 

to Garlington, 20 Jun 16, sub: Effect of Act Approved June 3, 1916, Upon TGD. A II in 

Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. See also A RIG 1916, p. 295. 

3 1 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

lnspecting Batte1y C, 1Oth Connecticut Field Artillery, at Tobyhanna, 

Pennsylvania, During the Me;v:ican Border Crisis 

The situation became more urgent in light of a full-scale mobilization 

going on along the Mexican border, concurrent with the passage of the 

act. The rapid growth of large provisional units in the Southwest caused 

local commanders to appoint their own inspectors without notifying the 

Inspector General. Although their ad hoc action indicated a high regard 

for inspection, it threatened IG standards and violated approved procedures. General Garlington moved quickly to curtail the practice by having a directive from the Secretary of War issued to all department commanders forbidding such appointments. As a result, commanders unilaterally could appoint an inspector only for the emergency desh·uction 

of property. At the same time, the appointment of approved inspectors 

was speeded up. 6 

Planning for expansion of the Inspector General's Department continued because of the provisions for a reserve in the National Defense 

Act. Lawmakers envisioned the eventual training of a half-million men 

annually, creating a pool of three million reservists. When such a proMemo, IG to TAG, 30 Oct 16; Ltr, SofW to Dept Cdrs, 7 Nov 16. Both in Entry 

25, RG I 59, NARA. 

32 
INSPECTION AND REFORM 

gram was realized, l nspector General Garlington determined that OIG 

personnel strength would need to be increased by six officers to support 

the thirteen who would be in the field with units. But the immediate 

demands of the field increasingly dominated his department's time. 

Even wh ile the final expansion plans were being made, the inspectorate 

already had been involved in supporting serious operations along the 

Mexican border for over six months. 

The Punitive Expedition 

The continuing problems along the Mexican Border climaxed on 1 

March 1916, when the town of Columbus, New Mexico, was raided by 

Mexican irregulars Led by Pancho Villa, an opponent of the recognized 

government headed by Yenustiano Carranza. Villa or hls group had 

committed earlier hostile acts against Americans, apparently in the 

hope that U.S. intervention would bring down the Carranza government. American intervention did indeed result from the attack on 

Columbus, but mostly to the disadvantage ofVilla. 

Reaction to the raid itself by Columbus' 13th Cavalry garrison had 

been unexpectedly vigorous, and the Villistas lost an estimated 100 

men. On 15 March Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing's Punitive Expedition, 

consisting of one infantry and two cavalry brigades, crossed into 

Mexico in pursuit. Pershing established his rear base at Columbus, with 

a forward base at Dublan in the Mexican state of Chihuahua. From the 

forward base, Pershing sent out a series of cavalry colum11S that slowly 

eroded the strength of the Villista bands in the course of a series of 

sharp engagements. 

Beginning about June 1916, Pershing shifted his strategy by dividing his limited operational area into districts, each combed by a force 

of regimental size. By that time the last elements of the Regular Army 

mobile forces had been called to the border because of the growing hostility of the Carranza government over the presence of U.S. troops on 

its soil, and President Wilson had federalized the National Guards of 

Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. The growing possibility of war with 

Mexico caused the President to call out most of the rest of the National 

Guard on 18 June, about two weeks after the newly signed National 

Defense Act authorized the move. 

While most U.S. troop activities in Mexico were limited to patrols 

and vigorous training, an outnumbered force from the I Oth Cavalry was 

defeated by Carranza troops at Carrizal on 21 June. The battle shocked 

both sides into seeking a peaceful solution, and all American units were 

withdrawn peacefully by 5 February 191 7. Although the politico-mili33 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

tary value of the expedition is still debated, the invaluable experience 

and training gained by senior officers and commanders in the Regular 

Army and National Guard alike is not. Among them, the inspectors who 

worked on both sides of the border learned important lessons while providing essential information, assistance, and evaluation to all participating units and staffs.57 

Because of its provisional nature and the speed with which it had 

been constituted, the Punitive Expedition initially lacked an inspector 

general. Col. Lucien C. Berry was named acting inspector in the general order organizing the expedition and later, after he assumed command of the 4th Field Artillery, was replaced by Lt. Col. Henry T. Allen. 

In the meantime, General Garlington recommended that an IG be 

detailed to Pershing's command because of its size and importance. As 

a consequence, Lt. Col. George 0. Cress, a cavalryman serving as TG 

of the Central Department, was sent on temporary duty to the Southern 

Department. There, General Frederick Funston, the department commander, assigned Cress to Pershing's headquarters, and he joined the 

expedition at Dublan on 15 June. 58 

One of Cress' first tasks was to investigate the battle at Carrizal, 

which occurred just after his arrival. Two troops from the I Oth Cavalry, 

under the command of Capt. Charles T. Boyd, had attempted a frontal 

assault against a much larger entrenched Mexican force. After inflicting 

heavy losses on the Mexicans, the Americans were repulsed with many 

casualties of their own; Captain Boyd was among those killed. As his 

investigation developed, Colonel Cress noted several less than creditable 

acts by some of the fight's survivors. He also concluded that Boyd, 

although courageous, had sh·etched his orders and used bad tactical judgment. Sensing that various reputations might suffer, he wrote General 

Garlington, asking for guidance in case he should find sorneone's conduct discreditable. Garlington promptly replied in a long encouraging letter, telling Cress to discover the unvarnished facts. "The facts developed 

will point to your conclusions and recommendations." Doing so was the 

only way to be fair to the individuals and the rest of the Army. 59 

s

1 Punitive Expedition summary based on versions in Clendenen, Blood 011 the 

Border, and Frank Tompkins, Chasi11g Villa: The StOIJ' Behi11d the SIOIJ' of Pershi11g s 

£xpeditio11 IIIIo Me.>:ico, (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1934). 

'" Ltr, Garlington to Cress, 17 May 16, and End, Garlington to TAG, 14 Jun 16, Entry 

25, RG 159, NARA; Tclg, Bundy to Pershing, 15 Jun 16, Entry 11 87, RG 394, NARA. 

Sec also Tompkins, Chasi11g Villa, pp. 72, 257. 10 Rpt. Cress, Aug 16, sub: Investigation of Encounter Between American and 

Mexican De Facto Government Forces at Carrizal. Mexico, June 21, 1916, and End 

(quotation), Garlington to CofS, WD, [Sep 16], Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 

34 
INSPECTION AND REFORM 

Encouraged, Cress went on to produce a thorough report. He interviewed seventy-four persons, producing a 66-page narrative that realistically described what had occurred. He concluded that Boyd had 

exceeded his instructions and underestimated the danger of his situation. Be l icving the I Oth Cavalry troops had fought as well as the odds 

allowed, he recommended no further action. His findings paralleled 

and corroborated the versions of other participants on both sides. The 

report moved through channels with little comment, and General 

Garlington passed it to the Secretary of War after analyzing some tactical lessons. The United States and Mexico had been at their closest 

point to war as a result of Carrizal, and the incident had made such an 

impression on President Wilson that he kept a copy of the report among 

his private papers.60 

The bulk of Cress' duties were much more prosaic, but valuable in 

their own way. General Pershing was a strong advocate of inspection 

in a ll its forms, using his aides as his tactical eyes and cars. While he 

roved between elements of his force in a small motor cavalcade, he 

would send one or two of his aides to other places of interest or concern. The aides had the authority to give orders in his name. The 

inspector and the assistants periodically assigned to him were used in 

a similar fashion for support and logistical activities. In this way, 

Pershing was able to impose his direction and standards on a ll of his 

scattered command.61 

It was routine for a vigorous program of inspection to be carried 

out by each of Pershing's principal staff officers in their areas of 

responsibility. Their findings were given to the expedition's chief of 

staff, who summarized and tabulated them for Pershing's use. While the 

staff officers looked at c lements germane to their functions, such as 

pack trains or medical aid stations, the lG reviewed the entire command, with an emphasis on personal clothing and equipment and the 

care and condition of the livestock. From 20 August to 6 September 

Colonel Cress inspected all the units and locations within the expedition. His inspection was subjective, detailed, and unanalytical. 1-Je also 

continued to inspect unit funds and disbursing accounts on a regular 

basis. His remarks were general on the funds; apparently, he made a ll 

the minor corrections needed without listing them. Pershing himself 

conducted regularly scheduled command inspections, accompanied by 

members of his staff. On these occasions Colonel Cress, with his 

,;o Lillk, l lfJodrow Wilson, p. 142 . 

• , Tompkins, Chasing Villa, p. 156. 

35 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

branch background, performed as the cavalry inspector. Weekly full 

inspections were made at Dublan, and Pershing directed subordinates 

elsewhere to make frequent inspections of their units. After each command inspection any deficiencies were reported by letter to the commanders, who were not required to respond because any failure to take 

corrective action would be detected in ensuing inspections.62 

Garlington and Cress maintained an extensive formal and informal 

correspondence throughout the period of the Punitive Expedition's 

existence. Cress had only recently been detailed to the Inspector 

General's Department and lacked an experienced c lerk to help him. 

Consequently, his primary concerns had to do with meeting regulatory 

requirements, such as funds and property inspections, and reporting 

them properly. Garlington told him not to be unduly concerned about 

such things, but rather to concentrate on improving the expedition's 

efficiency. Hence, Cress circulated continually between his headquarters at Columbus and the town of El Valle, Chihuahua, 176 miles 

away- by October the farthest outpost of the expedition. The road conditions were such that the trip took four days, despite the best efforts of 

the engineers. By making these exhausting treks, Cress was able to 

observe equipment in action, talk with the troops, sometimes prevent 

waste, and gather invaluable data on equipment and operations.63 

A large part of the inspector's time was spent in evaluating equipment and assessing field maintenance operations. A great number of 

new items had been developed since the War with Spain, and the expedition provided a rare opportunity to test them under extended use in 

demanding field conditions. By September 1916 Cress had produced a 

detailed analysis of most of the equipment used, along with recommendations for changes in operations and support plans. He divided his 

report under topics pertaining to command issues and to each of the 

bureaus.6-l He commented on each item of clothing and personal equipment about which he had received a complaint; noted such minor matters as the need for hip pockets on fie ld trousers, a modification later 

agreed to by the Quartermaster General; and pointed out that the snaps 

on the ammunition pouches were so tight that often the pouches could 

not be opened, which was unacceptable in combat and resulted in 

Ordnance Department testing to find a more suitable fastener. 

Everyone Cress inspected stated that the model 1912 cavalry equip62 Punitive Expedition to Mexico Reports/Inspection File, Entry 1202, RG 394, 

NARJ\. 

"' Llr, Cress to G<~rlington, 23 Oct 16, Entry 25, RG 159, NARA . 

.. Rpt, Cress to TAG (thru channels, 35 ends.), 16 Sep 16, Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 

36 
INSPECTIO N AN D REFORM 

ment was a disaster and no improvement over previous designs. Later a 

cavalry board was convened for the purpose of reviewing and correcting the problems. As a matter of interest, Cress reported that the cavalry w1its had left their sabers in storage at home. The general view was 

that they should be eliminated, with no more time wasted on training 

the troops to use such edged weapons. 

Cress' report also treated major items of equipment and logistical 

procedures. He favored the use of the so-called rolling kitchens, on the 

grounds that they greatly enhanced the comfort and convenience of the 

troops. At the same time, he pointed out some design defects in existing equipment, which tended to confirm observations from other 

sources and precipitated further Ordnance Department testing to develop a better design. The inspector recommended adopting the repair and 

maintenance system developed during the expedition- forward support teams and light repair shops moving with or near the combat 

units- as an Army-wide standard. These forward maintenance elements were backed up by full service shops in the base areas, which 

were capable of performing major overhauls. The system was found to 

be responsive to immediate needs, keeping more material out of the 

pipeline and in the hands of the users. The Quartermaster General 

favored Cress' recommendation and later began inquiries to determine 

the personnel composition of the forward teams so that an appropriate 

table of organization and equipment could be issued. 

Colonel Cress echoed his predecessor, Colonel Bell, in concluding 

that supply paperwork was too complex, a conclusion also reached 

simultaneously by his colleagues inspecting National Guard units. He 

lu·ged that inspection reports or sw·veys be used as transfer docwnents 

at depots and that no fu1·ther accountability be required. He viewed the 

existing supply system as functioning properly only in peacetime, when 

each supply officer could be near the organization requiring equipment. 

Field conditions prevented this, and Cress suggested a more flexible 

bulk issue to units whose own supply personnel would determine distribution. General Pershing agreed, saying that all peacetime systems 

should work unchanged in wartime or be replaced by ones that would. 

A classic example of the existing system's inflexibility could be seen 

in the Quartermaster General's repeated queries about the disposition of 

the hides of government cattle. Livestock were purchased locally in the 

wilds of Chihuahua for immediate consumption. Normal procedure at an 

Army post would be to preserve the hides of slaughtered cattle and to sell 

them to the highest bidder within ten days. To follow this procedure in 

Mexico was absmd, indeed impossible, and yet bureaucrats demanded a 

documented explanation for each departure from normal procedure. This 

37 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

sort of red tape was often so harassing that many officers preferred to usc 

their own money to feed their units. A board convened to consider the 

problem somewhat reduced the tight accountability requirements, but 

still did not go so far as Colonel Cress wished. 65 

Numerous other matters addressed by the inspection report set precedents that endured for years. For example, the War Department approved 

Pershing's and Cress' suggestion that officers wear their rank insignia on 

one collar and branch insignia on the other collar of their work shirts. 

Cress also proposed that vehicle drivers and other technicians not be 

given NCO rank, but rather special ranks of their own, with the aim of 

upholding the prestige of the sergeants and corporals in the line. All in 

all, the extensive report that emerged from the Punitive Expedition had a 

positive effect on many aspects of policy and logistical support, providing a stimulus for change at a critica l time and proving beneficial to planners in the early phases of 1917 wartime mobilization.(,(, 

It also provided welcome support for an unexpected requirement 

imposed on the Office of the Inspector General by the Secretary of War. 

On 21 July 1916 Baker asked General Garlington to be the focal point 

for statistics concerning the operations in Mexico and along the border, 

requiring that his office coordinate with the chiefs of the supply corps 

and departments to document expenditures incurred by the Punitive 

Expedition and related border operations. As the project evolved, all 

supply elements forwarded monthly reports to the OlG, which consolidated them for the Secretary's usc. The final report differentiated 

between National Guard and Regular Army expenditures, providing 

special detail on costs involving motor vehicles and aircraft. 67 

The observation of the logistical and tactical operations was the 

major part of the inspector's duties. But some time was also spent in 

investigating complaints and matters of special interest. A few complaints came from civilians concerning property destruction. The 

majority, however, dealt with military matters, most of which could be 

classified as leadership issues. The following two cases were typical. 

During his time as the expedition inspector, Colonel Allen investigated 

a problem arising essentially from a personality conflict between a battery commander and one of his lieutenants. The solution was to reassign the lieutenant and to counsel the captain on self-control. 

Meanwhile, Colonel Cress investigated a more serious case of miscon-

•s Tompkins, Chasing Villa, pp. 147-48. 

"" Rpt, Cress to TAG, 16 Sep 16, Entry 25, RG 159, NARA . 

• , Ltr, TAG to lG, 2 1 Jul 16; Rpt, OIG, 25 Jul 16, sub: Record of Expenditures. Both 

in Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 

38 
INSPECTION AND REFORM 

duct in response to a soldier's complaint of improper treatment. He 

found that a group of officers who had been drinking roughed up the 

soldier for no other reason than that he happened to be passing by. The 

officers involved were relieved and court-martialed.68 

ln a case with wider implications, General Garlington himself successfully defended Army personnel who were under political attack. 

New Mexico Senator Albert B. Fall claimed that poor leadership and 

faulty equipment had increased the vulnerability of the town of 

Columbus to Villa's attack. Garlington supervised the investigation and 

found that, on the contrary, the garrison commander, Col. Henry J. 

Slocum, had done all that could be expected. The Inspector General 

analyzed Slocum's report in light of his mission and concluded that his 

patrol plans and interior guard system represented sound procedures. 

He praised the rapid assembly and aggressive reaction of Slocum's 13th 

Cavalry as signs of good leadership, discipline, and train ing. 

Newspaper allegations against the machine-gun officer, Lt. Jolm P. 

Lucas, were similarly shown to be without foundation. Garlington recommended that the defenders of Columbus be commended for their 

vigorous defense of the town.(><) 

Some investigations of narrow issues proved in the long run to have 

benefits for the entire command. In October Colonel Cress investigated soldiers' complaints about unfair treatment while on truck train, or 

convoy, duty. His examination of the problems led Cress to observe that 

no standard policy for the operation of convoys existed; each was run 

on the whim of its particular commander. The inspector recommended 

the adoption of a uniform standard to assure efficiency and fairness for 

the guards and drivers, and Pershing agreed. He directed that unsafe 

practices be halted and required the rear base commander to evolve a 

standard policy to establish responsibilities for convoy procedures and 

roadside camp administration. Greater overall operational efficiency 

resulted from an initially narrow complaint investigation. 70 

6$ Rpl, Allen to CG, Pun Exp, 19 Jun 16, sub: Investigation of Mulual Complaint 

Against Capt. Edgar C. Yule and l!Lt. C. P. George; Ltr, CO, 4th FA, to CotS, Pun Exp, 

7 Dec 16, sub: In the Matter of the Complaint of Private Eliacc M. Buzzard, Supply 

Co., 4th F. A.; Memo, Div lnsp, n.d., sub: Reference Complaint of Private Buzzard, 4th 

rA. All in Entry I 187, RG 394, NARA. 

"" Tompkins, Chasing Villa, pp. 61 64; Garlington Remarks on Rpt, Slocum, 1 I Mar 

16, sub: Border Conditions, Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 

• Rpt, Cress to CG, Pun Exp, 29 Ocl 16, sub: Investigation of Complaints Made by 

Members of Guards on Truck Train No. 63; Proceedings of a Board ofOfTs Convened 

at Base of Comm, Columbus, N.Mex .. 2 Nov 16; Hq Base of Cornm GO 33, 4 Nov 16. 

All in Entry 1187, RG 394, NARA. 

39 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Cress' useful work and the seriousness with which General 

Pershing viewed inspection set a precedent for the larger challenges 

about to be presented by the World War. The situation in the Punitive 

Expedition also exemplified the solid position enjoyed by the inspectorate after nearly fifteen years of adjustment to the changes begun at 

the start of the century. At the working level, in the field, these changes 

had had relatively little effect. Inspectors, detailed or permanent, continued to inspect, investigate, and perform special missions for their 

commanders. At the War Department level, however, the inspectorate 

had to adjust to pressures exerted by the Chief of Staff and the General 

Staff. This entailed, in part, the Inspector General having to defend the 

inspectorate and its independence repeatedly against the efforts of some 

zealous General Staff members who wanted to absorb the inspection 

function completely. 

This hostility, however, was not reflected in the field, where most 

commanders appreciated a good inspector. The value and uses of an 

inspectorate in the presence of strong leaders was underlined once 

again during this era. General Wood used the inspectors as his enforcers 

and evaluators to ensure that his policies were being implemented. 

Pershing also used the inspectors to set standards for his command. In 

each case the lG served as the eyes and ears of his general, and in so 

doing acquired extensive influence. But measuring the effect of the 

Inspector General's Department requires a more detailed look at the 

inspections and investigations made between the War with Spain and 

World War I and their impact on the higher-level changes and reforms 

of that era. 

40 
2 

Shaping the New Army 

The inspectorate's role-enforcing the directives of War Department 

reformers and evaluating the results in inspection reports- evolved 

gradually. At the same time, the needs of commanders in the new Army 

structure had to be defined, the quality of units evaluated, and the safety and comfort of the men safeguarded and, where possible, improved. 

Army property also had to be regulated by tougher standards of efficiency. Jn these areas policy and practice developed together, the former often growing out of specific problems encountered in the latter. 

Inspection Reports 

With the establishment of the General Staff, Army regulations were 

revised both to clarify the relationship of inspectors to field commanders and to define the jurisdiction of the Washington inspection office. 

Unless otherwise instructed by the Secretary of War, inspectors 

assigned to the geographical commands continued to work exclusively 

for their commanders, to whom they submitted their inspection reports. 

The commanders could hold these reports as long as necessary but 

eventually had to retire them through channels to the Office of the 

Inspector General (OIG). When appropriate, the OIG forwarded the 

inspection reports to the Chief of Staff, recommending that the bureau 

in question be notified of the problem areas to be corrected. 

At times, this flow of information was modified by the Inspector 

Genera l himself. For example, General Bwton personally notified the 

Chief of Engineers of problems encountered in the Corps of Engineers, 

forwarding the inspection reports to the Chief of Staff only after the corps 

had taken remedial action. Burton told his staff that special handling was 

necessary because of the Chief of Engineers' sensitivity to criticism. 

General Garlington, on the other hand, denied the less powerful Chief of 

Ordnance similar early notice. In July 1909 the Chief of Ordnance 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

demanded that he be considered an intermediate commander in the routing of arsenal and depot reports and statements of remedia I action. For a 

few months Garlington allowed depot reports to go through the Chief of 

Ordnance, but in September returned to the regular process, holding a 

report until a remedial action report was received from the inspected unit. 1 

The General Staff was barred from interfering in the inspection of 

excluded activities, such as depots and hospitals. Inspectors for these 

units were nominated by the Inspector General to the Secretary of War. 

The senior inspector hjmself, or a subordinate OIG officer, was to inspect 

geographical commands, civilian and military schools, and the U.S. 

Military Academy. The suzerainty of the Chief of Staff was recognized 

with the requirement that the Office of the Inspector General prepare an 

aru1ual inspection plan, for review by the Chief of Staff and for approval 

by the Secretary of War. By the summer of 1903 the principles had been 

agreed to. One final change, made in November, provided that orders to 

inspectors be given by letter, rather than being published as had been the 

custom in the past. The change was intended to reduce the possibility of 

advance notice, allowing units to be seen "under normal circumstances."2 

The monitoring and control of actions derived from the inspection 

reports were among the OIG's principal functions. Inspection reports 

before World War I rarely dealt with broad aspects of mission accomplishment, unless that topic was the purpose of the inspection. For the 

most part, the reports were factual, listing each specific irregularity 

noted in the conduct and appearance of personnel and in the condition 

of equipment and facilities. General Burton directed inspectors to stop 

following standard formats soon after he became senior inspector. 

Rather, they were to use notebooks, recording whatever they thought 

was important under broad topical headings. The headings were to be 

in the same order for all reports, to allow readers to find particular subjects more easily. Inspectors were expected to solicit ideas and opinions 

for improvements and to conclude with a narrative description of the 

unit or post inspected, specifying any immediate necessary actions.3 

Extracts from remedial action reports constituted the most significant 

information circulated by the Office of the Inspector General. The remedial process was often cumbersome and time-consuming, and many 

1 Corresp, OIG, 19 Nov 03, 23 Jul 09, 19 Scp 09, sub: Instructions for Clerks, Entry 

35, Record Group (RG) 159, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), 

Washington, D.C. 1 WD Cir 22, 28 Nov 03, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 1 Ltr, Burton to SofW, 22 May 03; Memo, WD, 22 May 03, amending Memo. AGO, 

same date, sub: Inspections; WD Cir 22, 28 Nov 03. All in Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 

42 
SHAPING THE NEW ARMY 

actions that were left to the end of the inspection cycle merited much 

quicker attention. Consequently, Chief of Staff Wood directed Garlington 

to come up with a faster system. Wood wanted the OIG to review each 

incoming report and then the Inspector General to brief him personally on 

any critical matters. Garlington believed that part of the problem lay in the 

long delays that were encountered in funneling reports out of the geographical commands. 1:-le suggested that commanders be required to 

explain any unusual delays in their endorsements and that they forward 

immediately extracts of any items that required prompt action beyond 

their power to correct. The Chief of Staff approved Garlington's approach, 

implementing it with a letter to each geographical area commander. In 

1914 the expedited procedure was incorporated into Army regulations.~ 

Yet the number of inspection reports, particularly those of garrisoned posts, continued to grow as the General Staff and bureaus 

added more and more special subjects for which information was 

desired. In some cases a picture of the units emerged, but all too often 

the reports became long lists of irregularities and property, alternating 

with formal statements that requirements were being met. In 191 3 a 

change in the regulations specified that trivial matters would not be 

reported, particularly those that could be corrected on the spot. The 

effect was to prune the growth of the inspection reports, and during the 

final years before the World War they were quite prosaic and trim, providing a fairly clear picture of unit and post conditions. Nevertheless, 

items for special inquiry continued to be added to the reporting requirements, especially those dealing with administration, logistics, training, 

and living conditions. The most enduring concern, however, was the 

conduct of proper business methods. The greatest number of special 

topics grew during the tenure of General Wood, reflecting his activism 

as Chief of Staff. By 1916, the last full year of peace, sixteen items of 

special inquiry had been added to the basic inspection report. 5 

'Memos, Wood to Garlington, 9 Jan 14, and Reply, 10 Jan 14, and Llr, TAG to Dept 

Cdrs, 26 Jan 14, Entry 24; Memo, IG to TAG, 12 Jan 17, sub: Proposed Amendments 

to Army Regulations, Entry 25. All in RG 159, NARA. 5 Memos, Wood to IG, 26 Jan 12, 28 May 13, 17 Jun 13, 27 Aug 13, Entry 24; 

Corrcsp, OlG, 191 1- 1912, sub: Special Instructions for Inspectors, File 15208, Entry 

9; Memo, Brewster to lnsps, 2 Aug 16, sub: Special Topics of Inspection, 19 13- 19 16, 

Memo, OIG to lnsps, 8 Jan 16, sub: Mailers Pertaining to Blank Forms, and Rpt, 

Galbraith, 15 Jun 15, sub: Annual Inspection of Ft. William McKinley, Rizal, P.l., Entry 

26C. All in RG 159, NARA. Sec also WD GO 23, 1912; U.S. War Department, OITicc 

of the Inspector General, A Guide for the Use of Officers of the Inspector Generals 

Depart mew. 191 I. Corrected to April I. 1917 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

Office. 1917), pp. 27- 36.38 (hcrcaflcrcitcd as Guide 1911/ 1917). 

43 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Inspectors often submitted a supplcmentalletter to the Office of the 

Inspector General, summarizing their general observations once they 

had completed a cycle of annual inspections of similar organizations or 

functions. The Inspector General circulated these reports to the bureau 

chiefs, concerned that they receive the information and take appropriate action. Each inspector in the field also was required to submit an 

annual report, which constituted one means of indirect OIG control 

over inspectors and provided another source of information to the 

bureaus and the General Staff. These IG reports became feeders for the 

Secretary of War's annual report, which was mandated by Congress. 

They consisted of a brief summary of activities, followed by a more 

detailed analysis of the year's trends, and often contained recommendations in some depth for remedial action and lessons learned from 

investigations. Specific investigations were cited only if findings pertained to aspects of War Department- level policies and programs.6 

The JG reports proved to be useful for assessing Army-wide trends. 

In 1909 they showed that many findings over the year dealt with failures to comply with regulations and orders, primarily because of myriad policy changes then engulfing the Army. Several inspectors agreed 

that commanders should be alert to the changes, some appearing for the 

first time in the reports, but they urged the central staffs to ease up on 

the process, allowing the field commands to respond in a more efficient 

manner. Others used them as vehicles to express their own views on the 

effects of War Department policies. In 1911 Col. John L. Chamberlain, 

the Western Division inspector, criticized the excessive rotation of line 

officers by showing a direct ratio between good units and stable officer 

assignments. In short, the annual reports allowed the presentation of 

opinion and analyses that were out of place in the more formal and limited individual inspection reports. Collectively, they provided a sound 

view of the concerns of the Army, along with many useful recommendations for improvement.' 

The information contained in the annual reports, however, was for 

the Army alone. The practice of keeping all inspection reports and IG 

investigations within official channels dated to the time of the Civil 

War; only the Secretary of War could direct the release of information 

derived from IG activities to persons outside a chain of command. This 

policy was upheld by the Judge Advocate General each time the issue 

• Dept of East Annual Rpt, 1904, Entry 35, RG 159, NARA; Ltr, Garlington to 

Chief, War College Div, WOOS, 26 Mar 12, sub: Necessity for Annual Report, Entry 

296, RG 165, NARA. 

' Dept of East Annual Rpt, 191 I, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA 

44 
SHAPING T H E NEW ARMY 

arose. The authority and propriety of releasing information within the 

official chain was often less clear. In 1914 one of the Southern 

Department assistant inspectors, Maj. Alonzo Gray, submitted a report 

critical of a cavalry brigade to the department commander, General 

Bliss, who f01warded the report to the War Department because, in his 

opinion, it contained useful information on new cavalry drill regulations. But the embarrassed brigade commander contended that Major 

Gray should have submitted the report to him for his disposal. General 

Bliss passed the complaint to General Garlington for resolution. 

Garlington's decision helped to clarify the internal treatment of 

information. He ruled that it was Gray's duty to give General Bliss the 

unvarnished truth, because Bliss as commander had to know the true 

condition of his units. Bliss, in turn, had the right to forward the repot1 

to the War Department if he considered it worthwhile. But Garlington 

also ruled that the inspector had erred in not discussing his findings 

with the brigade commander before forwarding them, because the latter's views on the problem areas could have enhanced the report and 

spared him the surprise and embarrassment of learning about the criticism first from General Bliss. While he concluded that greater tact and 

objectivity would have made the report more palatable, Garlington nevertheless held that Gray and Bliss were technically within their rights in 

treating it as they had. 8 

There was no such confusion over the granting of information to 

persons outside the War Department. Requests for photographs or 

accurate copies of IG documents were screened by the Office of the 

Inspector General for any matters of a confidential nature before they 

were satisfied. This rule applied even when the requester was another 

federal or state government entity. Anything judged derogatory or 

uncomplimentary was excised before copies were made. Standards 

were very stringent, and the age of the document seemed to mean little. 

For example, in 1914 the acid remark "The commissary which stands 

at the foot of the hill is a monument to the false reasoning of him who 

erected it" was deleted from a copy of an 1828 report on Fort Mackinac 

sent to the Wisconsin Historical Society!9 

However excessive in individual cases, such control assured that 

reliable information was disseminated to those needing it within the 

War Department and that reputations and the confidentiality of sources 

• Memo, Garlington to Lyon, 6 Oct 14, sub: With Respect to Letter Received From 

Major Alonzo Gray, IG, dated 2 October 1914, and Ltr, Lyon to Gray, 6 Oct 14, Entry 

24, RG 159, NARA; WD, OIG, Guide 191111917, pp. 12- 13. 

• Memo, Pyne to IG, 12 Jan 14, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA 

45 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

were protected. The scale and scope of the information contained in IG 

reports and their revelation of the Army's strengths and weaknesses 

pointed to the overall wisdom of the policy. 

Education and Training 

No function of the inspectorate was more important than oversight of 

the education and training of both officers and men. Civi lian colleges 

were becoming important sources for the increased number of h·ained 

officers that were needed. Assigning officers to college faculties and 

issuing government equipment to schools had been authorized since the 

1880s. It was not long before the inspectors became involved in evaluating such programs. 

Annual inspections of colleges began in June 1886. As a result of 

program expansion, the inspectorate had to share its responsibil itics 

with specially detailed officers. The number of participating schools 

dropped during the War with Spa in but returned to prewar levels by 

1903; in that year seventy-eight detachments were in colleges, fifty-one 

of which were led by recalled retirees. In hopes of increasing enrollments, the War Department authorized these detachments to grant a 

small number of Regular Army commissions in place of the less prestigious reserve commission. Inspection of the colleges became more 

decentralized in late 1903, when the responsibility was transferred to 

the geographical commands in whose areas the schools were loeated. 10 

The General Staff used IG reports as the basis for planning the 

staffing, equipping and training of the various civilian cadet units. This 

unusual situation caused the Chief of Staff in November 1905 to direct 

that the Genera l Staff assume the responsibility for college inspections. 

Annually, thereafter, four officers were designated as inspectors from 

the General Staff. They not only visited the schools but also functioned 

as a board that selected "distinguished institutions."" This practice persisted until 1916 when, as a result of the crisis in Mexico and other 

major changes in the Army, the inspection responsibility reverted to the 

geographical area conu11anders and local inspectors general. 

Despite the significance of training in civilian institutions, the most 

important influence in upgrading the standards of the Army was its own 

burgeoning school system. The system closed in 1898 because of the 

•• Ltr, Chamberlain to AG, Dept of East, 30 Jun 09, Entry 7, RG 159, NARA. Sec 

also U.S. War Department, Annual Reporl of/he Inspector General, 1909 (Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909), p. 290 (hereafter cited as A RIG). 11 Southwestern Div Annual Rpt, 1904, Entry 35, RG 159, NARA. 

46 
SHAPING THE NEW ARMY 

War with Spain, but by 1902 most schools reopened. Their reemergence reflected basic changes in the Army. The nature of the officer 

corps was in transition. By 1902 half of its nearly 3,000 men had 

entered the Army since 1898, and only a fraction of them had been 

trained at the Military Academy. Consequently, an expanded educational system was essential. By 1916 there were eleven major schools 

located in Washington, D.C., and at Forts Riley, Leavenworth, Momoe, 

and Sill, many of them training both officers and enlisted men. The last 

two schools to be formed were Aviation, at San Diego, California, in 

1913, and Ordnance, at Sandy Hook, New Jersey, in 1916. All were 

subject to inspection by War Department inspectors, usually by General 

Garlington himself. His office kept inspection suspenses and received 

information on matters pertaining to the schools. Only the six bakers 

and cooks schools were the responsibility of the geographical area 

commanders, with inspections performed by localiGs.

12 

After a tentative beginning in the 1880s, general orders issued 

between 1890 and 1892 had made post and branch schools and the 

Military Academy subject to IG inspections. Most school inspections 

were made by simply observing classes and activities, whereas troops 

at the Military Academy and the bakers and cooks schools were formally reviewed and inspected. Inspectors sometimes included their 

opinions or impressions, as well as factual information. Maj. Jacob G. 

Galbraith, for example, in 1909 recorded the "tension" experienced by 

the students at Fort Leavenworth's Army School of the Line: "By tension is meant extreme strain of mind and nervous anxiety. These result 

from hard study and rivalry." He suggested doing away with grades or, 

at least, not publishing them. One of the students he interviewed was 

Captain Helmick, who cited his experience at Fort Leavenworth as one 

of the most unpleasant of his career.

13 

Not everyone agreed. Following his inspection of the Coast 

Artillery School in June 1909, Maj. Henry D. Todd, Jr., found no competition for grades at Fort Monroe but rather a strong desire to work 

hard in order to be prepared professionally. "The whole tone of the 

institution is a healthy one. The requirements are rigid, based upon 

what men well above average can accomplish in eight hours every day." 

12 Memos, Pyne to IG, 12 Jan 14, and Garlington to SofW, 25 Jan 17, sub: Request 

of Rep. William L. lgoe, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 13 lnsp Notes (quotation), Galbraith, 1909, File 13385, Army School of the Line 

Inspection, Entry 9, RG 159, NARA. See also copy of Eli A. Helmick, "From Reveille 

10 Retreat: Autobiography of Major Genera l Eli A. Helmick," U.S. Army Military 

History Institute (MHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 

47 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

He recommended that officers trained at the Coast Artillery School be 

admitted to the Army War College without any further training. The 

school also gave courses for senior enlisted master gunners, electricians, and artillery engineers. 14 

Few school reports were so laudatory. Those on the newly established Artillery School of Fire were sympathetic and helpful, but not 

uncritical. Courses offered for junior officers and NCOs generally were 

praised, while the field-grade course was regarded as a waste of time. 

Part of the problem lay in the small amount of ammunition authorized 

for practice (forty rounds for officers, ten for NCOs), which meant that 

no meaningful tactical training of any complexity could be given. 

Another consequence was that the school statistical section was limited in the data it could collect on the accuracy and effect of artillery 

fire. 15 Such discriminating and technically competent criticism was 

common in the inspectors' reports. 

The inspectors also looked into school and personnel administration and funds management. These activities usually were well run, 

although occasionally the presence of unauthorized funds would be discovered, derived from the sale of books and school materials. Such 

accounts either were closed or diverted to authorized nonappropriated 

funds that were used for student welfare. The practice of maintaining 

unauthorized funds, however, became so widespread that in August 

1915 General Garlington directed that all inspectors make a special 

effort to detect their existence. In addition, the inspectors evaluated not 

only the levels of responsibility of staff and faculty, making recommendations for grade increases and organizational changes, but also the 

appropriateness of school locations and available facilities. Because of 

student turbulence and poor facilities, the Washington Barracks 

Engineer School was inspected annually.'6 

A routine 1914 school inspection of the new aviation arm of the 

Army was unusual in that it led to an extended series of investigations 

and probes. The War Department established the Aeronautical Service 

as part of the Signal Corps in August I 907. Bids were put out for a suitable aircraft, and the Wright Brothers responded in the summer of 

1908. Unfortunately, the aircraft they offered crashed during tests at 

" Rpt (quotation), Todd, Jun 09, sub: Inspection of Coast Artillery School, Ft. 

Monroe, Va., Entry 9, RG 159, N/\RA. In loc. c it., sec also Rpt, Chamberlain, 13 Oct 

08, sub: Inspection of Ft. Monroe, Va. 

" Rpt, Lyon, 18 Apr 14, sub: Inspection of School of Fire for Field Artillery, Entry 

25, RG 159, NARA. 

" Memo, Garlington to CofS. WD, 30 May 09, sub: Wear of Uniforms, File 15344, 

Inspection of Alaskan Posts and Stations, 1908- 1909, Entry 9, RG 159, NARA. 

48 
SHAPING THE NEW ARMY 

Fort Myer, Virginia, killing Lt. Thomas W. Selfridge, the first of a disturbingly large number of aviator fatalities. In the ensuing years several Army officers were detailed to the service and the one aircraft it 

owned. They were based first at College Park, Maryland, until 1909; 

then, as the detachment slowly grew, it moved to several different locations, finally coming to rest at San Diego in the summer of 1913. By 

this time the organization had become large enough for the Chief 

Signal Officer, Brig. Gen. George P. Scriven, to redesignate it as the 

Aviation Section of his corps. In December the San Diego facility was 

designated the Aviation School and made part of the Army's educational system. This distinction marked it as an item for inspection. " 

Col. John L. Chamberlain, then the Pacific Division inspector, visited the Aviation School in February 1914. What started as a routine 

inspection, however, soon became a detailed investigation of school 

operations, prompted by the death of Lt. Henry B. Post in an aircraft 

crash- the fifteenth of the forty-eight officers detailed to aviation duty 

to have died since Selfridge. The investigation uncovered serious problems. Neither the school nor the recently created I st Aero Squadron 

were organized except on paper. Equipment and personnel had not been 

provided, and no system of accountability existed for the disbursal of 

funds. Most important, interviews with aviators and mechanics 

revealed that most of the aircraft on hand were obsolete and unfit for 

field service-few could be used even for training. No well defined 

system of training existed either for aspiring pilots or enlisted mechanics. Only a few hired civilian maintenance men were considered competent to work on the aircraft. 

Chamberlain believed that poor equipment and guidance were only 

part of the problem with the aviation facility. The overall lack of experience among the junior officers assigned to aviation duty worsened the 

situation. Most were lieutenants, and the few senior Signal Corps officers involved at the War Department were not pilots and had little 

understanding of the school's needs. Furthermore, all of the aviators 

were on detail, just as in any other staff department, and as soon as they 

gained experience the four-year rule required them to return to their 

basic branch units. Hence, experience in flying not only was in short 

supply but, once gained, was quickly lost. 

Regrettably, Chamberlain's proposals for reform were ignored. 

After another critical annual report, however, the Chief of Staff 

11 Rpt, Chamberlain, 19 Mar 14 , sub: Annual Inspection of First A reo Squadron and 

of Signal Corps Aviation School, Entry 9, RG 159, NARA. 

49 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

appointed General Garlington as president of a board to examine the 

Aviation School administration. Its findings confirmed the flaws pointed out by Chamberlain. Additionally, the board discovered fraud and 

collusion on the part of the school commandant and contracting irregularities on the part of the Army officers overseeing aircraft contracts, 

who were accepting substandard planes from the factories because of a 

lack of supervision and intense pressure to speed up delivery. The practical effect of Garlington's board was the replacement of most of the 

school staff and faculty and the start of a senior officers flight program 

to attract more seasoned o/Ticers." 

But problems lingered. After two pilots crashed in January 1917, a 

further investigation by the assistant IG ofthe Western Department, Lt. 

Col. Frank M. Caldwell, led to action on a number of his recommendations, including the appointment of Col. Alexander Dade, the former IG 

of the Vera Screws Expedition, as conunandant, along with a new staff. 

Despite the changes that resulted, the case of the Aviation School 

inspections stands as a cautionary example. The effect of the inspections 

depended both on the views or key members of the chain of command 

and on the degree offollow-up. At the San Diego school the inspectors' 

findings and recommendations were long ignored, because of parochial 

interests and the indifference of other members of the system. 19 

Endless other examples could be cited of the interest taken by inspectors in military schooling. General Burton, for example, was a strong 

advocate of giving advanced training to medical corpsmen, with the aim 

of enabling them to act on their own in medical emergencies. Jn 1911 Lt. 

Col. Charles G. Morton, after visiting the Signal School, suggested that 

the Signal Corps experiment with motor vehicles as radio caniers. The 

idea was quickly put into effect. In time, on the basis of their extensive 

experience, the inspectors developed a broader view of the Army's entire 

school system. By 1916 General Garlington was sh·essing better coordination among the service schools and the creation of a formal hierarchy 

of education to assure a logical progression throughout individual careers. 

He urged that the program also should apply to National Guard officers.20 

18 Gar I ington, "Proceedings of a Board of Officers," 4 Apr 16, Entry 33, RG 159, 

NARA. 

'" Rpt, Caldwell to TAG, 17 Mar 17, sub: Investigation in Case of'Lost Aviators' Lt. 

Col. Bishop and Lt. Robertson, and Secondary Report, Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. Ln 

Joe. cit., sec also Auxiliary Report, 26 Apr 17. 

"' Rpt, Shanks, 15 Jul 16, sub: Inspection of Department Hospital, Entry II ; Memo, 

CSigOfT to CotS, WD, 14 Jun II , sub: Experimental Use of Motor Vehicles, Entry 9: 

and Rpts, Gale, 1905, 1906, 1907, sub: Inspections of Madison Barracks, New York, 

Entry 7. All in RG 159, NARA. Sec also Helmick, "Autobiography," Ml·ll. 

so 
SHAPING THE NEW ARMY 

His ideas could not be realized at once, however. To his dismay and 

that of the other inspectors, the school system collapsed under the pressures of the Mexican border crisis. The schools were closed, and both 

the students and the faculty were assigned to units assembling for duty 

in the Southwest. Inspectors criticized this shortsighted approach that 

ignored future needs, particularly those generated by the concurrent 

expansion of the Army. They urged that, at the very least, cadres be 

retained to provide continuity during the inevitable revival of the 

schools. In fact, IG criticisms helped to bring about the rapid reopening of the schools in late 1916.21 

The Military Academy at West Point was always a special case. The 

Inspector General himself usually inspected the academy and the corps 

of cadets; when scheduling conflicts arose, the Department of the East 

senior inspector would make the visit for him. In either case, a narrative report for the Chief of Staff was submitted through the academy 

superintendent and The Adjutant General. Every West Point inspection 

report provided voluminous information concerning academy operations, including details on the menus in the cadet mess hall and descriptions of laundry operations. Occasionally, however, matters of greater 

significance came into the reports.

22 

Discipline issues at the Military Academy, as well as in the rest of the 

Army, were referred to the Inspector General for his review and remarks. 

The issue of greatest concern was hazing, which had become so serious 

in the 1890s that in 1901 Congress passed a law compelling the superintendent to dismiss cadets who engaged in such behavior. General 

Garlington objected to the law on the grounds of inflexibility and, in 

1909, proposed amending it to give the superintendent the same latitude 

as a general court-martial authority. Garlington believed that any cadet 

dismissed under this reformed system should be barred permanently fi:om 

returning. The law was amended later that year, incorporating his views.23 

Garrison and Unit Inspections 

Every unit and post in the Army had to be visited each fiscal year by an 

inspector, and this goal was normally met, except on rare occasions 

21 Rpt, Shanks, 6 May 14, sub: Inspection of Mounted Service School, Entry 9, RG 

159, NARA. 

u Rpt, Garlington, 27 Jul 08, sub: Inspection of USMA, July 16th to 20th, Entry 9, 

RG 159, NARA. 2

} Rpt, Shanks, 3 Aug 14, sub: Annual Inspection of USMA, Entry I I; Ltr, 

Garlington to CofS, WD, 29 May 09, sub: USMA Superintendent G. C. M. Authority, 

Entry 24. Both in RG 159, NARA. 

51 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

when weather or health problems intervened. Year after year it was safe 

to assume that well over I ,700 places and organizations would receive 

thoroughgoing attention to their facilities, personnel, and operations.24 

The inspector accounted for all personnel, listing all officers absent 

by name. Inspection of units stressed the appearance of soldiers, the 

care and condition of their uniforms and equipment, and the adequacy 

of their quarters. The inspectors also saw the units at various drills and 

parades, including a full field inspection followed by proficiency 

demonstrations in first aid, signaling, and similar skills. Suggestions 

for improvement were made, where appropriate. fnspectors were 

required to report all officers whose units were not properly prepared, 

as well as those physically, mentally, or morally incapable of performing the duties of their grade. Other concerns included the condition of 

livestock, conduct of garrison schools, and care of post prisoners. 

Funds were inevitably a matter of concern. All documentation was carefully reviewed, and any unexplained entries were referred to the custodian for written explanation. If the responsible officer had been reassigned, an inquiry was sent to him at his new station. The file on the 

report remained open until a satisfactory explanation was received. 25 

Inspection reports concluded with a brief, frank overall statement 

of a unit's or post's capacity to perform its mission. Here inspectors frequently gave their views about the effect of War Department plans or 

policies on the organizations inspected. Flaws in regulations or policy 

were sometimes detected as a result of inspections. Inspectors also conti nued to be strong advocates of modernization, especia lly in cases 

where mora le, efficiency, or safety could be improved. Persistence by 

the Inspector General's Department (IGD), for example, overcame 

inaction, and in 191 1 the War Department agreed to provide electric 

power to Army posts in Alaska. fn the Philippines an inspector's recommendation led to a new policy of buying local horses, which were 

small, tough, acclimated, and inexpensive, rather than shipping animals 

from the United States to meet arbitrary size standards.26 

Regardless of where they were conducted, the inspections of garrisoned posts represented a prodigious task for the team of one or two 

inspectors and a clerk. Aspects of the inspection had the potential to 

2

• U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the SecretaiJ' of IVw; 1904 (Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1904), p. 33 (hereafter cited as A RSIV). Sec, for example, inspections of Department of the East posts in Box 154, Entry E9, RG 159, NARA. 

" Memo, Brewster to lnsps Gcn, 4 Nov II, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 

'" Files 15344 and 15679, Inspection of Alaskan Posts and Stations, 1908, 1909, 

1911, Entry 9, RG 159. NARA. On the purchase of local horses, sec Rpt, Frier, I Aug 

13, sub: Inspection of Camp Stotsenburg. P.l., same entry. 

52 
SHAPING THE NEW ARMY 

"Picket Line Outside Brick Stables at Fort Myer." A major IG oversight 

responsibility was the acquisition, care, and disposal of horses. 

reflect adversely on a unit. In all cases, extreme frankness on the 

inspector's part was expected and strenuous work was the norm. Major 

Helmick learned during his first tour the difference between an inspection versus a social visit. Other inspectors strongly advised him not to 

accept the hospitality offered when conducting an official inspection to 

avoid the possibility of embarrassment and a conflict of interest. After 

becoming Inspector General in 1921 , Helmick adopted this informa l 

practice as IGD policy. 27 

Tactical Inspections 

In one of its most important reforms, the General Staff increased the 

amount of practical training beyond the simple drills required of all 

units and supporting services. By late 1906 garrison training had been 

differentiated from field training. In the latter, emphasis was placed on 

weapons firing and tactical exercises. At least one day each week was 

to be set aside for full unit training, with no excused absences. More of 

a unit's time was expected to be spent under field conditions. Beginning 

" Helmick, "Autobiography," MI-ll. 

53 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

in 1907, all units were required to conduct extended three- to six-day 

road marches each month, accompanied by all their trains and equipment. At least once a year every regiment was expected to conduct a 

combined practice march and three-week bivouac, with all of its elements present. The training cycle was refined even more in 1911 , when 

Chief of Staff Wood specified that the bivouac phase would include 

large-scale tactical maneuvers.28 

The capabilities of Army units and their levels of training had been a 

growing interest of inspectors even before the War with Spain. In 1892, 

at General Breckimidge's suggestion, annual inspections had begun to 

include tactical exercises. The era of reform h·ansformed a practice into a 

requirement. The new War Department general orders specified that IGs 

inspect a unit's tactical training and report their findings. Usually, the 

annual inspection was scheduled to coincide with the bivouac, for mutual convenience. Prior to 1910 the inspection report of a garrison included 

comments on both the troops and the installation; however, beginning in 

September, a separate field report was required. The reason for the reporting change was General Wood's greater stress on preparedness. Wood 

wanted inspectors to assess the efficiency of the units as patt of a mobile 

force. Troops had to be observed in the field for at least four days while 

they conducted tactical problems, road marches, and weapons training. 

In some cases unit commanders helped devise the field problems, 

but most of the time the visiting inspector prepared them. Combined 

arms exercises, whenever possible, were conducted to familiarize the 

participants with each other's work. Inspectors were required to note 

especially the support provided by staff department troops. Saber and 

bayonet proficiency and the condition of soldiers' feet after marching 

were further items of concern. The use of motor vehicles and the standardization of equipment were stressed as a result of observations of 

the first large-sca le bivouacs.

29 

Inspectors quickly formulated a set procedure to ensure that all 

required subjects were covered. Their visits were divided between gar21 Rpt, Sanger, 7 Dec 1896, sub: Coast Artillery Inspections, Department of the East; 

Memo, Breckinridge to lnsps Gcn, 28 Nov 03. Both in Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. The 

emphasis on field training led the Inspectors General to recommend repeatedly that a 

chief be appointed for each combat arm. (Only artillery had a chief, and when the arm 

was divided the chief's position went to the newly formed coast artillery.) Both Burton 

and Garlington contended tJ1at field problems would be of grenter value if branch chiefs 

existed to issue training doctrine and policies. See A RIG I 905, p. 444; A RIG 1906, p. 650. 29 For policies on training and tactical exercises, see WD GO 44, 1906, GO 177, 

1907, and GO 7, 1911. Sec also ARIG 191 I , pp. 265,267, 274; Memo, Garlington to 

lnsps Gcn, 29 May I I, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 

54 
SHAPING THE NEW ARMY 

rison and field activities. During the garrison phase they evaluated drill, 

athletics, equitation, and bayonet practice. The field phase was further 

divided into camp and tactical sections. The inspection of h·oops in 

camp emphasized organization, sanitation, and completeness of equipment. The performance of support clements, such as the kitchens and 

trains, was examined, as were the functions of the battalion and regimental staffs. During this time individual skills in first aid, signaling, 

and range finding were made by selecting men at random and running 

them through a series of tests. The tactical portion of the inspection 

concentrated on scouting, pah·olling, entrenching, and battle exercises. 

Problems on the ground included outposts by day and night, attacks, 

withdrawal, and position defenses. River crossings and night movements were practiced whenever possible.JO 

Some senior officers resented the tactical inspections, fearing the 

effects of criticism on their careers and disliking the disruption of their 

routine caused by the inspector's visit. But implicit in the Root reforms 

were higher standards of officer performance. Some colonels, unwilling 

to adjust to the new situation, were forced into retirement. Inspectors 

frequently were involved in these actions, if only because of their evaluations of a unit's tactical proficiency. J nefficient or incompetent senior 

officers were most often identified through tactical inspections. 

Although commanders were relieved on the spot, the War Department or 

the particular geographical command usually would direct a follow-up 

inspection to see how the officer in question had reacted to earlier criticisms. An inspector, ordinarily accompanied by a senior member of the 

geographical command staff, would return for a second look. Few of the 

old colonels survived this process. Many had resisted the changes under 

way in the Army, almost to the point of insubordination.J• 

Despite such opposition, one of the benefits of the new system was 

to reduce the total number of inspections that units had to face. By the 

time Wood came to office, inspections had multiplied to a point that 

tlu·eatened to overwhelm units in the field. Even the Surgeon General, 

Quartermaster General, and Chief Signal Officer, as well as the geographical area commanders, assigned officers to make some sort of unit 

or garrison inspections. Much of what they did was duplicated by the 

inspectors general, who were also following regulatory requirements.32 

;4 Memo, Brewster 10 IG, 2 Nov II, Entry 35, RG 159, NARA. 

" Helmick, "Autobiography," M.HL 

n Ltr, Bell to AG, Weslern Div, 17 Feb 12; Memo, Garlington to CofS, WD. 28 Jun 

12; Ltr, Garlington to Wood, 6 .lui 12; Memo, Pync to Garlington, 5 Jul 12. All in Enlry 

24, RG 159, NARA. 

55 
T HE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

Wood felt that the whole system was makeshift and that the structure needed clarification. In his view, inspectors general were to be 

responsible for garrison, financial, and supply accounting inspections 

and senior commanders for inspecting units in the field and evaluating 

the performance of officers. Commanders could use IGs to assist them 

but could not delegate the responsibility for tactical inspections. Wood 

wanted such inspections to be held during scheduled field training, 

rather than on special exercises, to reduce disruptions, and he wanted 

officers' annual physical evaluations to be scheduled at the same time. 

Secretary of War Stimson gave the Chief of Staff strong support.33 

Wood coordinated closely with General Garlington and other OIG 

officers while developing his new plans for tactical inspections. Each 

phase of planning was mutually agreed to. The Chief ofStaffintcnded his 

new policy to be tested and then refined after the first year of implementation. For his scheme to work, Wood realized that the senior commanders and their inspectors had to become competent inspectors. He thus 

decided that the local command IG would prepare all reports, including 

the one on the tactical inspection, and forward them through his commander. The modified tactical inspections program began in July 1912. 

Commanders were asked to coordinate inspection schedules upon receipt 

of Wood's instructions. The OIG field artillery inspector was required to 

do the same with the geographical commands. All itineraries had to be 

forwarded to the War Department along with requests for any General 

Staff support or IG personnel needed to augment local staffs.34 

At the end of 1912 General Wood required all inspectors and division 

commanders to provide their views on the new system. The consensus 

was generally favorable, and the system was made permanent in January 

1913. New regulations issued that month attempted to define command 

relations and procedures for the conduct of tactical inspections-changes 

that coincided with the reorganization of the mobile army into tactical 

divisions and brigades within geographical commands.3

' 

The new system had problems. Some inspectors found that senior 

commanders failed to conduct the required inspections personally. 

General Garlington advised that in such cases the inspectors in the field 

were obliged to tell their commanders what should be done and to make 

11 Memo, Wood to TAG, 9 Jut 12, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA; Memo, Wood to 

Garlington, 13 Jut 12, Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. 

}< Memo, Wood to TAG, 23 Jut 12, Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. 

'

5 Llr, TAG to Dept Cdrs and lnsps, 13 Dec 12, sub: Change to Army Regulations, 

Entry 9, RG 159, NARA; Change 26 to Army Regulations, 20 Jan 13, Entry 296, RG 

165, NARA. 

56 
SHAPING THE NEW ARMY 

recommendations as to how to conduct proper inspections. Inspectors 

had to avoid being made the commander's surrogate, because the regulations now specified that the commander had to perform his own tactical inspection. Garlington blamed the problem on the reluctance of 

some generals to accept the responsibility that came with their positions. Too many counted on inspectors and their staffs to "pull their 

chestnuts out of the fire when the flame is very hot," and Garlington 

was quite bitter about the conduct of some of the line commanders. 36 

A major concern of the field inspectors was the perception that 

they represented the local commander, even if they actually came 

from a higher staff for the event. Tn such cases they viewed themselves as no more than observers. This view was strengthened when, 

during the first inspection cycle, several brigade commanders were 

found to be incompetent. Clearly, this significant fact could not be 

made known in the proper quarters if the inspectors were subject to 

the command of the marginal officer. Other inspectors complained 

that too much of the actual conduct of the inspection was being 

required of them. Very few senior commanders were giving full support to the program, compounding the problems of the inspectors 

charged with making it work. 37 

Garlington advised the new Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. William R. 

Wotherspoon, of the situation in May 1914, suggesting that the regulation more clearly state the geographical area commanders' responsibility for conducting tactical inspections. The Chief of Staff agreed, 

amending the regulation to specify that JGs from geographical commands would serve only as observers at infantry and cavalry field exercises but that they could assist the commander if so requested. For field 

artillery inspections, an OIG inspector would continue to conduct them. 

These changes, which appeared in June 1914, were now an established 

part of the Army's routine and remained in effect until wartime training 

requirements brought a complete revision. Exercises conducted as a 

part of the tactical inspections grew in scale as larger troop concentrations took place. On the whole, the emphasis on preparedness would 

prove exceedingly beneficial to the expanding Army. 38 

16 Ltr. Garlington to Chamberlain, 17 Feb 14, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 

" Ltrs, Chamberlain to Garlington, 4 Mar 14. and Mills to Garlington, 9 Mar 14, 

Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 

n Memos, Garlington to CofS, WD, 8 Jun 14; Biddle to Col'S, WO, 25 May 14, sub: 

Proposed Changes in Army Regulations in Connection With Annual Tactical 

Inspections; and Lyon to Garlington, 27 May 14 and I Jun 14. All in Entry 296, RG 

165, NARA. Sec also A RIG 1914, p. 198. 

57 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Field Artillery Inspections 

The tactica l inspections made clear that the Army's components were 

not all progressing at the same pace. The coast artillery was consistently the most efficient arm, while the cavalry and infantry were only 

gradually improving. On the other hand, the field artillery was so beset 

with problems that at times its progress seemed hopeless. 

The lack of proficiency in the field artillery may best be explained 

by the number of changes it had undergone in the period since the War 

with Spain. Originally, the Corps of Artillery had consisted of both 

field and coastal units, scattered in battery-sized organizations 

throughout the country. Although regiments existed in theory, the dispersion and the diverse missions of their constituent batteries meant 

that regimental officers had no experience in actually commanding the 

massed elements of their unit- a major flaw in artillery organization. 

The War Department began forming two-battery battalions in 1904; 

activated two provisional field artillery regiments in 1905; and considered separating the field artillery from the coast artillery in 1906, 

which was approved in January 1907. The Chief of Artillery was left 

with the Coast Artillery Corps and the well-organized artillery school 

at Fort Monroe.)

9 

The newly created Field Artillery Corps, consisting of one horse, 

two mountain, and three light regiments, had the immediate tasks of 

establishing its own schools and doctrine. In 1909 the Secretary of War 

directed that a thorough inspection of the entire corps be made to identify areas requiring improvement. An extensive series of tactical inspections was made by Maj. William Lassiter, the OIG field artillery 

inspector, to assess the progress of the reorganization and to evaluate 

the tactical proficiency of the units, particularly battalion and regimental headquarters. What he discovered was not encouraging. He found 

that the regiments were not well drilled in fundamentals, such as hitching teams or making camp, and exhibited a high level of absenteeism. 

Several battery commanders admitted they had never seen all their men 

assembled in one place for anything.40 

The artillery inspectors tested each battery in a series of tactical 

exercises involving reconnaissance, the selection and occupation of 

19 William A. Ganoe, The 1/istOJ)' of the United States Army (New York: D. Appleton 

and Co., 1924), p. 428; Vardell E. Nesmith, Jr., "The Quiet Paradigm Change: The 

Evolution of the Field Arti llery Doctrine of the United States Army, 1861- 1905" (Ph.D. 

diss., Duke University, 1977), pp. 320-30 . 

... ARJG 1909, p. 291. 

58 
SHAPING THE NEW ARMY 

positions, and simulated fire at targets. The tests began on the drill 

ground and then moved to the post maneuver area. A final examination 

at each station was designed to evaluate regimental-level control over 

road marches and as many tactical situations as could be introducednight movements, usc of camouflage, and the soundness of tactical 

decisions. Targets were positioned at appropriate points, and live 

ammunition was used during fire missions.4

' 

Major Lassiter concluded that the exercises showed that not a single artillery command could take to the field and be effective. All were 

deficient, technically and tactically, through lack of training and experience. None of the units had trained together, and many of the artillery 

field-grade officers were not up to the task of commanding at regimental levels. Several of them showed no inclination or flexibility to 

Jearn or to improve themselves. The inspector judged the artillery to be 

a "mere aggregate of batteries, devoid of intelligent direction'' and 

incapable of performing as required in a tactical division.42 

Lassiter believed the remedy began with the development of a 

coherent artillery doctrine at the War Department level, accompanied 

by progressive training programs designed to prepare units for field 

duty. He urged the appointment of a field artillery chiefto provide centralized guidance and the establishment of a school of fire to give battery personnel practical, standardized experience. He stressed the need 

for combined arms exercises and special programs for senior officers. 

Proficiency could only be gained through practice and experienceand for the artillery, he pointed out, that meant budgeting at War 

Department levels for far more liberal ammunition allowances. 

After reviewing summaries of Lassiter's devastating reports, several members of the General Staff called them "admirable" for their 

candidness and scope. Under pressure from General Wood, reforms 

along the lines of Lassiter's recommendations began to be made. The 

War Department established the School of Fire at Fort Sill, 

Oklahoma, in 19 11 and expanded the mission of the Artillery Board, 

established in 1902 as a technical advisory board for the Secretary of 

War, to include operational matters. The board moved from Fort Riley 

to Fort Sill in 191 3, and its membership expanded to include the 

School of Fire faculty. Although these measures never resulted in the 

appointment of a field artillery chief or the creation of a cohesive 

" Rpt, Lassiter, Apr 09, sub: Inspection ofThird Field Artillery Regiment, Entry 9, 

RG 159, NARA. 41 Ltr, Lassiter to 1G, 3 Aug 09, Entry 9, RG 159, NARA. 

59 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

doctrine, the consolidation of the board with other artill ery activities 

was a step forwa rd.

43 

The War Department reorganization in February 1913 created tactical divisions subordinate to the geographical commands. The change 

caused field artillery inspection procedures to be modified. New regulations required the geographical area commanders to concentrate subordinate tactical divisions annually to allow senior personnel experience in handling larger units. Tactical inspections of the various arms 

were to be carried out by the geographical area commander with the 

assistance of his inspector, as was usual for cavalry, infantry, and coast 

artillery."" Regardless of the arrangement, the inspector prepared the 

inspection report, which he gave to his commander to forward through 

channels to the Office of the Inspector General. 

The tactical inspections conducted after the reorganization continued to show serious problems in the field artillery. The inspectors concluded after the 1915 inspection cycle that the most serious obstacle to 

improvement lay in the scattering of the field artillery units among 

small garrisons. In the Southern Department, for example, fourteen 

batteries from three different regiments were assigned to eight different 

locations. The problem was compounded by the diversion of half of 

their officers to schools, other duties, and militia training. The situation 

meant that field artillery battalions and regiments could not perform 

effectively in the field. Regular and militia w1its alike repeated elementary gun drills but fai led to go beyond them into more complicated 

maneuver and firing problems. The low levels of field artillery proficiency were made worse by what inspectors felt was the wrong mix of 

artillery units in the force. The current fighting in France was showing 

that many more guns were needed to support a given number of 

infantry formations.45 

The Army expansion dictated by the National Defense Act of 1916 

found the field artillery unprepared. New regiments quickly absorbed 

the small pool of experienced personnel. The effect was to make the old 

regiments as unfit as the newly created ones. Inspectors recommended 

that the subsequent mandated expansions be achieved by transferring 

•J Rpt Extract, Lassiter, Jun 09, sub: Artillery Commands, and Memo, Wood to IG, 

I 0 Jan II , Entry 9; Rpt, McNair, 2 Jun 15, sub: Inspection School of Fire, Entry 25. All 

in RG 159, NARA. See also G. B. McReynolds, "Notes on Some Random Activities of 

the Field Artillery Board," Field ArtilleiJ' Jouma/32 (Jul 42): 509 (quoted word). 

"" Ltr, Funston to Garlington, 26 Jul 15, Entry 25, RG 159, NARA; AReg 193(2)(k), 

1913 . 

., ARIG 1916, p. 303. 

60 
SHAPING THE NEW ARMY 

small cadres of quality personnel to provide a nucleus for the newer 

units, thereby preserving the effectiveness of the old ones. Supply 

shortages also were noted, as a result of poor coordination between the 

General Staff and the supply departments at the time the expansion 

directives were issued. The inspectors concluded that staff procedures 

must be improved, and, even more important, that supplies must be 

stockpiled for unexpected requirements. Commanders and staffs at all 

levels were having difficulty adjusting to the organizational and logistical demands of a large modern Army. Nevertheless, the inspectors' 

recommendations helped provide the basis for later restructuring 

prompted by the declaration of war on Germany in April 191 7.

46 

Business Methods 

While the tactical inspections of officers, men, and units emphasized 

preparedness, the annual inspections of armories, depots, and hospitals 

focused increasingly on what the Progressive Era termed business 

methods. This phrase referred to both paperwork processing and fiscal 

management. Army leaders viewed the great burden of paperwork as an 

impediment to the organizational and tactical reforms and the reliance 

on business methods as a manifestation of the general effort to achieve 

greater efficiency and control. 

Eventually, every IG report had a section devoted to business methods analyses. The inspectorate's traditional role involved oversight of 

disbursements and property, and about half of each inspector's annua l 

effort was spent investigating some aspect. Secretary Root's interest 

brought additional emphasis. Late in his tenure he directed that a study 

be made of the disbursement of funds appropriated for so-called War 

Department civil costs. Root's successor was equally interested in 

improving administration. Secretary Taft directed General BUl·ton to 

develop an inspection program that would review systematically the 

accounts and business methods of all disbursing officers. By July .1 903 

Burton had special inspections on all fiscal accounts and contracts 

scheduled world ide.~7 

The first inspections showed that disbursing was only a small part of 

the Army's problems. Cumbersome administrative procedures and 

requirements imposed by each echelon of command often proved to be a 

" Rpts, Stephens, 20 Scp and 30 Oct 16, subs: 3d Field Artillery Regiment, Entry 

II; Rpt, Conner. 31 Jan 17, sub: Quartermaster Matters Observed During Annual 

Inspection of Field Artillery, Entry 25. All in RG 159, NARJ\. 

" Ltr, Burton to Ainsworth, 26 Jul 03, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 

61 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

greater hindrance than a help to managers and their commanders. Hence, 

the War Department ordered inspectors to evaluate the effects of each 

change in administrative procedure, and in November 1905 a general 

order formally added business methods as a topic in all inspections:8 

The Inspector General's Department was required to inspect each 

bureau and geographical command headquarters to assure administrative uniformity and to recommend any changes to existing procedures, 

a requirement that demanded detailed inspections of correspondence 

files and voluminous comments on office paperwork, marking, indexing, and so on. The reports were obviously time-consuming and 

tedious, but were viewed as necessary to improve efficiency and to 

keep up standards. The inspections, however, went beyond the minutiae of office management. The complexity of business methods inspections increased with each inspection cycle. For example, inspectors had 

to examine the activities of the Quartermaster General's Department; 

they analyzed such matters as the size of local work forces and the 

appropriateness of office and depot locations and identified officers 

qualified for duties in disbursing and procurement. 

By 1909 General Garlington considered the review of business 

methods to be routine. The scope was widened in 1910, in response to 

the work of the Secretary of War's Board on Business Methods. Based 

on the board's recommendations, the Office of the Inspector General 

had inspectors examine the operating expenses of all depots and commands, and in January 1911 the Secretary of War directed each bureau 

to survey its operations, with the objective of reducing the unnecessarily large amount of intricate and cumbersome paperwork in the Army. 

Garlington solicited the views of all OIG inspectors and forwarded a 

lengthy report containing numerous proposals. These included dropping 

the muster roll in favor of a single regimental return; discontinuing 

duplicate-type reports, such as the post exchange audit and monthly 

finance reports; and simplifying correspondence and filing procedures. 

The board's recommendations, including those of Garlington, were tentatively approved by General Leonard Wood in April.49 

48 Rpt, OIG, 29 Jun 09, Inspection of the Department of the Lakes, St. Paul, Minn., 

Entry 9; Ltr, Garlington to TAG, 6 Feb 09, sub: History for 1908, and Memo, OIG to 

lnsps Gcn, 29 Jun 09, sub: Change to AR 888, 1909, Entry 24. All in RG 159, NARA. 

Sec also WD GO 191, 1905, GO 11 8, 1908, GO 73, 1908, GO 92, 1908, and GO 176, 

1908; ARJG 1906, p. 635. 

•• Rpt 2, Bus Methods Board to TAG, 9 Mar II ; Memo, Wood to SofW, 18 Apr II ; 

and Memo, Liggett to Sec, WDGS, 20Apr II , sub: CommittccofOfficcrs. All in Entry 

296, RG 165, NJ\RA. See also OIG Summary of FY 1909 1910 Business Methods 

Inspections; Rpt, Garlington to Offs Cmte, 26 Feb II. Both in Entry 24, RG 159, NARA 

62 
SHAPING THE New ARMY 

The period of administrative introspection was prolonged with the 

appointment of President Taft's Committee on Economy and Efficiency. 

Its preliminary report, issued in November 1911 , provided an excellent 

overview of Army organization, finding little to criticize in the management of daily operations. The committee 's research represented the last 

major effort to make a comprehensive overhaul of Army administration 

before the World War. Although inspectors remained extensively 

involved in financial matters, the high-level concern over improving 

administration was slowly overshadowed by a growing stress on tactical 

preparedness. The period of reform left the business methods of the staff 

departments in a condition that was judged to be generally sound. 

Funds Management 

The Inspector General's Department had been the Secretary of War's 

agent for the inspection of all funds and disbursing activities since the 

days of Calhoun. Specific responsibilities in this field had been 

described in an April 1874 law, which required IGs to make frequent 

unscheduled inspections of funds activities. 

The number and variety of disbursing accounts were large. 

rnspecting the more important Quartermaster contracts associated with 

major items of government spending proved to be fairly easy, whereas 

supervising the numerous small-unit and installation accounts proved to 

be extremely time consuming. Every company-sized organization- units 

of 100 to 200 men- managed a morale and welfare fund of considerable 

complexity. Every regimental or post commander also had a small fund, 

as did engineer and coast artillery commands and even military bands 

with separate messes. In fact, the installation band was the source of 

income and the principal beneficiary of the fund. The proliferation of 

funds also included accounts managed by chaplains and others. 

Unlike current unit funds, each could generate income in profitmaking activities, subject to War Department approval. The inspectorate 

was the department's adviser and approving authority on all requests 

fi·orn funds managers to enter into such ventures. The line between unit 

fund activities and those of the post exchange, in which the funds were 

shareholders, was often indistinct. All issues of indebtedness to any type 

of govenunent fund were submitted to the Office of the Inspector 

General for review before final actions were taken. This allowed uniform determinations of liabilities while it also kept the inspectorate alert 

to problems that might require policy or regulatory changes.50 

w File 63, Bad Debts, Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 

63 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Every time an officer was relieved from or given responsibility for 

a fund, his commander or bureau chief notified the Office of the 

Inspector General, initiating closeout inspections and the beginning of 

a new inspection cycle. The OIG reviewed all claims for and against the 

government to assure justice and, again, to note any problems within 

the system. 

Inspection responsibility for funds outside Army appropriations also 

fell to the Office of the Inspector General, because of its experience in 

the field. In 1905 the OIG assumed oversight of a miscellaneous collection of sma ll civil accounts in the District of Columbia, including the 

funds disbursed for the maintenance of public buildings, the Washington 

Aqueduct, and War Department civilian salaries. In 1906 the Secretary 

of War transferred to the Inspector General his responsibility for 

inspecting the accounts of the newly chartered American Red Cross. 

Additional quasi-military accounts were added in 1909, when the Chief 

of Staff recommended to the Secretary of War that the funds of War 

Department civil agencies administered by Army officers should be 

inspected also. The inspectorate was directed to include in its inspection 

schedule not only the Alaska Telegraph, rumored to be poorly administered, but also such exotic activities as the California Debris 

Commission and the Board of Alaska Road Commissioners.51 

Regardless of category, the Office of the Inspector General supervised an average of nearly 2,000 account inspections in the United 

States and 70 in the Philippines each fiscal year during the pre-World 

War era. Rarely were problems encountered. But each account had to 

tmdergo a routine but thorough aud it, followed by a detailed written 

appraisal and report. The procedures required a documentary verification of all h·ansactions and a complete review of every check, bill, and 

deposit. The sources of income each had to be identified and eva luated 

for conformance with regulations. All vouchers and receipts were physically checked or accounted for. Everything was expected to balance. 

All work had to conform to the revised guide for inspectors issued in 

1911 , which contained twenty-eight pages of procedural guidance. 

Many inspectors objected to their involvement in such a time-consuming process, and the field commands wanted more time given to 

issues of preparedness. Gad ington recognized the problem, but felt that 

the Army's need to document its handling of funds to Congress and the 

5

' Llr, Garlington to TAG, 25 Jan 07, sub: llistory for 1906, and Memo, Garlington 

to lnsps Gen, 16 May 08, sub: The Inspector General's Department of the Army, Entry 

24; file 306/6650, Accounts Inspections Reports, 1905, Entry 22. All in RG 159, 

NARA. Sec also WD, OIG, Guide /91111917, pp. 37- 39. 

64 
SHAPING TH E NEW ARMY 

public prevented any relaxation of standards. When the revised guide 

for inspectors general was distributed, an accompanying memorandum 

stressed the necessity for the thorough inspection of all financial matters. A similar admonition was pasted inside each guide.52 

Depot Activities 

Depots, armories, arsenals, and similar facilities usually were inspected annually by the Washington office. Inspectors examined both management practices and the larger question of whether the facility was 

still needed. Their reports contained narrative descriptions of depot 

activities, a chronicle of events since the previous inspection, and a 

summary with detailed statistics. 

The inspection of medical depots covered essentially the same 

ground, although closer attention was paid to the inventory and accounting of such high-value pilferable items as drugs and alcohol. The inspection of arsenals was much the same. After describing the work force, 

most reports focused on improvements in efficiency through technological innovation, for example, the use of motor vehicles. The inspections 

of supply depots were reported in equal detail, but observations and recommendations tended to be even more practical and specific. Inspectors 

often proposed changes in routines to aid efficiency.

53 

One inspector pointed out sources of possible savings. In his June 

1908 report Colonel Chamberlain recommended that supply articles 

should all be of standard designs, with no unique items procured for 

particular individuals, and identified procedures that would enable the 

government to defray moving costs to families when units were reassigned. Many of these types of suggestions had beneficial effects. For 

example, one found in a Philippine depot inspection report resulted in 

a 33-percent reduction in land costs there. The inspectors were consistent advocates of the expansion of the enlisted strength in the 

Quartermaster General's Department a goal realized eventually with 

the merger of the latter and the Subsistence Department into the 

Quartermaster's Corps in 1908.54 

Despite such improvements, the depot commanders appeared to 

have seen little value in the inspection visits. The basic operations of 

their facilities were controlled by the respective bureau chiefs, to whom 

$2 Memo, Brewster to Tnsps, 20 Sep 16, Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 51 1nsp Rpts, Medical Supply Depots, 1915- 1917, Entry 11 , RG 159, NARA. 

,. Rpt, Chamberlain, 7 Jun 08, sub: Inspection of Philadelphia Depot, Frankford, Pa., 

Entry 9, RG 159, NARA; ARSW 1907, p. 17. 

65 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

"Coming Home Aboard the SS Grand Duchess." Shipboard conditions 

became a special IG interest wlten tlte US. acquired global commitments. 

they looked for guidance; outside criticism was often unappreciated. 

The General Staff, for the most part, deferred to the bureaus to judge 

the value of the inspection comments and to take remedial action. This 

situation was recognized by the Inspectors GeneraL General Burton 

recommended in 1906 that arsenals and depots be placed under the 

geographical area commanders, especially for inspection. But the suggestion was successfully fought by the bureau chiefs, and most of their 

facilities remained exempted. Depot inspections obviously were valuable sources of information, for they often were amplified at the request 

of a bureau chief concerned about one of his activities. In an effort to 

avoid public criticism, depot activities were reviewed repeatedly and 

special inquiries were conducted at one time or another in nearly every 

depot, genera lly in response to journalistic reports citing inefficiency or 

corruption. Garlington advised the Secretary of War that such newspaper accounts generated more excitement than they merited. 

Nevertheless, as the Inspector General recognized, public interest was 

a positive force in maintaining high standards.55 

" ARIG 1906, pp. 639, 647. 

66 
SHAPING THE NEW ARMY 

Inspection of the Militia 

The Inspector General's Department had been one of the first War 

Department elements to display an interest in the resurgent militia or 

National Guard. General Breckinridge had served in the Kentucky volunteers during the Civil War, and his emphasis on the importance of a 

citizen reserve led to an order in 1889 that made his office responsible 

for coordinating militia inspections.u 

In 1892 the Adjutant General assumed the duty of preparing militia inspection instructions, and the Office of the Inspector General lost 

direct control over the matter. But IGs at the lower levels continued to 

carry out militia inspections. They monitored inspection standards; the 

performance of specially detailed inspectors who assisted them; and the 

forwarding of inspection records to the War Department. Thus in this 

way, even after the General Staff created the Militia Affairs Division in 

1908 to administer militia inspections, the Inspector General retained 

considerable influence over National Guard inspections through his 

technical channels. 57 

The militia was also the object of legislation during the tenure of 

Secretary Root. Root eventually supported legislation establishing the 

organized militia, aware of unyielding congressional sentiment favoring 

the state troops. The Militia Act of21 January 1903, generally known as 

the Dick Act, increased federal aid to the National Guard and laid the 

basic groundwork for its role as part of a total force. The first annual 

inspection of the National Guard occurred shortly after the law was 

passed. The War Department used the findings to determine the scope of 

its new liabilities and responsibilities. Each state's military organization 

was unique, tailored to its own concept of its needs. Jn consequence, a 

considerable force imbalance existed nationwide. Infantry units, cheaper 

to maintain and easier to fill, predominated, while very few states maintained the more expensive support units or artillery or cavalry formations. 

Some substantial discrepancies in actual strength as opposed to reported 

strength also existed. Many reorganizations and realignments thus were 

necessary in each state for meeting the law's requirement that the National 

Guard must parallel Regular Army organization within five years.58 

Inspectors at geographical commands had conducted the first 

inspection, assisted by officers temporarily detailed by their commanA RIG 1883, pp. 34-35; Memo, SofW IO IG, 13 Nov 89, Enlry 24, RG 159, NA RA. 51 WD, OIG, Guide 191 1/1917, p. 19. 58 Ganoe, 1/istOJy, p. 417; Elbridge Colby, "Elihu Root and lhe National Guard," 

MilifaiJ' Affairs 23 {Spring 59): 32; ARSW 1904, pp. 28- 29, 258. 

67 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

ders. This process was formalized in December 1903. Geographical area 

commanders were made responsible for the scheduling and conduct of 

the annual militia inspections. Each January thereafter they were to publish an inspection schedule and a roster of officers to be detailed for the 

duty. Tn actual practice, the local inspector carried out the responsibility 

and assured inspection standards. Units usually were visited during their 

five-day encampment, rather than in their armories. Typically, the 

inspectors looked into all aspects of Regular Army support for the militia units undergoing training and examined the units themselves for proficiency, conduct of training, and troop strength. Overall, they were to 

assess compliance with the provisions of the Dick Act and the resulting 

improvements in Guard operations. Their inspection reports went from 

the geographical area commanders through channels to the General 

Staff and, after 1908, to its Militia Affairs Division.s

9 

The National Guard was brought closer to federa l control when an 

amendment to the Dick Act on 27 May 1908 lifted restrictions on its 

employment following mobilization and specified that its supply and 

administrative procedures were to meet Regular Army standards by 

1910. Thereafter, inspectors visited National Guard armories, making 

the equivalent of a Regular Army garrison visit. The War Department 

in March 1911 authorized the assignment of Regu lar Army inspectorinstructors to the Guard units, on the basis of one officer for each regiment or separate battalion. The objective was to have 200 regulars 

assisting and evaluating the Guard units, but strength problems restricted the actual number to just over I 00. These individuals were carefully 

selected and sent for special training to the Army Service School at Fort 

Leavenworth. Among the first officers assigned to the new duty were 

Lt. George C. Marshall (Massachusetts) and a future distinguished 

inspector general Capt. Marcellus G. Spinks (Maine).60 

Inspector-instructors were considered to be agents of the War 

Department assigned to assist in National Guard training. Repeatedly, 

they and the state governors were advised that their relationship was 

one of coordination only, not direction. The regulars were encouraged 

to be flexible regarding adherence to regulations and enjoined to exercise tact and diplomacy. The Militia Affairs Division chief repeatedly 

"' Ltr, CofS, Atlantic Div, to Garlington, 15 Jun 06, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. See 

also A Reg 191, 1908. 60 Ganoe, HisfOIJ', p. 438; Ltr, Wood to TAG, 15 May II, and File 6506, InspectorInstructors, Entry 296, RG 165, NARA; U.S. War Department, Report (~l C!tiej; 

Divisio11 of Militia Affc1irs. 1911 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing OfTice, 

1912), pp. 48- 51; WD GO 33, 1911, and GO 45, 1911. 

68 
SHAPING THE New A RM Y 

emphasized to newly detailed officers the avocational, part-time nature 

of participation in the Guard. Inspector-instructors and lGs were 

warned that tllis did not imply a lack of zeal or military interest, for 

"militiamen are frequently shrewd observers, quick to detect a mere 

assumption of knowledge." Regular Army inspectors had to be fully 

knowledgeable; otherwise, they would lose all credibility.61 

By 1913 a set f01mula was being used to cover all topics of interest. 

The Militia Affairs Division had prepared an extensive series of formats 

for every conceivable type of inspection by branch or by function. To 

assist, the Inspector General's Department produced a form for the annual inspection of National Guard armolies. Despite the quantity of detail 

revealed through these checklists, the main areas of concern remained 

unit strength, property and fiscal accountability, and tactical proficiency. 

The two groups of inspectors complemented each other's activities, minimizing the problems that might have arisen from the fact that Guard 

inspection responsibilities were divided between two departments.62 

During this period a growing number of states began to create the 

overhead staffs for major tactical organizations. By early 1912 ninety 

guardsmen were listed as inspectors general within their various commands. Their selection had been made by state officials, with no coordination with the Tnspector General. Appointments to state inspectorates often were rewards for long and faithful service within the state 

military structure. But most functioned as additional staff officers in 

the state headquarters or as aides to one of the senior state officials, and 

rarely, if ever, perfo1med as inspectors general. This was not always the 

case, however. In early 191 1 the Delaware adjutant general, Brig. Gen. 

Ira P. Wickersham, successfully arranged for his inspector, Maj. 

Charles A. Short, to understudy active-duty IGs at the Eastern Division 

headquarters, and by the end of the year both Wickersham and General 

Garlington were satisfied that Short was operating at a level that was up 

to War Department standards.63 

Despite instances of zeal and interest, however, the condition ofthe 

National Guard still gave many Regular Army officers cause for con61 Llrs, Mills to lnsp-Jnstrs, Ret Offs on Duty with Mililia, and AGs of States, 

[ 19 15], sub: Duty of JllSpector-lnslructors; to lnsp-lnstrs, I 9 Feb 15, sub: Confidential 

Instructions (quolalion); and to lnsp-lnslrs, I Sep 15, sub: lnslructions. All in Enlry 35, 

RG 159, NARA. 

"' Rpt, Shanks, 9 Oct 13, sub: lnspeclion of South Carolina National Guard, Entry 

24; IGD Office Memos and Blank Forms, Box 206, Entry 35. Both in RG 159, NARA. 

•

1 William II. Carter. The AmeriC{I/1 Army (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1915), 

pp. 282, 292; Ltr, AG, Stale of Del., 10 Chief, Mil Affs Div, 12 Jan II , and Ends., En1ry 

296, RG 165, NARA. 

69 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

cern. Strength, organization, and training levels remained low. The 

Guard's reliability was also questionable because of the legislative limitations on its deployability, length of service, and responsiveness. The 

value of the Guard as the Regular Army's main backup was challenged 

repeatedly with respect to the number that could be mobilized and the 

effect on the Army of diverting regulars to support Guard training. 

The growing number of joint maneuvers and encampments 

observed and reported on by inspectors throughout the era allowed the 

National Guard's improvement to be monitored and an accurate comparison to elements of the Regular Army to be made. Joint maneuvers 

were carried out as early as 1902 and then in the summer of 1904 in 

California, the state of Washington, and Virginia. Other mixed exercises were conducted annually at coast artillery posts for units of that arm. 

Maneuvers and mobilizations took place every year- except 1905, 

I 907, and 1909 due to budgetary constraints- up through the Mexican 

border crisis. Mixed brigades of regular and militia units were formed 

into provisional divisions to conduct tactical exercises at various campsites throughout the country. Troop concentrations averaged between 

5,000 and I 0,000 men. The largest maneuvers were held at Manassas, 

Virginia, in 1904. There, a total force of over 26,000 officers and men 

was mobilized and organized into a provisional corps of two divisions. 

About 5,000 of the troops were regulars, while the remainder were militia from seventeen states. Joint maneuvers grew steadily in importance, 

especially as the border troubles with Mexico increased.&~ 

As revealed by the inspection reports from these periodic joint 

maneuvers, the National Guard's major problems had to do with the 

maintenance of unit strength and the inexperience of senior officers. 

Equipment was improving at about the same rate as in the Regular 

Army. As indicated in the tactical inspection reports submitted on regular units, the problems of the two components were essentially the same. 

There was little difference in the skill levels of enlisted personnel, 

despite the regulars' Uptonian bias against part-time soldiers. General 

Garlington- surprisingly-showed a strong prejudice against the 

National Guard, even though he was one of the few War Department 

officials privy to the inspection reports that should have allowed him to 

make a more balanced judgment.6

s 

6< Ganoe, Hist01y. p. 420 . 

.s Ltr, TAG to IG, 22 Mar 15, sub: Study Regarding Strength and Organization of 

Armed Land Forces, and Reply, 20 Apr 15, Entry, 25, RG 159, NARA. Secretary Root 

directed the posthumous publication of Col. Emory Upton's study Milirw:y Policy of the 

United Stares, which argued eloquently against reliance on a militia or National Guard 

as backup for the Regular Army. See Ganoe, lfisto1y, p. 418. 

70 
SHAPING THE New ARMY 

With the passage of the National Defense Act of 19 I 6, the inspectorate's role as the primary inspector of Guard units and activities was 

reestablished. Every Guard function, including finances, became subject to IG inspections. Whatever each had thought of the other, the new 

law required a ftllly professional re lationship immediately, as Guard 

units answered the call to the Mexican border.66 

the March 1916 raid on Columbus, New Mexico, caused the 

Wilson Administration to call out the National Guard of New Mexico, 

Arizona, and Texas to supplement the regular troops already gathered 

along the border or chasing Villa. Secretary of War Baker notified the 

respective state governors by telegram on 9 May 1916. The Adjutant 

General the next day sent a formal letter to each War Department 

bureau and department chief. General Garlington was told to ship all 

the necessary forms to the Southern Department and to coordinate with 

the officers selected to help the local inspectors muster the troops at the 

state mustering points. Federal recognition inspections were conducted 

concurrently by the mustering officers. Contingency instructions were 

issued to the commanders of the other geographical commands, directing them to prepare for similar call-ups in their areas. On 18 June the 

remainder of the National Guard was mobilized, and on the twentieth 

The Adjutant General directed the Inspector General to provide the 

same support as already given to the units activated the month before.67 

General Garlington wanted his lGs to inspect every aspect of the 

National Guard concentration. On 2 1 June he recommended to the 

Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott, that they inspect the mobilization camps for the ir suitability- including sanitation, care of the 

sick, and the efficiency of logistical support- and that they also examinc the health and equipment of the men and the mustering objectives 

of strength and proper organization. Garlington wanted the inspections 

done in accordance with instructions prepared by him, but under the 

authority and supervision of the respective geographical area commanders. General Scott quickly concurred, and on 23 June instructions 

were issued to the commanders to begin the more extensive inspections 

as soon as possible.68 

66 Memos, IG to Chief, Mil Bureau, 18 Jul 16, sub: Requests for Orders and 

Circulars; Mann to CofS, WD, 20 Nov 16; and CofS, WD, to .IG, 2 1 Nov 16. All in 

Entry 25, RG I 59, NARA. See also Carter, American Army, pp. 290- 94. 61 Ltrs, TAG to IG, 10 May and 20 Jun 16, subs: Muster in of Organized Militia, and 

Wood to TAG, 18 Jul 16, Entry 25, RG I 59, NARA 

.. Memo, lG to CotS, WD, 21 Jun 16, sub: Inspection of Mobilization and 

Concentration Camps of the National Guard; Ltr, Barry to TAG, 23 Jun 16. Both in 

Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 

7 1 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Within days, inspectors descended on the mobilizing Guard units, 

preparing detailed reports on strength, personnel status, drill, organization, weapons proficiency, equipment status, and discipline. In 

them they were to comment on food, medical and supply services, 

camp operations, and unit administration; state their ovcral I impression of unit personnel and the latter's preparedness; and to estimate 

the time necessary for the unit to become fully campaign ready. 

Appendixes to each report were to include lists of equipment not on 

hand and descriptions of any other logistical or medical shortcomings 

that impaired efficiency. 

In practice, inspectors often summarized the most critical problems 

faced by units in their forwarding endorsements. They also commented 

on any other significant matters, such as the condition of troop trains, 

which might affect the unit. Generally speaking, the inspector-instructors and geographical area inspectors at the mobilization camps were 

kinder in their comments than were the IGs, who looked at the units 

after their arrival in the Southern Department. 69 

Early problems in supply began a series of IG investigations that 

added to the huge workload already thrust upon the inspectors. Almost 

from the beginning of the mobilization, members of Congress began 

to relay to the War Department the complaints of their state adjutants 

genera l about equipment shortages. Geographical area commanders 

also were sending wires, complaining about state interference in the 

supply process. On 27 June General Garlington instructed Maj. 

Willi am S. McNair, a field artilleryman detailed to the OIG, to investigate the situation. 

McNair's two-week study identified several major problems. The 

depot with the responsibility to supply all Guard units east of the 

Mississippi River was in Philadelphia. It had been converted recently 

into a multifunction facility, holding equipment that belonged to several bureaus. No single bureau chief controlled the depot any longer; 

instead, it responded directly to the orders of the Chief of Staff. 70 

The Chief of Staff's involvement, however, was overlooked by the 

General Staff in the initial excitement of the mobilization, and the 

depot was neither notified nor given guidance for the first three days. 

The depot commander exercised commendable but misplaced initiative 

and distributed the supplies, using a remarkably accurate Associated 

Press dispatch that gave mobilization locations. His problems were 

"' File 454, Inspection of State Mobilization, Entry 25, RG 159, NARA . 

..., Rpt, McNair, 8 Jul 16, sub: Investigation of Supply of Mobilization Camps, Entry 

25, RG 159, NARA. 

72 
SHAPING THE NEW ARMY 

compounded by the unexpected speed of unit concentrations. For 

example, New Jersey and Pennsylvania units reported in at full peace 

strength on 21 June, three days after the call. They demanded full field 

equipment, which the depot could not issue without specific authorization. Adding to the crisis was the fact that many southern National 

Guards showed up without any equipment or uniforms, presuming that 

everything would be provided by the federal government. 

Adding to the initial problems were unilateral changes of the mobilization sites, conflicts between Quartermaster and Army regulations, 

and the insufficiency of depot stock to meet the surge of requirements. 

Major McNair concluded that the problem lay with the system, rather 

than with the actions of any individual. He recommended that a nationwide mobilization plan, to include depot participation, be created and 

that Congress provide the funds to allow the stockage of sufficient 

reserves of materiel to sustain a full mobilization. His depot organizational recommendations were adopted in July, while the next appropriations bill addressed the need for greater equipment reservcs. 71 

But broader proposals were disapproved. The inspector of the New 

Jersey Guard mobilization recommended that permanent mobilization 

sites and equipment depots be prepared for each National Guard division and that periodic practice call-ups be held to test the mobilization 

plans. The Quartermaster General supported the concept, saying he 

could begin construction using standard designs on hand whenever 

funds were available. The General Staff, however, turned down the idea 

on the grounds that another full mobilization was unlikely and that sufficient facilities existed to sustain incremental call-ups. It appeared that 

one of the major lessons to be learned from the 1916 mobilization had 

been rejected even before it was fully developed.72 

Urged on by the chief of the National Guard Bureau, General 

Garlington also planned to inspect National Guard units once they had 

deployed to the Mexican border. While Maj. Fox Conner began a circuit of the artillery units, Lt. Col. Eli A. Helmick, the newly appointed 

Southern Depa1tment inspector, organized an extensive inspection program for the remaining units. The scale of the task, plus Helmick's 

aversion to wasting the troops' time, led him to devise a new and more 

efficient inspection method, consisting of a series of checklists and 

" Ibid; WD SO 177, 1916. 

" Memos, Johnson to Garlington, 8 Jul 16, sub: Inspection of Mobilization Camps; 

OlG to lnsps, 19 Sep 16; and TAG to IG, 5 Jul 16, sub: Changes in Mobili7.ation Points. 

All in Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. Sec also Rpt, Chamberlain, Jul 16, sub: Mobilization 

of New Jersey National Guard, and End., Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. 

73 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

explanatory illustrations for each echelon within an infantry regiment. 

l lclmick had it mimeographed, illustrated with photographs, and circulated among the inspectors on the border teams. Ultimately, the checklist became the guide and model for IGs and General Staff members 

responsible for inspecting the far greater number of units preparing for 

deployment to France in 1917.n 

The findings reported by the inspectors were not promising. Most 

of the units barely had met their muster strength, and many of the men 

on hand were in process of receiving compassionate discharges. On the 

whole, inspectors felt that the social nature of many Guard units attracted older enlisted men with family and financial obligations that made 

them unsuitable for extended military service. Although a few units 

were filled with over-qualified college men, the personnel of most were 

comparable to those of the average regular unit. Nevertheless, inspectors considered the overall Guard personnel system to be flawed, a criticism that extended to the officers. The inspectors classified most of the 

Guard officers as willing and eager to learn, but on the average they 

were too inexperienced to fulfill the role of instructors that was expected of them in a mobilization. 74 

Not all the problems were unique to the National Guard units. The 

inspectors were surprised by the low level of discipline prevailing 

throughout the force, regardless of component, a condition which they 

attributed in part to the dilution of Regular Army units to form cadTes 

for newer units and in part to lack of experience in the younger officers. 

Throughout both components, the overall training levels of the troops 

were found by inspectors to be much lower in every function than 

expected. Nevertheless, the magnitude of such difficulties was always 

greater in the state-raised formations. Some 45 percent of the men in 

the Guard units had enlisted atler the President's call, and a slightly 

higher percentage had never fired a weapon. Believing that under the 

circumstances training could never be more than marginally successful, 

the inspectors were very pessimistic over any real progress being made 

without the National Guard being brought under complete federal control in peace and war. 75 

?J File 454d, Inspection of Organized Militia and National Guard in the Service of 

the U.S., Entry 25, RG 159, NARA; Helmick, "Autobiography," MHI; Memo, 

Chamberlain to lnsps, 3 Jul 17, sub: Method of Inspecting and Checking the Field 

Equipment of an Infantry Command, Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. 

" Helmick, "Autobiography," Mill. 

" Memo, Helmick to IG (through channels), II Nov 16, sub: Special Field 

Inspections of National Guard and Organized Militia in the Southern Department, 

Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 

74 
SHAPING THE New ARMY 

Guard units began to be released from the Mexican border in the 

fa ll of 19 16, mustered out by IGs and inspector-instructors in a reversal of the mobilization process. The growing tensions with Germany 

caused IGs in the geographical commands to give priority during early 

1917 to the conduct of inspections in the armories of National Guard 

units not in federal service. Shortly thereafter, the inspection and 

muster process experienced in the summer of 1916 began to repeat 

itself. The Adjutant General in early March checked on the federal status of Guard units and then solicited geographical area commanders to 

specify what further units they needed for federal service. By the twenty-fourth units were being recalled. Additional inspectors began to be 

detailed and assigned to mobilization sites in the first week of April. 

The smoothness of this second mobilization and the promptness of the 

accompanying inspection effort reflected fourteen years of cumulative 

experience capped by the dress rehearsal on the Mexican border. 76 

In retrospect, the reports of the inspectors recorded not only the 

growth and maturing of the National Guard but also the impact of the 

Progressive Era 's reforms on the Regular Army as it reshaped itself into 

a modern force. These documents provide insight into the differences 

and prejudices dividing the Regular and Guard components, and help 

to explain many of the problems that later developed during the deployment to France in 1917 and 19 18. Colonel Helmick's unsympathetic 

views towards the Guard formed during the inspections in the summer 

of 19 16 were to persist into the World War, and his experi ence would 

influence strongly his findings during the mobilization. His 1916 report 

presaged the policies of 19 17 and sealed the fate of many senior 

guardsmen. Despite such prejudices, there were hard truths about the 

state of both guardsmen and regulars contained in the views of the 

inspectors- truths that the Army as a whole needed to learn quickly as 

the nation drifted toward war. 

'• Ltrs, Garlington to Dept lnsps, 8 Dec 16, sub: Ammal Armory Inspection of 

National Guard, etc., and AG, Eastern Dept, to Glasgow, 6 Apr 17, sub: Inspection of 

71st Regin1ent, N.Y. lnf. NG," Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 

75 

3 

The Quality of Life 

From the time they joined the Army until the time they died, soldiers 

and veterans depended upon the inspectorate to watch over the quality 

of life and to protect them against abuses. As the Army modernized, 

inspectors investigated the complaints they received and filed reports 

on almost every aspect of military life. The problems that they identified were many and varied, and not all would be solved rapidly. 

Recruiting 

lnspectors, usually those assigned to geographical commands, actively 

monitored the various recruiting stations scattered in cities across the 

country. Because the stations were WaT Department activities, the 

inspection reports were sent directly to the Office of the Inspector 

General (OIG), which, when necessary, referred them to the respective 

recruiting officers for remedial action or comment before forwarding 

them to The Adjutant General. These reports were quite brief, in a letter format, and covered such topics as the appearance of the recruiting 

personnel, administration of the office, and adequacy of the facility. 

The inspectors considered their visits to the stations to be one of their 

more important duties, both because of the need for good recruits and 

because the stations represented the Army in the eyes of the public! 

Inspectors also addressed the productivity of the station and made 

recommendations as to whether it should remain open. Most of the stations in northern New Mexico, for example, were closed in I 907, 

because the number of men recruited was too low to justifY operating 

costs. Other areas of interest were the effectiveness of advertising and 

community attitudes, and any contracts and fiscal arrangements made by 

' File I 0583, Recruiting Station Inspection Reports, Entry 24, Record Group (RG) 

159, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C. 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Maj. Gen. John L. Chamberlain 

(Rank as of 6 October 1917) 

the station commander were scrutinized and evaluated for cquitability and acceptability. However, not 

all IG recommendations were well 

received. In 1915, as the Eastern 

Department inspector, Colonel 

Chamberlain suggested that tours 

for recruiting NCOs be changed 

from indefinitely- the practice of 

the time-to four years. General 

Garlington backed Chamberlain, 

but The Adjutant General vigorously rejected the idea. The Chief 

of Staff and Secretary agreed, and 

Chamberlain's proposa l was 

shelved-another idea whose time 

had not yet come.2 

The inspectors' involvement 

with the stations also led them to 

deal with issues that affected the 

retaining or attracting of recruits. 

1n 1913 Lt. Col. Augustus P. Blocksom successfully recommended 

elimination of the unpopular "2300 bedcheck." Periodically, fGs 

remarked on the need for adequate pay and bonuses to attract recruits 

with special skills. Affiliating regiments with geographical areas for 

recruiting purposes was sometimes suggested. Some of the problems 

the inspectors encountered reflected the prejudices of the era in which 

they livcd.3 

In 1905 Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont proposed that a teetotaler's oath be made a condition for enlistment. Secretary of War Taft 

asked Inspector General Burton to explain to the senator the difficulties 

that would result. Bw·ton cited the many earlier Army efforts to promote temperance, which proved to him that encouraging moderation 

was the best policy. Trying to make the potential soldier a teetotaler 

would make recruiting impossible, with no retention advantage to the 

2 Ltr, Chamberlain to Garlington, 5 Jun 15, sub: Recruiting, Entry 25, RG 159, 

NARA. 

' U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Inspector Geneml, 1906 (Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906), pp. 644. 648 (hereafter cited as A RIG); ARJG 

1913, p. 277; Ltr (quoted words), £31ocksom to Dept Cdr, 14 Ju1 13, with ends., Roll 40, 

Microfilm 912, Indexes to War College Division Records, RG 165, NARA. 

78 
THE QUALITY OF LIFE 

Army. r lc thus suggested that the best way to achieve temperance in the 

Army was to restore the sale of beer and wine in post exchange canteens. The senator agreed to withdraw his proposal, but the canteens 

remained dry.4 

The Army traditionally mustered new recruits at selected depots, 

where they were physically evaluated and given the rudiments of training before being sent to their units. Discontinued in 1894 as an economy measure, the practice was revived in 1904, when recruit depots were 

reactivated at Columbus Barracks, Ohio; Fort Slocum, New York; and 

Jefferson Barracks, Missouri. As before, the depots were placed under 

the control of The Adjutant General (or the Military Secretary, as he 

was briefly known). Additional depots later were activated at Fort 

McDowell, California, and Fort Logan, Colorado. Almost immediately, 

the depots became major items of concern for the Inspector General's 

Department (IGD).5 

Numerous complaints about mismanagement and abuse of authority began to be received at the War Department. Fort Slocum was cited 

the most frequently. The recruit barracks were below standard, and 

petty rackets were rampant. With the apparent knowledge of the commander, the recruits were required to sell their civilian clothing to one 

of the cadre NCOs or to pay bribes to the post bandmaster to receive an 

easier duty assignment in the band. The impression made on the new 

recruits was deplorable.6 

The flood of such complaints led the Secretary of War on 29 March 

1906 to direct General Burton to inspect every recruit depot in the 

Army every two months, describing the actual conditions and recommending improvements. The problems .Burton discovered at these locations were due largely to their hasty formation with temporary personnel and little practical guidance from the War Department. Burton 

assisted the local commanders as best he could and successfully won 

approval for the assignment of permanent training cadre and staff. He 

did find corruption at Fort Slocum, resulting in the relief of the post 

commander and several NCOs. Their replacement with permanent 

cadre solved the most pressing difficulties there. By May, when 

General Burton made his last inspection, the recruit depots had 

' Llr, Burton lo MiiSec, 15 Apr 05, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 

• U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the Secret my of Wm: 1905 (Washington, 

D.C.: Govcrnmenl Printing Office, 1905), p. 13 {hereafler cited as !IRS IV); Leonard L. 

Lcrwill, The Personnel Replacement System in the US. Army, DA Pamphlet No. 

20-2 11 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 140-43. 

• Llr, Smith Jo CotS, WD, 26 Mar 05, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 

19 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

improved further. In 1907 inspection authority was passed to The 

Adjutant General, although in practice IGs continued to do the work at 

his request. 7 

The recruit depots continued to function up to 1921, remaining 

within the purview of the War Department inspectorate because of their 

exempted status. When the discharge and replacement depots took over, 

they were assigned to the control of the geographical area commanders 

and the inspection responsibility devolved to inspectors at that level.8 

Rations and Quarters 

Securing the soldier adequate rations and quarters remained an important aspect of the inspectorate's duties. In 1914 the Office of the 

Inspector General conducted a massive survey of leased off-post housing at recruiting stations and other areas where military personnel were 

not living in government quarters. The survey was undertaken because 

of the supposedly high cost of leased housing and the charge that enlisted personnel assigned to Washington, D.C., were profiting from kickbacks from rent paid to their landlord by the government. 

Headed by Lt. Col. David C. Shanks, a team wrote to every officer 

known to be Jiving off post worldwide, asking for a copy of his lease 

and a description of his accommodations. Each geographical area commander was similarly solicited for copies of all housing contracts on 

file within his command. Bureau chiefs were surveyed so that facilities 

leased for recruiting stations, remount depots, and warehouses would 

not be overlooked.

9 

The survey showed that the Army generally was competing reasonably well on the housing market. Those few quarters found to be overpriced were identified and the leases scheduled for termination or renegotiation. Colonel Shanks determined that officers usually were living 

within their allowances, but he described the workings of the 

Quartermaster lease system for enlisted men as "grotesque." Far from 

profiting from it, the system required married soldiers to pay from their 

7 ARJG 1905, p. 466; ARIG 1906, p. 649; Memo, MiiSec to IG, 29 Mar 06, Entry 

24, RG 159, NARA; U.S. War Department, Office of the Inspector General, A Guide 

for rite Use of O.fficers of the Inspector General :1' Department, 1911, Corrected ro April 

I. 19.17 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917), p. 17 (hereafter cited 

as Guide 1911/ 1917); WD GO 124, 1907. 8 WD GO 55, 192 1. 9 File 16689, Leased Off-Post Facilities Inspection, Entry 24; Rpt, Shanks, 13 Apr 

14, sub: Investigation Concerning Leases of Quarters for Army Nurses and Enlisted 

Men on Duty in Washington, DC, Entry 35. Both in RG 159, NARA. 

80 
THE QUALITY OF LIFE 

own pockets rents that exceeded the basic allowance for nongovernment housing. Single men simply needed less to live comfortablyhence, the allegations of graft. 10 

Shanks went on to describe the situation as both frustrating and 

humiliating for married senior NCOs, and a frequent cause for their 

early departure from the Army. He concluded that the only fair way to 

deal with the situation was to determine a flat money commutation, 

based on grade and marital status, to be paid whenever government 

housing was unavailable, with an additional variable rate for especially 

high-cost areas. General Garlington agreed with Shanks' recommendations in his report to the Secretary of War, and Shanks' approach 

became the basis for a housing allowance policy that remained in force 

for the rest of the century. 11 

Just as proper housing included aspects of morale, living conditions, and business efficiency, so too did the related topic of rations and 

feeding. Mess hall operations were at the center of a major controversy 

early in the century. In 1893 Congress had approved a Quartermaster's 

Department recommendation to consolidate unit messes into post general messes, in an effort to make the feeding system more efficient and 

to use the scarce talents of the cooks and bakers just graduating from 

newly established schools. The act was universally deplored by line 

conunanders. Unit mess halls had served as social focal points and 

were under each commander's control. The practical chore of equitably 

sharing unit fund improvements with other units was ctunbersome if 

not impossible. Also, a well-run unit mess hall and its company garden 

often could show a profit, to be used for other morale-support activities. General Buxton recommended that the Army return to the company mess system, and his proposal was adopted in 1905, general messes 

being retained only at recruit depots and similar installations where 

they were unavoidable.'2 

Inspectors also were concerned about the content and composition 

of field rations. In June 1906 Congress revised the Navy ration, standardizing it throughout the fleet and including dairy products as a component. Garlington stressed in his 1907 report that similar arrangements should be made for Army rations. At the time, the garrison ration 

was a monotonous issue of staples, supplemented by produce from the 

company garden and special purchases of the company fund. 

Garlington pointed out that a unit's location and its commander's busi-

'

0 Rpt, Shanks, 13 Apr 14, Entry 35, RG 159, NARA. 

II Ibid. 

11 AR!G 1903, p. 447; ARIG 1904, p. 289. 

81 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

ness acumen too often determined the quality of an Army mess and its 

offerings. Should a unit be deployed elsewhere, soldiers could be 

denied many components of a healthy diet. Garlington recommended 

incorporating greater variety into the standard Army ration, a reform 

that might even help to retain soldiers in the service. His recommendation, however, was not accepted, and a modified version of the system 

he disliked was retained for many years. 13 

Post Exchanges 

The War Department established post exchanges, originally called canteens, in 1889 to replace the post trader system, which had proven both 

difficu lt to control and often unfair to the troops. The canteens were 

authorized to sell beer and wines as well as light meals and sundries. 

By the time of the War with Spain, they were judged to be a great success. They provided a wholesome alternative to off-post saloons, and 

they turned a modest profit that could be channeled into other forms of 

welfare spending, including unit funds. 14 

Exchange operations continued to expand and, by 1901, provided 

an extensive blend of sales and morale-support activities. Regulations 

specified that a fully operational exchange would consist of a general 

store, a restaurant, library, game rooms, and a gymnasium. Barber, tailor, and shoe repair shops also were desirable. The regulations defined 

the nature of each commercial activity and prohibited any other ventures without War Department approval. The inspector General's 

Department was the War Department agency that decided on both the 

propriety of existing activities and on exemptions. 15 

The unit, or company, funds were intended to supplement the 

activities of the post exchanges, as well as the items issued by the supply departments for troop welfare. The funds were limited to spending money "for the benefit of the company," but the requirement was 

very broadly interpreted. For example, seed purchased for a company 

garden and wages for the gardener were both authorized. Company 

funds could be used to operate profit-making faci lities like barbershops if such services were not provided by the post exchange. 

Capital for the exchanges was derived in part from per capita shares 

purchased by each of the units on the post. The disposition of the 

'

3 End, Garlington, I I Nov 07, to Ltr, Greely to SG, I Nov 07, Entry 24, RG 159, 

NARA 

" ARIG 1889, p. 131 ; ARIG 1890, p. 105. 1

s WD GO 176, 1909, and GO 113, 1910; PXReg, 1916. 

82 
THE QUALIT Y O F LIFE 

funds generated by company-level enterprises was subject to OIG 

review, as were any changes in the regulations governing funds and 

other aspects of soldier welfare. 16 

A critical problem in funding the exchanges developed when 

Congress prohibited the sale of beer and wine. This well-intended effort 

to reduce soldier drinking drove the men into off-post grog shops, 

beyond commanders' control, and drastically reduced exchange profits, 

curtailing other morale-support activities. 

The narrow margins of profit underscored the need for professional exchange management, which the inspectors had begun to advocate 

almost from the beginning of the century. In 1903 Genera l Burton successfully suggested the allocation of appropriated funds to sustain the 

libraries and gymnasiums, which no longer could be supported from 

exchange profits. Jn turn, the use of appropriated funds led to an 

increased number of investigations to assure that the money was being 

spent as Congress intended. 17 

The absence of standard accountability systems as revealed by 

inspections led General Burton to develop a model in 1905 and to urge 

its adoption. The discovery in February of that year that the exchange 

steward at Fort Monroe, Virginia, had been guilty of embezzlement 

prompted a series of investigations and inquiries, which led to the complete revision of exchange operations throughout the Army. After much 

investigation and delay, in 1909 a general order codified a standard 

bookkeeping and accounting system. Initially, the General Staff refused 

to endorse the new system because of its concern over conunand prerogatives. But most officers were happy to embrace the proposed system, whose practice also continued throughout the century.

18 

The OIG's recommendation remained the final word in approving 

or disapproving requests from exchange or company fund councils to 

operate concessions or games that could generate profits. Inspectors 

also continued to make the fina l recommendations for any waivers 

from the regulations. Advancing technology and changing modes of 

entertainment increased the variety of such requests. For example, 

General Garlington favored running motion picture programs only on a 

concession basis, primariJy because of the overhead costs of buying 

equipment and building fireproof projection booths. But his reluctance 

to let the silver screen come to the Army posts was not shared by the 

Secretary of War, who overrode his objections. 

•• WD Cir 6 (quoted words), 1904; AReg 343, 1913. 

" A RIG 1903, pp. 450- 51; ARSW 1905, pp. 380-82. 

IS ARIG 1905, p. 454;//R/G /906, p. 639; WD GO 176, 1909. 

83 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

The variety of activities and the unpredictable nature of a project's 

profitability meant that problems could arise over the disposition of 

assets. Local commanders usually designated their inspectors to investigate any losses or improprieties in the management of exchange funds 

and to determine responsibility. Negligence and procedural errors composed the bulk of these sort of inquiries. Occasionally, however, disciplinary action had to be taken by commanders. In June 1912, when an 

inspector determined that a chaplain was misusing exchange funds, 

General Garlington recommended that the officer be reprimanded and 

reassigned, and the geographical area commander sent him off with a 

blistering letter. In such unusual cases, as in the more customary ones, 

the Inspector General's Department was the authority on every aspect 

of local funds management. '

9 

Discipline 

The improvement of living conditions could not satisfy all men in the 

ranks. Inevitably, the Army endured a steady trickle of desertions. 

Losing trained men was costly, and the morale and leadership of the 

affected units also suffered. 

Inspectors had long been concerned with matters of discipline 

throughout the Army. Any issues involving disciplinary matters were at 

least touched upon in regular inspections, and the attention of the 

inspectors extended also to the disposition of the men disciplined and 

the policies affecting them. Prior to the annual inspection, units were 

required to submit strength and discipline statistics for the inspector's 

use during his visit and in preparing his report. Whenever the number of 

desertions or courts-martial was excessive, the issue became a matter of 

special inquiry, conducted in conjunction with the scheduled inspection. 

The deserters' backgrounds and their places of enlistment were checked 

for any trends. Inspectors interviewed unit personnel and any apprehended deserters to determine precise causes for leaving. Early in the 

century the main causes were personal, such as excessive drinking or 

indebtedness, both believed to be partially caused by a lack of recreational alternatives. By 1906 inspectors also listed excessive turbulence 

in the officer corps as a major factor contributing to desertion.20 

'

9 File 12592, Post Exchange Policy Files, Columbus Barracks, Ohio, Case of 

Chaplain E. P. Newson, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 20 A Reg 906(7), 1908; A Reg 913(7), 191 0; AReg 889(7), 1913. See also ARJG 1903, 

pp. 447-48; ARJG 1906, p. 638; ARJG 1907, pp. 265-{59; ARIG 1909, p. 295; ARJG 

1911 , p. 27l;ARJG 1915, p. 231. 

84 
THE QUALITY OF LIFE 

By 1907 the problem of desertions had become so acute that the 

Secretary of War directed a special investigation be made to determine 

causes and provide possible remedies. Each geographical command 

inspector general made the inquiry in his region. Typical of these was 

the one made by Maj. Zerah W. Torrey in the Pacific Division. He first 

reviewed the statistics on desertions by unit throughout the division. 

He identified eighteen units with unusually high desertion rates and 

others with low but steady rates. Torrey visited each of the affected 

units, as well as a few others selected at random that had few or no 

desertions. Interviewing first the post commander, the officers, and 

NCOs of the identified units, as well as many of the men, he then 

moved on to interview over 200 incarcerated for desertion in the military prison at Alcatraz. 2

' 

Most desertions occurred because of an excessive turnover of officers- many of the worst units had had as many as tlu-ee commanders 

in a year- and because of harsh or unfair treatment and poor food. 

These conditions, Torry concluded, were directly related to the inexperience and instability of the company leadership. He suggested that the 

solution to the desertion problem lay in leaving the company-level officers in their units for periods long enough to give them the experience 

and responsibility of caring for their men. Torrey's report was received 

favorably tlu·oughout the chain of command and was published as a part 

of the Inspector General's 1907 annual report. A copy also was sent to 

each inspector and senior commander. Such measures and general 

command attention to the causes of desertion Jed to a modest drop in 

the rate the next year. Yet the problem remained a matter of concern for 

the Army up to the World War.

22 

Complaints and Investigations 

Soldiers were authorized to make complaints to a visiting inspector, 

who would often investigate them while on site. The quantity of soldier 

complaints may have been reduced by the practice of naming each 

complainant and his allegations in the body of the inspection report. 

Such actions were nevertheless routine. Inspectors were required by 

regulation to verify and report on all complaints, including those by 

civilians, and make special note of items requiring War Department 

action. They also were expected to follow up on any issue raised that 

· OlG, 28 Dec 07, sub: Synopsis of Major Torrey's Reports on the Causes of 

Desertion, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 22 !bid.; ARSW 1907, pp. 66-110; ARJG 1908, p. 260. 

85 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

was not in accordance with accepted practice or regulations and to recommend a solution. For unsubstantiated innuendo, they had to prepare 

a brief neutral account of the allegation in a separate memorandum and 

then forward it to the Office of the Inspector General for fi ling in case 

any corroboratory trends surfaced in the future.23 

General Garlington made it a matter of unbending office policy 

never to react to an anonymous complaint. If the general source could 

be determined, he would direct that the complaint be sent to the local 

inspector for his information- a personal policy not practiced at the 

geographical commands. Garlington ignored particularly vituperative 

complaints, saying that no good purpose could be served in trying to 

investigate them. Generally speaking, complaints made by soldiers with 

poor disciplinary records or in a convict or AWOL status received preliminary analyses and brief investigations, but no further action. ~ 

Issues raised by members of Congress were handled promptly. In 

1914 Congressman Charles A. Plumley of Vermont had received a letter from a soldier complaining of poor conditions in the guardhouse 

and erratic justice at Trinidad, Colorado, and passed it on to the 

Secretary ofWar, who ordered an immediate investigation. The Central 

Department inspector, Col. Charles M. O'Connor, was selected to 

investigate the complaint on behalf of the War Department. O'Connor 

noted the unique conditions in Trinidad, a temporary camp set up to 

monitor labor unrest, and the need for tight discipline. The inspector 

judged the conditions in the guardl10use to be spartan, but not umeasonable. General GarLington reconm1ended to the Chief of Staff that the 

complainant be punished for making a false statement and going out of 

the chain of cotlUlland, believing that soldiers were not allowed by the 

Articles of War to seek redress through a third party.

25 

Secretary of War Garrison tightened the handling of complaints on 

10 November 1914, directing that all be referred to an inspector general for investigation. He had learned that a number of complaints had 

been investigated within units, sometimes by those against whom the 

complaints had been made. He agreed that commanders should and 

could determine whether a complaint had some basis, but he wanted all 

ll WD GO 87, 191 1; WD, OIG, Guide 1911/ 1917, p. 24. See also Rpt, Donaldson, 

17 May 15, sub: Garrison Inspection of Plattsburg Barracks, N.Y., Entry II, RG 159, 

NARA. 24 Menlo, Gar I ington to OIG, [ 1906], sub: Anonymous Complaints; Ltr, Gross to 

SofW, Nov 14, and End, Garlington, 2 Dec 14. Both in Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 

1J Rpt, O'Connor, 5 Dec 14, sub: Investigation of Military Conditions at Trinidad, 

Colorado, Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 

86 
THE QUALITY OF LIFE 

but the most obviously false ones referred to an IG to ensure justice and 

to avoid allegations of mishandling. 26 

Sometimes inspectors found themselves involved in sensitive cases 

equivalent to modern pretrial investigations. This was particularly so in 

inquiries involving officers. Other bureau chiefs often asked through 

channels for an IG to look into sensitive items in their own clements, 

rather than have a member of their own corps do so. At times the Office 

of the Inspector General would recommend that the investigation be 

made by the geographical area commander or his inspector. About twothirds of the cases investigated typically dealt with complaints about 

officer or soldier conduct, ranging from allegations of the abuse of 

authority to the commission of crime.27 

In 1915 the Office of the Inspector General objected to wording in 

the proposed bill to organize the Army. The bill said in essence that the 

Judge Advocate General 's duties included investigations necessary to 

the administration of justice. The Inspector General's executive officer, 

Lt. Col. AndreW. Brewster, drafted Garlington's ideas in a memorandum to the Secretary of War, stating that the Judge Advocate General's 

Department should become involved in IG investigations only upon 

their completion and when probable grounds for a criminal charge were 

evident. Garlington and the Secretary agreed. A new definition was 

prepared, stressing the paramount role of the Inspector General's 

Department in investigations. 28 

The tight grip on investigations was not quite as complete in practice as it was in principle. Commanders could appoint other officers to 

conduct investigations when IGs were unavailable. This practice was 

not encouraged, however. The chance that an investigation might not be 

sufficient or that confidentiality could be compromised was greater 

when an investigation was made outside IG channels. Further, the War 

Department risked embarrassment if a reply to a complainant was 

based on an incomplete report. 

This problem was illustrated by a 1915 officer conduct case. The 

local commander recommended sending an investigation made by one 

of his officers directly to the Congressman who had forwarded the initiating complaint from one of his constituents. General Garlington 

10 Memo, Garrison to CofS, WD. 10 Nov 14, Entry 296, RG 165, NARA; ibid., II 

Nov 14. Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 1

' For a listing of typical investigations, sec Rpt, Bailey to IG, 30 Jun 03, Entry 35, 

RG 159, NARA. 

:• Memo, Brewster to SoiW, I 0 Nov 15; Telg, IG to SoiW, 15 Nov 15; Memo, 

Brewster to CofS. WD, 27 Nov 15. All in Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 

87 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

rejected the proposal firmly, stressing that it was the "unbroken rule" of 

the OfTice of the Inspector General not to furnish investigation reports 

to outside parties, regardless of the status of the Army investigator. In 

this particular case the investigating officer happened to be a former 

IG, designated as a special inspector for the investigation but not a 

member of the Lnspector Genera l's Department. 29 

Race Relations 

Investigations touched upon virtually every aspect of the soldier's life 

and activities. None were more sensitive or more politically charged 

than those involving race, especially in what can only be termed a racist 

age. The best known of the many cases investigated before the World 

War involved the soldiers of the 25th Infantry, a black regin1ent. ln late 

July 1906 a regimental battalion deployed from Fort Niobrara, 

Nebraska, to Brownsville, Texas. The troops encountered strict Jim 

Crow laws after their arrival and were not well received by the white 

citizens of the town, who had vehemently opposed their assignment. 30 

In this tense environment a number of racial incidents occurred. 

Then on the night of 13 August a party of unknown men rampaged 

through the town, firing rifles. One white civilian was killed and two 

others were wounded. The community inm1ediately suspected the black 

troops as being the perpetrators, a lthough the circumstantia l evidence 

ava il able could as easily have been levied against white rowdies. Major 

Blocksom, the assistant inspector for the Southwestern Division, conducted the initial Army investigation of the incident, beginning his 

inquiry on the eighteenth. He interviewed the battalion officers, NCOs, 

and many of the men, as well as many civilians and federal officials. 

The major also visited the various places where other significant incidents had taken place. 

In his rep011 Blocksom briefly summarized the record of tensions 

between the community and the newly an-ived black troops. He then 

recorded the specific events of the so-called raid as reported to him. 

Apparently, he had begun the investigation without questioning the 

"' Rpt, Helmick to CG, 2d Div, 8 Sep 15, sub: Investigation of Charges Against 2Lt 

J. A. Davies, 27th lnf, with encls.; Rpt (quoted words), Winn to TAG, 18 Feb 16, sub: 

Accusations Against 2Lt Jasper A. Davies. Both in Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 10 There are several studies of the Brownsville incident. See Marvin Fletcher, The 

Black Soldier and Officer in the United Stales Army, 1891- 1917 (Columbia: University 

of Missouri Press, 1974), and John D. Weaver, The Browns1•ille Raid (New York: W. W. 

Norton and Co., 1970.) 

88 
THE QUALITY OF L IFE 

guilt of the black troops. His only question was their identity and the 

degree of responsibility of their leaders. He concluded that the battalion officers had done nothing that could have contributed to the incident and that they had acted reasonably in its aftermath. Unable to discover any perpetrators, Blocksom assumed that the soldiers had entered 

into a conspiracy of silence. He recommended that the whole unit be 

discharged without honor and barred from any further federal service if 

the guilty parties remained unknown. Blocksom ended his report listing the names of the men arrested by civil authorities, most of whom he 

presumed to be the culprits, and stating that they would be released 

because of a lack of evidence.3

' 

By the time the report was submitted on 29 August, the battalion 

had been moved to Fort Reno, Oklahoma. There the men were watched 

closely, in the hope that further information could be obtained about the 

raid. Up to this point, with the initial exception of the battalion commander, the entire chain of command assumed that some of the soldiers 

had been involved in the shooting. 

In late September I 906 Blocksom 's superior, Lt. Col. Leonard A. 

Lovering, who, like Blocksom, was a West Point graduate from a 

northern state, initiated a follow-up investigation because of the continued lack of information from the troops and because two officers, 

stationed in Brownsville just before the arrival of the black troops, had 

stepped forward with sworn affidavits. The officers charged that some 

of Brownsville's citizens had conspired to discredit the blacks, with the 

aim of having them sent away. Colonel Lovering accumulated a large 

number of sworn affidavits from the officers and men. From this he 

was able to build an accurate list of unit members present at 

Brownsville or out of the area. He fmther substantiated some of the 

community hostility towards the black soldiers. But Lovering, who 

also presumed that the black soldiers were guilty, came no closer to 

discovering the truth. 32 

The work of both inspectors had far-reaching results. President 

Theodore Roosevelt used the inspectors' recommendations as the 

basis for his decision to discharge the entire battalion without honor 

as conspirators, unless the guilty were identified. On 4 October 

Assistant Secretary of War Robert Shaw Oliver gave a letter of 

instruction to General Garlington. Clearly implying the guilt of some 

members of the 25th Infantry, the letter directed the Inspector General 

to resume the investigation and to present the troops the President's 

31 ARSW 1906, pp. 225- 85 (Biocksom Rpt). 11 lbid., pp. 287- 356 (Lovering Rpt). 

89 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

ultimatum at a moment of his choosing after he had interviewed them 

at Fort Reno.33 

Before going to Oklahoma, Garlington discussed the case with 

Lovering and Blocksom in their office at Fort Sam Houston. Nothing 

new came out of the conference. Garlington then interviewed a group 

of soldiers still held at Fort Sam Houston, against whom Texas charges 

had been made and dropped; he talked with each informally in private 

and concluded that they were intentionally reticent when the subject of 

Brownsville came up. Proceeding to Fort Reno, Garlington next interviewed battalion members-officers and selected NCOs, as well as 

enlisted, questioning mostly the older men on the premise that their loyalty and discipline would make them less likely to cover anything up. 34 

Here again, the Inspector General found the soldiers to be uncommunicative about anything to do with Brownsville and concluded that 

some sort of conspiracy existed among the men. He soon decided that 

he could make no further progress. He had the battalion assembled, 

read then1 the President's ultimatum, and gave them twenty-four hours 

to think it over. At the end of the waiting period he endorsed the recommendation that all men in the battalion be discharged without honor 

and barred from federal employment. Garlington was convinced that 

some of the soldiers had participated in the incident and that their guilt 

was being covered up by all the others. He felt that example and good 

discipline for the rest of the Army required such a severe measure, 

although he recognized that some innocent men might be hurt. 

President Roosevelt approved the discharges on 5 November, and the 

order was carried into effect four days later.

35 

The President's order aroused a storm of protest in the black press 

and became a matter of growing controversy in Congress. The plight 

of the soldiers was championed by Senator Joseph B. Foraker of Ohio, 

who welcomed the opportunity to assail the President for political reasons but also was genuinely outraged by the blanket discharge. The 

agitation stirred the administration to further action. Secretary of War 

Taft wrote Garlington in December to say that, although the President 

considered the IG reports "entirely sufficient" for his decision, he felt 

it expedient to reopen the investigation because of the political interest. Taft accordingly directed that Major Blocksom return to 

Brownsville to gather up any further information that might be available. He closed his letter with the odd observation: "The President has 

90 

J! Lh·, Oliver to Garl ington, 4 Oct 06, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 

J.• Ltr, Garlington to Ainsworth, 14 Dec 06, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 1

s ARSW 1906, pp. 357- 62 (Garlington Rpt). 
T H E QUALITY OF L IFE 

reached a conclusion as to what the facts are, but this should not influence Maj. Blocksom."36 

Blocksom went back to Brownsville, accompanied by Assistant 

Attorney General Milton D. Purdy. The two men conducted still another investigation, even more complete. Their findings in part led the 

President to cancel the portion of his order barring the discharged soldiers from getting civil service jobs. Roosevelt also authorized that any 

of the discharged soldiers who could prove they were not involved in 

the incident could be reconsidered for reenlistment. As a result, on 2 1 

January 1907 Secretary Taft directed General Ainsworth, who was 

responsible for recruiting operations, to screen those from the 25th 

Infantry who were applying for reenlistment. Each applicant was to be 

queried on the extent of his involvement in the Brownsville incident 

and what he had done to uncover the culprits. Other witnesses could be 

interviewed if necessary for fact-finding purposes. The interviewer further was to determine the veracity and quality of each applicant and 

decide whether he could reenlist.31 

A week later Ainsworth fotwarded a roster of applicants to General 

Garlington, requesting that an IGD member who was not involved in 

any of the Brownsville investigations perform the examinations. 

Recruiting officers already had been told of the requirements and procedures in a circular issued earlier. Major Galbraith conducted most of 

the interviews, traveling from Washington to wherever a member of the 

25th applied for reentry. Yet his inquiries seemed more focused on gathering additional information about the incident than on clearing any of 

the soldiers, and his 11 February report resulted in very few of the discharged men being allowed to return. In the meantime, Major 

Blocksom remained in Brownsville until late April, searching for more 

information, a diversion of effort that completely upset his command's 

inspection plan and necessitated nearly all inspections being deferred 

or passed to IGs from other regions. 38 

This activity deflected some of the criticism aimed at the President, 

but Senator Foraker continued to pursue the matter. In January 1907 the 

Senate Military Affairs Committee agreed to investigate the raid. While 

that was going on, the battalion commander and officer of the day were 

.16 James A. Tinsley, "Roosevelt, Foraker and the Brownsville Affray," Jouma/ of 

Negro HisfOIJ' 4 1 (Jan 56): 46, 50; Ltr (quotations) Taft to Garlington, 22 Dec 06, Entry 

24, RG 159, NARA. 

J' Memo, Taft to MilSec, 21 Jan 07, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 3

s Llrs, Ainsworth to lG, 26 Jan 07, and Galbraith to MilSec, 11 Feb 07, Entry 24, 

RG 159, NARA. 

91 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

acquitted in separate courts-martial. Their cases raised doubts as to 

whether the soldiers had been the perpetrators or whether the culprits 

had been racist local citizens. The Senate investigation was not completed until March 1908, when the findings were released. The majority concurred with the inspectors and the President that some of the soldiers were guilty, although unidentified, and recommended a bill to 

extend the President's discharge review authority in case new evidence 

appeared. A minority view, spearheaded by Foraker, proposed a bill 

authorizing the reenlistment of all of the discharged men on the premise 

that they were innocent until proven guilty. Senator Foraker a lso produced considerable circumstantial evidence that weakened the government's case by pointing away from the soldiers to some sort of conspiracy by the local white citizens. 39 

The debate over the two bills caused considerable concern in the 

Senate. Senator William E. Borah, newly elected from Idaho, wrote a 

personal letter to Garlington, asking his views on Foraker's interpretation of the evidence. The Inspector General's lengthy reply only served 

to indicate that he remained fully convinced that some members of the 

battalion were guilty. He offered a rebuttal to each of Foraker's points, 

essentially saying that the confusion during the night in question made 

it possible for any number of men to have gone into town while appearing to be accounted for in barracks. He then reviewed a series of proven 

riot cases involving black units, insinuating that such conduct was typical. His circumstantial counterargument quelled the senator's doubts as 

to the justice of the government's case.

40 

A compromise was reached in February 1909, when Congress 

approved the appointment of a military court of inquiry that President 

Roosevelt convened a few days before he left office. This body ended 

its deliberations in March 1910, essentially corroborating the earlier 

findings but judging that fourteen of the men were eligible for reenlistment. President Taft's approval of the court's findings closed the case. 41 

The Brownsville case severely affected President Roosevelt's relations with Congress, accelerating the growing differences between the 

two and eventually leading to confrontations over other issues. The 

'

9 Tinsley, "Brownsville Affray," p. 56 . 

.&O Ltr, Borah to Garlington, 4 Apr 08, and Reply, 7 Apr 08, Entry 22, RG 159, 

NARA. 

•• Tinsley, "Brownsville Affray," pp. 59- 61; Weaver, Brownsville Raid, p. 283. In 

1971 Congressman Augustus F. Hawkins successfully sponsored legislation to convert 

the discharges to honorable and to make restitution. On 28 September 1972, when 

Secretary of the Army Robert F. Froehlkc issued the order to change the record, only 

one member of the 25th Infantry was alive. 

92 
THE QUALITY OF LIFE 

President's quick acceptance of the inspectors' findings seemingly 

reflected the implicit racial perspective of the era, when stereotyping 

clouded even the most liberal views. Roosevelt in other situations had 

accomplished a great deal in advancing black interests. Similarly, all of 

the inspectors involved were men with a reputation for fairness and 

integrity. They were, however, products of their time, unknowingly carrying its prejudices.

42 

The Army's and the inspectorate's record in racial matters was not 

always so questionable. An incident with remarkable parallels to 

Brownsville took place in 1909 at Madison Barracks, New York, with far 

different results. The case involved the 25th's sister black regiment, the 

24th Infantry, commanded by Col. William Paulding. The barracks was 

located next to the small town of Sacketts Harbor, whose citizens also 

reacted against the news of a black regiment being assigned in their area. 

They were aware of the Brownsville incident and feared a repetition.43 

Their apprehensions were soon allayed when the regiment arrived. 

The soldiers were cordial and well behaved, and their presence significantly boosted the local economy. Unfortunately, this promising beginning was marred by a number of incidents. None were particu larly 

important in themselves, but the local sensitivity to any racial tensions, 

combined with overzealous newspaper reporting, resulted in deteriorating conununity relations. 

The situation worsened in February 1909. In that month General 

Wood, then the Department of the East commander, received a letter 

from one "James White," with a clipping from the Watertown Times 

attached. The ru·ticle was a highly dramatic description of a black soldier's attack on a village girl on the eleventh. The letter writer demanded that General Wood do something about the presence of black troops 

in Sacketts Harbor."" 

General Wood referred the letter to Colonel Paulding, asking him 

to investigate and advise him as quickly as possible. Paulding, in turn, 

ordered Capt. William B. Cochran, Company B commander, to conduct the investigation. The captain was able to piece together the 

sequence of events with some accuracy. He found that on 11 February 

42 For another exposition of attitudes, see Memo, SO to President, 24 Dec 04, sub: 

Undesirability of Colored Contract Surgeons, Entry 242, RG 112, NARA; Handlist of 

Brownsville Material, OTJG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH). 4

) Testimony of Dr. Arthur .1. Hodge, Mar 09, an. to Fi le 30361, Entry 1486, RG 393, 

NARA . 

.... Ltr, "James White" to Wood, 12 Feb 09; "Colored Soldier Attacks White GirlStruck Down by Infantryman," Watertown Times, 12 Feb 09. Both in File 30361, Entry 

1486, RG 393, NARA. 

93 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

the young woman in question had been hit and knocked down by a 

black man wearing a soldier's hat and overcoat. When the girl 

screamed, the man ran away and managed to escape his pursuers in the 

darkness. Initially, Cochran was unable to find any suspects. After a 

reward was offered on the twentieth, the local tailor came forward and 

identified Pvt. James Richardson, stating that the latter had appeared 

to be in an agitated state when he came to ask for a loan on the night 

of the assault. The tailor claimed to have given the soldier a receipt for 

an earlier loan, and a part-time painter at the barracks later produced 

a receipt made out to Richardson, claiming he had found it in the snow 

ncar the assault site. With this information, Captain Cochran thought 

that he had his man. Private Richardson, however, had a solid alibi: A 

lieutenant, his wife, and their cook all said that he had been working 

on the furnace in the officer's quarters at the time of the assault. 

Cochran found other grounds for doubt. He later said he did not think 

that the alleged victim had been frank with him and pointed out that 

the letter to General Wood was really anonymous- there was no 

"James White" in the area. 45 

Meanwhile, community relations continued to deteriorate. After 

one of his men was sentenced by an obviously biased judge to three 

months confinement on a minor charge, Colonel Paulding on 26 

February put Sacketts Harbor off limits. The same magistrate was 

alleged to have granted blanket authority to the townspeople to not only 

carry weapons but also arrest any black soldier they deemed suspicious. 

Genera l Wood reacted to these events by reopening the investigation, 

assigning the task to his inspector general, Colonel Chamberlain. Wood 

told Chamberlain to investigate all incidents so far reported, to examinc the conduct of the garrison, to determine the causes for community hostility, and to propose a solution.46 

Chamberlain left for Madison Barracks on 9 March, arriving that 

evening. There he found many citizens already protesting the economic effects of the off-limits order, and he began his investigation immediately. He interviewed a remarkable number of people in three days, 

including most of the prominent townspeople, regimental officers, key 

enlisted men, and the principals in the assault and court cases. He took 

" Cochran Investigation, Encl 2 to Corrcsp 3440, 7 Mar 09, and Cochran Testimony, 

File 3036 1, Entry 1486, RG 393, NARA. 

,. Note (pencil), Wood to TAG, 4 Mar 09; Ltr, Paulding to Wood, 28 Feb 09; and 

"Colored Soldier Sent to Jamestown," Symcuse (N.Y.) Post St(lnd(lrd, 26 Feb 09. All in 

File 30361, Entry 1486, RG 393, NARA. See also Ltr Order, Dept of East, 8 Mar 09, 

File 6046, Entry 22, RG 159, NARA. 

94 
THE QUALITY OF liFE 

an additional ten days to organize his report before submitting it to 

General Wood. 

According to Chamberlain, part of the difficulties lay in Colonel 

Paulding's failure to specify social guidelines for whites and blacks to 

follow. He also concurred with Captain Cochran's position that a large 

part of the problem arose from the toleration of vice in the village and 

the lack of municipal control. He judged the entire village government 

to be corrupt. With a population of I ,000, it had six saloons and a hotel 

bar, none of which paid any attention to state Laws specifying closing 

hours and Sunday operations. Additionally, there was an illegal gambling house and at least two houses of prostitution, the most profitable 

of which was operated by the town constable. The arrest and trial of the 

jailed soldier were characterized by Chamberlain as a miscarriage of 

justice, revealing the bias and incompetence of the judge. The soldier 

was picked up on unverifiable suspicion and convicted on unprovable 

charges over the protests of his lawyer. The judge's post-trial inflammatory remarks had Led to Paulding's decision placing the town off limits.~7 

But the most telling part of his report related to the original incident. Chamberlain's inquiries into the assault case uncovered a clumsy 

frame-up on the part of the town tailor and the part-time painter to collect the reward money while discrediting the black troops. It turned out 

that the painter had forged the "James White" letter to Genera l Wood. 

Although Chamberlain was suspicious of many aspects of the assault 

story, he fe lt that some soldier was guilty on the g rounds that he could 

think of no reason why a civilian would do it. Despite this conclusion, 

he considered Colonel Paulding justified in placing the town off limits 

in order to avoid any possible trouble. 

Chamberlain surmised that the universal local animosity toward the 

black soldiers alleged by the newspapers did not exist. Instead, it was 

limited to a rowdy minority. Contrary to the views expressed by this 

element and the press, Chamberlain found that the 24th's conduct had 

been exemplary. He interviewed local police officials, reviewed arrest 

records, and talked with officials ofthe railroad and trolley lines used 

by the soldiers. They all agreed that the soldiers were among the best 

behaved of any ever stationed at the barracks. Of course, every unit had 

its roug h e lement. It was these few who caused the problems in the village, taking advantage of its tolerance for corruption. 

Chamberlain informed the village council of its responsibility to 

clean up the town, especially if the citizens wanted protection from the 

" Rpl, Chamberlain, 22 Mar 09, sub: lnvesligalion, Sackells Harbor, File 30361, 

Enlry 1486, RG 393, NARA. 

95 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

rowdy few. Until the council did so, he would recommend to Colonel 

Paulding not to lift his restriction. The soldiers were not deprived, since 

they could take the short train ride to nearby Watertown for shopping 

and entertainment or go on pass to Syracuse. He passed his comments 

to Paulding, suggesting that he cooperate with the village officials and 

perhaps establish courtesy patrols to restore civilian confidence. He 

further told Paulding that in his view he was also partially responsible 

for the crisis and that he should have been more vigorous in investigating and prosecuting reports of soldier misconduct. He predicted that 

should the town begin to reform as expected after elections scheduled 

for L6 March, there would be no further trouble, given the regiment's 

record for excellent behavior.48 

The investigation raised another problem for Colonel Paulding, 

caused by Private Richardson's alibi that he was working in the lieutenant's quarters. The soldier had added that he waited on tables, did 

other domestic duties, and was excused from most drills to do so. 

Apparently, the practice of employing soldiers as servants and permitting them to almost completely disregard their military duties was 

widespread among otTicers. Colonel Chamberlain mentioned his findings informally to Colonel Paulding, who pledged he would correct 

the situation.

4

'

1 

Despite this, General Wood learned of the practice and decided 

more formal action was necessary. He instructed Paulding to assure that 

his troops were performing only proper duties and that any personal 

work was done after duty hours and for proper pay. He formalized his 

views in a department circular, specifying the conditions under which 

a subordinate could work for a superior. The work could not be 

demeaning, must be performed after duty hours, and must be completely voluntary and remunerative.50 Thus, from a seemingly obscure 

incident and investigation, a major Army policy emerged, establishing 

a long-standing precedent. 

The situation began to improve in Sacketts Harbor as well. As 

Chamberlain predicted, the elections brought in a new regime, whose 

efforts largely cleaned up the town. Colonel Paulding ended the offlimits restriction in April. Then, in October, General Wood received a 

letter from retired Maj. James H. Durham, a reporter for the Syracuse 

•s Ibid. 

•• Memo, Chamberlain to Paulding, 23 Mar 09, sub: Disregard of Military Duties; 

Madison Barracks Cir 2, II Mar 09. Both in File 30361, Entry 1486, RG 393, NARA. 50 Dept of East Draft and Cir 14, 14 Apr 09; Ltr, TAG to All Cdrs, 17 May 09. Both 

in Fi le 30361 , Entry 1486, RG 393, NARA. 

96 
THE QUALITY OF LIFE 

Post-Standard. He was a 25-year Army veteran and a local native. His 

editor had picked him to cover the assault case because of his background. He told Wood that in the course of his own investigation he 

had become convinced that the young woman in question was not 

telling the truth. Several months after Chamberlain's visit, she finally 

admitted that the incident had been contrived to discredit the black soldiers and have the 24th Infantry reassigned. Her co-conspirators had 

lost their nerve to follow up the incident with a riot and shooting as 

planned.51 The confession supported the suspicions of many of the 

investigators, and the regiment was vindicated. Until its return to the 

Philippines in December 191 I, the unit enjoyed amicable relations 

with the community. 

Corruption in the Army 

A few investigations turned up evidence of extensive corruption and led 

to the criminal conviction of military personnel. Such was the case of 

the supply operations in the Division of the Philippines. Established 

during the Insurrection, the depots seemed unable to organize themselves properly. Colonel Garlington served as the local division inspector from April to June 1900, when he went on extended sick leave, and 

Col. Joseph P. Sanger thereafter until Garlington's return in February 

190 I. As early as 190 I Garlington cited the Manila Commissary Depot 

for stockpiling more material than necessary, causing much unnecessary and expensive spoilage. When General Breckinridge visited the 

capital the following year, he began an investigation of the Manila 

Medical Depot because the amount of damaged stores being condemned indicated similar stockage problems. Recognizing that overseas logistics represented a new challenge, both directed their efforts to 

improve the new "imperial" logistics system. 52 

As a result of their interest, the Division of the Philippines developed specific policies for handling stores and condemning perishables. 

ln addition, a court of inquiry was convened in May 1902 to find out 

how such enormous excesses could have been accumulated and 

whether specific responsibility should be fixed. Colonel Sanger, the 

division inspector and acting chief of staff as of April, headed the court. 

According to the court's findings, the excesses resulted from pardonable misjudgment on the part of the responsible officers. Their desire 

" Ltr, Durham to Wood, II Oct 09, File 30361, Entry 1486, RG 393, NARA. 

ll Rpt (quoted word), Garlington, 5 Apr 01 , sub: Extravagance in Manila 

Commissary Depot: Memo, Breckinridgc, [1903]. Both in Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 

97 
T HE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

not to be caught short had combined with the novelty of the situation to 

create the surplusage.sJ 

Thus the first problems that surfaced at the depots were found to 

result from inefficiency rather than turpitude. But those found at the 

Manila Quartermaster Depot were of a different nature. A growing 

scandal surfaced in January 1906, when Colonel Garlington, once 

again the division inspector, performed a routine inspection. Probing 

accusations that the depot commander had had furnitlU·e made in the 

carpentry shop for his own use at government expense, he found a 

broad pattern of similar work done for many others, along with evidence of collusion, cover-up, and graft. Because of his findings, the 

depot was closed and its responsibilities were transferred to other facilities. In May, following Garlington's return to the United States because 

of illness, General Wood, the division commander at the time, appointed the deputy inspector, Lt. Col. William T. Wood, to continue the 

investigation, directing him to look into every aspect of the defunct 

depot's operations.s.. 

Colonel Wood's efforts extended into November, as he pieced 

together seven years of questionable activities. He requested that several former depot commanders and their civilian assistants return to 

Mani Ia to give personal testimony, for their own sake as well as for that 

of the government. Over several months the inspector was able to reconstruct numerous examples of every type of transaction made at the 

depot. During the investigation he interviewed over I 00 individuals.ss 

The depot shops had been established in May 1899, under the depot 

quartermaster. In September 1901 they were reorganized, becoming a 

separate agency directly under the division chief quartermaster, Col. 

Charles F. Humphrey, later the Quartermaster General of the Army. The 

investigation revealed that irregularities in shop operations had begun by 

the summer of 190 I. Wood first worked on the furniture issue, since that 

was what had precipitated the whole case. Finding three different sets of 

books kept by the carpentry shop, he concluded that over $25,000 worth 

of work had been performed for nearly 200 officers and organizations, 

with no payment to the Treasury. In some cases, the recipients of the 

work had paid in good faith and the shop employees and depot commander had pocketed the funds. In other cases, officers were unaware 

sJ Oiv of Phil GO 23, 1902, and SO I 02, 1902, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 

" Memo, Wood to Div Insp. 26 May 06, with encl. (Garlington Rpt), Entry 24, RG 

159, NARA. 

ss Discussion in this and the fo llowing six paragraphs from Ltr, W. Wood to MiiSec, 

Phil Div, 10 Nov 08, with cncls., Entry 24, RG 159, NARA 

98 
THE QUALITY OF liFE 

that they were supposed to pay, 

assuming they were entitled to the 

service. Still others had had items 

made for themselves, fully aware 

of the impropriety. 

As a result, individuals both 

high and low had become witting 

or unwitting participants in a fraud, 

and some had incurred substantial 

bills to the government. Even 

Brigadier General Humphrey, 

while he was the Quartermaster 

General, had ordered lacquered 

chests to be made, which he gave 

as presents- one of them to 

President Roosevelt. Colonel 

Wood reconstructed the liability of 

each officer. Debts ranged from a 

high of $6,252.99, owed by a former Adjutant General, to a low of 

44 cents, owed by a captain in the 

Subsistence Department. 

Brig. Gen. William T Wood 

(Rank as of 18 February 1918) 

But such irregularities were only the beginning. He also discovered 

private sales of public property, with no accounting for the funds 

received. Procedures required that all worn or potentially useless property be inspected before disposal. This had not been done at the depot 

shops. Rather, scrap metal, lumber, and worn items were sold openly to 

private individuals and the proceeds split between the depot commanders and several senior civilian employees. Wood estimated that the 

government had lost $15,000 in five years. 

Another irregularity consisted in padding payrolls with fictitious 

names, enabling the conspirators to draw extra pay. This fraud required 

an elaborate multiple bookkeeping arrangement involving the depot 

commander, his chief clerk and the timekeeper. Two different commanders had pocketed about$ J l ,000 by this means. Official paperwork had 

to be fabricated so that visiting IGs would not detect the discrepancies 

during their periodic audits of employee time cards. The time books had 

to be correlated with the payrolls. Some individuals were shown in 

higher paying jobs than they were performing; personal servants of the 

depot commander and his officers were listed as carpenters and 

welders. False vouchers were prepared to bjde the purchase of items for 

private use. 

99 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

There were other frauds. An outrageous rent was paid for some dock 

facilities. In return, the dock's owners paid $2,000 into the depot commander's personal bank account, allegedly in payment for dock maintenance. The roster of employees was amended to exempt many from 

recently initiated civil service examinations; the carpentry shop secretary, for example, was listed as a machinist, and expert Japanese woodcarvers were carried on the rolls as carpenters. Their carving work was 

done in a secluded area so as to avoid visits from inspectors, and an elaborate warning system was developed to alert them whenever IGs happened on the premises. ft was these carvers who had turned out the beautiful furniture accepted unquestioningly by so many persons. 

Work orders were rarely fi led, although, strangely, they were 

retained in most cases. The carpentry shop also operated an unauthorized printing press, sanctioned by the division quartermaster general, 

Col. John L. Clem. Clem, in addition, fai led to monitor the purchase of 

large items, such as coastal vessels that were bought for interisland traffic, merely authorizing expenditures on request. The inspector discovered that a gambling partner of the shop commander received sales 

commissions on these overpriced ships. In Colonel Wood's view, the 

whole atmosphere of the establishment was amoral, characterized by a 

lack of responsibility or accountability. Honest workers shunned the 

depot shops, and Wood agreed that the depot's closing had been the 

only solution to solve the immediate problem. Based on Wood's recommendation, six successive depot commanders were court-martialed 

and Clcm/ 6 one of the last Civil War veterans on duty, was disgraced. 

In December, after Secretary of War Taft, the late governor of the 

Philippines, read Wood's report, he wrote a carefully reasoned letter to 

General Garlington, now the Inspector General. In Taft's view, Wood's 

identification of the improper property disposal and funds and payrol1 

manipulations was so thorough that it established the groundwork necessary for the judicial proceedings soon to get under way. The Secretary 

was disturbed, however, by the furniture bills and wished them to remain 

an IG, rather than a criminal, matter. He was quite confident that some 

of the men on the list had committed no criminal act, that others might 

be due a return of funds, and that still others owed the government. This 

specific matter, he believed, should be cleared up quietly. 

The Secretary gave Garlington a suggested line of inquiry and 

asked him to devise a system for resolving the bills. He cautioned 

u Early in the investigation Clem was reassigned to a post in the United States, 

where he served until he retired in 1916. 

100 
THE QUALITY OF L IFE 

against any premature publicity, as the accusations involved many 

prominent officers. Determining an equitable settlement took longer 

than expected; Garlington eventually had to go to Manila. The amounts 

recorded by the depot were mixed with its other operations and had 

been padded. The only recourse was to review completely all the paperwork. In some cases, testimony from former employees of the carpentry shop on the actual prices charged and on the amount of markup was 

the only hard evidence available. A new set of corrected bills was prepared, each containing a best estimate of the actual costs to the government, which Secretary Taft approved in November 1907. He further 

agreed to Garlington's plan to refund overpayments to those who had 

paid in good faith the first, inflated, billing. By June 1908 only General 

Humphrey had failed to pay.57 

The Office of the Inspector General functioned as the collection 

agent, placing the money in an account in a Washington bank from 

which the refunds were made. Meanwhile, the courts-martial ran their 

course in Manila, and all six depot commanders involved received fines 

and jail sentences. The refund account was closed on 30 June 1908, and 

with its passing, a delicate problem, fraught with the potential for 

extended scandal, was resolved. So ended one of the most prolonged 

and far-reaching investigations conducted before World War I. In retrospect, the criminals' fear of discovery by inspectors had compelled 

them to develop such an elaborate system of fraud, involving so many 

people, that it virtually collapsed of its own weight. The case itself 

demonstrated the professionalism and integrity of the inspection system, which ultimately assured that justice was served while protecting 

the rights of the innocent involved. 

Military Prisoners and Prisons 

Many aspects of the military justice system drew the inspectors' attention. When Leonard Wood was Chief of Staff, he became concerned 

with the practice of armed guards escorting all garrison prisoners. 

Wood was worried over the images such practices gave to post visitors. 

Consequently, in May 1911 he encouraged post commanders to place 

"good risk" prisoners on parole when they performed duties in public. 

In February 1912 Wood asked General Garlington to make the execution of this program an item of special inquiry during inspections. Until 

" Ltr, Sotw to IG, 20 Dec 06; Memo, Garlington to TAG, 19 Jun 08. Both in Entry 

24, RG 159, NARA. 

101 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

1917 each inspection report thus contained a section giving related statistics and an assessment as to whether Wood's intent was being 

achieved. The reports were generally positive.58 

The War Department also reviewed other military justice policies. 

Beginning in 1901, dishonorable discharges had been authorized for 

soldi ers with five or more court-martial convictions. This policy was 

amended in June 1905. The change specified that to qualify for such 

discharges, soldiers had to have been convicted of offenses meriting 

large fines and confinement- in other words, major crimes. This modification raised a storm of protest. Commanders argued that they would 

no longer be able to dismiss marginal soldiers who were habitually in 

trouble for minor offenses. Others retorted that the commanders had 

been getting rid of too many people without first trying to reform them. 

The Judge Advocate General rejoined that discharges for prior convictions had dropped by 19 percent since 1901. 

In March 1907 the Secretary of War asked General Garlington to 

assess the true effect of the policy and to determine whether it was beneficial as it stood or whether it should be modified. Garlington passed 

the requirement to inspectors at the geographical commands, asking 

them also to survey the officers on the situation. They found that about 

60 percent of the nearly 300 company commanders surveyed disli ked 

the 1905 amendment, claiming that it reduced their ability to eliminate 

problem soldiers. However, nearly 80 percent of the field-grade officers favored it, arguing that company-level officers were younger and 

less experienced than their pre-Spanish War counterparts. They felt that 

company officers often used courts-martial to avoid having to deal with 

the undesirable in any constructive manner. The inspectors concluded 

that the courts had become in many cases substitutes for leadership. 

Garlington agreed, stating that the senior officers' views should prevail. 

As a result, the J 905 amendment was retained, but special provisions 

were added to handle administratively soldiers who were chronic disciplinary problems. 9 

The inspectors were equally involved in reporting on the operations 

of the U.S. military prisons. The Army had begun its own prison system 

in 1873, and inspections began shortly thereafter. .Because the 

Secretary of War had responsibility for prison operations, War 

Department inspectors usually performed the inspections un less scheduling prevented them. However, in 1895 the central Army facilities 

'' Memo, CofS, WD, to IG, 3 Feb 12, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA . 

.. Ltrs, TAG to IG, 8 Mar 07, and IG to TAG, 5 Aug 07, Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 

102 
THE QUALITY OF LIFE 

were turned over to the Federal Bureau of Prisons as an economy measure. This arrangement meant that while a few military felons went into 

the federal penitentiaries, most military prisoners were in local stockades administered by garrison commanders, imposing a great burden 

on them. 

The Inspectors General supported the garrison commanders consistently in urging that a military prison system be resurrected. In 1903 

General Bwton noted that most post stockade facilities were inadequate and the requirement detracted from organizational efficiency. The 

task of guarding prisoners was distasteful and burdensome for units 

that also were trying to train. Units received no additional equipment or 

personnel for the job. Bw-ton was delighted when, due to a change in 

policy, the Army regained control of the prison facilities at Fort 

Leavenworth in February 1906. While repairs began, inspectors continued to make welfare visits to military convicts in other federa l prisons.60 

During their prison visits inspectors were concerned with food, 

troop conduct, living conditions, staffing, and the facility in general. 

When necessary, they also dealt with issues unique to the individual 

prisoner. For example, during an inspection in October 1906 Colonel 

Chamberlain, who was assigned to the Office of the Inspector General, 

encountered a former ordnance private first class who was convicted of 

pilfering some minor items for his own use. The man had served with 

distinction for twenty-four years in the same unit and his court-martial 

board bad recommended clemency. But the recommendation had been 

ignored, and the man was given a two-year sentence, with a dishonorable discharge. Chamberlain concluded that the prisoner was slow-witted and recommended that the remainder of the sentence be remitted 

and the man be pardoned. The Secretary of War agreed, and at the end 

of November the President remitted the sentence and upgraded the 

man 's discharge.61 Not only was he now free but also eligible for residence in the Soldiers' Home in Washington, D.C. 

Inspectors recommended the assignment of chaplains to the prisons 

and later clerk typists to assist them. After the 1907 inspection of the 

Leavenworth prison, the inspector came to the conclusion that the prisoners, instead of splitting rock and doing crude roadwork, should be 

kept busy in meaningful labor that would enable them to learn a trade. 

He suggested that they repair tools and furnitme for the Army. The 

Quartermaster General agreed in principle, and directed that the prison 

60 ARIG 1903, pp. 450- 51; ARJG 1905, p. 453; ARJG 1906, pp. 650-51. 6

' Llr, Chamberlain, thruiG, 10 SoiW, 23 Oct 06, and Reply, 23 Nov 06, Entry 7, RG 

159, NARA. 

103 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

provide furniture repair support to the Fort Leavenworth garrison. 

Preparing for their inspections also made the inspectors aware of the 

outdated and conflicting policies on prisons then in print, and a revised 

set of policies was published in February 1908.62 

General Garlington's personal interest in penology remained high. 

When he represented the United States at the Imperial German 

Maneuvers in 1911 , he delayed his return in order to visit England, 

where he received an extensive tour of the British Detention Barracks. 

He expressed a particular interest in efforts to rehabilitate military 

offenders. On his return, his detailed report on the conditions and procedures in the British system was considered so important that the 

Secretary of War had it published as part of his annual report.63 

Garlington's report gave impetus to reform and rehabilitation in the 

prison system, joining a similar move in the civilian sphere. The regulations were changed to differentiate between criminal and military 

offenders, and the latter were placed in disciplinary companies to 

undergo additional strict training aimed to rehabilitate and ultimately 

return them to duty. The program was a matter of interest whenever 

inspectors visited the prisons or their branches. /\t first, the military 

offenders spent their full sentence in a disciplinary company. This policy was amended in early 1915 at the inspectorate's suggestion. The 

new concept allowed offenders with good records to be restored to duty 

after completing a training course at the disciplinary barracks as soon 

as the commandant judged that they could be productive--a more 

humane and sensible approach to rehabilitation.(,! 

Homes and Cemeteries 

Even on issues relating to retirement and death benefits the inspectorate continued to guard the individual soldier's interests. The homes 

for regular and volunteer troops and the national cemeteries received 

special attention from the Secretary of War, and the homes were unique 

in that their inspection was required by act of Congress, rather than by 

War Department policy. 

6J Rpl, Galbraith, 4 May 07, sub: lnspcclion, Lcavenwonh Military Prison, Enlry 7; 

Ltr, T. Wood 10 TG, 15 Sep 08, Entry 9. Bolh in RG 159, NARA. Sec also WD GO 131. 

1890, GO 13, 1895, and GO 16, 1908. 63 /IRS IV 1911, pp. 23, 68 74. See also prison escape files, Box 151 , Enlry 24, RG 

159, NARJ\. 

"'ARSIV 1913, p. 9; 11/UG 1915, p. 232; WD GO 56, 1913. See also prison inspeclion files, Box 166, Enlry 9, NARA. 

104 
THE QUALITY OF L IFE 

The Soldiers' Home in Washington, D.C., had been established in 

the 1850s as an asylum for disabled Regular Army soldiers, with membership later broadened to include all retired regular enlisted men. The 

Inspector General, acting for the Secretary of War, began to inspect the 

home in 1883, when Congress directed that he visit the home annually 

to investigate alleged financial inefficiencies on the part of the board of 

managers. As required by the March 1883 law, the Secretary provided 

the inspection report to Congress.65 

The inspection reviewed every aspect of the home thoroughly, 

including its operation and accotmts. The Inspector General was accompanied by an assistant and the OIG expert accountant, who examined all 

transactions and disbursements and listed them in great detail. Half of the 

report presented data on salaries, expenditures, and costs; the remaining 

half included a thorough description of the I iving quarters, with remarks 

on all facilities, such as the library and hospital. Compliments as well as 

recommendations for improvement were given in the narrative remarks. 

The conduct, appearance, and morale of the residents also was discussed 

and suggestions made where appropriate. During this period the reports 

showed that the home was generally well run by able retired officers. The 

inspection usually took two days, and the report served mainly as a means 

to publicize the home's needs and to justifY expenditures.66 

Such judgments were not the case with the more complex and 

decentralized organization set up to care for the Civil War volunteers. 

The National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers (NHDVS) had 

been organized in 1865 under the direction of a civilian board of managers. Membership originally was limited to war-disabled veterans, but 

in 1884 it was opened to all veterans incapable of earning a Jiving. By 

then the NHDVS consisted of a growing number of branches scattered 

tlu·oughout the United States, plus a headquarters in New York City. 

The organization suffered from serious mismanagement, which erupted in a series of scandals in the late 1880s. As a result, between 1891 

and l 893 the War Department inspectorate assumed a growing role in 

the inspection of NHDVS fiscal activities. Finally, in 1893 the 

Inspector General's Department was given the responsibility to make 

an annual inspection of all elements of the NHDVS. 67 

6

' WD GO 24, 1883. 

"' See Soldiers' Home lnsp Rpts, 1883-, Entry 35, RG 159, NARA, as well as those 

published in ARSW. 61 Maria B. Butler, "The National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers," Harpers 

New Montii/J' Magazine 73, no. 47 (1886): 683- 95; Act of Congress, 3 Mar 93, copy in 

Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. 

105 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Because of the high degree of assumed congressional interest, the 

first few inspections were exceptionally stringent. As a result, the per 

capita cost of members actually dropped at a time when the resident 

population was increasing. General Breckinridge estimated that in the 

first decade of lG inspection, the government had saved about 

$500,000 annually. The need to make full audits ended in 190 I, but 

inspectors continued to look closely at all NHDVS financial activities. 

In the meantime, minor complaints against various elements of the 

organization became so routine that a form letter was developed to 

acknowledge receipt to the complainant and to initiate action. The 

Secretary of War forwarded all correspondence to the Office of the 

Inspector General, which tasked the president of the NHDVS Board of 

Managers for the actions necessary to address the complaint.~s 

The annual inspections of the NHDVS required a large portion of 

an inspector's year. Major Brewster, along with expert accountant 

William T. Kent, conducted the 1909 inspection between II August and 

27 October. The two men visited the organization's nine branches, sanitarium, depot, and general ofTices, giving each a thorough inspection 

and audit. Each branch's administration, records, membership qualifications, and internal operations were analyzed and improvements or 

changes recommended.69 

In 1909 the NHDVS received and disbursed about $ 16 million. A 

unique part of its operation was the NHDVS Depot at Dayton, Ohio, 

whose purpose was to manufacture blank forms, issue bedding and 

clothing throughout the system, and store Army surplus items that 

would be used to replace old Nl!DVS equipment. Payrolls for the entire 

system were prepared at the depot, which also arranged all major open 

purchases or contracts. Brewster considered the facility to be superbly 

run by its superintendent, Mrs. D. L. Miller, a woman who obviously 

could hold her own in a male-dominated age. Brewster judged her to be 

"far more than average in ability" and responsible for creating a tone of 

integrity throughout the NHDVS system. 70 

The inspection of national cemeteries was another task precipitated 

by post-Civil War congressional concern for veterans. Authorized by 

Congress in 1862 to handle the growing number of Civil War casualties, 

the cemeteries initially were located near hospitals and battlefields to 

.. Memo, Breckinridge, [ 1903], Entry 24, RG 159, NARA. For complaints, see File 

3100. Entry 29, RG 159, NARA . 

.. Rpt, Brewster to SofW, I Dec 09, sub: Inspection of the Several Branches of the 

National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, Entry 22, RG 159, NARA. 

• Rpt, Brewster to Sotw, I Dec 09, Entry 22, RG 159, NARA 

106 
THE QUALITY OF LIFE 

meet emergency needs. After the war the Quartermaster General began a 

consolidation program, dtu·ing which land titles were validated, headstones placed, and remains accounted for. By 1870 there were nearly 

300,000 graves in seventy-tlu·ee cemeteries. A February 1867 law provided for the care and maintenance of the cemeteries and mandated that the 

Secretary of War appoint officers to conduct annual inspections. The subsequent findings formed the basis for justifying appropriations to maintain the cemeteries. By 1873 legislation had expanded burial rights in a 

national cemetery to all veterans. This led to a further expansion of the 

system throughout the country, particularly in the Western states, where 

reburials from the cemeteries of closed posts further fueled the growth.71 

The inspection requirements grew as the cemetery system expanded. Quartermaster officers had the responsibility to make the inspections until 1876, when the job was assumed by local IGs. It reverted 

again to the quartermasters in 1879, only to be resumed by IGs in 1882. 

The requirement was again modified the next year to allow acting 

inspectors detailed from the Quartermaster's Department to inspect the 

cemeteries. Their reports still had to go through IG channels. Finally, in 

1903 supervision over cemetery inspection was placed at the War 

Department inspectorate and visits were required once every two calendar years, which remained the practice until the national cemeteries 

were transferred to the Veterans Administration in 1973.72 

The reports indicated that the cemetery inspections, although usually routine, were thorough. They provided a good pictw·e of cemetery 

conditions, as well as information on records, administration, and physical appearance. A summary of each report was prepared at the Office 

of the Inspector General and, once the Secretary ofWar had a briefing, 

was forwarded to the Quartermaster General for his use and action. 

Inspectors' recommendations were divided fairly evenly between policy suggestions and proposals for local improvements. The latter included such things as providing memorial tablets or recording the knowledge of long-term superintendents before they retired.

73 

Occasionally, an inspector's suggestion led to substantial improvements, as in 1915, when the War Department decided that water and 

" Erna Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army: A Hisr01y of the Corps. 

1775- 1939 (Washington, D.C.: Quartermaster Historian 's Office, Office of the 

Quartermaster General, 1962), pp. 463- 68. 

n WD GO 68, 1876, GO 6 1, 1879, GO 17, 1882, and GO 73, 1883; Memo, 

Breckinridge, (1903], Entry 24, RG 159, NARA; A Reg 20- 10, various dates beginning 

27 Jan 21. On the transfer, see PL 93-43, 18 Jun 73. 1

J For examples of cemetery inspections, see Boxes 96 and 154, Entry 9, RG 159, 

NARA. 

107 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

sewage systems were to be installed in all cemeteries . Major Gray, the 

assistant inspector of the Southern Department, fe lt the measure was 

necessary to aid in improving the foliage, providing modern restrooms 

for the public, and helping in fire prevention. The Quartermaster 

General agreed and began the project the next year. 74 

There was a great similarity in the cemetery reports. The minor 

deficiencies were routinely passed to the Quartermaster General, who 

saw to it that they were corrected promptly. When larger problems concerning the care and condition of a cemetery were reported, often 

involving unexpected expenditures, the Quartermaster General was 

hampered by the slow appropriations process, which often took years. 

Cemetery inspections also included a thorough audit of the superintendent's disbursing records. Rarely were major problems encountered on 

these inspections, which, while conscientiously performed, must have 

been a pleasant break from more rigorous requirements. 

,. Rpt, Gray, 10 Nov 15, sub: Port Hudson Cemetery, Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 

108 
PART TWO 

WORLD WAR I AND THE 

INSPECTORATE, 1917-1919 

4 

The Great War Approaches 

The development of the War Department General Staff and command 

staffs during the era of reform and the stress on preparedness, schools, 

and training created a generation of officers who proved capable of 

meeting the vast challenges presented by World War I. Yet the United 

States Army as a whole was at best marginally prepared for the great 

modern conflict in which it found itself when the nation declared war 

on the German Empire on 6 Apri I 1917. 

Girding for War 

Other nations had been fighting since August 1914, and at first it 

seemed unlikely that the United States would be able to make a11 important contribution to the struggle. Limits on the nation's potential for 

success had been imposed w1wittingly by the Wilson Administration 

and Congress. Before the outbreak of hostilities, government policy 

discouraged any interest in the European war; the President's desire to 

remain neutral in "thought as well as action" precluded taking any measures that would help to prepare for involvement in the war. The 

National Defense Act of 1916 was intended to make America capable 

of repelling an invader, not of projecting its power overseas. 1 

Even after war was declared, President Wilson remained indifferent 

to the need for a strong Chief of Staff and delegated most of his authority to Secretary of War Baker and to General John J. Pershing, Baker's 

1 Edward M. Coffman, The ~ritr To End All Wars: Tire American Militmy Experience 

in World War I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 10- 11 , 17; Harvey A. 

DeWeerd, President Wilson Fights His H-Itr: H-¥1rld ~ritr I and the American intervention 

(New York: Macmi llan Co., 1968), p. 394; Ernest R. May, The World rritr and American 

Isolation, 1914- 1917 (Cambridge, Mass.: .Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 44 

(Wilson's quoted words). 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

choice as commander-in-chief of the American Expeditionary Forces 

(AEF). Baker, an able administrator, focused on the administrative and 

logistical aspects of creating the huge Army needed for the war and left 

the strategic and operational planning to Pershing.2 

Meantime, an uncoordinated procurement program began, characterized by highly optimistic manpower goals and misplaced priorities as 

each bureau went into direct competition with each other for available 

resources. American war potential was at first in danger of being frittered away in ambitious, unrealistic procurement programs propelled 

by uninformed guesses of War Department officials or the overly pessimistic estimates of allied advisers.3 

By December J 917, because of the severe winter in Europe and the 

shifting military picture, the inefficient and cumbersome procedures at 

the War Department came under intense scrutiny by the Senate 

Committee on Military Affairs. The committee was highly critical of 

War Department organization. ln response, Secretary Baker undertook a 

number of reforms in early 1918. He centralized War Department activities, gradually strengthening the Office of the Chief of StafT; created 

supervisory agencies, such as the War Industries Board, which exercised 

tighter control over purchasing and pol icy decisions; and replaced several bureau heads with more aggressive but flexible administrators. In 

March Baker also appointed a new Chief of StafT, General Peyton C. 

March, who possessed the authority and personality necessary to organize and centralize War Deparh11ent activities into a coherent unit.~ 

A final product of the reorganization was the Overman Act of May 

1918, which gave the President much wider war powers. Henceforth, 

tbe chief executive had the authority to create, alter, or abolish any 

agencies that affected any aspect of the war effort. For the Army the 

practical result was to give the Secretary broad control over industrial 

mobilization and the Chief of Staff the power to restructure bureau 

activities, particularly supply and procurement.5 

1 Warren W. Hassler, Jr., The President as Commander-in-Chief(Menlo Park, Calif.: 

Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1971 ), p. 98; Daniel R. Beaver, Newton D. Baker and 

the American War E.ffort. /91 7-1919 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), pp. 

87, 180. 

1 DeWeerd, Wilson Fights His Hill", pp. 394-95. 

' Peyton C. March, The Nation at War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. Doran and 

Co., 1932), pp. 40-43, 49 51, 369-70; Beaver, Baker and the 110r Effort, pp. 96- 97. 

March actually served as Acting Chief of Staff from March until 19 May 1918, when 

he received his permanent appointment. 

James B. I lewes, Jr., From Root to lvlcNamam: Army Organization tmd Administrtttion, 1900- 1963 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Mi litary History, 1975}, p. 41. 

11 2 
THE GREAT WAR APPROACHES 

General March used the General Staff as both a directing and a 

planning agency, with the technical bureaus in a clearly subordinate 

position. He streamlined the logistics system, concentrating it under the 

direction of Maj. Gen. George W. Gocthels, the builder of the Panama 

Canal. Ultimately, he established a system under which the Chief of 

Staff was recognized as paramount, and all bureaus reported to him 

through clements ofthe General StafT. March's primary objectives were 

to synchronize the training and logistical systems in order to allow the 

greatest possible flow of troops to France.6 Inevitably, some tension 

developed between himself and General Pershing, whose status as the 

AEF commander-in-chief enabled him to enjoy the independence 

allowed him by Wilson and Baker. But both, beyond doubt, were 

focused on the same goal- victory in Europe. 

That end entailed a far greater effort than anyone had anticipated. 

When the United States entered the war, very few of its leaders expected to see millions of Americans fighting in Europe. Rather, the vague 

anticipation was that American participation would consist of considerable financial aid, some naval cooperation with the Royal Navy, and 

perhaps a token ground force sent "over there." As late as the end of 

May 1917 the country's leaders were still reluctant to recognize that a 

large land force would have to be raised and deployed overseas. The 

realization began to sink in as the allies frankly described their situation, which was very difficult: Russia was in collapse; Great Britain 

was scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel; and a wave of 

mutinies afflicted the French Army. 7 

General Pershing's small expeditionary staff arrived in France in 

June and, training with a separate Un ited States commission headed by 

Col. Chauncey B. Baker, already in Paris, gave Washington planners their 

first realistic picture of the size army that was needed. At a minimum, a 

force of thirty divisions, with support troops in a suitable separate line of 

communications, would be required; an estimated three million men 

would have to be called to the colors. Obviously, reliance on volunteers 

for such a huge force was not possible. Within days the Secretary of War 

ordered the Judge Advocate General to produce a reasonably equitable 

conscription law, which was almost immediately enacted. 8 

• March, Nation ati'M:tr, pp. 70. 76, 188, 372. 

' Ronald Spector, "You're Not Going To Send Soldiers Over There Arc You!" 

Military Afl{tirs 36 (Feb 72): 1-4 (quoted words, p. I). 

' llugh S. Johnson, The Blue Eagle From Egg to Eartlt (Garden City, N.Y.: 

Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1935), pp. 75 82; Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. 

Henry, llisl01:1' ofMobili=alion in tlte Uniled Simes Army. 1775- 1945, DA Pamphlet 

No. 20- 212 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 254. 

113 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL., 1903-1939 

The two groups also proposed a new infantry division, designed to 

endure the attrition expected on the Western Front. Much larger and differently organized fi·om the few then existing, the so-called square division consisted of two infantry brigades, each with two regiments; a 

field artillery brigade, with three regiments; an engineer regiment; 

machine gun and signal battalions; and support units, to include medical. The huge unit had over 28,000 men and 6,000 horses and mules, 

twice the size of European divisions. Pershing planned from the start to 

create a force large enough to operate independently. Consequently, the 

AEF personnel requirements and the subsequent equipment demands 

remained extremely high throughout the war. Changes in either allied 

or enemy numbers seemed to have little effect on AEF manpower planning. The consistently high demands for men and materiel later prompted a frustrated Secretary Baker to say that Pershing "saw his own problem, but seems wholly to have fa iled to grasp ours."9 

IGD Expansion 

The Inspector General's Department (I GO) was no better prepared than 

the rest of the War Department for handling the demands of a major 

war. Yet, like other parts of the Army it was obliged to set a hectic pace. 

The focus of its work was assessing the quality of the men and units 

being readied to go to France, and yet all the customary and statutory 

duties of peacetime had to be carried on despite the emergency. The 

force available for this double duty was at first hopelessly small. 

The effects of the National Defense Act of 19 16 were only barely 

being felt when war was declared. Three additional o·tficers were on 

board, the first of the expected five annual increments; existing legislation did not provide automatica lly for strength increases. With each 

restructuring or new nontacticalunit, Brig. Gen. Jolm L. Chamberlain, 

the Inspector General, was required to reapportion his personnel assets 

up until passage of the Overman Act, which allowed his department to 

expand more rapidly. In 19 17 the department had 23 officers at the time 

war was declared in April and 37 by the end of June. A year later, after 

the Overman Act eased restrictions on expansion, the number of officers had increased to 129. The peak strength of the inspectorate was 

2 16 officers on 12 November 19 18. 10 

• DeWeerd, Wilson Fights 1-lis War, pp. 208, 241-42, 394-95; CoiTman, War To End 

AI/ Wars, p. 185 (Baker·s quoted words). 10 Rpt, 1GD, Jan 19, sub: Historical Data, War of 19 17- 1918, Entry 26, Record Group 

(RG) 159, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C. 

114 
THE GREAT WAR APPROACHES 

Organizationally, the Inspector General 's Department had component elements located in the War Department, in each geographica l 

command and port of embarkation, in each combat division and higher tactical unit, and in the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the AEF in 

France. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in Washington 

mainly was concerned with the selection and allocation of inspectors 

and the coordination and standardization of inspection efforts throughout the Army. It consisted of several tactical unit inspection teams, a 

growing number of accountants, and a matrix of inspector-investigators 

to provide support wherever needed. The six U.S. and three overseas 

geographical commands provided area support to the installations and 

organizations permanently in their regions. Each had a small staff of 

officers who inspected or investigated as required. The port and GHQ 

AEF inspectorates developed functionally, having distinct inspection 

and investigation elements. 

At first, the Inspector General's Department functioned as before 

the war, with the local inspectors covering everything in their geographical areas, augmented only by inspectors in the new infantry divisions. General Chamberlain's later adjustments reflected a growing 

centralization of the stateside inspection system, seeking to achieve 

uniform standards and efficiency in order to meet urgent War 

Department needs for evaluation and information. A growing number 

of Washington inspectors dealt with matters concerning units training 

for overseas. A smaller number remained on the staffs of the geographical commands, focusing on installation and procurement matters.'' 

The demand for high-quality inspectors caused Chamberlain to 

change his initial reluctance to use only regulars, and in May he told the 

Chief of Staff that he agreed to the appointment of "well equipped" 

National Guard officers to division inspection positions. Instead of 

farming out his inspectors to the tactical units, as he had first planned, 

Chamberlain retained some of his best talent, eventually bringing the 

officers under his direct control. This, in turn, increased the importance 

of OIG activities, making the office the focal point of the inspection 

system, both from the perspectives of those in the field and in 

Washington. Nevertheless, there were some losses lo the Washington 

office, notably Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Andre W. Brewster, who was 

selected by General Pershing to be his inspector general. Brewster was 

a distinguished infantry officer, with nearly eight years of experience 

" Rpt, lGD, Apr 17, sub: Establishment of Changes in Department, Districts, etc., 

Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 

l i S 
THE INSPECTORS GEN ERAL, 1903-1939 

as an inspector. Cited for gallantry in Cuba and the Philippines, he had 

received the Medal of Honor for his bravery at Tientsin, China, during 

the Boxer Rebellion. Highly regarded by Generals Garlington and 

Chamberlain, and a personal friend of Pershing, he had an Army-wide 

reputation for professionalism and high personal standards. 12 

Original estimates for IG manpower continued to climb as the work 

load in the newly forming units became clearer. Originally, the War 

Department had authorized one lieutenant colonel inspector for each 

division. The burgeoning requirements necessitated additional personnel, and each local commander began to augment his IG office within 

weeks of his unit's activation. Chamberlain recommended that a major 

be authorized in each division as an assistant inspector. The proposal 

initially lacked support from The Adjutant General; however, 

Chamberlain persisted, his effort augmented by comments from officers overseas. The increase was approved in March 1918, making official what was by that time established practicc. 11 

Not all augmentations came as easily, despite a sh·ong consensus 

regarding their necessity. General Chamberlain was an early and strong 

advocate of having senior War Department inspectors appointed for 

each arm and for aviation matters. He was able to bring experts from 

the field, such as Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Eli A. Helmick in infantry, to 

achieve this aim. The officer selected to be the artillery expert was 

Major Conner, who had been an artillery inspector during the Mexican 

Border mobilization. But no sooner had he been detailed than he was 

picked by General Pershing for overseas duty as Brewster's assistant at 

the new AEF headquarters. (Capt. George S. Patton, Jr., had been 

offered the job first, but he turned it down, saying that service on the 

staff was "the cemetery of ambition.") As a result, there was no inspector in the branch considered the most critical by Chamberlain. 14 

The procurement of officers from other branches posed a different 

problem. Chamberlain had begun by adding a few Regular Army officers to the Inspector General's Department, only to see them siphoned 

off to other staff jobs or to commands where they were critically needed. The turbulence persuaded Chamberlain to request the recall of 

'

1 Memo (quoted word), IG to CofS, WO, 29 May 17, sub: Detail of Inspectors for 

the National Guard Infantry Divisions, Entry 25, RG 159, NARA; File 5728 ACP 1884, 

Andre Walker Brewster, Box 941, RG 94, NARA. Brewster was promoted to brigadier 

general on 17 June 1917. 

u Ltr, CG, 29th Oiv, NG, to IG, II Sep 17, sub: Detail of Omcers, Entry 26A, RG 

159, NARA. 

" Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mitllin Co., 

1972- 74), I :463. Helmick was promoted to brigadier general on 17 December 1917. 

116 
THE GREAT WAR APPROACHES 

retired regular officers with inspection experience; many such officers 

had written Chamberlain to express their willingness for recall in any 

capacity. Within two weeks after entry into the war, Chamberlain was 

soliciting those eligible with a personal letter. He intended to accept 

only those willing to serve as inspectors for the duration, rather than to 

see them use the IGD recall as a vehicle to get into some other part of 

the Army. He remarked in a May 1917 note to Capt. Walter L. Reed, 

who became The Inspector General in 1935, that there was no dearth of 

applicants but that very few "promised well." '

5 

· Most bureaus and departments established boards or panels to 

review the qualifications of applicants for reserve or emergency commissions. General Chamberlain opted for a formal board of two IG 

officers and a medical officer when appropriate. The first appointments 

were made to fill positions in the IGD's Officer Reserve Corps, established by law on 3 June 1916. Under the provisions ofthe law, all applicants had to have served at least one year on active duty and be under 

forty-five years of age. The first man to receive an IGD reserve 

appointment was Robert S. Clark, a New York civil engineer who had 

left the Army in 1903. Within ten days of applying for a temporary 

conm1ission, he was boarded and accepted into the Inspector General's 

Department. Reporting for duty as a major on 28 May 1917, Clark was 

quickly tagged to be part of the AEF inspectorate.

16 

Manpower from any source was most welcome by the summer of 

1917. Statistics gathered in July showed that the IGD case load had 

increased by more than 360 percent in one year and by 65 percent in the 

three months after the declaration of war. But 20 experienced officers 

were pulled out of the department in the sunm1er of 1917 to fill critical 

jobs in the National Guard and National Army divisions. None were 

assigned as inspectors. Their replacements had never served as inspectors before, yet Chamberlain felt lucky to get them because of the great 

demand for good officers throughout the Army. 17 

By September the authorized strength of the inspectorate had 

grown to only 34, despite the fact that 89 officers- 30 regulars, I 0 

" Ltr, Chamberlain to Byrne, 18 Apr 17; Ltr (quoted words), Chamberlain to Reed, 

14 May 17, sub: Officers of the National Guard for Service in the !GD. Both in Entry 

25, RG 159, NARA 16 Memo, IG to TAG, 23 Apr 17, sub: Appointment of Board To Examine Applicants 

for Appointments in ORC; Memo, JG to TAG, 28 May 17, sub: Appointment, Robert 

S. Clark. Both in Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 

'

7 Ltr, W Wood to Donaldson, 22 Aug 17, Entry I I; Memo, Scofield to IG, 23 Jut 

17, and Reply, 26 Jul 17, Entry 26. All in RG 159, NARA. See also Ltr, Chamberlain 

to Brewster, 14 Sep 17, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

117 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

recalled regulars, 49 reservists- were detailed to IG positions in the 

United States and France. Thirty-six of the total were serving in tactical units. In November Chamberlain proposed an authorized increase to 

158 officers. These were intended for the most part to fill higher level 

tactical headquarters and to meet the requirements of the greater number of divisions being formed than first anticipated. His request was 

approved, with a few modifications in the branch requirements of 

senior inspectors. The practice of expanding automatically as tactical 

nnits were activated was again confirmed. 18 

Chamberlain felt that his authorizations were not the only things 

out of pace with reality. He also considered the grades of his senior 

inspectors to be unrealistic when the scale of their duties and the importance of their recommendations were considered. In October 1917 he 

successfully brokered promotions to brigadier genera l for the senior 

OJG infantry and cavalry inspectors, on the grounds that the judgment 

of these men determined whether a unit should embark or not, and for 

the Deputy Inspector General, Col. William T. Wood, who was recalled 

from retirement. Wood remained in Washington, filling the role of 

Acting Inspector General because Chamberlain spent most of his time 

traveling, and his elevation to flag rank facilitated his dealings with 

senior War Department and government officials during Chamberlain's 

absences. Chamberlain also recommended that all bureau chiefs be 

made major generals. This would, of course, include himself. He pointed out that he was often called upon to investigate senior officers and 

that "officers generally, at least inwardly, resent being inspected or 

investigated by their juniors in rank." His point was well taken. 

Chamberlain and all those bureau chiefs who were not major generals 

were promoted that month. 19 

This flurry of promotions led to a growing surplus of senior officers in the department, as officers below the brigadiers were elevated to 

colonel. Chamberlain's plan was to build a surplus or senior inspectors 

in order to staff the headquarters of senior tactical units as they were 

activated. A serious problem was encountered in this scheme in 

October, when the decision was made at General Pershing's request that 

all unit staffs above a division would be formed in France from personnel selected by him within the theater. The colonels that Chamberlain 

had groomed for these positions were not only surplus but seemed 

" Memo, Lochridge to CoS, WD, 28 Nov 17, sub: Increase in Personnel and 

Advanced Grades of Inspector General's Department, Entry 296, RG I 65, NARA. 

•• Ibid.; Memo (quotation), Chamberlain to CofS, WD, 18 Scp 17, Entry 296, RG 

165, NARA. 

118 
THE GREAT WAR APPROACHES 

doomed to Stateside tasks. The decision and its implementing order 

upset all his plans, leaving him with several first-rate colonels suddenly sidetracked. Chamberlain asked Brewster to intercede with Pershing. 

Brewster was able to persuade the A EF commander to select corps- and 

army-level inspectors from among the senior officers already designated by Chamberlain. Thus, in practice, Pershing deferred the choice of 

corps and higher inspectors to Brewster and Chamberlain, retaining the 

right to veto their decisions, a power he was never to cxercise.

20 

In November authorized IG strength rose to l 64 officers and 125 

enlisted men, an increase in part premised on a 44-division force. 

Automatic increases above that strength again were allowed if the number of divisions exceeded that level. The Chief of Staff directed that the 

new IG positions not be filled with regular line officers except as a last 

resort. Reserve, National Guard, or emergency officers had to be considered first and justification made for not selecting them. As a result 

of this decision, most of the ofTicers brought into the Inspector 

General's Department in 1918 before the armistice were nonregulars. 

Almost all Stateside positions came to be filled by them, while most 

tactical units overseas also had nonregulars assigned. By the beginning 

of the year the department had J 79 inspectors and 14 commissioned 

accountants, with 73 of the former and 9 of the latter assigned to 

Stateside organizations and with the remainder of each either in the 

AEF or in units designated for deployment to France. In February, 

despite General March's policy, General Chamberlain's strong plea for 

9 additional Regular Army officers to inspect troop units was approved. 

Experience had shown that, no matter how well intentioned, temporary 

officers did not have the depth and background to judge tactical units 

preparing for deployment.l' 

One category of specialist- that of expert accountant- was so rare 

and desperately needed that temporary officers had to be used. The proliferation of funds and the vast amounts of money involved necessitated 

expert oversight on a continuous and large scale. Brewster requested in 

August 1917 that Chamberlain find two experienced accountants for 

assignment to the AEF as quickly as possible. The Inspector General had 

10 Ltrs, Chamberlain to Brewster, 22 and 27 Oct 17, and Brewster to Chamberlain, 

15 and 25 Nov 17, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. See also War College Division 

Coordination Sheet, 7 Dec 17, and Ltr, Chamberlain to TAG, 27 Oct 17, sub: Officers 

of the Inspector General's Department for Duty in France, Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. 11 Memo, Biddle to TAG, 27 Dec 17, sub: Increase in Personnel and Advanced 

Grades of the Inspector General's Department; Memo, TAG to IG, 16 Feb 18, sub: 

Increase of Regular OITicers for the Inspector General's Department. Both in Entry 

296, RG 165, NARJ\. 

119 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

some difficulty finding men who met his standards, unwilling to commission anyone in the department unless they showed the potential to 

perform all of the inspector's duties, and he resisted successfully an 

effort to "open up the Department to a corps of expert accountants." His 

compromise was to procure the appointment of selected individuals as 

majors in the National Army, with duty to the Inspector General's 

Department. The first two men so appointed were Wallace A. Streater, 

the War Department auditor, and Arthur L. Webb, assistant to the auditor of the Panama Canal. Delighted to get both, Brewster agreed that 

their govenunent background made them immediately useful without 

much additional training. The need for accountants continued to grow, 

however, as the size of the Army and its financial operations expanded. 

ln July 1918 two Treasury Department auditors and the Panama Canal 

collector were conunissioned as majors to sustain the IG's effort, which 

grew steadily throughout the war and even beyond the armistice.

22 

In late October 19 18 specific plans were made to expand the Army 

to eighty divisions in France and eighteen divisions in the United 

States. The concept had been approved in principle in June and some 

increases had commenced. An additional 99 inspectors would have 

been added to the 2 15 already serving when the anticipated fu ll mobilization was to be reached on 30 June 1919. Chamberlain pointed out a 

growing problem intrinsic to this continued expansion. In October 

twenty retired or former regulars were serving with the Inspector 

General's Department. Few more could be absorbed, because all further 

strength increases were against units overseas or otherwise expected to 

meet the physical demands of line organizations. In other words, the 

source of qualified manpower was pretty well consumed. In practical 

terms, this meant that the expansion contemplated leading to an eightydivision AEF would require fi lling from Regular Army assets. 

Chamberlain felt that temporary officers did not have the depth of 

experience necessary to perform satisfactorily in tactica l units. 

Consequently, he warned, the burden to fill these positions would fa ll 

on the Regular Army e lement of the AEF.23 

As matters turned out, the armistice in November 1918 canceled 

the need to carry out the planned expansion, and the dilemma broached 

21 Ltr (quotation), Chamberlain to Brewster, 14 Sep 17, and Reply, 8 Oct 17: Ltr, 

Brewster to Chamberlain, 20 Aug 17. All in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. Sec also 

Memo, Brown to CofS, WD, 18 Nov 18, sub: Limited Service Men for Accountants in 

the Inspector General's Office, Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. 

n Memo, Chamberlain to CofS, WD. 23 Oct 18, sub: Commissioned Personnel, 

Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. 

120 
THE GREAT WAR APPROACHES 

by General Chamberlain, like many other manpower issues, could be 

ignored rather than resolved. Chamberlain was able, however, to use the 

expansion plan to achieve some of his other objectives. He won 

approval for immediate promotion of the senior field army inspectors 

from colonel to brigadier general and also for a flag rank inspector of 

artillery. Earlier, General Pershing took care of one of his own, approving the promotion to brigadier general of Colonel Spinks, the AEF 

assistant inspector general. Just weeks before the war's end, the senior 

IG grades conformed to aims Chamberlain had expressed shortly after 

the declaration of war.

24 

Confronting Chaos 

Despite the small number of inspectors available at the beginning of the 

war, the Inspector General's Department had an important role to play 

in mobilization, h·aining, and deployment. Inspections of the new divisions revealed a great deal about the Army of 1917- 18, and tactical 

inspections helped to explain many of the problems experienced by the 

AEF during the fall offensive of 1918. TG reports, in short, formed a 

comprehensive and detailed picture of the Army as it struggled to ready 

itself for its first major war overseas. 

Soon after the declaration of war, Regular Army regiments were 

concentrated to form a first provisional division-sized unit and hasty 

measures were made to have what became the 1st Division sent on its 

way to France. Meanwhile, National Guard units still returning from 

the Mexican border were retained in federal service, and those already 

discharged were recalled to carry out local security measures, guarding 

bridges and other faci lities against possible sabotage. As soon as the 

training camps neared completion in August and September, National 

Guard units were redeployed to begin their training cycle. At the same 

time, the first waves of draftees began to fill the camps designated for 

the new National Army divisions. 25 

The plan was for the units to begin their training in the United 

States and to complete it in France under expert allied tutelage. Once in 

France, they would first participate in weapons and tactical exercises up 

to division level. Thereafter, to gain experience and seasoning under the 

2

• Memo, Brown to CofS, WD, 23 Oct 18, sub: Personnel, Entry 296, RG 165, 

NARA. 

~ Frank Tompkins, Chasing Villa: The St01y Behind the St01y of Pershing's 

Expedition info Mexico (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1934), p. 

230. 

121 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Inspecting 27111 Division Troops at Camp Wadsworth, 

South Carolina, in 191 7 

guidance of allied commanders, division elements would go into a quiet 

sector of the front for a month and then undergo combined training with 

all arms before deployment as a division. Because Pershing considered 

the allied training philosophy too defensively oriented, he added extensive open order attack training and- what proved to be of questionable 

va lue and very time consuming- individual marksmanship practice. A 

program this elaborate was experienced only by the early arrivals. As 

pressures increased in 19 18, it will be seen that AEF training was curtailed well below minimums and was the source of considerable command concern.26 

The War Department's immediate problem was the care and tra ining of the thousands of draftees and guardsmen being called up. A 

month before the declaration of war, the Quartermaster General's 

Department had developed plans for the housing of a million-man 

force. A Cantonment Division was created to supervise the actual 

construction. Once war was declared, the plans were activated. By 

the end of May sixteen barracks sites, mostly in the northern states, 

were selected to house the National Army divisions and sixteen tent 

camps, all in the southern states, for the National Guard divisions. 

10 DeWeerd. Wilson Fights His 111-w, p. 214. 

122 
THE GREAT WAR APPROACHES 

Work was begun immediately. Unlike some other bureau actions, the 

whole program was carried out with considerable urgency. Speed was 

so essential that contracts were let to single bidders on a cost-plus 

arrangement. Later review revealed surprisingly little unjustifiable 

expenditure. Schools, depots, and ports were built at the same time 

with equally creditable records.27 

At the new barracks and camps confusion greeted the first large 

influx of men and units. Many things still needed completion. The 

problems of adjusting to the often primitive physical facilities were 

aggravated by numerous personnel changes. National Guard units had 

to reorganize to conform to the new organizations desired by General 

Pershing. Regular Army formations had to spread themselves thinner 

and thinner as their elements and personnel were split off to form new 

units. Concentrations of experienced men were diluted in an effort to 

reassign existing talent throughout the growing force. Promising NCOs 

who could have held the units together were sent to officer candidate 

schools to receive a modicum of training before returning to the 

National Army as captains and majors. 

The lack of experience and the shortage of equipment and facilities 

severely impaired training. The littl e progress achieved was vitiated by 

the practice of reassigning large numbers of unit personnel to serve as 

replacements in higher priority units. ln some cases fully trained men 

with other civili an specialties were reassigned to functions using their 

civilian skill, rather than in the one in which they had been trained and 

which was needed within their unit. The tone and pace of the training 

camps were frenzied and frustrating, clearly indicating the need for 

coherent War Department guidance.

28 

As soon as they could be fielded, teams of inspectors, first from the 

geographical commands and later from the Office of the Inspector 

General, began a cycle of visits to wherever units could be found mobilizing or in training. The teams inspecting deploying units were staffed 

with some of the strongest inspectors in the system; the team chiefs 

were always distinguished senior officers of their branch, with many 

years of experience as commanders and inspectors. The latter inspected the tactical units, observing the more experienced regulars, whereas 

" Clarence H. Cramer, Newton D. Baker: A Biogmplly (Cleveland: World Press, 

1961 ), p. 98; Erna Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army: A HistOIJ' of the Co1ps, 

1775- 1939 (Washington, D.C.: Quartermaster Historian's Otfice, Office of the 

Quartermaster General, 1962), pp. 606- 08. 18 Coffman, War To End All H0rs, pp. 64, 66- 67; Wayne S. Jones, Ben: The Life of 

Benjamin Seth Jones. 1877- 1943 (N.p., 1984), pp. 83- 85. 

123 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

the reserve or temporary officers usually covered such areas as troop 

facilities, mess halls, and remount activities. Assignment of the 

reservists to ports or overseas organizations often followed this initial 

training and inspection.29 

The Inspector General's Department completed its first inspections 

of the National Guard camps just before Christmas 1917 and began work 

on the National Army and aviation camps immediately aftetward. All 

combat divisions and most support units were inspected at least twice 

prior to being sent overseas, and the fi11dings of the inspectors determined the priority of division deployment to France. Their reports on unit 

efficiency and the quality of officers were frank. However, despite generally good coordination and cooperation among War Department elements, reaction to the IG reports was not as "prompt or radical" as 

General Chamberlain had hoped or as General Pershing had urged.3

(

1 

The Inspector General himself stayed on the road, particularly after 

Colonel Wood was assigned as his deputy. The only limitation on his 

travel was Secretary Baker's request that Chamberlain remain in 

Washington on those occasions when he himself was absent. 

Chamberlain set a strenuous pace for himself, observing his teams in 

action, conducting inspections and investigations on his own, and maintaining a steady flow of memoranda to the Chief of Staff and the principal staff members. The 59-year-old Chamberlain paid a price for his 

constant activity, being hospitalized for exhaustion during most of 

November and December 19 J 7. 31 

The inspection system developed by Helmick on the Mexican border in 1916 provided the basis for the way in which divisions were 

inspected during the World War. But a constant theme running through 

the comments of inspectors old enough to remember 1898 was the 

desire to avoid the failures of the War with Spain. Considerable emphasis was thus placed on matters concerning clothing issues, sanitation, 

and mess conditions, as well as on troop conduct and basic discipline. 

The previous war served as a sort of negative standard to evaluate the 

conditions of 1917 and 1918.32 

14 Rpts, Helmick to TAG, 19 Jun and I Jul 18, subs: Morale Inspections, 6th Division 

and Camp Meade, MD, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA; David Lewis, "A Short Account of 

My Experiences in the American Expeditionary Forces in France, 1918- 1919," OTIG 

files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH) . 

... Ltr, Chamberlain to Brewster, 30 Jan 18, Entry 588, RG 120, Entry 588, NARA. 1

' Ibid., 20 Jan and 22 Nov 18, Entry 588, RG 120, NAR.A. 

·'

1 Ltr, Helmick to Simmons, 31 May 34, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA; U.S. War 

Department, Annual Report of the Inspector Geneml, 1918 (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1919), p. 222 (hereafter cited as A RiG); ARJG /919, p. 650. 

124 
THE GREAT WAR APPROACHES 

The dilution of experienced officers and men was perhaps the 

Army's greatest manpower problem. Inspectors reported that the influx 

of recruits reduced even established Regular Army units to the lowest 

levels of training, and the influx ofNational Guard and temporary officers contributed to a rapid decline in efficiency and standards. Lack of 

coordination and clarity at the War Department level added to the confusion of new men attempting to run new organizations. For example, 

the War Department ordered two major units to Camp Jackson, South 

Carolina, although the camp could accommodate only one of them. 

Elsewhere, commanders received orders to move nonexistent units or to 

perform missions with units that had never been assigned to them. In 

other cases they were directed to form units or staffs but were not given 

the necessary personnel or equipment. In one instance a major headquarters was assigned to one post, while its subordinate elements were 

assigned hundreds of miles away. 33 

Examples of chaotic conditions could be multiplied almost at 

will. Regiments lost their fie ld-grade officers just before advanced 

field training. In one case the officers of a machine gun battalion 

were formed as a faculty, leaving the enJisted men to fend for themselves, and they were not scheduled to rejoin their unit until a week 

before it was programmed to go overseas. Specialists were moved 

about so often that they rarely learned their duties or were integrated 

into their units. One inspector suggested that War Department staff 

officers visit the units in training both to learn their problems and to 

confront reality.H 

The effects of personnel turbulence noted by every inspector seriously affected the readiness of new divisions trying to meet deployment 

dates. Although efforts were made to rationalize the replacement system, the demands for units in France and the rapid pace of deployment 

prevented the establishment of a coherent system. The original replacement concept had ca lled for several large depots to receive, train, and 

dispatch draftees to the divisions, but the press of events prevented the 

depots from functioning as intended. Most replacements were taken 

from major units in training and added to others that were closer to 

deployment; draftees often were sent directly to combat units for training, and the local depot units assumed the role associated with modern 

reception stations. While the depots languished, some units in training 

continued to be drained to fill those nearing their deployment overseas. 

» ARIG 1917, p. 211. 

,.. Memo, Landis to IG, 21 Jun 18, and OIG handwritten comment, 22 Nov 19, Entry 

26, RG 159, NARA. 

125 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

And divisions often arrived in France and entered action with little time 

for additional training.

3

s 

Inspecting the New Divisions 

Inspectors assigned to the divisions in the various cantonments devoted the bulk of their time to discipline, morale, and training. Each developed his own approach in accordance with his own views and those of 

his commander. For some, this meant essentially a teaching role 

designed to complement the work of the commanders. By contrast, 

some preferred a competitive system of inspection in which inspection 

results were published for unit comparison, and units competed against 

each other and their own earlier ratings to show improvement. 

Regardless of their approach, inspectors found that most temporary 

officers were able to master basic technical skills fairly rapidly and pass 

these on to their subordinates. The new officers' inexperience continued to show, however, in matters of discipline, and inspectors at the 

division level always had their hands full in this area. 36 

As seasoned officers, the inspectors were genera lly well respected 

by the commanders of the reviewed units. Additionally, those assigned 

to the Regular and National Army units spent several weeks in 

Washington for orientation at the Office of the Inspector General and 

were consequently aware of the most current policies. The inspectors 

also found themselves intimately involved in important aspects of overseas preparations, going far beyond their usual duties. For example, 

when Lt. Col. Joseph A. Baer became inspector of the 15th Cavalry 

Division, forming at San Antonio in January 1918, he quickly became 

a primary assistant to the division chief of staff. In this capacity Baer 

helped prepare plans for the organization and training of the division 

and then inspected training and faci lities to assure that the plans were 

being implemented. He also assisted in the preparation of training and 

movement schedules and equipment checklists for overseas service, in 

this way fully integrating his own inspection responsibilities with the 

division's operational staff.H 

}} Leonard L. Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System in the U.S. Army, DA 

Pamphlet No. 20-211 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 

178-86. 

"' Rpt, Parker, 30 Sep 19, sub: Annual Report of Inspector, Camp Funston, Kansas, 

Entry 26, RG 159, NARA; ARIG /919, p. 648. 

J' Ltr, Baer to IG, 8 May 19, sub: Personal Service in the IGD, Entry 26, entry 159, 

NARA. 

126 
"Genera l Helmick's Guide for the Rapid Inspection of Large Units" 

PLATE I 

The equipment assumed is equipment "A" with or without mtions and witlr 

swplus kits. 

1. FORMATION: Columns o.f companies at Ira(( company distance; baggage and combat wagons on riglrt.flank o.f column where companies can easily obtain equipment. 

2. PREPARATION AND INSPECTION: 

(a) Have flaps to a111111Unition pockets and .first aid pouches unsnapped 

and .folded back so contents o.f pockets and pouches can be inspected and 

marking ofpouclres observed. 

(b) Have identification tags e.xposed, the tope passing out between .first 

and second buttons o.f slrirt. If the tape comes out between buttons lower down, 

tire tag is liable to be drawn back in and hidden ji-om view. 

The preparation described in {a) and (b) should be made immediately afler 

the column has been .formed so that all 01ganizations may be in absolute readiness.for the inspection at tire hour designated. 

(c) Cause rifles to be brought to the position o.f port, bolts to be removed 

and held in riglrt /rand by the side. (See plate 1.) 
PLATE 2 

(d) As soon as the inspector has passed him, cause each man to bring 

rifle to right shoulder (changing bolt to left hand) and depress the muzzle so 

that barre/may be looked through jimn the re{/1: (Sec plate 2.) 

PLATE 3 

(e) When the inspector has passed the rear of each man, lwve bolt 

replaced, position of fix bayonet assumed, bayonet drawn and held horizontally in the right hand, point to left. ring up and inclined to front. The bayonet 

should be held lightly between the thumb cmd fingers, back oft he hand clown. 

in order not to cover slot and ring of bayonet. (See plate 3.) 
PLATE 4 

When the inspection of bayonets is completed, cause them to be fixed and 

lll!fixed to see whether all can easily be attached and detached from the rifle. 

(/) When the bayonets have been w~fixed, have oiler and thong cases and 

spare part containers renwved and prepared for impection as follows: 

Partially insert brush in the muzzle of the rifle, thong with weight allached 

hanging beside the barrel, the muzzle of which leans against the belt; remove 

the cover of oilet; and holding oiler in left hand, insert the dropper into the oil 

with the right hand, and hold up, point of dropper down so a drop of oil will 

depend/rom the point as the inspector passes. 

Remove the contents o.lspare parts container and hold them in the left 

hand so the inspector can see them as he passes. (See plate 4.) 

ln order that there may be no delay, the inspector should inspect the succeeding company as to (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e), while the preparation 

described in (/) is being made. Position (/) should be retained until checking 

officer has completed the checking to be done in ranks. This should begin as 

soon as inspection of the balta/ion is completed. 
PLATE 5 

3. As soon as the checking in ranks ofa ballalion is completed. shelter tent 

camp is made and preparationforfurther inspection and checking carried out 

as follows: 

(a) Field Kit (less poncho): Arranged by each man immediately in front 

of his own half of shelter tent so marking on each article can be seen. (See 

plate 5 for arrangement.) NOTE: Plate shows bacon and condiment cans 

empty; if these are to be inspected filled, the lid of the bacon [can} should be 

removed. The tooth brush holder shown in the cut is not a prescribed article of 

the equipment. 
\ · 

-- PLAT£! 6 

(b) Surplus Kit: Spread poncho on ground about one yctrd in.fi"ont oft he 

personal kit, marking of poncho exposed; display the clothing 011 the poncho 

as ftJIIows: O.D. shirt spread out, bullons up with sleeves folded to show 

elbows: breeches spread out with waist band on waist of shirt. flap unbulloned 

and bullon-hole side fumed back to show bullon holes and bullons: shoes, 

soles up, at foot of breeches, extra shoe strings across shoes; undershirt and 

drawers similarly displayed at side of outer clothing with socks spread out at 

feet of drawers. (See plate 6.) 

PLATIZ 7 

(c) Have company property displayed for inspection. In this display the 

water-bag should be hanging up; .fire irons erected and kellles and hooks 

a/lached; G. I. cans and bake pans separated and tops removed so they can be 

thoroughly inspected and quickly checked. All containers, including .field 

desk. should be open and ready to open promptly when the inspector appectrs. 

(Sec plate 7.) 
PLATE 8 

(d) Have property of regimental and battalion headquarters displayed, 

and the personal property of all officers arranged so that it can be quickly 

inspected and checked. (See plate 8.) 

(e) Have picket lines stretched and animals unsaddled or unpacked and 

ready for inspection of backs and feet. 

PLATE 9 

(f) As soon ns the shelter tent comp has been completed nnd property 

displayed for inspection, lwve the men sit on tl1e ground in front of and facing 

their tents, remove their shoes and socks, drawing the /a/le1; bo!loms up, over 

their hands and placing the formel; soles up, beside their bare feet which rest 

on their leggins. (See plate 9.) 

This is the position of inspection of feet. The above description applies to 

Headquarters and Machine Gun Companies and Sanitmy Detachment of the 

regiment. 
PLATE 10 

- ':~~ ............. . 

·-;..·. -~ ~ .. ... ---::C:as . ::::d- . -. , • .,....,, ... ,..... .... .....~ 

PLATE 11 

(g) Have baggage and combat wagons, as soon as unloaded, assembled 

wit!t remainder of train and held in readiness for such maneuvers in driving as 

the inspector may desire. At termination of this maneuvering, cause the train 

again to be assembled and spare parts and accessories to be displayed for 

inspection and checking, and the clothing and personal equipment of members 

of the Supply Company, including swplus kits, to be made ready for inspection. (See plates 1 0/ 11.) 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

The visit of one of the OIG inspection teams to a division in training was a major event for the unit. The press of time and sense of 

urgency required that these inspections be businesslike and as brief as 

possible. The senior team inspector would consult with the division 

inspector and then pay a courtesy call on the commander if possible. 

The other inspectors on the team, in the meantime, would familiarize 

themselves with the cantonment, possibly also inspecting post facilities 

and veterinary activities. During the courtesy call, the senior inspector 

would give the division commander a detailed letter listing the information required by the inspection team to complete its inspection. The 

information desired was broken down by topic and passed down to the 

appropriate staff sections or units for action.38 

Replies were usually forthcoming within twenty-four hours. Most 

were narratives, with the appropriate statistics appended. In combination, they gave a fairly good picture of an organization's conditions and 

its training levels. Inspectors used the replies to supplement their own 

findings in assessing a unit's proficiency; however, they did not wait for 

them before they began their own inspection. Normally, the senior 

inspector would spend a half-day with each line regiment, while others 

on his team would begin similar visits with combat support units and 

nondivisional organizations. Deficiencies detected in the course of the 

inspection were reported through unit channels to those responsible for 

immediate corrcction.39 

The inspections of the National Guard divisions were thorough 

and generally critical, reflecting in part the Regular Army bias of the 

inspectors. But the inspectors were also aware that these units would 

be the first to deploy and, in consequence, had to conform quickly to 

realistic standards. Further, the inspectors themselves were still developing their own mass inspection techniques and perhaps were more 

severe than they would be later, after establishing a routine and gaining more experience. 

The inspection of the 28th Division (Pennsylvania National Guard) 

was a typical if scathing example. The inspectors- Helmick and Reed, 

now a major, a remarkable team at the time for each would serve as The 

Inspector General- concluded that training levels were far from satisfactory; that the fundamentals of individual training had not been 

stressed; and that many of the officers and NCOs, while putting on a 

good show of activity, failed to perform satisfactorily in many impor33 Memo, Miller to Surg, 82d Div, 30 Jan 18, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

" Memo, llclmick to IG, 6 Apr 18, Entry 26, RG 159, NAR/\. 

134 
THE GREAT WAR APPROACHES 

tant areas. Sanitary conditions were deplorable, kitchens and latrines 

were in poor condition, and the commanders from division down had 

ignored the reports of the division inspector and surgeon. Discipline 

throughout the division was "totally unsatisfactory," and the inspectors 

identified a long list of officers, including three generals and two regimental commanders, to be considered for discharge. (Jn fairness, they 

also identified several officers of high quality, including the division 

surgeon and inspector.) Chamberlain agreed, saying the division's condition was "unpardonable" and that sending "the Division to France in 

its present state of unpreparedness would be criminal.'>-!() 

After each of the National Guard divisions in training had been 

inspected, the senior inspectors returned to Washington and discussed 

their findings. A product of their meeting was an annotated ranking of 

divisions. Each unit was rated from most to least deployable, with the 

reasons given for the particular placement. The ratings included evaluations of training, strength, administration, discipline, and the quality 

of the commander and staff. The 40th Division, with a "very good" 

commander and administration, "fair" discipline, and "good to very 

good" training, was rated first. Last was the 39th Division, with a 

"poor" in everything. The report was then forwarded to the Chief of 

Staff for use in General Staff deployment planning.41 

The inspectors appeared more sympathetic to the National Army 

organizations, possibly because of their own knowledge and experience 

gained in criticizing National Guard units. The report from the five 

senior inspectors on the sixteen National Army divisions, which was 

forwarded to the Chief of Staff on 25 March 1918, was much more generous. They used the same criteria in giving each unit a ranking, the 83d 

Division coming first and the 88th Division last, but unanimously 

praised "the very high character of the commissioned and enlisted personnel of these divisions and the spirit and ardor with which they have 

taken up and pursued the work of training." They reported that "the War 

Department can, without injury to the service ... determine the order 

of sai ling."~2 

Each National Guard and National Army division was inspected at 

least twice, and inspectors made an etrort to schedule their final inspec40 Rpt (quoted words), Helmick to IG, 7 Dec 17, sub: Inspection of the 28th 

Division, NG (Pennsylvania); Memo (quotations), Chamberlain to CofS, WD, 10 Dec 

17, sub: Conditions in the 28th Division, Camp Hancock, Georgia; and File 333, 

Foreign Officers. All in Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

" Memo, W. Wood to CofS, WD, 10 Jan 18, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

•! Memo. lnsps to IG and CofS, WD, 25 Mar 18, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

135 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

tion as c lose to the unit's shipping date as possible. Predictions of combat readiness and training assessments formed part of the final inspections made on the deploying units. Some proved tragically accurate. 

The find ings of t11e last stateside inspection of the 27th Division (New 

York National Guard) indicated "a lack of that definite control on the 

part of the officers which is an index of good discipline." The inspectors judged the I 06th Infantry as headed for disaster without drastic 

changes in command, which did not appear to be forthcoming, and 

warned that the division would require extensive additional training 

before it could be trusted in combat- predictions borne out at 

Bellicourt and Bony on the Hindenburg Line that autumn.43 

Whenever possible, another inspection was made just before boarding ship. Port inspectors monitored the company officers and followed 

up on the shortages reported in the cantonment inspection to make sure 

they had been made up. The objective of these final inspections was to 

assure that the men going overseas left as fully equipped as possible 

with new or at least fully serviceable clothing and equipment. 

Intuitively evolved by the inspectors, this procedure was later formalized in a War Department circular and its amendment.~ 

Field Artillery Problems Continue 

Artillery units usually were inspected separately by the special IG 

artillery team of Col. Alfred A. Starbird and Maj. Dawson Olmstead. 

Often, divisional artillery brigades were located apart from their parent 

units, because of the need for extended firing ranges. In genera l, these 

units did not make the same training progress as other ru·ms and services, principally for lack of equipment and an insufficient number of 

qualified instructors. Conditions in the divisional artillery brigades 

were described as "deplorable" after the first cycle of inspections in 

November and December 19 L 7.45 

The fie ld artillery for some period of time had problems, which 

promised to become even more critical as it tried to expand to meet the 

requirements of the war. Reports from overseas attaches, especially Lt. 

Col. Spencer Cosby in PaTis, underlined the huge scale and technical 

requirements necessary for an effective field artillery system on the 

Western Front. General Chamberlain consequently saw the requirement 

0 Rpt, Helmick to TAG, 5 May 18, sub: Methods and Results ofTraining in the 27th 

Division, Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. 

•• WD Cir, I l Jul 18, amended 21 Sep 18, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA . 

• , ARJG 1919, p. 652. 

136 
T HE G REAT WAR A PPROACHES 

27th Division Field Artille1y Trains 

for an urgent focus on artillery in the American mobilization, emphasizing the need for a senior field artillery inspector who specialized in 

the inspection of units of his arm and who, in the absence of a branch 

chief, served as an "instrumentality" to provide doctrine and guidance. 

But no one on the General Staff believed it was appropriate for the 

inspectorate to perform such a role. Competent field artillery officers 

were so scarce that in the summer of 1917 only one lieutenant colonel 

or colonel of that branch served io the Office of the Inspector General 

at any one time.

46 

By September Chamberlain felt that the artillery inspector positions 

were so important that one senior inspector in the United States and one 

in Europe should be at least a brigadier general. He stressed to the Chief 

of Staff that tlu·oughout the Army the field artillery was in "a demoralized condition," needing all the help it could get. Equipment to train soldiers was practically negligible; artillery officers and NCOs in newly 

formed National Army units were almost entirely ignorant of their specialty; and the National Guard units were in even worse shape.47 

In October inspection of field artillery units began in earnest. 

Colonel Starbird and Major Olmstead began to make a circuit of field 

46 Memo (quoted word), Chamberlain to CofS, WD, 28 Nov 17, sub: Increase in 

Personnel and Advanced Grades of Inspector General's Department; Memo, ACofS, 

WD, to TAG, 24 Aug 17. Both in Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. 

'

7 Memo, Chamberlain to CofS, WD, 18 Sep 17, Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. 

137 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

artillery brigades in training. Their findings soon began to confirm 

Chamberlain's worst suspicions. The information sent back by the two 

inspectors established the dimensions of the problem and enabled 

Chamberlain to have three more field artillery officers temporarily 

detailed to the Inspector General's Department. With support from 

Genera ls Pershing and Brewster in Europe, approval was finally granted in November 1917 for inspectors of artillery with the rank of colonel 

to augment IG offices of corps and higher units, to include the AEF and 

War Department inspectorate. The augmentations were valuable, but 

they came almost too late to influence the artillery programs of the first 

wave of divisions shipping to Europe:s 

Starbird 's and Olmstead's inspection of the National Guard field 

artillery brigades revealed an absence of any training standardization 

and minimal unit discipline. The difficulties of artillery training were 

exemplified by the !57th Field Artillery Brigade at Camp Gordon, 

Georgia. Organized in August 19 17 as part of the 82d Division, in early 

February 1918 the unit was still suffering from impossible equipment 

shortages. Two battalions had no equipment at all, while the third had 

only one battery's worth, which it shared. Thus the eighteen batteries of 

men were trying to train with one battery of guns. Wooden mock-ups 

had to be used for gun drill. The limited training that one of the 

unequipped regiments, a six-inch-gun unit, received on the available 

three-inch guns was of marginal value. Equa lly critical was the fact that 

the other two unequipped regiments were supposed to be motorized. 

Without equipment, none of the drivers and mechanics could be trained, 

rendering any learning by the gunners of doubtful value. 9 The situation 

was common among most of the newly forming arti llery organizations. 

The inspection reports were so universally bleak as to make it 

apparent that unusual measures would be necessary to achieve even 

minimum levels of artillery proficiency. In early January 1918 the 

Chief of Staff directed that more Regular Army officers be assigned to 

each unit. Many were not artillerymen but cavalrymen- like Col. 

William C. Rivers, who would become The Inspector General in 1927. 

At least they could provide discipline. Additionally, experienced regular NCOs were ordered on temporary duty to serve as instructors in the 

newly formed National Guard field artillery units. An artillery school 

for brigade and field officers was opened at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 

and a senior officers refresher program was begun at the School of Fire 

• $ Ltrs, Brewster to Chamberlain, 8 and 18 Oct 17, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

•• Rpt, McDonald to TAG, 5 Feb 18, sub: Inspect ion of the 82d Division at Camp 

Gordon, Georgia, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

138 
THE GREAT WAR APPROACH ES 

at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Provisions were made to attach qualified 

Regular Army officers to National Guard and National Army units, 

whose officers then were sent to the school.50 

At Starbird's suggestion, the General Staff developed an improved 

equipment distribution scheme to provide each National Guard brigade 

enough equipment for one field battery in each of its battalions. The 

earlier practice of trying to equip battalions fully, one at a time, was too 

inefficient. Schools were given a high equipment priority to assure that 

they had sufficient weapons by type to provide thorough training in a 

reasonable time. Finally, in March 1918, fourteen field-grade and twenty-three company-grade officers with experience in France were 

brought back to act as trainers at the schools and in selected units. 5

1 But, 

despite the best efforts of inspectors and unit members on both sides of 

the Atlantic, artillery was to remain a problem throughout the war. 

The Inspection System Matures 

The inspections became more efficient and systematized as inspectors 

gained more experience and developed a sense of what was critical in 

assessing a unit. Their reporting also became more structured as War 

Department elements and the Office of the Inspector General developed their own sense of what was needed to respond to issues identified in the course of the inspections. 

The inspection reports initially were narrative in format, organized 

by topics that reflected the prioritized importance assigned by the team 

chief. Subsequent reports essentially mirrored the first ones made, their 

organization informally standardized by the areas of interest in each 

unit: h·aining and instruction, including schedules, use offilms, and target practice; field exercises; sanitation; discipline and punishments; personnel; clothing; equipment; medical care; and commendations. Each 

report ended with some sort of conclusion or evaluation of the unit. 

The similarity in report contents and format derived not only 

from the developing experience of inspectors at all levels but from the 

training given inspectors at the Washington office and the existence 

of various references already in circulation. The Army field service 

regulations provided general guidance as to the measurement of unit 

proficiency under field conditions, and Army regulations and the 

Yellow Book for inspectors offered some genera l statements on the 

$() Fi le 9600, Artillery Inspection, Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. 

Sl Ibid. 

139 
THE INSPECTORS G ENERAL, 1903- 1939 

proper means of making fi eld inspections. Collectively, this guidance 

allowed most inspectors to carry out reasonably satisfactory inspections. As a growing number of major units were activated, the pace of 

inspections quickened and the need for accurate, moderately standard 

information became critical. Consequently, Genera l Chamberlain 

began an overhaul of the available inspection guidance to provide uniform standards, procedures, and formats for reporting inspections. In 

October 1917, "as information and guidance" for his inspectors, he 

disseminated a draft compilation of his published verbal instructions 

given in the past. On the twelfth an advance copy of his latest instructions was issued preliminary to Special Regulation Number 69. The 

regulation summarized the authority and responsibility of an inspector to look into anything affecti ng unit efficiency, with emphasis on 

determining individual proficiency in combat skills and the knowledge of unit drills and procedures. "The object of all inspections of 

troops is to determine their read iness and preparation for war."52 

Unfortunately, the specia l regulation did not clarify fully every 

facet. f nspectors were expected to make a complete assessment of the 

units- including tactical- that they visited. The new policy confirmed the inspector's role; however, the field service regulations still 

specified that an inspector could not make tactical inspections, which 

was the responsibility of division commanders. When this conflict was 

pointed out to General Chamberlain in March I 918, he recommended 

that the authority for conducting tactical inspections be granted c learly to inspectors.

53 

The War Plans Division director of training, Maj. Gen. John F. 

Morrison, differed, explaining that the intent of the fie ld service regulations was to make senior commanders personally aware of the tactical condition of their units. The War Plans Division already had agreed 

to authorize division commanders to allow their own inspectors to 

make tactical inspections. Morrison felt that any further authorization 

was unnecessary and would dilute the intention of the original policy. 

The Chief of Staff compromised by modifying the requirement to allow 

'

1 Nco-style 265 ofSReg 69, and End (quotations), Chamberlain to IG [blank], 2 Oct 

17, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. Nco-styles were an early form of mimeographing. A 

large part of the regulation addressed procedures to be followed during inspections of 

financial accounts. Its circulation helped to standardize the inspection process, with 

inspectors providing more information and analyses than routinely required. See GS 

File, Inspection Service of Armies in the Field, With GO 134, 12 Oct 17, Entry 296, 

RG 165, NARA. 

" Ltr, 10 to TAG, 30 Jan 18, sub: Tactical Inspections, Entry 26; I st End, TAG to TO, 

5 Mar 18, sub: Tactical Inspections, Entry 34A. Both in RG 159, NARA. 

140 
THE GREAT WAR APPROACHES 

commanders to delegate tactical inspection responsibilities to their 

inspectors. But commanders were still considered responsible for the 

tactical proficiency of their units through their own independent observations. 54 Nothing changed from a practical point of view. 

The inspection report became increasingly complex as a growing 

munber of items of concern requiring special comment were added to 

the list-for example, unit strength shortages and overages. A narrative 

summary of the unit's backgrOLU1d was given, along with a summary of 

the unit's training level and progress. Training topics were discussed 

generally and later related to the Army's master training schedule for 

divisions once it was issued in August 1918. The quality of training 

faci lities and their location also were assessed. 55 

The personnel and equipment status of all deployable units was 

checked thoroughly. Court-martial cases were reviewed as indicators of 

discipline, as were the appearance and courtesy of the soldiers. 

Clothing and equipment inventories were assessed and critical shortages reported. The inspection report also included remarks on the 

health of the command and the quality of the cantonment facilities to 

sustain it. Following requests by the Surgeon General in January and 

August 1918 that inspectors report on medical personnel and operations, including the medical training program run by hospital commanders, the topics were covered on a regular basis. Reports of remedial 

actions by hospital commanders inspected were forwarded with the 

inspection reports. Matters requiring immediate action were extracted 

from the report and forwarded separately to the Office of the Inspector 

General, which passed it to the agency responsible. 56 

The unit inspection and training reports were put to many uses by 

the War Department. They represented a reliable source of information 

on the deve loping combat units, their training facilities, and their problems. The inspectors were the first to note the need for a separate cantonment staff to free combat commanders from camp administration. 

~· Memo, Morrison to CofS, WD, I Mar 18, sub: Division Inspectors Not Authorized 

To Make Tactical Inspections; Memo, Graves to TAG, 4 Mar 18. Both in Entry 296, RG 

165, NARA. 

$S Rpt, Dade, 6 Oct 18, sub: Inspection of the I I th Division, Camp Meade, MD, 

Entry ll, RG 159, NARA. 

~ Telg, Chamberlain to Senior Jnsps, 27 Jan 18, sub: Surgeon General Request; Lt:r, 

Shanks to W. Wood, 30 Aug I 7, and Reply, 3 I Aug 17. All in Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

See also War College Division Rpts, Microfilm 912, Roll 12, Indexes to War College 

Division Records, RG 165, NARA. Incidentally, in June 1917, General Chamberlain 

recommended to the Surgeon General that an enlisted school of nursing be established, 

as opposed to just current hospital on-the-job training. 

14 1 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

They were virtually the only source of information on the largely successful use of allied officers as training supervisors. Inspectors continually stressed that War Department officials should be more aware of 

the consequences of personnel turbulence on unit lriOrale and progress 

in training. 

The reports also formed a primary source of information on the 

soundness of War Department programs, and as such they provided a 

useful guide for correcting errors. For example, in February 1918, an 

inspector's observation that not enough time was allotted for preliminary marksmanship training and dry firing resulted in General 

Morrison amending the training schedule and, in a letter to senior commanders, requesting their support for the change. Many reports noted 

the lack of discipline in the units-"a delinquency throughout the 

Army." The result was a March I 918 letter from the Chief ofStaffto all 

senior commanders, urging their attention to the problem and enjoining 

them to use their inspectors to assist them in eradicating indiscipline. 57 

The War Plans Division made a number of abstracts to assist in its 

planning. Observations detailing progress were placed on separate 

sheets. The Office of the Inspector General periodically supplied the 

War Plans Division, through the Chief of Staff, with an updated list of 

the divisions that had been inspected, ranked in order of their relative 

preparedness for combat. This, of course, was helpful in movement 

planning. Another sheet abstracted issues of a systemic nature, such as 

the optimum number of officers that should be authorized in a supply 

company. Flaws in training programs were always sought when analyzing reported training deficiencies. The inspection reports were useful to 

the Chief of Staff as a means for responding quickly to inquiries from 

Congress and elsewhere on conditions in various units. On occasion, 

for example, when a unit's readiness or training became an issue or 

when an allegation had to be answered, he asked that the Inspector 

General conduct a special inspection to gather the fact ~s Surprisingly, 

it did not occur to the General Staff at first that this mass of information would be invaluable to the forces in France. 

Originally, the inspection reports on units deploying to France did 

not leave the War Department. Then at the end of May 1918 Brig. Gen. 

H Extract (quoted words) from llclmick Rpt, 4 Feb 18; Extract from TAG Ltr, 4 Mar 

18. Both in File I 0754, Entry 296, RG 165, NARA 

'' Rpt Abstract, WPD, 13 Apr 18, sub: Inspection of the 8th Division, Camp 

Fremont, Palo Alto, CA, 22- 28 February 1918; Memo, March to IG, 18 May 18. Both 

in Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. Sec also War College Division Rpts, Microfilm 912, 

Roll 12, Indexes to War College Division Records, RG 165, NARA. 

142 
THE GREAT WAR APPROACHES 

Lytle Brown, the new War Plans Division director, realized that the 

AEF was not on the distribution list, even though it had the greatest 

need for the information the reports contained. Time was being lost in 

France as inspectors and trainers there unknowingly repeated exercises 

already practiced in the States. Brown discussed the matter with 

Chamberlain, and on the twenty-ninth the Chief of Staff formally 

authorized the Inspector General to forward to France "parts of inspector's reports he deems necessary for the staff of the AEF."59 

Communications on training improved quickly, and by the summer 

the process of reciprocity was in motion. The Office of the Inspector 

General forwarded to the War Plans Division extracts of the AEF 

inspection reports on divisions in France. The information provided 

more data on the effectiveness of training in the United States, and particularly allowed better evaluation of discipline and morale programs. 

The division, in turn, used extracts from inspection reports as part of a 

periodic report to the GHQ AEF, required for assessing the progress of 

units in the States and for anticipating more accurately those ready to 

be deployed overseas. Specific problems in training were identified to 

allow the AEF Training Division (G- 5) to modify its training program 

in France. The data sent to the AEF consisted of a War Plans Division 

summary and evaluation of a division's training status, the inspectors' 

comments, and a unit's strength and equipment status. In a few cases, a 

division commander's remarks on his unit's level of readiness and its 

training deficiencies would be appended also. By this time the reports 

had assumed a vital role in the training, movement planning, and organization of all elements of the Army.(>() 

The depth and frequency of the OlG team visits, combined with the 

flow of information along the IG technical chain, made the Office of 

the Inspector General one of the most knowledgeable agencies at the 

War Department level. The observations of inspectors were respected 

by the General Staff, which frequently translated them into formal policy. The trend toward training standardization was an example. While 

on a visit in December 1917, Colonel Wood noted the 32d Division 

commander's comment criticizing the vagueness of current infanh·y 

training policies issuing from the General Staff Training Division. He 

Memo, Brown to CofS, WD, 29 May 18, sub: Inspection Reports To Be Sent to 

the AEF; Memo (quotation), TAG to IG, 29 May 18, same sub. Both in Entry 296, RG 

165. NARA. 60 Memo, Brown to CotS, WD, 29 Oct 18, sub: Report on Training of the 8th 

Division, Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. Sec also War College Division Rpts, Microfilm 

9 12, Roll 12, Indexes to War College Division Records, RG 165, NA RA. 

143 
THE INSPECTORS GEN ERAL, 1903-1939 

concurred and recommended that curricula be developed at the War 

Department level for each type of school desired. 61 

General Morrison disagreed, arguing that the guidance was intentionally vague to allow local commanders to develop the schools and 

courses they deemed necessary. The General Staff did not want to 

develop specific doctrine, which would be forthcoming from the various service schools once they were established. Inspectors, on the other 

hand, became strong advocates of training standardization at the War 

Department level, after seeing in the field the variety of interpretations 

placed upon the guidance provided by the General Staff. Many senior 

inspectors began to urge programs in which training moved from simple to complex topics in a sequential manner, rather than randomly 

packing subjects into the time available. They also advocated the reservation of periods each day exclusively for training, with the maximum 

number of unit members partic ipating.

62 

At length, in the summer of 19 18 the War Department succumbed 

to a barrage of comments from inspectors. In June the first wave of 

National Guard and National Army divisions had been inspected at 

least twice, giving inspectors a unique view of recurrent systemic 

problems that could be deferred no longer. The Office of the 

Inspector General submitted a detailed series of recommendations for 

improving infantry training, emphasizing that leisu rely prewar practices were no longer possible. "The soldier must be trained and the 

NCO made within a period of months, instead of a few years." A simplified drill manual and training program was needed, and the inspectors recommended producing an easy-to-read illustrated manua l, distributing a soldier's handbook, and establishing a school for NCOs in 

each camp.

63 

As a result, drill and training were standardized throughout the 

Army. Training instructors relied more on demonstrations and training 

films. Complete modification of the drill regulations was deferred by 

the General Staff, however, because of the turbulence it would cause, 

and the idea for NCO schools was referred to a War Department committee for development.61 

61 Memo, W. Wood to TAG, 30 Dec 17, sub: Infantry Training Document 656, Entry 

296, RG 165, NARA. 

"' Rpt, Helmick to TAG, 5 May 18, sub: Methods and Results ofTraining in the 27th 

Division, Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. 

'' Memo. Helmick to IG, 19 Jun 18, sub: Suggestions and Recommendations for 

Improving Disciplinary Drill in Our Army, Entry 296, RG 165. NARA. 

"' Memos, Brown to CofS, WPD, 16 Jul 18. and Brown to TAG, 16 Jul 18, Entry 296, 

RG 165, NARA. 

144 
THE GREAT WAR APPROACHES 

The inspectors were equally critical of one specific aspect of 

infantry training, referred to by them as musketry. Their inspection of 

the mobilized divisions revealed insufficient emphasis placed on range 

estimates, fire distribution, and fire discipline, as well as little time 

spent on target practice. Their steady drumming on the inadequacies, 

combined with substantiating statistics, fina lly led to changes in the 

training program. A small arms firing school was established at Camp 

Perry, Ohio, in May 1918, to train marksmanship instructors. In addition, the General Staff began to develop a standard training course in 

riflery for all recruits. In such ways, the positive contributions made by 

the inspectors to improve training were at least as important as their 

negative accounts of unit failings.

65 

Officer Evaluations 

Inspectors' comments on officers eventually were incorporated as a formal a1mex to the inspection report. In July 1917 officer efficiency 

reporting was suspended for the duration of the war and not resumed 

until June 1920. But when visiting deployable units, inspectors were 

directed to observe and evaluate all unit field-grade officers. As a 

result, some were promoted but many more were either relieved for 

inefficiency, demoted, or discharged.66 

At first glance, this would appear to be a responsibility fraught with 

the potential for excesses. In operation, however, the practice had internal limits and was further ameliorated by the restraint and fair-mindedness displayed by the inspectors themselves. Officer evaluation began 

with the arrival of the inspection team at a camp or division. One of the 

items requested by the division commander in the opening briefing was 

a list of all officers who were either undergoing, or being considered 

for, efficiency board proceedings. Unit commanders usually submitted 

a single memorandum, listing all of their officers regardless of grade, 

with a brief comment on each. Any adverse actions were indicated.

67 

Evaluations on officer fitness were varied. Some were as simple as 

"an excellent officer." Others were complex, such as one inspector's 

6

s Memo, Caldwell to JG, 20 May 18, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA; Rpt, Helmick to 

IG, Jan 18, sub: Inspection of the 83d Division, Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. 

~ ARIG 1919, p. 652; Memo, Wright to CofS, WD, 3 Jul 20, sub: Report by the 

Inspector General Upon the Efficiency of Officers of the Army Above the Grade of 

Captain, Entry 26, RG I 59, NARA. Captains were included on 5 February 1920. 61 Memo, HQ, lith Div, to Regt/Sep Unit Cdrs and Unit Surgs, 26 Sep· 18, Entry 

1291; Ltr, Sessions to AG, II th Div, 28 Sep 18, sub: Information Required by Inspector 

General, Entry 2 144. Both in RG 120, NARA. 

145 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

rating of a brigade commander as "didactic; not responsive to recommendations. Does not inspire me with confidence." And others were 

simply enigmatic- or at least too brief to be of immediate value. A 

division commander, for example, rated one of his colonels as "Good. 

Now before a court martial for immorality, other than that, is energetic 

and intelligent." All in all, however, the estimates seemed to be fair 

reflections of the officers inspected. Developments once the units 

deployed to France bore out the judgments made by commanders and 

IGs with reasonable consistency.68 

Division commanders were expected to take action on those officers reported by inspectors to be unsuitable candidates for retention in 

their current jobs. The inspectors included in their evaluation of each 

officer a recommendation as to his disposition, ranging from discharge 

through reassignment to reclassification. In some cases, medical evaluations to assess duty capabilities and transfers to less demanding jobs 

were made as a result of the inspectors' remarks. Shortly after a senior 

inspector had rated one of the 78th Division's brigade commanders as 

"too fat for active field service," the officer was reduced to permanent 

grade and sent to a depot. In each case involving a negative action, 

inspectors were required to personally observe the officer in question 

and to verify or alter the comments made by those in the man's chain of 

command. Inspectors found very few cases meriting reversal of the 

immediate commander's views.69 

On the other hand, the inspectors' officer eval uations were themselves subject to review, especially those critical of senior division officers. A division commander, or any other senior officer with knowledge 

of the criti cized officer, could rebut the critical assessment. In one case, 

General Helmick characterized Brig. Gen. Julius Penn of the 85th 

Division as ineffective and better suited for a staff job. The division 

commander, Maj. Gen. Chase W. Kennedy, disagreed. He said Penn had 

been so overextended with multiple training and command responsibilities that he had been unable to give adequate attention to any one task. 

General Kennedy felt that Penn would make a good commander when 

given the chance, and asked that he be retained. The Army Chief of 

Staff agreed, and Penn remained in command of his brigade.70 

68 Rpt, Helmick to TAG, 26 Feb 18, sub: Estimate of Efficiency of Officers Above 

the Grade of Major in the 82d Division and in Other Organizations Stationed at Camp 

Gordon, Georgia, Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. 

"" Memo, Graves to TAG, 26 Feb 18, sub: Report Regarding Incompetent Officers 

of the 78th Division, Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. 10 Extract of Rpt, Helmick, 9 Apr 18, sub: lnspection of 85th Division, Entry 296, 

RG 165, NARA. 

146 
THE GREAT WAR APPROACHES 

In fact, the ChiefofStaffrevicwed all officers' reports, which were 

sent to him as soon as they were received by the Office of the Inspector 

General. Any unfit medical officers were reported directly to the 

Surgeon General. The Chief of Staff provided the Secretary of War his 

recommendations on the fate of flag officers. Regular Army officers 

found wanting were reduced to their permanent grades; those in other 

categories were given a lower temporary rank. Officers serving in combat units often were reassigned to administrative positions at regional 

or training commands.71 

Evaluation boards on field-grade officers were formed as needed, 

using officers from the War Department when men of suitable rank, 

senior to those being boarded, could not be found locally. The Secretary 

of War directed the Chief of Staff to follow through on the fate of all 

junior officers with poor eva luations and to submit a report regarding 

the action that had been taken on each. As a result, a follow-up report 

was forwarded through command channels to the Chief of Staff. An 

information copy was sent to the Office of the Inspector General, 

whose task was to ensure that no otficer was overlooked.12 

Although commanders at every level could influence the ultimate 

fate of particular officers and rebut report findings, the inspectorate 

became identified with the program. This alone explained why inspectors' visits were so feared and why the inspectorate came to be disliked 

and, in some cases, mistrusted by e lements of the officer corps. 

Eventua lly, the Office of the Inspector General was responsible for 

investigating all reported instances of poor performance by officers. 

Special investigations outside the cycle of unit visits were made whenever required, especially in the case of nondeployable organizations 

whose officers were not evaluated routinely. 

As may be imagined, many of the officers culled from the tactical 

units and sent to depots and garrisons continued to perform marginally. The effect of reassigning rather than discharging them often did 

more harm than good, causing serious morale problems and adversely 

affecting local operations. Such a case might surface as a result of a 

court-martial, a congressional complaint, or local mission failure. 

General Chamberlain commented in response to an inquiry from the 

" Memo, O!G to Insps, 22 Mar I 8, sub: Inefficient and Unfit Olficers, Entry 34A; 

Memo, Graves to TAG, 19 Mar 18, sub: Report of Inspectors General Relating to 

Deficiencies of Officers, Entry 26. Both in RG !59, NARA. 

'

1 Memo, Lochridge to CotS. WD, 12 Dec 17, sub: Appointment of Military Boards 

To Pass Upon the Qualifications of General and Field Officers of National Guard 

Divisions; Memo, March to SofW, 8 Mar 18, sub: Disposition of Officers Reported as 

Inefficient by Inspectors General. !3oth in Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. 

147 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Quartermaster General that the commander of the San Francisco 

Depot would have to go. "He is a pleasant gentleman with courteous 

manners and agreeable address, but markedly inefficient as has been 

already explained. He means well and desires to please. His inefficiency is due to lack of mentality, not unwillingness to try, but he is 

not a student of his duty." At Chamberlain's recommendation, the officer in question was invited by The Adjutant General to retire and he 

accepted the invitation. 73 

Morale and Welfare 

The War Department's increasing concern with the influence of marginal leadership on morale indicated its growing interest in an aspect of 

troop welfare that hitherto had been largely ignored. Before the war 

ended, morale and morale-related activities were to become a major 

issue throughout the Army. 

At the time of the 1916 mobilizations along the Mexican border, 

the Secretary of Way had asked Raymond B. Fosdick to look over the 

troops' living conditions at their isolated bases. Fosdick, a former 

Princeton student of the President's, was a lawyer with an established 

reputation for fair investigation into social problems. Initially, he found 

the usual saloons and bawdy houses around the posts and a laissez-faire 

command atmosphere of "boys will be boys." Both he and Baker 

believed that most of the men were intrinsically decent, would welcome 

more wholesome entertainment, and were patronizing the honky-tonks 

only because they lacked alternatives. The two concluded that the Army 

was responsible for providing suitable recreational and welfare activities, in their opinion a practical means for lowering the number of venereal and alcohol casua lties.74 

The concept was novel. Since the Army hierarchy was slow to 

respond, the first organizations to meet the need for morale-support 

activities were civilian agencies, such as the Red Cross, YMCA, 

Knights of Columbus, and similar charitable groups. In April 1917 

Fosdick was appointed by the Secretary to head the Commission on 

Training Camp Activities, formed as a temporary organization to coordinate the ongoing actions of many groups interested in improving the 

" AR!G 1919, p. 653; Rpt (quotation), OIG, 12 May 17, sub: Change Station, Col. 

Wallace, QMC, on Account Alleged Use Intoxicants and Incompetency, Entry 25, RG 

159, NARA. 

74 Raymond B. Fosdick, Chronicle of a Genera/ion: An Aulobiography (New York: 

Harper and Brothers, 1958), pp. 136-40. 

148 
THE GREAT WAR APPROACHES 

lot of the soldier. In the early stages of the war private agencies funded 

much of the welfare activities. Club furnishings, recreation rooms, even 

the hospital ship in the port of New York, often came from the donations of private citizens. The Red Cross and the church-affiliated associations donated most of the sundries needed by the soldiers. 

Eventually, the activities of these organizations pervaded the entire 

Army structure. Red Cross units supplemented Army ambulance and 

nursing capabilities. YMCA officials managed overseas canteenswhich might now be considered small post exchanges-and served as 

recreation directors on board each Army transport ship. Fosdick's commission was able to coordinate and channel most of this activity fairly 

smoothly in the Stateside cantonments. Yet even here, he deplored the 

sectarianism and duplication of effort that developed. Overseas, the 

presence of paramilitary organizations would be a source of serious 

problems, ultimately leading to one of the largest IG investigations of 

the war. 75 

Fosdick's position was advisory, not directive in nature. Within the 

first year of the war it had become apparent that the morale-support 

activities were generally well accepted but in need of much firmer control. Additionally, it was Fosdick's view that "either through timidity or 

inability to get the doughboy point of view, the repot1s of Army inspectors frequently failed to reflect the whole situation." To become better 

informed on morale issues, the Secretary appointed Frederick P. Keppel, 

dean of Colwnbia University, to become the Third Assistant Secretary of 

War for Personnel. Within a few weeks Keppel informally approached 

General Chamberlain. Based on their meeting, Keppel began to receive 

IG inspection report extracts on a routine basis. After a brief review, he 

specified such topics as health care, recreation, services, and community relations as being of special interest to him. Chamberlain, in tum, 

directed that inspectors carry out a morale and welfare inspection along 

with their regular unit and training inspections and that they prepare a 

morale report, submitting it separately from the others.76 

From its inception, the morale report had a standardized format, 

consisting of a list of the inspection team members and those intern Ibid., p. 143; Coffman, War To End All Wars, p. 77; Cramer, Ne1v1on D. Baker, p. 

98; Beaver, Baker and !he War Ejforl, pp. 220- 23; David C. Shanks, As They Passed 

Through the Port (Washington, D.C.: Cary Publishing Co., 1927), pp. 296- 98. On the 

postwar TG investigation, see Chapter 7. 

'

6 Fosdick, Chronicle, p. 176 (quotation), and in Entry 26, RG 159, NARA, see: 

Memo, Keppel to Chamberlain, 14 May 18; Ltr, Chamberlain to Keppel, 18 May 18; 

Memo, 3d ASofW to lG, 16 May 18; and Neo-style 32 1, Lnformation Desired by 3d 

Assistant Secretary of War, 20 May 18. 

149 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

viewed and a number of topical paragraphs that reflected the 

Secretary's areas of concern- the general health of the command, religious activities, community relations, and conscientious objectors. The 

first topic on the health of the command dealt with the incidence of discase (to include venereal cases, quarantine, and treatment procedures) 

and, because of a serious epidemic in the autumn of 1918, the handling 

of those with communicable diseases, as well as the efforts of such 

charitable organizations as the YMCA and Knights of Columbus. The 

second topic discussed the breadth and type of religious activities available, to include the extent of cooperation among military chaplains, the 

quality of each, and the interaction with local clergy- who, as of the 

summer, were banned from posts because unit commanders had found 

that their proselytizing and stance of pacifism were too disruptive. The 

third topic on community relations covered the degree of cooperation 

with local police and the extent of their control over houses of prostitution, plus an overall assessment of morale based on such indicators as 

the venereal rate and the number of disciplinary actions. The final topic 

on conscientious objectors described the local program and identified 

the officer in charge, usua lly from the Judge Advocate General's 

Department, and the number and types of objectors. An assessment of 

the officer's suitability for such a job and the objectors' amenability to 

noncombat duties were included. A separate analysis of the objectors' 

viewpoints, whether religious or personal, was sometimes appended.

77 

This concern over conscientious objectors and their treatment was 

another novelty. The objectors numbered about 4,000 out of the nearly 5 

million men drafted into service. About 1,300 of them were willing to 

fi ll noncombat military positions. What to do with the remainder was a 

serious problem. General March insisted that the objectors be subject to 

military discipline and liable to court-martial for failure to obey an 

order. Secretary Baker sought a less drastic alternative. The issue 

appears to have climaxed as the result of a letter sent to President Wilson 

from the Church of the Brethren, requesting that consideration be given 

to furloughing conscientious objectors "to noncombatant occupations in 

agriculture and other constructive pursuits." The President fotwarded 

the letter for comment to the Office of the J nspector General. 

" Ltr, Helmick to TAG, I Jul 18, sub: Information Desired by the Third Assistant 

Secretary of War Regarding Camp Meade, MD, Entry 26; LIT, Chamberlain to lnsps, 20 

May 18, sub: Information Desired by the Third Assistant Secretary of War, Entry 34A; 

Llr, Helmick to TAG, 19 Jun 18, sub: Information Desired by the Third Assistant 

Secretary of War Regarding the Sixth Division Regular, Entry 26. All in RG 159, 

NARA. 

ISO 
THE GREAT WAR APPROACHES 

Chamberlain replied by memorandum through the Secretary of War on 

24 May 1918. He shared General March's hard line. "It is my conviction 

that any policy contemplating granting furlough ... would be a fertile 

and just cause for charges of discrimination against other persons who, 

for any cause, may desire to avoid military service." He recommended 

that conscientious objectors be assigned to noncombatant military duties 

and be subject to "the same treatment ... [as any other] citizen if he 

shirked his duty or disobeyed orders."78 

Secretary Baker, given the job of resolving the issue, did not agree 

fully with either Chamberlain or March. As he told the Inspector 

General a few days after receiving his views, "After careful consideration of the whole question, 1 have decided to permit conditionally the 

furloughing of cettain conscientious objectors, but only in approved 

cases, after a searching investigation as to their sincerity." Policy letters 

were issued 1 June and 1 July, establishing procedures for handling 

objectors and making the issue a special item for inspection and, once 

developed, coverage in the morale report. Assistant Secretary Keppel 

monitored the program and attempted to see that the men were treated 

fairly. In the course of the war about 1,300 were furloughed while 

another 371 were jailed for a military offense. Inspections revealed that 

their treatment varied at each location but with few exceptions was generally decent. The last objector in jail was not to be released until 

November 1920.79 

In October 1918 coverage of chaplain activities was expanded in 

the morale report. At the time no corps of chaplains existed to provide 

guidance to its officers in the field; each chaplain's duties depended on 

his own initiative and the desires of his commander. The brief surveys 

in the body of the morale report showed a wide variation in both duty 

performance and scope. Assistant Secretary Keppel desired to gain a 

broader feel for what chaplains were doing and to compile data for 

developing specific policies on what they should be doing. To accomplish this, he asked inspectors, both in the United States and overseas, 

who visited posts with assigned chaplains to add to the regular report 

comments on chaplain activities in several general categories. 

The data on chaplains was statistical in nature and usually quite 

short. Items listed included the number of men the chaplain personally 

1

s Ltr, Wilson to IG, n.d., and Encl (first quotation); Memo (remaining quotations), 

Chamberlain to SofW, 24 May 18, sub: Consc.ientious Objectors. All in Entry 34A, RG 

159, NARA. See also DeWeerd, Wilson Fights His War, p. 242. 

"' Ltr (quotation), Baker to Chamberlain, 27 May 18, Entry 34A, RG 159, NARA; 

Coffman, War To End All 11f1rs, pp. 75- 76; DeWeerd, Wilson Fights His War, p. 242. 

lSI 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

knew and the number of pastoral visits he had made. Duty performance 

also was summarized- whether the chaplain accompanied the troops to 

the field and what additional unit duties he had to perform. The report 

described his relations with chaplains of other faiths, and whether any 

organization of chaplains existed within the unit or its chain of command. In some units, inspectors bad the chaplains fill in questionnaires, 

which they consolidated; in others, inspectors wrote their own summaries after visiting the chaplains. A great deal of data was accumulated, showing clearly the variety of tasks the chaplains performed and 

demonstrating that their efficiency suffered because of the absence of 

any central guidance or specific training to instruct them in their duties. 

No practical use was made of the information, however, and shortly 

after the war ended the tasking was discontinued. 80 

Also in October the General Staff established the Morale Branch. 

Its mission was to coordinate myriad morale-support activities and to 

formalize the morale and welfare system after Commission on Training 

Camp Activities ceased operations at the war's end. Headed by Brig. 

Gen. Edward L. Munson, the branch was soon to prove invaluable during the demobilization, assming smooth transition of morale-support 

activities and programs from civilian to Army control. The formation of 

the branch marked the advent of the final requirement on the morale 

report. Munson asked for recommendations on policies and procedmes. His request became still another item of special interest, and was 

institutionalized as a part of the report.81 

Army Schools 

Inspectors became involved in another aspect of training by reporting 

on the various schools that were being established at the cantonments. 

Often, these were associated with the divisions in training and were 

mentioned in the body of the unit inspection report. However, a growing number were formed by the bureaus to train the specialists needed 

for supporting the combat divisions or the new services, such as aviation or motor transport. 

Inspectors found that most of the schools run by recalled retirees 

and later supplemented by officers ca lled home from France specifi-

"' Memo, W. Wood to lnsps, 17 Oct 18, Entry 34A; Nco-style 349, Report on 

Chaplain Activities, 17 Oct 18, Entry 26; Rpts, 2d Army Corps, AEF, Oct Dec 18, 

Entry 26. All in RG 159, NARA. 

$I March, Nation at War, pp. 212, 21 5; Ltr, Munson to IG, 25 Nov 18, sub: Inclusion 

of Morale Items in Reports of Inspectors General," Entry 34/\, RG 159, NARA. 

152 
THE GREAT WAR APPROACHES 

cally to serve as cadre were functioning reasonably well. Equipment 

shortages and training standardization problems were common difficulties noted in reports. For the most part, however, few major irregularities were discovered, except in the system created by the Signal 

Corps to train its aviation personncV2 

The Signal Corps aviation training program exhibited the same 

weaknesses as its aircraft procurement programs. It was badly conceived, poorly organized, overly ambitious, and virtually uncontrolled. 

As a result, the aviation schools were a magnet for inspectors, ultimately involving General Chamberlain himself. The system was built 

around eight flight schools and one balloon school. Feeding them were 

military aeronautics schools for ground or preflight training, established at eight universities with training contracts. Additionally, the 

Signa l Corps created nine squadron stations, but only one was located 

ncar a flight school.33 

These various schools were only a few of the many places that 

General Chamberlain had planned to visit on a nationwide tour in July 

1917, but soon they became the focus of his attention. Indeed, the work 

that Chamberlain devoted to Signal Corps aviation training problems 

was the principal cause of his physical collapse. Between July and 

November he inspected all the aviation training sites and operational 

fields. Normally, he was on the road for two or three weeks, returning 

to Washington to report his findings and discuss them with the Chief 

Signal Officer and then immediately repeating the cycle without 

respite. His findings were so dire that they led the Chief Signal Officer 

to request, in September, that the Office of the Inspector General dedicate at least one inspector to Signal Corps matters. Yet Chamberlain 

continued to fulfill this role until February 1918, when an entire IG 

team was committed to it.84 

In his concluding aviation report to the Chief of Staff in 

November 1917, General Chamberlain noted that aviation training 

11 Coffman, War To End All Wars, p. 193. 

" The aviation schools were in San Diego, California; Mineola, New York; Chicago, 

Illinois; Newport News, Virginia; Miami, f-lorida; Chanute Field, Ill inois; Selfridge 

Field, Minnesota, and Wright Field, Ohio. The balloon was at Fort Omaha, Nebraska, 

and an experimental field was at Langley, Hampton, Virginia. The prellight campuses 

were Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Princeton University, Cornell University, 

Georgia Institute of Technology, Ohio State University, University of Illinois, 

University of Texas, and University of California, Berkeley. See File 354.1, Aviation, 

Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

•• Memo, Chamberlain to CofS, WD, 18 Sep 17, Entry 296, RG 165, NARA; Ltr, 

Chamberlain to Brewster, 27 Oct 17, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

153 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

lacked "organization, system and coordination and a total lack of uniformity in the methods pursued." He went on to observe that the tendency at the schools was to "neglect the training of officers except in 

flying" and to ignore completely their training in discipline and basic 

military subjects. Sudden policy changes from the Chief Signal 

Officer had hindered the development of a coherent program. 

Construction of training facilities was defective because of a lack of 

supervision and unclear requirements and specifications. The selection of sites themselves was often questionable. Spare parts requisitioning was unsystematic and expensive, causing delays in training. 

Some of the training a ircraft acquired were of very poor design and 

should not have been purchased.85 

Well before his report was filed, changes began to be made as the 

result of his verbal interim reports to the Chief Signal Officer. 

Disbursing officers were assigned to each school to handle finances 

and to attend to unusua l student financial needs. In late September 

1917 school commandants were authorized to discharge "any student 

who evidences unfitness by reason of his habits, lack of character, inefficiency, or who is guilty of misconduct."86 Thus the Inspector General's 

visits had an almost immediate effect, bringing improvements to many 

aspects of student morale and camp administration. These, however, 

formed only a small part of the Signal Corps' problems. 

Shortly after Chamberlain 's unflattering final report in 

November, the aviation school commanders were called to a meeting 

in Washington. There the Chief Signal Officer set the training goals 

for the future and directed the adoption of a standard program. He 

also appointed a board of experts to visit each school and to assure 

training quality and uniform standards. Aircraft and parts procurement procedures were reviewed and, as a result, centralized; vehicle 

use policies were determined and vehicle a llocation tables were 

developed for each airfield. Finally, the Signa l Corps coordinated 

with the Quartermaster General's Department to facilitate the timely 

issue of adequate winter clothing and to prevent the unauthorized 

issue of popular flight jackets.37 

Although still marginal, the aviation training program was pulled 

from the brink of disaster. General Chamberlain had identified spe-

$$ Memo, Chamberlain to TAG, 13 Aug 17; Memo (quotations), IG to CofS, WD, 13 

Nov 17, sub: Aviation Schools. Both in Entry 26, RG I 59, NARA. 

"" Memo, CofS, WD, to TAG, 14 Sep 17, Entry 296, RG 165, NARA. 87 Memo, IG to CofS, WD, 13 Nov 17, and 2d End, Arnold, 22 Nov 17, Entry 26, 

RG 159, NARA. 

154 
THE GREAT WAR APPROACH ES 

cific problems relatively early and provided both the recommendations and the motivation for improvement. What began as a routine 

training inspection had evolved into a thorough analysis and reform 

of a major program. 

In more general terms, the Inspector General's Department association with unit training played a central role in the objective assessment 

of nearly every organization in the Army- its strengths, weaknesses, 

and readiness for deployment. Every cantonment, school, and combat 

unit was visited by inspectors. In their inspection reports they investigated or analyzed unique unit problems and made recommendations for 

their resolution, many of which resulted in improvements in overall 

conditions, including morale, and in the training of combat units and 

their supporting specialists. Nowhere in the Army was there a group 

with a better understanding of the status and problems of units and programs. The inspectorate became the fulcrum for the War Department 

decisions leading to the buildup of the AEF in France. 

155 

5 

The Inspectorate in France 

Although General Chamberlain in Washington and General Brewster 

overseas enjoyed a close cooperative association throughout the war, 

their IG organizations developed quite differently. The first wave of 

personnel increases and policy decisions created a fairly stable 

Inspector General's Department (IGD) in the United States. This was 

not the case in France, where the inspectorate underwent continual 

alterations and expansion as the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) 

and its subordinate elements adjusted to many unanticipated demands 

and the problems intrinsic to growth. 

Adjusting to Overseas 

For over a two-year period, until the AEF was inactivated, Generals 

Chamberlain and Brewster maintained regular contact with each 

other through personal letters, written, on average, nearly every two 

weeks. Each kept the other fully informed as to policy changes and 

personnel needs, exchanging views on the abilities and duty performance of inspectors and men they desired for assignment. Brewster 

generally deferred to the views of Chamberlain as the Inspector 

General of the Army, who, in turn, exerted every effort to meet 

Brewster's needs. By this means, IGD standards and policies were 

uniform throughout the inspection system. At the same time, 

Chamberlain was able to maintain an unobtrusive influence over the 

t1ow of events in France as they affected the department, treating the 

AEF's TG office essentially as if it were another subordinate element 

of his own organization. 1 

' File 73, Guidance for IG, AEF, Entry 588, Record Group (RG) 120, National 

Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C.; Ltr, Brewster to IG, 

16 Feb 18, sub: Tables of Organization, Entry 26A, RG 159, NA RA. 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

The inspectorate 's role in the AEF was shaped by both General 

Pershing's command style and his personal relationship with General 

Brewster. Pershing often relied on Brewster when making decisions on 

professional matters, such as training and the maintenance of personal 

standards, and apparently used his IG as a sounding board and source 

of advice. References to Brewster throughout Pershing's memoirs 

reflect the commander-in-chief's esteem for his inspector and suggest a 

close and continuous working relationship. But Pershing also made 

extensive use of his inspector general system because of his own 

unwillingness to delegate authority beyond his personal staff and his 

tendency to attempt to control too much himsel£.2 

Pershing recognized Brewster's command potential, briefly considering him for command of the 4th Marine Brigade of the 2d Division 

shortly after the unit arrived in France. In the end, Pershing decided not 

to assign him to the post only because ''the services of ... Brewster cannot be spared." The AEF commander went on to note that "it has become 

necessary to confer considerable authority on the Inspector General and 

there is no one who can take his place. He possesses the personal and 

military qualifications that make him of exceptional value, especially in 

determining the efficiency and fitness of officers for command." 

Tluoughout the war Pershing continued to list Brewster as one of the 

officers he considered capable of commanding a division or higher unit.3 

Pershing demonstrated his professional respect by ensuring that Jus 

IG retained access to him. The general order a1mouncing the creation of 

the AEF staff divided it into general and administrative and technical 

components, including the inspector among other bureau and department 

chiefs in the Administrative and Technical Staff. Initially, the heads of 

each staff element, twenty in number, had access to General Pershing. 

The arrangement proved to be increasingly unworkable, and much of the 

administrative history of the General Headquarters (GHQ) revolved 

around efforts to improve it. However, restructuring in July 1917 and 

again in February 1918 left the IG as one of the few staff officers, other 

than members of the General Staff, to remain in Pershing's headquarters.4 

2 File 12, Commander-in-Chief Reports, Entry 22, RG 120, NARA; John J. 

Pershing, i\1/y Experiences in the World War, 2 vols. (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 

1931 ), I :20, SO, 263, 333. 1 Frederick Palmer, Ne111ton D. Baker: America At Wcw, 2 vols. (New York: Dodd, 

Mead and Co., 1931 ), 2:231; Telg (quotations), Pershing to TAG, 9 Dec 17, Entry 588, 

RG 120, NA RA. 

• Department of the Army (DA), Historical Division (II D), The United Stares Army 

in the World Wm; 1917- 1919, 17 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 

1948), 16:1 - 2 (GO I, 191 7), 13- 24 (GO 8, 1917), 216- 25 (GO 31, 1918). 

158 
THE INSPECTORATE IN fRANCE 

Under Brewster the AEF 

inspectorate became highly centralized. At first, subordinate 

inspectors were allowed to operate 

under their commanders, with a 

minimum of interference from 

Brewster's office. This policy 

began to change, however, as the 

AEF grew in size and complexity 

and increasing numbers of questions were referred to Brewster 

and his staff. The absence of uniformity and standardization within the divisions, as well as the 

inexperience of many inspectors, 

argued for more central control. 

Ultimately, Brewster closely monitored the activities of all inspectors through a detailed reporting Maj. Gen. Andre W. Brewster 

system, and in time his office 

expanded in size, becoming the largest TG staff in the AEF. Because of 

his growing responsibilities, Brewster received his second star as a 

major general in the National Army on l December 191 7. 

The unusual demands placed upon Brewster's office were attributable to the inexperience of not only unit inspectors but virtually all personnel. By the fall of 1917 inspectors routinely were expected to 

instruct new leaders and suggest remedies for deficiencies. The experience in France showed that the number of inspectors required in a force 

depended not only on its size but on its condition, mission, location, 

and state of training. After the war Brewster suggested that future AEF 

IG authorizations reflect minimums but allow for expansion in case of 

need. Although the maximum authorized sh·ength rose to only 35, in 

fact 80 officers were serving as inspectors at the time of the armistice, 

with most of the overstrength in the tactical units. Later, in May 1919, 

to undertake a series of comprehensive investigations or to assist in 

faci litating embarkation and demobilization, 216 inspectors were 

detailed or attached to Brewster's office and to the AEF's Services of 

Supply (SOS).5 

' Memo, Brewster to AG, AEF, 20 May 19, sub: Report of a Board of Officers 

Appointed in Compliance AG AEF Memorandum of May 5, 1919, Entry 591, RG 120, 

NAR/\. 

159 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

The inspectorate did not only grow at the top. Commissioned 

strength in the tactical units nearly always exceeded authorizations, 

and late in the war division commanders routinely augmented their 

inspectors' one-man offices because of overcommitments. Thus Lt. 

Gen. Robert L. Bullard, in command of the Second Army since its 

activation on 10 October 1918, informed Brewster that "practically 

every Division and Corps commander recently desired to double the 

number of his inspectors." Pleased with the "efficient work" done by 

inspectors, and realizing that no further authorizations were forthcoming, he wrote to tell Brewster that he was allowing the IG offices at 

every level to be augmented by officers from other elements within the 

command.6 The steady growth resulted from a process of discovery 

throughout the command of the AEF's inherent weaknesses and the 

manifold ways in which the inspectorate could strengthen and compensate for them. 

The Evolution of the Inspectorate 

When General Brewster and his small staff landed in France, expansion 

on the scale just described was unthinkable. Coping with planning 

problems of inm1ense importance to the future of the AEF took first 

priority, after which inspection methods and procedures evolved on the 

basis of experience. Brewster's first job upon arrival was to serve as a 

senior member of a board that developed AEF port and reception procedures for all debarkation points in Europe. Following the initia l press 

of special platming, however, Brewster spent much of his time conducting general inspections or observing allied operations.7 

Brewster and Major Clark, newly assigned to the AEF, carried the 

burden alone for most of 1917, because Pershing had diverted 

Brewster's assistant, Major Conner, and a detailed inspector to other 

duty assignments. The burden left on Brewster was even heavier than it 

seemed, for Clark, although an able investigator, lacked the necessary 

background to inspect tactical units effectively. To compensate for the 

lack of manpower, Pershing authorized Brewster to use officers from 

the General Staff, and Brewster took advantage of this policy, especially by using fie ld artillerymen to check artillery units that, here as in the 

United States, were most in need of assistanee.8 

• Ltr, Bullard to IG, AEF, 27 Jan 19, sub: Inspector General, Entry 26A, RG 159, 

NARA. 

' Ltr, Brewster to Chamberlain, 8 Oct 17, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

• Ibid., 25 Nov 17, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

160 
THE INSPECTORATE IN fRANCE 

Despite this outside help, Brewster found it difficult both to inspect 

and to carry out the administration and headquarters liaison expected of 

him as the AEF IG. Inspection difficulties were exacerbated by the steady 

siphoning off of competent division-level inspectors as soon as command 

and key staff positions opened. Brewster did not want to deny these men 

any opportunities, releasing them with a plea for replacements, but an 

ever-growing number of new units meant that Brewster's office was 

mired in routine. By November most of his and Clark's time was being 

consumed by special investigations. Hence, Brewster asked Chamberlain 

to send an additional officer of"experience and rank" to be his assistant.9 

As a result, three officers were assigned to France from the War 

Department inspectorate: Col. John H. Hughes, Col. John S. Winn, and 

Major Olmstead. They were the first of what was to become a steady 

flow of officers picked by the Office of the Inspector General (010) for 

European duty and allowing Brewster to finally fill the IG offices of 

higher-level units. When new inspectors arrived, they were immediately put to work as assistants to inspectors already on the staff. At the 

same time, they were given copious amounts of reading to familiarize 

themselves with the unique aspects of AEF organization. Colonel 

Baer's experience suggested the frenetic pace at which Brewster was 

operating. Reporting on 27 July 1918, he set out only three days later 

with the medical inspector on a three-week inspection of facilities in 

the District of Paris. Immediately afterward, he conducted two major 

investigations on his own and then departed from the GHQ AEF to an 

advanced element, where he worked every day until the armistice. 

Between 27 July and II November he enjoyed only three days off, and 

that brief rest was attributable to his car breaking down. 10 

Problems sometimes resulted when those selected as inspectors 

lacked matw·ity or experience. Although bureau inspectors performed 

much useful work in their own specialties, the proliferation of non-IGD 

inspectors also led to a series of distracting, uncoordinated visits. The 

First Army IG complained that one of his units was visited by medical, 

veterinary, remount, G- 3, G- 5 and IG inspectors- all on one day. Often 

new inspectors merely recapitulated the findings of those who had preceded them, while the inspected units got little assistance in overcoming 

their problems. Inspectors had different standards, some letting a situation pass that others cited as a deficiency. The overall impact was to 

reduce the effectiveness of inspections and to lessen their credibility. 

9 1bid., 7 (quoted words) and 10 Nov 17, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 10 Ltr, Bacr to IG, USA, 8 May 19, sub: Personal History of Service in the Inspector 

General's Department, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

161 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Hence, General Brewster consolidated inspections at the field army 

level. He set up an informal coordination system at AEF level, either 

establishing working arrangements or, in some cases, taking actual control over the inspection efforts of the other bureaus and departments. 

The AEF General Staff, however, was not amenable to his control, and 

its inspection activities led to common complaints about overinspection 

from field units. 11 

Quality and Turbulence 

The officers who eventually passed under Brewster's supervision were 

either reservists, like Major Clark, or regulars detailed to the Inspector 

General's Department. Guardsmen accompanying their divisions overseas also began to enter the system. Aware of the needs of the General 

Staff and the line, Brewster asked Pershing for no assignment priority 

and released any inspector for troop duty as ordered. The inspectorate 

thus continued to experience considerable turbulence. Brewster reported that between 1 July and 31 December 1918 "the personnel of the 

IGD has changed practically twicc."12 

For the same causes, quality declined because of the inexperience 

of those who were available for an IG assignment. Brewster maintained 

reasonable standards by retaining some senior regulars and by exploiting the limited expertise of others; he always ensured that at least one 

good medical and one legal officer were assigned to him. Despite the 

dilution of the Inspector General's Department, many exceptional officers saw service with it. One who impressed Brewster was the first tactical unit inspector to arrive in France-Maj. Conrad L. Babcock of the 

I st Division, who turned down a Stateside emergency promotion to go 

overseas. Babcock's division commander assigned him early to the 

division general staff and later gave him command of a regiment. Other 

men who were well qualified to perform their task were Majors Webb 

and Streater, now serving as expert accountants, and the overworked 

Colonel Baer. The dedication shown by Babcock was paralleled by the 

enthusiasm and professionalism of the ebullient Maj. Edward E. 

Britton, who left the Hoboken piers to work in the AEF's Services of 

Supply late in the war.' 3 

These men formed one side of the coin. The other consisted of a 

significant number of inspectors who lacked both the desire and the 

" Memo, Baer to CG, 3d Corps, 7 Feb 19, Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 11 Memo, Brewster to CotS, AEF, 7 Jan 19, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 11 Ltr, Brewster to Chamberlain, 8 Oct 17, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

162 
THE INSPECTORATE IN fRANCE 

qualifications to perform their IG duties. Many of the senior Regular 

Army officers selected in France did not welcome an IG assignment. 

Although they accepted it reluctantly, they expressed their displeasure 

and their desire to find a combat job. Some even tried to avoid the IG 

assignment all together- and, when successful, bragged about it. Once 

he became Brewster's assistant, Colonel Spinks tried to motivate the 

disgruntled officers, usually writing each a letter that stressed the 

importance of the TO's function. A11d as he pointed out in one letter, " In 

war some men sacrifice their lives, others their careers. We all have to 

give up something." ~ 

Despite such encouragement, Regular Army officers regarded IG 

duty as detrimental to their careers, and inspectors felt overlooked by 

promotion policies favoring officers on the General Staff and technical 

bureaus. The rapid promotion rate for Adjutant General and Ordnance 

officers was notorious. Many officers in the Inspector General's 

Deparhnent thus viewed their work as demanding, thankless, and personally unrewarding. Lt. Col. Philip Lauber, on duty in the Services of 

Supply at Tours, told Colonel Spinks that he noted in many of his fellow inspectors "a bitter feeling toward their organization instead of one 

of loyalty." He felt that the lack of recognition during the war was an 

omen of things to come once the war was over. A few officers manifested so poor an attitude as to require immediate rei ief. 15 

The situation grew worse when American forces suffered unprecedented losses in the summer of 1918. The need for experienced Regular 

AJ"my officers was so acute that in August General Pershing directed that 

by I October all regulars serving as division or corps adjutants, ordnance 

officers, quartermasters, commanders of military police or inspectors 

would be assigned to command combat units. Major unit commanders 

received instructions to plan accordingly and to be prepared to select and 

assign National Guard and reserve officers as staff replacements. 

General Brewster prevailed upon Pershing to modify his order to 

allow a Regular AJ·my officer to remain as senior inspector on each 

" Llr (quotation), Spinks to Fleel, I Nov 18, Enlry 591, RG 120, NARA. The aliitude of some inspectors is strange to understand given that many of the senior AEF 

commanders, from Pershing down, expressed their apprecialion and admiration for the 

inspectorate. General Bullard, for example, later atlribuled lhe success of the 33d 

Division commander, Maj. Gen. George Bell, to his prewar experience as an IG. lie 

"was known to lhe whole Regular Army as perhaps the most exacting inspector genera l that was ever in it." Sec Robert L. Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences of 1he 

War (Garden City, N. Y: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1925), p. 268. 

" Memo, Lauber to Donaldson, 16 May 19, and Llr (quotmion), Lauber 10 Spinks, 

16 May 19, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

163 
T HE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

corps staff. Senior inspector vacancies at corps headquarters were 

filled with one of the regulars being reassigned from the divisions. 

Pershing also approved the immediate identification and assignment of 

the nonregular division replacements, in an effort to provide for some 

cross-h·aining with the departing officers. By the end of September 

only division- and corps-level staffs, with a few exceptions, had 

Regular Army officers. 16 

The end result was a widespread assignment of so-called temporary 

officers to tactical unit IG positions, but the real effect on the inspectorate was that its reliability and effectiveness was doubted by Regular 

Army officers. This was attributable partly to the prevailing lack of confidence in the replacements and partly to the fact that many of them did 

not have the experience necessary to be of full value to their commanders. Justifying the change as a necessary evil, General Brewster later 

said that the situation proved the truth of the adage that "men are not disposed to cheerfully and willingly accept criticism from those whom they 

may have cause to believe not fully qualified to criticize."17 

Yet the problems that developed were not always the fault of the new 

inspectors. Some found their ability to do their jobs impaired by the 

absence of help or encouragement from their superiors. On 31 October 

1918 Maj. David Lewis, a former Pennsylvania guardsman, was assigned 

as inspector to the 6th Division, at the time stationed close to units fighting in the Argonne. Lewis reported to the division chief of staff, whose 

sole guidance to him was "to keep one foot on the ground," an insh·uction that Lewis felt was "quite needless." The division commander was 

only marginally more helpful, telling his nervous new inspector to "look 

after the care of animals, transportation and observation of all troop 

movements on the march, or otherwise." Lewis was able to make a productive contribution only as a result of help from an infanh·y captain who 

had been assigned as the assistant division inspector.18 

Other division inspectors were moved about or given inappropriate 

duties by their commanders. Sometimes Brewster heard of such cases 

only when replacements for the reassigned men were requested. 

Another practice was to substitute an untrained officer chosen by the 

local commander for an experienced inspector. Commonly, a division 

16 Ltr, AG, AEF, to CGs, 13 Aug 18, sub: Availability of Regular Officers; Ltr, Spinks 

to Johnson, 14 Aug 18; and Ltr, IG, AEF, to CGs, 17 Aug 18, sub: Detail of Division 

Inspectors. All in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 11 Rpt, Brewster to CinC, AEF: n.d., Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

" David Lewis, "A Short Account of My Experiences in the American 

Expeditionary Forces in France, 191 &-1919," OTIG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH). 

164 
THE INSPECTORATE IN fRANCE 

staff officer would be ordered to fill in for an inspector who was ill or 

away at school, to prevent IG cases from accumulating. This practice 

was often the source of poor investigations or reports. Although technically improper because the replacement was not on detail, it was tolerated on the grounds that it did more good than harm. Some units, 

however, seemingly forgot that the permanent detailing of inspectors 

was not their prerogative. In one case, a corps chief of staff diverted an 

officer sent for regimental command to be the corps lG, ousting the 

assigned IG without informing either Brewster or his own commander. 

Both were furious when they discovered the change; the inspector was 

reinstated and the erring chief of staff was reassigned.19 

Not all the difficulties that developed, however, could be blamed on 

the misuse of inspectors. An inexperienced or rash IG officer could 

make many problems for himself. A Regular Army corps inspector 

acknowledged that the broad charter given to IGs had motivated several of his inexperienced division inspectors to "overstep a bit." He urged 

them to behave with tact and to keep their commanders informed of 

what they were doing. He suggested to his army-level counterpart that 

the word be spread to lGs at all levels to be more circumspect, fearing 

the development of"a wide breach between the line and the staff which 

will be very difficult to heal."20 

Examples of such friction were all too frequent. It was easy to 

sympathize with the rage of the 82d Division commander, whose 

machine gun company had been written up for having dirty wagons on 

the tenth day of the fighting in the Meuse-Argonne. In another case, 

"one of these Reserve Corps inspectors skinned the company officers 

of a certain unit for being around the mess hall at dinner time, evidently being afraid they would try to eat some of the men's rations." He 

ignored the otTicers' explanation that they were assuring proper mess 

procedures by their presence. The tendency of some inspectors to look 

always for something wrong alienated many commanders, particularly 

in the heated atmosphere of the final offensives, when the slightest 

error by a commander usually meant summary re lief. Under pressure 

both from the enemy and from their own commanders, some officers 

began to view their inspectors with extreme hostility. 21 

•• Telg, Baer to IG, AEF, 9 Feb 19, and Memo, Brewster to CinC, AEF, 27 Sep 18, 

Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. See also Hines lnterv, 7 Nov 47, Army General Staff 

Interviews, Cater Files, OCMH Collection, U.S. Army Military History Institute 

(MI-11), Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 

"' Memo, Peck to Johnson, 23 Oct 18, Entry 799, RG 120, NARA. 21 Ltr, Baer to Spinks, 8 Dec 18, Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 

165 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

There were many other points of friction. Brig. Gen. Hugh A. 

Drum, the First Army chief of staff, criticized the lack of imagination 

shown in the numerous IG reports he reviewed. Inexperienced inspectors at the division level slavishly stuck to their checklists, commenting on each topic whether any changes had occurred or not. Drum 

pointed out that replacement problems and the condition of animals 

were generally recognized as critica l and that commanders needed no 

endless "harping" on the fact. Drum also urged IGs to refrain from 

tactically second-guessing commanders and to assess operations only 

when specifically tasked to do so. Drum further cautioned inspectors 

to be discreet when assessing the battle-worthiness of troops and 

units. " It is undesirable and psychologically damaging to attract attention to such matters as fatigue, time on line, and replacement quality 

without any real cause. A unit often only has the problems it perceives 

are problems."22 

Tactlessness and pedestrianism were not the only problems of the 

less able inspectors. On rare occasions their actions in the field made 

them laughingstocks, discrediting the entire inspectorate. One such 

case involved a guardsman who was assigned as the 37th Division IG. 

During the Meuse-Argonne offensive this inspector drew his pistol on 

some soldiers he presumed were stragglers. Refusing to hear their 

explanations, he escorted them to the front lines. Later, they were able 

to identify themselves as members of a signal wire team setting up lines 

from the rear. On another occasion the same inspector drew his pistol 

again while trying to clear up a traffic jam. The division commander 

reprimanded the IG for his rash conduct; however, acknowledging that 

the inspector had rendered "excellent service" overall, he judged that he 

should not be punished further for actions made under "extremely 

aggravating circumstances" that might have been avoided by a more 

experienced officer. Nevertheless, the errant IG was reassigned to a 

division returning to the United States, for his usefulness in the 37th 

Division had ended.2

l 

Brewster attempted to counsel the inspectors, urging that their 

questions should be positive, "helpful, calculated to build up the morale 

21 Ltr (quotations), Drum to IG, First Army, 20 Oct I 8, sub: Comments on 

Inspectors' Reports, with pencil notes by A.W.B. attached; Ltr, Mcilroy to Spinks, 9 

Nov 18, sub: Circular Letter to All Inspectors. Both in Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 

u Memo, McKenney to IG, AEF, 3 Nov 18, sub: Lt. Col. B. J. 13arger IG; Ltr, 

Larimore to CG, 37th Div, 4 Nov 18, sub: Lt. Col. Barger; and Ltr, Barger to CG, 37th 

Div, 14 Nov 18, sub: Accusation That I Pointed a Pistol at a Lieutenant in the Argonne 

Drive, and End (quoted words), Farnsworth, same date. All in Entry 588, RG 120, 

NARA. 

166 
THE INSPECTORATE IN fRANCE 

and esprit de corps of the command." He prepared an encouraging letter to each inspector, specifying items of concern and directing them to 

work with their corps inspectors when they were in doubt. He also 

pointed out that it was command policy to hold them responsible for 

not reporting unsatisfactory conditions. He stressed that IGs should 

enter units as in the chain of command, from "the top down," explaining their purpose to everyone and, upon completion of their task, 

reversing the process as they identified matters that needed correction. 24 

As Brewster's field assistant, Col. Joseph A. Baer, admonished 

inspectors to "assume the attitude of an instructor and an importer of 

information and orders," and both he and Brewster noted that a helpful 

attitude could achieve cooperation. Baer made it a practice never to use 

his authority to give orders except in an emergency. "My policy was to 

force the officer concerned to see the need for correction and to issue 

the orders himself." This method sustained the authority of local commanders and avoided the tendency to attribute their shortcomings to IG 

meddling. Baer observed that an inspector should always tell the 

inspected commander what he had found, never letting him find out 

after the fact in a directive from above.

25 

The steady criticism of IG performance affected morale, especially, that of the lower-level inspectors. They bristled particularly at the 

statement that they would be held responsible for unreported deficiencies. One inspector pointed out to General Brewster that he was already 

working fourteen hours a day with no assistance, mostly on special projects for his commander, and asked for guidance on his priorities to 

avoid any criticism. Another inspector expressed similar sentiments, 

saying much of what he reported went no further than his commander, 

who decided what to do with it. He wanted to know what deficiencies 

Brewster deemed critical. Guidance, however, consisted merely of the 

typical checklists, the source of Drum's complaint that many IG reports 

were filled with the obvious. The pressure placed on new inspectors 

explained their excesses, at least in part, and added to the supervisory 

burden of IGs at corps and higher levels. 

By exercising tact, able GHQ inspectors soothed but never completely overcame the resentment caused by circumstances and their own 

inept bretlU'en. As soon as hostilities ended, the divisions that still had 

reserve officers assigned as inspectors requested that they be replaced 

by regulars. Regular Army officers were authorized by General 

l-1 Memo, IG, AEF, to Insps, 4 Sep 18, sub: Responsibility of Division inspectors, 

Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

H Ltr, Baer to IG, USA, 8 May 19, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

167 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Pershing to be detailed again to the Inspector General's Department on 

2 December 1918, and despite continuing difficulties in finding experienced men, the quality and experience of inspectors had for the most 

part returned to satisfactory standards by Apri I 1919. 

Nevertheless, the personnel problems in the lower echelons of the 

inspectorate had been a difficult extra burden at a critical time of frenetic activity. The positive side of the experience was the revelation of 

the kind of people needed by the inspectorate to succeed. But the problems of wartime cast long shadows. Many senior inspectors feared that 

the IG system had suffered permanent damage by allowing inexperienced or marginal officers to serve in it. The policy unquestionably had 

created a legacy of bias against the inspectorate among many officers 

destined for positions of influence in the postwar period.26 

Training Inspections 

Despite the tensions, General Pershing and the GHQ staff relied extensively on the AEF inspectorate to gauge conditions within the expeditionary force. Conformity with the GHQ training programs was 

stressed heavily, in part because of the low training level of the divisions arriving in France. Inspectors monitored AEF policies for avoiding overreliance on the British and French officers, which accorded 

with General Pershing's desire to keep the AEF as American as possible. They also reported on the effects of strength and equipment shortages. Inspectors were asked to comment on unit march discipline, 

including proper conduct of rest halts, appearance of the troops, correct 

pace, and the ability to keep a portion of the road open at all times. 

Finally, the ever-present officer evaluations had to be carried out, at 

least partly in reaction to allied reports about the limited staff capabilities of the American units.27 

General Pershing insisted that this sort of information continue 

flowing from those American units that passed under allied control. 

Regardless of where a unit was, he kept close tabs on it through 

inspection visits and personal contact. The inspectors' duties were varied. IGs carried out, with tact and diplomacy, special inquiries on unit 

re lations with allied officials, as well as reviewed transactions and 

26 Memo, Brewster to AG, AEF. 20 May 19, Entry 591; Llr, Magruder to Helmick, 

3 Jan 27, Entry 1360. Both in RG 120, NARA. 11 Memo, Fiske to IG, AEF, 25 Jun 18, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA; John Toland, No 

Man:~ Land: 1918- The Last Year of the Great War (New York: Doubleday and Co., 

1980), p. 189. 

168 
THE INSPECTORATE IN fRANCE 

agreements executed by American units with Allies to ensure compliance with AEF policy. Specific information requests increased steadily. For example, inspectors were asked by the AEF ordnance chief to 

investigate the serious abuse of machine guns, which machine gunners 

were wrecking at an alarming rate; by the AEF G- 3, to be alert to the 

misuse of aviation marking panels; and by the AEF chief quartermaster, to informally note the number of garbage cans in use dm·ing unit 

inspections and provide recommendations for a standard basis of 

issue. 28 The list seemed endless. 

The normal AEF field inspections lasted four to seven days. During 

this time inspectors observed activities, interviewed unit members and 

most key personnel, and gathered and correlated statistics on discipline. 

Control of venereal disease was a major concern of General Pershing, 

who made it a special item of inquiry for every visit or inspection. IGs 

learned to check a unit's venereal rate for trends and to seek explanations for any variations. Service records and pay cards kept in the units 

had to be spot-checked in response to complaints about delays and 

errors in pay.29 

The major portion of an inspection report, however, dealt with tactical efficiency and the exercise of command. In June 1918 Pershing 

directed all inspectors to make frequent training observations and assist 

in assuring the quality of training and the best use of time. Typical of 

the inspections that resulted was Col. Jacob C. Johnson's visit on 26-30 

August 1918 to the 82d Division, then occupying a quiet sector in 

Lorraine. Although the 82d was one of the better units, and was theoretically in its final stages of training, Johnson found that its troops had 

no experience in open (free from the trenches) offensive warfare. 

Practice in attack, liaison, and fighting in woods and villages was just 

beginning at the time of Johnson's visit. Indeed, the 82d had received 

so many replacements that even its level of basic training was low. Most 

men needed training in infantry crew-served weapons and grenades; 

one brigade commander reported that the closest his men had gotten to 

such weapons was at demonsh·ations. None had any experience in dealing with artillery, for the division artillery brigade had been trained sep23 Memos, Brewster to Lnsps, 28 Jan 18, sub: Observance of Official and Social 

Courtesies; Ovenshine to lnsps, 20 May 18, sub: Injury to Machine Guns; Spinks to All 

lnsps, 15 Oct 18, sub: Misuse of Marking Panels; Spinks to Insps, 5 Oct 18; and 

Olmstead to Insps, 8 Jul 18, sub: Training. All in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. See also 

Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences, p. 140. 29 Edward M. Coffman, The War To End All 1#1rs: The American Militmy Experience 

in World War I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 132; Memo, Ovenshine 

to Insps, 23 Aug 18, sub: Payment of Soldiers, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. ' 

169 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

arately, only joining the division 

on 24 August. The turnover of key 

personnel had been constant and 

damaging, despite conscientious 

efforts to retain the best officers 

and NC0 s.30 

High sick rates, caused by 

poor sanitary practices, and a serious transportation problem also 

lowered the division's combat 

readiness and overall proficiency. 

Jolmson discussed the situation 

with the division lG and chief of 

staff, who agreed to pursue a more 

aggressive sanitation program. 

The unit's acute shortage of vehicles, with only 45 percent of its 

rolling stock and e leven of its fifty 

Col. Jacob C. Johnson authorized motor ambulances on 

hand, virtually doomed any effective medical evacuation during heavy combat. And the lack of the necessary spare parts for the vehicles exacerbated the whole situation. If 

the division were required to redeploy quickly, it would have to abandon most of its unserviceable vehicles, further reducing its already 

deficient transportation capability.3

' 

The division commander, Maj. Gen. William P. Burnham, 

impressed Colonel Johnson, as did the brigade and regimental commanders and the division IG. Burnham was confident that the division 

could do whatever was required of it, warning, however, that "without 

the h·aining we may have 2, 3, or 4 casualties where we ought to have 

only one." (His prophetic comment also had application for the entire 

A EF in the offensives launched in the autumn of 1918.) Johnson judged 

the commanders and staff to be ready "for the test of battle," pressed for 

a resolution of the division's transportation problem, and recommended that the division be required to accelerate its training.32 

Units on the march often were observed by corps and Army fGs, 

who were dispatched to assess their march discipline, equipment status, 

"' Memo, Johnson to CG, First Army, I Sep 18, sub: Report of Inspection, 82d 

Division, AEF, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

" Ibid. The 1917 TO&E authorized 544 wagons and 731 motor vehicles. 

" Ibid. 

170 
THE INSPECTORATE IN fRANCE 

and degree of organization. Upon arriving in the unit area, the inspectors would first make their presence known to the commander. If the 

unit was on the road, they would then go down the line or observe the 

unit as it moved past. One inspector said he never reviewed infantry 

while he was in a car. " I made it a rule never to drive past troops and 

splash them with mud," or to ride while they walked. Inspectors might 

accompany the organization, watch it go into bivouac, and spot-check 

the condition of its equipment. The vehicle shortage was always 

extreme, and inspectors sometimes suggested reducing cargo loads. 

Inspection reports revealed that a surprising number of units, theoretically in the final stages of readiness, were ill-organized and short of 

equipment even as they moved to the front. 33 

As a matter of policy, inspectors from the AEF's IG office tried to 

be present whenever a major unit disembarked at one of the ports, to 

gather information on its training status. One visit had unexpectedly 

lasting consequences. In August 1918 Colonel Baer had the duty of 

watching the 81 st Division disembark at the port of St. Nazaire. Upon 

seeing that the troops were wearing the silhouette of a wildcat on their 

sleeves or caps, he made an inquiry through channels if the practice was 

proper. Eventually, his report reached the division commander, Maj. 

Gen. Charles J. Bailey, who replied that he had noted the practice in 

all icd units during his orientation tour of the Western Front. When his 

unit was marking its cargo for overseas shipment, the men selected a 

wildcat. Bailey allowed the usc of the symbol on uniforms and, because 

it enhanced unit cohesion and morale, urged that the practice be authorized throughout the AEF. His recommendation was approved by 

General Pershing in October 1918, and shoulder sleeve insignia have 

been a part of the U.S. Army uniform ever since. 34 

Inspection teams soon discovered that inspectors assigned to divisions had varied roles to play, according to their commanders' wishes. 

Lt. Col. Matthew H. Taggart, the 28th Division IG, stated that he had 

no authority over training but visited training areas to ensure that unit 

programs and policies were being carried out. He spent most of his time 

inspecting billets and messes for adherence to health requirements. He 

Jl Lewis, "Short Account," quolation, OTIG files, Pentagon (SA IG-ZXH); Rpts, 

lnsp, First Army Arty, to CG, Army Arty, 20 Sep and 14 Oct 18, subs: lnspcclion of 

60th Artillery. CAC, and Inspection of 57th Artillery, CAC, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

" Memo, Baer to IG, AEF, 5 Scp 18; Ltr, CinC, AEF, to Cdr, 81st Div, 28 Sep 18, 

and 1st End, Cdr, 8 1st Div, to CinC, AEF, 4 Oct 18; Tclg, AG, AEF, to All Div CGs, 8 

Oct 18: and Ltr. IG, AEF, to IG, SOS, AEF, 12 Dec 18. All in Entry 588, RG 120, 

NARA. 

171 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

also devoted considerable interest to the care, treatment, and condition 

of the division livestock. His commander had delegated him the authority to order corrective actions in his name whenever necessary, which 

became normal practice by the summer of 1918. Taggart conducted 

investigations of officer efficiency, damage claims, and self-inflicted 

wounds, and he reviewed and made recommendations on all requests 

for discharge or compassionate reassignment. Taggart's relationship 

with his commander was cordial, close, and fully supportive.)$ 

The 5th Division commander gave hls inspector, Lt. Col. Robert G. 

Peck, a substantially different role. Peck spent hls time almost exclusively in the field, inspecting unit conditions and training progress, visiting 

troops, assessing their activities, and helping commanders where he 

could, while a captain was attached to the division IG office to handle 

administration and conduct routine investigations. At first Peck experienced a lot of hostility from the division general staff, but he overcame 

the situation through sheer perseverance, the support of the division commander, and his own helpful contributions to the staff's efforts to train the 

division and ready it for combat. By the time the regulars were pulled out 

of special staffs in September 1918, the division IG was considered one 

of the keys to assuring division readiness and discipline . .l6 

Discipline and Race Relations 

In April 1918 General Pershing decided to add a "disciplinary feature" 

to the inspectorate, with the aim of imposing high standards of appearance and conduct throughout his growing expeditionary force. He hoped 

to see the AEF's IG office become "something of the nature of a court 

of equity." Brewster soon became responsible for overseeing discipline 

in the AEF and for adjudicating discipline matters in Pershing's name. A 

similar approach was recommended at all other levels of command.37 

u Memo, Taggart to IG, AEF, I Jul 18, sub: Inspection of 28th Division; Taggert, JG, 

28th Div, Annual Rpt, 1917- 18. Both in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. See also Lewis, 

"Short Account," OTIG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH). 16 Llr, Peck to Brewster, 23 Sep 18, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

" Memo (quotations), Pershing to Brewster, 14 Apr 18; Ltr, Brewster toW. Wood, 8 

Apr 18; Memo, Brewster to CofS, AEF, 12 Apr 18; Memo, Brewster to CinC, AEF, 16 

Apr 18, sub: Duties of Inspector General's Department; Memo, Brewster to CinC, AEF, 

I May 18, sub: Draft of Order on Discipline; and Memo, Olmstead to lnsps, 16 Apr 18, 

sub: Supervision of Discipline by IGD. All in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. See also 

Marcellus G. Spinks, "Major Problems of the Inspector General, AEF, and Their 

Solution" (Lecture delivered at G- 1 Course No. 5, Army War College, Washington, 

D.C., 9 Oct 33), in Army War College Curriculum Papers, MHI. 

172 
THE INSPECTORATE IN fRANCE 

Shortly afterward, inspectors in the field received instructions to 

submit, using a form supplied by the AEF's IG office, a monthly report 

on any disciplinary issues. They did not welcome the new responsibility, regarding the tasking as a burdensome addition to an already full 

schedule. Nevertheless, GHQ AEF considered the discipline reports as 

critical information, giving staff members a means to identify trends, to 

fix responsibilities, and to make recommendations to the proper commanders. A general order, issued on 5 June 1918, formally assigned the 

responsibility for discipline oversight to Brewster and confirmed the 

requirement for the monthly report. Commanders were ordered to give 

the same responsibility to their IGs, subject to their own policies, and 

the discipline report was expanded to include any lack of followthrough on irregularities noted in unit inspections.38 

The biggest problem encountered by inspectors everywhere, but 

especially in line units, continued to be inexperienced personnel. Too 

many green junior leaders had difficulty supervising troops, which in 

turn led to failures in discipline. Inspectors offered constructive criticism while using discipline as a measure of progress, if only evidenced 

by such outward signs of military conduct as saluting and appearance. 

But more important indicators were AWOL and venereal rates and, 

although less measurable, the prompt execution of orders and policies. 

The AEF inspectorate conducted numerous special investigations 

whenever indiscipline appeared related to unit inefficiency. The high 

standards set by Pershing, combined with the growing urgency and 

intolerance for error brought on by the German offensives, allowed little latitude for honest error. The black combat units then in training suffered as a consequence, for many senior AEF officers, including those 

in the inspectorate, had a strong bias against such organizations, especially if they had black officers. In these cases the black leadership conveniently became scapegoats for any failures experienced by the units.39 

Reflecting this attitude were the inspectors who visited the black 

92d Division and the four black infantry regiments organized for the 

never-completed 93d Division and training with the French. In June 

1918, after the regiments had been fully incorporated into French divisions and were using French equipment and rations, Col. Alexander T. 

3

' Ltr, Brewster toW. Wood, 16 Apr 18; Rpt, Johnson, 5 May 18, sub: Discipline, I 

Corps; Ltr, Olmstead to Johnson, 7 May 18; Memo, Brewster to lnsps, 25 Jun 18, sub: 

Reports. All in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. See also Lewis, "Short Account," OTIG 

fi les, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH); DA, HD, World War, 16:337 (GO 87, 1918). 39 Coffman, ~~1r To £nd All Wars, pp. 317- 19; Memo, Brewster to CinC, AEF, 31 Jut 

18, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

173 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Ovenshine from the AEF's IG 

office visited them. Ovenshine 

spent a day with each regiment, 

after which he submitted a report. 

According to his report, the unit 

he considered best was commanded by a white Regular Army 

colonel and had no black officers. 

His ratings of the others dropped 

as the numbers of black officers 

on their rolls increased, with the 

all-black 370th Infantry rated the 

worst. Ovenshinc recommended 

the removal of all black officers 

and their replacement by white 

officers as the only way to 

upgrade discipline and efficiency. 

But careful review of his few 

Col. Alexander T. Ovens/tine substantive comments failed to 

justify his findings. The units, on 

the contrary, all appear to have 

been reasonably well disciplined and trained and to have high morale. 

A balanced assessment would have compared them favorably to most 

of the other new AEF units. However, Ovenshine's fixation on commissioned blacks completely warped his vision. The apparent problem 

prompted General Pershing in July 1918 to direct a special investigation of the black field-grade officers in the 370th and 372d Infantry. 

Apparently considered to be the AEF IG's authority on black units, 

Colonel Ovenshine conducted the investigation, which coincided with 

the relief of Col. Franklin A. Denison, the black commander of the 

370th Infantry, for health rcasons.-10 

Denison's replacement was Col. Thomas A. Roberts from the AEF 

G- 1, an officer who had reported adversely on the commander of the 

372d Infantry two months before. Ovenshine viewed the appointment 

as a good one, likely to improve the regiment. Turning to the other black 

field-grade officers, he was frank in saying there was no basis for 

boarding them for incompetence. However, he persisted in recommending their gradual elimination and replacement with whites, first 

.. Memo, Ovenshine to IG, AEF, 24 Jun 18, sub: l11spection of 369th, 370th, 371st, 

and 372d Infantry Regiments (Colored), Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

174 
THE INSPECTORATE IN fRANCE 

on the staff and then throughout the line. As matters turned out, Roberts 

proved to be a good commander, a lthough he was greatly resented by 

the men for having replaced the ir black colonel.~1 

The consistency of the bias shared by the inspectors and the officers on the GHQ staff was exposed by an incident in the midst of the 

Meuse-Argonne offensive. The four independent black regiments had 

acquitted themselves well while fighting with the French in the summer 

and early fall of 191 8. During the unprecedented attrition of midOctober, however, the AEF staff discussed the desirability of their 

return to American control. Brewster told Pershing that he did not consider any of the units to be in good condition, maintaining that so long 

as they had any black officers they would not make satisfactory combat units. Yet three of the units by this time had earned at least one Croix 

de Guerre. Notwithstanding, Brewster offered two scenarios for consideration once tbe units came under U.S. control: breaking them up 

and using them as replacements for the 92d Division, or forming them 

into labor units after taking out the best men for the 92d.

42 No amount 

of evidence to the contrary was able to shake the prevailing racial bias 

against black troops. 

Fortunately for the AEF, the inspectors remained more open on 

other problems. Their concern over matters of discipline brought them 

into duties traditionally associated with the military police. The Provost 

Marshal General of the command at first lacked the capability to carry 

out all such functions, and as a result his sphere was limited to confinement of prisoners, some traffic control, and planning for the maintenance of order. A formal Military Police Corps was not organized 

until the summer of 1918. Until then, each division detailed a group of 

its own men to serve as police, and each field army headquarters possessed a traffic and police regiment. 3 

The first function picked up by the inspectors was the investigation of criminal matters. Vandalism or theft, so-ca lled depredations, 

" Arthur E. Barbeau and Florette I lenri, The Unknown Soldiers: Black American 

Troops in World War I (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, I 974), pp. 123- 28; Rpt, 

Ovenshine to 10, AEF, 20 Jul I 8, sub: Investigation of Colored Field O!ficers in the 

370th and 372d Infantry, Entry 588, RG 120. NARA. 

u Memo, Spinks to Brewster, 18 Oct 18; Memo, Brewster to CofS, A EF, 19 Oct 18, 

sub: Recommendation as to 369th, 370th, 37 1 st, and 372d Infantry Regiments 

(Colored). Both in Entry 588, RO 120, NARA 

•l Memo, Groome to CofS, AEF, 9 Jun I 8, sub: Recommendation for a Military 

Police Corps; Memo, Brewster to CofS, AEF, II Jun 18, sub: Military Police Force; and 

Ltr, Elmore to 10 , AEF, 25 Jun 19, sub: Report From Observations of AEF. All in Entry 

588, RO 120, NARA. 

175 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

became more prevalent as the AEF grew in size. New activity also 

seemed to coincide with the AEF chief of staff's referral of IG investigations to the appropriate command. Even after a police capability 

was developed, many inconclusive or dead-end investigations were 

referred to the IGs for review. The scale of IG activity remained large 

also because the newly formed police were not authorized to investigate anything connected with the efficiency of a unit. Because the 

term efficiency was interpreted broadly, almost every misdemeanor 

went to the inspectors fi st.~~ 

From the beginning, General Brewster perceived the nature and 

scope of what was being thrust on the inspectorate, and in June 1917 

asked General Chamberlain to authorize assigning Secret Service 

investigators to the AEF's JG office. Chamberlain turned down the 

request promptly, instructing Brewster to refer undercover actions to 

military intelligence and to cope as best he could with the numerous but 

simple criminal conduct cases that he anticipated. As matters turned 

out, traffic-related actions comprised the bulk of them, and included 

not only serious cases involving death or injury but also minor incidents of property damage. Eventually, IG findings led to the formulation of vehicle-use policies and their enforcement by unit provost 

guards with local IG support.~s 

Services of Supply Established 

The rapid accumulation of diverse functions made it imperative that a 

division of effort be made within the inspectorate. Army fie ld service 

regulations provided for the establishment of a line-of-communications 

(LOC) organization to provide support for forward units. As an increasingly elaborate logistical infrastructure developed in France, mounting 

inefficiencies and control problems appeared as the pace of events 

quickened and the high command concentrated on preparations for 

combat. General Brewster observed the h·end as early as August 1917, 

when he wrote to General Chamberlain that the huge shipments of 

unnecessary equipment from the United States were compounding the 

severe congestion problems at the ports. Apparently, some supplies 

were shipped automatically under peacetime authorizations, which no 

one had canceled. Other supplies were sent that, in fact, could have 

... File 281, Depredations, and Ltr, Pershing to Chief. French Mil Miss ion, 21 Jan 19, 

Entry 588, RG 120, NARJ\. 

" Ltrs, Chamberlain to Brewster, 14 Sep 17, and Brewster to Chamberlain, 8 Oct 18, 

Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

176 
THE INSPECTORATE IN fRANCE 

been procured locally, thus preventing ships from transporting more 

critical item 6 

These conditions and his increasingly unwieldy span of control led 

General Pershing to direct Brewster in December 1917 to survey the 

whole situation. The purpose of the study was to examine the means to 

decentralize GHQ activities by relegating as many functions as possible to the LOC. Other General Staff elements studied aspects of the 

problem throughout the month and on into January 1918. Their recommendations led to the February appointment of a restructuring board 

under Col. Johnson Hagood. Hagood proposed that a distinct logistical 

command, with broad operational responsibility, be created. General 

Pershing gave his approval on the eighteenth. By the end of the month 

the structure and relationships between the reconstituted General Staff 

and the newly created Services of Supply, successor to the LOC, were 

also efined. 7 

The incumbent commander of the old LOC, Maj. Gen. Francis J. 

Kernan, presided over a complete restructming of the rear areas. Before 

February the LOC had consisted of the port of St. Nazaire, a headquarters area in the city ofNevers and various facilities scattered throughout 

France behind the front. This rather vague arrangement was changed to 

a much more formal organization. Advanced and Intermediate Sections 

were set up behind the front, with separate base sections organized 

arotU1d each major port- six in France and one in England. An eighth 

section was organized in Italy a few days before the armistice. Each contained a varying number of depots, support facilities, hospitals, and 

training centers. Separate SOS commands were set up in the District of 

Paris and atthe SOS headquarters near Tours (see Map 1}."8 

The Services of Supply ultimately engaged over 670,000 men, performing every conceivable support task. But serious problems soon 

appeared. Rear area troop morale was one, as SOS soldiers suffered 

from a second-class image. Conditions worsened because of the generally poor unit leadership that resulted when the Services of Supply 

46 Ltr, Brewster to Chamberlain, 20 Aug 17, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

•• Memo, Pershing to IG, AEF, 15 Dec 17, and Rpt, Brewster to CinC, AEF, 31 Dec 

17, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA; Erna Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army: A 

HistOIJ! of the Corps, 1775- 1939 (Washington, D.C.: Quartermaster Historian's Office, 

Office of the Quartermaster General, 1962), p. 649; Johnson Hagood, The Services of 

Supply: A Memoir of the Great War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., I 927), pp. 134, 

139-40, 151; DA, HD, World War, 16:2 16 (GO 3 1, 1918). 

•s Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 657n42; American Battle Monuments 

Commission, American Armies and Balll~fields in Europe (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1938), pp. 437- 38. 

177 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

SERVICES OF SUPPLY, AEF 

March 1918 

® Goneral Headquarters, AEF 

--line of Jan 1918 

... • ..... S<teclon Boundnry 

0 Hoadquanots, SOS 

~ Aailrood 

Noto: Numbcrs lndlcoto baso soc-cions. 

0 100 

Miles 

3 

N 

N 

BA 0 

SPAIN 

MAP I 

4 

-. 

R H 

A 

. ,.,.... .}""--..... , ~ 

' · ··-' • ' Antwerp i( 1GERMANY 

, ~ ~ 

.\ B E L G I U M ·-· • 

·-"" {f> '••""\., 

--· ,' 

6 

Gu/ of L !111 

) 

.. J ) ........ ·, _ 

,-' 

-~·ITA LY \ , 

. ' .. ,. 

became a dumping ground for unsatisfactory combat-unit officers. 

These problems and others led Pershing to relieve Kernan in July 1918 

and replace him with the 2d Division commander, Maj. Gen. James G. 

Harbord, who had participated in the first battles along the Marne. As 

one of Pershing's most trusted subordinates, Harbord allowed Pershing 

178 
THE INSPECTORATE IN fRANCE 

"Saint Nazairc" 

to focus on the problems of diplomacy and the front, secure in the 

knowledge that the Services of Supply was in able hands.~9 

Harbord's appointment marked the opening of a period of broad 

autonomy for the Services of Supply, which was reflected in the methods and organization adopted by the inspectorate. When first created 

in July 191 7, the LOC lacked an inspector, with coverage provided as 

far as possible by Brewster and Clark from the AEF headquarters. The 

arrangement proved increasingly unworkable, and by August 

Brewster was pressing Chamberlain to identify and send over suitable 

officers. After some experimentation, he secured the services of the 

energetic Col. Robert Alexander and then Colonel Hughes on 7 

January 1918. Shortly thereafter, Alexander was promoted and 

departed for command of a division, to be replaced on 2 February by 

Colonel Winn, another detailed IG. Within a week of arriving, Winn 

was in turn promoted to brigadier genera l but was retained as senior 

" Coffman, Hfw To End AI/IWtrs, p. 129; Hagood, Services of Supply, pp. 301 , 310; 

James A. Huston, T!te Sine111s q/Hftr: Army Logislics, 1775- 1953 (Washington, D.C.: 

Office of the Chief of Military IIi story, United States Army, 1966), pp. 365- 66; SOS, 

AEF, GO 29, 32 1/2, and 33, 1918, OTIG files, Pcntagon(SJ\IG-ZXII}. 

179 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

LOC inspector, despite being overgrade, on the assumption that sooner or later his position wou ld be authorized flag rank. General Winn 

was a respected cava lry officer with several years experience as an 

inspector. Both Brewster and Harbord considered him a strong leader 

with a "forceful personality," fully qualified to command a brigade. 

Brewster also reassigned Major Streater to the new Services of 

Supply to begin financial inspections, allowing Winn to concentrate 

on other issues.50 

The creation of the sections led to an immediate need for more 

inspectors. Both Brewster and Winn wanted to have at least one at each 

of the major SOS subordinate commands, as well as several at the 

headquarters near Tours. The first officers so assigned were Maj. 

Richard I. McKenney, in the Advanced Section; Maj. J. Ryan 

Devereaux, at St. Nazaire; Maj. Owen T. Kenan, at Brest; and Col. 

James B. Mitchell, at London. Colonel Spinks became Winn 's deputy 

on l2 April, where he remained until I l June, when he took over similar duties in Brewster's office. Seven more Regular Army officers 

were assigned from General Chamberlain's informal pool by the end 

of June, and all were sent to base sections, except Maj. Lloyd B. 

Magruder who became an assistant inspector at Tours. By Armistice 

Day eleven officers were serving as inspectors on duty with the staffs 

at each base section and district command, with eleven more at the 

Tours headquarters available for general support. 51 

As might be expected, the duties of the SOS inspectors were 

focused mostly on inspections and investigations related to the base 

ports, depots, and other facili ties set up in the SOS area. Inspections of 

troops were limited to those assigned to the Services of Supply; the 

combat units arriving and going through the training areas were served 

by their own assigned inspectors or IGs from GHQ. Similarly, every10 Ltr, Kinnison to Brewster, 19 Nov 17, and Reply, 21 Nov 17, Entry 588; Memo, 

Howard to Kinnison, 23 Nov 17, sub: Regarding Installation of Records, Entry 588; Ltr 

(quoted words), Harbord to CinC, AEF, 13 Dec 18, sub: Report on General Officers, 

Entry 6; Ltr, Farnsworth to CinC, AEF, 12 Dec 18, sub: Confidential Report on General 

Officers, Entry 6; Ltr, Brewster to Winn, 26 Jan 18, Entry 1360. All in RG 120, NARA. 

Sec also Rpt, Lauber, tl.d., sub: The Inspector General's Department, S.O.S, November 

1918, Entry 26B, RG L59, NARA. 

" Memo, Lauber to Donaldson, 16 May 19; Ltr, Brewster to W. Wood, 8 Apr 18; 

Historical Record of the Office of the Inspector General, S.O.S., from June I st to 

December 31st 1918, n.d.; and Rpt, Donaldson to IG, AEF, 14 Mar 19, sub: Report of 

the Inspector General. All in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. See also Info Memo, March 

to IG, USA, 24 Jun 18, Entry 26A; Miller, IG, Base Sec !,Annual Rpt, 30 Jun 19, Entry 

26. Both in RG 159, NARA. 

180 
THE INSPECTORATE IN fRANCE 

thing connected with combat tTaining, including schools, remained the 

province of officers sent out by GHQ. Disbursing accounts began to be 

inspected from the SOS headquarters following the assignment of 

Major Streater, while base section inspectors examined the company, 

hospital, and welfare funds of organizations in their areas that lacked 

assigned inspectors. The section inspectors periodically checked on 

property salvage operations, although no longer required to do so by 

regulation, in order to detect excessive turn-ins. Wherever they visited, 

they emphasized all aspects of sanitation and Pershing's venereal disease prevention program. The relative inexperience of these units led 

most SOS inspectors to see their role as one of providing guidance to 

enthusiastic young leaders- " to encourage or suppress as tendencies 

are right or wrong."s

2 

General Winn, however, departed from the model set by General 

Brewster by operating a decentralized inspection system, under which 

inspectors outside his own headquarters were left alone except for technical advice. The result was friction with Brewster, who judged the 

SOS inspection operations to be somewhat ineffective, in part because 

so many of the SOS inspectors worked for the base commanders 

beyond the direct control of Generals Harbord and Wino. For this reason, among others, General Wino was relieved as the SOS IG and 

assigned to command a brigade on 9 September. His replacement was 

another cava lryman, Brig. Gen. Thomas Q. Donaldson. General 

Harbord judged Donaldson to be knowledgeable and active, but not as 

strong a personality as his predecessor.SJ 

The Services of Supply now became increasingly centralized. 

Several inspectors were reassigned to Tours; troop inspections came 

under Donaldson's control, in partial compensation for the inexperience 

of the inspectors in the field. By the end of October Donaldson felt that 

he had his operation under fairly tight control. All inspections were 

conducted henceforth from his office in General Harbord's name, and 

units and staff departments at all levels were put on a periodic visit 

schedule. By then the Tours office was averaging 78 troop and 152 

money inspections and 40 investigations each quarter. The Tours office 

also prepared a compliance guide or manual patterned after the prewar 

Yellow Book. Its concentration on transport underlined the command's 

paramount concern with all forms of ship, motor, and rail movement. 

The manual was a useful reference, but was structured in such a way 

n Miller, IG, Base Sec I, Annual Rpt, 30 Jun 19, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

s• Ltr, Brewster to Donaldson, 15 Scp 18, Entry 588; Ltr, Harbord to CinC, AEF, 13 

Dec 18, Entry 6. Both in RG 120, NARA. 

18 1 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

that it could be turned into a grinding checklist by an inexperienced or 

lazy inspector.$-! 

Funds Inspections 

Following the reorganization that created the Services of Supply, the 

important responsibility for funds inspections was divided. The 

accounts of tactical units remained under the supervision of their 

assigned inspectors, while the AEF IG retained general supervision. 

Along with the transfer of Major Streater to the Services of Supply, 

General Brewster at the same time consolidated the inspection of 

accounts and related fiscal matters under the agency. 

Emergency legislation in November 1917 had authorized disbursing officers to entrust their funds to other officers, and the practice 

became widespread in large-scale Quartermaster and Ordnance activities in France. Brewster alerted all inspectors to check for abuses, particularly in receipt systems. Unit fund management also was made 

somewhat less formaL The accounts were expected to be inspected 

whenever units were not at the front or engaged in training. Disbursing 

officers' money accounts were checked as often as possible without 

interfering witb combat operations. Reports went directly to the AEF's 

IG office, rather than through channels.55 

The unit funds proved to be a continual problem for inspectors, 

even though very few cases of embezzlement were uncovered. There 

were, however, numerous irregularities in both company- and hospital-type funds, leading Brewster to direct that all such funds be reconciled and inspected monthly. The problems emanated from the custodians' inexperience and the senior unit officers' lack of time to 

instruct or supervise. The regulations themselves made things no easier. Only unit commanders were allowed to be the funds custodians, 

and normally they had no place to secure such funds except on their 

person. Many thus went into battle carrying large amounts of cash, 

and often the money was lost when the officer became a casualty. In 

"' Memo, Lauber to Donaldson, 16 May 19, and Ltr, Donaldson to Brewster, 2 Nov 

18, Entry 588, RG 120, N/\RA. Sec also Manual for !Gs, SOS, AEF, Nov 18, and Ltr, 

Spinks to lnsps, 22 Jul 18, sub: Points for Consideration of Inspectors Concerning 

Operations of 4th Sec. Gen. StatT. OTIG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXII). 

'' Ltr, IG, AEF, to All lnsps, 25 Nov 17. sub: Funds of Disbursing OfTiccrs, Entry 

588; Ltr, Chamberlain to Dept lnsps, 15 Jun 17, sub: Company Fund Balances (Ncostyle 255), Entry 588; Ltr, IG, AEF. to All Oiv lnsps, 6 Nov 18, sub: Inspection of 

Company Funds and Money Accounts, Entry 590. All in RG 120, NAR/\. 

182 
THE INSPECTORATE IN fRAN CE 

cases where officers had access to French banks, different national 

procedures prevented conformity to American requirements. 

Ironically, the American bank in Paris proved hopelessly inefficient; 

it was late in processing checks, and more often than not gave inaccurate information to custodians and inspectors alike. Almost universa lly, JGs urged that a more flexible system be developed to reduce 

the burden of administering funds in combat. But reforms had to wait 

until well past the end of the war.s

6 

The technical performance of unit IGs in matters of finance was 

evaluated by AEF and SOS inspectors. This was a field in which many 

line officers could not be expected to excel even in the best of circumstances. One of the SOS expert accountants would make the rounds of 

a command, not only inspecting its accounts but also assessing the 

quality of the work done by the local inspectors. A basic purpose of 

these trips was to educate both accountable officers and unit inspectors. 

The accountant often had a member of the local IG office accompany 

him, which ensured good accountability and proper follow-up on any 

adverse findings. In addition, the practice allowed commanders some 

insight into local IG and unit performance.57 

Bases, Districts, and Depots 

Growing centralization throughout the SOS inspection offices did not 

diminish perceptibly the work load of the inspectors who were left at 

the base section ports and headquarters. Expanding duties and new 

responsibilities were the ru le at the local level. Typical was the experience of officers at Base Section No. l. Originally established at the 

great port of St. Nazaire when American forces began to arrive, the 

base section subsequently expanded its operation throughout the Loire 

Valley and the north coast of the Bay of Biscay. By July 191 8 it encompassed two other ports, three hospital centers, three veterinary centers, 

a forestry district, four major depots, and five school or training centers. But only two inspectors were assigned, one who concentrated on 

port activities and another who roamed the inland bases. Between them, 

they averaged eight major inspections and five investigations each 

month until the armistice. At this time their work load increased even 

'" Memo, Brewster to CinC, AEF, 3 1 Aug 18; Ltr, Haske ll to IG, AEF, 5 Apr 19, sub: 

Reporl on Operation of the Inspector General's Department in France; Ltr, Vestal to 

GJIQ AEF, 25 Apr 19, sub: Report; and Ltr, Elmore to IG, AEF, 25 Jun 19, sub: Report 

From Observations of AEF. All in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

" Webb Trip Diary, n.d., lAW par. 97. SO 2, Entry 590, RG 120, NAR/\. 

183 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

more, necessitating the assignment of thirteen more inspectors for dealing mostly with problems of embarkation. 5

8 

Base Section No.3 was centered in London, with responsibility for 

all the British Isles. The command was scattered, with 15,000 aviation 

personnel located at some seventy British bases and several thousand 

medical personnel assigned to British hospitals. Discipline was poor, in 

part because of the absence of sufficient staff to supervise the command's varied activities. Under these circumstances, Colonel Mitchell, 

in his role as IG, became the command troubleshooter. Moving from 

place to place, either advising, reprimanding, or teaching, he functioned much more like a deputy commander. After the armistice 

Mitchell determined the sequence and timing for the closing of 

American facilities. 59 

Port activities were the most important at each base section. The 

inspection of transports continued under the same procedures that 

had been established before the war. Inspectors en route to or from 

France assisted unit commanders during the voyage, conducting safety drills and monitoring troop welfare and medical support. They 

filed their reports with the base section inspection office upon 

arrival, but remedial action on the part of the Transportation Service 

was often slow. Consequently, port inspectors spent considerable 

time following up on remediation. Other transport-related inspections or investigations were made whenever ships had accidents, such 

as rammings or fires. Special attention was given to the conduct of 

personnel in a disaster, and conditions and procedures at dockside 

were closely monitored.60 

Inspectors at this level found their work shaped by the unique 

aspects of their area. The District of Paris came into the SOS IG orbit 

in August 1918, when a major inspection of conditions in the city 

was prompted by complaints about brutality in the Army prison system. The inspection resulted in the relief of the district commander, 

and the appointment of a new staff, including an inspector for the 

first time. Lt. Col. Henry W. Fleet was transferred from the 

Advanced Section in October and was joined by Lt. Col. Lloyd B. 

'' Miller, IG, Base Sec I, Annual Rpt, 30 Jun 19, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA; Lewis, 

"Short Account," OTTG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH). 

,. Mitchell, IG, Base Sec 3, Annual Rpt, 22 Jul 18, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. See 

also Rpt, Janney, n.d., sub: Official IIi story ARC Convalescent llospital No. I 0 I, Entry 

2136, RG 120, NARA. 

"' File 12, Transport Activities; Rpt, Div lnsp to 1st Div Cdr, 13 Jul 17, sub: 

Inspection of Transport McClellan. Both in Entry 588, RG 120, NA RA. 

184 
THE INSPECTORATE IN fRANCE 

Magruder in November, who became chief of the inspection office 

until its closing. 61 

Colonel Magruder's observations about the city explain fully the 

need for the growth of his office: "Of the nearly two million Americans 

who visited France during the years 1917 and 1918, about 99.9 percent 

had one supreme desire- see Paris. As it was manifestly not possible to 

permit this desire to be satisfied and still continue military operations, 

visits to the capital were not encouraged. The result was that many, in 

whom the power of inhibition was not developed, went anyhow. These, 

together with others who, having permission, did not make the best of 

it, furnished the material that made detail of an inspector necessary.'x.2 

Depot division lGs worked closely with their unit commanders, but 

eventually they too came to be viewed as part of the SOS inspectorate. 

The activities of an IG in a depot division were similar to those in a combat division. Depot divisions were former line units that had been converted to serve as replacement regulating commands. They were used to 

control and forward the unexpectedly large numbers of men needed to 

sustain the units at the front. The first unit so transformed was the 41st 

Division, a National Guard unit from the western United States. 

Functioning as the I Corps Replacement Division and later as the I st 

Depot Division, the division lost its combat units and personnel. During 

its Stateside phase, when the division had trained as a combat unit, its 

inspector had performed the usual duties relative to mustering and overseas deployment. When the division was restructured after its arrival in 

France in January 1918, the IG's duties underwent a considerable shift.61 

The division elements were distributed over a I 00-square-mile 

area, divided into five districts for administrative and training purposes. Each area contained about five sites, where division troops were on 

duty. Replacements assigned to the division remained with it for an 

average of only four or five days before going forward. A systematic 

inspection schedule was developed, and once it went into effect inspectors saw each organization and location at least five times a month. A 

record card system was developed in the lG office to keep track of all 

these visits and to record observations and findings. The IG sent a 

weekly activity report to the division commander, in which he summarized conditions encountered during the previous week. 

•• File 27, Weekly Reporls, and Memo, Magruder to CG, Disl of Paris, 29 Jan 19, 

sub: Historical Data, Enlry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

t-~ Memo, Magruder 10 CG, Dist of Paris, 29 Jan 19, Enlry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

6J Memo, Rich 10 CG, 1st Depot Div, 24 Jul 18, sub: Operations of IGO Within the 

1st Depot Division, AEF, FY 1918, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

185 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

The greatest part of the inspector's time in depot divisions was consumed by aspects of supply and property management. Physical security for equipment was a paramount concern; proper storage and guarding were checked continually. Control had to be maintained over the 

vast amounts of equipment stored for issue to the thousands of men 

processing through. Accountability and responsiveness to the needs of 

individuals were watched closely. A re lated issue was that of salvage 

and property disposal. The handling of expendable items and perishables, such as rations, required constant attention to avoid waste. 

Motor transportation was supervised for proper use and for control 

over spare parts. Vehicle maintenance remained a critical issue 

throughout the war, mostly because of inadequate supplies of repair 

parts. Consequently, inspectors made every effort to promote efficiency and to economize on vehicle operations. Schools for drivers and 

motor officers also were monitored. A related topic was the care of 

animals. Each organization in the division was required to submit a 

weekly report on its animals to the inspector's office. There the data 

was consolidated, analyzed for trends, and forwarded to the division 

commander for his information. As a result, few substantial complaints or problems were encountered.(>! 

The Burden o f Routine 

Despite the quickening pace of combat, 1918 saw no reduction in the 

burden of routine borne by inspectors in the AEF. Jnspection results 

showing unusual amounts of excess property in some units and critical 

shortages in others led to an AEF-wide crackdown on hoarders. The 

intention was to have a complete equipment review and redistribution 

before the fall offensives opened. Genuine shortages were identified, 

and numerous organizations were brought to better equipment leve ls in 

the weeks before the St. Mihiel offensive of September 1918.6$ 

Personnel losses as the result of injuries from nonhostile causes, in 

particular, self-inflicted wounds, a lso became an item of concern as the 

buildup progressed. Not only were these accidents a manpower drain, 

they reflected possible underlying disciplinary problems. On 13 July 

and 8 August the AEF adjutant general instructed all division and hospital commanders to report such cases to the AEF's TG office following 

investigation by the unit inspector and unit medical personnel. Cases 

.. Ibid. 

"' Memo, Spinks to IG, First Army, 3 Scp 18, sub: Excess Property in Possession of 

Troops, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

186 
THE INSPECTORATE IN fRANCE 

were to be classified as "unavoidable," requiring no further action; as 

"gross negligence," requiring a summary court-martial; or as "intentional," requiring a general court-martial. Suspect cases were treated 

only in division hospitals, and not evacuated further to the rear. Any 

soldier sentenced to hard labor as a result of court-martial was ordered 

to serve his sentence at the most dangerous places on the line, wearing 

a brassard displaying the letters SIW (self-inflicted wound).66 

Special investigations on every conceivable topic threatened to 

overwhelm unit inspectors, who were often obliged to sacrifice 

inquiries into operational matters to examine special cases. The 28th 

Division inspector, for example, estimated that he spent half his time 

looking into cases of self-inflicted wounds or the condition and treatment of animals. He was required by his commander to investigate all 

requests for compassionate discharge; all allegations of indebtedness 

brought against division officers or unit funds; and any complaints 

dealing with aspects of division administration, such as lost mail, 

unjust promotions, or reductions in rank. At the GHQ level the treatment of prisoners of war and other aspects of the Geneva Convention 

were recurring topics handled with urgency. After they became a matter of personal interest to General Pershing in August, IGs were 

expected to interview prisoners to determine whether they had been 

h·eated fairly. 67 

Some of the more difficult and time-consuming IG investigations 

had to do with aspects of personal conduct- breach of promise, 

bigamy, nonsupport, and "ungentlemanly" conduct by officers. Such 

complaints primarily came from wives in the United States, as well as 

from French females who had developed liaisons with American suitors. The reason for IG involvement was General Pershing's desire to 

maintain high moral character in the officer corps. Standards were so 

high that officers were court-martialed for escorting so-called loose 

women to unit social events. There were, however, more serious allegations to be examined as well. Brewster or Spinks handled those cases 

involving allegations against an officer's loyalty to the United States; 

unit inspectors investigated lesser security breaches, such as losing 

66 Memo, Davis to Div Surgs and All Hosp Cdrs, 13 Jul 18, sub: Report of Selfinflicted Wounds; Ltr (quoted words), AO, AEF, to COs, 8 Aug 18, sub: Self-inflicted 

Wounds; and Memo, Jones to Div COs, 5 Sep 18, sub: Report of Self-inflicted Wounds. 

All in Entry 588, RO 120, NARA. 67 File 20, OIG, 28th Div, Investigations and Inquiries, Entry 1241 ; Rpt, Brewster to 

CinC, AEF, n.d., EntJ·y 588; Memo, McAndrew to 10, AEF, 8 Aug 18, Entry 588; 

Memo, Peck to Johnson, 12 Oct 18, Entry 799; and Rpt, Peck to IO, AEF, 19 Oct 18, 

Entry 590. All in RO 120, NARA 

187 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

maps or papers. Pershing insisted on personal responsibility being 

established whenever possible.63 

One of the most peculiar sma ll investigations of the war merits 

detailing because of the later prominence of the officers involved. Lt. 

Col. Richard I. McKenney from the AEF's IG office responded to a 

complaint that Lt. Kingdon Gould, an Intelligence Corps officer and a 

well-known New York millionaire, had eaten flies in public. The source 

of the allegation was the director of the Army Intelligence School. The 

director urged that Gould, then a student at the school, not be allowed 

to graduate, and the Army Schools commandant and the AEF G- 2 seconded his recommendation. The incident occurred when Gould was 

dining in a hotel with some prewar friends-Capt. Hamilton Fish, Maj. 

E. Alexander Powell, and Lt. Andre Roosevelt, New Yorkers of nearly 

equal distinction. Apparently, Fish found some flies in the bottom of his 

wine glass. Since the evening's conversation had been about exotic 

things to eat, someone in the group bet Gould that he would not eat the 

flies. Thereupon, he brought the glass to his lips and seemed to quaff 

the contents. He immediately wiped his mouth with a napkin so that no 

one could say whether he really had eaten the flies. This was the act that 

the school director found so disturbing.69 

Colonel McKenney classed the whole thing as "ludicrous" and 

deemed it "fortunate that thus far it has not reached the too eager hands 

of the New York press." He cited the fact that Gould spoke five languages 

fluently and two others reasonably well. His value to the Intelligence 

Corps could not justify his loss for a youthful prank. He successfully recommended that Gould be allowed to complete the course and that the 

case be closed. All of the men involved went on to render valuable 

wartime service. Yet the fact that a senior inspector could be diverted for 

four days on such an absurd mission at the height of the St. Mihiel attacks 

reveals the importance the AEF placed on officer conduct.70 

More serious cases along this line dealt with abuse of authority. The 

investigation of senior officers usually was the responsibility of the 

principal inspector of the major command. For example, General 

., Memo, Brewster to AG, 1\EF, 15 Nov 17, sub: Report of Investigation of Alleged 

Deceit on Part of A. L. He lwig, Entry 588; Ltr, AG, AEF, to CG, 89th Div, I Nov 18, 

sub: Lost Secret Documents, Entry 588; OIG, AEF, Officer Conduct, Entry 588; IG, V 

Corps, Special Investigations (quoted word), Entry 11 38. Al l in RG 120, NARA . 

.. Ltr, Catron to Comdt, Army Schools, 27 Aug 18, sub: Conduct of I st Lt. Kingdon 

Gould; Rpt, McKenney. 14 Sep 18, sub: Investigation Concerning Conduct of Lt. 

Kingdon Gould at Hotel du Cheval Blanc Evening of27 August. Both in Entry 588, RG 

120, NARA. 

"' Rpt, McKenney, 14 Sep 18, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

188 
THE INSPECTORATE IN fRANCE 

Brewster asked General Winn to investigate allegations against the 

commander of an artillery training area located in Base Section No. 2. 

The colonel was accused of being a tyrant, closing hotels, chasing suspected loose women out of town, and trying to regulate civilian conduct. Winn made a thorough investigation, interviewing French officials, regimental commanders, and numerous civilians. He found that 

the colonel was being blamed for exaggerated stories about the enforcement of French rules by French officials and quickly concluded that 

there was no basis for the allegations. Brewster briefed Pershing, who 

personally clarified the situation with the senior French official who 

had passed on the allegations. 7 1 

Many such cases derived from misunderstandings or distortions, 

but each represented an imposition on the overworked inspectors' time. 

A typical division-level investigation occurred in October 1918 at the 

28th Division. The commander had received a written complaint 

through channels, in which a corporal claimed a colonel had used profane language toward him. The unit inspector interviewed numerous 

eyewitnesses and concluded that the corporal had exaggerated greatly. 

The colonel had not used profanity, but had verbally reprimanded the 

man- justifiably- for his lack of judgment in operating a motor vehicle in a bivouac area. The upshot was that the soldier received a written 

reprimand from the division commander.72 

Unit inspectors in particular also had another large portion of their 

time consumed by investigation of property-damage claims, filed by 

civilians with French government officials. Cases included pilferage of 

fruit from orchards and vineyards, looting and destruction of housing 

in the war zone, and unauthorized hunting and fishing. The problems 

were often another manifestation of the lack of discipline throughout 

the command. Troop conduct in billeting and training areas usually was 

irresponsible. Damage was inflicted carelessly on civilian property 

wherever the troops went, and there were occasional cases of deliberate 

vandalism. Disciplinary action was severe. As the tempo of combat 

quickened, the number of these cases declined. 73 

Unit inspectors also carried out investigations to determine responsibility when billets evacuated by a unit were damaged or left in unsan-

" Rpt, Winn, 18 Apr 18, sub: Investigation of Colonel Fredrick B. Hennessy, Entry 

588, RG J 20, NARA. 12 Rpt, Taggart, 28 Oct 18, sub: Investigation of Complaint Against Language of 

"Captain" Prescott, Entry 124 I, RG 120, NARA. 73 Ltr, Johnson to IG, AEF, 22 Mar 19, sub: lnformation for Report on American E. 

F., Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

189 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-193 9 

itary condition. Complaints could come from units that inherited the 

mess, as well as from civilians upset over the condition of their property. The pursuit of those responsible obviously did not make inspectors 

objects of popularity. However, if the AEF had not been disciplined on 

this topic, the entire American sector could have become one vast slum, 

with the United States shouldering the burden of liability. After the 

armistice unit commanders were required to make inventories of the 

condition of the facilities they were to use before moving their h·oops 

into them, a practice that reduced false claims while also fixing responsibility for damages.74 

Such were the manifold duties of inspectors behind the fighting 

lines. As American participation in the struggle moved from scattered 

contacts with the enemy to hard fighting in the summer of 1918 and 

finally to full participation in the final allied offensive, the inspectorate 

faced even more pressing work among the combat units. 

" Ibid. 

190 
6 

The AEF in Combat 

In 1918 AEF and tactical umt mspectors focused increasingly on 

combat operations, for all the preparations in the rear areas had meaning only in the payoff of battle. The same basic problems of inadequate training and inexperienced commanders appeared again in one 

inspector's report after another. Thus, the 2d Division inspector noted 

that the majority of soldiers joining his division lacked the rudiments 

of field craft and soldiering and that the division suffered excessive 

combat losses as a consequence. The need to continue training informally was noted by Colonel Johnson, when he assumed I Corps 

inspection duties in February. However, he also faulted the division 

inspectors for merely repeating accounts of common deficiencies, 

without doing enough to correct the problems they uncovered. He 

consolidated the division lists to show the inspectors the degree of 

overlap and provided suggested solutions to each problem, asking 

inspectors to hand out copies to the units they visited. Johnson contir1Ued this practice, which he called "preventive assistance," when he 

became First Army inspector in July. His inspection standards were 

eventua lly published as an AEF pamphlet.' 

First Stresses 

Poor and inexperienced unit leadership raised graver questions. One 

case involved the 7th Machine Gun Battalion in the 3d Division's first 

large-scale engagement at Chateau-Thierry. On the night of I June 

' Edward M. CotTman, The War To End All W(U:~: The American Military Experience 

in World War 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 219; Lay, !G, 2d Div, 

Annual Rpt, 8 Aug 18, Entry 588, Records Group (RG) 120, National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA); Memo (quoted words), Johnson to IG, AEF, 13 Jut 

27, sub: Scope of Policy No. 1, Be Helpf11l, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

1918 the two platoons of the battalion's Company B hastily withdrew 

from its position along the Marne River. The 3d Division lG, Lt. CoL 

Ernest H. Agnew, directed by his commander to make an immediate 

investigation, found that the withdrawal had been unnecessary. The 

units had sustained no casualties. Yet, at the first sign of the enemy 

artillery, the two inexperienced I ieutenants who were in charge had 

requested permission to withdraw and, without personally checking the 

situation, the company and battalion commanders immediately granted 

it. Further, the commanders lost contact with and control of the platoons as they pulled out, allowing them to escape the battle entirely. 

Investigation showed that the battalion commander had been noticeably 

under the influence of alcohol for several days. The division commander forwarded the investigation to General Headquarters (GHQ), AEF, 

with the information that the battalion commander was being courtmartialed, the company commander transferred to the Services of 

Supply (SOS), and the two lieutenants given another chance. General 

Brewster reviewed the case in his discipline oversight capacity and 

approved the decisions.2 

Hoping to derive general lessons from the first heavy combat, 

inspectors interviewed commanders and principal staff officers about 

their tactical decisions, logistical support, and equipment and forwarded the results to Brewster's office. Summarized by subject, the collected data became a ready reference for Pershing and for the GHQ and 

SOS staffs. Although most commanders' comments were favorable, 

some serious problems turned up that had to be rcsolved.3 

The degree of disarray in the Air Service was noticeably greater 

than elsewhere. Pershing had separated the service from Signal Corps 

control the summer before, and it evidently was undergoing extended 

birth pangs. Problems included organizational adjustments, the clash of 

personalities, and the traditional indiscipline of an individualistic service. The major American tactical unit in June and July was the I Corps, 

commanded by Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett. On Liggett's staff was the Air 

Service chief, Brig. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois, who exercised operational control over the air observation units. The fighter aircraft, known 

as Pursuit Service, were under the operational control of the French 

Sixth Army and rece ived only administrative support from Liggett's 

corps. Subordinate to the corps, another command had been inserted, 

the I stAir Brigade, headed by Col. William "Billy" Mitch ell. 

2 Memo, IG. AEF, to CinC, AEF, 12 Jun 18, sub: CoB, 7th MG Bn, Entry 588, RG 

120, NARA. 

1 Memo, IG, AEF, to CofS, AEF, 14 Aug 18, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

192 
THE AEF IN COMBAT 

Determined to play a dominant role despite the fact that he had no 

units specifically assigned to him, Mitchell had behaved with a tactlessness, zeal, and aggressiveness that strained relations with his superior, General Foulois, and drew a strong letter from the corps chief of 

staff, Brig. Gen. Malin Craig. Mitchell's behavior precipitated a G- 3 

investigation at GHQ AEF. The G- 3 recommended that Mitchell's position be eliminated. Because of the seriousness ofthe situation, the AEF 

chief of staff directed that General Brewster himself investigate and 

recommend a solution.~ 

On a scheduled visit to Liggett's headquarters to observe operations at the height of the Soissons counterattack in July, Brewster 

interviewed all of the senior Air Service officers. He quickly concluded that Mitchell's position was redundant, that many of the problems came from Mitchell's efforts to create a job where none existed, 

and that his "aggressiveness and peculi ar temperament" had contributed to the friction and confusion. Despite this, Generals Liggett 

and Craig felt that Mitchell was a strong leader who could be a great 

asset commanding air units, and Brewster therefore successfully recommended the reassignment of General Foulois to the AEF air staff 

as deputy for logistics. Mitchell's old position was eliminated, and he 

was assigned to command the First Army's air units as they were 

formed.5 

Although Mitchell was admired for his action-oriented style, toleration of such antics may have fostered many of the adverse traits 

already noted in Army aviation by the prewar investigations. In France 

General Brewster found that discipline and military courtesy were Jacking in some air units. This lack of discipline, in his estimation, promoted a cavalier approach that had serious negative effects on maintenance 

and repair. As a result, SOS inspectors made aviation maintenance 

operations an item of special interest. On an inspection visit during the 

Chateau-Thierry fighting Colonel Johnson found that two-thirds of the 

aircraft on hand were out of commission because of maintenance problems, with critical effects on air operations.6 

• Memo, Gorrell to ACofS, G- 3, AEF, 12 Jul 18, sub: Inspection Air Service, 1st 

/\rmy Corps, Entry 588, RG 120, N/\ RA. 

' Memo (quoted words), Brewster to CofS, AEF, 27 Jul 18, sub: Investigation Air 

Service, 1st Army Corps; IG, AEF, Synopsis of Report on Investigation Air Service, 30 

Jul 18. Both in Entry 588, RG 120, N/\RA. Sec also John F. Shiner, Foulois and the 

US. Army Air Corps, /931- 1935 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 

United States Air Force, 1983), pp. 9 II . Mitchell went on to enjoy g reat success as an 

air commander and fame as a martyr for a ir power in the 1920s. 

• Johnson, IG, First Army. Annual Rpt, 16 Jul 18, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

193 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

The personal conduct of many aviators was incorrigible. Writing 

after the war, General March- whose son, a pilot, had been killed in 

training-declared that the special status given the Air Service made its 

members feel they were above the constraints imposed on others. The 

result was serious individual indiscipline and a drift away from a tradition of military teamwork. General Donaldson, the SOS IG, seconded 

these sentiments, citing Air Service conduct as a continuous nagging 

problem for his inspectors. In his view the Air Service fostered a notion 

that the nature of its mission required special treatment for the aviators, 

who were alleged to be intrinsically temperamental. Donaldson termed 

this claim ridiculous, for "no healthy normal male is naturally temperamental, but each one will take advantage of laxity." His views mirrored those of Pershing and Brewster, all of whom stressed the need for 

a single standard of discipline, with no exceptions.

7 

The issue came to a head in August 1918 dtuing the preliminaries 

of the American buildup for the St. Mihiel attack. One of Brewster's 

assistants, Lt. Edgar Scott, was directed on the fifteenth to go to Nancy 

and Toul to investigate rumors that General Pershing had heard regarding the conduct of aviators visiting those cities. Scott interviewed civilian and military police authorities and U.S. medical personnel. He concluded that nearly all the officers visiting the towns were boisterous, 

freely drinking, and associating with loose women. Although everyone 

interviewed agreed that the behavior of the 82d Division officers had 

been the wildest, they also concurred that the pilots were the most consistent in heavy drinking and carousing. Scott heard of one case where 

eight pilots out on a spree flew their planes over German lines, never to 

return. (Scott surmised that they had flown over enemy terrain until 

they ran out of gas and were forced to land; a later writer attributed the 

incident to inexperience and poor navigation in poor weather.) 

Uncovering several other tales of alcohol-related accidents and 

h·agedies in and out of combat, the inspector concluded a sedous 

behavior problem existed, resulting from an image of bravado on duty 

and idleness during off-duty time.

8 

Brewster sent the report to the Air Service chief for his review and 

comment. Within three weeks General Foulois returned a memorandum 

' Peyton C. March, The Nation At U0r (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, Doran and 

Co., 1932), p. 209; Rpt (quotation), Donaldson to CG, SOS, 14 Mar 19, Entry 588, RG 

120, NARA. 

s Rpt, Scott to IG, AE F, 20 Aug 18, sub: Investigation Concerning Conduct of 

Aviators in Nancy and Its Neighborhood, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA; Coffman, ~f0r To 

End All Wars, p. 206. 

194 
THE AEF IN COMBAT 

outlining the actions he had taken. Believing that the main problem was 

the absence of wholesome diversions at the air bases, he initiated a 

comprehensive program with the Red Cross and YMCA to provide 

each depot and airdrome with a clubhouse containing a library, snack 

bar, theater, and classrooms. He further arranged with theAEF G-4 and 

the Red Cross to supply athletic gear, and he directed commanders to 

devise full programs of games and exercises. He and other senior officers visited units to talk with the younger pilots about the effects of 

drinking and flying. Foulois also began a program of"systematic medical supervision of all flying personnel," something he had been urging 

for several years. He told Brewster that these measmes already had 

developed a marked improvement in aviator behavior and performance, 

and the decline and ultimate e.limination of investigations on the subject tended to validate his claim.9 

Medical Crisis 

Other problems revealed in the midsummer fighting were not so easily 

resolved. Complaints about logistical support during the Soissons 

offensive prompted several investigations from various levels. Pending 

his reassigmnent to the III Corps from the AEF's IG office, Colonel 

Ovenshine conducted a thorough overview for General Brewster. 

Ovenshine interviewed key members of the 1st and 2d Divisions and 

gathered written statements from those he was unable to interview, 

including the British division commander under whom the American 

units had trained. The officers were in agreement that both units were 

tactically proficient. Their greatest concern was the need for improvement in medical support. 10 

Inefficient medical operations already had come under considerable scrutiny. GHQ AEF became interested in July, when a New York 

Tribune reporter submitted a scathing criticism of the Medical 

Department to the censor. The censor notified the AEF chief surgeon, 

Maj. Gen. Merritte W. Ireland, MC, who requested an immediate investigation. The case was passed to General Brewster, who took the 

reporter with him on a preliminary inquiry. At the same time Ovenshine 

began a more detailed investigation. The conclusions of both were 

much the same. 

9 Memo, Fou1ois to IG, AEF, 9 Sep 18, sub: Efficiency of Air Service Personnel, 

Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 10 Memos, Ovenshine to IG, AEF, 7 and 28 Aug 18, and Spinks to CofS, AEF, 14 

Aug 18, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

195 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Oven shine corroborated Brewster's finding that, because of security reasons, medical personnel lacked knowledge of the planned attacks 

until just before the troops were committed. As a result, field hospitals 

were hastily deployed, often too far to the rear. The insufficient lead 

time imposed an inordinate strain on the hard-pressed evacuation system. Casualties were far higher than expected, overrunning the understaffed and ill-equipped unit medical detachments. Litters and medicines on hand proved to be inadequate at every echelon. Deployment of 

corps and field army ambulance units was delayed, and heavy road 

congestion slowed the movement of the available ambulances.'' 

The upshot was a medical evacuation disaster. Some casualties 

remained on the battlefield for hours or days, and at the regulating stations they often lay without medical attention or food because of the 

shortage of corpsmen. Combat troops and supply vehicles filled in as 

best they could. The field hospitals experienced similar problems. 

Inundated with casualties from the front, they were unable to evacuate 

them promptly because hospital trains were either diverted or unavailable. Like the field hospitals, they too had not been notified in time.'2 

Concern over the medical situation resulted in a medical officer 

being detailed to the AEF inspectorate in June L 9 I 8. Col. Henry 

Beeuwkes, MC, a graduate of the Johns Hopkins Medical College, joined 

Ovenshine, placing his emphasis on the treatment of personnel after they 

had reached the field hospitals. Beeuwkes recommended that regimental 

medical units be doubled in size and authorized to carry greater quantities of hospital supplies; that American surgeons practice the french system of triage to better manage battle casualties; and that the number of 

hospitals near the front be increased. Both inspectors pointed out that one 

of the main causes for the crisis was an excessive concern for secrecy on 

the part of tactical planners, emphasizing that medical personnel had to 

know as early as possible when a large operation was scheduled to occur. 

The problems with ambulances also showed a need for much greater rear 

area traffic control. As a result of their findings, regimental medical 

detachments were doubled in size and the need for better medical planning, coordination, and dep.loyment was recognized. 13 

" Rpt, Brewster, 17 Jul 18, sub: Investigation Concerning Charges of I ncfTiciency 

on the Part of the Medical Department Contained in Cablegram Prepared by Mr. Casper 

Whitney of the New York Tribune; Memo, Brewster to CinC, AEI-: 3 I Jul 18; Memos, 

Ovcnshinc to JG, AEF, 7 and 28 Aug 18. All in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 11 Rpt, Lay, 2 Sep 18, sub: Investigation Concerning the Care of the Wounded at 

Crcpy-en-Valois, Entry 2144; Memos, Ovcnshine to IG, AEF, 7 and 28 Aug 18, Entry 

588. All in RG 120, NARA. 11 Memo, Brewster to CinC, AEF, 3 I Jul 18, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

196 
THE AEF IN COMBAT 

Given high priority by General Pershing, the investigation was thorough and searching, with special emphasis on the evacuation of casualties from the field hospitals rearward to the great medical centers in the 

Services of Supply. Throughout, the re lationship between Generals 

Brewster and Ireland and their respective departments was cordial and 

supportive, and the AEF chief surgeon credited the inspectorate's considerable help as being pivotal to improving medical conditions.'4 

The Final Push 

Not only in the medical arena but throughout the command every 

effort was made to apply the lessons that had been learned at great cost 

during the summer fighting in 19 J 8. The hardest battles for American 

units lay ahead. The fa ll offensives would determine whether they 

were ready to participate in the war as a full-fledged army, their days 

of learning and experimentation now over, or whether they remained 

journeymen warriors. 

Preparations for the concentration of U.S. forces into a field army 

for operations against the St. Mihiel salient proceeded even while the 

Aisnc-Marne battles approached their climax. Orders were issued for 

the creation of the First Army headquarters in late July, and the staff 

assembled at Neufchateau in time for the command to begin to function 

on I 0 August. The headquarters deployed on 28 August to the town of 

Ligny-en-Barrois, southwest of St. Mihiel, while completing the plans 

for the September offensive. 

By I September the First Army included four American and one 

French corps- a total of sixteen American and three French divisions. 

Until October General Pershing continued to command the new organization while also commanding all U.S. fo rces in France. The First Army 

staff, however, was distinct from the GHQ AEF; no officer but the commander served in a dual capacity. Pershing brought with him a small 

advance element to ensure timely coordination on events with GHQ, 

now located at Chaumont. In addition to maintaining liaison with GHQ, 

the so-called Advanced Headquarters monitored aspects of the preparations for the September offensive that were of greatest interest to 

Pershing. General Brewster and Colonel Baer formed the lG clement at 

Adva nced Headquarters, and Colonel Beeuwkes and tlu·ce fi eld clerks 

soon joined them. Brewster continued to keep in close touch with the 

AEF's IG office at Chaumont, which was under the direct control of 

,. Memo, Ireland to Brewster, 9 Oct 18, and Rpt, Donaldson to CG, SOS, 14 Mar 

19, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

197 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

General Spinks. The work done there was normally passed to Brewster 

at the Advanced Headquarters for his approval and information. ~ 

Baer served as the forward IG executive and later as Pershing's special troubleshooter. After command of the First Army was transferred 

to General Liggett on 12 October, Baer took over from Brewster at the 

Advanced Headquarters, while Brewster continued with Pershing at 

Chaumont. Soon after the inspectors came forward in August, Pershing 

told them that he expected them to set up a "continual inspection" system to enforce traffic and march d.iscipline, as part of an effort to 

achieve a secret concentration of forces preparatory to the St. Mihiel 

attack. Inspectors in the tactical units were subject to Brewster's direction and were authorized to correct problems wherever they arose.'6 

Brewster, Baer, and Beeuwkes, soon joined by Maj. Charles H. 

Rice, began to visit unit areas. Brewster established the policy that at 

least one division in each corps must be visited daily. Inspectors who 

were not involved in the effort were to exercise more general observation over corps and field army activities, a practice that persisted until 

the end of hostilities. By the end of the St. Mihiel operation Brewster 

had developed a tight hierarchical control over the tactical unit inspectors, especially during unit movements, to assure that AEF requirements were being met. 17 

Antagonism to this system was quick to develop, both among the 

First Army staff and among the corps and division commanders. With 

few exceptions, these officers resented the direct link, outside the 

chain of command, between Pershing and the roving inspectors. An 

exception was the cordial relationship between Baer and Col. Robert 

McCleave, the First Army G- 3. Each night Baer gave the G- 3 information on the problems and tactical lessons he had noted and on the 

status and location of units. Jn return, McCleave provided Baer with 

summaries of the next day's orders, enabling him to place inspectors at 

the most critical locations. 

As time went by, other members of the First Army staff began to 

appreciate the value of the information gathered by IGs at all levels, 

particularly those from the Advanced Headquarters. The number of IGs 

15 U.S. Army War College, Historical Section, The Genesis of the American First 

Army (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938), pp. 50- 51; Department 

of the Army, Historical Division, The United States Army in the World Wm; 1917- 1919, 

17 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), 16:393 (GO 120, 

19 18); Memo, Spinks to Baer, I Nov .I 8, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA 16 Rpt, Brewster to CinC, AEF, n.d., Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 17 lbid.; Memo, IG, AEF, to CinC, AEF, 19 Sep 18, Entry 588; Ltr, Brewster to 

Spinks, 21 Sep 18, Entry 590. All in RG 120, NARA. 

198 
THE AEF IN COMBAT 

at Advanced Headquarters was increased by seven as more and more 

requests for information in greater detail were received. The coordination of this larger group eventually obliged Colonel Baer to remain at 

the headquarters, where he worked to assist tactical unit inspectors in 

overcoming their commanders' suspicions. 18 

Gradually, the inflow of data was organized and standardized. 

Inspectors of units that had been in the summer fighting were requested in August to submit special reports to the General Brewster, giving 

observations and recommendations based on their recent experiences. 

The idea was to derive a compilation of lessons learned from those in 

a position to observe. Inspectors were asked to submit similar reports 

after each future engagement. Formal tactical reports seemed even 

more desirable. During the St. Mibiel offensive Colonel Johnson, in his 

role as the First Army IG, prepared a summary of the various problems 

evident throughout the battlefield, identifying issues that affected combat success. Brewster found Johnson's report so useful that he informally requested all inspectors to submit similar observations on tactical developments in their units. 

As a result, some corps-level inspectors required that division 

inspectors submit to them a daily summary. Many of them dealt with 

the near-insoluble problems of traffic management that had developed 

behind the front. Typically, Maj. T. Charlton Henry, the 79th Division 

IG, discussed at length the chaos on the roads in the division zone. No 

one appeared to be in control. Military police were too few and too illinformed to be helpful to those who were lost. Part of the problem was 

the absence of any system to handle vehicle breakdowns and to repair 

road sections destroyed by constant use. 19 

The growing number of reports flowing in also began to show 

Colonel Johnson that some commanders were not using their inspectors 

to the full advantage that his headquarters had intended. Some IGs were 

stationed with unit rear echelons, while others worked as liaison officers. A few had failed to disengage from routine duties, such as billets 

inspections, in order to concentrate on field operations. Johnson began 

a program requiring daily reports on items he knew were of concern to 

Pershing, forcing the inspectors to perform. This practice also had the 

secondary effect of circumventing limitations imposed on unit IGs by 

'

8 Ltr, Baer to !G, USA, 8 May 19, sub: Personal History of Service in the IGD, 

Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 19 Rpt, Johnson to IG, AEF, 23 Sep 18, sub: Delinquencies During Recent Operation 

in St. Mihiel Salient, Entry 588; Henry Daily Rpts, 26-30 Sep 18, Entry 1138. All in 

RG 120, NARA. 

199 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

their commanders. Johnson and the corps inspectors continually 

stressed the need for IGs to take immediate corrective action and to 

suggest solutions to problems they observed. 20 

The daily reports were considered useful enough to be made a formal requirement on 10 October. Ideally, the reports from the divisions 

were intended to be a record of the improvements being made in the line 

units. Inspectors were supposed to review the questionnaires and checklists sent out by GHQ AEF, to recognize the areas in which they knew 

their units to be weak, and to go out and check on them. If their suspicions were confirmed, they were to report on what was being done to 

make the situation better. The daily reports were not intended to be lists 

of mistakes or errors, the so-called skin lists. Rather, Pershing wanted 

them to be an honest appraisal of combat and administrative capabilities. 

The reports quickly came to be viewed by First Army and GHQ staffs as 

more accurate and useful than data from any other sources, as well as 

primaty sources for information on casualties, POWs, and ammunition 

expenditures. Pershing later asked Brewster confidentially to monitor 

the effectiveness of the General Staff in the same way. His findings and 

those of the roving Advanced Headquarters inspectors were to be consolidated with the daily reports and presented along with them.21 

The importance of the information coming from the inspectors may 

be seen in Pershing's 4 October directive that inspectors be used only as 

IGs, performing no other staff duties, and that they be assured adequate 

transportation to do their job. Army and corps inspectors tried to help 

subordinate JGs whose reports were unsatisfactory. Most reports quickly reflected the new emphasis. Those provided by Maj. G. Edward 

Buxton, Jr., the 82d Division IG, were typical. After describing tactical 

operations, he summarized his division's ammtmition status and commented on innovations in the use of weapons. Buxton took seriously the 

requirement to make specific recommendations to improve operations. 

He helped groups of stragglers to find their units, watched traffic 

movement throughout the area, and carried out special inquiries sent 

him from every echelon, division and above.22 

20 Rpt, Dallam to CG, Fifth Army Corps, n.d., sub: Argonne-Meuse Operations, Fifth 

Army Corps, 26 September to 11 November, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA; Ltr, Elmore 

to Helmick, 12 Apr 22, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 21 Ltr, Baer to Lay, 13 Nov 18, Entry 590; Memo, Buxton to IG, I st Corps, 18 Oct 

18, Entry 590; Ltr, Brewster to Chamberlain, 30 Dec 18, Entry 588; Rpt, Brewster to 

CinC, AEF, n.d., Entry 588. All in RG 120, NARA. 21 Men1o, Johnson to Corps Insps, 4 Oct 18, sub: Proper Use of Inspectors, Entry 

590; Ltr, Baer to Taggart, 8 Nov 18, sub: Report, Entry 588; Buxton Daily Rpts, 7- 19 

Oct 18, Entry 590. All in RG 120, NARA. 

200 
THE AEF IN COMBAT 

Despite their value, however, 

division inspectors strongly resented the daily required report, which 

was an additional burden to their 

already heavy work load. Most 

believed that daily reports fueled 

the tendency of the corps and army 

!Gs to inh·udc into unit affairs, at a 

time when their own commanders 

were also placing urgent requirements on them. The only time for 

preparing the report was late at 

night, after exhausting days with 

units under fire, and the report format seemed to encourage a kind of 

mindless repetition of problems, 

without any solutions. One inspector characterized the reports as 

"impractical whHe on the march, Maj. G. Edward Buxton, Jl: 

impossible to render without typewriter or field desk- the time to 

make a report is when you have something to report." A chorus of complaining inspectors pressed for a modification of the requirement. 

Finally, on 1 November Brewster and Pershing changed the reporting frequency to once every ten days, effective the tenth of the month.23 

Part of the problem with the daily report requirement and senior 

IG supervision lay in the fact that the system had grown informally, 

almost experimentally, without fully advising corps and division commanders. Brewster and Pershing liked the way IG fu nctions had 

evolved, and in early October Pershing directed Colonel Baer to prepare specific guidance for the entire force. At the end of the month the 

small unnumbered pamphlet Inspection of Armies in the Field was 

published. The document reaffirmed existing policy and became the 

basic directive for IG operations in the AEF. The policy it embodied 

was a direct reflection of Pershing's views that IGs were "aides, not 

only to myself but to the commanders of the units inspected, and are 

in a position to observe and call attention ... to defects and irregular-

" Memo, Boyd to Brewster, I Nov 18, Entry 588; Buxton Daily Rpts, 20-23 Oct 18, 

Entry 590. All in RG 120, NARA. See also David Lewis, "A Short Account of My 

Experiences in the American Expeditionary Forces in France, 191 8- 1919," quotation, 

OTIG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH). 

201 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

ities." He also referred to them as a source of information that was 

"most helpful" to his conduct of the war.24 

St. M ihiel ( 12-16 September) 

A few days before the First Army began to concentrate its forces against 

the St. Mihiel salient, its chief of staff, General Drum, sent a detailed 

letter of instruction to the corps commanders on secrecy and deception- that is, denying information to the enemy. Drum designated the 

movement zones in which no daytime traffic was allowed; specified the 

hours for night movement; stressed the use of concealment, camouflage, and light discipline; and, in particular, emphasized the dangers of 

enemy air reconnaissance. Each corps headquarters had orders to detail 

an officer to enforce the requirements of the letter, to monitor the 

enforcement of the Army security plan, and to correct any violations. 

The commanders assigned this duty to their corps inspectors.25 

Methods varied fi·om one command to another. The IV Corps IG, 

Col. Edward Carpenter, volunteered for the assignment, believing that he 

could carry out the task without any sort of extensive organization. Only 

four officers were made temporary assistant inspectors; they were divided into two teams, which alternated in twelve-hour shifts, one officer 

covering the rear areas and another the front. The corps military police 

were directed to cooperate with them. On the other hand, the V Corps IG, 

Col. S. Field Dallam, received direct orders to supervise the program. A 

military police detachment offour officers and fifty men was assigned to 

assist him. Dallam and the provost marshal worked out an elaborate system of control, with checkpoints on the battlefield approaches.26 

Typically, the corps inspectors found little understanding or appreciation of the security requirement. An August general order making 

the discussion of troop movements in public a serious offense apparently bad made no impression. Colonel Dallam, in particular, had to 

stress repeatedly to the senior commanders in the V Corps the need to 

enforce security measures to assure some surprise in the forthcoming 

attack. He and his counterparts also discovered that the troops disrez• Memo (quotations), Pershing to CofS, AEF, 20 Oct 18; Memo, Spinks to Brewster, 

3 1 Oct 18. Both in Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 25 Ltr, Drum to COs, I st, 4th, 5th Army Corps, 25 Aug 18, sub: Secrecy in Troop 

Movements, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

'" Memo, Carpenter to CofS, lY Army Corps, 28 Aug 18; Ltr, Ulio to All Org Cdrs, 

IV Army Corps, 28 Aug 18; Memo, Oallam to PM, V Army Corps, 28 Aug 18, sub: 

Instructions; and Ltr, Carpenter to IG, AEF, 27 Sep 18, sub: Observations on the 

Offensive for the Reduction of the St. Mihiel Sal ient. All in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

202 
THE AEF IN COMBAT 

garded camouflage and many other concealment measures, even in the 

last days before the attack. For example, units were drilling and training in the open; off-duty soldiers were visible in the streets of the towns 

in which they were billeted; bivouacs and vehicles kept lights burning 

at night; ammunition and equipment dumps were left in the open; and 

convoys picking up or dropping off supplies in the daytime pinpointed 

otherwise camouflaged unit locations. Whenever possible, such failings 

were corrected on the spot, and improvements followed as the troops' 

experience convinced them of the wisdom of concealment. 27 

The corps inspectors also remained heavily involved in coordinating traffic flow, especially the forward movement of ammunition and 

the evacuation of the wounded. Sometimes they served, in effect, as 

medical regulators, by diverting streams of ambulances to empty hospitals when others were reaching capacity. They continued to monitor 

traffic control even after the programs they had developed passed nominally to the corps G- ls. This was because of General Brewster's association with the foundering military police and his oversight responsibility for discipline and combat efficiency.28 

Traffic, however, remained a daily headache. Military police often 

were insufficiently briefed to give directions. Vehicles traveled too fast, 

causing accidents that blocked the roads. In other cases, units would not 

pull over during halts. One of the worst practices was "double-banking"- occupying both lanes of a two-way road while going in the same 

direction. Lack of coordination over all the various units moving 

throughout the sector contributed to congestion. French units withdrawing after being replaced routinely ignored American traffic rules. 

Nevertheless, staffs at every level worked desperately to keep things 

flowing; Colonel Carpenter reported seeing a division chief of staff personally unsnarling traffic at a particularly critical road junction. During 

combat the slow forward deployment of the military police and the 

slowness of engineers to repair road damage compounded the congestion on the roads, but the main problem continued to rest with the indiscipline of the drivers.29 

Mindful of the medical problems in July, inspectors at all levels 

were careful to note conditions during the St. Mihiel fighting. 

n SOS, AEF, GO 39, 24 Aug 18, OTJG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH); Rpt, Dallam 

to CG, 5th Army Corps, n.d., and Ltr, Carpenter to IG, A EF, 27 Sep 18, Entry 588, RG 

120, NARA. 

>& Cdr, Co A, 4th M P Co, Daily Rpts, 2- 9 Sep 18, Entry 1138, RG 120, NARA; Llr, 

Baer to IG, USA, 8 May 19, Entry 26, RG 159. NARA. 

~> Llr, Carpenter to IG, AEF, 27 Sep 18, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

203 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

General Brewster With His 

Assistant, Col. Joseph A. Bae1; 

During a Field Inspection 

Fortunately, the number of casualties was relatively light and the 

hospitals were never overtaxed. 

Despite this, long delays were 

again the rule as ambulances tried 

to work their way rearward 

through the traffic jams. Because 

of the traffic problem, ambulances were in short supply on the 

first day of fighting. Additional 

units were deployed to alleviate 

the situation by the evening of the 

second day, when the main fighting was pretty much over. The 

handling of wow1ded animals was 

better than in July, but prompt 

tTeatment was still unavailable in 

numerous cases. Burial of the 

dead also was accomplished more 

quickly than before, due in part to 

the low casualties and the rapid 

advance. But, again, as the corps 

inspectors noted, the division burial teams had no backup, and 

when they moved forward with their units, the corpses of men and animals they had missed often went unattended-sometimes for days.30 

Despite their preoccupation with matters directly behind the front, 

the corps inspectors on occasion became involved in tactical activities. 

Colonel Dallam made it a point to observe special actions, going forward to witness a 4th Division reconnaissance in force and to comment 

on its execution. He noted that infantry-artillery coordination was a 

persistent problem because of the unfamiliarity of the two arms with 

each other. As a result, the inspectors became increasingly involved in 

facilitating better liaison. The major problems, however, remained in 

the rear areas, and by the third day of the attack IGs and every other 

staff officer available were back trying to regulate traffic.31 

Colonel Baer, roving the battle area at all echelons of command, 

concluded that the Army's biggest problem was difficulty in having 

30 Ibid. 

J• Rpt, Dallam to CG, 5th Army Corps, n.d., Entry 588, RG 120, NARA; Coffman, 

WCtr To End All Wars, p. 344. 

204 
THE AEF IN COMBAT 

orders obeyed. "Perfectly beautiful" orders often were issued, but the 

junior officers receiving them merely interpreted them as guidelines. 

Senior commanders were too busy to check, and control was lost on the 

battlefield.32 The indiscipline on the roads reflected attitudes and habits 

that pervaded the entire AEF. 

Meuse-Argonne (26 September-3 October) 

Even as the St. Mihiel fighting reached its successful conclusion, 

preparations for the major effort in the Meuse-Argonne were under 

way. AEF planners had envisaged a three-phase offensive for pushing 

the Germans northward through the dense forest and hills west of the 

Meuse River. With the most experienced units committed at St. Mihiel, 

less experienced divisions had to carry the burden during the first 

phase. But a series of crises, brought on by the cross-movement of 

troops in the new sector (200,000 Frenchmen leaving, 600,000 

Americans entering), compelled General Pershing to halt opening operations and to realign his forces, redeploying some of the veteran units 

and ruthlessly pruning incompetent commanders. Even as the fighting 

continued, the arrival of fresh German units assured intense future 

actions for the Americans. Each day posed new challenges to troops, 

commanders, and inspectors alike as the Iron Commander insisted on 

keeping the pressure on the staggering enemy (see Map 2). 

33 

Colonel Baer's roving mission from the Advanced Headquarters 

was so useful to General Pershing that he assigned an IG, or one of his 

aides, to each corps as his personal liaison for the Meuse-Argonne 

operations. The AEF commander expected to be briefed daily on the 

actual conditions in the battle area. He specifically told the so-called 

rovers to collect information on road and railway repairs, artillery 

movement, traffic discipline, evacuation of wounded and prisoners, 

engineer and tank activities, unit liaison and communications, and food 

and ammunition resupply. Later the new First Army G- 3, Col. George 

C. Marshall, Jr., asked the inspectors to rate each division's combat 

capability, commander and staff, equipment, and clothing. 

The Advanced Headquarters inspectors tried to keep each echelon 

of conunand advised of their activities. They called first at the corps 

headquarters to see its chief of staff, obtaining information on current 

activities, and to give him their itinerary. The inspectors also offered to 

n Ltr, Baer to Brook, 24 Sep 18, Entry 59 1, RG 120, NARA. 

u R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, Militmy Heritage of America (New York: 

McGraw Hill Book Co., 1956), pp. 385- 87. 

205 
Dieppe• 

• Dover 

Calais 

• 

WEST ERN FRONT 

March-November 1918 

\)32 • Allied Offensive, Sep- Nov 

ELEVATION IN METERS 

' \ 

. 

0 200 400 800 1600 and Above 

0 75 

Miles 

MAP 2 

• Ostend • Antwerp 

BRU! 

® 

B E L G 

N 

F R A N 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

investigate any items of corps interest. The same routine was followed 

at division Level. When the inspector left a unit, he briefed the commander or a senior staff officer on his findings or assessments. If time 

allowed, he visited tmits adjacent to the division to check on liaison 

procedttres. Normally, the inspector ate his supper at corps headquarters, where he could brief the corps staff, monitor reports from other 

elements of the corps, and coordinate activities with the corps IG. ~ 

The army inspectors usually convened late at night at the Advanced 

Headquarters to discuss their evaluations with the AEF rovers and to 

consolidate their findings. General Brewster or Colonel Baer subsequently briefed the First Army G- 3 and, at the earliest opportunity, 

General Pershing. In the meantime, other inspectors coordinated with 

responsible staff officers and followed through on specific problems 

they hoped to resolve during their visits. Always, any supply deficiencies were noted. Inspectors then personally worked with the staff to 

find items reported as unavailable by the inspected division. Army and 

corps inspectors operated in similar fashion whenever they were not on 

assignments specified by their commanders.35 

A division of labor evolved between Baer's post at the Advanced 

Headquarters and Spinks' office at GH.Q AEF. Baer's immediate staff 

concentrated on issues directly related to combat operations, such as 

supply to the front, traffic control, and the care of animals, and eventually assumed responsibility for investigating cases of officers 

relieved in combat. Spinks' office took care of nearly all other personnel matters, including cases of self-inflicted wounds, conditions 

and assignments in combat units, and issues not related to combat 

operations. 36 

Division inspectors usually were based at the equivalent of the division rear headquarters (second echelon). The experiences of the 79th 

Division IG, Major Henry, were typical. His division went into the 

attack on 26 September and was withdrawn on the thirtieth, after taking the German strongpoint at Montfaucon in heavy fighting. On the 

first day of the attack Henry monitored road movements but concentrated on the developing tactical situation, being especially interested in 

the use of tanks and in liaison between units. His second daily report 

showed a growing concern with traffic conditions and their effect on 

evacuation of the wounded. The third and fourth days again found him 

preoccupied with the traffic situation. Then he returned to the front, 

J.< Ltr, Baer to IG, USA, 8 May 19, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. ss Ibid. 

so Memo, Spinks to CinC, AEF, 10 Nov 18, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

208 
THE AEF IN COMBAT 

Discussing Training With the 77th Division lnspectOJ; 

Col. George D. Moore (right) 

investigating allegations, which he discovered to be fa lse, that friendly 

air support was lacking. Each day during the course of the offensive 

Flenry briefly met with either the division commander or the chief of 

staff to discuss his findings.37 

Once their units went into combat, division inspectors functioned 

for the most part as expediters and problem solvers. Higher-level 

inspectors might be sent to monitor unusual situations. This was the 

case with the famous " lost battalion" of the 77th Division. The 1st 

Battalion, 308th Infantry, a long with Company K, 307th Infantry, and 

Companies C and D, 306th Machine Gun Battalion, were cut off from 

the rest of the division during an attack on 2- 3 October. Under the command of Maj. Charles W. Whittlesey, the battalion defended itself until 

1

' Henry Daily Rpts, 26- 30 Sep 18, Entry 11 38, RG 120, NARA. 

209 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

the night of the seventh, when division elements reached the isolated 

units after five desperate attacks. 

The incident gained considerable romantic notoriety in the 

American press. General Drum at First Army, learning of the developing situation from a division inspector's daily report, asked Brewster to 

send an inspector to the 77th Division to monitor events. Lt. Col. Albert 

T. Rich was dispatched, arriving on the scene the morning of 6 October. 

Rich remained with the division until contact was made with 

Whittlesey's w1it, sending back periodic summaries of events to 

Generals Drum and Brewster, some obviously in response to specific 

questions probably received over the telephone. He also looked into the 

circumstances concerning the unit's isolation, and the direction of his 

effort and the nature of his findings allow the inference that he had 

been instructed to investigate who was at fault. 38 

In doing so, Rich focused on the mental collapse of the commander of the 308th Infantry, Col. Cromwell Stacey. The inability of 

Stacey's regiment to keep pressure on the Germans allowed the enemy 

to infiltrate behind Whittlesey's lst Battalion and to cut it off. The division commander, Maj. Gen. Robert Alexander, relieved Stacey; the 

!54th Infantry Brigade commander, Brig. Gen. Evan M. Johnson, then 

became the senior officer on the ground, leading the assaults to link 

with the battalion. Rich believed that the root of the crisis was 

Alexander's 2 October order to advance without regard to flank security. He exonerated Johnson, feeling that he had deployed his troops correctly and provided inspiring leadership during the relief attacks, and 

concluded that, while no one was censurable for the situation, Stacey 

should be evaluated by a disability board. That unfortunate officer was 

evacuated for neurasthenia, returning eventually to the United States to 

be discharged for disability.39 

While Colonel Rich was serving as a reporter and investigator, the 

bulk of the First Army was enjoying a brief pause and reorganization 

preparatory to renewing the assault against stubborn German resistance. Colonel Johnson went over the problems noted in the first phase 

of the attack and issued guidance to the corps and division IGs on ways 

38 77th Division Association, Histo1y of the Seventy-seventh Division, August 25th, 

1917- November 1 I th, 1918 (New York: 77th Division Association, 1919), pp. 72- 76, 

150- 51; American Battle Monuments Commission, American Armies and BaffleJields 

in Europe (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938), pp. 337, 362- 65; 

Rpt, Rich to !G, First Army, 8 Oct 18, sub: 77tb Division Cutting Off of Seven 

Companies and One Machine Gun Company, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 3

• Rpt, Rich to IG, First Army, 8 Oct 18, and Memo, Rich to CofS, First Army, 8 Oct 

19, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

2 10 
T H E AEF IN COMBAT 

they could improve their own operations. Reminding them that "an 

inspector must be where things are happening," he stressed that they 

should keep one another constantly informed while covering as much 

of their units' operations as possible. Johnson also urged them to stay 

in close touch with the rest of the staff to gain and transmit information. 

He admonished the inspectors to avoid getting trapped by routine 

administration and audits and to concentrate on "bigger things"- above 

all, winning the battle.40 

Many problems needed to be solved. The Meuse-Argonne offensive 

began to lose its momentum early because of traffic management and 

command-and-control difficulties. Initially, General Pershing exercised 

too much control over advancing divisions, causing them to miss unexpected opportunities by holding them too rigidly to the original plan. 

Communications breakdowns eventually made it impossible to impose 

any direction after the first day. Some units, such as the 35th Division, 

lost all cohesion. Transportation bottlenecks exacerbated the situation. 

The three marginal roads designated as main supply routes could not 

handle the flow, generating massive traffic jams. Artillery, medical, and 

logistical elements, plus combat units of the attacking divisions, were all 

crammed together, frantically trying to get their jobs done.

4 1 

Road discipline had been virtually nonexistent during the first 

phase of the offensive. Motorized and horse-drawn trains were placed 

on the same routes. Military police were unfamiliar with their responsibilities and, when questioned by inspectors, did not know what types 

of vehicles or what units could use which roads and could not give 

proper directions. Double-banking remained a serious impediment to 

traffic flow, while numerous accidents due to poor and inept driving 

added to the chaos. Lack of coordination with the French resulted in 

innumerable roadblocks, especially when French convoys were trying 

to go against the stream. The poor condition of the roads themselves 

was a contributing factor, but repairs were never adequate.

42 

The chaos was so severe that efforts by senior officers were sometimes necessary to induce any movement at all. The traffic jams in the lii 

Corps area literally threatened to halt the assault before the Germans did. 

General Bullard, then the corps commander, finally "devoted all my 

spare military police, a battalion of infantry, and some 50 officers to regulate the traffic and prevent blockades." He eventually ordered his personal aides to help undo the tie-ups. These efforts did not preclude 

40 Memos, Johnson to Corps Jnsps, I and 2 Oct, Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 41 Coffman, War To End All Wars, pp. 313- 14. 

"' Rpts, Henry to JJJSp, 5th Corps, I Oct 18, Entry 1138, RG 120, NARA. 

2 11 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Premier of France Georges Clemenceau from getting caught in one massive jam near Montfaucon on 29 September. He was so infuriated by his 

experience that he wrote Marshal Ferdinand Foch urging that as 

Generalissimo he relieve General Pershing for incompetence. Foch 

calmed him down and politely ignored the suggestion. The French attributed the American transportation crisis to a beginner's tendency to try to 

fit too many units into the front. They also cited American inexperience 

as an explanation for poor reconnaissance and coordination, although the 

stiff German resistance was acknowledged to be a contributing factor.'13 

Preliminary to the second phase of the offensive, traffic control 

remained an issue because of the relatively small number of military 

police (MPs) available. However, all inspectors agreed that traffic discipline had improved. Corps and army inspectors then became focused 

on a second major problem, communications, both within organizations and to adjacent and rear units. Considerable attention was paid to 

the use of telephones, radios, runners, and other means of liaison and 

control. In early October four corps and army inspectors tested the use 

of artillery pieces well forward, under the direct supervision of infantry 

commanders. Interviews with artillerymen showed that they were little 

used, while being dangerously exposed, and the IGs joined with them 

in recommending that all guns remain under artillery control.-~-~ 

Inspectors also were required to assess the condition and attitude of 

senior commanders to see, in Pershing's words, how much "push and 

punch" they had left. When the 28th Division called for relief, saying 

that its regiments "were shot to pieces and down to 600 men," Brewster 

was sent to verify the claim and to assess the combat effectiveness of 

the officers. Even though the division had lost about half its frontline 

strength, he concluded that the survivors were in good spirits, well fed, 

and well equipped; "they are not asking to be taken out," he reported. 

Brewster felt that the artillery brigade commander had lost his drive 

and was the source of the pessimism pervading the division's leadership 

levels, and he identified several other senior officers who likewise merited evaluation. However, hjs visit apparently provided sufficient inspiration to the division officers. No one was relieved, and the performance of the 28th remained steady or better.45 

4l Coffman, War To End All Wars, pp. 338, 340; Robert L. Bullard Personalities and 

Reminiscences of the War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page and Co., I 925), p. 272 

(quotation) . 

.... Rpt, Peck to IG, AEF, I Oct 18, sub: Observations, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

•s Memo, 10, AEF, to CinC, AEF, 3 Oct 18, sub: 28th Division, Entry 590, RG 120, 

NARA. 

212 
THE AEF IN COMBAT 

Corps and army inspectors 

believed that one of the best ways 

to gauge the combat effectiveness 

of a division was to observe it on 

the march as it was pulled from the 

line. Typical were Colonel Peck's 

observations of the 35th Division. 

The unit had taken part in hard 

fighting around the town of 

Cheppy; on its first day in combat, 

fourteen field-grade officers had 

become casualties while leading 

their units from the van, much like 

Civil War heroes. Unfortunately, 

the division's discipline was also 

reminiscent of earlier armies of 

citizen soldiers. 

Peck observed routine disregard of AEF policies. March dis- Ll. Col. Robert G. Peck 

cipline and camouflage were poor, 

wagons were improperly loaded, 

and the troops failed to clear the right-of-way at halts. The men had 

made no effort to clean their weapons, and many appeared to have 

abandoned their personal equipment. Peck felt that few of the division 

officers were enforcing standards, and cited the division's National 

Guard origins as one of the reasons for the laxness- a judgment that 

division members greatly resented. While Peck's blunt remarks provoked some criticism in Congress when someone in the division violated the confidentiality of his report, high-level AEF officers tended to 

view the 35th's problems as typical of new units in battle for the first 

time. In fact, the division, despite the fai lings noted by the inspector, 

had acquitted itself reasonably well in combat.~6 

.,. Rpt, Peck to CO, 35th Div, 12 Oct 18, Entry 588, and Ltr, Jackson to McAndrew, 

I Feb 19, Entry 15, RG 120, NARA; Congressman Little in U.S. Congress, House, 

Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 3d Scss., 1919, 57, pt. 3:2557- 59; Clair Kenamore, 

From Vauquois Hill to Exermont: A History o.f the Tlrirty-fi.ft!r Division o.f the United 

States Army (St. Louis: Guard Publishing Co., 1919), pp. 244-45, 251- 53; Marcellus 

G. Spinks, "Major Problems of the Inspector General, AEF, and Their Solution" 

(Lecture delivered at G- 1 Course No.5, Army War College, Washington, D.C., 9 Oct 

33), in Army War Col lege Curriculum Papers, MHI; Coffman, War To End All Wars, pp. 

311 - 12; Bullard, Pe1:sonalities and Reminiscences, p. 327; Hunter Liggett, A. E. R: Ten 

Years Ago in France (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1928), pp. 180- 8 1. 

213 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Inspectors at all levels also were called upon to study the employment of tanks. Problems with the new weapons were many. Tanks had 

to operate in the extremely rough terrain characteristic of the Argonne 

Forest, and limited communications capabilities and a lack of combined-arms h·aining meant they could expect little infantry support. The 

tank brigade, equipped with 141 tanks, went into battle on 26 

September with 70 officers and 657 men. By 14 October it had a total 

of 330 casualties and 62 tanks out of action. The survivors were 

grouped into a provisional company, and Lt. Col. Thorne Strayer from 

the First Army IG office was sent to determine whether the tanks 

should be committed again. 47 

He found the morale of the provisional company to be high and 

the remaining equipment in good condition. He noted, however, that 

the French had pulled out their tanks because the harsh terrain made 

maintenance nearly impossible, concluding that the probable personnel and equipment losses "were not commensurate with the offensive 

advantages" to be derived from the use of the tanks. He recommended that the company and its equipment be withdrawn to the First 

Army's tank center, where they could be of greater value in speeding 

the organization and training of newer armored units. Despite these 

recommendations, however, the provisional company was used in one 

more attack on 16 October, losing about half of its remaining 

strength. This action contributed more to infantry morale than to tactical success.

48 

The attack led to a First Army special inquiry by the V Corps IG, 

Colonel Dallam. The tanks, committed to support a brigade of the 42d 

Division, had arrived two hours late because of terrain difficulties, and 

within an hour all had been eliminated by enemy fire or mechanical 

failure. Those that could be salvaged were held in defensive positions 

against a possible counterattack until they could be withdrawn. Dallam 

felt that tanks had great potential, but stressed that combined training 

with infantry was necessary. He faulted tank leaders for not making 

adequate map and ground reconnaissances before going into battle and 

both infantry and tank commanders for failing to develop proper liaison for exploiting changing situations. Finally, he emphasized the need 

for near-perfect maintenance in tank units, to avoid battlefield breakclowns, and made several recommendations for changes in tank design . 

• , Rpt, Strayer to IG, First Army, 14 Oct 18, sub: Tank Units With First Army, Entry 

797, RG 120, NARA; Martin B1umenson, The Pal/on Papers, 2 vo1s. (Boston: 

Houghton Miffiin Co., 1972- 74), 1:620. 

•• Rpt, Strayer to IG, First Army, 14 Oct 18, Entry 797, RG 120, NARA. 

2 14 
THE AEF IN COMBAT 

His views, though valid and perceptive, came too late to be of practical 

value in the Argonne:'

9 

Meuse-Argonne (4 October-11 November) 

As the fighting extended through October, senior command inspectors 

were drawn once again into the problems of combat support. Growing 

chaos in the rear areas prompted General Liggett on 22 October to suspend inspection requirements at the front, ordering the First Army IG to 

concentrate on the inspection of units and facilities behind the division 

areas. Convinced that the rear areas were neither well organized nor 

fully productive, Liggett wanted labor units to be inspected and evaluated at railheads, hospitals, remount depots, supply dumps, and so on. 50 

Meanwhile, AEF-level inspectors continued to monitor combat 

effectiveness. The morale and physical condition of the troops and their 

junior leaders remained a paramount concern. Men at all levels were 

questioned, and occasionally an inspector's findings led to immediate 

improvements. This was the case when 82d Division soldiers complained to Major Rice that nightly rotation of battalions from the front 

line prevented them from sleeping. Rice reported the situation to the 

division chief of staff, and the unit's relief schedule was changed to 

allow the troops more time to rest. 

The fact that an inspector was obliged to raise so basic an issue 

underlined the enthusiastic amateurism sti.ll pervading much of the 

force. Other problems pointed to the same underlying difficulty. In 

early November, as the war drew to an end, inspectors continued to 

note fundamental weaknesses in staff procedure and leadership born 

of inexperience and overwork. New leaders were still unable or unwilling to enforce policies and follow tlu-ough on orders. Just holding 

things together at division level was an achievement for the staff and 

its inspectors. 51 

The demands on division IG offices increased greatly once units 

were committed to battle. Part of the problem was handling the number 

of outside inspection requirements. The 82d Division, for example, 

between 6- 11 October had one visit from the Advanced Headquarters, 

•• Memo, Dallam to IG, First Army, 28 Oct 18; 83d Bde Daily Log, 15 Oct 18; and 

Lenihan Notes on Tanks From Experiences in Champagne, St. Mihiel Salient and 

Before St. Georges, 27 Oct 18. All in Entry 797, RG 120, NARA. 

so Memo, Drum to 10, 1st Army, 22 Oct 18, Entry 799, RG 120, NARA. 

so Rpt, Rice to 10, AEF, 23 Oct 18, and Memo (pencil notes), Mcflheny to Baer, 3 

Nov 18, Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 

2 15 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

two from the First Army, and one from the I Corps added to, of course, 

the daily rounds of its own inspector. In the 26th Division in late 

October the two inspectors found themselves stretched to the limit. 

They oversaw numerous small issues of interest to their commander, 

tried to complete the reports required by corps or army lGs, audited two 

"badly tangled" financial accounts, and conducted four full-scale 

inquiries on topics ranging from the efficiency of the division veterinarian to dereliction of duty and disregard of division road-march policy. A particularly complex investigation involving friendly artillery 

fire consumed two weeks of one inspector's time, reflecting also hours 

spent enforcing corrective measures. Continued disregard for concealment measures caused the division commander to direct his IG to 

enforce the regulations. No one else seemed able to do so.52 

While the pressures prevented the inspectors from completely satisfying either their commanders or their counterparts at higher headquarters, most continued to enjoy command support. Many had direct 

access to their commanders, and even when the IGs were placed under 

the division G- ls, the practical effect often was much the same. fn the 

6th Division, for example, the IG served under the G- l because the 

division chief of staff did not want a "free lance inspector" reporting 

directly to the division commander. In practice, however, the division 

commander used his inspector as a personal staff officer and the G- 1, 

recognizing this, kept a very light rein on the officer, working closely 

with him to assure that no conflict arose between the commander's 

needs, those of the chief of staff, and any G- 1 requirements.

53 

American MPs had begun to improve their performance in traffic 

control, but major problems on roads were still encountered, particularly during darkness when traffic volume increased. On 13 October, 

after a week in battle, the 82d Division experienced critical congestion 

on its main route. The division IG and G- 1 spent two hours trying to 

straighten it out. They then were joined by the division provost marshal 

and several other staff officers, sent by the division commander with 

orders to stay until the traffic was flowing properly. The inspector successfully proposed that French-speaking soldiers or French military 

police be used to augment the Americans. ~ 

Each division handled the traffic crisis in its own manner, but in 

each case the unit inspectors exercised some degree of oversight. In 

'' 82d Div File, Box 6563; Ltr (quoted words), Foote to Johnson, 5 Nov 18; Buxton 

Daily Rpt, 18 Oct 18. All in Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 

$I Lewis, "Short Account," OTIG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH). 

" Buxton Daily Rpts, 8- 16 Oct 18, Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 

216 
THE AEF IN COMBAT 

many divisions they were actua lly put in charge. For example, the 28th 

Division IG was authorized to be "in charge of traffic and have control 

of MPs, directing their activities in traffic control, straggling and prisoners." The operations of the 6th Division IG were more in line with 

standard practice. There, Major Lewis worked with the division provost 

marshal to try to ease the road congestion. At times each would take a 

crossroads and actually direct traffic, with Lewis claiming that he now 

understood something of the work of a traffic cop. The division commander expected his inspectors to be on the road whenever any division 

element was en route to correct problems, to police stragglers, and to 

do whatever was necessary to reduce traffic congestion. In some cases 

the IGs trained new young MPs on the spot on how to regulate road 

traffic, developing the maxim: "In inspecting on roads, nothing must be 

done to interfere with the progress of the march, but an inspector can 

question all he likes at the various halts."55 

Despite improvements wrought by much effort, traffic control 

remained a problem until the shooting stopped. The enduring practical 

problems were exemplified by those confronting the 2d Division during its attack in the first week of November. The division TG and 

provost marshal thought they had implemented a well-conceived plan. 

They trained division MPs and placed them along all of the unit's main 

routes and at every key point. They discovered, however, that seven 

other divisions were using the same roads and, generally, refused to 

obey 2d Division personnel who were trying to keep order. Nearly 

three days passed before the V Corps responded to requests for additional MPs. The new men arrived without briefings, maps, or information sufficient to do their job. With the division forced to divert the 

equivalent of a company to assist in tra·ffic control, the division IG 

rated traffic flow as the major problem the unit faced because of its 

effect on the conduct of the battle and the crisis it imposed once more 

on medical evacuation.56 

Indeed, throughout the Meuse-Argonne the effect of traffic problems on evacuation was tragic. Ambulances took as long as ten hours 

to make a short trip back to the field hospitals, and casualties arrived in 

poor condition. On some, wounds were not dressed, going unattended 

for almost two days; on others, tourniquets on injured limbs had shut 

off the blood flow for so long that the limbs could not be saved. Tie-ups 

5

' Taggart Daily Rpt (first quotation), 7 Oct 18, Entry 590, RG 120, NARA; Lewis, 

"Short Account," second quotation, OTIG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH). 

$0 Rpt, Lay to IG, AEF, 14 Nov 18, and Llr, Lay to Baer, 16 Nov 18, Entry 590, RG 

120, NARA. 

217 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

were so bad that it was not unusual for litter-bearers to be forced to 

carry the wounded 5 mi les before they could find an ambulance. As 

reported by the 79th Division 10, one ambulance team spent fifteen 

hours traveling just 4 miles. Major Henry estimated that hundreds of 

deaths resulted from the delays imposed by the massive congestion in 

his division area alone. 5

7 

The evacuation problems were compounded by the unexpectedly 

high number of casualties. Apparently, actuarial predictions had not 

factored in the consequences of inadequate training. Hence, insufficient numbers of medical personnel were available, despite the increase 

authorized after the lessons of the Aisne-Marne. To augment corpsmen, 

a number of divisions trained line personnel in first aid and made them 

available as litter-bearers whenever needed. But some corps forbade 

this practice, requ iring that ambulance personnel be used- a solution 

that shifted the evacuation problem without solving it. The number of 

medical corpsmen was never sufficient, and the additional strength 

increases urged by inspectors and surgeons did not go into effect until 

after the armistice. 

Another factor complicating evacuation was the nature of the battlefield itself. The stationary battle lines limited the recovery of casualties and extended their exposure to artillery fire, forcing them to 

seek refuge in trenches, shell craters, and similar positions for hours, 

sometimes days, until evacuation to battalion or regimental aid stations 

was possible. Artillery fire often prevented ambulances from moving 

forward to the regimental areas, which in turn added to the burden of 

the weary litter-bearers who had to trek even greater distances back to 

an ambulance station or an advanced dressing station. Army-level 

ambulance units and their French counterparts were brought in to help 

offset division and corps shortages. Nevertheless, the wounded frequently had to be hauled on primitive flatbeds, compounding their suffering. While some were fortunate enough to receive stabilizing care 

at the front, the average time from wounding to initial treatment at an 

aid station was five hours and then five to ten more hours for definitive care at an evacuation hospital. 58 

Minor medical problems helped to clog the system. In the newly 

arrived units a large number of evacuees identified as gas cases were 

found to be suffering more often than not from exhaustion or a virus. 

Yet some were lost to their units for long periods, even permanently. 

'

1 Henry Daily Rpts, 26- 30 Sep and I Oct 18, Entry 11 38, RG 120, NARA. 

sa Brewster Notes ... During Active Operations From 12 Sep 18 to II Nov 18, n.d. , 

Entry 268, RG 159, NARA. 

218 
THE AEF IN COMBAT 

After inspectors pointed out the problem, the policy was adopted of 

retaining all mild or indefinite cases at division aid stations until they 

could be diagnosed properly. In this way many evacuees were returned 

to their units after a few days' rest, which sustained unit strength and 

also discouraged malingering. The inspectors remained critical of the 

practice of placing convalescents into the general replacement pipeline, 

and some efforts were made to return them to their original units. 

However, this rarely could be done if an individual had moved all the 

way back to a base hospital. The lGs cited rigid evacuation policies as 

detrimental to morale and a serious manpower drain. 

The inspectors were also critical of several other medical practices. They cautioned against mobile medical units settling too firmly into permanent facilities and surgeons performing complex operations too far forward, in contravention to what was prescribed by regulations. They also emphasized the need for accurate treatment 

records, especially the proper use of diagnostic tags, noting some 

improvement toward the end of the fighting. IGs who visited base 

hospitals to evaluate the treatment given to casualties as they moved 

through the medical system found the care to be generally sound at 

every level. Administrative weaknesses, however, still required attention, such as safeguarding personal property and salvaging government equipment.59 

Burial of the dead was a worse problem in the Argonne than at St. 

Mihiel or along the Marne. As a result of the IG findings after the 

Aisne-Marne fighting, earnest efforts were made to improve the system. Various concepts were tried. For the St. Mihiel offensive most divisions had organized a squad of ten or more men, drawn from the 

reserve battalion in each regiment. Equipped with the necessary picks 

and shovels, the squads were attached to their respective regimental aid 

stations and placed under the supervision of their chaplains. The chaplains worked under the genera l supervision of the division burial officer, who was responsible to the division G- 1 in most cases. Designated 

"sub-inspectors" of cemeteries, they continued to supervise actual 

burials and graves identification and maintained burial records until 

picked up by Graves Registration Service personnel- a problem in 

itself, for they rarely appeared. The chapla ins also were responsible for 

collecting the personal effects of the deceased and moving them into 

quartermaster channels for return to the next of kin.60 

S9 Ibid. 

"" DA, HD, World War, 16:210 (GO 30, 1918, quoted word); Memo, Buxton to 

Burham, I 1 Sep 18, Entry 2144, RG 120, NARA. 

219 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Burial sites usually were located adjacent to civilian cemeteries. 

Each graveyard was for the use of a specific unit, which detailed to 

the site small burial teams organized from its reserve. If any Red 

Cross or YMCA members were attached to the division, they came 

under the supervision of the division chaplain, who assigned them 

wherever he felt they could be most useful in the identification and 

burial process. All of the burial teams were expected to bury dead animals and otherwise police the battlefield when not dealing with 

friendly and enemy dead. Even though the casualty total for St. 

Mihiel was not particularly high, problems persisted. A large number 

of isolated, unrecorded burials were made. In some cases mass graves 

were used in violation of policy. Too much was expected of the hardpressed chaplains, who could not supervise every aspect of the system as thoroughly as necessary.6

' 

Administrative problems added to their difficulties. A unit's casualty reports were often simply the surgeon's admission and disposition 

reports, which, of course, reflected only the injured in medical channels. Combat conditions and the swiftness of unit reliefs prevented a 

proper sweep of the battlefields, and new units coming in often inherited corpses from their predecessors. These problems caused the system to be altered for the Meuse-Argonne attack in late September, 

when it became apparent that the initial reforms could not handle the 

human and animal casualties. A company of pioneer infantry was 

detached from corps control and assigned to each division; at division, 

officer-led platoons were attached to each regiment. Each was 

equipped with digging implements, markers, and maps to record burial sites. The division sanitary inspector, a medical officer, was 

brought in to assist the burial officer and the chaplains in planning and 

supervising burial operations.62 

Even after these changes, the only area in which army and AEF 

inspectors noted any improvement was in the wearing of identity 

disks. Burying the dead promptly and properly eluded those responsible. The problem lay in the dual use of the pioneer infantry, who 

were expected to continue to perform the corps salvage mission as 

well as division burials. When they were performing the graves mission, salvage suffered; when the emphasis shifted to salvage, burials 

•• Memo, Hollis to Surg, 82d Div, I Ocr 18, Entry 2 144, RG 120, NARA; Brewster 

Notes . .. During Active Operations From 12 Sep 18 to II Nov 18, n.d., Entry 268, RG 

159, NARA. 

'" 82d Div File, Boxes 6563-65; Memo, Mcilroy to IG, AEF, 22 Oct 18, sub: Report 

of Inspection in Sector of 42d Division. Both in Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 

220 
THE AEF IN COMBAT 

suffered. Overall, burials continued to be haphazard. Inspectors at the 

front often reported seeing the same remains lying unattended at the 

same spot for several days. The situation was even worse with the 

remains of horses and mules.63 

The prolonged exposure of the dead led to the scandalous practice 

of corpse-robbing during the Argonne fighting. An extended investigation of the 28th Division was prompted by a 29 September letter to the 

AEF chaplain from one of the division chaplains, who wrote that he 

was having trouble identifying German and American remains because 

the bodies had been rifled; even identity disks had been taken as souvenirs. Only American troops had been in a position to commit these 

acts. General Brewster directed Lt. Col. James G. Mcilroy to investigate. Colonel Mcilroy interviewed the complaining chaplain and most 

of the division burial teams and also toured the area. He concluded that 

in two places within the division area several hundred German and 

American bodies had been robbed completely of all valuables and identification. Although unable to identify those responsible, Mcilroy 

judged that 28th Division personnel were unquestionably at fault and 

recommended that all citations for gallantry within the unit during the 

period 26 September-7 October be disapproved.64 

General Brewster largely agreed with Mcilroy's findings; however, 

he believed that such conduct was not limited to the 28th Division. 

Brewster estimated that 95 percent of the German and 50 percent of the 

American dead on the battlefield had been robbed. Rejecting the idea 

of denying valor awards, which punished the innocent as well as the 

guilty, he suggested that Pershing send only a letter of reprimand to 

Maj. Gen. Charles H. Muir, the division commander at the time of the 

incident. This was done on 29 October. Muir protested the findings, but 

a new investigation, carried out in February 1919, produced even more 

convincing evidence that the 28th Division was at fault.65 

The robbery of the dead by wandering troops was symptomatic of 

a growing problem of straggling, which began to plague the combat 

units almost from the beginning of the attack. The decline in frontline 

63 Rpt, Mcilroy to IG, AEF, 22 Oct 18, Entry 590; Buxton Daily Rpts, 8 and 14 Oct 

18, Entry 590; Memo, Brewster to CinC, AEF, 10 Nov 18, sub: Investigation 36th 

Division Burial of Dead, Entry 588; Memo, Brewster to CinC, AEF, 20 Nov 18, sub: 

lnvestigation 2d Division Burial of Dead, Entry 588. All in RG 120, NARA. 61 Rpt, Mcilroy to IG, AEF, 14 Oct 18, sub: Investigation Concerning Alleged 

Robbing of German Dead, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

"' Ibid.; Brewster Comments on Mcilroy Rpt, 18 Oct 18; Ltr, AG, AEF, to CO, 28th 

Div, 29 Oct 18, sub: Robbery of Dead; Weekly Rpts Extract, OIG, AEF, Feb 19; and 

Memo, Baer to CinC, AEF, 14 Oct 18. All in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA 

221 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

strength, caused by the unexpectedly high casualties, increased interest 

in retaining manpower by every means possible. The effect of straggler 

control requirements on inspectors may be seen in the experience of the 

37th Division IG, Lt. Col. Byron L. Barger. During the fighting at 

Montfaucon on 28 September, the division commander told Colonel 

Barger to drop everything else he was doing, to collect all the stragglers 

he could, and to get them to the front. 

As a result, Barger roamed the areas immediately behind the 

attacking regiments. At one time he gathered nearly 180 men, whom he 

organized into temporary squads and led forward to place under regimental control. He continued doing the same things each day the division was in the attack, forming groups that he occasionally turned over 

to military police but more often led forward himself. Dealing also with 

traffic problems as he moved about the battle area and subject to 

artillery and sometimes small-arms fire, he formed an impression of a 

frenzied situation on the edge of chaos.

66 

By mid-October straggling was a major discipline problem. Over 

I 00,000 men were estimated to be away from their units, some on proper business, others lost or shirking. General Liggett cracked down hard 

on the situation when he assumed First Army command, supported by 

Pershing who went so far as to authorize summary execution of anyone 

running away in combat. The AEF required all division inspectors to 

report what their w1its were doing to control straggling and keep men 

at the front. In some units military police were stationed at key crossroads and sites, such as dumps and hospitals, where they gathered unattached men into groups and periodically escorted them forward. 67 

The 82d Division, operating in the Argonne Forest, embarked upon 

such a vigorous and elaborate straggler control program to cause the 

First Army to investigate. Shortly after becoming engaged, the division 

estimated that about 1,000 of its line troops were unaccounted for. The 

commander required a daily physical count. Military police circulated 

through all rear area facilities around villages, dugouts, and YMCA 

canteens; unit patrols swept from the division rear forward, picking up 

140 in the first two days. Many of the stragglers were truly lost. 

Whenever units moved at night, large numbers inevitably turned up 

missing the next day. Many of them, too, were replacements. Surprising 

numbers could barely speak English and had failed to understand their 

.., Ltr, Barger to CG, 37th Div, 14 Nov 18, sub: Accusation That I Pointed a Pistol at 

a Lieutenant in the Argonne Drive, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

•• CotTman, War To End All Wars, pp. 332- 33; Memo, Barker to Brewster, 14 Oct 18, 

sub: Report on Straggler Posts, Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 

222 
THE AEF IN COMBAT 

commanders' instructions on the location of the rallying points. The 

First Army investigator approved the system, judging that the division's 

vigorous actions to minimize straggling had given a false impression 

that an unusual problem existed. The 82d's approach so impressed 

Colonel Johnson and General Liggett at First Army that its program 

was recommended to other units.68 

The V Corps inspector also recommended that corps MPs begin a 

series of patrols in towns, around depots, and at YMCA and Red Cross 

canteens, because "stragglers, like fli es, require food and warmth." This 

earthy aphorism hinted at another problem indirectly shown by straggling: a breakdown in logistical support. Prompted by General 

Brewster, an I Corps investigation showed that some of the 77th 

Division stragglers actually were wandering in search of food. On 8- 9 

October over 100 soldiers, representing most of the un its in the 78th 

Division, straggled into the 82d Division rear headquarters, asking fo r 

food and saying that they had not eaten for two days or more. Rough, 

unshaven, and dirty, they had been trucked in to a replacement rendezvous and apparently forgotten. The 82d division IG talked with 

many and found them " intelligent and uncomplaining." He and the division provost marshal saw to their feeding and made arrangements to 

return them to the 78th, located more than 12 miles away.69 

Inspectors attributed such breakdowns in support to the inexperience and frequently low quality of unit logistical officers, whose positions were often a haven for the less competent officers in a line unit. 

Supply and transportation were particularly affected. Senior logistical 

officers were for the most part able, but their numbers were so few that 

their influence was fata lly diluted by the scale of operations. Logistical 

success was left to the poorly prepared temporary officers, and their 

experience was so limited that they accepted intolerable situations as 

necessary evils rather than trying to correct them. 

This attitude was especially noticeable in unit supply officers, who 

often contented themselves with submitting requisitions and then 

awaiting delivery. This passive approach and frequent unit moves led to 

extended delays, as depots tried to find units to arrange an issue. Those 

divisions with supply officers who searched out the depots and pursued 

•• Memo, Rice to IG, AEF, 18 Ocl 18, sub: Investigation of Straggling in 82d 

Division, Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 

.. Memo (quotation), Dallam to CG, 5th Army Corps, 24 Oct 18, sub: Report on 

Stragglers, Entry 1138; Ltr (quoted words), Buxton to IG, AEF, 9 Oct 18, sub: 

Condition ofTroops From 78th Division, Entry 590; Memo, Mc ilroy to Peck, 10 Nov 

18, sub: Stragglers, Entry 590. All in RG 120, NARA. 

223 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

their requests usually got what they needed. The main difficulty was 

finding the depot with the desired supplies. To ameliorate such conditions, inspectors suggested automatically issuing consumables, such as 

rations and fuel, without waiting for any requests. Items known to be 

rapidly consumed would be stockpiled closer to the front, but still under 

army or SOS control, without making them an extra burden for combat 

units lacking storage or transportation capabilities.70 

Since the chief difficulty in the system lay in a lack of coordination 

between the unit logistical and depot officers, First Army and Advanced 

Headquarters staffs used the IG daily reports to keep the depots current 

on shortages existing in each unit. The depots, in turn, dealt directly 

with the units. This ad hoc system evolved into a modified form of 

automatic supply in every class. The elimination of most requisition 

paperwork sped up the process as long as tactical unit logisticians could 

keep the inspectors informed of their needs. Eventually, ammunition 

resupply was managed the same way. 71 

Transport and Supply Problems 

Blame for supply problems by no means rested exclusively on the tactical units. Inspectors also found serious deficiencies in SOS policies, 

compounded by a lack of discipline and supervision. No SOS priority 

system existed for the issue of equipment; available items were handed 

out to whomever asked. Units in the combat zone received what they 

needed only if their requisitions coincided with what was on hand. The 

movement of supplies in the intermediate and advanced zones proved a 

serious problem, especially at the railheads. Complaints about lack of 

care in handling supplies, waste, and black-marketeering eventually led 

to an investigation by both field-army 1Gs.72 

A thorough inspection of army depots and railheads by the regulating officer responsible for field-army support resulted in the appointment of a railhead inspector. Assigned a vehicle, this inspector spent his 

entire time going from railhead to railhead identifying problems, expediting solutions, and training troops. He further identified incompetent 

officers for relief and generally kept the regulating officer informed. 

'

0 Ltr, Vestal to IG, AEF, 25 Apr 19, sub: Repo1t, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 11 Brewster Notes ... During Active Operations From 12 Sep 18 to J 1. Nov 18, n.d., 

Entry 26B, RG 159, NARA; Ltr, Elmore to IG, AEF, 25 Jun 19, sub: Report From 

Observations of AEF, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 72 Ltr, Johnson to IG, AEF, 22 Mar 19, sub: Information for Report on American E. 

F., Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

224 
THE AEF IN COMBAT 

This practice was so effective that it was soon duplicated throughout 

the Services of Supply.73 

Even with this oversight, the flow of supplies continued to be 

unsatisfactory because of the lack of coordination between SOS units 

and the field forces. Those responsible far to the rear were unaware of 

many of the difficulties affecting supplies moving forward to the 

front- such things as pilferage; rough or unsanitary handling of supplies, resulting in major waste; and the absence of salvage and storage 

facilities. Inspectors took it upon themselves to provide the information 

necessary for those in the system to implement corrective measures.'• 

Despite every effort, however, the logistical system could endure 

no further pressure. The attrition experienced in the Meuse-Argonne 

taxed all forms of supply and medical service to their limits. The rear 

areas were swept clean of men, animals, and vehic les in a "now or 

never" decision to sustain the offensive. Ammunition handling, engineer activities, and vehicle repairs slowly wound down because of the 

lack of people. The decision was a gamble, and the system was beginning to show signs of fata l stress at the time of the November armistice. 

The SOS would have been unable to sustain the units at the front if they 

had continued fighting at the levels of intensity characteristic of 

October and November.

75 

One of the problems encountered by the Salvage Service was unexpectedly high waste on the part of the American troops, rooted in a policy of tolerating reduced accountability because of combat losses. ln 

other cases, the absence of transportation forced units to abandon serviceable equipment when they were redeployed. Few combat o·fficers 

could be bothered over matters of salvage. Since none of the officers or 

men were held pecuniarily liable, quantities of usable equipment were 

discarded for convenience alone. Some threw away their clothes when 

they were dirty, knowing they could draw more with no questions 

asked, and others did the same with weapons.76 

The crisis in salvage and equipment was paralleled by an even more 

critical situation- the supply and care of animals, considered by 

" lbid.; Memo, Johnson to IG, AEF, 8 Nov 18, Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 

'" Ltr, Johnson to IG, AEF, 22 Mar 19, Entry 588; Memo, Johnson to lG, AEF, 8 Nov 

18, Entry 590. Both in RG 120, NARA. 15 James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775 1953, (Washington, 

D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966), p. 386; 

Johnson Hagood, The Services of Supply: A Memoir of the Great War (Boston: 

Houghton Miffiin Co., 1927), pp. 314-17 (quoted words, p. 314). 76 Llr, Ovenshine to IG, AE .. ~ 28 Mar 19, sub: Report; Llr, Elmore to IG, AEF, 25 

Jun 19. Both in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

225 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

Pershing to be "one of the biggest, if not the biggest problem" in 

France. A total of 243,360 horses were issued to the AEF, a ratio of 

about I horse to 8 men. They represented the Army's basic transportation unit at the time. Initially, the animals were shipped from the States; 

then the French undertook to supply horses, many of which, however, 

proved to be in poor condition. Their condition and the ignorance of 

most of their American handlers promised a disaster. When it became 

apparent that the French could not fill AEF requirements, horses again 

were procured from the States during the period November 191 7 to 

April 191 8. Then other priorities stopped further shipments. Purchases 

in Spain and France could not offset the steady consumption of animals 

thereafter. Shortages became so critica l that some key units had to be 

motorized. At times, the allies loaned large numbers of animals so that 

AEF combat divisions could carry out essential deployments. 77 

Beginning in April 1918, the state of care and general condition of 

animals was made an item of special inspection interest. ln May 

General Winn of the SOS conducted an inspection of the entire 

Remount Service. At the time, he found conditions to be unsatisfactory, and a follow-up check in July revea led little improvement. Mange 

and other diseases, overwork, and frequent breakdowns in the supply of 

forage took their toll on the health of most of the livestock. Many succumbed to sickness and died, while many others needed extended rest 

and recuperation before they could go back into service. The largest 

part of the problem lay in the continued disregard by officer and soldier 

alike of the rudiments of animal care. Inspectors tried to change conditions in the ir units through informa l training programs; however, as 

they had fea red, the marginal health of a large proportion of the livestock worsened during the fall offensives. This further deterioration 

was due primarily to continued poor care, the lack of supervision, and 

no command emphasis on standards.'s 

Greater command support for veterinarians soon brought change. 

As a rule, animal evacuation was carried out whenever appropriate. The 

Remount Service was more responsive, a llowing reasonably prompt 

replacement of animal losses. Remount officers were attached to each 

field army to expedite animal supply and to train personnel in proper 

n Memo, Hewitt to Surg, 82d Div, 31 Mar 19, Entry 2144, RG 120, NARA; Erna 

Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army: A Hist01y of the Corps, 1775- 1939 

(Washington, D.C.: Quartermaster Historian 's Office, Office of the Quartermaster 

General, 1962), p. 681 (Pershing's quoted words). 

'$ Brewster Notes ... During Active Operations From 12 Scp 18 to II Nov 18, n.d., 

Entry 260, RG 159, NAR/\. 

226 
THE AEF IN COMBAT 

animal care. Inspection of animal evacuation hospitals verified that rear 

area veterinary support was working well. IG observations led to the 

increase of veterinary unit strengths and to the authorization of sufficient rail transport for more efficient animal evacuation. By the end of 

November each field army and the Services of Supply had a senior animal inspector to educate everyone involved in the care, management, 

and administration of their livestock. Because of this intense effort, animal deaths were a rarity and diseases were fully under control by the 

end of February 191 9.79 

Replacement Flow 

Like the logistical system, the AEF manpower system teetered on the 

brink of disaster. U.S. forces sustained an estimated 35,000-45,000 

casualties in the first four days of the Meuse-Argonne attack. By early 

October the need for replacements was so great that two depot divisions 

and two newly arrived infantry divisions had to be broken up to fi ll the 

gaps in the line. Despite this expedient, shortages remained so severe 

that authorized unit strengths had to be reduced.80 

As a result, the movement of individual replacements and recovered casualties through the remaining depot divisions was accelerated. 

The speed with which the men were hustled into combat units during 

1918 was phenomenal. ln August, while visiting a hospital in Mars-surAllier, General Chamberlain encountered a soldier who told him that he 

had been drafted in May, sent to France in June, wounded in July, and 

then had his leg amputated and received his port call to the United 

States in August. By the time of the fall fighting, replacements were 

sometimes equipped, interviewed, and assigned in less than a day. 8' 

Even the earlier three- to four-day training sessions were curtailed 

in face of the urgent need for manpower at the front. Many replacements were held only a few hours at the Le Mans classification center 

to receive the rudiments of gas training. The center commander 

,.. Ltr, Johnson to TG, AEF, 22 Mar 19, Entry 588; Ltr, Woolfolk to COs, 15 Mar 19, 

sub: Inspection and Supervision Rc Animals and Transport, Entry 588; Lay, IG, 2d Div, 

Annual Rpt, I Mar 19, Entry 590; Memos, C. Helmick to IG, 2d Div, 24 and 28 Feb 19, 

Entry 590. All in RG 120, NARA. Sec also lntcrv, author with C. Helmick, 3 Feb 83, 

Inspector General Collection, MI-ll. 

.. Daniel R. Beaver, Newton D. Baker and the American War E.ffort. 1917- 1919 

(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), pp. 196, 202; John J. Pershing, My 

Experiences in the World 111-tr, 2 vols. (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1931), 

2:238. 

" Patterson Diary, II Aug 18, Entry 268, RG 159, NARA. 

227 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

requested that he be allowed to keep them an additional eight hours for 

basic rifle training, but GHQ AEF denied his request, stating that they 

were needed too urgently to allow any delay. By late September 

numerous inspectors were citing appallingly low levels of training 

among the replacements. General Brewster reported the situation to 

the AEF G- 3 and G- 5 and offered to investigate, but the staff was 

already aware of it, having directed the assignment of the replacements 

as a military necessity.J

2 

The poor quality of replacements was investigated, nevertheless, in 

order to measure the combat effectiveness of units at the front. One of 

the most notorious cases involved the 77th Division in late September. 

The 77th received about I ,250 replacements, men whom unit commanders described as "almost entirely uninstructed ... and very poorly disciplined." Of these, 850 were assigned to the division's 307th Infantry, 

which was at the time short some I ,500 soldiers. The replacements 

arrived the day before the 77th attacked in the Argonne. Company commanders reported that 90 percent of them had never fired a rifle, thrown 

a grenade, or undergone any kind of tactical drill; yet, because strength 

was so low, the regimental commander felt that they had to be 

employed. Company leaders encountered great difficulty in trying to 

keep these troops moving in rough terrain. They had to be herded from 

place to place and physically put into position. Each man had to be told 

what to do and when to do it. One battalion commander told an inspector that he learned in ta lking with the replacements that they had spent 

most of their time since being inducted traveling to France.83 

The stra in on junior officers was intense, as they tried to use such 

men without committing them to their own slaughter. Leaders were 

obliged to take more risks, increasing their own chances of becoming 

casualties. By October the replacements were arriving with so little 

trainjng that they could not be used at all. On the twelfth Brewster's 

office petitioned- although unsuccessfully- the AEF G- 1 to slow 

down the flow of replacements, to allow adequate time for them to 

undergo minimum training.84 

The replacement picture darkened with reports of a worldwide epidemic of influenza. Major Britton, writing about his voyage to France 

&I Hagood, Services of Supply, p. 291: MFR, Spinks, 14 Oct 18, Entry 588, RG 120, 

NARA. 13 Memo (quotation), Read to Spi11ks, II Oct 18; lntervs, Rich with Haughton, 6 Oct 

18, and Rich with Jenkins, 6 Oct 18. All in Entry 590, RG 120, NA RA. 

S< Memos, Read to Spinks, II Oct 18, and Baer to A Co IS, G- 1, AEF, 12 Oct 18, 

Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 

228 
THE AEF IN COMBAT 

in October, graphically portrayed the ravages of the epidemic on troopships. About 2,400 soldiers had set sail on a converted passenger liner. 

Thirty influenza cases appeared after the first day at sea. The number 

grew to sixty-four by the third day and to eighty-two by the fifth day. 

During this period ten cases of pneumonia also were reported. By the 

sixth day 19 soldiers had died, and topside cabins had to be converted 

into medical wards. Britton attributed part of the problem to the lack of 

thorough medical screening at embarkation; many of those who 

became ill were showing symptoms before they came aboard. His 

report not only described the growing medical crisis but also hinted at 

the condition of men and units rushed to the front on arrival in France. ss 

A case cited by Colonel Beeuwkes reflected both the urgent need 

to move troops and the too frequent disregard for their welfare. On the 

night of 7 October 1,700 replacements for the 79th Division were 

crowded into boxcars, about I 0 more per car than regulations prescribed. All were wet from a rainstorm. When they arrived at the division railhead on the tenth, 45 were transferred immediately to the hospital with flu or mumps; another 155 were hospitalized with flu within the next two days. Beeuwkes felt that the poor transportation 

arrangements helped to incubate the disease and, even more critical, 

that the men were now carriers, spreading influenza where it had not 

existed before.86 

Culling the Officer Corps 

Unfortunately, the condition of the troops was not improved by an able 

commissioned officer corps. A variety of problems in officer procurement and promotion brought many unsatisfactory individuals to the 

AEF, and the situation was worsened by the arbitrary relief of able men 

because of personality clashes and other difficulties unrelated to combat efficiency. At Pershing's order, the inspectorate became deeply 

involved in assessing officer efficiency and the pace of senior officer 

reliefs quickened greatly as the levels of combat rose in the fall of 19 18. 

Numerous postwar writers described General Pershing's policy as 

" ruthless." The AEF commander wanted dynamic leaders, tactically 

proficient and decisive, who also were strong disciplinarians. If an 

officer faltered or did not produce quick results, he was finished . 

., Rpt, Britton to CG, Base Area (Sec) 3, SOS, 19 Oct 18, sub: Observations 

Concerning Embarkation and Transport of Troops During Epidemic of Influenza, Entry 

26, RG I 59, NARA. 

"' Memo, Bccuwkcs to 10, AEF, 12 Oct 18, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

229 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Between I September and 20 November 1918 General Brewster's 

office dealt with the cases of 152 relieved officers, 33 of whom were 

generals. In the first week of October alone, Pershing fired four 

brigade commanders. The summary relief of so many key people was 

characterized by Maj. Gen. William G. Haan, the 32d Division commander, as an "epidemic" conducted by the high command with little 

justification, and the demoralizing effects at battalion and regimental 

levels were severe. 

87 

The situation almost went out of control. Following perfunctory 

investigations by division IGs, the administrative system took over, 

hustling the hurt and bewildered officers to a camp at Blois. As a result, 

the AEF chief of staff directed General Brewster to make the Advanced 

Headquarters IG office the controlling point for all such investigations, 

bringing those done at corps or at GHQ under its purview. Brewster and 

Baer immediately screened all IG levels to gather the cases under way 

and to identify any others needing action. By 15 October they had built 

a complete roster of all generals relieved in the AEF si nce its activation. 

Beginning 6 November, relieved officers were notified by wire and 

held at their senior headquarters until interviewed by an inspector. In 

this way, just before the armistice a semblance of order was restored to 

the unseemly sacking of the AEF leadership.88 

Yet administrative attrition continued to be high until the end of 

hostilities. The stultifying effect of the ruthless policy adopted by 

Pershing unquestionably limited initiative. More tangibly, the movement of senior personnel impaired cohesion and damaged unit efficiency. The summary relief of so many senior officers was cited by 

inspectors as doing more harm than good, especially when it was discovered later that some had been cashiered UJ1deservedly. Many others 

were fired for h·ansient difficulties that might, in the long run, have led 

to their becoming better commanders. But men were given no latitude 

to learn. The VI Corps TG, Col. Samuel C. Vestal, summed up cogently: "The famous fighting units of past history were not made up of conCotTma , War To End All Wars, pp. 330-3 1 ("ruthless" on p. 330). See also Box 

2260, Officers Relieved, Entry 6; Fi le 406, Relief Investigations, Entry 588; and Ltr 

("epidemic"), 1-Taan to CotS, AEF, II Mar 19, sub: Morale of Troops, Entry 15. All in 

RG 120, NARA. 

'8 Memo, A. W.B. to Baer, 9 Oct 18. Entry 588; Memo. Spinks to ACofS, G 5, AEF, 

12 Oct 18, Entry 590; Ltr, Baer to Spinks, 18 Oct 18, Entry 590; Memo, IG, Ill Army 

Corps, to [blank] Oiv Insp, 14 Oct 18, Entry 590: Memo, 13rewster to CofS, AEF, 23 

Oct 18. sub: Relief of Officers, and Replies, 25 Oct and 3 Nov 18, Entry 590; and Ltr, 

AG, AEF, to IG, AEF, 6 Nov 18, sub: Relief of General OfTiccrs, Entry 590. All in RG 

120. NARA. 

230 
THE AEF IN COMBAT 

stantly changing personnel ... transferred into them one day out the 

next, and when the history of this war shall have been written, the same 

things will be found true."89 

The impact of officer turbulence on the already shaky discipline of 

the force was reported by inspectors every day. The operations of late 

191 8 exposed the high degree of inexperience and little knowledge that 

characterized the officer corps as a group. Inspectors agreed in their 

final reports that poor discipline, limited training, and ofTicer turnover 

were constant concerns and formed the root of most of the other problems they observed. The men's good character could not compensate 

for the lack of discipline and experience. Leadership deficiencies had 

to be "made up by using men in greater numbers with consequent 

greater losses."90 Cumulatively, IG reports reflected the woefully low 

levels of competence throughout the American forces, which achieved 

success largely through the bravery of the soldiers. Victory was gained 

by the sacrifice of good men, often poorly led, who had had no opportunity to learn how to soldier and survive. 

•• Ltr (quotation), Vestal to IG, AEF, 25 Apr 18, sub: Report; Ltr, llaskcll to IG, AEF, 

5 Apr 19, sub: Report on Operation of the IGD in France. Both in Entry 588, RG 120, 

NARA . 

.. Rpt, Brewster to CinC, AEF, n.d., Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

231 

7 

From War to Peace 

By agreement between the allies and the German government, an 

armistice went into effect at 1100 hours, 11 November 1918. Division 

inspectors moved through their units, making sure the cease-fire was 

being observed. In some cases, providing the proper instructions to 

the fighting men proved to be difficult; some units of the 2d and 89th 

Divisions continued hostilities for an hour or more after I I 00. All 

such events were documented, to counter any German charges of 

armistice violations.' 

Armistice Aftermath 

Once the cease-fire was in effect, American divisions established 

examining posts to assist returning French refugees and allied prisoners of war, delivered by truck to the allied lines and released. There the 

liberated prisoners were organized, interrogated, and evacuated via 

proper channels. Field army inspectors checked procedures and made 

sure that the troops understood their duties. However, ten days of intensive inspections and visits to various division headquarters were 

required before the system ran satisfactorily.2 

With the end of the fighting, inspectors at all levels saw old duties 

replaced with new ones. Their burden of camouflage and light-discipline requirements was removed. But because lapses in troop discipline 

' Edward M. Cotfman, The War To End AI/ Wars: The American Military Experience 

in World War I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 355; Oliver L. Spaulding, 

The Second Division: American Expeditionmy Force. in Fmnce. 1917 /919 (New 

York: Historical Commission, Second Division Association, 1937), p. 224. 1 Rpts, IGs, lsi and 2d Army, to IG, GIIQ, AEF, 11- 22 Nov 18, subs: Patrol and 

Examining Posts for Receiving Returning Prisoners of War, Entry 590, Record Group 

(RG) 120, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C. 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

were expected in the aftermath of the armistice, they now had to be 

alert for signs of trouble and to take immediate corrective measures. 

The IGs also were to include in their reports their views on how to 

maintain discipline.3 

One immediate problem was fraternization with the enemy. The 

practice was strictly forbidden, and inspectors were required to include 

in their reports their suggestions on how to prevent it. But issuing the 

order proved to be easier than enforcing it. Colonel Ovenshine, inspecting division outposts in the center of the Second Army front on 12 

November- the morning after the armistice-found German troops 

panhandling for food inside the 28th Division lines. At one outpost he 

encountered a crowd of forty Americans and even more Germans 

laughing, talking, and exchanging souvenirs. While he was there, several groups of Americans were seen returning from the German lines. 

None of the sentries carried their rifles. Neither the guards nor the other 

Americans k11ew of any fraternization prohibitions; the guards had 

been given no special instructions. The troops reluctantly complied 

with the inspector's orders to break up their gatherings and remove the 

Germans from the American lines.4 

Colonel Ovenshine found the same situation in the adjacent sector 

held by the 33d Division. Officers in charge of various outposts 

claimed to have received no guidance, and they were doing nothing to 

prevent the former enemies from mixing. Nearly everywhere guards 

went unarmed. A German officer approaching an outpost under a flag 

of truce was not noticed until Ovenshine called attention to him. 

Division inspectors seemed to be making little effort to inform the 

troops of their duties, as required by Genera l Brewster at Advanced 

Headquarters and General Spinks at General Headquarters (GHQ). 

Ovenshine brought the problem to the attention of the respective division chiefs of staff. He also briefed the Second Army commander, 

General Bullard, who directed his own chief of staff to assure that the 

nonfraternization policy was disseminated properly.5 

The apparent failure of unit inspectors to monitor nonfraternization 

might be explained at least in part by the press of more familiar duties. 

Investigations begun before the cease-fire had to be concluded properly, and command problems, burial of the dead, cases of POW abuse, 

and the animal inspection program demanded their attention. General 

' Memo, Johnson to Corps lnsps, l 0 Nov 18, Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 

• Memo, Ovenshine to Brewster, 12 Nov 18, sub: Daily Report oflnspector General, 

2d Army, Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 

s Ibid., and 15 Nov 18, same sub, Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 

234 
fROM WAR TO PEACE 

Pershing also ordered a special investigation into casualty reporting, in 

an attempt to correct the questionable existing reports. But combat 

deaths continued to be discovered and reported well into December. 

Complicating the picture was a reorganization that caused the strong 

hand of Brewster's office to re lax temporarily. 6 

As the Advanced Headquarters prepared to move forward into occupied Germany, all IG personnel briefly returned to Chaumont as, once 

again, GIIQ AEF became the focal point of all inspection activities. 

Colonels Baer and Mcilroy moved with a more streamlined Advanced 

Headquarters to Trier, where they served as IG liaison between GHQ 

and the occupation forces, forwarding daily reports on their observations for the use of Pershing and his staff. Meanwhile, Brewster's AEF 

inspectors continued to oversee items of interest to Pershing, such as 

senior officer conduct. Most of their efforts, however, were directed to 

problems affecting the withdrawal of the AEF from Europe, which 

necessitated a series of trips to the seaports involved. Another area of 

concern was the care and evacuation of wolmded and sick. In January 

1919 the AEF inspectors checked all convalescent camps, hospitals, 

hospital trains, and hospital ships in France. During subsequent months 

they concentrated on medical facilities and embarkation centers. They 

maintained such a rigorous schedule until Pershing and Brewster were 

satisfied that the system was working well. 7 

Beginning in December 1918, the AEF's IG office began to refer 

increasing numbers of cases requiring investigation to the commands 

where the incidents occurred. As a result of the growing work load, additional officers were attached to IG offices at all levels. Field army inspectors took the lead in matters directly affecting their organizations, such as 

monitoring troop discipline and animal care. The quality of life for the 

troops was a pressing concern, as the First Army IG, Colonel Johnson, 

made plain. Many of the troops in his command were in poor health, still 

living in the crudest field conditions, and lacking both the leadership and 

the discipline that were needed to improve their lot. Johnson predicted a 

major scandal unless inspectors took action. He believed that they should 

become directly involved in training battalion-level officers in the elementary tasks of caring for their men and strongly pressed for a vigorous 

effort to ameliorate the appalling conditions he describcd.8 

• Memos, Brewster to CinC, AEF. 20 Nov and 10, 31 Dec 18, Entry 588; Memo, 

Johnson to IG, AEF, 21 Nov 18, Entry 590. All in RG 120, NARA. 7 File 406, IG, AEF, Selected Schedules, I Jan- 31 May 19, Entry 588, RG 120, 

NARA. 

• Ibid.; Ltr, Johnson to Spinks, 23 Dec 18, Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 

235 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Organizational Inspections and Reports 

In 1918, while serving as a corps and army inspector, Colonel Johnson 

observed that several divisions had established their own extensive 

internal inspection systems to supplement the activities of their overworked assigned inspectors. In one regiment of the 26th Division the 

executive officer also functioned as the "organization inspector," monitoring all unit supply and administrative matters. The 42d Division also 

formally set up a similar practice as early as May 1918. The division 

commander required that each subordinate unit appoint an experienced 

officer- usually the unit's executive officer- to function as the organization inspector. The latter's supervision rested with the division 

inspector, who held weekly conferences to answer questions, give 

instructions, and discuss issues of current concern. As a result, in this 

atmosphere of cooperation and uniform practices, division problems 

were identified and solved quickly.9 

Colonel Johnson, at the time the I Corps IG, was favorably impressed 

by the system and recommended it to other senior-level inspectors, some 

of whom were reaching similar conclusions from their own experiences. 

The IV Corps IG, Colonel Carpenter, wrote to the AEF's IG office in 

August 1918, tu·ging adoption of a similar system tlu·oughout the AEF. 

He had observed inspection systems in nine different divisions as they 

came under the IV Corps' control. rn some, inspection was systematic 

and well organized; in others, haphazard and limited. Carpenter felt that 

unjform inspection practices throughout his corps were essential to efficiency and discipline. A method already existed: AEF Bulletin No. 44, 7 

July 1918, required that an officer in each regiment and separate smaller 

unit be made responsible for all administrative and logistical matters in 

the unit, in order to give commanders more time to lead their units. 

Carpenter judged that making these officers the equivalent of the 42d 

Division's organization inspectors would be a simple matter of modifying the existing bulletin. The imminence of the St. Mihiel attack prevented implementation of Carpenter's idea at the time. However, his proposal kept the concept prominent among senior inspectors.10 

Thoughtful about the expected decline in troop discipline and the 

demonstrated inexperience of junior leaders, Colonel Johnson, now the 

9 Memo (quoted words), Johnson to CotS, AEF, n.d.; 42d Div, AEF, Memo 165, 4 

May 18, and Memo 191, 30 May 18; Memo, Jenkins to Insp. I st Army Corps, 19 May 

18. All in Entry 799, RG 120, NARA. 

•• Memo, Johnson to CotS, AEF, n.d., Entry 799; Ltr, Carpenter to Spinks, 26 Aug 

18, Entry 588. Both in RG 120, NARA. 

236 
FROM WAR TO PEACE 

First Army IG, sought to revive the concept in a more comprehensive 

form. On 10 November he proposed that AEF policy require an officer 

in every unit, from the battalion level upward, be designated to serve as 

the organization inspector to monitor conditions affecting discipline. 

As a group, they would become part of a coordinated inspection chain, 

extending from their level up to GHQ AEF. Johnson's subordinate IGs 

favored the idea, as did Generals Brewster and Pershing.

11 

Johnson's scheme became policy in the First Army's General 

Order 38, issued on 24 November 1918. The formal order mandated 

not only the appointment of an officer in each regiment, battalion, and 

company to assist the commanders in developing "soldierly qualities" 

but also weekly regimental-level meetings of the officers, with the 

division inspector in attendance. A sixteen-page questionnaire, which 

covered activities within the unit area- such as kitchens, latrines, and 

billets-and, of growing concern to commanders, more sensitive 

issues of animal care and motor transport, was attached as an enclosure. The elementary nature of the questions reflected Johnson's low 

opinion of leadership at small-unit levels. Inspectors were expected to 

find out if mess sergeants could cook, if troops were using proper 

latrines, and if soldiers were being required to bathe. Weapons were to 

be examined for rust and the stables checked to ensure that the horses 

were being fed regularly. 12 

The officers designated under General Order 38 usually were the 

executive officers or adjutants, who were to be trained or at least 

assisted by the division inspector and his staff. The concept called for 

having the respective chain of command involved to the greatest extent 

possible in detecting and correcting unit problems. Since division IGs 

hitherto had been encountering the same or similar deficiencies 

repeatedly, Johnson believed that the new approach would give commanders the information and motivation necessary to stop the cycle of 

recurring defects. The plan was based ultimately on establishing a 

thoroughgoing system of responsibility from the NCO level upward, 

and training unit NCOs in the new standards and requirements was to 

be the first step. Ideally, Johnson hoped that IGs eventually would 

become teachers and observers of those doing the actual checking, 

freeing them to concentrate on major problems rather than revisiting 

the minor ones again and again. 13 

'

1 Note, Johnson to Brewster, with Baer comment and encl., I 0 Nov 18, Entry 590, 

RG 120, NARA. 

'

2 First Army, AEF, GO 38, 24 Nov 18, OTIG files, Pentagon (SAfG-ZXH). 13 Ibid. 

237 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

The ultimate goal was to make the chain of command function as 

it should, by giving commanders the chance to make their own corrections rather than receive endless adverse reports from outsiders. 

Close supervision by the inspection chain was necessary, however, 

until unit personnel gained confidence and experience. Each regimental commander was briefed on the factors that indi cated good or 

poor discipline, such as sanitation and appearance. In turn, he and his 

organization inspector, with IG help, were expected to train their subordinate leaders. The IGs assisted as required, discussing the purpose 

of the inspection with junior leaders and pointing out ways of correcting deficiencies. 1

'

1 

General Liggett, commanding the First Army and later the Third 

Army, stressed to division commanders and their IGs that the key to the 

system's success was the quality of the unit personnel selected and the 

degree of supervision given them. Some units saw General Order 38 as 

an opportunity to offset the inexperience of their officers by making 

nearly all of them an expert in something. Assistants to the organization 

inspector were appointed, and each developed expert knowledge in one 

or two areas of concern. The result was a marked improvement in unit 

conditions and attitudes as many officers, for the first time, became 

aware of War Department and AEF requirements. The scheme was 

embellished in some divisions by rotating the topical responsibilities 

among unit officers, gradually broadening their understanding and 

expanding their expertise. 

Implementation of the new program, however, was slow. Johnson 

reported that few concrete changes had taken place by mid-January 

1919. The high-quality officers needed to make the program work often 

were not appointed. Some officers proved reluctant to exercise their 

authority to correct deficiencies. As Johnson bitterly wrote, "There is a 

more conscientious effort on the part of the average enlisted man to 

properly perform his duties than is apparent in some officers." In other 

cases, unit commanders failed to give the program the support it needed to be successful. Although inspection reports showed that most units 

were making efforts, 90 percent of the deficiencies noted were the same 

old recurring ones. Nevertheless, many people proved amenable to 

instruction, and Johnson told subordinate inspectors to make their visits into training sessions to help junior leaders understand what was 

expected of them. 

15 

" Ltrs, Johnson to Dallam, 28 Dec 18, and Johnson to IG, AEF, 22 Mar 19, sub: 

Information for Report on American E. F., Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

'

5 Memo, Johnson to Corps lnsps, 15 Jan 19, Entry 1138, RG 120, NARA. 

238 
fROM WAR TO PEACE 

Johnson's own role consisted primarily in briefing division and corps 

commanders on the value of the system. In his opinion, gaining the major 

commander's support and training the unit inspectors so that they could 

train others knowledgeably and tactfully were critical. He shared with 

Colonel Dallam ofV Corps his positive experiences with division commanders, many of whom offered to support their inspectors' efforts to 

implement an effective system. ln one case, a division commander 

promised his inspector as many assistants as he needed. Johnson urged 

the corps inspectors to carry on a steady program of senior-officer education to assure ever-widening support for the developing program.16 

In the V Corps Colonel Dallam personally conducted classes for 

inspectors in all corps units and other units that were tenants within the 

corps area. He briefed commanders on the meaning and intent of the 

new inspection program and agreed to an arrangement intended to 

reduce the danger of over-inspection. The corps G-3 kept a roster of all 

staff officers making inspections, including the IG. The object was to 

have every division in the corps visited daily by someone from the 

headquarters. Colonel Dallam saw this rule as a limit on his flexibility, 

but went along with it in the name of harmony and to sustain the evident command interest in promoting the inspection program. As he told 

Colonel Johnson, "Keeping everlastingly at it brings success."17 

Outside the First Army, old problems festered. When Colonel Baer 

led an AEF team on a routine inspection to the 32d Division in midFebruary 1919, the inspectors encountered numerous small problems, 

especially in the so-called discipline indicators; apparently, the division 

IG had not been performing as required. Other inspectors made the mistake of confusing carping with constructive criticism and suggestions 

with commands. Ciiticism without correction too often led to demoralization and resentment, defeating the whole purpose of the program. Baer 

admitted in May that "young and inexperienced inspectors who delighted to show off by giving orders to their seniors or by running in, making 

notes and running away without acquainting the commanding officer of 

the mistakes noted, occasioned much irritation and adverse criticism."'8 

'

6 Ibid. 

" Memos, Dallam to IG, First Army, 16 (quotation) and 19 Jan 19, and Dallam to 

G- 1, V Corps, 22 Jan 19, sub: Conference, Entry 1138, RG 120, NARA. 

" Memo, Baer to CG, 3d Army Corps, 7 Feb 19, sub: Inspections, Entry 590; Memo, 

Baer to Brewster, 7 Feb 19, sub: Inspection of 32d U.S. Division Stationed With 

11eadquarters at Ringsdorf, Entry 590; Memo, Baer to IG, AEF, II Feb 19, Entry 590; 

and Ltr, 1-faan to CoS, AEF, II Mar 19, sub: Momlc ofTroops, Entry 15. All in RG 120, 

NARA. See also Ltr (quotation), Baer to IG, USA, 8 May 19, sub: Personal Service in 

the Inspector General's Department, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

239 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

The frustrations from this sort of inspection can easily be imagined. Unquestionably, some IGs showed more zeal than sense while 

making inspections, creating bitterness towards inspectors and the 

Inspector General's Department (IGD) in a generation of officers. 

Senior commanders were angered. In March 1919 Maj. Gen. John L. 

Hines, then commanding II Corps, wrote to General Pershing, 

expressing his resentment of developments in the inspectorate. He 

disliked the growth of Brewster's oversight and the proliferation of 

inspectors. He disapproved of their authority to give orders, rather 

than simply to inspect and report their findings. Hines said he feared 

that if the trend continued there would be "a usurpation of functions 

of the General Staff." His view was shared by several other senior 

officers who would carry their dislike into postwar reorganization 

debates. 19 

General Pershing believed that most of the shortcomings coming to 

his attention were due to inexperience and a "want of instruction," not 

intentional neglect. He saw the inspectors' main role as training and 

instructing the units they visited, for they "had exceptional opportunities for imparting useful information and instruction," and he urged that 

they establish a good relationship with young officers and NCOs to 

allow the easy flow of information. He cautioned that criticisms should 

always be accompanied by explanations and remedial suggestions, 

judging that by the "exercise of courtesy, tact and patience, inspectors 

would be welcomed, even sought." Directed to implement Colonel 

Johnson's First Army program in the other two field armies, Brewster 

sent his inspectors a letter, in which he summarized Pershing's views 

and to which he attached a copy of the First Army's General Order 38 

reissued as an unnumbered AEF pamphlet. Brewster warned: "The 

prestige of the department and of inspectors depends entirely on the 

personality of the inspectors."20 

Some problems remained. The periodic reports, although 

changed from daily to once every ten days, continued to be required 

so long as General Pershing was in Europe. The continuing problems 

of discipline and control prompted GHQ AEF to attempt to use the 

reports to fix responsibility for the failures noted by inspectors. Maj. 

Gen. James W. McAndrew, the AEF chief of staff, wanted the reports 

to do more than to indicate general conditions: "We want to know 

where the fault lies." This, of course, would have destroyed the deli-

'

9 Memo, Hines to CinC, AEF, 16 Mar 19, Entry 15, RG 120, NARA. 20 Ltr (Pershing quotations), Brewster to IGD, AEF, Offs, I 8 Feb I 9, Entry 588, RG 

120, NARA. 

240 
fROM WAR TO PEACE 

cate relations of helpful confidentiality being built under General 

Order 38.21 

Colonel Baer at the Advanced Headquarters IG office in Trier successfully resisted the requirement. l-Ie pointed out that the purpose of 

the reports was only to give impressions and to record corrections or 

improvements made. Many were extracts from reports made by inspectors for their own commanders. Time would be needed to accord blame 

in what essentially would be a small investigation, and the delay would 

erode the greatest value of the reports, which was their timeliness. 

Gross irregularities already were investigated as a matter of course, and 

Baer proposed to keep the headquarters more fully informed on such 

investigations. His proposals were accepted, and the reports were modified accordingly.22 

Beginning in February, all irregularities cited in the periodic 

reports had to be corrected at the proper unit level. The local inspector 

and one superior were required to monitor the situation until rectified 

and the army inspector to maintain overs.ight on the progress of any corrections. Issues beyond the control of subordinate units and IGs were 

the responsibility of the army inspector. Some he referred to other army 

elements. Most, however, were personnel and supply matters, for example, complaints about rest billets and the distribution of bloodstained 

clothing from salvage units, which the army IG referred to the Services 

of Supply (SOS) after coordinating with the G- 1 and G-4. Problems of 

an overlapping nature, such as coordinating with railroads to synchronize troop leave with train schedules, received the attention of the army 

IG himself because of his connections and comprehensive views.23 

The monthly discipline report continued to be required. As of 

March 1919, army inspectors also included comments on what the local 

IG and other officers in the command had done to improve the morale 

of the h·oops. By then the report had become a formatted survey, which 

could be filled in within a few minutes. Its major topics were officers' 

duties, courts-martial, sanitation and health, training, and general discipline (including morale). The perfunctory aspects of the form appar21 Memo, Spinks to All lOs, II Dec 18, Entry 590; Telg (quotation), McAndrew to 

ACofS, Adv Hq, Treves [Trier}, 5 Jan 19, EntJ"Y 590; Ltr, Gordon to Johnson, 20 Dec 

18, Entry 799. All in RG 120, NARA. 22 Memo, Conger to IG, AEF, 5 Jan 19; Memo, Baer to ACofS, Adv Hq, 7 Jan 19; 

and Memo, Baer to 10, 2d Army, 10 Jan 19, sub: Daily Reports. All in Entry 590, RG 

120, NARA. 

l) Memo, Johnson to IG, AEF, 23 Feb 19, sub: Action on 10-Day Reports, Entry 590, 

RG 120, NARA. 

24 1 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

cntly minimized its value, considering the amount of work it represented. Nevertheless, General Pershing wanted to see the report, along with 

summaries of the periodic reports, and his marginalia and requests to 

Brewster and Spinks for more information are evidence that he perused 

them scriously.

24 The commander-in-chief's effort to exert control 

through his inspectors remained as strong as ever. 

Complaints and Grievances 

The underlying cause of many of the problems faced by inspectors was 

a general deterioration of morale among the American forces that 

resulted, not from specific failings, but from the armistice itself. The 

decline manifested itself in a general slackening of discipline and 

responsiveness on the part of the soldiers. "Men were not as willing to 

suffer as they were in the movement forward. Their packs grew heavy, 

their shoes hurt their feet."25 

The troops had expected to defeat the Germans on the field of battle, and a sense of anticlimax followed the cease-fire. Personal problems suddenly seemed more pressing, and complaints at all levels 

became more numerous. rnspectors attempted to compensate by paying 

more attention to morale issues, such as rations, pay, and mail. But in 

the atmosphere of disillusionment and homesickness other issues 

loomed large. An order to stop all promotions on the day of the 

armistice upset many soldiers, especially those recommended for 

advancement because of their demonstrated performance on the job. A 

powerful incentive was withdrawn at one blow. At the same time, both 

officers and men complained bitterly about the excessively rigorous 

training program launched after the armistice, which in their view no 

longer had any purpose.26 

The high command, on the other hand, believed that the deteriorating state of discipline justified the extensive training program. The 

armistice was seen at first as just that- a break in the hostilities rather 

than the end. It apparently was a godsend to those who had observed 

the AEF disintegrating in the Argonne, giving them another chance to 

transform what seemed little better than an armed rabble into a manageable force. Thus the program was adopted both to sustain disci-

" Memos, Spinks to Insps, 28 Mar 19; Memo, Spinks to Sec, GS, AEF, 5 Apr 19; 

and Memo, Spinks to CinC. AEF, 10 Jun 19. All in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

:; David Lewis, "A Short Account of My Experiences in the American 

Expeditionary Forces in France, 1918 1919," OTIG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH). 10 Ibid. 

242 
fROM WAR TO PEACE 

pline and to provide the training most American soldiers had never 

been offered.27 

But as the weeks passed and the likelihood of renewed hostilities 

diminished, resentment of the training program grew steadily. Most 

men had no objection to "a reasonable schedule of disciplinary drills 

and exercises" to keep them busy, but they had little tolerance for the 

rigorous program required by their leaders. Raymond Fosdick, now 

General Pershing's special assistant for morale, labeled the program as 

the biggest morale problem in the AEF. The policy, in his view, failed 

to take into account the need for constructive recreation and the dissatisfaction of the soldiers in the aftermath of the armistice.28 

Although the troops had more sports and educational programs 

starting in early 1919, their living conditions remained poor and their 

commanders seemed indifferent. ln December 1918 Maj. Edward C. 

Sammons, the 79th Division inspector, asked General Spinks for assistance, describing the dreary existence being led by the men of the division: They drilled outdoors in the wet until darkness fell at about 1600 

and after supper sat around in their billets, with no lights and no heat, 

awaiting the next day. Reporting that the assigned YMCA representative was doing the best with what little he had, he petitioned Spinks to 

let the Red Cross and the YMCA know of the need for candles, reading 

matter, and indoor games. General Spinks complied, and the YMCA 

immediately sent the desired articles. Both agencies told Spinks that 

they assumed the 79th Division was not unique and began preparations 

to send similar items to other units requesting them. In retrospect, it is 

remarkable that an informal IG action was needed to obtain this kind of 

support, and even more surprising that the request did not originate in 

co1nmand cha1mels. 29 

For the soldier, redress of grievances was expected to be handled 

through military channels. Paragraph five of the 1913 regulations, still 

in effect, prohibited going outside Army command channels regarding 

such matters. Complaints written by soldiers directly to General 

Pershing were passed to Brewster's office for action. Many of the cases, 

"Collman, War To End All 1-Vars, p. 358. 

" Eli A. Helmick, "From Reveille to Rclrcat: Autobiography of Major General Eli 

1\. llc lmick," quotation, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.; 

Raymond B. Fosdick, Chronicle of a Generation: An Autobiography (New York: Harper 

and Brothers, 1958), pp. 180-82. 

,. Ltr, Sammons to IG, AEF, 14 Dec 18, sub: Morale ofTroops; Ltr, Spinks to Carter, 

YMCA, 16 Dec 18, and Reply, 21 Dec 18; and Ltr, Semans, ARC, to Spinks, 15 Jan 19. 

All in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

243 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

whatever the source, dealt with minor abuses of authority and were 

found to be justified. Disciplinary actions were taken against the complainants only when it could be verified that their chain of command 

had publicized proper grievance procedures. 

One case involved the many inductees who, after the armistice, sent 

unsigned letters to the newspaper Stars and Stripes in an effort to get 

some action on their complaints. Concerned with the pay problems and 

embarkation delays detailed in these stories, the AEF G- 2 section, 

which had staff supervision over the newspaper, collected the letters in 

January 1919 and sent them to the AEF's IG office, where each allegation was checked. General Brewster, upset that the soldiers should have 

chosen to seek redress through the newspaper, questioned the propriety 

of a semiofficial journal condoning their action by publishing the letters. Hence, he recommended disciplinary action against the anonymous writers, and every effort was made to identify them. 30 

A similar issue was raised when a group of officer patients at Base 

Hospital No. 44 sent a joint letter to the AEF's adjutant general, complaining about poor food. An SOS inspector eventually looked into the 

matter and concluded that the hospital was doing the best it could 

under the circumstances. Citing the officers' action as unmilitary and 

a violation of the regulation, he recommended that each signatory to 

the letter be told to submit only individual complaints through channels in the future. 31 

As a rule, inspectors attempted to handle complaints processed by 

soldiers through the chain of command as informally as possible, even 

those posing court-martial charges against their superiors. Most problems derived from the mutual inexperience of the complainant and his 

superior. Even when complaints were justified, the conditions encountered in tbe combat zone were usually beyond anyone's control, no matter how unsatisfactory. Whenever a valid grievance was found, it was 

corrected and the case referred to the AEF judge advocate general if 

necessary. Complaints passed to inspectors during a visit were resolved 

whenever possible on site. Any of a general nature, which was the usual 

case at hospitals and casual camps, where food and inprocessing were 

30 Memo, Nolan to CofS, AEF, 13 Jan 19; Memo, Thomas to IG, AEF, 15 Jan 19, 

sub: Complaints Received by the Stars and Stripes. Both in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

See also AReg 1913, par. 5. 

" Memo, AG, SOS, to CO, 18th lnf, 22 Jan 19, sub: Officers' Mess Base Hospital 

No. 44, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. The first time the lodging of complaints was condoned outside charu1els came afler the regulations were changed in January 1921. See 

AReg 20-10 ( 11 ), 1921. 

244 
fROM WAR TO PEACE 

frequent sources of soldiers' ire, the inspector would defer to local command channels.32 

Another source for complaints was information provided by officers. An example was an investigation in February 1919 of the Casual 

Officers Camp at Angers. A medical colonel on his way home wrote a 

description of his outprocessing experience to a colleague at GHQ AEF, 

who in turn showed it to a G-4 logistics officer. The latter then forwarded it to the AEF's IG office, with the comment that similar rumors 

were circulating about Angers. Shortly thereafter, Colonel Mcilroy verified the allegations: Officers languished for up to a month before 

securing homeward-bound transportation; discipline in the companygrade barracks was excessive; quarters were in an abandoned hospital 

complex, with ten to a room and the floor a sea of mud; venereal checks 

were mandatory regardless of grade; and there was even an officer punishment pen. Such humiliations compounded the indiscipline of many 

of the temporary officers, and virtually guaranteed postwar enmity 

toward the Army. Altl1ough a new commander was brought in to ameliorate conditions, the physical and organizational conditions were part 

of a greater problem pervading the Services of Supply.

33 

Complaints about conditions came from the civilian sector as 

well, lodged by friends and relatives of the soldiers. The Office of the 

Inspector General in Washington reviewed all submissions. Those 

that appeared to have substance were referred to the AEF for investigation, and the remainder were handled with a polite explanatory letter to the complainant. Inquiries from members of Congress generally went first to the Secretary of War and then to the Inspector General. 

Senator Joseph S. Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, as the head of a committee investigating the treatment of soldiers, was a particularly prolific source.

34 

Discharged soldiers also related stories to their hometown newspapers, which were often published in embellished form with no 

attempt at verification. Some issues raised in this way entered Army 

channels as a result of a congressional or War Department inquiry. 

Regardless of the source, each case was investigated. In a few 

n Ltr, Bacharach to Sotw, 26 May 19, sub: Investigation of William Miller Who 

Reported Mistreatment in Letter to His Sister; Ltr, Green to TAG, 26 Feb 19, sub: 

Complaint Against Officers. Both in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 33 Lewis, ''Short Account," OTIG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH); Ltr, Shirley to 

Philips, with encls., 26 Jan 19, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 34 Ltr, Miller to CG, Base Sec I [I), I 0 Apr 19, sub: Report of Investigation of Col. 

James K. Parsons on Letter of James King; Ltr, Frelinghuysen to Keppel, 18 Mar 19; 

and Ltr, Robert to PershiJlg, 3 Apr 19. All in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

245 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

instances a responsible editor might forward a proposed item prior to 

publication to either Secretary Baker or General Pershing himself. For 

example, the editor of the Chicago Tribune asked the AEF to look into 

a veteran's claim that hundreds of gas victims were dying because of 

deplorable hospital conditions at Le Mans. Hospital operations were 

investigated thoroughly; detailed statistics were gathered on admissions and deaths at all facilities in the huge hospital center; and disabilities, diseases, and lengths of treatment were tabulated. No evidence of any of the alleged mistreatment or abuse could be found. In 

fact, it was proven that only eleven gas casualties had died over the 

entire period. The accusations were labeled as being completely 

unfounded. This information was passed to the Tribune editor, whoperhaps weary of waiting- had published the spurious story a few 

days before learning the facts.35 

Welfare Organizations 

A major source of complaints was the civilian welfare organizations, 

especially the YMCA. Problems with their overseas activities had been 

simmering for some time. Jn the months following the outbreak of hostilities the YMCA and, to a lesser extent, the Red Cross increasingly 

became the objects of aversion and criticism, and by the time of the fall 

offensives in 1918 relations between the these two agencies and the War 

Department were decidedly cool. 

Before America's entry into the war in the spring of 19 17, the 

YMCA had its representatives in Europe working with the allied forces. 

At the recommendation of Edward C. Carter, who was in charge of the 

YMCA's overseas operations, several of them were diverted to support 

the first U.S. military contingents to arrive in France. In May a recreation center was opened in Paris. From this base the YMCA secured a 

foothold in AEF welfare activities, and, along with several smaller 

charitable groups, ultimately assumed responsibility for all such activities in the command. Unfortunately, this useful and indeed necessary 

support began to breed problems, for the organizations, having their 

own overhead and logistica l demands, competed- not cooperatedwith each other. Their uncoordinated work for the troops resulted in a 

chorus of complaints throughout 1918. The soldiers charged a lack of 

command support. The commanders, who viewed military morale and 

welfare as an Army problem, objected to the usurpation of their respon-

•s Memo, Burleson to IG, AEF, 5 May 19, sub: Investigation of Le Mans Area, Entry 

588, RG 120, NARA 

246 
FROM WAR TO PEACE 

"Y.M.C.A." The recreation tent was one of the YMCA s .few .field 

.facilities for the troops in France. 

sibilities. Some even complained that YMCA's practices were conducive to poor morale and indiscipline.36 

By November the complaints and criticisms led General 

Chamberlain to conclude that the civilian organizations could not sustain their operations indefinitely and that it was more appropriate for 

the Army to assume responsibility for the support of its own welfare 

and morale services. He advised inspectors overseas to be prepared to 

monitor the establishment of theaters and exchanges. He suggested in a 

letter to General Brewster that the issue be raised with Genera l 

l<l Jameson Ltr to the Editor, New York Times, 13 May 22, p. 12; Daniel R. Beaver, 

Newton D. Baker and the American War Effort, 1917- 1919 (Lincoln: University of 

Nebraska Press, 1966), pp. 223- 24; Fosdick, Cltro11icle, p. 182; Peyton C. March, The 

Nation at llilr (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1932), pp. 213- 16. 

247 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Pershing and the AEF G-4 so that contingency plans could be made to 

establish accounts and sign over property.37 

Meanwhile, on 28 December the general secretary of the YMCA 

National War Council, John R. Mott, wrote to the War Department, 

requesting an official investigation of his organization's European operations. He enclosed a number of critical letters and asked that they be 

submitted to the AEF's IG office. At the same time, Carter asked 

Katherine Mayo, an author known for her investigative reporting on 

state government, to come to France to conduct her own review. 

Although Mott alleged only a desire to improve the YMCA's operations, he and Carter probably hoped to see their organization exonerated, both officially and before the public.38 

Secretary Baker's office forwarded the letters through channels to 

the AEF IG's office, with the request that General Brewster investigate 

the validity of the allegations. Brewster assigned the task to Brig. Gen. 

John J. Bradley, an J 891 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy serving as commander of the 163d Infantry Brigade. As a member of the 

Washington State Bar since 1908, he had gained considerable experience as a judge advocate before the war. Accordingly, Bradley formed 

an inspection team, which reviewed the letters and decided to focus its 

inquiry on fifteen genera l topics. But the team soon had to broaden its 

original scope. Complaints from veterans and their families about the 

YMCA's overseas activities had not abated, and in January and 

February Secretary Baker passed on the new allegations through 

General Pershing, requesting that they be added to the original directive. The result was a massive effort that involved virtually every 

inspector in the AEF between February and June 19 19.39 

Upon assuming direction of the YMCA investigation, Genera l 

Bradley quickly refined its scope, directing that inquiries wou ld be 

made down through company level. He then detailed specia l investigators to units lacking inspectors of the ir own and disseminated information to the troops. Shortly after the investigation was under way, Mott 

requested that the amount and value of work performed by the YMCA 

also be eva luated- evidently an attempt to add a positive note to the 

original, almost purely negative focus on complaints. General Brewster 

agreed to Mott's request, a lthough Pershing emphasized that the inves-

" Ltr, Chamberlain to Brewster, 22 Nov 18, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

" Book review of Katherine Mayo, T!tat Damn Y.· A Record of Service Overseas 

(Boston: lloughton Milfin Co., 1920), New York Times, 27 Jun 20, pp. 9, 30; Ltrs, 

Bradley to Brewster, 9 and 13 Apr 20, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 19 YMCA Investigation Records, Boxes 57- 58, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

248 
fROM WAR TO PEACE 

tigation should still deal principally with grievances. Once again, 

Bradley's inspection team had to broaden its approach.40 

Both Brewster and Bradley understood the wider significance of 

the investigation. From the outset Bradley grasped the fact that it would 

supply the Army with vast amounts of data that could serve as a guide 

for developing welfare and morale activities in future emergencies. But 

the individual inspectors conducting the actual investigation saw it in 

simpler terms. They had three objectives: to ascertain the attitudes of 

the welfare workers and determine the efficiency and value of their 

operations to the soldiers; to develop a broad overview of the opinions 

of military personnel toward the agencies; and to express their own 

views on the type of morale and welfare organizations they felt would 

be the most appropriate to a force like the AEF. At unit level, the heaviest emphasis was on interviews with military personnel- in most 

cases, with individuals selected at random from men with good records 

in order to avoid the so-called chronic gripers. Welfare workers also 

were interviewed extensively, but their testimony was regarded as 

somewhat self-serving and not as significant as that of the soldiers.

41 

On 21 April General Brewster added the American Red Cross to 

the list of agencies to be investigated. Its unusual status was responsible for the delay. Unlike the other welfare organizations, the Red Cross 

formed an integral part of the AEF medical services. Its officers 

enjoyed equivalent-rank commissioned status and its ambulance corps 

members enlisted status. Each division had a Red Cross staff. Assigned 

throughout the Services of Supply, the Red Cross officers supervised 

the issue and distribution of medicines and materiel supplied by the 

organization; they also served as casualty representatives, gathering 

details on the killed and injured to keep families informed. Although 

Red Cross finances already were included in IG oversight, General 

Brewster decided that the entire organization should be examined to 

avoid the charge of favoritism. However, by the time of the decision, 

most of the inspectors had finished their welfare organization inspections or were close to doing so. In some cases, demobilization was by 

then taking place so quickly that no investigation could be made.'12 

40 Bradley Conclusions of Final Report of YMCA Investigation, 30 Jun 19, Entry 

588, RG J 20, NARA. 

" lbid.; Rpt, Haskell to Brewster, 30 Jun 19, sub: Welfare Activities Covering All 

Observations in the AEF, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 42 Department of the Army, Historical Division, The Uniled Slates Army in the World 

Wlu; 191 7- 1919, 17 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), 

16:424 (GO 139, 1918); Rpt, Morris to CG, 9th Corps, 25 Apr 19, sub: lnvestigation of 

Red Cross, Ninth Corps Troops, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

249 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

While Bradley's specia l inspectors were completing their overview 

of the activities of the welfare organizations and the soldiers' attitudes 

toward them, Fosdick was conducting an independent review for 

Pershing on the same subject. After visiting American units throughout 

Europe, he identified some morale issues- such as back pay- that 

were the Army's responsibility a lone. However, he a lso developed 

strong views on the inappropriateness of having civilian organizations 

primarily responsible for the Army's morale and welfare activities. He 

cited the variation in service, particularly for frontline troops, and the 

unnecessary duplication of effort among the agencies. Fosdick submitted his report through Pershing to Secretary Baker in early June, which 

conveniently set the stage for General Bradley's YMCA investigation 

report published at the end of the month.43 

The tone of Bradley's 1 ,300-page report inevitably was critical of 

the YMCA, reflecting both the genuine failings of the organization and 

also the exaggerated expectations it had raised but had fa iled to satisfY. 

While the YMCA had done a great deal of good work in France, its 

overall rating was found to be mediocre if not poor. Its most egregious 

mistake was operating the canteens- the equivalent of small post 

exchanges or ship's stores. YMCA officials had volunteered for the 

duty, telling General Pershing they could do it more efficiently than 

anyone else; they had persisted even when cautioned about the need for 

an increase in personnel, saying they could obtain the qualified staff. 

The YMCA apparently saw the canteen operation as a chance to 

increase its influence and prestige with the soldiers, to its own postwar 

advantage, but the results were quite different. The mismanagement of 

the canteens-surly clerks, inconvenient store hours, overpricing, and 

the sale of items originally marked as gifts- created a negative image 

of the YMCA in the minds of the troops.44 

Fueling the soldiers' ire was the perception that the YMCA said one 

thing but did another. Despite the millions of dollars collected at home 

on the promise of providing aid and service to the soldier at the front 

and despite the commitments given to GHQ AEF, YMCA personnel 

showed little desire in cooperating with the military and supporting the 

.,, Fosdick, C!tronicle, pp. 182- 84; Rpt, Fosdick to Sotw, I Jun 19, sub: Activities of 

Wcllllrc Organizations Serving With the 1\EF, OTIG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH). 

" Bradley Conclusions, 30 Jun 19, and Ltr, Bradley to Brewster, 9 April 20, sub: 

Comment on Letters to Mr. E. C. Carter Concerning Report of Investigation of 

Inspector General of the YMCA in the AEF by Avery D. Andrews and Warren Motley, 

Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. The YMCA was the only welfare organization that sold, 

rather than gave, sundries to the troops. The fact that it gave away supplies- and on a 

large scale-went unnoticed amid the charges of mismanagement. 

250 
fROM WAR TO PEACE 

frontline troops. Only 20 percent of the YMCA's overseas strength 

served with combat units. By comparison, 25 percent were on duty in 

Paris and the remainder on duty at base sections or leave areas. Thus, 

the soldiers were disappointed, many feeling that their families at home 

who had made contributions to the YMCA had been duped.45 

The negative image also extended to YMCA personnel, whose 

healthy physical appearance caused many soldiers to judge membership on the YMCA staff as a way to evade military service and thus, 

rightly or wrongly, to perceive them as shirkers. Very few had the skills 

needed to handle their jobs and a significant number saw their job to be 

proselytizing Clu-istianity, which the majority of the troops resented. 

Other compounding factors for the YMCA were its inefficient personnel system, which at one point had no record of 20 percent of its workers overseas, and its unrealistic and inadequate personnel selection or 

management procedures. An adjunct to this was the lack of initiative 

shown by YMCA officials in the field. Too often, they gave the impression that the Army was there to serve them, further aggravating the mistrust between the two organizations. 

General Bradley's huge IG report verified most of the original 

allegations against the YMCA, but he cautioned that its purpose was 

not to malign the many sincere workers who had he lped the soldiers. 

He judged his findings to be "honest and conscientious," demonstrating in the final analysis that the YMCA had asked for and been 

given too heavy a job to do. He believed that the experience of the 

civilian welfare agencies in France clearly illustrated the need for the 

military to have its own services. More significantly, Bradley's report 

provided the basis for the development of the Army's own organization to take care of its recreational and welfare needs. In fact, the 

AEF was obliged to take over welfare programs as the civilian groups 

scaled down after the armistice; each major command appointed a 

welfare officer, usually one of its chaplains, to monitor all welfare, 

morale, and education activities. The completion of the report 

marked the end of the YMCA investigation, which proved to be one 

of the largest consumers of IG manpower in the period after the 

armistice. 46 

•s Ltr, Bradley 10 Brewster, 9 Apr 20. Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. In contrast to the 

front, the YMCA's work at base sections was unquestionably good . 

.. Ibid (quoted words). On 25 January 1919, following the practice in the United 

Slates, chaplain activities in AEF units became an item ofTG interest. On 17 February 

a special survey was begun on chaplain activities. Sec Memo, Spinks to All lnsps, 17 

Feb 19, sub: Report on Chaplains, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

251 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Problems of Peace 

Even while the YMCA investigation was going on, inspectors continued to deal with a growing variety of issues- some familiar but some 

peculiar to the postwar period. A large number of investigations concerned damage to civilian property, and in many cases the complaints 

lodged by the French were justified. Beehives, in particular, were frequent victims of the doughboy's attention (and his sweet tooth). 

However, inspectors had to be alert to the fact that the French were not 

always scrupulous about their claims for reimbursement, some of 

which were for amounts as little as 50 centimes. According to one 

inspector, "the old peasant merchant looked upon the sometimes 

extravagant American soldier as his natural prey."~7 

The movement and departure of units again raised the old problem 

of maintaining billeting and bivouac areas. AEF general orders covered 

the proper clearing and salvaging of such sites, but the matter became 

a special item of inquiry after the armjstice. JGs were expected to 

implement corrective measures as soon as they identified any abuses or 

violations and were required to report units that did not comply so that 

disciplinary action could be taken. The task did little to endear them to 

unit officers. In the First Army IGs systematically checked out troop 

billets, then stables, depots, grounds, and unit transportation; departing 

units left details behind under the inspector's control to correct any 

problems that might be found. The program was considered essential to 

prevent the hopeless deterioration of sites that had to be used countless 

times by a variety of units.

48 

A problem profoundly affecting morale was the erratic AEF mail 

service. A matter of great concern to Secretary Baker throughout the 

war, its fai lings were not improved by the coming of peace. When the 

AEF first reached France, delivery of mail was the responsibility of 

U.S. Post Office Department civilians who accompanied the units overseas. Service was poor from the outset, in part because the civilian 

clerks could not cope with the rapid moves of the military units and 

refused to accept the austere field conditions. The volume of mail that 

they had to handle in the field overwhelmed the establishment of an 

effective organization. Afterward, the postal service was placed in the 

position of permanently- and unsuccessfully- trying to catch up. 49 

" Lewis, "Short Account," OTIG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH). 

"' Memo, Johnson to Alllnsps, 20 Nov 18, Entry 590; Rpt, Burr to IG, AEF, 18 Apr 

19, sub: Supplemental Report 7th Div. AEI~ Entry 797. Both in RG 120, NARA. 

"' Frederick Palmer, Newton D. Baker: America at War, 2 vols. (New York: Dodd, 

Continued 

252 
FROM WAR TO PEACE 

Relatively few complaints were received at JG offices about neglect 

or failed accountability. The major issue was misdirected or late mail. 

Numerous investigations revealed the causes to be a lack of postal personnel and inefficient procedures. Neither the postal service nor the 

AEF adjutant general maintained a central locator file for the routing 

of mail, and consequently a soldier's letters would follow him from 

place to place, rarely catching up. New York port authorities became 

painfully cognizant of the real magnitude of the problem in January 

1919, when 22 million pieces of undelivered mail for soldiers were 

dumped at a port of Hoboken warehouse for rerouting or return.

50 

Some improvements were seen in mail management. Inspectors 

recommended locating division post offices at railheads, rather than 

with the headquarters, allowing the breakdown and distribution of mail 

along with rations. Better unit locator cards were adopted, becoming an 

item of inspection, and each company was authorized a mail clerk to 

handle postal and locator problems. Even though inspectors called 

attention to the low priority given mail leaving the United States in relation to other cargoes, little changed. By the summer of 1918 the Army 

had assumed full operation of the mail system in Europe, but the complaints over delays and damage continued, making mail service a constant IG item of interest at all echelons. As late as September, General 

Chamberlain was still advising Secretary Baker that the "mail problem 

has not yet been satisfactorily solved." The difficulty posed by the rapid 

movement of men and units and the consequent delays in mail delivery 

was never really overcome while the fighting 1asted.51 

After the armistice, when soldiers found little if any justification 

for inconvenience, complaints over late or undelivered mail increased. 

Even inspectors were not immune. A corps IG told General Brewster 

that his wife had received only 20 percent of the letters he had sent her, 

and he warned of the effect of such an unreliable system on the troops' 

morale. An exhaustive investigation of the Postal Service, begun 

immediately after the armistice, suggested that accurate personnel 

accountability was the key to improvement. However, by this time the 

Mead and Co., 1931 ), 2:404; David C. Shanks, As They Passed Through the Port 

(Washington, D.C.: Cary Publishing Co., 1927), pp. 275- 76; Ltr, Read 10, AEF, 27 Mar 

19, sub: Report in Compliance With Instructions in Your Letter of February 23, 1919, 

Entry 588, RO 120, NARA. 

$0 Ltr, Read to IG, AEF, 27 Mar 19, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA; Shanks, As They 

Passed, pp. 275- 76. 

s• Ltrs, Read to IG, AEF, 27 Mar 19, and Elmore to 10 , AEF, 25 Jun 19, sub: Report 

From Observations of AEF, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA; Paln1er, Baker, 2:404 

(Chamberlain quotation). 

253 
THE INSPECTORS GEN ERAL, 1903-1939 

issue had begun to solve itself, at least in part. Under the conditions of 

peace, units became more stable and the mail backlog was eliminated. 

Once the occupation forces were in place, an express rail system 

brought further improvements. Indeed, with the system functioning at 

an acceptable level, an fG was reprimanded for exaggerating the problems that remained.s

2 

But by January 1919 some of those problems had begun to take on 

a more sinister aspect. Theft, pilferage, and a general mishandling of 

the mails were new areas of IG concern in the ensuing months. No 

sooner were mail bottlenecks solved at the unit level than others 

appeared in the pipeline between the ports and the major commands. As 

late as March some 85,000 Christmas packages were still on hand and 

undeliverable, which inspectors attributed in part to the poor training of 

the postal clerks. At the same time, however, the ransacking of the mail 

added an unsettling dimension and pointed to growing indiscipline and 

crime along the rail system.s3 

Railroads After the Armistice 

During the fighting General Spinks' office had handled a number of 

railroad-related cases, most involving such disciplinary problems as 

troops riding on top of railcars or vandalizing the rolling stock. More 

ominous cases began to appear in December 1918, when an Italian supply train was held up and plundered. The IG investigation found that no 

Americans were involved, but the same could not be said of later cases. 

Eventually, four GHQ inspectors formed a team that did nothing but 

investigate systematic looting on American supply trains in France. 

The first week of February brought eleven railroad-related cases: 

five for looting and pilferage, three for vandalism, and another three for 

rail security failures. By the end of the month nearly half of the GHQ 

investigations were concerned with aspects of misconduct or criminal 

acts, many of them connected with the railroads. The situation was so 

critical that inspectors put special emphasis on railroad crime throughout March and April 1919.S4 

51 Ltr, I Iaske II to lG, AEP, 5 Apr 19, sub: Report on Operation of the lGD in France; 

Memos, Brewster to CinC, AEF, 10 and 20 Nov 18; and Rpt, Baer to ACofS, Adv Hq, 

23 Jan 19, sub: Non-receipt of Mail in 3d Division. All in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

n Llr, Donaldson to IG, AEF, 15 Mar 19; Memo, Brewster to CinC, AEF, 20 Mar 19; 

and Ltr, Ovenshine to IG, AEF, 28 Mar 19, sub: Report. All in Entry 588, RG 120, 

NARA. 

~· Memos , Brewster to CinC, AEF, 10 Jan and 10, 20 Feb 19; File 406, IG, AEF, 

Selected Schedules, 10 Jan- 20 Feb 19. All in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

254 
fROM WAR TO PEACE 

Criminal activities were particularly rife among SOS troops in the 

Second Army area. The army loaned one of its inspectors, Lt. Col. 

Clyde R. Abraham, to the Services of Supply to observe and report on 

measures the Transportation Servi ce was taking to safeguard goods in 

transit. After discussing the situation with the AEF G-4 and SOS officia ls and then checking the routes from the main regulating point at 

Liffolle-Le-Grand through occupied Germany and back, Abraham 

reached some disturbing conc lusions. Nearly everyone in the 

Transportation Service appeared to be indifferent to safeguarding 

official property. Standard measures-such as sealing boxcars, convoying trains, inventorying cargo, and adopting antitheft policieswere ignored.s

5 

Jn a few instances Abraham found that his presence was resented. 

Officers of the 21st Railroad Engineers Regiment stationed at Conflans 

openly avoided him. His requests for information were ignored, and the 

prevailing indifference and incompetence that he found was "unlike 

anything 1 had ever seen in the military service." Yet this was the exception, not the rule. In general, Abraham was courteously treated, and his 

recommendations were well received. Most problems, he discovered, 

were a result of inexperience and the virtually complete lack of military 

training among both officers and enlisted men. When the railroad units 

were first organized, those civilians with the necessary skills were 

rushed to France with little or no introduction to military life or military requirements. 56 

The indiscipline at Conflans was well known to inspectors. Train 

robberies and black-market activities were particularly bad in the area, 

and many members of the 2 1st Rai I road Engineers Regiment were 

found to be involved in the crimes. As a result of earlier JG investigations, some regimental personnel were convicted of looting quartermaster rail cargoes and pilfering wine and rations from French and 

American trains. Because of Abraham's report, General Bullard loaned 

one of his best investigators to the Services of Supply, Lt. Col. George 

C. Lewis, with the mission of helping him to clean up the situation.s

7 

Colonel Lewis immediately began to follow through on the cases 

uncovered by earlier inspectors. He, too, felt hand icapped by the 

marked lack of cooperation from the regimental officers, which he 

characterized as collusion to protect the guilty. Lewis performed "a 

" Rpt, Abraham to IG, SOS, AEF, 13 Feb 19, sub: Conditions in Transportation 

Service, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

'" Ibid. 

" Memo, Davis to TAG. 20 Oct 19, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

255 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

prodigious amount of work" in seeking to restore discipline and identify those who had broken the law, and he was not always gentle in doing 

so; his frustrations were sometimes apparent in the harshness of his 

questioning. Later, complaints about his manner became the basis of an 

IG investigation from General Chamberlain's Washington office. A 

lieutenant in the regiment, apparently something of a guardhouse 

lawyer, complained of unnecessary arrests and detentions. In the end 

Lewis was not only exonerated but commended for completing a difficult job under adverse conditions. More important, the special inspections were credited with reducing substantially the losses in railroad 

shipments.ss 

Because of the problems revealed by these special inspections, 

GHQ AEF directed commanders to take a greater interest in preserving 

and protecting property. Inspectors were required to report on how well 

depots complied with the policy, which stressed proper storage, 

accountability, security, and rail movements- the time of greatest vulnerability for government property. A daily report of the condition of 

freight cars arriving at the main rail depot at Is-sur-Tille was submitted 

through channels to the AEF's IG office. Each report listed the cars broken into, the kind of damage, and the type of stolen cargo. Using the 

reports, the AEF IG staff recorded any major thefts and maintained statistics, which facilitated a thorough analysis of the problems within the 

rail cargo system and the identification of defects. This information 

was passed to the SOS headquarters for remedial action. By March 

1919 cargo security had improved to the point that pilferage ceased to 

be important. Individual larceny cases, however, continued to be investigated until the final American withdrawal from Europe. 59 

Beyond the realm of crimes was another trouble spot that bedeviled 

inspectors, namely, the enmity of French and German railway personnel servicing duty trains running between France and Germany. 

Numerous complaints were received about the hostility, which sometimes seemed to reverse the roles of friend and foe. The duty trains were 

made up in Germany with German equipment, but on their arrival in 

France the French habitually removed the cars that were in good condition and substituted broken or inferior units. French engineers refused 

to heat the cars so that American soldiers often were compelled to ride 

s. Ibid (quoted words); Rpt, Abraham to IG, SOS, AEF. 13 Feb 19, Entry 588, RG 

120, NARA. 

,. AEF Bul 15, 2 1 Feb 19; Memo, Spinks to All Insps, 7 Mar 19, sub: Bulletin No. 

15; and Memo, Spinks to ACofS, G-4, AEF, 6 Mar 19, sub: Daily Reports, Regulation 

Stations 1918- 19. All in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

256 
fROM WAR TO PEACE 

in windowless, heatless carriages in the middle of winter. Further, the 

French refused to recognize the German's baggage checking, and as a 

result all baggage on the France-bound trains was dumped at the border, creating a wild scene as the passengers tried to find their be longings in order to continue the journey. There was no problem going in 

the opposite direction.60 

Beginning in January 1919, AEF inspectors gathered many statements about the difficulties of traveling on duty trains. Working 

through the SOS TG, they achjeved a distinct improvement by early 

February. American Railway Transport officers rode the trains and 

served as conductors, while NCOs took charge of the baggage cars, 

supervising the French civilians and assuring greater cleanliness and 

reducing incidents in which poor equipment was substituted for good. 

No one, however, could persuade the French engineers to hook up their 

engine to the German cars to provide heat. To the end, a trip on the duty 

train remained something of an adventure.61 

Special Administrative Inquiries 

Confusion, indiscipline, and administrative disarray in the AEF led to a 

number of special inquiries by the inspectorate in the months following 

the armistice. A special inspection of all personnel records in the AEF 

was necessary both to tighten accountability and to identify AWOLs 

and deserters. Problems with records also could delay embarkation, 

because the War Department required that soldiers have up-to-date 

records, fully documented, before being sent home. Division and corps 

commanders were authorized to detail extra inspectors to get the job 

done quickly. The AEF adjutant general informally asked that all IGs 

make compliance with service record policies a special item of inquiry. 

When this approach proved unsuccessful, General Spinks issued a 

memorandum requiring a ll inspectors to make the necessary investigations to assure compliance.62 

Faulty records keeping contributed to the unauthorized wearing of 

insignia and decorations, a practice that blossomed after the armistice. 

The situation became so tlagrant that it brought a complaint to General 

Brewster from Col. George S. Patton, Jr., then a brigade commander 

60 Ltrs, Baer to Spir1ks, 7, 26 Jan and 10 F'eb 19, Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 

•• Memo, Wimberly to Spinks, 14 F'eb 19, Entry 590, RG 120, NARA. 62 Memo, Fifth Army Corps to Cdrs, 30 Nov 18, sub: Personnel Accountability, 

Entry 799; Memo, Davis to Brewster, 28 Oct 18, Entry 588; and Memo, Spinks to All 

lnsps, 20 Nov 18, sub: Service Records, Entry 588. All in RG 120, NARA. 

257 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

in the Tank Corps. Having encountered both officers and enlisted men 

whose chevrons showed more overseas service than they actually had 

and having heard rumors that the wound chevron and other awards 

were being similarly abused, Patton requested that action be taken 

before the wearing of such items became a "joke." Brewster and 

Spinks agreed, and the latter issued a memorandum on tbe subject in 

mid-December.63 

Sheer carelessness precipitated a rather unusual and prominent IG 

investigation in the postwar period. The 305th Infantry of the 77th 

Division, which had acquitted itself well in combat, lost track of its 

colors while preparing to redeploy. The flags were left temporarily 

with a graves registration unit for a ceremony, then never reclaimed. 

Word of the loss led to an extensive special investigation that spread 

from Europe to the United States. An AEF inspector spent two weeks 

trying to track down units and individuals scattered throughout 

France and Germany, but the trail was cold. The case then passed to 

the War Department inspectorate, where several former 305th and 

graves personnel, civilians by then, were interviewed without success. 

U.S. Customs records for 1918 and 1919 were scanned to see if someone had mailed the colors home. General Chamberlain reviewed the 

case and closed it in February 1920. The fate of the colors remained 

a mystery.(>! 

At the same time an even odder case, with considerable international notoriety, was under investigation. In January 1919 six U.S. 

artillery officers on leave in the Netherlands created a scandal when 

they tried to visit the ex-Kaiser, who was living there in exile. The 

leader of the group was Col. Luke Lea, a Tennessee guardsman and former U.S. Senator. General Bullard later speculated that Lea was trying 

to duplicate Frederick Funston's exploit in capturing guerrilla leader 

Emilio Aguinaldo during the Philippine Insurrection. However, the visit 

seemed in fact to be a spontaneous indiscretion on Lea's part. The men 

were traveling through the low countries with no specific destination, 

and when Colonel Lea learned that the Kaiser's place of exile was nearby, he apparently made a quick decision to call on him. Lea's action 

"' Ltr (quoted word), Patton to Brewster, 6 Dec 18, sub: Service and Wound 

Chevrons; Memo, Spinks to All Insps, 18 Dec 18, sub: Unauthorized Wearing of 

Chevrons, Badges, etc.; and Ltr, Donaldson to CG, SOS, 14 Mar 19, sub: Report of the 

Inspector General. All in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA 

6-' Ltr, Geyelin to TG, AEf~ 14 May 19, sub: National and Regimental Colors of305th 

lnf., 77th Division; Memo, Brewster to Chamberlain, 14 Feb 20. Both in Entry 588, RG 

120, NARA. 

258 
fROM WAR TO PEACE 

flared into a major international incident, even briefly threatening the 

peace talks going on in Paris. A Dutch investigator more reasonably 

concluded that "the affair could be treated as a joke and would be of no 

consequence," except that one of the visitors stole an expensive ashtray 

from the Kaiser's estate as a souvenir.65 

General Brewster selected Colonel Johnson to investigate the incident for the AEF. Johnson traveled throughout Belgium and Holland, 

carefully reconstructing the entire sequence of events. His findings portrayed a rather wild group of artillerymen out for a good time, using 

Army cars and drivers on their meandering jaunt and bending rules by 

their entry into neutral Holland. Johnson fe lt that Lea's status as a 

colonel and former senator merited his being court-martialed for 

behavior that could have had serious international consequences. 

General Pershing, however, settled for a sternly written reprimand and 

an immediate return to the United States, a prescription that abruptly 

ended the publicity surrounding the case.66 

Embarkation. 

The postwar process of demobilization and its attendant problems dramatically increased the work load oftheAEF inspectorate, especia lly in 

the area of the withdrawal from Europe. Soon after the armistice 

General Pershing sent General Brewster on a tour of the port facilities 

to get a firsthand feel for their condition and capabilities. He made a 

complete circuit during December, accompanied by an aide, his son Lt. 

Daniel B. Brewster, USMC, and Major Britton from the staff of Base 

Section No. 5. It was well for the Services of Supply that Pershing had 

relented and agreed to a llow the overage but energetic Britton to serve 

in Europe. Britton's background in international shipping and his 

apprenticeship inspecting port activities at Hoboken made him invaluable at a time when an embarkation system had to be set up quickly to 

manage the flow of soldiers back to the United States. His linguistic 

abilities had enabled him to establish cordial relations with the French 

Transport Commission officials in New York, which he expanded while 

in France. These connections proved useful as he and the Brewsters 

6$ Robert L. Bullard, Pe,:sonalities and Reminiscences of the War (Garden City, N.Y.: 

Doubleday, Page and Co., 1925), p. 312; Memo (quotation), Bethel to CinC, AEF, 15 

Feb 19, sub: Case of Col. Luke Lea, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

M Ltr Order, Brewster to Johnson, 16 Jan 19, and Rpt, Johnson to Brewster, 5 Feb 

19, sub: Investigation Concerning Conduct of Colonel Luke Lea, I 14th FA, AEf-, and 

Party in llolland, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

259 
T HE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

made their rounds, advising the base section and port commanders on 

what was expected of them.67 

Major Britton fast became the AEF IG expert on port activities and 

embarkation procedures from France. In December the AEF G- 1 sent 

a wire to port commanders, specifying that each departing transport 

would be inspected for adequacy by a board of officers headed by an 

IG. Major Britton returned a detailed letter on this, with SOS concurrence, to General Brewster. He described at length the evolution of the 

Stateside port inspection system, emphasizing that special arrangements already had been made as far as inspection of Navy transports 

and suggesting that they be continued in France. Britton rejected the 

concept of a fonnal inspection board as too cumbersome and time-consuming, recommending instead that an IG and a medical officer make 

independent inspections, compare notes, and immediately see that deficiencies were remedied. The object of inspections in French ports 

should be to "determine deficiencies, if any, on incoming; to notify 

proper authority for remedy; take cognizance of progress of remedy; 

verify such by subsequent outgoing inspection; [and) make [a) report to 

the C.O. of the base." He also stressed that inspection procedures 

should be tailored to the idiosyncrasies of each port rather than be 

directed inflexibly from the higher headquarters.68 

While he was getting the method of inspection changed, Britton 

developed thorough guidance for the St. Nazaire and Brest IGs at their 

request. His advice closely reflected the systems used at U.S. ports and 

obviously were the product of considerable experience. Critical areas 

were developing with loca l port authorities a system for the routine 

exchange of information on arrivals, departures, and loading schedules; 

checking and verifying ship capacities and lifesaving equipment, based 

on the criteria used by each nation; and assuring clean and adequate 

sleeping, lavatory, medical, and mess facilities. Britton also offered 

some pointers on dealing with a ship's officers , for example, the purser on a large liner or the chief officer on a commercial transport.69 

The AEF Sw-geon General's Department asked Britton for his 

views on the types of medical inspection appropriate to sea transportation. A few days later General Brewster told him to draft IG guidelines 

., Ltr, Brewster to Donaldson, 24 Dec 18, and File 27, Reports, Entry 588, RG 120, 

NARA. 

"'Telg 203, Cavenaugh to CO, St. Nazaire, 4 Dec 18; Ltr (quotation), Britton to IG, 

SOS, 6 Dec 18, sub: Inspection ofTransports. Both in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 111 Memo, Britton to lGs Concerned, 6 Dec 18, sub: Notes for Inspection of 

Transports, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

260 
fROM WAR TO PEACE 

for the movement of the sick and wounded. By then, it had become 

standard procedure for Navy commanders to give both the "rated 

invalid capacity" of their vessels and the patient category (ambulatory, 

mental, etc.) to Army port officials, who in return supplied a categorized patient roster of those being embarked. A copy of each roster was 

given to the IG overseeing the embarkation. After verifying it, he 

retained it as a passenger record until receiving confirmation that the 

voyage was completed safely and subsequently turned it over to the theater adjutant general for filing. With this as the basis, Britton prepared 

an entire embarkation medical inspection program, outlining several 

steps for lGs and medical inspectors to follow. 70 

According to Britton, port medical regulating officers, not IGs, 

were responsible for determining a patient's evacuation status. They 

were to select the stretcher and ambulatory cases that could be treated 

as "progressed convalescents" (beyond any need for intensive care), 

because of the limited medical facilities aboard ship. The selection and 

designation of units and casuals and their medical examination was 

made preferably at interior points; but, regardless, no one in theory 

sailed without a full health check. Britton stressed that port medical 

facilities had to be enlarged not only to handle the larger transient population but also to hold personnel rejected for travel for medical rcasons. IGs were to oversee port reception arrangements and procedures, 

ensuring that the departing soldiers had proper clothing, equipment, 

and documentation, as well as adequate food and shelter. And to avoid 

crowding and waiting exposed at dockside, Britton suggested that 

inspectors facilitate the sequencing of ground transportation arrangements to coincide with the arrival of ships in port.71 

A fina l medical check was required at embarkation, when inspectors, whether dealing with medical cases or healthy passengers, performed essentially the same duties. Admittedly, more technical knowledge was necessary to judge the adequacy of a ship's sleeping, lavatory, mess, medical, and other facilities for the wounded. Britton recommended that lGs make a final inspection of the loaded vessel to assure 

that there was no overcrowding, that proper equipment was on board, 

and that no last-minute deficiencies had developed. In his judgment, 

with which Brewster concurred, the inspectors' main objective should 

"' Memo (quoted words), Fiske to CO, USS MaiiOIJI, 15 Nov 18, sub: Transportation 

of Disabled Soldiers to the U.S. on Ships of the Navy Acting as Transports (T-53-

40(9)E); Memo, Britton to Brewster, 9 Dec 18, sub: Transportation and Handling of 

Convalescent, Sick and Wounded to the U.S. !3oth in Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

" Memo, Britton to Brewster, 9 Dec 18, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

26 1 
THE INSPECTORS GEN ERAL, 1903-1939 

be to head off complaints before they start or, if all else failed, to be in 

a position to offer solutions. 72 

Thus, in Less than a month embarkation policies were fully on their 

way to final form. It was well that they were because Brewster and 

Britton were not encouraged as they visited the ports, finding many illprepared for handling the ever-growing influx of cargo and departing 

troops. Transport inspections were not being made unless specifically 

requested. Port officials and IGs were not coordinating information, 

nor did the latter have a familiarity with many aspects of port operations. Tn a few cases, U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) officers had been 

attached as transport inspectors. Most of them knew little about their 

duties, and Britton spent much of his time training them. 

Britton had prepared his guidelines with these and similar augmentees in mind. He and Brewster made a thorough survey of each port 

visited, assessing the capacity of not only the facil ities but also the officials. Britton also paid goodwill visits to the U.S. Navy and French officials and their facilities. He reported on their degree of cooperativeness 

and the quality of their operations. Both inspectors were confident that 

the ports had the potential to meet embarkation requirements; however, 

they foresaw a prodigious effort on the part of the whole Services of 

Supply to do so.

73 

Concurrent with Brewster's tour, the 2d Depot Division at Le Mans 

was redesignated the American Embarkation Center. It expanded into a 

vast enterprise by taking over eight divisional areas, each with its own 

subdepot and a billeting capacity of about 30,000 men, and by converting the original camps and training areas to handle casuals, convalescents, and small units. The center's capacity approached 250,000 men. 

Its troop population never went below l 00,000 for the first six months 

of 1919. 

Several other smaller centers, located near ports, handled nondivisional units. Inspectors at these centers assured that the departing 

troops were paid and properly clothed; that they had up-to-date records; 

that they did not take any as souvenirs government property or explosives on board ship; and that they had converted their foreign money, 

which had to be confirmed by their unit commanders. When division 

inspectors were unavailabl.e, center IGs checked unit funds and 

resolved accountability issues. Each departing soldier also had to submit to a final examination by a surgeon. Before departure, both the surn Memo, Britton to Chief, Labor Bureau, SGD, 4 Dec 18, sub: Embarkation of 

Troops for the U.S., Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

'

3 Memo, Britton to Brewster, 19 Dec 18, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

262 
fROM WAR TO PEACE 

geon and the center IGs had to certify that the organizations and individuals they inspected were ready for embarkation. ~ 

Assisting the center IGs was a large number of combat arms officers. Most served as acting inspectors for troops and equipment; a few, 

as administrators for the enlarged inspection staffs. The detailed IGs 

coordinated the embarkation program and dealt with funds and disciplinary issues. When units were inactivated or moved to the ports, their 

inspectors were not released until they had completed all inspections 

in progress, forwarding their reports to the AEF's IG office, and, as a 

final act, had inspected the areas, billets, and facilities used by their 

units to assure they were left in good condition and to minimize future 

claims. Many Regular Army inspectors opted to take positions in the 

SOS inspectorate once their units had left rather than return to the 

United States.75 

Occasionally, the behavior of even an experienced inspector proved 

embarrassing to the inspectorate. In one such case, Col. Harry T. 

Matthews, recently assigned to Brewster's office after being the J Corps 

inspector, unnecessarily upset the officers of the 1st Replacement 

Depot at St. Aignan, causing considerable resentment. The depot was 

one of several overwhelmed by the large numbers of troops being sent 

for embarkation processing. The overcrowding made conditions there 

deplorable, and the depot cadre had been working hard to ameliorate 

the situation. Colonel Matthews paid a three-day visit to the camp in 

response to a congressional inquiry. He made little effort to learn what 

the cadre had done to improve things or what their plans were. Instead, 

he immediately began an inspection of the admittedly poor facilities. 

Disdainful and critical, he openly berated the cadre for tolerating such 

conditions and, at one point, profanely shouted down an officer who 

tried to explain.

76 

After Colonel Matthews left the depot, Brig. Gen. Paul B. Malone, 

the depot commander, wrote General Spinks. He criticized Matthews' 

conduct, saying he merely had discovered that which was known 

already about camp conditions. His attitude and conduct had lowered 

the morale of the permanent party and had created discipline problems 

14 Rpt, IG, AEJ-o~ AEC, to Brewster, I May 19, sub: American Embarkat ion Center, 

Le Mans (Sarthe), France, I May 19, Entry 588; SOS, AEF, Embarkation lnstrs 13, 4 

Jan 19, Entry 591 ; and, Rpt, Camp Covington 1nsp to IG, SOS. n.d .. Entry 2691. All in 

RG 120, NARA. 

'

5 Rpt, Camp Covington 1nsp to lG, SOS, n.d., Entry 2691; Memo, AG, AEF, to CG, 

2d Army, 7 Apr 19, sub: Inspections, Second Army, Entry 588. All in RG 120, NARA. 

" Ltr, Spinks to CO, 1st Replacement Depot, St. Aignan, 3 Mar 19, sub: Request for 

Information, and Reply, 13 Mar 19, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

263 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

among the casual personnel. Spinks already knew about the incident, 

learning some details from another general who had visited the depot 

after Matthews' inspection. He thus asked Malone for all the facts so 

that some action could be taken against Matthews. Malone responded 

with a series of sworn statements, but asked Spinks to drop the case as 

he and his men were too busy to follow up. The incident is illustrative 

of the pressured atmosphere under which everyone was working to 

cope with their giant task and limited resources. Colonel Matthews had 

been a sound corps inspector, but must have met his limit with the situation at St. Aignan. His loss of control shows the harm such actions 

on the part of an inspector can achieve.77 

The port inspectors also found the pressures of their job increasing 

as Major Britton's inspection schemes went into effect. The experience 

of Base Section No. I at St. Nazaire was typical ofthose with embarkation missions. The IG section was enlarged and organized along functional lines. The troops coming from places like Le Mans staged into 

camps in the base section area. Inspections for each camp were organized, as were teams to make final inspections at the docks. A small 

troop transport inspection team was formed under the direction of one 

of the USMC officers, and a larger team was dedicated to the inspection of the sick and wounded being prepared for evacuation from hospitals in the base section area. 78 

Prior to moving to the base section, most of the troops were 

processed for embarkation either at Le Mans or at their own billeting 

areas. The inspections performed there consisted only of checking on 

the correction of the deficiencies identified in reports of the preceding 

inspectors. Units coming from Le Mans initially required closer scnttiny because of the incompleteness of its inspection program, but by 

March 1919 the Le Mans operation had improved so much that few 

deficiencies were noted in units. This reduced the base section inspector's work load merely to spot-checking certain items, thus speeding up 

a unit's movement to the doeks.79 

The inspection of personnel, finance, and related records for those 

units not processed at interior sites was performed in full in the base 

section billeting areas. Unit adjutants could certify that corrections 

were made to the deficiencies noted. These certificates were accepted 

in lieu of further inspection, although the section inspectors still were 

11 Ibid. 11 Rpt, Miller to CG, Base Sec 1, 30 Jun 19, sub: Annual Report as Required by 880 

A.R., Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. ,. Ibid. 

264 
fROM WAR TO PEACE 

held responsible for the condition of records. The time so saved was 

judged worthwhile, particularly when balanced against the few complaints about adminish·ative or financial issues directed at the base section from receiving agencies in the United States. Formal inspection 

reports were made only when units permanently assigned to the base 

section were being processed for home. For the most part, inspectors 

gave verbal instructions to correct the problems they fou11d. Their 

objective was to get the units ready for embarkation as quickly as possible. This was noted and appreciated by the troops with whom there 

was generally a friendly, cooperative relationship. The IGs were seen as 

assisters, rather than critics. A side benefit of this informal approach 

was the reduction in IG paperwork, which, in turn, gave the inspectors 

more time to be with the units. A great deal of effort went into establishing the system and its accompanying facilities. It was during its 

developing phases that most of the embarkation complaints and horror 

stories were made. so 

The sudden surge of soldiers at base section ports soon after the 

last shots were fired caught the Services of Supply off balance, its 

efforts and resources still committed to supporting the fighting front. 

Many of the ports had neither the facilities to house nor the organizations to support adequately the departing troops. As a consequence, 

those processing out in the first weeks after the armistice endured considerable hardship and inconvenience. This situation gave rise to the 

inevitable complaints and stories that resulted in political and newspaper inquiri es. The preponderance of them concerned the great port of 

Brest in Base Section No. 5, through which more than half of the those 

returning home processed. 

Base Section No. 5 

Brig. Gen. George H. Harries, a D.C. National Guard officer, had 

presided successfully over the expansion of Brest during the buildup. 

He early had improved the city water supply, but was given few 

resources for housing and transportation. Harries mentioned this problem to General Pershing during the latter's inspection visit in August 

1918, pointing out that it would be particularly critical when the flow 

of men started going the other way. Approval was given for additional 

construction the next month. However, delays were encountered 

because of the flu epidemic and the continued absence of transportation 

"' lbid. 

265 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

to move building material. Progress was marginal until the Services of 

Supply redirected the necessary resources within days of the armistice. 

By then, the c1isis General Harries predicted had developed. The situation became so bad that Harries was relieved and replaced by Maj. Gen. 

El.i A. Hehnick. 81 

General Helmick had arrived in France on 9 November with the 

advance elements of his 8th Division. Shortly thereafter his friend and 

former protege General Harbord, the SOS commander, approached 

him, recommending that he take an assignment in the Services of 

Supply. Helmick deferred making a decision until 21 November, when 

he learned that the 8th Division was going to be deactivated. " lnside of 

an hour" of his phone call to Harbord, he was en route to Brest to 

assume command of Base Section No.5. He took with him most of the 

8th Division staff members who had accompanied him to France. As 

Helmick later wrote, his brief stop at Brest in early November had 

shown him that the port had some big problems. The facilities were 

spartan because of the aforementioned priorities. Loading, out-processing, and shipping requirements mandated far greater housing, 

dockage, and transportation than were presently available.82 

A month after assuming command of Base Section No. 5 Helmick 

sent General Brewster a memorandum, in which he summarized the 

conditions that he found and the actions he was taking to correct them. 

Brewster had availed himself of Helmick's old IG ties to ask him to 

keep him posted because of the great nwnber of complaints that were 

co1ning in about Brest. Helmick emphasized throughout his summary 

that no one was to blame for the problems cited, which he attributed to 

the sudden mission reversal, and admitted that correcting what he 

found wrong was posing an enormous challenge. As a first step, he 

placed Brig. Gen. Smedley Butler, USMC, in command of the 

embarkation camp at Pontanezen, 3 miles from the port, and Brig. Gen. 

Alfred A. Starbird, the War Department's senior artillery inspector 

before assuming command of the 8th Field Artillery Brigade, in charge 

of port operations and permanent-party personnel and units.

83 

Helmick told Brewster that the key to understanding all of the problems lay in the fact that expansion of the embarkation camp had not 

., James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775 1953 (Washington, 

D.C.: OITice of the Chief of Military History. United States Army. 1966), pp. 366, 391; 

Johnson Hagood, The Service of Supply: A Memoir oft he Great llfw (Boston: !Iough ton 

Miffiin Co., 1927), p. 181. 

" llelmick, "Autobiography," Mill. 

" Memo, Helmick to Brewster, 22 Dec 18, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

266 
fROM WAR TO PEACE 

begun until the armistice. Even then, supplies, labor, and materials were 

difficult to obtain, primarily because there were no rail facilities 

between the city station, docks, or campsites. Consequently, all materials had to be transferred to trucks and moved over very poor roads. The 

ground was so boggy that vehicles could not get off the road once in the 

camp area. The situation was made more acute by the J 918- 19 winter 

being one of the wettest and coolest on record. At Camp Pontanezen 

"an impervious clay subsoil retained the rainfall near the surface, converting the soil ... into deep stratum of muck which for ages had been 

permeated with human and animal waste." A railroad spur was built to 

overcome this problem. By the end of December this spur made it possible for materials to be brought right to the camp, thus speeding up the 

building process, and for departing troops to ride to the docks instead 

of hiking the muddy 3 miles.84 

When General Butler took over, the camp lacked sewage and water 

systems. Water carts, drawn by the troops, were the only source. Under 

Butler's general direction, various camp projects received a high construction priority. A dam had to be constructed and a pipeline installed, 

which by the end of January J 919 provided sufficient drinking and 

bathing water. Delousing and disinfecting facilities, as well as tent platforms, kitchens, and hardstands, were essential for ensuring minimum 

health standards and comforts. The capacity of the Brest facilities had 

nearly trebled by the end of December J 918, when each of the nine 

kitchens at Pontanezen was feeding 5,000 men at a meal. Helmick later 

said that nearly 17,000 structures were erected, with a cost in lumber 

alone of nearly seven million dollars. In addition to the construction 

projects, General Butler also organized the processing of casuals and 

units on their way to the port. 85 

At the port General Starbird established order amongst the diverse 

permanent-party elements- labor, motor transport, military police, and 

guard troops. He assumed control over their campsites and was responsible for troop discipline and medical care. To improve dock operations, 

Starbird implemented a property checking system, under which quartermaster and transportation officials coordinated closely. Previously, 

because no controls were in place as goods moved from ship to dock 

and then to warehouse or transport, pilferage and untraceable losses 

were high. This new coordination permitted a more efficient use of 

transportation, thus improving the movement of goods and speeding up 

· Helmick, "Autobiography," MHI. 13 Ibid.; Memo, llclmick to Brewster, 22 Dec 18, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 

267 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

the requisition cycle. Expecting an acceptable operation by the end of 

January I 919, Helmick suggested to Brewster that he could use "another good inspector" to keep up the pace of improvements.86 

While trying to improve port operations, the onslaught of more 

troops ti·om the interior and supplies fi·om the United States, which 

were no longer sent inland, exacerbated the already deplorable living 

conditions. It was not until late February that adequate vehicles were 

available to move the men and cargo around the port with any efficiency. The embarking troops were used as unskilled labor while at 

the port, to support the frantic construction efforts of the engineers. 

The mud and penetrating chill added to the misery. "To get out at 5 

O'clock in the morning and march in the dark to the kitchen for 

breakfast, eat it standing in the wet and mud, then march three miles 

through the sloppy streets to the port, work there all day with a cold 

lunch at noon, return to camp for supper, to be eaten again in the dark 

and mud, and then back to their unfloored tents for a night in wet, 

muddy clothing- that was not a pleasant life in a Rest Camp." As 

might be expected, numerous complaints began to surface through 

every possible medium. 87 

Helmick took a personal approach as base section commander, 

spending considerable time visiting the port, observing progress, 

encouraging the workers and transients, and overseeing that the best 

possible was being done. Under his guidance, reception procedures, 

such as feeding arriving troops at the railheads before marching them 

to billets, and the quality of military police, whose inexperience and 

arbitrariness had been a major source of complaints, were improved. He 

characterized his job as "inspection work over again, but no tedious 

reports to work up for my superiors." He considered his experience as 

an inspector as invaluable in contributing to his ability to cope with the 

situation at Brest. The progress of construction and improving weather 

ended the worst of the problems by March 1 919. Ironically, by then a 

large portion of the AEF had already staged through the port. 

By March, however, Brest already had become a cause celebre 

among the press and members of Congress. Reporters in New York 

gathered horror stories of conditions at Brest from disgruntled doughboys as they came off the ships. Soon, there was criticism throughout 

the country of the entire chain of command for apparently condoning 

86 Helmick, "Autobiography," MHI; Memo (quoted words), Helmick to Brewster, 22 

Dec 18, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA. 37 Helmick, "Autobiography," MHI. Subsequent paragraphs, including quotations, 

are from this source. 

268 
fROM WAR TO PEACE 

the situation. At first this had the salutary effect of making the 

resources available to Helmick and his staff much more rapidly. But the 

constant carping about the problems that the Brest cadre was trying to 

improve eventually became discouraging. Reporters and government 

officials "gloried to find things to criticize and gave us no credit for the 

efforts we were making to correct them." Stories were rarely verified 

and completed corrections were never reported. 

Some were fair, others were not. A U.S. Senator and his wife, who 

toured the base and dined with the troops, was less than candid. 

Overall, they were complimentary on what they had seen. But once 

they were back in New York, they granted a critical newspaper interview and decried the deplorable "suffering" of the soldiers. After doing 

some damage control, Helmick and Butler resolved that they would no 

longer waste their time or good food on political visitors. Some 

reporters, notably Mary Roberts Reinhart, were objective and fair in 

their comments. A series of inspectors sent to Brest in response to the 

complaints consistently praised the improvements in operations. Later, 

Chief of Staff March made a public statement supporting Helmick and 

his staff for their efforts. Finally, Secretary Baker and Secretary of the 

Navy Josephus Daniels separate ly issued praise for the improvements. 

By April the scanda l over the "He ll-Hole of France" had faded away as 

the press sought other sensations. At the end of June measures were 

begun to slowly draw down the operation. 

When Base Section No. 5 officially closed in September, nearly 

1.1 million U.S. troops had processed through it on the way home. In 

other words, thirty-one divisions and numerous casuals had embarked 

from Brest. The average time at Camp Pontanezen was about six days, 

although one division, the 2d, had gone through in less than two. The 

port's peak embarkation month was July, when 176,000 soldiers had 

embarked and sailed for the United States. Despite its early reputation, its health rate was comparable to the AEF average, while its disciplinary incidents were lower. General Helmick praised many of his 

staff officers for the base's successful role in embarkation. He particularly singled out Col. Walter L. Reed, his inspector "who did more 

than any other sta ff officer to bring order out of the chaos that existed in the camp during the early days." With the closure of the base, a 

modest AEF headquarters in Paris monitored the last phases of withdrawal from France and the completion of arrangements for the occupation of Germany. 

The problems faced by the inspectors at home and overseas were, 

however, only one part of the story. World War I had brought the United 

States briefly into the arena of international responsibilities and great269 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

power conflicts. With the demobilization process under way in France, 

other American forces were taking part in the occupation of defeated 

Germany and, although unwillingly, in the civil war in Russia that followed that country's revolution. In these places, too, the inspectorate 

faced new and unexpected challenges. 

270 
8 

The Inspectorate in Germany 

and Russia 

One provision of the armistice agreement established an occupation 

zone to be held by the allies on the west bank of the Rhine, along with 

three bridgeheads on the east bank. In consequence, American forces 

were committed to occupation duty in Germany at least until the peace 

treaty was signed, and, as it turned out, for several years after that. The 

area held by the United States consisted of, for the most part, a slice 

of the Rhineland between Luxembourg and the German city of 

Coblenz. On L 5 November 191 8 General Pershing activated the Third 

Army, under Maj. Gen. Joseph T. Dickman, to control the occupation 

forces. Dickman selected Brig. Gen. Malin Craig to be his chief of 

staff and began gathering the nearly 200 staff officers necessary to 

form the headquarters. The Third Army was to monitor compliance 

with the armistice terms, and by I 5 November it was directing the 

eastward movement of several corps following the withdrawal of 

German forces.' 

An Army of Occupation 

Initially, the new field army headquarters controlled about 240,000 

U.S. troops. While the III Corps, with three U.S. divisions, moved 

across the Rhine and into the Coblenz bridgehead, the IV and VII 

Corps, with five divisions, occupied the Moselle valley along the line 

of communications back to Luxembourg. The rn Corps units immedi-

' Keith L. Nelson, Viclors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 1918- 1923 

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 26- 27, 29; Department of the 

Army, Historical Division, The United States Army in the World 111-w, 17 vols. 

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), 10:101-02. 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

ately began marking the boundaries of the bridgeheads, to prevent 

allied soldiers from wandering into the neutral zone between U.S. and 

German forces and to control civilian movement in and out of the 

American zone.

2 

The IV Corps divisions west of the Rhine were centered around the 

towns of Andernach, Ahrweiler, and Cochem. The VIJ Corps occupied 

a rear area centered on Trier, where the Advanced Headquarters was 

located. By 15 December the Third Army headquarters was in place at 

Coblenz, the capital of Germany's Rhine Province and a major administrative center. For the duration of the occupation General Dickman 

and his successors, with their staffs, were housed in the massive 

Ehrenbreitstein Fortress, which towers over the city on the east bank of 

the Rhine. The U.S. forces were well established by Christmas, and the 

entire command was brought up to full sh·ength with personnel fi·om 

units being disbanded in France (Map 3).

3 

Discipline and standards were maintained through a rigid program 

of command and general inspections. In January 1919 General 

Brewster made a full inspection of U.S. units in their new billets in 

Germany, visiting every corps and division headquarters in the Third 

Army, as well as many of the regiments and battalions. He paid special 

attention to the appearance and equipment of the troops and the effects 

of American civil affairs policies toward the Germans. He reported 

favorably to Pershing regarding discipline, civil-military relations, and 

training, citing the lst Battalion, 28th Infantry, 1st Division, as especia lly conunendable. Pershing followed with his own thorough inspection a month later. 4 

By February a routine had been established, in which unit training 

ended at noon and the troops engaged in sports the rest of the day. One 

of the great events for the month was a football game between the 4th 

and 89th Divisions, witnessed by 20,000 officers and men. (The 89th 

won, 14 to 0.) Third Army schools opened, as did others at the unit level, 

to train or refresh personnel in needed military skills. About I ,800 officers and men attended courses at British and French universities. The 

2 American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC), American Armies and 

Bafllejields in Europe (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1938), p. 489. 1 Ernst Fraenkel, Militmy Occupation and the Rule of Law: Occupational Government 

in the Rlline/ant/, 1918- 1923 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 7. 

• Rpt, Brewster to Pershing, 9 Feb 19, sub: Field Inspection of the Third Army, 

13 28 January 1919, Entry 588, Record Group (RG) 120, National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C.; Memo, Woolfolk to OIG, 26 Mar 

19, sub: Points Covered by the General of the Armies in Inspections, OTIG files, 

Pentagon {SAIG-ZXH). 

272 
THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA 

Verdun 

• 

FRANCE 

Map 3 

\,_ 

'\ 

. ;-• 

. 

,.· 

I 

• Metl 

December 1918 

® Headquarters, Third Army 

-xxxxx- Boundary of American Zone 

-xxxx- Boundary between American Armies 

-xx- Division Boundary 

so 

Milos 

civilian welfare organizations continued their work until April 1919, 

when the Third Army G- 1 took over most of their operations. The army 

quartermaster purchased the Red Cross' and YMCA's surplus stocks and 

sold excess items to the hard-pressed local populace.5 

Political turmoil and the possible need to use military force should 

the armistice or peace negotiations break down kept all of the Third 

Army's staff elements working at levels far beyond normal peacetime 

training activities. The G- 2 continued an active Order of Battle 

Section to identify German un its capable of opposing American move5

Third Army G- 1 Rpt, Historical File 193- 11.4, Entry 93 1, RG 120, N/\RA; Irwin 

L. 1-lunt, "American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918- 1920: Report 

of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs," mimeographed, 4 vols. (Coblenz, 1920), 

I: 141 , copy in Army Library, Washington, D.C. 

273 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

ment eastward from the bridgehead. It also monitored civilian activities within the American zone, sharing its information with the inspector general, the provost marshal, and the chief of civil affairs. Through 

the intelligence-gathering activity, considerable political and labor 

unrest was averted.6 

The G- 3 and the G-5 continued the planning and preparations that 

would be needed if military force again had to be used against the 

Germans. Personnel turbulence, however, aggravated their efforts. 

Gains and losses of individuals and units began almost as soon as the 

Third Army entered Germany; by the end of June 1919 almost 130,000 

men had been sent home. Gradually, the major combat units were withdrawn and replaced by smaller organizations. Immediately after the 

peace treaty was signed, a further massive reduction of units required 

complete restructuring within the staff and the command. The G- 3 and 

G- 5 were merged, and control of the occupation zone was centralized, 

rather than entrusted to unit commanders in their own areas.' 

The huge surge of units out of the conunand required the Third 

Army to become deeply involved in demobilization, mainly a G-4 and 

ordnance activity. Units and equipment had to be staged through 

Services of Supply (SOS) facilities either at Brest, Rotterdam, or 

Antwerp. Surplus equipment was transferred to remaining units or sold 

through the U.S. Liquidation Commission. Refurbishment of the dilapidated German railway system by Third Army engineers was critical for 

meeting use demands. A related logistical problem of major proportions 

was the disposition of German war materiel abandoned or given up 

under the terms of the armistice. Whatever was not desired by the 

Liquidation Commission was destroyed, including millions of artillery 

rounds and hundreds of aircraft, while signal equipment, anns, and vehicles often were shipped to other nations, such as Belgium and Poland. 

The Liquidation Commission itself became the object of an IG 

investigation, carried out by General Chamberlain at the special request 

of Secretary Baker. An independent agency established in February 

I 919 to dispose of the property, faci lities, and equipment that were no 

longer needed to support the U.S. Army's overseas activities, it was 

completely separate from the AEF. The commission consisted of four 

members, the best known of whom was Charles G. Dawes, a financier, 

diplomat, Republican politician, and old friend of General Pershing 

• Third Army G- 2 Rpt, Historical File 193- 11.4, Entry 931 , RG 120, NARA. 

' Nelson, Victors Divided. p. 126; ABMC, American Armies, p. 493; Third Army 

G- 3 Rpt, Historical Fi le 193- 11.4, Entry 93 1, RG 120, NARA. 

274 
T H E IN SPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA 

who served as a National Army brigadier general in the Services of 

Supply and who would become vice-president of the United States in 

1925. When the strong-willed Dawes resigned to join Warren G. 

Harding's 1920 campaign for the presidency, three members and a 

small staff remained, working under great pressure on a vast scale in a 

turbulent period. Competitiveness and rancor generated by the goals 

and ambitions of profiteers and newly created governments ultimately 

led to accusations of improper conduct by the commission, which in 

turn had led to Secretary Baker's request.8 

General Chamberlain ordered his financial expert, Major Streater, 

to pursue the specific allegations. Following his review, Streater reported that the Liquidation Commission had entered into several questionable arrangements with a holding company acting for the Polish 

Government. The chairman of the holding company was a former commission staff officer, whose possible proprietary knowledge seemed to 

expose the commission to charges of favoritism. The commission, too, 

sold goods directly to the Polish Army, although a German company 

had entered a higher bid. This, however, was within the commission's 

prerogative, provided that its members believed it to be in the best interests of the United States. Major Streater also noted that the speed with 

which American surplus items were sold made it necessary to repurchase some of them, an embarrassing inconvenience. Both he and 

Chamberlain agreed that th is represented poor planning but was hardly 

criminal. In conclusion, the Inspector General told Secretary Baker that 

the conunission could have been better managed but that its operations 

merited no further investigation while it phased itself out.9 

By March 1919 the occupation forces in Germany were no longer 

dependent upon the Services of Supply in France for logistical support. 

Operations were fully established in Antwerp, with forward bases at 

Andernach and Bendorf and a regulating station at Trier. Subsidiary 

facilities were also set up at Rotterdam under the control of the Antwerp 

port conu11ander, who took his orders from the Third Army G-4. 10 

8 Memos, Baker to Chamberlain, l Jun 20, and Streater to IG, USA, I 0 .lui 20, Entry 

1360, RG 120, NARA. See also Erna Risch, Quartermaster Supporl of rite Army: A 

His101y ofi!te Corps. 1775- /93 9 (Washington, D.C.: Quartermaster Historian's Office, 

Office of the Quartermaster General, 1962), pp. 698- 99. 

• Memo. Streater to IG, USA, I 0 Jul 20, Entry 1360, RG 120, NARA; Memo, 

Chamberlain to Baker, 27 Nov 20, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. See also Frederick 

Palmer, Newlon D. Baker: America ar War, 2 vols. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 

1931 ), 2:397- 98. 

•u IJunt, " Military Government," I :21 4-15; Henry T. Allen, ;\IfF Rhineland Joumal 

(Boston: Houghton M iffiin Co., 1923), pp. 14, 86. 

275 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

When the U.S. forces entered Germany, civil affairs was a top priority at each level of command. Operating at the Advanced 

Headquarters in Trier, the newly assigned civil affairs officer dealt 

directly with General Pershing. His deputy was placed in charge of 

civil affairs at the Coblenz headquarters, where he served until March 

1920; he was responsible for policies and broad supervision over 

matte rs involving public works and utilities; fiscal affairs; public 

health; schools; charities; and political, legal, or penal activities. 

Each corps and division also had an officer on its staff performing 

similar duties. In June 1919, as distance and organization made the 

Advanced Headquarters increasingly superfluous, it was finally 

phased out, with all remaining functions transferred to the Third 

Army's Coblenz headquarters. 11 

Administering the American zone by tactical area proved to be 

increasingly difficult and unnecessarily turbulent for the Third Army 

because of the constant shift of key personnel and units. The overall 

result was the near-impossibility of implementing uniform civil affairs 

policies. As major units began to depart, whole regions of the zone were 

completely ungarrisoned and unsupervised. To rectify this awkward 

situation, the Third Army established a territorial organization in May 

1919. One or more civil affairs officers, with a small staff consisting of 

a provost court officer, a sanitary inspector, and an executive, were 

assigned to each county (Kreis in German), and military police units of 

appropriate size were detailed to patrol each district and maintain order. 

Completed by the end of June, the new structure successn•lly weathered the uproar over the signing of the Versailles Treaty, in part because 

the investigations carried out by IGs for the Third Army civil affairs 

officer restored the German's faith in the good intentions and essential 

fairness of U.S. policies.12 

After the signing of the treaty, there was little possibility of a 

renewal of hostilities, and the withdrawal of U.S. personnel that had 

begun in May became torrential. On 2 July the Third Army was deactivated, and its remaining personnel and equipment were transferred 

to the newly created American Forces in Germany (AFIG) headquarters, which remained at Coblenz. In the nearly eight months of its 

existence, the Third Army had created the framework of the occupation, with missions, functions, and standards that would endure until 

" Hunt, "Military Government," I :58- 60; Ltr, Grier to Oberpresident, Rhine Prov, 8 

Jun 20, sub: Civil Affairs Functions, Entry 1360, RG 120, NARA; Rpt, Brewster to 

Pershing, 9 Feb 19, Entry 588. RG 120, NARA. 11 Hunt, "Military Government," I :71- 72. 

276 
THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA 

the last American soldier was withdrawn. When Dickman's replacement, General Liggett, retmned to the United States in July 1919, 

Maj. Gen. Henry T. Allen, the commander ofthe 90th Division on the 

Western Front, became the AFIG commander, serving until the AFIG 

was deactivated. Meanwhile, AEF headquarters remained in Paris, 

merging with the Services of Supply in September 1919 to form the 

fast-fading American Forces in France (AFIF). This temporary organization ceased to exist with the departure of General Pershing in 

January 1920. While in the United States, Pershing closed out final 

AEF matters until the time of his appointment as Chief of Staff in 

July 1921. 13 

Long before that, General Allen had set the pattern for the remainder of the occupation in Germany. Obviously, the presence of U.S. 

troops was more diplomatic than operational. AFIG strength had 

totaled 110,000 in July 1919 but only 11 ,000 in September and then, 

with the addition of the 8th and 50th Infantry in a brigade intended for 

peace-keeping service in Silesia but never deployed, about 15,000 in 

October, remaining at this level until the final withdrawal began in the 

fall of 1921. The drastic reduction of U.S. troops in 19 19 necessitated 

a corresponding reduction in the size of the American zone, which ultimately consisted of only a part of the Coblenz bridgehead and an area 

north of the Moselle on the west bank of the Rhine. French forces took 

over the areas abandoned by the United States, creating the potential for 

friction both with the Germans and the doughboys.

14 

General Allen was forced to spend most of his time as the 

American representative on the Allied High Commission, dealing 

with political and diplomatic issues that affected the Rhineland or 

relations with Weimar Germany. Despite his focus and his diminished force, Allen insisted on the highest standards of military conduct and training. In his opinion, his showcase units made up in prof iciency and appearance what they lacked in relative size. 

Consequently, as a matter of policy, and also to keep the troops busy, 

the half-day schedule ended and fie ld training and tactical exercises 

became the norm for the occupation soldier. 15 The combination of 

issues that arose concerning soldier conduct, diplomatic needs, and 

civil-military relations created a challenging situation for the staff of 

the occupying forces. 

" Allen, R!tineland Joumal, pp. 6- 7; Rpt, Reed to CG, AFIF, 20 Dec 19. Entry 588, 

RG 120, NARA. 

"Nelson, Victors Divided, pp. 126, 2 1 I; Allen, Rhineland Joumal, pp. 43, 46. 

's Allen, Rhineland Joumal, passim. 

277 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Organizing the Inspectorate 

The inspectorate in Germany evolved with the army of occupation. 

Inspectors arrived on the Rhine on the staffs of the Third Army and its 

major tactical units. With their return to the United States in the summer of 1919, the small AFlG staff in Coblenz was forced to assume the 

functions of inspection for the entire occupation zone. Tlu·ee officers 

were authorized, but until January 1920 only two were assigned full 

time. They were assisted by one army field clerk and one enlisted clerk 

until October 1921, when a chief clerk, an enlisted fi le clerk, two army 

field clerk stenographers, and an interpreter joined the office. The 

Coblenz office serviced not only the 15,000 men of the AFIG but also 

the nearly one million Germans in the zone and small groups of U.S. 

forces in Poland, Belgium, and several other European countries. 16 

The first senior inspector in the occupation force was Col. Alvan C. 

Read, a U.S. Military Academy graduate and an infantry officer. As a 

young man, he had seen action in Cuba and the Phi li ppines; later, he 

served as the 1st Division senior inspector and then as the First Army 

assistant inspector before being assigned to the Third Army on 13 

November 191 8. He was assisted by two other infantrymen, Col. 

Robert G. Peck and Lt. Col. Charles H. Rice, until August 1919, when 

they returned to the United States. Read was then alone until 3 

September, when he was joined by Major Magruder, a coast artilleryman who had been an inspector at the SOS headquarters and at the 

District of Paris. Magruder remained in the office until its closing, ultimately serving as senior inspector of the force. 17 

Another officer important to the success of the inspectorate in 

Germany was Lt. Col. (later Col.) Louis Van Schaick, who reported on 

24 November 1919. As a permanent member of a General CoUtt-martial Board, Van Schaick at first performed few 10 functions. Then 

tragedy struck. In late December Colonel Read contracted influenza, 

which was later compounded by pneumonia. He died in Coblenz on 19 

January 1920 and was buried there a few days later in an impressive 

international ceremony. Thus Van Schaick became the senior inspector 

by default, until his reassignment home in July. Col. William H. Hay, a 

cavalryman, succeeded him as the senior inspector on 19 August. A 

wartime major genera l who had commanded the 28th Division, he was 

,. Memo, IG, A FIG, to CofS, A FIG, 4 Oct 2 1, sub: Clerical Personnel, Entry 1360, 

RG 120, NARA. 

" See Roster of Inspectors, AFIG, Entry 1360, RG 120, NARA 

278 
THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA 

a conscientious and efficient officer, admired greatly by General 

Allen. On 9 May 1921 Hay was 

selected to be the AFIG chief of 

stan: and Major Magruder then 

replaced him as senior inspector. 1

& 

No less burdensome were the 

consequences of an upheaval in 

organization. The Third Army 

commanders and, later, General 

Allen all believed firmly in the 

need for frequent command 

inspections of every element of 

their organizations. Allen conducted periodic full-scale inspections and reviews of the AFIG, 

continually emphasizing the need 

for the very best levels of appearance and performance in personnel and equipment alike. He preferred to concentrate units into 

Col. Alvan C. Read 

formations as large as possible for his inspections. Movement to the 

concentration site was in itself a test of mobility and equipment, serving almost as a major field problem and an opportunity for drill on a 

large scale.'9 The entire procedure was very much in the style of 

General Pershing, to which all personnel were accustomed. 

So long as General Craig was chief of staff, the heavy emphasis on 

command inspections remained in balance with the traditional staff 

relationships that developed in the AEF in 1917 and 1918. However, 

when Brig. Gen. William W. JJarts took over as Craig's successor at the 

AFIG on 20 July 1919, the result was a heavy shift toward complete 

dominance by the general staff. Prior to that date the senior inspector, 

recognized as an independent member of the personal or special staff, 

had reported directly to the chief of staff and attended all staff conferences. General Harts made the inspectors general, along with the Signal 

Corps staff, service sections of the G- 3. In similar fashion , he subordinated the provost marshal and adjutant and judge advocate genera ls to 

" Ibid.: /\lien. Rhineland Journal, pp. 72- 73. I lay was later promoted to brigadier 

general. He left Germany in June 1922 to command a brigade on the Mexican border. 

• /\lien. Rhineland Journal, pp. 40, 83. 

279 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

the G- 1, as well as the surgeon, ordnance officer, quartermaster, and 

the Antwerp base section commander to the G-4. Harts transformed the 

G sections into operational, rather than planning, elements. Needless to 

say, "there was a distinct under current [sic] of dissatisfaction among 

the officers in Germany."20 

One effect of the reorganization was an uncontrolled and uncoordinated flurry of inspections, carried out by a variety of staff officers who 

frequently gave conflicting instructions to confused and frustrated unit 

commanders. Practically all inspections- routine, tactical, or preembarkation- were made by general staff officers and not by inspectors 

general. The arrangement contravened the intent of the National 

Defense Act of 1920, which stressed that the War Department General 

Staff- and thus its officers- should restrict itself to planning and coordinating functions. 21 

It was not until Colonel Hay arrived in August that any changes 

were made. Hay insisted that he be given the independence necessary 

to carry out his functions in a direct relationship with the conu11ander. 

He asked for and was given direct access to the AFIG chief of staff and 

the authority to attend staff conferences in his own right. And when he 

took over as chief of staff, he ended the inspectorate's subordination to 

the G- 3 by directing that Major Magruder report to him directly. 21 

Prior to Hay's intervention, however, Harts' experiment caused 

myriad difficulties. Typical were those that developed in the Antwerp 

Base Section. Maj. John L. Parkinson was the base inspector when the 

base was still a service section of the AFIG G- 4. G-4 policy restricted 

Parkinson's contact with the command inspector genera l, and his 

reports never found their way into IG channels. No problems resulted 

so long as his duties were limited to routine activities, such as the 

inspection of Army transports or the handling of local complaints. 

However, on issues of greater importance that could affect the entire 

command, the possibility existed that his reports would not be utilized 

to aiJow prompt and proper resolution. 

In July 1920 General Chamberlain pointed out the potential problem in a report to General Allen, offering the solution that he assign 

Parkinson to the AFIG's lG office with duty station at Antwerp. Allen 

10 Memo, Reed to IG, USA, 16 Feb 20, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 11 Ibid.; James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and 

Administmtion. 1900- 1963 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Mi litary History, 

1966), pp. 50- 51. 

u Ltr, Magruder to Chamberlain, 23 Aug 20; Memo, Chamberlain to Allen, I 0 Jul 

20. Both in Entry 1360, RG 120, NARA. 

280 
THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND R USSIA 

directed that a study be made, but quickly encountered strong opposition from his G-4, Lt. Col. Brehon Somervell. Somervell argued that 

the inspector at Antwerp should deal exclusively with the port commander and his superior, the G-4. The AFIG chief transportation officer, Capt. Abbott Boone, agreed with Somervell; however, he believed 

that Parkinson should be allowed access to the AFIG's lG office for 

technical matters. Neither officer saw any harm in Parkinson providing 

copies of his reports to the command inspector general. Hence, General 

Harts' immediate successor as chief of staff, Col. John C. Montgomery, 

directed that Parkinson keep the AFIG inspector informed of his activities and authorized direct coordination between the two offices.

2

) 

Under the new arrangement inspection reports from the Antwerp 

Post were sent to the AFIG G-4, who provided an information copy to 

the AFIG inspector. The change, however, proved to be insufficient. 

The British consul general in Antwerp requested that allegations of 

mistreatment of a British subject by U.S. military police be investigated. Major Parkinson, after a thorough investigation, found that the military police had in fact used excessive force. Yet the report, because it 

reflected unfavorably on some G-4 policies, was filed quietly by that 

office. No copy was provided the inspector general, no follow-up was 

carried out, and no corrective action was taken. As a result, General 

Allen eventually had to offer his apologies to the Allied High 

Commission for discourtesy shown to one of its member states. Shortly 

afterward, Allen shifted the subordination of the port inspector from the 

G-4 to the command inspector general and directed that his reports 

would go tlu·ough IG channels for appropriate action. In this way, after 

Parkinson's formal reassignment on 14 November, Colonel Hay was 

able to reestablish fully the status of the inspectorate as it had been 

when the Third Army entered Germany nearly two years before. ~ 

The small inspection staff remained extremely busy throughout 

these upheavals, despite the fact that opposition by some members of 

Congress to any American presence in Germany made the AFIG's 

future perpetually uncertain. Some inspectors played a role in the drawdown. For a time, overstaffing by officers typified the command. Many 

23 Memo, Chamberlain to Allen, I 0 Jul 20; Rpt, lG, AFIG, to Col'S, AFIG, 26 Oct 

20, sub: Inspection Concerning the Complaint of Mr. E. C. Preston; Memo, Col'S, 

AFIG, to IG, AFIG, 23 Jul 20, sub: Status of Captain [sic] J. L. Parkinson. All in Entry 

1360, RG 120, NARA. 

N Memo, IG, AF!G, to Parkinson, 26 Jul 20, sub: Status in Relation to Port 

Commander, Port of Antwerp; Memo, AG, AFIG, to !G, AFJG, 2 Nov 20, sub: Reports 

From Port Inspector. Both in Entry L360, RG 120, NARA. 

281 
THE INSPECTORS G ENERAL, 1903-1939 

who had held wartime jobs in the numerous short-lived organizations 

related to the am1isticc, peace agreements, and relief work simply transitioned into AFIG positions, often supernumerary and frequently overgraded, in the postwar period. An additional surplus arrived from the 

AEF units rapidly demobilizing in France. Continued duty in Europe 

was desirable for many reasons. Temporary wartime grades remained in 

effect until the end of 1919; the dollar was very strong, compared to the 

declining European currencies; no Volstead Act- imposed prohibition 

existed; and life in an occupation force was safe and appealing. 

An inspector visiting the A FIG from the American headquarters in 

France in June 1919 reported that he had encountered infantry companies commanded by field-grade officers and one infantry regiment with 

three colonels. He considered the AFIG staff "exceedingly large and 

somewhat top-heavy," concluding that it was too easy for an officer to 

secure a position in Germany. Colonel Reed, then the AFIF inspector, 

reported his observations to General Chamberlain when he returned to 

the United States. Shortly afterward, the War Department began to 

pressure Allen to reduce the number of officers in the command. 

Between October 1919 and May 1920 the headquarters trimmed nearly 450 officers out of an original total of 850. ~ 

Thereafter, the strength of the command stabilized until November 

1921. Then an Army-wide reorganization, mandated by Congress, 

reduced the command to about 6,000 of all ranks, 5,500 of whom 

served in a single infantry brigade. No sooner had the drawdown been 

achieved than another directive arrived in February 1922, reducing the 

command to about 3,200, with a single regiment. Each time the reduction axe fell, the small IG office anticipated losses from its own ranks. 

However, it remained fully manned with three officers and the supporting staff until May 1922. In Major Magruder's view, General Allen 

understood the need for an adequate number of inspectors to handle the 

personal and financial aspects of the ongoing withdrawal.16 

By June 1922 all but I ,200 troops had departed. Two inspectors 

went home at that time, leaving Major Magruder and a field clerk to 

maintain the office until the final withdrawal in January 1923. In the 

course of its existence, the /\FIG's IG office conducted nearly 200 socalled special investigations along with many more of a routine nature. 

" Memo (quoted words), Reed to IG, USA, 16 Feb 20, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA; 

Allen, Rhineland Joumal, pp. 41, I 08 . 

.. Memo, AG, AFIG, to CG, AFIG, 15 Oct 21, sub: Reduction of American Forces 

in Germany; Ltr, Magruder to llclmick, 8 Mar 22, Both in Entry 1360, RG 120, NA RA. 

Sec also Allen, Rhineland Joumal, pp. 277. 301, 320. 

282 
THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND R USSIA 

It also completed several special inquiries for General Allen that profoundly influenced the organization and policies of the command. 27 

Inspectors, Duties 

The inspectors general held a broad area of responsibility that was limited only briefly and partially by General Harts' policies favoring the 

general staff. The authority to resolve deficiencies and to oversee discipline that General Pershing had vested in them continued throughout 

the occupation phases of the Third Army and the AFIG.2

' 

All investigations and inquiries made by other agencies in the occupation force, such as the Provost Marshal's Department or a staff section, were expected to be referred to the JG office for information, additional action, or trend analysis. On occasion, the inspectors would recommend follow-up actions by other members of the headquarters. They 

had extensive influence over lega l questions, for AFlG policy required 

that IGs investigate all instances of abuse, neglect, or irregularity 

brought out at general courts-martial.29 

The IG office also continued to use court-martial data to indicate 

trends as part of its periodic analyses of discipline. Problems in soldier 

attitudes and conduct were not the only issues detected. For example, 

an inspector reported that soldiers accused of assaulting allied soldiers 

were never convicted, despite valid witnesses, and that long delays 

seemed to be the norm for bringing these types of cases to trial. The situation was an embarrassment to the AFIG, forcing General Allen to 

make excuses and offer apologies to his colleagues on the Allied High 

Commission. An inquiry found that the problem Jay with one of the 

court-martial presidents, a crusty old colonel who was "not in sympathy for punishing soldiers becoming involved with foreigners." He was 

given other duties, which brought about an improvement in the judicial 

process and international relations.

30 

Flawed administration in the AFIG was all too common, with the 

commander having to rely on his IG staff for solutions. On two occa11 A lien, Rhineland Journal, pp. 366, 493, 506, 508, 513; A FIG IG f-i le 20 I, Entry 

1360, RG 120, NARA. 2

' Rpt, flay to CG, AFJG, 13 Muy 2 1, sub: IG History, Entry I 360, RG 120, 

NARA. 

·• Rpt, Robert to TG,AFIG, 19 Feb 20, sub: [Complaint] Against U.S. Soldiers, Entry 

1360, RG 120, NARA. 

"' Rpt, IG, A FIG, to CofS, AFIG. 28 May 20, sub: Case of Sgt. T. J. Vrana, 28 May 

20; Memo (quotation), Allen to TAG, 19 Mar 20, sub: Case of PrivateS. B. Gerace. 

Both in Enlry 1360, RG 120, NARA. 

283 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

sions the IG office carried out special investigations in an effort to 

reduce the vast amounts of paperwork generated within the command. 

In February 1920, after General Allen had rece ived complaints from 

unit commanders, an inspector recommended that some reports be 

e liminated and endorsement procedures simplified. Then in April 1922, 

in response to an Army-wide paperwork reduction tasking, Allen once 

again relied on his IG. Major Magruder, after nearly a month of study 

and surveying, proposed improvements in the way orders were published and changes were made to regulations. ln his report to the 

Inspector General of the Army, he identified the real problem as "generally too much information published but too little digested doctrine," 

suggesting that officers at every staff level should assess the value of 

what they wrote before imposing it on others. 31 

Units also were quickly brought under the inspectors' purview. 

General inspections at first tended to be informal in the Third Army, for 

Genera l Craig assumed that recent combat experience and the possibility of renewed hostilities would be sufficient motivation for commanders to keep their units in the best possible condition. This did not prove 

to be the case, however; some units failed to either mainta in proper 

standards or take the necessary remedial actions voluntarily. 

Consequently, beginning in late January 1919, all inspections were 

announced and compliance with inspectors' findings was directed formally. An encouraging fact, discovered by inspectors, was that most 

units were careful in their financia l dealings; inspections carried out 

during the entire occupation period found the majority of unit funds to 

be maintained correctly. Camp exchange funds and welfare distributions also were monitored, and inspectors assisted the often inexperienced custodians in the proper disposal of their surpluses. 

In May 1921 Colonel Hay successfully argued against opening fullsca le post exchanges, despite the urging of many of General Allen's 

advisers. Hay pointed out that exchanges would not only compete with 

such established quartermaster activities as the commissary but also 

pose severe accounting problems. He also noted that establishing post 

exchanges implied a greater permanence for the command than U.S. 

policy then seemed to justify. 12 

'

1 Ltr, AG, AFIG, to CofSccs/Svcs, 18 Feb 20, sub: Reduction of Paperwork; Ltr, 

TAG to CG, A FIG, 10 Apr 22. sub: Reduction of Paperwork; Rpt (quotation}, Magruder 

to IG, USA, 10 May 22, sub: Reduction of Papenvork. All in Entry 1360, RG 120, 

NARA. 

" Ltr, AG, 2d Army, to AG, IX Corps, 22 Jan 19, Entry 22; A FIG JG File 123, Funds, 

Entry 1360. Both in RG 120, NARA. 

284 
THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND R USSIA 

Inspectors assumed their heaviest burden and played their most 

useful role in helping units that were deactivating or returning to the 

United States to dispose of their assets properly. Funds managed by 

departing units had to be closed, commissaries and unit exchanges notified, and the international transactions monitored. The work proved to 

be far more than Read and Magruder could handle while attending to 

other IG duties. In October 1919 Read wrote to Chamberlain's deputy, 

General Wood, and requested an accolmtant for his office. The 

Inspector General approved the request, and arrangements were made 

to reassign Major Streater from the AFIF headquarters as soon as he 

could be spared. General Wood also told Read that his assignment and 

those of Magruder and Streater would not be "disturbed," to allow some 

stability and continuity in his office. Arriving on 12 January 1920, 

Streater turned out to be everything the office had hoped for. General 

Allen recommended him for a Regular Army commission; but, because 

he was overage, he was discharged on 20 November under the provisions of the National Defense Act of 1920 that required the relief of all 

temporary officers. 33 

One of his most onerous duties was keeping track of disbursing 

accounts and other funds held by American officers in locations 

throughout Europe. Major Streater traveled through Belgium, France, 

and Germany on a virtually endless circuit, performing audits during 

his year in the AFIG. In Paris, visiting the AFIF f inance officer, he 

found one of the more unusual funds that absorbed the assets of disbanded organizations. Never very large, the fund dropped to less than 

$2,000 by the fall of 1922- when few American units were left in 

France- and thus was almost completely inactive. Finally in December 

Magruder urged that it be closed, calling it "a relic of the Great War."34 

Overall, the account inspections rarely disclosed an impropriety, 

although occasional honest errors were noted on the part of harassed 

and inexperienced fiscal officers. Then the inspector would assist in 

making the necessary corrections. · 

The AFIG's IG office also reviewed unit commanders' decisions 

and all board proceedings that adjudicated irregularities in funds management. The legality and fairness of the actions taken were considered and recommendations made to accept or modify them. In one 

case, four officers were found equally liable for a cash loss, because 

" Ltr (quoted word), W. Wood to Read, 17 Nov 19, and File 201 , W. Streater, Entry 

1360, RG 120, NARA. 

~ Rpt, Eddy to JG, AFIG, n.d., sub: Disbanded Organization Account, Entry 1360, 

RG 120, NARA. 

285 
T HE INSPECTORS G ENERAL, 1903-1939 

each had known the combination of a safe from which money had been 

stolen. Colonel Hay felt that penalizing all for the loss of funds for 

which only one was responsible was unfair to the point of absurd ity. 

He recommended that the accountable officer alone be held liable, on 

the grounds that he had put the money in an unsecured place. General 

Allen agreed, amending the board's decision to conform with the 

inspector's recommendation.35 

Although the drudgery of finance accounts and related matters 

consumed a great deal of time, civil affairs placed fu rther heavy 

demands on inspectors. The United States ruled its zone as a military 

occupier, albeit benignly. Until the United States and Germany signed 

a peace treaty in 1921, the AFIG authorities retained their theoretical 

autonomy while cooperating with the Versailles signatories. Authority 

over civilian activities was extensive. There were separate military tribunals established to try and imprison German violators of military 

rules imposed on the population- such offenses as entering the zone 

without a pass, engaging in black market trade, and committing 

vagrancy for immoral purposes (prostitution). The German judicial and 

penal systems also were monitored for compliance with U.S. and AFIG 

standards and policies. Inspectors visited German jails and health facilities, accepting complaints as if they were on a routine unit inspection . .l4 

The AFIG's IG office also received complaints from private 

German citizens and civilian police, mostly about the behavior of 

American soldiers in public places. In a typical case, an American officer was rude to a German woman while trave ling on the 

Coblcnz- Frankfurt train. She complained to the assigned inspector, 

who tracked down the offender and then referred the case to his commander. IGs also looked into complaints from civilians concerning 

unsatisfactory police investigations of offenses committed by U.S. soldiers against Germans. These generally resulted from jurisdictional or 

procedural misunderstandings between local police and their American 

counterparts and normally were resolved quickly.l7 

The number of domestic issues, such as breach of promise and 

paternity, grew as the years of occupation went on and became a del-

" Memo, Hay to G-4, AFIG, 19 Oct 20, Entry 1360, RG 120, NARA. 

II> Ltr, I lay to OIC, Civ A ITs, 23 Feb 20, sub: Complaints or Gennan Prisoners; Rpt, 

I lay to CofS, A FIG, 23 Nov 20. sub: Crowded Condition of City Prisons. Both in Entry 

1360, RG 120, NARA. See also llunt, "Military Government," I :320. 

" Memo, Talbot to CofS, A FIG, 5 Oct 2 1, sub: Complaint of Henry Bohn, CzechoSlovak Civilian; Memo, Magruder to PM, AFIG, 18 Dec 20, sub: Stolen Necklace of 

Countess d' Armil; and A FIG IG File 20 I, Misconduct of Lieutenant Whitley. All in 

Entry 1360, RG 120, NARA. 

286 
THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA 

uge in its final days. Regardless of topic, each complaint was followed 

up by the AFIG's lG office through either provost marshal or civil 

affairs channels until resolved. Most complaints against the German 

courts and the American military tribunals, such as injustice and overly long sentences, were found to have no basis. However, prison conditions were often judged to be below U.S. standards and required 

improvement, leading to the construction of a new prison in Coblenz 

to case congestion.38 

Foreign civilians employed by the AFIG or subject to its regulations 

provided additional work to the inspectorate. Such people were allowed 

to file complaints with the AFIG's IG office. Whether German or citizens of some third nation, civilians with an extended record of misdemeanors could be deported from the occupied zone, an action that 

required approval from the Allied High Commission. Those marked for 

expulsion could appeal their deportation through inspector general 

channels in the American zone. Of the several hundred appeals 

reviewed, no High Commission decisions were overturned by the 

inspector general. 

Officers and Soldiers 

The occupation forces in Germany faced a heavy dose of command and 

staiT inspections, not only from their own inspectors but from a steady 

flow of foreign and American dignitaries. In June and July 1920 

Generals March and Chamberlain each inspected the AflG within a 

few weeks of each other. As Allen later remarked, such scheduling was 

su!Ticient to "take the edge" off both inspections. 3

'

1 

March apparently intended to see the troops, evaluate their tactical 

efficiency, and size up their leaders. He was generally pleased with what 

he saw, but, as General Allen later noted, he did not "overdo" his praise . .w 

General Chamberlain, arrivingjust as ChiefofStaffMarch was leaving, 

concentrated on the internal functions of the command. Yet, like March, 

he could not resist presiding over several large field inspections, including a mounted review in the shadow of the Ehrenbreitstein Fortress. He 

" Rpt, I lay to CofS, AFIG, 23 Nov 20, Entry 1360, RG 120, NA RA. 

•• Allen, R/iine/a/1{/ Joumal, p. 120 (quoted words). Allen's biographer suggests that 

the A FIG commander invited the Chief of StaiT's inspection in a letter to March sent 

th~o: previous December. Sec Heath Twichell, Jr., Allen: The Biogmphy of a11 Army 

Of!icer (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1974 ), p. 277. 

,. Allen, Rlri11eland Journal, p. 11 7 (quoted word); Ltrs, March to Allen, 17 and 23 

Jun 20, Entry 1360, RG 120, NARA. Aller leaving Europe, March told a Chicago 

Tribu11e reporter thai the A FIG was the best unit in the Army. 

287 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

General Chamberlain Inspecting an A FIG Unit at Coblenz 

visited each location where American troops were stationed and made a 

critical inspection of their facilities and how they were caring for them. 

He laid particular emphasis on guardhouses, prisons, and mess halls, but 

focused on the many problems with the Transportation Service, mostly 

in the areas of management and lack of adherence to War Department 

policies. Despite five closely typed pages of critica l observations, 

Chamberlain concluded, to Allen's surprise, that the AFIG was the 

"most magnificent" command he had inspected. Later, in July 192 1, 

both Chamberlain and March returned for a visit that was more a grand 

tour than a serious in pection .~' 

Although the visits of dignitaries generally were productive, AFIG 

officers, for the most part, dreaded them as they did those of inspectors. 

General Allen used lG reports as one of his sources for not only evaluating senior commanders but a lso determining the state of the command, and the effect of inspections in exposing the deficiencies of marginal units were sometimes devastating to their leaders. In June 1920 

•• Allen, Rhineland Journal, p. 128; Ltr (quoted words}, Chamberlain to CO, A FIG, 

I 0 Jul 20, Entry 1360, RG 120, NA RA. 

288 
THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA 

Allen relieved the commander of the 5th Infantry, largely as a result of 

problems shown in a series of IG inspections and investigations. In 

comparison to other units, the regiment consistently received the lowest rating in the monthly discipline report, having the highest number 

of incidents and courts-martial and the greatest number of cases 

returned for improper preparation. Two special investigations had 

revealed unit administration to be poor, and several tactical inspections 

had shown unit training to be the worst in the command.~l 

Not only commanders suffered. Special investigations often targeted members of the officer corps. At least 75 percent of the cases had to 

do with some form of personal misconduct. General Allen took a severe 

view of any abuse of alcohol. Any allegation of overindulgence was 

investigated and, if found to have substance, referred to a court-martial. 

A few other forms of personal misconduct, such as paternity, indebtedness, and brawling, occasionally appeared in IG reports. The remaining 

25 percent of the cases concerned professional rather than personal failings- taking bribes, abuse of authority, and dereliction of duty. 

Gambling was viewed with a jaundiced eye. In September 1919 

Colonel Read investigated allegations of big-money gambling that supposedly had taken place in the 1st Signal Battalion Officers Club. 

Although Read found that nothing of substance had gone on, General 

Allen iJ1formally asked him to survey the entire command to see 

whether gambling was an extensive problem. The AFlG's IG office sent 

a survey to the commanders of all organizations having clubs and canteens, asking their views on whether gambling was a major occupation 

among the troops and whether they viewed it as prejudicial to good 

order. The survey led only to the conclusion that gambling was not a 

problem. Because most commanders tolerated it, officers were personally moderate. In some cases, commanders had issued orders banning 

gambling in their own units. Poker was not particularly popular; officers 

preferred playing bridge for low stakes, while soldiers favored dice. 

Gaming between men of different ranks was not condoned. General 

Allen was pleased, remarking how careful one had to be to keep the conduct of a few from tainting the image of the whole command.~) 

The form of gambling that Allen found most distasteful was speculation in the wildly fluctuating German mark. He directed the A FIG's 

IG office to investigate, and Major Streater, the finance expert, looked 

., Llr, CG, AFIG, to TAG, 19 Jun 20, sub: Relief of Colonel Edgar Fry, Enlry 1360, 

RG 120, NARA. 

•J Memo, IG, AFIG, to ACofS, G- 3, AF!G, II Dec 19, sub: Gambling in American 

Forces in Germany, Entry 1360, RG 120. NARA. 

289 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

into manipulations of the June 1920 payroll. American troops were paid 

in dollars, but disbursing officers also were given a sum of marks to 

allow the troops to meet their obligations on the local economy. Some 

pay officers interpreted this provision very liberally, permitting the men 

to exchange funds in their possession in excess of the pay they drew. 

The practice contravened the intent of published orders; the pay officers apparently were not aware of restrictions on the amount a person 

could exchange. The investigation resulted in tighter controls and 

audits, wh ich prevented that particular form of speculation. However, 

money was still to be made by currency manipulation, and when Allen 

learned in November that some officers were still speculating, he had 

them court-martialed and returned to the United States.

44 

Cases involving enlisted men differed in some respects from 

those involving officers. For one thing, such cases did not feature the 

same high proportion of alcohol-related investigations, perhaps 

because of greater command tolerance for such behavior among the 

soldiers. At least half of the complaints received from enlisted men 

had to do with allegations of improper actions on the part of the military police, including brutality, false arrest, and unnecessary use of 

deadly force. There were a few breach of promise and paternity cases. 

The remainder of the cases largely involved petty crimes, such as barracks thefts and abuse of government property, while a few related to 

disrespect to allied officers. Many of the special investigations concluded with a recommendation for court-martial. If such a recommendation was approved, the AFIG adjutant general would paraphrase the IG report in a directive to the individual 's commander to 

begin the judicial process.45 

In many cases, the inspectors were called upon to conduct inquiries 

more appropriate for a criminal investigative service or a police organization. The military police had begun to perform such duties by the 

time of the armistice in 1918. However, over time the combination of 

inexperienced leaders and the lack of firm direction from the AFIG 

G- 2, under whom the military police had been placed, produced a drop 

in efficiency and a hopeless mixture of police and intelligence functions. By the fall of 1920 the situation had deteriorated to an unacceptable level. General Allen directed Colonel Hay to investigate the 

"' Rpt, Streater to CG, AFJG, 29 Jul 20, sub: Investigation of Money Exchanges by 

Paying Officers, Entry 1360, RG 120, NARA. 

'

5 AFIG IG File 201 , Boxes 3- 6 and 10, Investigations, Entry 1360; Ltr, AG, VI 

Corps, to IG, Vl Corps, I Apr 19, sub: Investigation Discipline, Headquarters Troop, 

Entry 11 49. Both in RG 120, NARA. 

290 
THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA 

Provost Marshal's Department because of allegations that evidence was 

being manipulated to help friends of the military police. 

The investigation took four weeks- all of October- and revealed 

many problems in addition to the suspected favoritism. Young military 

police officers were not technica lly knowledgeable and often showed 

poor judgment in their management of cases. Their organization did not 

control its discretionary funds properly, a llowing unauthorized or questionable expenditures. The Provost Marshal's Department was understaffed and overworked, a fact that partially accounted for its poor performance and the unprofessional conduct of its personnel. Colonel Hay 

concluded that the department needed a complete overhaul, with new 

personnel and some reorganization, and reconunended that an experienced officer be put in charge of the task of rebuilding command confidence in it.46 

International Complications 

Even before the reform could begin, however, amateurish efforts at 

criminal investigation created an international crisis that took all of 

General Allen's energies to subdue. On their own initiative, two young 

investigators had gone out of their jurisdiction into unoccupied 

Germany to apprehend a deserter, Pvt. Grover C. Bergdoll. In the ensuing fracas, shots were fired and a German woman was wounded. 

German police arrested the Americans, who were tried and sentenced 

to a jail term. Both the German and American governments were 

incensed at what they each viewed as infringements on their prestige 

and sovereignty. Allen was forced to resort to strong diplomatic threats 

to have the men released. He eventually got his way by warning the 

Germans that he might not mediate between them and the French as he 

had done in the past.47 

The Bergdoll crisis begged for a further analysis of the entire G- 2 

police arrangement. In November 1920 the AFIG's IG office received a 

broad directive to evaluate the relationship between the G- 2 and the 

Provost Marshal's Department and to reconunend improvements. 

Colonel Hay exami ned every clement of the counterintelligence and 

criminal sections under the G- 2, defined each of their missions, and 

turned up much evidence both of incompatibility and duplication. He 

.. Rpt, I lay 10 CoS, A FIG. 30 Oct 20, sub: Investigation Into Certa in Phases of the 

Provost Marshal's Department. Enlry 1360, RG 120, NARA. 

•" Twichell, Allen. pp. 243-44; Allen, Rhineland Joumal, pp. 178, 182, 193, 195, 197. 

291 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

concluded that intelligence and police activities should be entirely distinct and that the investigation of criminal activities should be vested 

solely in the Provost Marshal's Department, with the G- 2 removed from 

any direct involvement. Hay also was able to show how a better organization of the two functions would reduce personnel requirements. 

General Allen approved his recommendations on 31 January 1921.48 

The Provost Marshal's Department finally was given the opportunity to realize its potential. Because of improved operations, the number of complaints of police misconduct- and, concomitantly, the number of IG special investigations of criminal conduct- declined. All 

involved benefited from a change that marked a significant advance in 

efficiency and command morale. 

The Bergdoll crisis was not the first time that General Allen and his 

IG were involved in a case with high international interest. On occasion, 

AFIG inspectors handled delicate issues involving the improper use of 

government facilities by unauthorized civilians from allied countries. 

Sometimes entertainers, politicians, and businessmen unconnected with 

the U.S. Army or the Allied High Commission would foist themselves 

on unsuspecting billeting and transportation officers to secure treatment 

and benefits for which they were ineligible. Summaries of IG reports on 

such cases were sent to allied representatives, with a request for remedial action. American citizens who tried similar tricks were simply confronted with a request for reimbursement.49 

More significant was a soldier's death that for a time seemed likely to have wide ramifications. In September 1919 Pvt. Howell Madson, 

8th Infantry, had been shot and killed near Rosbach in the neutral zone 

between U.S. and German forces. The senior inspector at the time, 

Colonel Read, investigated the case and represented General Allen in 

dealing with the Germans. Madson had been poaching with a companion in an area patrolled by the Germans. When they encountered a 

group of German soldiers and failed to surrender, Madson was shot and 

his companion, bound with his own puttees, was forced to jog behind a 

mounted German NCO nearly I 0 miles to the German guard station, 

where he was interrogated with considerable rouglmess . 

._, Memo, Johnston to IG, AFJG, II Jan 2 1; Memo, Bagby to IG, AFIG, 25 Jan 2 1; 

and Memo, Hay to CG, AFIG, 26 Jan 21, sub: Invest igation of the Organization, 

Funct·ions and Duties of the Personnel of Intelligence Section, General Staff and 

Provost Marshal's Department. All in Entry 1360, RG 120, NARA. 

•• Rpt, IG, AFIG, to CofS, AFIG, 28 Feb 20, sub: Complaint of J. L. Frohlick 

Submitted by Coblenz Landrat; Rpt, IG, AFIG, to CofS, A FIG, I 6 Oct 20, sub: Case of 

Mrs. Ethel Gastrell. Both in Entry 1360, RG 120, NARA. 

292 
THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA 

ln the affair there was blame enough to go around. Colonel Read 

recommended that the dead man's NCO be court-martialed for allowing him to cross the line into a forbidden area. He also concluded that 

the Germans had used unnecessary force in making the arrest and that 

their treatment of their prisoner had been gratuitously harsh. Hence, he 

recommended that all members of the German patrol be interrogated 

and that its NCO be tried for brutality.50 

Read discussed the matter with the senior German military representative, who agreed to send his men into the American zone to be 

interviewed. In the meantime, General Allen sent his judge advocate 

general to Marshal Foch, the allied forces commander, to find out if he 

would support a demand to try the German soldiers. Foch, after reviewing Read's report and agreeing with its findings, stated that he believed 

the American soldiers were in the wrong but that he would support 

Allen in whatever he did. Further discussions, however, produced a 

face-saving compromise. The Allies requested that the German government tTy its NCO for misconduct and report the action taken. This was 

done, and by late November 1919 the issue had faded away. Colonel 

Read's diplomatic handling of the case had made a large contribution to 

its successful conclusion.s

1 

Other problems developed in eastern Europe. [n August 1920, shortly after his arrival at the AFlG, Colonel Hay was obliged to put aside his 

many IG duties to go to Poland. The U.S. Army had several thousand 

soldiers in that country. Some were members of the advanced party of 

the so-called Si lesian Brigade, which was beginning to withdraw after 

the American government decided not to participate in the plebiscites 

agreed to in the Versailles Treaty. Others belonged to the food-relief and 

typhus-treatment teams of the American Polish Typhus Relief 

Expedition, formed by the War Department to help combat the public 

health crisis caused by Poland's war with Russia. A fa irly large logistical support unit was stationed in Warsaw and Danzig to provide for the 

Americans and to aid the shipment of military goods to the Poles. 

General Allen wanted Hay to observe every American activity in 

Poland except the embassy. Lacking precise details, and concerned about 

the safety of Americans and the stability of the cotmtry in light of a successful Russian offensive then in progress, Allen sought firsthand information on what was occurring and on what good US. units were doing. 

50 Rpt, Read to CofS, AFIG, 13 Sep, 19, sub: Ki lling of Private Howell Madsen, Co. 

L, 8th Infantry; Memo, Nudant to Pres, GerArmCom, 7 Nov 19. Both in Entry 1360, 

RG 120, NARA. 

ll Memo, Nudant to Pres, GerArmCom, 7 Nov 19, Entry 1360, RG 120, NARA. 

293 
T HE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Hay spent nearly three weeks in Poland, observing among other things 

the favorable influence on Polish fortunes of a French military mission 

headed by French General Maxime Weygand. He briefed Allen on the 

recently stabilized situation in early September, and there the matter rested. He was impressed by the activities of the U.S. medical teams, and his 

report prompted General Allen to write letters of commendation to several oftl1e officers Hay had noted as deserving ofpraise.52 

Such actions brought credit to Allen's command; others, only 

embarrassment. One case involving the personal misconduct of a few 

came to light in the late summer of 1922. To the surprise of the command, eight finance and quartermaster officers who had worked in 

Poland were all awarded the Polish Cross of the Brave- the equivalent 

of the Distinguished Service Cross. After the AFTG adjutant general 

could not find any record of their nomination or any of the follow-up 

correspondence cited by the Polish Ministry of War in its transmittal 

documents, he referred the case to the inspector general. The IG investigation revealed that one of the recipients, a finance lieutenant, had 

worked through one of the assistant adjutants general at the AFIG headquarters, who, in turn, had bypassed all channels by writing directly to 

the Polish government to request the awards. The Poles wished to be 

accommodating, and, assuming that General Allen must have desired 

the action, awarded the medals. The lieutenant and the assistant adjutant general were court-martialed, the other officers receiving only reprimands, and all the medals were disapproved for wear. The Polish government, however, was not advised of the action to avoid mutual embarrassment over the temporary success of a scheme that reflected poorly 

on both nations. 53 

It is often surprising to learn what sort of thing mobilizes the full 

investigative capabilities of a command. The biggest dragnet in the 

AFIG's history resulted when the Transportation Service lost 

Congressman Walter F. Lineberger's trunk in February 1922. The quartermaster and G-4 began the search, as did the Antwerp port commander. Soon, the recently reformed Provost Marshal's Department became 

" Rpt, Hay to CO, AFIG, 1 Sep 20, sub: Inspection of American- Polish Typhus 

Relief Expedition, Entry II , RG 159, NARA; Ltr, Magruder to Chamberlain, 23 Aug 

20, Entry 1360, RG 120, NARA; AI fred E. Cornebise, 1j1plws and Doughboys: The 

American Polish 1j'plws Relief Expedition, 1919- 1921 (Newark: University of 

Delaware, 1982), p. 82. 

,, Ltr, Farman to AG, AFLG, 20 Dec 22; Rpt, JG, AFIG, to CoS, AFIG, 12 Feb 23, 

sub: Investigation Concerning Award of Polish Cross of the Brave. Both in Entry 1360, 

RG 120, NARA. See also Cornebise, Tj1plws and Doughboys, p. 145. 

294 
THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA 

involved. Then the railway police of France, Belgium, and Germany 

were asked to investigate as well. When it became known that the trunk 

contained some sensitive official papers, both the American and French 

secret police took part in the investigation. Naturally, the Congressman 

and General Allen were concerned, but the pressure increased when 

General Harbord, now Pershing's Deputy Chief of Staff, inquired as to 

the status of the investigation during the final days of his European 

visit. Apparently, he wanted to bring good news back home to the 

Congressman. 54 

Finally, General Allen directed Major Magruder to gather all the 

threads of the investigation and attempt to determine the fate of the missing trunk. Magruder took nearly three weeks to digest the details of the 

other investigations and to complete his own findings. His sole achievement was to establish an audit trail, with a sequence of events pinpointing the time and place of loss to the Coblenz railyards on 2 February. His 

only recommendation was that everyone involved stay alert in case the 

trunk reappeared. Congressman Lineberger even gave Magruder $100 to 

hold as a reward. In Januaty 1923, in one of his last acts as the AFTG 

inspector general, he returned the money, still without the trunk. 5

5 

By this time the occupation was ending, as far as the United States 

was concerned. The last troops marched out of Coblenz on 24 January, 

and General Al len turned over the Amerlcan zone to the French on the 

twenty-seventh. Three weeks later he and a sma ll staff left for home, 

and the AFIG joined the roster of other vanished forces in American 

military history. 56 To the very last, the ever-shrinking force maintained 

a reputation for discipline, courtesy, and appearance that challenged the 

forces of the other occupying powers. General Allen's high standards 

and strong command interest unquestionably set the tone, and his small 

IG office had proved to be a consistent source of rei iable guidance, 

information, and ana lysis. 

American Expeditions to Russia 

During World War I American troops found themselves in places 

stranger than France and Germany. The collapse of czarist Russia early 

s. Rpt. Magruder to CG, AFIG. 20 May 22, sub: Loss of Trunk of Mr. \V. F. 

Lineberger; Llr, Lineberger to Magruder, 26 Jan 23. Both in Entry 1360, RG 120, 

NARA. 

" Ltr, Lineberger to Magruder. 26 Jan 23, Entry 1360, RG 120, NARA. 

'• llenry T. Allen, The Rhineland Occupalion (Indianapolis, Ind.: 13obbs-Merrill Co., 

1927), pp. 536, 541. 

295 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

in 1917 shocked the allied leadership, as did the withdrawal of Russia 

from the war one year later by its new Bolshevik government. The 

Russian Army had tied down great numbers of German and Austrian 

troops on the Eastern Front, but no one in the West had understood how 

utterly exhausted and ineffective the Russian forces were by 1917. Prior 

to the Bolshevik takeover, Western leaders assumed that, given a little 

support, the Russians would be able to resume the war as strongly as 

before. Much of the growing allied entanglement in Russia thus had its 

origin in the desire to reopen a front in the east.57 

A second motive for intervention developed with the increasing 

strength of bolshevism. The Bolsheviks-later to rename themselves 

the Communist Party--openly denounced the war and in March 1918 

signed a peace treaty that yielded much of western Russia to German 

control and freed many German divisions for future offensives in 

France. For these and other reasons, many Western leaders considered 

the Bolsheviks, or Reds, as enemies, and encouraged the allies to support anti-Bolshevik Russians, the so-caiied Whites.58 

Unfortunately, much of the information available to Western leaders came from diplomats who were strongly sympathetic to one group 

or another struggling for power inside Russia. Consequently, policy 

decisions often were premised on rumors and misinformation, compounding the difficulties of military commanders sent to carry them 

out. The allies themselves could not agree on their objectives, making 

an already difficult situation worse. President Wilson sensed the confusion but strongly resisted pressures to support intervention. When the 

need to reopen the Eastern Front became desperate as a result of the 

major and initially successful German offensives in the spring of 1918, 

Wilson reluctantly yielded to the views of the French and British and in 

July authorized the use of American troops in the allied expeditions to 

northwestern Russia and to Siberia.59 

These two areas were selected because they contained the only 

ports in Russia to which the allies had access at all seasons, Murrnansk 

and Archangel in the north and Vladivostok in Siberia. To these ports 

of entry, millions of tons of military goods had been sent for the czar's 

forces; the allies feared that the Bolsheviks would seize the materiel 

" Peter Fleming, The Fate oj'lldmiml Ko/chak (London: Rupert llart-Oavis, 1963), 

pp. 30 31. 

•• Clarence A. Manning, The Siberian Fiasco (New York: Library Publishers, 1952), 

pp. 4Q-41; Fleming, At/mimi Kolchak, p. 37 . 

.. John Bradley, Allied lnterl'ention in Russia (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 

31 36; Palmer, Baker, 2:314. 

296 
THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA 

and either ship it to the Germans or use it to secure their own power. 

One of the reasons given by President Wilson for sending American 

troops was to guard the supplies until they could be given to the 

Russian people.

60 How the Bolsheviks differed from the rest of the 

"Russian people" was never clarified to perplexed American officers. 

Another factor influencing Wilson was the presence of the Czech 

Legion, a force of nearly 70,000 Czech and Slovak nationals that had 

fought as part of the Russian Army. These trained men seemed essential 

to the manpower-pressed allies on the Western Front. They hoped to 

extricate the Czechs from their base in the Ukraine and to move them 

eastward across Russian Asia to Vladivostok and then by sea to France. 

Initially, the Bolsheviks agreed to this plan, hoping to be rid of the 

C:techs. However, under pressure from the Germans, they became less 

cooperative, virtually freezing the withdrawal until units of the Czech 

Legion were spread out along the entire length of the Trans-Siberian 

railroad. The allies modified their own plans, directing that Czechs still 

in European Russia be diverted to the northern ports for evacuation. 

President Wilson, in turn, announced that another mission of the 

American forces in Russia would be sent to assist the Czechs in their 

withdrawal. But subsequently the British and French reached the conclusion that defeating the Bolsheviks would be the best use of the Czech 

troops, particularly since the Germans appeared to be running out of 

steam in France. Thus by the time American !Toops landed, the Czechs 

were fighting as the main force in a White army, advancing against the 

Bolsheviks from Siberia. Since U.S. commanders were enjoined to 

remain neutral, the determination of their allies to influence the course 

of the Russian civil war placed them in an impossible situation.61 

Other allied objectives seern equally unrealistic in retrospect. The 

French and British hoped to prevent the repatriation of the thousands of 

German and Austrian prisoners of war, formerly held by the czar's 

army. Rumor had it that the Bolsheviks had released and armed these 

men to fight on the Western Front. In fact, the prisoners were largely 

leaderless victims of czarist inhumanity and ineptitude, glad to be 

released, antiwar in sentiment and eager only to return home. They 

loomed large in allied fears, however, and guarding those who remained 

in Siberia became one of the missions of the American forces. 

'"Manning, Siberian Fiasco, p. 109. 

•• Ibid., pp. 43-52; Fleming, Admiral Kolchak. pp. 77- 80; Bradley, ;11/ied 

lnterwntion. pp. 88- 92; John A. White, The Siberian lnte1wntion (Princeton, N.J.: 

Princeton University Press, 1950), pp. 259 60; Sylvian G. Kendall, Amerkm1 Soldiers 

in Siheria (New York: Richard R. Smith, 1945), pp. I 06, 190. 

297 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Although theoretically the two U.S. expeditions to Russia were elements of a single scheme, the lack of any clear objective and the vast 

distance between them made their experiences completely different. 

Americans in northwestern Russia found themselves functioning as a 

major combat element of a mixed allied force. Those in Siberia, while 

attempting to carry out neutral security missions, more often were 

caught in a brutal diplomatic sparring match between Reds, Whites and 

the Japanese members of the allied expedition. 

The U.S. forces sent to northwestern Russia consisted of the 339th 

Infantry, a battalion of engineers, and a field hospital. All had been part 

of the tmtested 85th Division, which had been staging in England for 

service in France. The regimental commander, Col. George E. Stewart, 

a former enlisted man and Medal of Honor recipient, found himself 

having to respond to orders from various organizations. At AEF headquarters he learned that his unit was to perform guard duty at 

Munnansk, but he subsequently received a War Department telegram 

directing him to take his orders from the senior allied officer there, 

British Maj. Gen. Frederick C. Poole. Then a few weeks after arriving 

in Russia, he received a State Department wire instructing him not to 

participate in offensive operations. It goes without saying that the 

colonel had no idea what he was supposed to do and, consequently, did 

as little as possible, virtually turning over control of his battalions to the 

British while he fruitlessly queried the War Department for guidance.

62 

Arriving early in March, General Poole had used his slender force 

of second-rate British and French troops to push southward, following 

the Dvina River and a railroad line, in the direction of Czech forces 

some 600 miles away in central Russia. When the Americans landed on 

4 September 1918, his forces were having difficulty fending off 

Bolshevik counterattacks. The 339th doughboys were rushed straight 

from the Archangel docks into combat to stabilize the allied front. Not 

knowing why they were there, and with very little leadership from 

Colonel Stewart, they were committed to a miserable winter of exposure and fighting. The American forces, supported by a highly efficient 

Canadian field artillery battery, soon became the mainstay of the allied 

combat effort (Map 4).63 

62 ABMC. American Armies, p. 443; E. M. Halliday, The ignorant Armies (New 

York: Award Books, 1964), pp. 5 1, 77- 78; John Silverlight, The Victors· Dilemma: 

Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil Wm: 1917- 1920 (New York: Wcybright and 

Talley, 1970), p. 176; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, Medal o.f 

Honor Recipients, 1863- 1978, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 381. 

"' Halliday, Ignorant Armies, p. 73. 

298 
THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA 

® ARCHANGEL 

. onego 

. chekuevo 

Bolshie-Ozerki • Obozorskaya 

NORTHWESTERN RUSSIA 

1918-1919 

Map 4 

<i American Headquarters 

• Scone of American Activity 

40 

MilO$ 

Solotskoe 

• 

Bereznik• 

Pinega• 

• • Tulgas Kit sa 

Shogovnrl• 

• shonkursk 

Ust-Padenga • 

In November General Poole was replaced by Maj. Gen. Edmund 

Ironside, a far better leader who recognized the errors of Poole's 

deployment. He adopted a defensive strategy, but could do little to 

299 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

improve the difficult living conditions of the soldiers at the front. 

Iron ically, the men of the 339th fought one of the worst battles of the 

expedition on the twelfth, the day they learned of the armistice. No one 

could understand why they were still there. At home, the War 

Department and President Wilson came under increasing pressure to 

withdraw the troops, since the reasons alleged for their presence had 

disappeared with the end of the war.64 

By late January 1919 the pointlessness of continuing had become 

evident. Declining morale among the British and French troops and 

improving performance in the Bolshevik forces led General Ironside to 

recommend an allied withdrawal. The Whites in the area had done little to help themselves; the troops they raised had proven to be singularly unreliable. In February Secretary of War Baker announced plans 

to withdraw U.S. forces as soon as ice conditions permitted. Railroad 

units were sent to Murmansk to prepare for a withdrawal. Under Brig. 

Gen. Wilds P. Richardson, a small staff was dispatched to take charge 

of all U.S. units. 65 

Inspectorate in Northwestern Russia 

Despite the fact that American units had received little support, even 

from the regimental headquarters, the troops had conducted themselves 

well. Among their allies, discouragement and mutiny had been rife. 

Russian units had mutinied and deserted; the French battalion had 

refused to go to the fi·ont; and the British battalion had to be severely disciplined before finally returning to the lines from a rest area. The only 

similar incident in the 339th received far more notoriety than it deserved. 

In late March 1919 the men of Company I, at a rest camp near 

Archangel, complained to their first sergeant that they saw no reason to 

load up and return to the front. They felt that the numerous White 

Russian troops lounging around the rear area should be required to go 

before they did. The first sergeant reported this grumbling up the chain 

of command. Eventually, Colonel Stewart assembled the company in 

formation and read the Articles of War, one of which specified death 

for mutiny. Then, in what could only have been his finest hour in 

Russia, he told the troops that he, too, could not explain why they were 

there but that he knew they would be among the first to perish if the 

., E. M. Halliday, "Where Ignorant Armies Clashed by Night," American Heritage 

(Dec 58): 26-29, 120- 25. 

•• Silvcrlight, Victors· Dilemma, pp. 186 87, 197: Halliday, Ignorant Armies, p. 254. 

300 
THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA 

Bolsheviks they were fighting triumphed. Seeing his logic, the men 

returned to duty without further incident. 

This was the so-called mutiny of the 339th, which for reasons 

unknown was made the subject of a press release by the War Department. 

One of the few bits of news to emerge from northwestern Russia, the 

story got considerable exposure, unnecessarily staining the 339th's excellent reputation. The incident was investigated by the U.S. Military 

Mission, headed by Col. James A. Ruggles, and later by the Inspector 

General of the Army. Both agreed that it hardly merited the effort.c"' 

The involvement of Colonel Ruggles' Military Mission in investigating the mutiny underscores the fact that the U.S. forces in northwestern Russia received little inspection support prior to the arrival of 

General Richardson. Ruggles relied on his intelligence officers to handle any problems. Needl.ess to say, standards of discipline, appearance, 

and equipment suffered from the combination of deficient oversight 

with hard service in a mixed command. As General Richardson 

remarked in July 1919, "It was unfortunate for the interests of the 

Government and for the good name of the command in North Russia 

that a competent and energetic inspector was not appointed earlier."67 

The new commander made haste to correct the deficiency. At the 

time of his appointment General Richardson asked Pershing to allow 

him to bring with him his inspector from his old command, Base 

Section No. 3, in London. This was Maj. Howard N. Scales, a temporary officer originally appointed into the Adjutant General's 

Department. Pershing agreed, and Major Scales assumed his duties on 

9 April 1919, immediately initiating a series of inspections aimed at 

restoring morale and discipline. He stressed bearing, appearance, camp 

police, and sanitation, and he oversaw a generally satisfactory process 

of improvement. 

The problems, he felt, were attributable "to a lack of attention by 

company and battalion commanders." He could have added inexperience as well. This was particularly the case in the area of funds management. Scales noted that virtually all of the unit funds were poorly 

maintained, and the fact that 90 percent of the money placed in sol66 Halliday, ignorant Armies, p. 238; U.S. War Department, Annual Report of the 

Inspector General. 1919 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 

655; File 22- 36.1 , Morale and Mutinies, North Russian Expedition, Roll I, Microfilm 

924, NARA. 

•' File 22-<l6.1 , Inspections, North Russian Expedition, Roll 2, Microfilm 924, 

NARA; I st End (quotation), Richardson, 23 Jul 19, to Rpt, Jnsp to CG, AEF, N. Russia, 

19 Jul 19, sub: Inspections and Investigations, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

301 
T HE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Maj. Howard N. Scales Working in His Archangel Office 

diers' deposits came from personnel in the supply company aroused 

his suspicion. His investigations Jed to the trial of three officers for 

"gross and inexcusable negligence" in handling various accounts. Poor 

management, he believed, on the part of the 339th's quartermaster had 

led to overstockages that, in turn, created urUlecessary opportunities 

for black-marketing.68 

Scales also looked into rumors of tension with the British and 

found them largely unfounded, mostly attributabl e to isolated 

instances of poor leadership on one side or the other. He recommended that the British ration should not be given to U.S. soldiers in 

future operations. Although nutritionally adequate, its differences 

from customary American rations "tended to cause a certain amount 

of discontent." Overall, Scales determined that the rumors of poor 

morale had no basis; in fact, in well-led units, such as those of the 

Engineer and Transportation Corps, he considered morale to be very 

high. Similarly, he judged that troop conduct was remarkably good, 

and like other investigating officers dismissed the Company I mutiny 

"" Rpt, Insp to CG, AEF, N. Russia, 19 Jul 19, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

302 
THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA 

as a minor incident that stronger company-level leadership could have 

nipped in the bud.

69 

The work of Scales and Richardson has been ridiculed by some historians as an w1necessary resort to Regular Army martinetism. But their 

by-the-book approach was needed to compensate for the inexperience 

of the National Army officers, who had been coping almost unaided 

with a difficult situation. The standards that they set were no different 

from those considered normal in the AEF in France or the Army of 

Occupation in Germany, and they were able to sustain the high level of 

discipline and morale necessary to achieve a smooth evacuation without incident in July 1919. The American forces had conducted themselves well in a virtually pointless situation, at the price of nearly 400 

casualties.70 Their fellow soldiers in Siberia were perhaps the only others who could understand the problems and frustrations of their task. 

Americans in Siberia 

U.S. forces landed at the eastern extremity of Russia better organized 

than their counterparts in the northwest, but equally unclear as to the 

reason for their presence. On 6 August 1918 the 31st and 27th Infantry, 

on duty in the Philippines, were alerted to move to Vladivostok. Their 

advanced parties set foot in Russia on the fifteenth, and within days 

the regiments were supporting Japanese attacks on Bolshevik strongpoints north of the port. Approximately 9,000 Americans, 70,000 

Japanese, 1,000 French, and 1,000 British were in Siberia by the end 

of September. 71 

Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. William S. Graves had arrived in the 

region, accompanied by a complete staff, service units, and replacements for the infantry regiments. Graves immediately put a halt to U.S. 

offensive activity, viewing it as contrary to his insh·uctions. An able 

officer with nearly thirty years of service, he had just assumed command of the former 8th Division in training at Camp Fremont, 

Ca lifornia, when he was tapped to lead the expedition. He was 

"" Ibid. 70 Halliday, Ignorant Armies, p. 254; Richard Luckett, Tlte White Generals: An 

Account of lite White Movement and flte Russian Civil War (New York: Viking Press, 

1971), p. 208. The British lingered in North Russia until September 1919, when they 

left the place to the White Russians. In February 1920 the Bolsheviks overwhelmed the 

Whites. 

11 Manning, Siberian Fiasco, p. 94; Si lverlight, l'icto1:v' Dilemma, p. 73; AEF Siberia 

Surgeon General's Report, Apr 20, Entry 5996, RG 394, NARA. 

303 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

assigned in a most unusual way. Secretly meeting with Secretary 

Baker in the Kansas City railroad station, he was handed the 

President's diplomatic statement justifying intervention. Then Baker 

departed with the encouraging words, "Watch your step, you will be 

walking on eggs loaded with dynamite." 72 

After reading Wilson's document, Graves saw his mission as safeguarding allied property; helping the Czechs; and, above all, remaining 

neutral in any internal Russian conflicts. He consistently attempted to 

follow a policy of fairness toward all elements of Russian society, 

repeatedly ordering his troops not to take sides in any loca l trouble that 

did not directly threaten them- a policy that often ran contrary to those 

of the other allies. By April 19 I 9 the effect was to restrict U.S. actions 

to providing security for parts of the Trans-Siberian railroad and the 

supply dumps in the Vladivostok area, which by that time had become 

targets for virtually every other player in the game (Map 5). 13 

The allies did not dominate Russian politics in Siberia as they had 

in northwestern Russia. They were confronted with a kaleidoscope of 

strong and weak groups, a ll trying to gain control. Eventually, a series 

of White governments, supported by the Czechs, appeared at Omsk in 

central Siberia. Control was centered by November 19 18 in the person 

of the former czarist admiral Alexander Kolchak. Personally honest and 

patriotic, Kolchak was a poor judge of character, and his government 

soon became more ruthless and corrupt than the old czarist monarchy. 

Despite this, the allies, including the United States, seriously considered recognizing the Kolchak regime because it seemed to have a 

chance of emerging as the dominant force in all Russia. 7

'' 

Such a development was not favored by the Japanese. Ostensibly 

America's major partner and a lly in the intervention, they saw opportunities for expansion in the continuing instability of Russian Asia 

and saw the American pressure as an obstacle to their goals. As their 

ambitions in Manchuria grew, they also began to consider possible 

annexation of Russian territory. But the American policy of neutrality, with its stress on the maintenance of existing territoria l integrity 

throughout the changing Far East, ran counter to Japanese ambitions. 

The results led to tension and hostility with American troops, whose 

main mission had become securing the ra ilroad upon which all partics depended. Moreover, since the railroad was largely in the hands 

William S. Graves. America~· Siberian Adventure. 1918 1920 (New York: 

Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith, 1931 ), p. 4 (Baker quotation). 

" White. Siberian lllle1wntion, pp. 27 1 74; Kendall, Soldiers in Siberia, p. 190. 

•• White, Siberian lnten•emion, pp. 341-42; Luckett, White Generals, p. 216. 

304 
THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA 

EASTERN SIBERIA 

1919 

... 1000 

C H 

MapS 

RUSSIA 

N A 

of the Whites, Americans also were automatica lly the targets of 

Bolshevik partisans. 75 

The Japanese went out of their way to harass the Americans. 

Russian clergymen who married U.S. soldiers to Russian women were 

beaten up, and the brides' families were threatened. American soldiers 

en route through areas controlled by the Japanese or their surrogates 

were detained and interrogated. In several cases officers and their 

enlisted escorts were arrested, some of whom were brutally beaten 

before being released. Each such case was investigated and protests 

made to the .Japanese high command, though to no avail. Fierce skirmishes erupted between American patrols and Bolshevik raiders or 

Japanese-sponsored bandits, and Company C, 27th Infantry, clashed 

sharply on one occasion with a Japanese unit of comparable size.76 

General Graves had the responsibility of dealing with this tangle. 

With his headquarters in Vladivostok, most of his troops were deployed 

north of the city, along the railroad and at the nearby Suchan coal mines. 

Seven companies, however, were stationed 3,000 miles away, on the railroad just east of Lake Baikal in an area under Japanese control. The cxpe75 White, Siberian intervention, pp. 259, 383. 76 Kendall, Soldiers in Siberia, pp. 202-06. 

305 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

dition IG, Col. Willis V. Morris, 

played a prominent role in developing the information needed by 

General Graves to deal with the 

Japanese. Additionally, he labored 

to keep the command in the best 

possible shape in circumstances 

that were exceptionally difficult 

because of the divided forces, the 

ongoing civil war, the international 

compl.ications, and the conditions 

of life in wartime Siberia. 

Morris, a cavalry officer and a 

graduate of the U.S. Military 

Academy, had been the inspector 

on the 8th Division staff before 

coming to Russia with General 

Graves. Whenever his work load 

Col. Willis V. Morris was heavy, acting inspectors were 

assigned to assist him. As a result, 

normally two officers performed 

inspection duties. One of the acting inspectors was Maj. Sydney C. 

Graves, the commander's son, who had come directly from France to 

serve first as his father's aide and then as an inspector from June 1919 

to April 1920. The younger Graves received Britain's Distinguished 

Service Order for evacuating civilians fTom a wrecked train near Ussuri 

during the heated cross fire of the ambushers and defenders. 77 

The turbulent situation spared no one. The inspectors found themselves on the road a lot, visiting the dispersed U.S. units performing 

guard duty. The soldiers lived in tents during the warm season, 

bivouacking normally under the crudest of field conditions near tiny 

villages along the railroad. The IGs spent their time gathering information and facts necessary to describe each un it's situation. When 

American positions were attacked, an inspector went to the location to 

record the chain of events and to try to determiJ1e responsibility. 

Reports included data on the behavior and attitudes of Russian civilians 

and local unit policies toward both White and Red armed bands. Many 

" AEF Siberia File 201, S. C. Graves, W. V. Morris, J. D. Leitch, Entry 5997, RG 

394, NARA. Young Graves had earned a Distinguished Service Cross in France; he was 

a member of the class of 191 5 at the Military Academy. 

306 
THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA 

reports of atrocities were received and all were investigated, if possible; 

brutality was more often the rule than the exception in the Siberia of the 

time. One of the worst cases was the murder of nearly 300 unarmed 

Latvian soldiers by the Japanese. When confronted with the facts, the 

Japanese blandly replied that all Europeans looked pretty much a like to 

them, and their troops had thought the Letts were Reds. '~ 

The inspectors also investigated instances of personal misconduct 

by American soldiers. The problems ranged from simple AWOLs and 

brawling to cases of desertion, in wh ich men left their units to join the 

Bolsheviks. The small inspectorate handled many complaints from 

Russian civilians concerning theft, or the failure of soldiers to pay for 

goods and services. Most complaints about soldiers' conduct or duty 

performance were handled through command channels. Other investigations reflected the tension and danger routinely confronting 

American soldiers. Those that might have a broader impact on relations with Russian civilians or all ied personnel were referred to 

Colonel Morris.'

9 

Individual situations were often exceedingly complex. In one such 

case, Russian railway police accused an American sentry of attacking a 

local civilian. Investigation showed that the sentry had been under 

orders not to allow crowds to collect near his post. When a Russian 

began to give a speech and people gathered, the inexperienced soldier 

repeatedly asked the orator to stop. When the individual ignored him, 

the doughboy- after the sixth warning- struck him on the head with 

his rifle butt. Colonel Morris conclucled that the sentry's action, "while 

unnecessarily severe," was excusable. General Graves agreed, saying he 

did not want anything done to discourage sentries from hesitating to act 

"when action might be critically nceded."80 

The conduct of inspections more nearly resembled standard lG 

practice. Unit inspections entailed typical reviews of administrative 

practice and logistical support, as well as detailed examinations of 

property records, morning reports, immunizations, and the soldiers' 

personal equipment and documents. A list of irregularities and deficiencies was given to the senior commander, who took corrective action 

and informed the IG of the results. When inspecting the camps where 

" Rpt, Morris to Graves, 4 Jun 19, sub: Inspection of American Troops in Section 

Verkline Udinsk to Mysovaya, Entry 5997, RG 394, NARA. 

,. AEF Siberia File 333, General Reference, Entry 5997, RG 394. NARA. 10 Rpt, Morris to Graves, 8 Ocl 18, sub: lnvestigalion Concerning an Alleged Assaull 

by an American Sentinel Upon a Russian Civilian, with Graves' notes in pencil, Enlry 

5997, RG 394, NARA. 

307 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

U.S. troops were stationed, the same concern for administrative detail 

was maintained as in Jess harassed commands. Inspectors spent the 

bulk of these visits training inexperienced unit officers in requirements, 

such as ration accountability, maintenance of vouchers, and so forth. 

Recurring problems in finance and equipment records required 

painstaking reviews of unit ledgers to ferret out the inevitable errors.8

' 

Complaints were accepted during each inspection visit from anyone who wished to speak out, including Russians and the remaining 

German and Austrian prisoners of war who were still under U.S. control. American soldiers complained about living conditions and discharge policies and what they viewed as instances of abuse of authority. Russians came to the inspectors with complaints about theft, misappropriation of property, and vandalism. In many cases, the U.S. command was the only form of authority able or willing to give a sympathetic hearing to complaints or claims. Colonel Morris heard many 

cases concerning injustices committed by the Whites or the Japanese, 

but could do little to correct them.

8

l 

ln August 1919 the Kolchak government began to crumble, and 

even the most obtuse interventionists soon realized that the allies could 

achieve nothing by remaining in Russia. The British and French pulled 

out their token forces in September; the American units near Lake 

Baikal were pulled back to Vladivostok in December. At the same time, 

General Graves announced that the United States also intended to withdraw completely from eastern Russia in the near future. 83 

As the time approached, the demands on the small inspectorate 

swelled. The sale of surplus materiel that was to be left behind at campsites when the U.S. troops withdrew had to be supervised. Port activities and the condition of transports also became a matter of concern 

with the embarkation of the first group of soldiers in January 1920. A 

final surge of claims and complaints from Russian civilians required 

s' Rpt, Morris t·o Graves, 27 Jan 19, sub: Irregularities and Deficiencies Observed at 

lnspections ofthe 3 1st Infantry; Rpt. Morris to Graves, 25 Sep 19, sub: Inspection of 

U.S. Troops, Spasskoe, Siberia. Both in Entry 5997, RO 394, NARA. 

Sl A EF Siberia File 321.3, Inspections- Consolidated Cross References, En tTy 

5997; Rpt, Sillman to Graves, 12 Oct 19, sub: Complaints of Men of Ambulance 

Company #4 at Spasskoc, Siberia, Entry 6012. Both in RO 394, NARA. 

s.~ There was growing opposition to the American presence in Siberia, led by 

Congressman Fiorello La Guardia and Senator Hiram Johnson (White, Siberian 

/ntervewion, pp. 355- 58). Congresswoman Jeanette Rankin added to the pressure by 

proposing that the U.S. government buy land in Siberia, to be used as a reservation for 

the troops sent there. Rankin thought they would be too diseased and morally corrupted to be allowed to return to the United States (Kendall , Soldiers in Siberia. p. 229). 

308 
THE INSPECTORATE IN GERMANY AND RUSSIA 

settlement, and more acting inspectors were added to handle the 

already heavy work load. Anti-American incidents increased as the 

Japanese and their bandit allies sought to hasten the American departure; the Whites felt beh·ayed and abandoned, and the Reds exploited 

the growing instability. Each incident of harassment, insolence, or outright assault had to be fully documented for General Graves, who 

would use the data to complain- although futilely- to the responsible 

commanders. Colonel Morris concentrated on the incidents and on 

closing out accounts, while other acting IGs saw to clearing billets, settling civilian claims, and disposing of surplus animals.84 

In fact, American forces slowed their departure at the behest of the 

State Department, in an effort to deter any Japanese attempts to take 

advantage of the chaos. The American presence in Siberia helped to 

assure the preservation of eastern Siberia as part of Russia; it almost certainly prevented a Franco-British arrangement with Japan to conduct an 

all-out anti-Bolshevik campaign. On this count, the Siberian Expedition 

could be viewed as a diplomatic success. But from the perspective of the 

soldiers, success came at a high price. The last Americans pulled out of 

Vladivostok on l April 1920, ending a mission whose purpose General 

Graves later admitted that he had never understood.85 

His inspectorate had performed conscientiously, if unspectacularly, 

in support of the expeditionary force. It had compensated for the inexperience of many of the officers and NCOs by assuring high standards 

in the administration of funds and supplies. Inspectors were instrumental in obtaining the information necessary for the headquarters to provide the best possible support to the isolated little garrisons strung 

along the railroad. They also kept General Graves more fully informed 

of the general situation than he could have been otherwise. Finally, it 

was their grim task to document many incidents of man's inhumanity to 

man. Solid, dedicated, and thorough, Colonel Morris proved the value 

of an inspectorate in a unique situation. 

•• AEF Siberia File 321.3, Inspections by the Tnspcctor General, Nov 18- Apr 20, 

Entry 5997, RG 394, NARA; Graves, Siberian Adventure, p. 310 . 

., White, Siberian Intervention, pp. 187- 88, 255; Judith A. Luckett, "The Siberian 

Intervention: Military Support of Foreign Pol icy," Milit(IJ:v Reviell' 64 (Apr 84): 54- 63; 

Graves, Siberian Advemure, p. 354. 

309 

PART THREE 

NEGLECT AND PRIVATION 

1919-1939 

9 

The Problems of Peace 

Soon after the armistice was announced, the War Department began to 

focus on demobilization and the structure of the postwar force. By midJanuary I 919 over 700,000 soldiers had been discharged, followed by 

500,000 the next month and another 800,000 during the three months 

after that- 2 million men in half a year. This phase essentially ended 

with the return of the l st Division from France in September.' 

Simultaneously, the War Department began to grapple with issues 

of reorganization, modernization, and mobilization that were to consume much of its energies for twenty years to come. The changes 

brought by wartime to the National Defense Act of 1916 had been temporary. Yet the military system required structural reform, if only 

because American participation in the global conflict had made it 

apparent that a similar involvement might occur in the future. General 

March favored a 500,000-man force, supported by a large reserve based 

on peacetime conscription. The political feasibility of such a large 

peacetime Army was another question entirely. 2 

Future of the IGD 

The role of the Inspector General's Department (IGD) also needed 

redefining. March himself favored the transfer ofseveraliG functions. 

In November 1918 the War Department General Staff's War Plans 

Division (WPD), after its review of the IGD's history, proposed that its 

' William A. Ganoe, The History of the United States Army (New York: D. Appleton 

and Co., 1924 ), p. 482; Ern a Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army: A His tO/)' of 

the Corps, 1775- 1939 (Washington, D.C.: Quartermaster Historian's Office, Office of 

the Quartermaster General, 1962), p. 697. 

' Russell F. Wciglcy, llist01:v of the UnitC'd States Army (New York: Macmillan Co., 

1967), p. 396. 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

functions be limited, with the General Staff assuming responsibility 

for training inspections and funds inspections. The study also recommended that the Judge Advocate General's Department or branch 

experts carry out investigations of misconduct and irregularities and 

that The Adjutant General take over the custody of inspection and 

investigation reports. 3 

When the WPD study was forwarded to the AEF for comment, 

General Spinks cautioned that eliminating the Inspector General's 

Department would not end the need for the functions it performed. He 

reasoned that somewhere in the War Department, assets would have to 

be consumed to continue the activities normally given inspectors. 

Spinks believed that the elimination proposal exposed a naivete and 

lack of understanding about the IGD mission. In sum, the conm1and 

requirement for independent information was essential and that the 

WPD proposals would cause "injury to efficiency "-~ 

Yet the WPD proposals reflected the views of the average line officer, whose opinion of the inspectorate was generally low. Too often in the 

period between the War with Spain and World War I excessive stress had 

been placed on blindly enforcing policies, instead of assessing and 

improving efficiency. One field artilleryman later told General 

Chamberlain that only once in twenty-one years had his units been 

inspected by a fellow gutmer capable of discussing branch issues in 

detail.5 Most officers had little understanding of the complete scope ofiG 

activities and were unaware of Chamberlain's philosophy of providing 

assistance rather than merely citing problems. In turn, the inspectors' 

potential often went unrealized because senior commanders and senior 

staff officers failed through misunderstanding to use them properly. 

General Chamberlain, in preparing his rebuttal, relied on the expertise of Lt. Col. Robert D. Palmer, a National Guard officer on duty in 

the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). In essence, Palmer argued 

that the Inspector General's Department had proven itself in war as a 

vital adjunct to the command and should not be altered. Without it, the 

Army could neither analyse its internal operations objectively nor, in 

} Memo, White to Chief, WPD, 4 Dec 18; Memo, Mcintyre to CotS, WD, 6 Dec 18, 

sub: General Outline of a Study on the Reorganization of the War Department. Both in 

Entry 296, Record Group (RG) l65, National Archives and Records Administration 

(NARA), Washington, D.C. 

• Memo (quoted words), Spinks to CofS, AEF, 14 Dec 18, sub: Proposed Military 

Pol icy, Entry 588, RG 120, NARA; Memo, Fiske to CofS, WD, 21 Dec 18, sub: 

Extracts From Proposed Military Policy, 6 December 1918, Entry 26A, RG 159, 

NARA. 5 Ltr, Scott to Chamberlain, 14 Nov 20, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

314 
THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 

the absence of an independent oversight organization, retain credibility 

with other government agencies and the public at large. Despite the 

JGD's reputation for finding fault, he asserted that " instead of being an 

agent of destruction it was essentially and distinctly an agent of construction." Many of its inquiries were unknown, except to a select few, 

and could not have been given to any other agency to perform. Like 

General Breckinridge earlier in the century, Palmer quoted many distinguished former officers who had praised the department.6 

Generals Chamberlain and Wood used PaLmer's arguments, refining them with further examples of IG successes in the recently completed war and stressing Secretary of War Baker's use of the Inspector 

General's Department in such projects as the business methods survey. 

Chamberlain's formal reply synthesized the ideas developed earlier, 

emphasizing areas of IG activity overlooked by the WPD study. In his 

view, regardless ofwhat happened, the inspection function was so necessary that it would survive somehow, somewhere. Efficiency and common sense dictated that it be allowed to remain in the form of the existing Inspector General's Department.' 

Apparently, General Chamberlain submitted his January rebuttal in 

what could only have been a heated conference with the WPD officers 

who had drafted the study. The resu lt was that they quickly backed 

down, explaining that their ideas were "experimental" and raised only 

for "consideration." A spokesman claimed that the WPD staff had not 

coordinated the study with the Inspector General's Department because 

of the press of time. The WPD staff agreed to consider Chamberlain's 

arguments in a revision, which was then under way. While Genera l 

Chamberlain kept up his offensive, hoping to justify fl.tlly the need for 

an independent inspectorate, various plans of reorganization were 

reviewed more thoroughly by a WPD committee.8 

Behind the apparent power grab by the General Staff may have 

been a fundamental disagreement between General March and 

Secretary Baker. March already had made it clear that, in his opinion, 

the General Staff could more appropriately perform training inspections and that only the Chief of Finance-not detailed officers- should 

• Memo, Palmer to Chamberlain, n.d., sub: The Eyes and Ears of the Commanderin-Chief, Entry 25, RG 159, NARA. 7 Memo, W. Wood to IG, 9 Jan 19, Entry 25; Memo, Chamberlain to WPD, WDGS, 

22 Jan 19, Entry 26A. Both in RG 159, NARA. 

• Memo (quoted words), Clark to Dir, WPD, 5 Feb 19, sub: Memorandum From 

Inspector General re Staff Organization; Memo, Brown to IG, 5 Feb 19, sub: Staff 

Organization. Both in Entry 296. RG 165, NARA. 

315 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

oversee funds inspections. Secretary Baker agreed with March on the 

matter of training but was not in accord on the issue of financial inspections. The Secretary believed that the function of the Inspector 

General's Department should be a "corrective" to other clements' fiscal 

activities. Beyond that, he wished to have access to a "freelance, independent agency" that could look into any topic concerning any War 

Department component.9 

General March contended that the Secretary could select any officer he wanted for such a service. Such power, however, existed only in 

theory. The Army was too large and the Secretary's tenure too transient 

for him to build his own list of trusted confidential experts in a variety 

of fields. It was the Inspector General's job to provide such a body of 

officers on an institutional basis. Hence, Baker felt that the inspectorate 

should be retained and saw no problem in keeping the Inspector 

General's Department as a separate element- not subordinate to the 

Genera l Staff. Testifying before the Senate Committee on Military 

Affairs on 17 August 1919, Baker credited the department with serving 

as a "side window" to let in the light, remarking that "the process of 

coming through channels sometimes is so intricate and lengthy that it 

is almost impossible to know where this thing started and who is 

responsible for it. He concluded his testimony by stating that he considered the TG function essential to avoid what he called "staff despotism"- management without independent oversight. 10 

Meanwhile, discussion went on as to the form the Inspector 

General's Department should take, assuming that it survived as a part of 

the 500,000-man army proposed by General March. The Chief of Staff 

envisioned the creation of seven districts, each of which would contain 

two or more tactical divisions. For example, the First District, based in 

New York City, would cover New England and the Middle Atlantic States 

and contain three National Guard divisions; the Second District, based in 

Washington, D.C., would cover the upper South and contain one Regular 

Army and one National Guard division. The Seventh District, based in 

San Francisco, would include the Far West, Alaska, Hawaii, and the 

Philippines, and contain three Regular Army and one National Anny 

division. Similar mixes prevailed in the remaining districts. 

Substantial changes in the Inspector General's Department would be 

needed to support this scheme. One proposal had the Office of the 

• Extract from Baker Testimony, Mil Affs Cmte, U.S. Sen, 17 Aug 19, Entry 26, RG 

159, NARA. 

'" Ibid. 

316 
THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 

Inspector General providing support to the Washington-based district, 

with two inspectors and a field-grade accountant assigned to each of the 

other districts. A radical departure from the past appeared in a proposal 

that inspectors assigned to the fie ld commands no longer be considered 

part of the department, but rather as staff officers exclusively serving 

their local commanders- a suggestion that would have the effect of keeping IGD strength low despite the proposed enlargement of the Army. 11 

General Chamberlain expanded on this concept by suggesting that all 

inspectors assigned to divisions no longer be considered a part of the 

inspectorate. Instead, they would sever their technical links with the 

Office of the Inspector General and work exclusively for the local commander. The Inspector General's Department, meanwhile, would develop 

regional offices answerable directly to the Chief of Staff, whose members 

annually would inspect all commands, depots, etc. These officers would 

operate under the direction of the Inspector General of the Army in 

response to the Secretary of War's requirements for information. 

Chamberlain justified his proposal by referring to the proven need for an 

inspectorate, as shown by wartime experience. He further stressed that it 

was unnecessary to reduce the number of inspectors during peacetime. 12 

In essence, the Inspector General's proposal would have made commanders or bureau chiefs responsible for virtually every type of inspection; but, at the same time, it would have made them subject to inspection by the centralized Inspector General's Department, with its direct 

line to the Secretary. Because the threat of placing Army elements 

under much closer War Department surveillance was so radical, 

Chamberlain surmised that it was unlikely that his proposal would be 

considered seriously. Instead, it established a bargaining position, in the 

expectation that a compromise could be achieved somewhat short of 

the other extreme of eliminating the department. u 

Signs appeared that positions might be moderating. Secretary 

Baker assured General Chamberlain that he had not reached "any defiJlite conclusion" as to the fate of the Inspector General's Department 

in any Army reorganization and that his mind was still open on the subject. General March retreated from his original views, and by July he 

was including an enlarged department as part of his plans for the 

500,000-man force. Late that month General Wood advised him that, 

should theAl·my reach that size, 105 inspectors would be required- 77 

" Memo, Naylor to IG, 8 Apr 19, sub: Tables of Organization, IGD, Entry 26A, RG 

159, NARA. 

'

1 Memo, Chamberlain to SofW, 15 May l9, Entry 26, RG l59, NARA. 

u Ibid. 

317 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

more than the 28 authorized in the 1916 legislation that had last defined 

the size of the permanent forcc. 14 

Despite the increasing support favoring retention of the Inspector 

General's Department, the elimination proposal had been included in 

the reorganization package sent earlier to the Congress. Consequently, 

General Chamberlain was required to defend his department before 

the largely sympathetic Senate and House Committees on Military 

Affairs. On 19 August 1919 he reiterated to the Senate committee the 

arguments developed by Colonel Palmer the previous winter and 

refined over the spring. The Inspector General stressed that the 

General Staff proposal had touched on only the most obvious of IG 

duties and failed to consider the more comprehensive special inquiries 

made by inspectors at every level. Once again contending that the Staff 

required an independent agency capable of determining the efficiency 

of Army activities, their relation to each other, and their coordination 

as a part of the whole, Chamberlain proffered as evidence the vast 

amount of work the inspectorate had performed for the Secretary and 

the Chief of Staff during the war and restated their continuing need to 

get the facts "no matter whom it hit."'

5 

Several committee members agreed, citing examples of instances 

in which the IGD's thoroughness and detached professionalism had 

been important. The senators saw the inspectorate as an independent 

mechanism for correcting the mistakes of others. General Chamberlain 

raised the issue of credibility, saying that no organization could investigate itself objectively and reach conclusions that carried the same 

weight as those of a disinterested outside agent. His words were well 

received, with some of the committee members adding that an investigation of a hospital could better be carried out by an inspector than a 

surgeon. The Senate committee, already so inclined, was fully persuaded against making any radical changes in the IGD's structure. General 

Chamberlain expressed similar views to the House committee the next 

month and won solid support for the !GO's survival. 16 

Despite this, some field commanders continued to integrate their 

IGs into their functional statTs. Even when new Army regulations in 

1921 specified that inspectors work exclusively for their comman-

"Memo (Baker quotation), W. Wood to Chamberlain, 5 Aug 19, Entry 26; Memo, W. 

Wood to CofPerBr. Opns Div, WDGS, 7 Aug 19, Entry 26A. Both in RG 159, NARA. 

" Chamberlain Testimony, Mil Ans Cmte, U.S. Sen, 19 Aug 19, Entry 26, RG 159, 

NARA. 

'" Ibid.; Chamberlain Testimony, Mil A ITs Cmtc, Hoffieps, 29 Scp 19, Entry 26, RG 

159, NARA. 

318 
THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 

ders, many continued to doubt 

their ability and to denigrate their 

function. The commander at 

Camp Shennan, Ohio, for example, revealed his bias; impressed 

by his IG's performance, he 

promised him an assignment 

"more in keeping with your abilities than your present duties." 

This continued lack of esteem for 

the duties of the inspectorate 

seems to be the basis for the 

fierce pressures against expanding the IGD's role encountered 

throughout the tenure of General 

Helmick, Chamberlain's successor in 1921. 17 

A major challenge in late 

1922 served to clarify the issue Maj. Gen. Eli A. Helmick 

further. That November, The 

Adjutant General told the Chief of 

Staff that he strongly objected to the Inspector General's ability to communicate directly with General Staff elements and recommended revocation of his authority to do so. At the time, a Chief of Staff memorandum had permitted the Inspector General to coordinate directly with 

any members of the Staff and to present papers in person to the 

Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, or his deputy, on inquiries 

received from them. General Helmick also had direct access to the 

Deputy Chief of Staff on everything to do with officer discipline and 

conduct. The Adjutant General wanted all these contacts to be made 

through him so that he might review the paperwork for administrative 

correctness. On routine cases he felt that he could begin taking the 

Inspector General's recommended action while forwarding the papers 

to the Deputy Chief of Staff, and in doing so could "expeclit[e] the 

transaction of business."'8 

General Harbord, the Deputy Chief of Staff, quickly rejected the 

proposal, ruling that The Adjutant General should have no power to 

17 Ltr (quotation), Smith to Austin, I Feb 19; Ltr, Helmick to Elmore, 12 Apr 22. 

Both in Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 18 Memo, Harbord to Cot'S, WD, 4 Nov 22, sub: Procedure in Disciplinary Cases, 

Entry 26B, RG 159, NARA. 

319 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

review OIG recommendations beyond noting obvious policy or procedural errors. Furthermore, OIG recommendations were not a basis for 

any action until they had been approved by the proper authority. 

According to Harbord, The Adjutant General's relationship with the 

Inspector General's Department was intentionally vague, given the fact 

that certain "cases ... cannot be handled according to any rule or policy" because they often required discreet and prompt referral to the 

Secretary of War or Chief of Staff for final action. 19 

This dispute averted any subordination of the Inspector General's 

Department to another General Staff element. The Office of the 

Inspector General was able to continue dealing directly with any part of 

the Army as necessary, although, as a concession to The Adjutant 

General, it had to include detailed implementing instructions for the 

action to be taken on a recommendation once approved. The last vestige of any questioning of the Inspector General's authority was 

resolved by Chief of Staff General Charles P. Summerall at a commanders conference a few years later: "The JGD is an independent agency 

of the Secretary of War, and of Corps Area commanders, self-contained 

and not affiliated with any other element of the military establishment."20 By the end of the 1920s the IGD's status was settled unequivocally, and challenges against its mission and functions faded away. 

This status was noted symbolically in 1924. General Helmick, 

along with several other department heads, was authorized to capitalize 

the word The in his title. A precedent for this practice was made in 

1907, when General Ainsworth converted his office from Military 

Secretary back to Adjutant General. The general order directing this 

change specified that the word The would precede the title designation 

of the department head. Since then the heads of other similar departments periodically agitated for a similar distinction, achieving success 

in 1924. At this time General llelmick had the title of The Inspector 

General. Although the use of capitalization was restricted to the head of 

the department or agency, the office acronym reflected the change- for 

example, Helmick's office symbol changing from OIG to OTIG. 2

' 

'

9 Ibid. 1

" Ibid.; Proceedings of Conlcrence of Corps Area and Division Commanders (quotation), 1- 2 Jun 27, Entry 2613, RG 159. NARA. 11 WD GO 46, 1907, and GO 2, 1924. The other officers so distinguished in 1924 

were The Judge Advocate General, The Quartermaster General, and The Surgeon 

General. Then in 1938 The Adjutant General confirmed a similar usage on their commissions. Sec Memo, TAG to OfT.~ Div, AGO, 19 Jan 38, OTIG files, Pentagon 

(SA IG-ZX H). 

320 
THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 

National Defense Act and the Budget 

During General Chamberlain's appearance on the hill in 1919, it had 

been clear from much of the questioning that what was really troubling the lawmakers was March's proposal for a 500,000-man force 

backed by universal military training. Subsequent congressional 

rejection of a large standing Army also affected the Inspector 

General's Department. And even while Congress debated the size of 

the Army, reductions had to be made in the active force. For a time 

Chamberlain hoped that his department might emerge stronger than 

before, or at least no weaker. To counter the confusion generated by a 

variety of legislative proposals and strength changes, the Inspector 

General began a practice of holding weekly meetings with OIG personnel, and by December was sufficiently optimistic to tell one of 

these gatherings that his successful defense of the lGD would probably increase its importance. "The General Staff has discovered that 

this Department is not something they can shove aside." He was confident that the Inspector General's Department was no longer in danger and expected it to emerge from his "little campaign" with a broader scope than ever before.

22 

Chamberlain's optimism proved to be unwarranted. What finally 

emerged from the legislative arena was the National Defense Act of 

1920. The act authorized a peacetime Regular Army strength of 

280,000 to provide the nucleus of a larger force, to be expanded in 

time of need by the National Guard and the Organized Reserve 

Corps (ORC). The Regular Army would man a large number of division, corps, and field-army units at skeleton strengths, to be filled up 

during mobilizat.ion. Implied in the law was reliance on conscription 

in case of a major emergency. Federal control over the National 

Guard increased in light of its role as the primary reserve for the 

active force. A Civilian Military Training Corps (CMTC) Program, 

similar to the prewar Plattsburg Camps, was launched to sustain publi c participation and interest in Army affairs. The act divided the 

country into nine corps areas for administration, training, and 

National Guard and reserve affairs (see Map 6). Each area theoretically was to hold one regular, one guard, and three reserve divisions. 

The corps area functions, along with tactical responsibilities, were 

22 Memo, Jervey to lG, 23 Sep 19, sub: Allotment of Officers, Entry 26A; Notes of 

an Address by General Chamberlain at a Conference of All Officers of the IGD (quotations), 29 Dec 19, Entry 26. Both in RG 159, NARA. 

321 
' ;~ ..... --...... .._ c 

1'• ·' ··---..... 7_· 

\ I ·-··-··-·----··-··-··-· 

~ :-,.. j 

A 

. 

·J'--); ---~ /' ( ) 

I, 

\ 

\ 

I 

~\ . 

• I -----. ! J i 

L ~-- -J·r·-.-----.---- . -·-r-----!___ i 

J . ·-.,. ___ _ r / NINTHj 7 __ } "·"""'"""'""• 

{ ,' ! />(' 

} \ J 

\ \ 

·, )~ 

HAWAII 

1•20.000,000 

Map 6 

·, / \ 

\ 

\ 

\ 

RUSSIA 

, 

I 

·c "' ~"' \ ~ 4' • \ 

___ .-.. .--· ~ ~ :"'1 NINTH / " 

./ '"'"" ·t(: p" .... 300000 ~ 

• H l.ug..1n 

N 

_____ c_ _____ _ \ 

\ ... 

--·-----

---·-------

EIGHTH 

fl Rll 

. . Sll 
A D A 

I 

----

H 

,..-~. / "' J J ----,. -------rr_.L.- \ . 

/'--'----

,_ "' 

I , " ' o \ ® t\TI.J\N1',\ 7 FOURTH \ t'• crl . r-t.<:""'"" 

~ r , ---\ 

~},~/;L---- -----1 ~~ \ 

CORPS AREAS 

December 1920 

® Army lnst\tllations 

orp$ Headquarters 

~ Corps Boul\dory 

Teuitory 

Notq: Minor shift • occurred in :ub state B$sign l·t < ;:,"'~"•"' yoor'::"nts ... ooo 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

assigned to the three overseas departments in Panama, Hawaii, and 

the Philippines. 23 

The act mandated several structural changes within the War 

Department to meet problems that had smfaced because of the war. The 

original detail system was modified to provide for greater professionalism in the technical branches, such as the Ordnance Corps and 

Quartermaster Corps. Each of the combat arms finally was given a 

bureau-level branch chief, and the Finance Department, Chemical 

Warfare Service, Air Service (later Air Corps), and Chief of Chaplains 

became permanent bureaus. The act a lso enlarged the War Department 

General Staff from thirty-six to ninety-three officers in Washington and 

placed no limits on the number of its members serving in the field. The 

Genera l Staff changed organizationally, with the establishment of four 

divisions. The addition of a fifth clement, the resurrected War Plans 

Division, was mandated by regulation during a subsequent War 

Department reorganization; it focused on contingency plans, doctrine, 

and force estimates, serving also as a shadow headquarters staff for any 

major force that might be mobilized. The strong examples of General 

March and his successor, General Pershing, affirmed the Chief of Staff 

to be the Army's paramount officer as envisaged in the new aw. ~ 

Achieving the law's objective of a multicomponent Army required 

some complex adjustments that could only be accomplished over time. 

The Regular Army was the first " line increment," with a mission to provide post garrisons, an immediate strike force, and a training cadre for 

the reserve components. The second line increment, the National 

Guard, was to provide forces for peacetime domestic disturbances and 

to serve as a balanced supplement to the Regular Army in wartime. The 

" Ganoe, Histol)', p. 483; James E. I lewes, Jr., From Root to McNamam: Army 

Organization and Administration. 1900- 1963 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of 

Militay History, 1975), p. 53; Mark S. Watson, Chief of Su!ff: Prell'ar Plans and 

Prepamtions (Wasbington, D.C.: llistorical Division, Department of the Army, 1950), p. 

25. As of December 1920 the nine corps areas were: First (New England); Second (New 

York, New Jersey, Delaware, Porto Rico); Third (Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 

District of Columbia); Fourth (Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, 

Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Tennessee); Fifth (Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, West 

Virginia); Sixth (Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin); Seventh (Arkansas, Nebraska, Iowa, 

Kansas, Missouri, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota); Eighth (Texas, Colorado, 

New Mexico, Arizona, Oklahoma); and Ninth (California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, 

Utah, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Territory of Alaska). See WD GO 50 and GO 71. 1920. 

u Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 709; Hewes, Root to J'vlctVanwm, p. 51; Watson, 

Chief of Sta,ff, pp. 70, 73; Wciglcy, 1/istOI:l', pp. 396, 403-05; James A. lluston, The 

Sinews of War: Army Logistics. 1775 /953 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of 

Military History, United States Army, 1966), pp. 403- 04. 

324 
THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 

Organized Reserve Corps was intended as the third line increment, to 

back up the other two with balanced units at a time of full emergency. 

The Army aimed at an incremental mobilization that would allow a 2-

million-man force of six field armies, each with three corps of three 

divisions each, to be fielded within sixty days. The Regular Army 

would comprise one field army; the National Guard, two; and the 

Organized Reserve Corps, the final three.

25 

The new concept made the relationship between active-duty officers and part-time citizen-soldiers critical. Reserve, ROTC, and 

CMTC training duties also added to the Regular Army's sense of being 

a part of the greater society. However, it would require a large overhead to meet the demands imposed by the ambitious mobilization concept and the extended involvement with the reserve components. But 

the cost of such an overhead generally went unrecognized or at least 

unsupported by Congress, highlighting the Army's basic interwar 

problem. Because of the fact that avoidance of major war was avowed 

American policy, preparation for the Army's role in such a conflict 

proved to be difficult. The need to perform its training and mobilization duties while working within the limits of a shrinking budget prevented the Army from performing either task well. A further problem 

was the General Staff itself, ever consumed by matters of little substance and ineffective in translating theoretical plans and concepts into 

reality. Coordinating the efforts of the staff elements remained onerous, while the Chief of Staff's span of control was so great that 

demands on his time impeded his effectiveness.

26 

Congressional intervention soon compounded these flaws. In June 

1922 the lawmakers cut the size of the Army from 280,000 to 175,000. 

The change required dropping or forcibly retiring 1,000 officers and 

demoting another 800 who wished to remain on active duty. The shattering effects led Congress to make some minor upward strength 

adjustments in January 1923, but the damage had been done. Most of 

the planning and preparations premised on the 1920 law proved unrealizable. The corps concept, for example, could not be implemented fully, 

and the extensive reserve training could not be carried out as contemplated. Beyond these practical consequences, the increasingly obvious 

1

" WD Bul 25, 9 Jun 20; WD GO 48 and GO 50, 1920; Memo (quoted words), Hal l 

to CGs, Corps Areas, 20 Sep 20, sub: Organization and Administration of Each Corps 

Area, Entry 268, RG 159, NARA. 1

" Ganoe, flistOJy, p. 486; Watson, Chief of Staff, pp. 83- 84; Robert A. Miller, "The 

United States Army During the 1930's" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1973), pp. 

58- 59. 

325 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

national indifference to military affairs was to be a growing source of 

demoralization within the Army throughout the interwar pcriod. 27 

Army strength was reduced further over the following years, reaching its low point of about 12,000 officers and 119,000 enlisted men in 

1927, remaining constant until 1933, and then beginning to increase 

gradua lly thereafter. Besides the steady decline in strength through the 

1920s, the Army was weakened by its huge stockpiles of deteriorating 

and outmoded equipment left over from the war and by its diminished 

funding, the bulk of military appropriations going to the Navy. With 

U.S. security policy focused increasingly on a sea defense, the steady 

decay and deterioration of the Army's capabilities continued unabated. 

The situation persisted late into the 1930s, despite repeated warnings 

about the Army's condition in the annual reports of the Secretary ofWar 

and the Chief of Staff and in their statements before Congrcss.

28 

The reductions in Army strength and the radical modification of 

many of the programs contained in the 1920 National Defense Act were 

attributable to a growing stress on economy throughout the government. The trend received additional impetus with the passage in 1921 

of the Budget and Accounting Act, which created the Bureau of the 

Budget. The budget director, the aggressive Charles Dawes, a wartime 

general officer and former member of the Liquidation Commissison 

after the war, embarked on a highly publicized campaign for greater 

"business efficiency" in all government departments. He was supported in his efforts by a succession of conservative presidents, parti.cularly Calvin Coolidge who stressed extreme economy in government 

expenditures. The fruga l Harding and Coolidge administrations repeatedly forced agencies to cut their work force and reduce their scale of 

operations. Economy surveys became a matter of routine, and in the 

War Department the inspectorate was tasked with the responsibility of 

conducting the surveys.29 

Before the establishment of Dawes' bureau, each Army element 

had been financially independent. No overall War Department coordination of appropriations had been attempted; each bureau and department dealt directly with the particular congressional appropriations 

committee that oversaw its activiti es. Once the 1921 law was passed, 

however, Army projections were processed through a War Department 

budget office that monitored requests for the Secretary of War. Then the 

'' Ganoe, HisiOIJI, pp. 484, 489 90. 

·• Watson, Cltief of S1aff, pp. 15 18; Wcigley, His101:v, pp. 400 0 I . 

.. Isabel Leighton, ed., The Aspirin Age. 19/9- /941 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 

Clarion Books, 1968), p. 145. 

326 
THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 

Secretary submitted a consolidated budget request for his whole 

department to the new Bureau of the Budget. Tt in turn set a ceiling, 

occasionally altering the military requests or returning them for adj ustment before sending them to Congress. Eventually, the pressure of cutbacks led the Secretary to allocate the monies received to the various 

arms and services. 30 

Tight control by the Bureau of the Budget and its War Department 

counterpart, as well as the persistent paring of appropriations by 

Congress, had a profound psychological effect on the Army ofthe 1920s 

and 1930s. Officers adopted a conservative approach to their trade, 

focusing on economy and the avoidance of costly risks and itmovations. 

Budget preparation within the Army eventually became a routine procedure, echoing earli.er submissions with few changes. Officers viewed 

this approach as safer than making new proposals, which seemed more 

vulnerable to congressional inquiries and demands for justification. This 

attitude developed over time into a habit that made it difficult for the 

War Department to innovate, even when funding again became available 

late in the second Franklin D. Roosevelt administration.

31 

Diminishing Resources 

The passage of the Budget and Accounting Act led General Helmick, then 

the Acting Inspector General, to have the act's financial oversight aspects 

reviewed for their effect on IGD activities. The act required the administration's Comptroller General to evaluate the adequacy of each executive 

department's system for inspecting its accounts and supervising its fiscal 

officers. Each department was supposed to provide the Comptroller 

General any information he requested about its financial activities, and 

his representatives were empowered to examine all relevant records and 

documents. By inference, the law allowed the Comptroller General to call 

on the Inspector General's Department, tlu·ough the Secretary of War, for 

information on the inspection of War Department money accounts and to 

verify the information by direct inspection.32 

'" Weigley, HisfOIJ', p. 40 I; John W. Killigrew, "The Impact of the Great Depression 

on the Army, 1929- 1936" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1960), ch. I, pp. 8- 9, and 

ch. 4, pp. 4-6. 11 Killigrcw, "Great Depression," Ph.D. diss., ch. I, p. I, and ch. 4, p. 2; Watson, 

ChiefofStaj.J; pp. 21, 26, 37, 48. 

'

1 Memos, McKenney to Hunt, 27 Sep 21, and Hunt to lG, 29 Sep 2 1, Entry 26, RG 

159, NARA. Helmick was slated to become the Inspector General of the Army at the 

conclusion of Chamberlain's terminal leave. 

327 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

After reviewing the Budget Act, General Helmick concluded that 

the process would have no practical effect on IGD activities, except to 

increase the number of reports. The Comptroller was not given the 

power to direct corrections. So long as the Comptroller General worked 

through the Secretary of War, he foresaw no conflicts between the two 

organizations. These were accurate forecasts: The inspectors and the 

investigators from the Comptroller's General Accounting Office developed a harmonious and cooperative relationship, and the inspectors' 

work load increased as a result of the investigators' findings. 31 

The advent of the Great Depression in October 1929 had a major 

impact on Army funding. The resulting government deficits ensured that 

defense spending would continue to be minimal. President Herbe1t 

Hoover wanted military expenditures further reduced as part of an overall government austerity program, and his approach was endorsed by a 

Democratic congressional majority chosen in 1930 by an electorate disil lusioned with Hoover's methods of dealing with the crisis. Adopting the 

view that the budget must be balanced, Congress slashed government 

payrolls in a vain attempt to restore prosperity. Meanwhile, the remaining stocks of World War I equipment were approaching final depletion.).~ 

The possibility of using military expenditures to aid the tottering 

economy was discussed as early as the summer of 1930. The Bureau of 

the Budget began to explore this option seriously in December. All military outlays were subj ect to very close congressional scrutiny. Public 

airing of such expenditures added to public hostility towards the military as a useless expense in desperate times. Using the 1\rmy to provide 

relief came to be viewed as a means of justifying its cost, and various 

schemes were proposed to usc military facilities and property to house 

the needy. A 1930 bill, for example, provided for the creation of a special reserve corps for the unemployed, whose members were to receive 

vocational training from the regulars. Army leaders were decidedly 

unenthusiastic regarding such proposals, and many civilians viewed 

them with suspicion, sensing the possible militarization of society. fn 

193 I corps area commanders were authorized to loan bedding and salvaged clothing to relief organizations. Otherwise, the Army remained 

aloof from relief activities.15 

" Memos, McKenney to llunt, 27 Sep 21 , and Hunt to IG, 29 Sep 2 1, Entry 26, RG 

159, NARA. 

" Killigrew, "Great Depression," Ph.D. diss., ch. I. pp. I 6; Leighton, cd., Aspirin 

Age, p. 222; Watson, Chief ofStqff. p. 4. 

" Killigrew, "Great Depression," Ph.D. diss., ch. 3. pp. 1- 5, and ch. 6, pp. 15- 17, 

24-25; Weiglcy, Hist01y, p. 402. 

328 
THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 

But the pressure resulting from the Depression was relentless. ln 

May, as economy measures, President Hoover proposed cutting back 

Army personnel authorizations and closing thirty small posts. The War 

Department successfully resisted the across-the-board pers01mel reductions on the grounds that the Army would be left with too few men to 

meet its minimum obligations. But the need to economize led Congress 

early in 1932 to consider merging the War and Navy Departments. 

Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthm vehemently opposed the 

consolidation, which proved to be an unsuccessful option. One result, 

however, was the creation of the Army-Navy Economy Board, with the 

mission of reporting periodically to the Joint Army-Navy Board on 

measures to reduce defense costs. The IGD executive officer usually 

was one of the Army representatives on the new board. 36 

With the Depression unconquered and a fall election facing him, 

President Hoover in September called for additional Army budget cuts. 

He focused again on the need to cut Army strength as a means to avoid 

paying the fixed pay and allowances costs that had been escalating as a 

resu It of more men staying in the Army since the onset of hard times in 

1929. The President also hoped to trim reserve-component activities; he 

wanted National Guard drills be cut in half, and ROTC and CMTC 

strengths and training funds reduced sharply. The War Department 

resisted on the grounds that these measures, by critically impairing 

mobilization capabilities, were contrary to the intention of the National 

Defense Act of 1920. The General Staff worked closely with National 

Guard proponents to preserve a resource that was more important than 

ever because of reductions in the strength of the Regular Army. Such 

assaults on the core of the defense concept obliged the War Department 

to play the role of a lobbyist for the civilian reserve components. 

Despite its efforts, many ORC units had to be inactivated or cut back to 

minimal cadres. 37 

Following his inauguration in 1933, President Frankl in D. 

Roosevelt took a strong, direct interest in managing Army affairs as he 

sought solutions to the economic crisis. The economic situation was so 

dark by the spring that Roosevelt announced that he would furlough 

3,000-4,000 officers in order to save money. General MacArthur resisted, and the scheme was dropped as the need for officers in the newly 

activated Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) became evident. Savings 

J• Killigrew, "Great Depression," Ph.D. diss., ch. 4, pp. 9, 19- 20, and ch. 6, pp. 

10- 11; WD News Release, 18 Feb 32, Entry 26B, RG 159, NARA. 

J

7 Ki lligrew, "Great Depression," Ph.D. diss., ch. 4, p. 31, ch. 9, pp. 3, 6, 14, and ch. 

10, p. 30. 

329 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

were realized instead by reductions in training, target practice, and 

flight training. Virtually all arsenal and depot research and production 

stopped, as did most large reequipment programs.38 

As a result, MacArthur directed that planning cease to adhere to the 

provisions of the National Defense Act of 1920. He was the force 

behind the preparation of a mobilization plan based on a Regular Army 

of 170,000, which was only slightly larger than the one that actually 

existed, backed by a 250,000-man National Guard. Known as the Initial 

Protective Force, this new approach became the basis for planning and 

requisitions until the beginning of World War II. The Organized 

Reserve Corps, of necessity, virtually ceased to exist, except as a manpower pool mostly of officers. MacArthur's more realistic plan won 

sympathy with the administration. After 1933 the strength of the Army 

increased moderately, and when the situation overseas worsened in the 

later years of the decade, Army budget projections trended upward. 

Despite the gradual improvement, however, budget issues rema ined 

a bone of contention throughout the decade. Maj. Gen. Johnson 

Hagood, a corps area commander, was relieved and later reassigned for 

declaring at a congressional hearing in February 1936 that he found it 

more difficu lt to get five cents for a lead pencil than "to get$ 1,000.00 

to teach hobbies to CCC boys." The continual stress on the need to 

economize and to achieve the greatest efficiencies with the limited 

resources available was a constant concern of everyone in the War 

Department. The Inspector General's Department, in particular, already 

deeply involved in disbursing and fisca l matters, was to find those 

issues dominating much of its time and absorbing its assets.

39 

Retrenchment and Growth 

In contrast to General Chamberlain's hopes for a large and vigorous 

organization, the Inspector General's Department experienced the same 

steady decline in personnel as the rest of the Army during the interwar 

period. The 215 officers assigned on Armistice Day rose to 248 in June 

1919, largely as a result of the special overseas inspections described 

earlier. Then the number plununeted. Within a year 87 officers and thir-

's Ibid., ch. 10, pp. 14-15; Watson, Chief<d"Stc!ff, p. 5; Ltr, TAG to IG, 17 Jun 33, 

sub: lntbrmation To Be Compiled at Corps Area Headquarters as of June 30, 1933, 

mimeograph copy, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA . 

• w Killigrew, "Great Depression," Ph.D. diss., ch. 8, p. 7, and ch. 15, p. 3 1; Watson, 

Chie.fofStqff, p. 26; Weigley, HisiOI:J', p. 406; AP News Releases, 24 Feb (quotation) 

and 13 Apr 36, OTIG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXI-1). 

330 
THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 

ty civilians were all that was left of the wartime expansion; 33 officers 

were in the Office of the Inspector General, while 54 remained at 

camps or in the geographical departments. 

The National Defense Act of 1920 fixed the strength of the department at 62 officers, including the Inspector General. The Secretary of 

War could raise or lower this strength by 15 percent without recourse to 

Congress. Inevitably, he selected the lower option, and department 

strength continued downward- to 56 officers in June 1922 and to 40 in 

1923, supported by only thirteen civilians in the Office of the Inspector 

General. This average strength, which General Helmick considered an 

irreducible minimum, continued with little change. Only in 1939, when 

dangers of a new war caused the Army's rapid expansion, were ten 

vacant officer positions filled in the Office of The Inspector General 

and the field organizations brought up to authorized levels.40 

The composition of the inspectorate underwent some changes as 

well. Before World War I the Inspector General's Department had consisted exclusively of officers of the combat arms. During the war, however, various specialists were admitted on a temporary basis and proved 

to be invaluable. The postwar stress on business efficiency and tight fiscal oversight made it natural that officers from the newly created 

Finance Department should be detailed to the corps areas as money 

accounts inspectors. Once on board, they were expected to audit virtually every financial activity. Of the six finance officers assigned in the 

fall of I 920, several were former AEF funds inspectors.41 

Additional changes over the next few years included the arrival of 

one officer each from the Ordnance Corps, Quartermaster Corps, and 

the Corps of Engineers. Still, in 1930, more than two-thirds of the 41 

detailed officers were infantry or cavalry, with the remainder members 

of the Coast or Field Artillery, except for one officer each from the 

Corps of Engineers, Finance Department, Ordnance Corps, and 

'

0 Ltr, Helmick to ACofS, G- 1, WD, 16 Oct 22, sub: Revision of Allotment of 

Officers to Activities, Entry 26; Rpt, Chamberlain to Chair, Accts Com, Hoffieps, 12 

Mar 20, Entry 26A. Both in RG 159, NAR.A. See also U.S. War Department, Annual 

Reports o.fllte Inspector General, 1919- 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

Office, 1920- 1940). IG strength distribution in August 1922 was: OIG, I 0; Corps 

Areas, 17; Pbj lippine Division, 3; Hawaiian Division, 2; Panama Division, 2; Combat 

Division, 4; Army War College, 2; Germany, I; District of Washington, I (Helmick). 

" Ur, Chamberlain to TAG, 23 Sep 20, sub: Assignment of Accountants, Inspector 

General 's Department, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. The first Finance Department officers appointed were: Maj. Austin Brown, Maj. Arthur L. Webb, Maj. Thomas L. Clear, 

Maj. Frank M. Holmes, Capt. Thomas H. Chambers, and Capt. Lawrence Worrall. All 

were finance auditors during the war. 

33 1 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

Quartermaster Corps. A final change in the branch mix occurred in 

1936, with the assignment of an Air Corps officer. The changes reflected the IGD's growing need for broad expertise in a variety of fields.

42 

The fluctuation in commissioned strength was reflected in the 

experiences of the IGD civilian force. The peak OIG civilian strength 

was fifty-four at the time of the armistice. Then between 1919 and 1921 

gradual reductions returned Army-wide IG civilian strength to the prewar total of fifteen. The National Defense Act of 1920 finally authorized the appointment of a chief clerk, something that inspectors had 

been urging since the time of General Breckinridge. The position was 

filled by the 61-year-old John D. Parker, who had worked in the Office 

of the Inspector General for forty-one years at the time of his appointment. These modest improvements did not, however, compensate for 

the ever-growing work load. In 1915 the office had handled about 9,500 

actions, while in 1921 it was processing nearly 17,700, roughly a 55-

percent rise, with no end in sight. Inspectors at all levels clamored for 

a proficient force of uniformed clerks to cope with what was proving to 

be a permanent increase in the demands on their department. 43 

An equivalent need for competent, permanent clerical support in 

the IG fi eld offices remained a problem throughout the interwar period. Immediately after the war Army field clerks occupied the few 

existing clerical positions, but the National Defense Act of 1920 specified that the warrant officers in that occupational category would be 

phased out and, as vacancies occurred, replaced by administrative 

warrant officers, who, unfortunately, rarely had any c lerical skills. 

However, the quality improved over time, and an OTIG survey conducted in 1930 indicated general satisfaction with administrative support in the field. By then most of the warrant officers were capable 

stenographers, and one or two of them were assigned to each fie ld 

office. Their assignment to the In spector General 's Department was 

not approved by Maj. Gen. John F. Preston, The Inspector General in 

1931, because he desired to have only detailed commissioned officers 

in the department. A satisfactory compromise was reached in 1932, 

when The Adjutant General agreed to a llocate nineteen warrant offi-

'

2 Ltrs, OTIG lnsps to Ex Off, OTIG, 3 Feb 30, sub: Replies to Memorandum of Data 

Desired by General Drum, Entry 26A, RG 159, NARA. Three of the deta iled officers 

were Maj. Harry R. Kutz, OrdC, 29 .Jun 28; Maj. Leon M. Logan, QMC, I Jul 28; and, 

Lt. Col. Ernest D. Peek, CE, 22 Sep 30. On the Air Corps, see Reed Annual Rpt, 2 Sep 

37, Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

•J England, IG, Camp Benning, Annual Rpt, 5 Jul 20; Memo, Irwin to CotFin, FD, 

I 0 Oct 2 1; Memo, Ex Off, OIG, to IG, sub: Status of Statutory Employees of the !GO, 

I Mar 22. All in Entry 26A, RG 159. NARA. 

332 
THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 

cers personally selected by General Preston for permanent rotation 

among IG positions.44 

By late 1935 Preston's replacement, Maj. Gen. Walter L. Reed, 

sought ways to have more commissioned officers assigned to handle 

the OTIG's significantly heavy work load. Reed first wrote each corps 

area commander to determine if any of them would be willing to give 

up a position. All replied, however, that their inspectors, overworked 

because of CCC requirements, were barely adequate in number. In 

1937 Reed resurfaced Preston's 1934 request that the Office of the 

Inspector General be authorized a permanent brigadier genera l slot. He 

wanted the officer to serve as chief of investigations and to supervise 

OTIG activities in his absence. The arrangement, he said, would facilitate senjor officer investigations and would fi ll an "urgent and constantly felt" need to give more depth to the OTIG's capabilitieS.45 

By 1937 the work load proved to be overwhelming because of several factors-the increase in Army strength, the continuing CCC 

requirements, and the ongoing special IG investigations. As a result, the 

informal practice of using officer augmentees was condoned officially. 

At first acting inspectors were authorized to be detailed wherever an 

assigned IG was unavailable; in this way two extra officers were added 

to the two detailed IGs at the Third Corps Area in Baltimore. Then later 

in the year assistant inspectors were detailed in each corps area, and 

plans were made to expand the Inspector General's Department up to 

its authorized full strength. By 1938 extra officers also were assigned 

to the Office of The Inspector General to deal with broadened tasks 

involving National Guard activities. The IGD strength reached sixty 

officers in October 1939, where it remained for some months. With the 

escalation of war tensions in Europe and Asia in 1940 and with the 

extended mobilization of the National Guard, the Inspector General's 

Department began to experience rapid growth.46 

The Inspector General controlled the selection of officers for detail 

within the department. Those selected generally had more than twenty 

'" Ltr, Scott to Helmick, 7 Nov 24; Ltr, Conrad to Williams, 13 Dec 24; Ltr, Helmick 

to Scott, 29 Dec 24; Ltrs, OTIG to All lnsps, 12 May 30, sub: Replies to Letter re 

Clerical Assistance to Inspectors; Ltr, Preston to Smith, 6 Oct 32; Ltr, TAG to All Corps 

Area, Dept, and Div Cdrs, sub: 26 Oct 32, sub: Allocation of Warrant Officers. All in 

Entry 26A, RG 159, NARA. See also WD Bul25, 9 Jun 20. 

·~ Memo (quoted words), Reed to ACofS, G- 1, WD, I May 37, sub: Additional 

General Officers of the Staff, Assistants to Branch Chiefs; Ltrs, Reed to Corps Area 

Cdrs, 9 Jan 36, and Replies, various dates. Al l in Entry 26C, RG 159, NAR.A. 

"" Reed Annual Rpt, 2 Scp 37; Memo, W.L.R. to Babcock, 15 Sep 38; Ltr, Logan to 

Humber. 30 Sep 35. All in Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. See a lso AReg 20- 10, 1935. 

333 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

years of service and were rated above average or better on their efficiency reports. Colonels usually were War College graduates, while the 

other officers were Command and General Staff College graduates. The 

Office ofThe Inspector General oversaw the assignment ofTGs to the 

field, coordinating with the ga ining command and the chiefs of the 

branches providing the individuals. Sometimes nominations came from 

the commands, but more often the branch provided several names. The 

OTIG would review them and forward those it approved to the field for 

selection. Personnel changes occurred when details ended or units 

deactivated, as well as when poor performance or other demands resulted in transfer 7 

The duties of officer augmentees were varied. In 1919 the tasks 

associated with demobilization had led to the appointment of so-called 

special inspectors at the request of hard-pressed local commanders. 

The augmentees functioned mostly at depots and ports, but also could 

be found at posts and camps scheduled for closure. Some special 

inspectors were approved by the Office of the Inspector General for 

single actions, such as the disposal of the Indian School property at 

Carlisle Barracks. Normally, however, these inspectors served a full 

tour in a more general capacity at salvage points. By 1922 the special 

inspectors had passed from the scene, but periodic surveys indicated 

the continued use of locally appointed augmentees. When the 2d 

Division inspector was reassigned in April 1928, for example, officers 

temporarily detailed from division units took on his duties to prevent 

a backlog of audits and property actions from accumulating before his 

replacement arrived.48 

An additional source of manpower was the Organized Reserve 

Corps. IG reservists began to be selected within days of the armistice. 

Those who applied had to be in the grade of captain or higher and have 

had at least five years of commissioned service, three in a line unit. 

Selectees fiJled specific mobilization positions in each corps area and 

in Washington. By 1929 a total of 155 spaces, ranging from colonel to 

captain, had been identified but only forty-three reservists had been 

assigned. Because General Helmick wanted close links established 

with the I GO's reserve officers, he launched a program under which the 

•• Ltr, Reed to TAG, 29 Aug 36, sub: Compilation of Polic ies Affecting 

Commissioned Personnel, Regular Army, Entry 26C; File 2 1 0.2, Assignment of 

Officers to 2d Corps Area, Entry 26A. Both in RG 159, NARA. 

•• Ltr, Cdr, Gen Hosp 31, to TAG, 26 Feb 19. sub: Special Inspector, Entry 26A; 

Rpts, Stone to OTIG. 2 1 May and 18 Jun 28, sub: Surveys of Fort Sam 11ouston, Texas, 

Emry II. All in RG 159, NARA. 

334 
THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 

names and addresses of such reservists were given periodically to the 

corps area inspectors so that liaison could be maintained. These 

reservists were routinely provided with copies of all IG publications 

and guides and included in all aspects of mobilization planning. One 

OTIG officer monitored reserve activities, kept a list of mobilization 

needs, and maintained contact with the reservists through bulletins and 

other publications. The same officer developed and administered a 

modest series of correspondence courses for reservists after 1927.49 

At first reserve officers were commissioned permanently in the 

IGD's Officer Reserve Corps, although after 1925 both the Organized 

Reserve Corps and the National Guard adopted the detail system. A 

detail in the IGD's Officer Reserve Corps was for four years, after 

which the officer had to return to his original branch for one year 

before eligible for a second appointment. All reserve appointments 

were in five-year increments, renewable until retirement so long as the 

physical and training requirements were met. However, reservists in the 

IGD's Officer Reserve Corps lost promotion chances, because they 

were not in a branch position with a promotion vacancy- a fact that 

explains the relatively small munber of authorized positions actually 

filled. IGD reservists were assigned either to a regional assignment 

group controlled by corps area commanders or to a branch assignment 

group controlled by the Inspector General's Department. The latter 

were earmarked for corps and higher IG positions, while the former 

were destined for divisions or installations.50 

Within the National Guard, fifty-five officers were assigned to IG 

duties in divisions or state headquarters. Unlike their IGD Officer 

Reserve Corps counterparts, these guardsmen could be redetai led 

indefinitely and could be promoted up to the grade authorized for their 

assigned position. The difference imposed a hardship on the IGD 

reservists, who had to find a branch slot to be eligible for promotion 

and barely had the chance to learn the nah1re of their IG duties before 

leaving them. When Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Drum became The Inspector 

General in January 1930, he directed a study of the reserve-component 

IG system, and the anomalies of the existing arrangements became 

apparent. Drum decided that it would be to the IGD's advantage to 

reduce the number of its Officer Reserve Corps incumbents. As an 

'" Memo, Wood to CofSeiSubsec, Com Per Br, Opns Div, WOOS, 14 Mar 19, Entry 

26; Ltr, He lmick to Corps Area lnsps, 4 Jan 22, sub: Inspectors General, ORC, Entry 

26; Rpt, Nugent to TIG, 13 Dec 27, sub: Survey oft he OlG. Entry II ; and Ltr, Preston 

to Roberson, 16 Oct 29, sub: IG-Reserve O!Ticers, Entry 26A. All in RG 159, NARA. 

~ Llrs, Of!G Insps to Ex 0/f, OTIG, 3 Feb 30, Entry 26A, RG 159, NARA. 

335 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

alternative, he proposed that a list of IGD-eligible reserve officers be 

compiled, to be drawn upon for call-ups required by mobilization. 

Thereafter, the reservists who were assigned in peacetime were volunteers on an indefinite tour.s• 

Gospel of Efficiency 

Unlike its strength, the headquarters e lement of the Inspector General's 

Department was essentially stable throughout the interwar decades. At 

the end of the World War the Office of the Inspector Genera l had six 

divisions. Two of these, Business Methods Survey and Field 

Inspections and Investigations, were dissolved by the end of 19 19. The 

four remaining divisions were Inspections, Investigations, Money 

Accounts, and Miscellaneous and Persmmel- the latter redesignated as 

the Administrative Division in 1921 and then as the Executive Division 

in 1927, with some functions reassigned in 1922 to form a small 

Records Division. Each division had a chief. The approximately fourteen officers not assigned as chiefs served in an investigations and 

inspections pool, conducting not only special investigations but also 

annual and accounts inspections. Each officer usua lly worked within a 

specialty, such as field artillery or uppl 2 

The demands on this small group were consistently heavy, starting 

with high-priority special demobilization inspections immediately after 

the war. The new mission to survey business methods promised to sustain the high postwar volume. The newly assigned finance specialists 

were required to inspect more than forty major War Department fiscal 

accounts, and the other officers averaged a like number of investigations 

each month. The disposal of surplus property received a great deal of 

attention in the years immediately after the war. A comprehensive survey 

was made of policies and methods of disposal, and safeguards against 

inefficiency and corruption were recommended. By direction of the 

Secretary of War, inspectors had to be present at all auction sales of sur5

' Memo, Merrill to TIO, 12 Feb 31, sub: Inspector General Reserve Officers; 

Memo, Bridges to TTO, 7 May 31, sub: Inspector General's Department Reserve. Both 

in Entry 159, NARA. 

n OTTO Surveys, 1927, 1929, 1930, Entry I I; OIO Org Charts, [31) Jan 19 and II 

Nov 20, Entry 26A; Memo, Helmick to ACofS, 0 - 1, WD, 21 Sep 21, sub: Estimated 

Requirements, Commissioned Personnel, Regular Army, Entry 26A; Memo, 

McKenney to OTIG, 28 Jul 21, sub: Name Change of Misc. & Pers. Div., Entry 26C. 

All in RG 159, NARA. The first structural changes since World War I took place in 

August 1941 , when the Records Division was made a section of the Executive Division 

and National Guard and Procurement Inspections Division were created. 

336 
THE PROBLEMS OF P EACE 

plus materiel to monitor procedures and adherence to law. ~ 

The great interest in efficiency 

and civilian business methods 

resulted in new methods of improving Army efficiency. In 1922 

Colonel Peck, now assigned at the 

War Department, received a fourmonth assignment with the large 

commercial retailer Sears, Roebuck and Company. After carrying 

out an in-depth study with the full 

cooperation of the company, Peck 

concluded that Sears' success lay in 

its strict cost accounting methods 

and its broad decentralization of 

authority. His apprenticeship was 

judged so successful that Maj. Gen. 

William C. Rivers, when he Maj. Gen. Wil/i(lm C. Rivers 

became The Inspector General in 

1927, sought and obtained more 

authorizations for civilian training. Two inspectors attended year-long 

courses in business methods at civilian institutions in 1928, and four additional officers attended similar courses in 1929. After that, budget limitations brought an end to the promising experiment. As a result of both 

training and practical experience on the job, inspectors were judged to be 

desirable instructors in Army schools, and during the 1930s TG officers 

lectured on funds management and business efficiency at the Army War 

College and both the Adjutant Genera l and Finance Schoo s.~ 

Training in key OTIG functions was also critical, especially for 

those under consideration for The Inspector General position. The practice of naming the strongest contender as the executive officer became 

the norm to assure continuity and the maintenance of standards. The 

executive officer ran the daily routine of the Washington office, signed 

" Llr, TAG to IG, 2 1 Jan 19, sub: fnspeclion of Progress ol' Discharge of Enlisted 

Men at Demobilization Centers and Ft. Sill, Okla.; Helmick and Irwin 1cstimonies, Mi l 

AITs Cmte, Hoffi.eps, 16 Jan 22, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

S< Rivers Annual Rpt, 29 Sep 28, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. In 1928 Maj. Franklin 

Babcock attended Sian ford, while Maj. Leo J. Ahern attended the Boston Institute. The 

four officers in 1929 wen1 to llarvard Business School. See Ltrs, OTIG lnsps to Ex OIT, 

OTIG, 3 Feb 30, Entry 26A, RG 159, NARJ\. Sec also OTIG Leclurc File 1937- 1941 , 

13ox 5, Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

337 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

most of the correspondence, and distributed the work load. He also prepared war plans and monitored War Department changes that might 

affect IG mobilization, keeping close liaison with officers in the G- 3. 

Most significantly, the executive officer handled all personnel matters 

throughout the Inspector General's Department. He maintained a roster 

of officers considered suitable for detail, including both the names of 

those who had done well as inspectors in the past and also of others 

who had expressed a desire to be inspectors. 

Every two years The Adjutant General provided the Office ofThe 

Inspector General with a listing of field-grade officers rated by their 

branch chiefs as above average or better and considered suitable for 

inspector duty. Rarely was anyone selected below those ratings. Corps 

area and department inspectors were usually picked from colonels who 

had just completed a command tour. Inspectors were assigned from the 

branch most strongly represented within their organizations. The executive officer selected officers from the Ninth Corps Area for rotation to 

the Philippines and Hawaii, assigning an extra individual to compensate for the time consumed in trans-Pacific travel. Most new details 

were made from among officers graduating from the Leavenworth 

schools or the Army War CoJlege. 55 

General Helmick also made the executive officer responsible for 

inspector training. Col. George Le R. Irwin, the first postwar executive, 

prepared and issued the first course for newly detailed inspectors in 

August 1921. The course was intended mostly for officers who were 

unfamiliar with the Inspector General's Department, but could be modified depending on the experience of the prospective students. The 

training was designed to be given at the Washington office, but could 

be presented elsewhere if necessary. Students were required first to 

review all Army regulations pertaining to the department and to inspectors. They then studied £G forms, publications, and policy statements. 

Finally, they read those reports of inspections and investigations selected as fine examples of the art. The student then went on a "practical 

phase;' starting work as an assistant on an inspection and then moving 

on, either to conduct a simple investigation on his own or to assist in a 

more difficult one. The new officers then were given thorough training 

in the inspection of money accounts and were briefed on IG adminish·ation and General Helmick's standards. 56 

~$ Memos, Williams to Ex OfT, OTIG, 28 Sep 26, and Preston to TIG, 23 Jan 30, 

Entry 26A, RG 159, NARA 

l

6 Course of Instruction for lGs Newly Detailed in the JGD, 19 Aug 21, Entry 26, 

RG 159, NARA. 

338 
THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 

The small Records Division, too, worked under the supervision of 

the executive officer. Consisting of one chief clerk and an assistant, the 

division maintained the IGD files and also kept the Washington office 

correspondence logs. A daily book of incoming cases, with a brief summary of each, provided a means to trace documents and served as a 

quick source for statistical summaries. The staff made all the indexes 

and cross- references necessary to keep track of related cases and provided a search service for other IG elements seeking old cases or precedents to support their current work. The inspection files, which dated 

back to pre-Civil War days, eventually included all of the AEF's IG 

office files. 57 

The day-to-day administration of the Inspector General's 

Department was carried out for the executive officer by the OTIG 

chief clerk. Inspection reports were sent first to the Inspections 

Division, where they were logged, reviewed, and cross-referenced, 

and then to the executive with a recommendation for action. 

Following his decision, correspondence for the appropriate bureaus 

or staff elements was prepared, after which the reports were forwarded and the suspenses monitored. Once the reports were returned, they 

were again reviewed for completeness or further follow up, their final 

destination being the Records Division for filing. All other cases 

were sent first to the Records Division for logging, indexing, and 

batching with similar material, if any. They were then given to the 

chief clerk for dispatch to the appropriate officer. The chief c lerk 

handled a ll civil service matters and equipment requisitions on his 

own authority. 58 

OTTG divisions were small and set up on a functional basis. The 

Investigations Division decided what investigations were needed, 

made assignments, and reviewed completed investigations to assure 

sufficiency of coverage. The division kept close liaison with other 

War Department elements to locate quickly precedents, decisions, 

and policies affecting particular cases. Especially in officer disciplinary cases, the IG reports were scrutinized so that remedial, corrective, or disciplinary action would be the same in similar cases, the 

goal being to ensure uniformity throughout the Army. In seeking to 

protect officers from hasty or discriminatory adverse actions, the 

division amassed a large body of precedent decisions that remained 

relative ly unknown to the rest of the Army, except to Judge Advocate 

" Memo, OTIG to lnsps, 28 Sep 26, sub: Records Division, Entry 26/\, RG 159, 

N/\R/\. 

'' Llrs, OTIG lnsps to Ex OIT, OTIG, 3 Feb 30, Entry 26A, RG 159, NARJ\. 

339 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

General officers who often relied upon it as a basis for their own 

decisions. 59 

Collateral duties often played a large role in the work ofOTIG divisions. In addition to making inspections and reports, for example, the 

Inspections Division maintained the OTIG library; monitored exempted operations (those not under corps control); prepared and revised regulations and forms; and issued policy letters and guides to inspectors 

assigned outside the War Department. Many of the fifty-eight types of 

accounts inspected annually by the Money Accounts Division were in 

unexpected areas, including the fiscal activities of the District of 

Columbia monuments and buildings; the D.C. Nationa l Guard; the 

National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, especially its special 

expenditure funds; the Soldiers' Home; and the Bond Section of the 

Finance Department. The division also examined the countless unit, 

chaplain, mess, and similar funds throughout the Army and investigated various types of claims- for example, liberty bonds and payments 

lost in the mail and related problems involving War Risk lnsurance.

00 

The Money Accounts Division, when required, could examine the 

books of firms making claims against the government and make recommendations as to the validity of the claim. Well into the 1930s, it 

continued to handle claims lodged against the unit funds of long-demobilized World Wru· I organizations. The division reviewed the finance 

inspection reports of IGs in the field and was the office of record for 

filing the reports. Finally, it provided support to the Office of The 

Inspector General, preparing the budget and h·avel vouchers and serving as the point of contact for commenting on other agencies' financerelated proposals.61 

Among the most unusual duties to befall Money Accounts Division 

officers was maintenance of the so-called Hixson Liquidation Fund. 

Set up in J 933 at the direction of the Secretary of War to liquidate the 

massive personal indebtedness of Lt. Col. Arthur G. Hixson, the f1md 

consisted of thirty-nine personal debts to other officers, firms, financia.l institutions, as well as the obligations of his cosigners who had 

become indebted as a result of his default. The Fourth Corps Area IG, 

s• Memo, OTlG to lnsps, 28 Sep 26, sub: Operations of Investigations Division, 

Entry 26A, RG 159, NARA. 60 Memo, OTTG to Insps, 28 Sep 26, sub: Duties of the Inspections Division; 

Memos, Webb to Williams, 7 Nov 23 and 7 May 27, subs: Functions of Money 

Accounts Division. All in RG 26A, NARA. 

" Memos, Webb to Will iams, 7 Nov 23 and 7 May 27; Rpt, Chamberlain to Chair, 

Accts Com, HofReps, 12 Mar 20. All in Entry 26A, RG 159, NARA. 

340 
THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 

responding to numerous complaints, investigated Hixson's personal 

finances, and the Secretary had decided that extraordinary measures 

were necessary because- in the event of Hixson's bankJuptcy-so 

many people would be hurt, to say nothing of the reputation of Army 

officers in general. Hixson agreed to have $160 a month taken from his 

pay, to be assigned to a fund managed by an OTIG officer to pay his 

debts. The Liquidation Fund disbursed over $ 10,000 before Hixson's 

death in 1938. The small remaining balance then reverted to the unfortunate officer's estate.62 

When General Drum took over the Inspector General's Department 

at the beginning of 1930, he immediately ordered an extensive management survey of his office. The starT provided him with statistics on 

personnel, organization, and operating costs, as well as data on the 

types and frequency of War Department- level inspections and on every 

active and reserve officer in the department. Within a month, The 

inspector General had a convenient overview of the status, procedures, 

and activities of each IGD element, as well as a listing of authorities 

and precedents. From this firm base Drum was able to embark quickly 

on changes he desired in inspection and investigation methods. Tn 

September each class or group of activities was assigned to a specified 

officer, who was instructed to build his expertise and become the IGD 

point of contact on his topic. Each specialist kept h·ack of inspections 

done by IGs at all echelons and provided guidance to corps area IGs 

when they inspected units in his area of expertise. Using the lower-level 

reports, he extracted items for follow up and trends analysis. At the end 

of each fiscal year he also prepared a narrative overview of the situation in his fie ld. General Drum's executive officer, Colonel Preston, 

assisted in developing this system, which he continued when he became 

the senior inspector a year later. 63 

General Drum also built on General Helmick's mobilization planning. Starting in 1922, Helmick had solicited from present and former 

inspectors comments on their wartime experiences, using the information as a basis for emergency planning. He warned that the mass of 

available data was too little utilized in planning for future crises-a 

weakness in the IGD system that invited an erosion of its functions in 

a time of emergency. Helmick's project languished during General 

., Memo, Reed to TAG, 20 Apr 38, sub: Hixson Liquidation Fund, Entry 26C, RG 

159, NARA. 

'' Ltrs, OTIG lnsps to Ex Off, OTIG, 3 Feb 30, Entry 26A; Memos, I lumber to TIG, 

(Aug] 31 and 12 Jul32, Entry 26A; OIG/OTIG Org Charts, 1919, 1922, 1934, 1936, 

1944, Entry 26C. All in RG 159, NARA. 

34 1 
T HE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Rivers' tenure as The Inspector General but thrived under the leadership of General Drum, who, by the end of his detail, had created a 

firm plan approved by the General Staff. His concept provided for a 

150-percent increase in IGD military strength and an over 200-percent growth in civilian strength. On M- day (mobilization) one 

Regular Army inspector would augment those already assigned to 

divisions, while others would go to ports of embarkation.64 Such 

preparations were timely in the decade that saw new wars break out in 

both Asia and Europe. 

IGs in the Corps Areas 

The corps area IG offices varied in strength in proportion to the number of units and War Department activities in their respective areas. 

Thus, New England's First Corps Area lG office in Boston was staffed 

by a colonel, a major, and a civilian clerk, whereas the Second Corps 

Area IG office at Fort Jay, New York, had three detailed inspectors (two 

for inspections, one for investigations and special inquiries); a captain 

attached to conduct audits and to inspect money accounts; and five military clerks. The IG offi.ce of the Fourth Corps Area in Atlanta was 

manned by a colonel and a major, who both carried out inspections, 

inventories, audits, and investigations. Because of the high volume of 

activity, two warrant officer clerks- one above the authorizationwere assigned to the office. 

65 

The volume of work was moderate in the first years of the new 

postwar organization. However, it grew year by year, and by 1924 corps 

area IGs found themselves in the position of having to repeatedly 

request additional clerks and officers, few of whom were available. The 

scope of their duties was broad, for they carried out inspections and 

investigations tor not only their own commanders but also those 

required by the War Department (Table 1). By 1928 each of the eighteen IGs in the corps areas were averaging thirty inspections and investigations annually, in addition to the numerous finance audits and property actions that were required of them.

66 

... Ltr, Helmick to Elmore, 12 Apr 22, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA; Army War College 

File 160- 62 1 F, Mobil ization Plan, OTIG, 1930, 1934, Revised to July I, 1936, U.S. 

Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 

•s Ltr, Ely to TAG, 26 Jan 28, sub: Survey of Headquarters, 2d Corps Area; Ltr, 

Pat1erson toAG, 4th Corps Area, 15 Feb 36. Both in Entry I I, RG 159, NARA. 66 Ltr, Scott to Helmick, 7 Nov 24, Entry 26A; Rpt, Major to TIG, 3 Apr 24, sub: 

Annual Survey of the Nine Corps Areas Headquarters, Entry II. Both in RG 159, 

NARA. 

342 
THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 

TABLE 1- TYPJCAL CORPS AREA lNSPECTJONS AND INVESTIGATIONS 

yYpe Level Frequency Authority 

Subordinate commands Corps Area Annual AReg 20- 10 

ftems of interest Corps Area Special AReg 20- 10 

Headquarters Corps Area Annual AReg 20- 10 

Exempted commands Corps Area Limited AReg 20- 10 

Property disposal Corps Area As necessary AReg20- 35 

NG armories Corps Area Amwal NGReg48 

Money accounts War Department Semiannual AReg 20- 10 

Exempted commands War Deparhnent Special AReg 20- 10 

Defects' Corps Area As necessary AReg 20- 5 

Un it complaints Corps Area As necessary AReg 20- 5 

Prejudicial complaints& Corps Area As necessary ARegs 20-5/ 

20- 10/20- 30 

Referred complaints Corps Area As necessary AReg 20-30 

Misuse of public funds 

or property Corps Area As necessary AReg 20- 30 

'Relating to mission conduct. "Relating to the character, swnding, or clliciency of any War Department member. 

Source: Organization Chart, File 333.1 , Entry II , RG 159, NARA. 

The area commanders' special demands imposed additional burdens. For example, in 1931 in one corps area both inspectors were 

asked to develop and monitor tactical exercises and map problems, and 

that duty, coupled with time-consuming local investigations, caused 

them to fall behind in performing and reporting required inspections. 

Maj. Gen. Fox Conner, while Hawaiian Department commander, used 

his inspector to prepare mess inspection standards and to help units 

meet them. Marked improvements resulted for the command, but again 

the inspector became tardy in his primary duties. 67 

61 Ltr, Whiston to Parker, 24 Feb 31, Entry 26B; Rpt, Van Schaick to OTIG, l5 Feb 

29, sub: 1929 Ammal Inspection and Survey [of the Hawaiian Department], Entry II. 

Both in RG 159, NARA. 

343 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

The situation was no better in the IG offices of the tactical division 

headquarters. The inspector of the 2d Division, located at Fort Sam 

Houston with the division headquarters, spent most of his time auditing 

unit and post funds, making property condemnation inspections, and 

conducting investigations on such relatively minor matters as car accidents. He had little time left to spend on more substantive issues, let 

alone on the numerous larger inspections, surveys, and investigations 

that became common after I 929. Across the state ofTcxas at Fort Bliss, 

the inspector of the 1st Cavalry Division encountered similar problems. 

If anyth ing, he was even more deeply embroiled in financial matters, in 

part because of the presence of severa l large Corps of Engineers civil 

works projects in his regio ~>.~ 

The nonmilitary aspects of the War Department's responsibilities 

consumed the energies of some inspectors, especia lly with the reactivation of the 1st Division at Fort Hamilton, New York City, in January 

1927. fts elements scattered in small garrisons throughout New York 

and New Jersey, the new division spent much of its time supporting 

civilian components. It he ld a few small exercises, but the bul k of the 

division could not be assembled for maneuvers until the fa ll of 193 1. 

The diversion from tactica l concerns was refl ected at a ll division IG 

offices, leaving the inspection of the tactical units to the corps IGs. 

The overall effect was a reduction in the amount of work at the division level and a dramatic increase at the corps area level. As a consequence, the division inspectors were late r attached for duty to the 

corps area, working for their own commander as required. Not surprisingly, unit commanders in the 1920s and I 930s rare ly gave thought 

to the tactical or wartime uses and needs of their IG sections. 

Inspectors themselves were so busy that they rare ly raised the issue. 

There were, however, exceptions to the rule in the overseas departments, especially the Philippines.69 

Inspecting U.S. Forces Overseas 

During the war a series of acting inspectors, supported by temporarily 

deta iled officers, had performed most inspection duties in the 

" Rpt, Stone to OTlG, 18 Jun 28, Entry I I; Ltr, Dagley to TAG, 6 Feb 36, sub: 

Replacement of a Warrant Oll'icer, Entry 26A. Both in RG 159. NARA. 

"' Rpt, Kaempfer to lG, 2d Corps Area, 23 Apr 28, sub: Annual Inspection and 

Survey of Headquarters, 1st Division, and Fort Hamilton, N.Y. ; Rpt, Thompson to IG, 

2d Corps Area, 24 Mar 32. sub: Inspection of the Headquarters. 1st Division, Fort 

llamilton, N.Y. Both in Entry II. RG 159, NARA. 

344 
THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 

Inspecting an AFIC Unit at Tientsin Barracks 

Philippines. Staffing became more permanent after passage of the 

National Defense Act. At this time the Philippine Department IG 

office had a five-person staff- a colonel, a major, a warrant officer 

chief clerk, and two enlisted typists. The two commissioned officers 

shared the IG duties, except that most finance matters were handled by 

the major. The depattment inspector, based in Manila, was also 

responsible for the annual inspection of disbursing activities in 

Nagasaki, Japan, and for IG support to the American Forces in China 

(AFIC), based at Tientsin.

70 

General Helmick made an extensive tour of the Far East in 1925. A 

few years later an IGD team under the leadership of Colonel Van 

Schaick, the former AFIG inspector who was a reputed Philippine affairs 

expert, completed a detailed sw-vey of the Philippine Department. The 

resulting reports, combined with those of the assigned inspectors, provide valuable insights into the condition of the department. 

After his arrival in the Philippines in July 1925, General Helmick 

visited every post and tmit throughout the archipelago, as well as most 

of the facilities in caretaker status. He was impressed favorably, for the 

most part, with the high levels of training and esprit shown by the units. 

70 Org Chart, Exh L of Rpt, IG, Phi l Div, to CG, Phil Div, 4 Feb 26, sub: Survey of 

Headquarters, Philippine Department, Entry II; Ltr, Austin to TIG, I 0 Dec 26, sub: 

Inspections of U.S. Forces in China and Money Accmmts Nagasaki, Japan, Entry 26. 

Both in RG 159, NARA. 

345 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

One exception was the 31st Infantry, which Helmick severely criticized. The appearance and training of the troops and the condition of 

the livestock was very poor. Apparently, with its elements scattered in 

sma ll garrisons throughout the city of Manila, the unit found training 

difTicult. Helmick judged the cause of its overall problems to be the 

inept leadership of the regimental commander, whom he felt should 

voluntarily retire or be boarded. One of the few entirely American line 

units in the Philippines, this regiment- because of its highly visible 

location in the capital- should have been a showcase to set the standard 

for the entire department.71 

The best of the many good units Helmick encountered was the 57th 

lnfantry (Philippine Scouts). Located at Fort William McKinley, this 

regiment formed part of a large garrison that included a division headquarters and the headquarters of the 23d Infantry Brigade, commanded 

by General Donaldson, himself a former inspector. The 57th Infantry 

underwent a series of reviews, exercises, and facilities inspections, all 

of which Helmick rated as superior. A sister regiment, the 45th, similarly composed mostly of American officers and Filipino troops, was 

almost as good. Engineer, medical, and antiaircraft units were equally 

impressive in their own spheres. The only all-American unit at the post, 

the I st Battalion, 15th Infantry, met the same high standards. Battalion 

members even had purchased tailored uniforms superior to the government issue. Helmick was measurably impressed, although he warned 

against possible improper command pressures on soldiers to buy nonissue uniforms. 

The units stationed at another large post, Camp Stotsenburg, had 

American officers and filipino troops. Helmick observed cavalry and 

horse artillery drills and exercises, all of which he praised. He was particularly fulsome in his description of the condition of buildings, facilities, and equipment. The guns of the 24th Field Artillery (Philippine 

Scouts), he said, were the best he had ever seen: "The steel looked like 

silver and brass parts shone like gold." Moving down to the southern 

islands of the Philippines, he found that the units there met the same 

high standards.

72 

The final two weeks were spent visiting the harbor defenses of 

Manila and Subic Bays. One of the three regiments assigned, the 59th 

Coast Artillery, was wholly American, while the other two were mostly Filipino. Helmick reserved most of his remarks for the condition of 

" Rpt, llclmick to CofS, WD, 22 Oct 25, sub: Inspection of the Troops in the 

Philippine Department, Entry II, RG 159, NARA. 

'' Ibid. 

346 
THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 

the defenses. The government's interpretation of the Washington 

Conference Naval Treaty had meant virtually no modernization for 

Corregidor, the key to the defense system. Helmick urged that the 60 

miles of roads on the island be made all-weather and that underground 

quarters, hospitals, and storage space be deve loped. As matters then 

stood, the garrison would be unable to withstand any extended fighting, since less than a third of its men could be protected. Similar 

improvements were necessary in communications, transportation, and 

harbor craft. 

He lmick was even more alarmed by a recent decision to raise the 

number of Filipino troops assigned to the defenses. Several times 

throughout his report he hinted at his doubts of Filipino reliability. 

Despite his conclusion that the Philippine Division was the best unit he 

had seen that year, he was concerned over the attitudes of the natives 

toward American rule. He urged that all important coast artillery fire 

control and communications positions be filled by Americans "so that 

no question as to loyalty may arise in any emergency." He went on to 

suggest that more American line troops be assigned so that a full 

brigade would be available " in time of emergency." He lmick claimed 

that Governor General Leonard Wood and the Philippine Division commander, Maj. Gen. James H. McRae, agreed with his concerns. Indeed, 

suspicion of the Filipinos formed the prevailing view at that time. 

Military intelligence officials in Manila judged that local sentiment for 

independence was strong, saw no way to change it, and believed that 

the only way to restrain its growth was to show progress toward independence for the Philippines.n 

The Inspector General was so concerned that he made the political 

situation in the Philippines an item of special inquiry during his visit, 

raising the issue with senior officers, government officials, and businessmen wherever he went. Although impressed with the economic and 

socia l progress that had gone on since he had left the islands in 1903 as 

a young officer, Helmick did not feel that the Filipinos had made comparable political progress, still considering them impressionable, unsophisticated, and easily duped by propagandists. He predicted that there 

would be a decline in Filipino unit efficiency as the original American 

Constabulary and Scout officers began to retire- few senior Americans 

believed that Filipinos would make comparably good leaders-and that 

71 Ibid. (quotations); Ltr, Prosser to Mcilroy, 24 Feb 26, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

Wood retired from active service in October 1921, and he served as governor general 

of the Philippines from 1921 to 1927. 

347 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

removal of American suzerainty would precipitate sectional, tribal, and 

religious sh·ife, suggesting that the United States articulate a firm policy toward Philippine independence. In the meantime, he successfully 

pressed for more inspections to assure the maintenance of standards 

and to sense the mood in predominantly Filipino units. On his return 

trip home, Helmick prepared specia l reports for the Secretary of War 

and the Assistant Chief of Staff G- 2 as welt.'• 

Politics of another sort attracted Helmick on the next phase of his 

tour of the Far East. In September 1925 he visited the Chinese cities 

of Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tientsin, and Peking during a period of 

great unrest throughout the country, which he believed was due to 

Communist influence. He observed, with approval, the efforts of 

American officers stationed there to learn the Chinese language, but 

was disturbed by the poor relations between American Marine and 

Army personnel. He attributed the trouble to Marine resentment at 

serving under the command of an Army general. Judging "prejudice 

still prevailed between the two services," he noted that the senior 

Marine in Peking, a colonel, avoided paying him a courtesy call. 

Despite this pettiness, his overall impression of U.S. troops was favorable. But he also considered them vul nerable to the Japanese and left 

Asia with the impression that Japan was a growing threat to U.S. 

interests. 75 

Three years after Helmick's tour, the r nspector General's 

Department undertook detailed surveys of major commands. Once 

again the Philippine Department and its activities came under scrutiny. 

Colonel Van Schaick, an early advocate of Phili ppine independence, 

who had sustained a close interest in the islands since receiving the 

Medal of Honor in Batangas in 190 I and had advised both Theodore 

Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson on the islands, led the effort. He and 

his team conducted the survey in late 1928 and early 1929. Van 

Schaick, cognizant that the Philippines were virtually indefensible 

against the Japanese, who regarded the American presence as a serious 

threat to their ambitions, nevertheless judged that the growth of autonomy at local and provincial levels was proof of the feasibility of selfgovernment. Although treaties prevented any substantial military 

" Memo, Helmick to SofW, II Dec 25; Memo, Helmick to ACofS, G- 2, WD, 18 

Dec 25, sub: Conunents Affecting G- 2 in the Philippines and China. Both in Entry 26, 

RG 159, NARA. 

" Memo (quotations), Helmick to ACofS, G- 2, WD, 18 Dec 25, Entry 26; Memo, 

Helmick to CofS, WD, 22 Oct 25, sub: I nspcction of U.S. Forces in China, Entry 26C. 

Both in RG 159, NARA. 

348 
T HE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 

improvements, the islands were costing the War Department $10 million a year without contributing a great deal to either their own or 

American security. Granting the archipelago independence, he maintained, would meet a moral commitment to the Filipinos while reducing the chances for conflict with Japan.u' 

Despite his strong opinions about American policy in the Far 

East, Van Schaick found the Philippine Department to be exceptionally well run by MacArthur, then the department commander. 

Believing that MacArthur fully understood the Army's policies of 

operating efficiently and economically, he focused on identifying 

some of the problems inhibiting command efforts at economy. For 

example, large quantities of materiel in depots and warehouses 

remained on hand, despite being identified as unnecessary to the 

command. Since most of this was not worn out through "fair wear and 

tear," the department IG could not condemn it without the Secretary 

ofWar's approval. This took months to achieve. Meanwhile, the costs 

of safeguarding and storing the materiel continued. Often, by the time 

final approval to sell it was received, it had deteriorated beyond usefulness. In a related action, the department IG spent hours passing 

judgment on clothing turned in, "settling each case as if it were his 

own coat he was about to discard." This meticulousness kept serviceable clothing in the system longer and greatly reduced questionable 

turn-ins. In Van Schaick's view, it also showed that all salvage and 

condemnation authority could and should be delegated to the department commander.77 

Another supply problem in the Philippines was the substantial delay 

encountered in completing requisitions. The fastest turnaround time that 

Colonel VanSchaick noted was five and a half months. He built an elaborate chart for his report, showing the average time consumed in completing requests for certain items. It took over a year for many requests 

to be filled, and two and three years were not uncommon; soldiers in the 

islands often had to wait such extended periods for simple items like 

metal polish and electric water heaters. Van Schaick recommended that 

the War Department G-4 study the matter, with a view to speeding up 

the process. A reverse problem in the supply system was that of automatic issue. Huge overages developed in some items, particularly 

76 Memo, Van Schaick to TTG, 2 Aug 29, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. His views were 

not representative of his colleagues in the department, most of whom favored dominion status. 

71 Rpt, Van Schaick to CG. Phil Div, 12 Jan 29, sub: 1929 Annual Survey of the 

Headquarters, Philippine Department, Entry II, RG 159, NARA. 

349 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-193 9 

rations, leading to forced issue of certain canned goods in contravention 

of Army policy to provide fresh food whenever possible. The need to 

rotate war stocks exacerbated the situation. Van Schaick suggested that 

the Philippines work solely on a modified requisition basis. 

Despite these difficulties, everywhere Van Schaick went he found 

storage and warehousing to be exemplary. The concerns in this area had 

more to do with the structures available. Cost cutting over the years 

since the war had caused buildings to deteriorate. As Van Schaick 

observed, " If we are to guard against economic waste in supplies, roofs 

must come first." Part of the problem lay in the fact that until recently 

there had been nothing authorizing extensive permanent construction, 

for the official view had been that U.S. troops were in the Philippines 

only temporarily. As soon as this policy was changed, General 

MacArthur had proposed a ten-year $11 million program to construct 

decent housing and storage facilities. Van Schaick reviewed and agreed 

with the proposal, stating that it was the minimum necessary to meet 

the needs of the command and pointing out that tropical conditions 

required the best materials. He also added his views on how the government could save the value of rents paid within three years after 

building its own warehouses. 

7

s 

Discussing administration, Van Schaick rejected a proposal that unit 

commanders be evaluated for the number of first-year enlistees lost 

through desertion and early discharges. He opined that the quality of the 

peacetime recruits was very low and the elimination of a large number 

inevitable. Enforcement of the proposed evaluation policy wou ld result 

mere ly in the retention of unsuitable soldiers, with a consequent drop in 

overall morale and efficiency. In essence, Van Schaick was echoing 

General He lmick's earlier concern about the demographics of the officer corps of the Philippine Scouts. In 1928 there were sixty-four 

American and twenty-eight Filipino officers. Their routine promotion 

would create more senior officers than needed in the Scouts, while under 

the law the officers could not serve elsewhere. Van Schaick further 

alluded to the possible problem of senior Filipinos commanding junior 

Americans. As a solution, he proposed that the law be changed to allow 

the Scouts' American officers to be assigned elsewhere and no more 

Filipinos to be commissioned. The racism implicit in these views needs 

no comment, beyond noting that it was the prevailing view of the cra.79 

General MacArthur, in his endorsement to the survey, praised Van 

Schaick's report as "a constructive effort of great merit and value." His 

's Ibid. 

"' Ibid. 

350 
THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 

lengthiest comments concerned the demoralizing effect of assigning 

officers to foreign service by roster; doing so smacked of picking a 

guard mount- and made no sense, being "based upon the false premise 

that the interest of the individual is paramount to that of the government." The system was unfair, with the total time an officer had spent 

overseas in his career the only basis for selection. As a result, senior 

officers who had been overseas during the Philippine Insurrection and 

World War 1, when such duty was desirable, never rece ived a postwar 

assignment outside the States. Younger, less experienced officers, on 

the other hand, got repeated tours, keeping them out of the United 

States for a large part of their careers. This rigid process had been 

adopted in 1922 over many protests, and MacArthur joined Van 

Schaick in urging its drastic modification. "It's an unquestionable 

axiom that military conditions which will not stand the test of war 

should not be adopted in time of peace." 0 

The concerns expressed by the senior inspectors of the Army during their various visits in the 1920s were echoed increasingly in the 

reports of Philippine Department inspectors during the next decade. 

The question of the Philippines' defense capabilities, fiJ·st raised by 

General Helmick and discounted by Colonel Van Scha ick, continued to 

be pressed by IGs. Concern for matters of security and combat readiness dominated inspection reports of the 1930s. The free use of native 

concessionaires on bases was criticized because of the opportunities it 

created for espionage and sabotage. The ammunition strength and 

equipment status of units often were detailed to show vulnerabilities 

and weaknesses. Inspectors, in many cases, were stating hard facts, 

which, although strongly endorsed by intermediate commanders, were 

not enthusiastically received at the War Department. Yet the emphasis 

on the weaknesses of American defenses in the Far East reflected the 

growing concern of many military professionals.81 

The equally critical situation in China was revealed clearly in a 

response to a U.S. Senator concerning a complaint written by a soldier 

at Tientsin Barracks. According to the complainant, the barracks 

plumbing was inadequate but money was spent, not on the necessary 

repairs, but on a new wall around the compound to improve security. 

The construction of the wall, plus the issuing of fewer passes and new 

curfew hours, led the man to claim that he was in effect a prisoner in 

"' 1st End, MacArthur, 15 Jan 29, to ibid. 

•• Rpt, Dwan to IG, Phil Div, 3 l Oct 36, sub: Annual Inspection, Fort Stotsenburg, 

P.l., including Clark Field, FY 1936, Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

35 1 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

the compound. He objected further to what he deemed was a loss of 

commissary privileges at a time when the troops had instructions to 

avoid native foods. One of the Philippine Department inspectors, Maj. 

Edward J. Dwan, prepared an information paper for the American 

Forces in China, addressing each topic in the complaint. 

Dwan noted that the Tientsin Barracks, located in the former 

German Concession, was the only foreign military area that did not 

have extraterritorial status. Consequently, the facilities were leased 

from private owners, and all improvements had to be negotiated. Law 

enforcement in the neighborhood was a Chinese responsibility and was 

in practical terms nonexistent. Japanese activity over the years had displaced inhabitants from North China who drifted to Tientsin, attracted 

in part by the presence of well-paid AFIC soldiers. By 1930 the venereal disease rate was an amazing 283.5 per 1,000 troops, compared to 

an Army-wide average of 47.7. The command instituted strenuous 

efforts to reduce this rate, combining an education program with curfews and fewer passes. Further reviews showed that 65 percent of the 

soldiers at the barracks carried passes authorizing them to stay out 

overnight, which not only encouraged concubinage but also rendered 

the garrison unable to meet night time emergencies. Tighter control 

over commissary privileges was imposed to restrict their use to men 

with authorized dependents. All of these actions had been recommended previously by the visiting senior inspectors in their reports. 82 

In addition, recent Japanese aggression in North China had accented 

the indefensible character of the American facilities. Unlike most 

Chinese complexes of a similar nature, the American garrison lacked any 

substantial wall around it for defense. The owners had avoided the issue 

for years by maintaining a decorative picket fence. A new unit commander finally persuaded them to erect a proper wall, both for defense and to 

reduce theft. The Japanese threat also led the commander to require a percentage of the troops to be available on a 24-hour basis, and he tightened 

discipline in order to reduce the chance of any incidents that the Japanese 

could use to create "difficulties." Major Dwan reasoned that all of the 

actions were justifiable. The problem lay in the commander not keeping 

his men informed as to the reasons for the changes he had made.83 

Throughout the world, the inspectors of the 1920s and 1930s were 

thus reporting on the cumulative effects of policies and conditions that 

" Rpt, Dwan to JG, Phil Div, 18 Sep 36, sub: Information Pertaining to Quoted 

Allegations Contained in Letter From Senator Morris Shepperd rc U.S.A.T. in China, 

Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA 

u Ibid. 

352 
THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE 

had developed over many years. The adjustment to changing financial 

conditions, popular attitudes, new missions, and unexpected requirements strongly influenced the entire Army, making it by degrees an 

entirely different force in 1939 from what it had been in 1919. The 

gradual adoption of motor transport, wireless communications, and aircraft of all types generated new demands on the internal organization 

of the Army and its Inspector General's Department and, ultimately, 

produced a revolution in management that would shape their infi·astructures in the conflict to follow . 

.. 

353 

10 

The Managerial Revolution 

Short on money and manpower, and overburdened with requirements, 

the Army was trying desperately to perform its mission within the constraints. As a result, to streamline a great variety of its operations, it 

made determined efforts during the 1920s and 1930s to learn from the 

management techniques that had been developed by the greater civilian 

society. In one form or another, this business culture and collateral economic issues influenced the diverse inspections and investigations that 

were carried out by the inspectorate during the interwar years. 

Internal Controls 

Much of the internal history of the Inspector General's Department 

(IGD) between the wars concerned The Inspector General's efforts to 

maintain uniform standards and procedures, using the technical chain for 

communicating with all inspectors. Just as it had before the war, the 

Office of The Inspector General (OTIG) required inspectors to send in 

copies of their travel orders, to avoid duplication, permit coordination, 

provide mutual support, and monitor travel costs. It also insh·ucted them 

to submit monthly reports, each containing the expected completion date 

of the ongoing inspection and the closing statements of all funds examined. In addition, the senior inspector of each command was expected to 

submit a report on lGD activities at the end of each fiscal year.' 

The bulk of most reports concerned the situation in the inspector's 

command, the effects of War Deparh11ent policies, and recommendations for improvements. Future needs, such as new training or equipment, were identified. Topics ranged widely- anything of importance 

to the local commander might be considered. The report was prepared 

' ARcg 20-5, 1921, 1924, 1930. 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

in two copies, with the original being forwarded through normal command channels. Each echelon of command added remarks endorsing, 

rejecting, or amplifying the inspector's observations. At the War 

Department the report was reviewed, with extracts circulated among 

the responsible staff. After all action had been completed, it was filed 

in the Office ofThe Inspector General. 2 

The OTIG staff maintained contact with unit inspectors through the 

issue of numbered "nco-styles"-duplicates of letters and policy statements. The original Yellow Book had languished and disappeared after 

1916, because of the rapid changes inci.dent to the World War and its 

aftermath. Eventually, to supplement the periodic nco-style and circular updates, the pocket-sized guide "Helpful Suggestions to Inspectors" 

was developed. This small guide, aimed at newly detailed inspectors, 

not as a rigid outline but as a supplement to the requirements given by 

their own commanders, was divided into six parts, each outlining procedures and references for various types of inspections.3 

In I 927 General Helmick tried to strengthen the rather disorganized 

and haphazard technical chain by directing the periodic issue of IGD 

policy statements to all inspectors. The need for tighter standards resulted from the War Department's emphasis on what was known as "dollar 

for dollar" efficiency. Inspectors were expected to scrutinize expenditures to see whether they were necessary and whether they achieved the 

desired objective at the least cost. Six policy statements had been issued 

by March 1929, when General Rivers created several inspection standards- short checklists and guides to ensure that inspectors covered a ll 

the necessary topics at each activity. The standards were made available 

to commanders, and generally were well received.~ 

Despite the blizzard of advice, there seemed to be no systematic flow 

of information coming fi·om the Office ofThe Inspector General. Finally, 

tmder General Drum, the problem was addressed. True to character, 

Drum directed a complete survey of the matter in conjunction with the 

organizational overview that followed his appointment as The Inspector 

General in January 1930. He reduced the nwnber of regulations pet1ain1 Ibid., and 1932. 1 " Helpful Suggestions to Inspectors, Parlicularly Those Serving Their First Detail 

in the IGD," 4 Feb 23, mimeographed, OTIG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH). Seven pages 

deal with inspections, four with investigations, and thirteen with finance audits. 

• OTIG Policy Statements 1- 6, Boxes 2 13- 14, Entry 26; Ltr, Rivers to Kilbourne, 8 

Mar 29, Entry 26; Logan Lecture (quoted words) to QM School, 9 Apr 3 1, Entry 26B. 

All in Record Group (RG) 159, National Archives and Records Administration 

(NARA), Washington, D.C. 

356 
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 

ing to IG activities from five to two 

and ceased the issue of neo-styles 

and policy statements, replacing 

them with functional inspection 

guides that consolidated the various bits of information in circulation. Each of the new inspections 

guides- ultimately twenty-six 

were issued- dealt with a separate 

subject, ranging from animal management to warehousing. The first 

gave general instructions, stressing 

that the guides were not intended to 

be followed slavishly. General 

Drum expected that the guides, 

once amended, would form the 

nucleus for a new IG manual akin 

to the old Yellow Book.5 

Unfortunately, the project lost Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Drum 

its momentum with General 

Dwm's departure in November 

1931. Although the guides continued to be used throughout the 1930s, 

undergoing revisions as regulations changed, the Office of The 

fnspector General also resumed the periodic issue of memoranda on 

trends noted by the War Department. Despite this deviation from 

Drum's structmed system, better control was maintained over the technical chain and the overwhelming flow of miscellaneous advice and 

information inherited by Drum did not surface again.6 

General Drum's legacy was even stronger in the area of inspection 

philosophy and focus. Drum considered inspectors to be the military 

equivalent of civilian efficiency experts. While the latter were concerned exclusively with matters of profit and loss, the lGs determined 

whether Army resources were being used in the best possible manner to 

support national defense objectives. Costs were a concern but not the 

sole consideration. Drum believed that the inspectorate's primary mission should be to "direct a searchlight into dark corners," to ensure the 

"preparedness of the army as an agency of national defense." He shifts Drum Annual Rpt, FY 1931 , Entry 26; Inspection Guides I 17 and 19- 27, 193()-31, 

Entry 26A; Logan Lecture to QM School, 9 Apr 31 , Entry 26D. All in RG 159, NARA. 6 OTIG Miscellaneous Corresp Files, Box I, Entry 26B; Memo, Merriam to OTIG 

Olfs, 2 Nov 36, Entry 26C. All in RG 159, NARA. 

357 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

ed the emphasis from a review of business methods and toward an 

analysis of equipment and systems maintenance for meeting mobilization or wartime requirements. As an aid to achieving change elsewhere 

in the Army, he urged inspectors to report positive innovations. Drum 

repeatedly stressed that " the IGD is a fact-finding, not a fault-finding, 

body" and that it existed to help commanders to meet their goals.' 

Hoping to end the frequently adversarial relationship that had existed in the past between the Inspector General's Department and the 

General Staff, Drum saw two distinct levels of inspection within the 

Army. Unit inspections, conducted by the local commander and his IG, 

should focus on the efficiency and economy of post or commmand 

operations and on compliance with regulations. OTIG inspections 

should concentrate on the efficiency of broad systems, such as Armywide hospitalization or heavy ordnance design and manufacture. 

Keeping such topics at the War Department level allowed closer contact 

with the staff elements responsible for making the systems work. 8 

To further his goals, Drum developed an Army-wide annual inspection plan. Each January the Office of The Inspector General would 

solicit other War Department officials for any topics of special interest 

they wished to see checked during the general inspections for the next 

fiscal year. Proposals were reviewed for appropriateness and then consolidated under broad headings, such as administration or supply. Items 

of concern to The Inspector General, the Chief of Staff, or the Secretary 

of War were treated under separate categories. The OTlG staff then 

developed a comprehensive inspection and special inquiry plan. After 

approval by the Chief of Staff, the plan became the basis for War 

Department- level JG activity for that year. The Adjutant General sent 

letters to major commanders, requesting that their inspectors look into 

the special subjects in addition to local matters.9 

In principle, the integrated approach had merit. However, its practical application proved to be a great burden for the OTIG officers 

tasked with developing the lists of special subjects. In July 1938, after 

years of dealing with constantly changing topics, Col. Harry H. 

Pritchett, the chief of inspections, suggested that the practice of soliciting special inspection subjects be discontinued. He pointed out that 

' Memo, Drum to OTIG, 16 Nov 3 1, sub: Relationship of OTIG to the Air Corps, 

Entry 26A, RG 159, NARA. 

• Ibid. 

• Ltr, Conley to CGs, Corps Areas, 18 May 35, sub: Special Subjects in FY 1936 

General Inspections; Memo, TAG to TIG, 24 Aug 36, sub: Instructions re llarbor Boats. 

Both in Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

358 
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 

many requests essentially duplicated the types of coverage idcnti fied in 

the inspection guides. The need to consolidate the items submitted by 

the branches and bureaus represented considerable effort with relatively little return. Experience had shown that important issues were added 

outside the process in the course of the inspection year. The time spent 

organizing the special topics tended to limit the time available for general inspections, funds inspections, and investigations. General Reed, 

agreeing with Pritchett, directed that the practice be suspended in fiscal year 1940 to see if any adverse reaction followed. ln fact, the change 

was barely noticed in the rush of activities associated with the war in 

Europe, and the practice faded away in the press of great events. 

General Drum's more organized approach remained, however, as did 

his philosophy of inspection, with its emphasis on teaching and its goal 

of efficiency as a means of preparing the Army for war. 10 

Decentralization 

During the interwar period special topics dominated the inspectors' 

time. Redefining the IG function , gradually weeding out excess duties, 

and decentralizing much of the burden of inspection became major 

tasks. Passage of the National Defense Act of 1920 encouraged these 

trends. Inspectors were asked to comment, for example, on the decentralization that resulted from the establishment of the corps areas; on 

the surplus materiel at installations; or on the pretrial confinement of 

accused soldiers, for the purpose of identifying unnecessary delays. 

The Army's image, particularly on the latter issue, was a matter of 

growing importance. Civil-military relations were made a special item 

in 1922, for good public relations were seen as critical for building citizen support for the reserve components. 11 

10 Memo, H.H.P. to TIG, II Jul 38, and Reply (pencil note), 18 Jul 38, Enlry 26C, 

RG 159, NARA. 

" Ltr, TAG to IG, 29 May 19, sub: Usc of Motor Vehicles, Entry 34A; Ltr, Rivers to 

/\II lnsps, 6 Jun 19, sub: Inspectors Required To Investigate System Under Which 

Rations Arc Issued, Entry 34/\.; Llr, T/\.G to IG, 29 Jan 19, sub: Fitting of Shoes, Entry 

34/\.; Memo, TAG to lG, 9 Jul 19, sub: Enforcement of War Department Orders, Entry 

34A; Ltr, W. Wood to Dept lnsps, 4 Oct 19, sub: Shortages in Clothing, Entry 34A; 

Extracts from Aviation Repair Depot lnsp Rpt, 15 Jun 20, Entry II; File 323.6, GO 132 

WD 1919 and GO 75 WD 1920, Entry 26; Memo, Peck to IG, 12 Jan 22, sub: 

Duplication of Reports on Surplus Property Activities, Entry 26; Neo-stylc 420, 2 Mar 

22. Entry 26; Helmick Annual Rpt, 1922, Entry 26. All in RG 159, NARA. Sec also 

Nco-style 333, 8 Jul 18, Neo-style 370, 5 May 19, Neo-style 423, 23 Apr 23, Neo-style 

345A, 30 Jan 19, and Nco-style 401, 8 Jun 20, OTIG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH). 

359 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

The steady growth of special items was one of the reasons that 

inspectors were overwhe lmed with many forms of disjointed guidance. 

Most of this miscell any was rescinded in 1927 as part of General 

Helmick's changes. Despite his efforts, however, new special items 

began to appear almost immediate ly. Thus in 1927 the Secretary of 

War directed one of the many initiatives to identify the number of soldiers performing duties away from the ir assigned positions. Inspectors 

were to make inquiries during their scheduled inspection visits and 

then to prepare their findings in a separate report. The next year the 

names of soldiers away from their primary duties had to be I is ted, and 

the inspectors had to assess whether the absence was justifiable. The 

number of IG special investigation areas reached seventeen in 1927, 

sank to six in 1929, and then increased to nine in 1937. Of course, 

field inspectors had to deal with themes or topics assigned them by 

their own commanders.'

2 

The primary difference after 1927 lay in the type and scope of the 

specia l items. Previously, a lmost every one had dealt with some kind of 

compliance requirement; inspectors were used as enforcers, duplicating 

the work of others and making it impossible for them to fulfill the role 

of teacher and helper as desired by the Office ofThe Inspector General. 

The overwhelming number of small requirements unquestionably distracted inspectors and diminished their effic iency. Helmick's policy 

changes during his last year on the job cleared the way for General 

Drum's reforms. During the 1930s more thematic special issues 

became the rule, and instead of compliance with official policy, inspectors sought to gather information and aid commanders on matters of 

current concern. 13 

The only IG duty in which consistency seemed to prevail throughout the interw ar era was the conduct of tactical inspections and evaluations. Beginning in 1920, training and tactical inspections were supposed to be made by commanders and their staffs; inspectors no longer 

participated. In practice, however, the arrangement was not quite as clear 

as it seemed. Inspectors could observe and comment on field exercises 

that happened to be under way during an inspection visit, and they still 

12 Ltr, Helmick to TAG, 28 Jul 27, sub: Rescission of Certa in AGO Letters, and 

Reply. 5 Aug 27, Entry 26; llelmick Annual Rpt, FY 1927, Entry 26; Rpt, Behr to 

OTlG, 16 Feb 19, sub: Inspection and Survey, Headquarters, 9th Coast Artillery 

District, Entry I I; Rpt, Cygon to CG, 3d Corps Area, 30 Apr 31, sub: Annual 

Inspection ofCarlisle Barracks, Entry II. All in RG 159, NARA. 

o) Themes in the Seventh Corps Area between 1931 and 1935, for example, included administrative efficiency, handling of requisitions, and work conditions. Sec 7th 

Corps Area lnsp Rpts, 193 1- 35, Box 23, Entry II , RG 159, NARA. 

360 
T HE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 

could hold formations of troops under arms to check on clothing and 

equipment. The new regulation ostensibly limiting IG activities in this 

sphere contained a significant loophole in that it allowed commanders 

to appoint qualified officers as their assistants. The practical result was 

that the whole inspection burden often devolved upon the locaiiG just 

as it had before the war. Moreover, because the senior commander's tactical inspection reports did not have to be forwarded beyond the major 

command headquarters, TG inspection reports continued to be used in 

Washington as a major source for unit eva luation .'~ 

In 1928, when inspectors became exclusively involved in the conduct of economic surveys, all tactical inspection requirements were 

shifted in fact as well as in theory to command channels. The nearly 

concurrent reactivation of several major combat units, such as the 1st 

Division in New York, led to the practice of division or brigade commanders devising field exercises that included the tactical inspection. 

Accompanied by his G- 3, the general observed his units in a variety of 

situations that he himself selected. Thus the 1932 inspections of lst 

Division elements consisted of a unit parade, a field inspection, the 

establishment of a tactical camp, meeting engagements, night attacks, 

and a combined-arms attack-and-defense problem. These were conducted without any formal ra participation.15 

General Drum's consolidation of the regulations governing inspections again raised some questions about the role of inspectors in tactical or training activities. In March 193 I a letter issued through The 

Adjutant General sought to clarify the situation. The regulations that 

made commanders responsible for tactical evaluations were cited again, 

emphasizing that IGs had no automatic role in such work. Yet inspectors were under the immediate and exclusive control of their respective 

commanders, who had the authority to decide the duties of their IGs, 

limited only by the latter's War Department requirements- that is, the 

time-consuming economic surveys. Commanders were enjoined to 

,. Memo, Chamberlain to Ex OfT, 5 May 2 I, Entry 26; Memo, TAG to Csoffiurs, 

WD, and CofMiiBur, 27 Aug 21, sub: Instructions re Inspections by Chiefs of Branches 

and Other War Department Inspections, Entry 26; Logan Lecture to QM School, 9 Apr 

3 1, Entry 268: File 300.3, AR 20 I 0, Entry 26A; llelmick Annual Rpt, FY 192 1, Entry 

26. All in RG 159, NARA. Sec also AReg 20 I 0, L922; Luther P. Call, Jr., "The 

History, Organization and Function of the Inspector Generals Department," Resen'e 

Officer 16 (Oct 39): 1 I. 

" Rpt, Kacmpfcr to IG, 2d Corps Area, 23 Apr 28, sub: Annual Inspection and 

Survey of Headquarters, 1st Division, and Fort llamilton, N.Y.; Rpt, Thompson to IG, 

2d Corps Area, 24 Mar 32, sub: Inspection of the Headquarters, I st Division, Fort 

Hamilton, N.Y. Both in Entry II, RG 159, NARA 

36 1 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

keep inspections of all types to a minimum so "that inspecting may not 

be overdone and the morale of the Army personnel thereby lowered." 

For all intents and purposes, IGs were at last completely out of the business of tactical evaluation. 16 

At the same time, inspection responsibilities were shifting. 

Inspections entailed considerable travel and expense. Consequently, 

whenever money was tight, OTIG inspection functions were transferred 

temporarily to local inspectors. As the budget squeeze persisted, some 

of these duties became customary, almost permanent. This was especially the case with so-called exempted stations- the installations, 

including arsenals, airfields, and depots that were answerable to War 

Department authority rather than to the local commander. The exemption was no longer as total as it had been before the war; by 1921 corps 

area commanders could direct limited inspections of exempted stations 

located in their areas in order to familiarize themselves with conditions 

and personnel. The discipline and appearance of troops was added in 

1924 as an appropriate topic. That same year mileage limitations coincidentally forced most OTIG inspections to be delegated to corps area 

personnel for the duration of the inspection cycle. 17 

The pressure to save travel money continued to grow, year by year. 

Finally, Chief of Staff Summerall directed in 1929 that exempted stations be made the responsibility of corps area inspectors. For the Office 

of The Inspector General, the order meant a possible loss of inspection 

continuity and uniformity at these installations. The problem was complicated by General Summerall's desire that War Department inspectorate continue to survey depots and arsenals and to inspect "big money" 

accounts. The OTIG executive, then Colonel Preston, seeking clarification, learned from the Chief of Staff that his basic intent was for corps 

area commanders to be able to direct inspections wherever soldiers were 

stationed in their areas. An understanding was reached. OTIG inspectors 

retained inspection responsibility for arsenals, depots, sea transports, 

and NHDVS facilities; corps area commanders assumed inspection 

responsibility of all other exempted stations. Additionally, the OTIG 

•• Ltr, McKinley to CGs, Corps Area, Depts, and Divs, 27 Mar 31, sub: Army 

Regulations and Guides, IGD, and Tactical and Trainillg Inspections, Entry II, RG 159, 

NARA. 17 Memo, Bullard to Eastern Dept Motor OfT, 13 Feb 20, sub: Exempted Stations, 

Entry II A; Rpt, Stone to OTIG, I Nov 28, sub: Survey of the Tucson Municipal 

Airfield, Entry II ; Helmick Annual Rpt, FY 1924, Entry 26. All in RG 159, NARA. 

Sec also AReg 20-20, 1921 and 1924; Call, "Inspector General's Department," pp. 

II 13. 

362 
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 

executive would coordinate with 

the technical bureau chiefs to 

avoid duplication and excessive 

numbers of visits. In this way the 

special expertise needed to inspect 

these facilities was maintained at 

the Office of The Inspector 

General, whil e General 

Summerall 's desire for greater 

corps area control was achieved as 

wcll. 18 

When General Drum became 

The Inspector General, he tried to 

concentrate his limited travel 

resources on the OTIG's remaining 

exempted station responsibilities, 

in part because of his desire to 

build extensive functional expertise in the War Department inspcc- Maj. Gen. John F Preston 

torate. However, he found it difficult to achieve his goal because of 

the continued budget squeeze. Even financial inspections had to be 

passed down to the corps area levels for completion, and in 1930 and in 

193 l many depots in the South and West came under local inspection 

purview. In 1932 the OTIG-level i11spection of War Department offices 

was canceled so that the modest sum involved could be diverted to support IG travel. Similar economy measures in 1932 almost killed Drum's 

system, when the Chief of Staff considered having local inspectors make 

all the inspections in their areas. General Preston objected strenuously, 

arguing that some War Department- level expertise on technical facilities had to be maintained to preserve the effective control by the Army's 

leaders. After discussion, the Chief of Staff agreed, and the situation in 

respect to exempted stations remained the same. 1

'

1 

11 Memo (quoted words), Summerall to TIG, 17 Jun 29, sub: Inspection of Exempted 

Station; Memo, Preston to Rivers, 19 Jun 29; Memo, Logan to TIG, 2 Jul 29, sub: 

Inspections and Surveys by Officers of the IGD. All in Entry 268, RG 159, NARA. 

Exempted stations with troops were mostly schools and airfields. 

,. Rpt, Cygon to CG, 3d Corps Area, 2 1 Jul 30, sub: Inspection and Survey of 

Carlisle Barracks; Memo, OT!G to lnsps, n.d., sub: Inspections Made by Officers in 

OTIG and Exempted Stations Assigned to Corps Areas for Inspections; Memo, Drum 

to J>rcston. 5 May 30; Memo, Preston to Cots, WD, I Aug 32, sub: Assignment of 

Inspectors. All in Entry 26A. RG 159, NARA. 

363 
THE INSPECTORS GEN ERAL, 1903-1939 

Nevertheless, the tight budget continued to upset the intended 

division of inspection responsibilities. In essence, OTIG inspectors 

were required to take annual samples in areas that would have been 

their exclusive responsibility if funds had been available. The situation was recognized in 1935 by a change to the regulations. Corps 

area commanders were required to make The Inspector General aware 

of any inspections and findings made by their IGs at exempted stations, and The Inspector General was expected to reciprocate. The 

loss of firsthand information caused the Secretary of War to direct in 

1936 that General Reed personally inspect all corps area headquarters. Starting in 1937, IGs from Washington inspected one corps area 

post in each command, specifically to give the Chie f of Staff a sensing "for general conditions." That year corps area IGs evaluated nearly all the exempted facilities during their scheduled visits to review 

money accounts. 20 

The act of sending OTIG inspectors to the corps area headquarters 

made it apparent that decentralization had gone too far- in some 

instances IGs were inspecting their own superiors. An inspection 

report received at the War Department, in which an inspector had commended his own commander, provided the necessary impetus for 

change. Beginning in 1938, division and corps area inspectors no 

longer completed the annual inspection at their own headquarters. The 

situation had proven awkward and embarrassing, for the inspection 

report could require remedial actions from the inspector's own commander. Henceforth, corps area JGs had to examine the divisions, 

while OTIG inspectors did the same for the corps areas.21 This was, 

however, the only case in which the long process of decentralization 

was reversed. 

Pa enwor~Pa enwork 

Army adminish·ation, on the other hand, was characterized by excessive 

centralization and excessive paperwork. In the opinion of critics both 

within the service and outside, too many organizational elements were 

20 Ltr, Pearson to CGs, Corps Areas, 2 Mar 36, Entry I I; Ltr, Reed to Corps Area 

Cdrs, 30 Jan 36, sub: Inspection of All Corps Area Headquarters, Entry II; Llr (quoted words), Reed to Spinks, 22 Apr 37, Entry 26C; Reed Annual Report, FY 1937, Entry 

26C. All in RG 159, NARA. See also ARcg, 20-10, 1935. 21 Memo, TAG to Corps Area Cdrs, 7 Jun 38, sub: Assignment of Inspections, FY 

1939, Entry II ; Logan Lecture to QM School, 9 Apr 31, Entry 26B; Memo, Reed to 

ACofS, G I, WD, 6 Sep 38, sub: War Department Policy- Administrative Inspections, 

Entry 26C. All in RG 159, NARA. 

364 
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 

engaged in monitoring others and shuffling documents. As the new 

efficiency experts for the Army, inspectors became deeply involved in 

attempts to control such excesses. 

The vast amount of paperwork entailed in Army administration 

was both a product and a symbol of unnecessary supervision and 

excessive standardization. Even the most trivial action required 

endorsements through every level of command. The pressure to justify virtually every Army expenditure led, ironically, to an expensive 

accumulation of data in reports and records. One post commander estimated that almost 44,000 documents were needed to account for the 

fixed and movable property on his installation. The system, too complex to work in a time of emergency, had been waived in 1918 so that 

the Army went " from czarism to anarchy to czarism" as it moved from 

peace to war and back again.22 

The subsequent pro) iferation of reports, blank forms, and complicated requisitions marked the resurgence of practices abandoned as 

unworkable during the war. Many of the inspections and inquiries carried out during the 1920s and 1930s had the aim of cutting paperwork 

while developing systems that would be applicable both in peace and in 

war. fnspectors viewed the current practice of issuing separate regulations as the primary cause for the increase. General He lmick predicted 

a time when no one would be able to read all of the regulations, and 

clerks would have to be assigned exclusively to filing and indexing. By 

1922 the growth of regulations already meant that the average commander was unable both to administer and to command. 

Bureaucratic habit contributed to the problem, with Helmick complaining that every time a form was eliminated another promptly took 

its place. But postwar turbulence was another factor. Allowances and 

authorizations were modified so often that few commanders could 

determine their unit's correct entitlements. "The result of this is to give 

a troop commander a feeling of helplessness," warned Helmick, "and 

to create a liability for the most careful, painstaking and hard working 

officer to be assessed with carelessness."23 

Efforts to alleviate the problem generally had made it worse. In 

1920 the General Staff was placed in direct supervision of the supply 

and administrative activities that once had been performed by the 

bureaus, thereby creating another echelon of correspondence and caus22 Ltr, Hagood to TAG, 12 Sep 19, sub: The Appalling Burden of Paperwork, Entry 

llA, RG 159, NARA. 

u Helmick Annual Rpl. FY 1922, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

365 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

ing everyone involved to document his actions. In an early postwar 

effort to ease commanders' burdens, a personnel adjutant had been 

authorized at unit levels; the practical result had been to introduce even 

more paperwork by expanding the capacity to handle it. Helmick urged 

that staff procedures be simplified by requiring staff officers to deal 

with each other informally. Written records should be brief and should 

be made only when truly necessary. 24 

Helmick's findings, along with complaints fi·om the field, led the 

Chief of Staff, General Pershing, to direct a special investigation of the 

entire situation in April 1922. A survey was undertaken worldwide. 

Inspectors in the field and each War Department bureau and staff clement 

provided data; specialized commands, such as hospitals and depots, were 

examined to identify any practices that might be unique to them. A mass 

of information resulted, which an roo group analyzed and subsequently 

coordinated its findings with other War Department elements.

25 

By 22 December, the day of Helmick's report to the Chief of Staff, 

about 138 reports, forms, or papers had been recommended for change 

or elimination. By the end of the month 73 were gone and 21 others were 

being simplified. The IGD findings were passed to a War Department 

board that had been established, on General Helmick's recommendation, 

to monitor the problem permanently. Col. Ora E. Hunt was named the IG 

representative to the board, when it became operational in March 1923.26 

General Helmick, however, saw deeper causes for the glut of paperwork, declaring that much was due to the excessive number of staff 

officers at all headquarters and what he called the "overorganization of 

the War Department" because of the General Staff trying to perform the 

propriety functions of the bureau and service chiefs. He recommended 

an arbitrary 40-percent strength reduction of War Department staff officers, relocating them from Washington back to their units and thus 

drastically chopping the flow of paper, and also a 20-percent cut at 

corps area and department levels. Helmick further suggested that The 

Adjutant General's Office should insist on being the sole War 

Department channel to the field- as regulations required- and should 

be more critical of the material it forwarded. 27 

2

' Ibid. 

u Llr, TAG to Corps Area Cdrs, 10 Apr 22, sub: Reduction of Paperwork; Memo, 

TAG to IG, 6 May 22. Both in Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

M Ltr, TAG to IG, 17 Feb 23, sub: Reduction of Paperwork in the Army, and Reply, 

19 Feb 23, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

" Rpt (quoted words), IG to CofS, WD, 22 Dec 22, sub: Investigation Concerning 

Excessive Paperwork in the Army; Helmick Annual Rpt, FY 1923. Both in Entry 26, 

RG 159, NARA. 

366 
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 

The volume of paperwork produced another unfortunate consequence in the tendency, noted by many inspectors, of General Staff officers becoming so absorbed in their office work because of the perceived need to document everything. Staff officers were functioning 

more as operators than as planners and observers, and at unit level they 

were buffering their commanders from proper contact with administrative and logistical personnel. Hence, Helmick suggested in 1924 that a ll 

administration be centralized at the level of the unit adjutant and that 

nothing be done at company lcvel.u 

Largely through General Helmick's efforts, the reform movement 

began to show some progress. Regulations were changed in 1924 to 

relieve commanders of personal liability for property accountability, 

reducing greatly the need for extensive documentation. At the same 

time, the War Department board successfully cut the number of blank 

forms needed in supply and finance procedures. A major achievement 

was the publication in 1926 of a new regulation restructuring the Army 

personnel system. Administration was consolidated at the battalion 

level along the lines Helmick had suggested two years earlier, theoretically freeing unit commanders and NCOs to focus on mission training. 

Stock record accounting and clothing records also were simplified. 

Although pleased with the reforms, Helmick pointed out that the total 

volume of regimental-level paperwork had not really decreased but had 

shifted to other echelons, making its impact less deleterious.29 

Despite the best efforts and intentions, however, a growing number 

of publications continued to be the bane of both inspectors and commanders in the field. Inevitably followed by changes, the regulations 

represented a huge administrative burden. One corps area reported in 

1928 that it had received 378 bulletins, regulations, and circulars, plus 

123 changes to existing regulations. One depot commander told 

General Rivers in 1928 that at the end of each fiscal year he had to submit sixty-two routine reports, most of them updating information 

already available in some form at the War Department.30 

General Drum made paperwork reduction a special item during the 

1931 inspection cycle. He warned that the General Staff's efforts to 

cover every possible administrative contingency with some sort of 

guidance had stultified commanders' initiative. In violation of the War 

Department's stated principle of decentralization, routine problems 

11 llelmick Annual Rpl, FY 1923; Memo, Helmick to TAG, 20 Feb 24, sub: 

Reduclion of Clerical Work in Organizations. Both in Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

Helmick Annual Rpls, FY 1924, FY 1926. FY 1927, Entry 268, RG 159, NARA. 10 Rivers Annual Rpt, FY 1928, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

367 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

were decided at the highest levels of command, although they could be 

better handled at a lower echelon. Drum urged that regulations be limited to policy statements and rules of procedures and that the General 

Staff refrain from attempting to control daily operations.31 

General Drum continued to hammer away at the tendency to oversupervise throughout his tenure. Staffs at all levels managed subordinate elements too closely because of a misplaced zeal to remain fully 

informed. The result continued to be unnecessary documentation and 

busywork. The Inspector General declared that the cause of the problem was the failure of the General Staff to plan clearly and to articulate the standards desired. "The efficient executive knows that planning is an essential feature of organization; that centralized control is 

an essential feature of decentralized operation; and that methodical 

inspection is an essential feature of supervision- organize, decentralize, supervise."32 This was good advice, based on contemporary management ideas, but it proved easier to enunciate proper principles than 

to halt bad practices. 

The size of the senior-level statTs was another enduring issue related at least indirectly to oversupervision and excess paperwork. It, too, 

seemed resistant to reform despite intense, extended IG involvement. 

Immediately after World War 1 Secretary Baker had requested that lOs 

make special inspections throughout the War Department, with the aim 

of keeping the work force in proportion to a demobilizing Army. 

Although Baker used the information gathered to defend the Army 

against charges of idleness and ovcrmanning, the special reviews were 

unpopular and perceived by many officers as threatening. In fact, the 

inspections had shown that much busywork was in progress, reflecting 

efforts to justify the strength of an officer corps that had become disproportionately too large for the shrinking Army.33 

Little actual improvement occurred, despite the downsizing 

requirement of the National Defense Act of 1920. Finally, in February 

1922 Secretary of War John W. Weeks, responding in part to congressional pressure and in part to 1 Jclmick's tough views, ordered a reduction in the number of officers assigned to the War Department, directing each bureau and staff dcparhncnt to halve its strength in two 25-

" Ltr, TAG to Corps Area Cdrs, 18 Jun 31, sub: Reduction of Paperwork; Drum 

Annual Rpt, FY 1931. Both in Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

" Memo, Drum to OTIG, 16 Nov 31, Entry 26A, RG 159, NARA. 11 Memo, Baker to Chamberlain, 9 Sep 19, Entry 26B; Notes of an Address by 

General Chamberlain at a Conference of All Officers of the IGD, 29 Dec 19, Entry 26. 

!3oth in RG 159. NARA. 

368 
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 

percent increments and giving the affected elements only seven days to 

prepare plans for the reduction. The Inspector General's Department 

was directed to review each plan and inspect each agency for compliance with the directive. Inspectors also were to assess the effects of the 

reduction on operations and the degree of the General Staff's involvement in generating each agency's work. The Chief of Staff added the 

requirement that all officers be identified who had been on duty in 

Washington longer than four years and that the duties of enlisted personnel be checked to ensure that General Staff functions were not indirectly being performed by NCOs. 34 

The resulting report from General Helmick stated that, in general, 

even greater cuts were possible. However, the reductions had to be 

made judiciously. Some components, such as the new Office of the 

Chief of Chaplains and the Office of Public Buildings, clearly were 

overstaffed; others, such as the Office of the Chief of Infantry, were at 

or below minimum, and any further cuts would hamper efficient operation. Helmick actually recommended an increase in the staff of the 

Air Service, feeling that its performance was "crippled" by the lack of 

a Sllfficient number of officers. He found that most of the excess was 

in the Ordnance and Quartermaster Corps, both of whose leaders had 

embarked already on reorganization plans to reduce officer personnel. 

The Inspector General was successful in recommending that his findings, rather than the original across-the-board cuts, be used to prune 

the War Department staffs, a decision that allowed a more flexible and 

efficient reduction. Eventually, 164 positions out of an estimated 800 

were eliminated.35 

This substantial reduction, however, failed to end congressional 

criticism. Consequently, in May 1923 the Chief of Staff directed the 

Washington inspectorate to make annual surveys of all War Department 

branches and bureaus and all exempted stations throughout the United 

States. Now the objective was to assess the value of each activity to the 

Army and to determine whether it was being run as efficiently and economically as possible. Deficiencies were to be noted, and instances of 

exceptional management were to be identified and circulated. The 

"' Memo, TAG to IG, 8 Feb 22, sub: Reduction of Number of Officers on Duty in 

Washington, and Reply, 10 Feb 22; Memo, McKenney to Helmick, 18 Feb 22, sub: 

Instructions. All in Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 35 Rpt, IG to CofS, WD, 16 Mar 22, sub: Inspection of Office of the Chief of 

Infantry; Memo (quoted word), Helmick to CofS, WD, 2 l Mar 22, sub: Reduction in 

the Number of Officers on Duty in Washington; WD News Release I, I Apr 22. All in 

Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

369 
THE INSPECTORS GEN ERAL, 1903-1939 

Secretary of War selected his own office as the first to be surveyed, and 

he enjoined all bureau and department heads to cooperate. An extensive 

analysis of General Staff operations was made by Col. Casper M. 

Conrad, Jr., who fonvarded his report to the Secretary at the end of the 

year. Conrad noted a few areas where some positions could be cut, but 

on the whole he found strengths at the proper level for daily activities. 

A loss of personnel, in his opinion, would have "one of two effects- a 

reduction of routine or less time spent on planning- probably the latter."36 This finding apparently reduced the volume of criticism, and for 

several years manpower changes were carried out by the General Staff 

with little IG involvement. 

Despite continued command and political interest, as Late as 1 930 

many posts still bad not undergone as complete a reduction from wartime 

strength levels as the War Department. A special survey of corps area 

headquarters, prepared in 1929 with the object of reducing overhead and 

standardizing organization, resulted in the preparation offm·mal tables of 

distribution for each. Budget cuts and the effects of the Depression, however, renewed the pressure to reduce headquarters strengths still further. 

ln June 1930 the Secretary of War asked the corps area and department 

commanders to have their inspectors survey post, depot, and garrison 

headquarters, with the aim of reducing personnel overhead to the 

absolute minimum that was necessary to conduct essential operations.37 

The survey results indicated that military headquarters strength had 

increased by 300 percent over the March 1917 level and that operating 

costs had risen by 15 percent. General Drum used the information to 

develop a comprehensive remedy. Although critical of the high overhead on staffs at all levels, he recognized that the situation resulted in 

part from the refusal of members of Congress to close unnecessary 

Army posts and the lawmakers' tendency to heap many quasi-military 

tasks on the Army. Drum admitted that the Army had little control over 

being overcommitted and underresourced, but he believed that it could 

make much more of the resources it possessed.38 

Drum supported a more thorough pruning of staffs to eliminate 

busywork and ease demands on troop units for nonmission support 

J6 Memo, Wahl to IG, 3 May 23, sub: Survey of All Branches and Bureaus of the 

War Department and Certain Exempted Stations, Entry I I; Memo, Davis to CotS, WD, 

26 Jul 23, Entry 26; Memo (Conrad quotation), IG to DCofS, WD, 13 Dec 23, sub: 

Report of Inspector on Activities of the Genera l Staff, Entry 26. All in RG 159, NARA. 

n Rivers Annual Rpt, FY 1929, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA; John W. K.illigrew, "The 

Impact of the Great Depression on the Army, 1929- 1936" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana 

University, 1960), ch. 2, pp. 12, 15. 

}s Drum Annual Rpt, FY 1930, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

370 
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 

requirements. Learning from the survey that maintenance funds were 

distributed more by precedent than by need, Drum successfully urged 

that allocations be made on a "fully scientific," or rational, basis. This 

reform allowed commanders, for the first time, to budget their annual 

repair expenditures and to make accurate projections for future materiel 

and personnel needs. To allocate funds, a board was set up at each echelon of command. A remaining weakness was officer turnover, which 

contributed to the lack of continuity for decision making and longrange planning. Moreover, although better resource management 

resulted from the survey, few personnel reductions were made because 

it was government policy not to add to the general unemployment. In 

consequence, only moderate curbs were imposed on the gradual 

increase in officer strength.39 

The story was different at the top, with Congress and the Roosevelt 

administration still perceiving War Department strength as excessive. 

Responding to this pressure, the Chief of Staff in August 1937 directed 

The Inspector General to survey Washington operations to identify 

areas for manpower reductions. General Reed conducted the inquiry 

with the help of two of his officers and two fi·om the General Staff. 

Working from a 1931 survey conducted by Lt. Col. Charles H. 

Patterson, who became The Inspector General in 1940, Reed discovered that by April 1937 only 40 of the 97 officer positions recommended by Patterson for elimination out of the total 644 had actually 

taken place. He attributed the slowness of the reduction to the addition 

of new missions, such as supervising the Civilian Conservation Corps, 

and to the growth of new planning and procw·ement activities. Reed 

concluded that the volume of work had grown while the number ofWar 

Department officers was dropping slowly and judged that any further 

cuts would impair efficiency.

40 There for the moment the issue rested. 

Economic Surveys 

Inspectors in their role as the Army's efficiency experts utilized economic sw·veys, which constituted the single greatest diversion from 

their customary IGD duties. Begun in May 1927 in response to a 

request from the Secretary of War, the surveys of branches, bureaus, 

and field activities and installations not under corps areas took prece39 Jbid. 

•o Rpt, Reed to CofS, WD, 7 Jan 38, sub: Officers on Duty in Washington; Rpt, Reed 

to CofS, WD, 5 Oct 38, sub: Employment of Civilian Attorneys in Office ofThe Judge 

Advocate General. Both in Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

371 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

dence over other general inspections. Their purpose was to identify cost 

and management efficiencies for the Army:" 

Like the earlier personnel survey, the first of the series of economic surveys came out of the Secretary of War's office, which set the pattern for a detailed management study of the entire headquarters. 

Commanders in the field concurrently were directed to have their IGs 

survey all of the activities and installations under their control. 

Inspectors were to determine which activities were essential and which 

were not. New and more economical methods of operation were to be 

identified and, when discovered, were to be considered for application 

elsewhere. A member of the activity being surveyed was to escort the 

inspector making the survey to assure that each understood the other's 

function. Corps area commanders were authorized to modify normal 

IG duties or to delegate them to other officers, thereby providing the 

inspectors sufficient time to conduct the surveys.

42 

The first surveys of the War Department were completed in 1927 

and 1928 and consisted of analyses of more than nineteen bureaus and 

activities. The Office ofThe Inspector General consolidated the remarks 

and statistics in these surveys in an overview report on the Army's condition. Although little substantial action appears to have been taken as a 

result of this great effort, the first report nevertheless provided a comprehensive picture of the functions, organization, financing, and physical and personnel assets of each organization visited.43 

Next, OTIG inspectors turned their attention to the large field 

activities, such as hospitals, depots, and arsenals. At the outset the 

Office of The Inspector General issued twelve inspection standards, 

ranging in subject from inspecting a headquarters to such topics as post 

exchanges, commissaries, and motor pools, to be used as preliminary 

guides for conducting the surveys. Subsequently, General Rivers 

" Rpt, Nugent to TIG, 13 Dec 27, sub: Survey of the I GO, Entry l l; Helmick 

AmlUal Rpt, FY 1927, Entry 26; Ltr, TAG to TJG, 3 May 27, sub: Survey of All 

Branches and Bureaus of the War Department, and Certain Exempted Stations, Entry 

26A. All in RG 159, NARA. 

'

2 Ltr, Collins to CG, Phi l Dept, 3 May 27, sub: Survey of War Department Activities 

and Installations; Msg (Immediate Action), Wahl to Corps Area and Dept Cdrs, 5 Nov 

27, sub: Survey of War Department Activities and Installations. Both Entry II , RG 159, 

NARA . 

• , OTIG Cir Ltr 27, 8 Oct 27; Ltr, Wahl to Corps Area and Dept Cdrs, 14 Oct 27, 

sub: Survey of War Department Activities and Installations; Rpt, Nugent to TIG, 13 

Dec 27, sub: Survey of the OIG; Memo, Rivers to TAG, 2 Oct 28, sub: Surveys of War 

Department Activities and Installations. All in Entry I I, RG 159, NARA. See also 

Rivers Annual Rpt, FY 1929, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

372 
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 

allowed each inspector to develop his own approach to the surveys, 

hoping that the variety of methods would enable him to select the best. 

The surveys quickly highlighted the fact that the Army had no standard 

system of cost accounting, making it difficult for inspectors to determine either costs or values received in some activities. In these cases, 

the IGs were obliged to make subjective judgments based on their own 

estimates of a unit's supervision, efficiency, and record of accomplishing its mission:•·• 

The survey reports first were provided to corps area commanders 

and then referred to the chiefs of branches. These officers were 

required to report to the Office of The Inspector General any actions 

they took, based upon the reports, and what economies, if any, they 

achieved. Commanders in the field indicated that they found the surveys useful for improving their operations. War Department chiefs of 

bureaus and branches appreciated the sw·veys, saying that the studies 

served to keep them in touch with problems in the field. All agreed that 

the Army leadership's heightened concern over issues of efficient management had been beneficial.45 

Troop and training installations underwent similar economic surveys. In their reports inspectors summarized the origin and development of such facilities; described in detail the property and buildings, 

noting the condition of storage facilities and motor vehicles; and provided a comprehensive out! ine of the activities of tenant organizations. 

The focus was to verify that the best practices were in use, to gather 

useful ideas for application elsewhere, and to ferret out inefficient practices, such as storing obsolescent gear rather than disposing of it. In 

1928 one inspector found that the New York General Intermediate 

Depot was issuing expendable dental material with a 1 0-year-old expiration date. Other subjects covered in detail included property accountability and funds management.46 

Later surveys did not contain the extensive details found in the earlier ones, but their emphasis remained the same- cost-effective administration of post and unit operations. New topics were added, such as 

the amount of troop labor used to sustain utmecessary overhead. 

Greater details were given on some topics, including the number of 

unprogrammed enlisted losses, and statistics were gathered in the hopes 

•• Memo, Rivers to TAG, 2 Oct 28, Entry II , RG 159, NARA. 

•s Rivers Annual Rpt, FY 1929, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

•• Rpt, Conrad to TJG, 2 Aug 27, sub: Survey of the OfTice of the Secretary of War; 

Rpt, Van Schaick to OTIG, 16 Jun 28, sub: Annual Survey and Inspection of the 

Medical Field Service School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Both in Entry 11 , RG 159, NARA. 

373 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

that ways could be found to modify this drain on the budget. Fire protection and electrical, water, and fuel arrangements were examined 

also. Yet too often the absence of funds prevented the necessary 

improvements from being made. For example, the ancient power plant 

at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, was marked down as inefficient in 

1928. For Jack of money for capital expenditures, however, replacement 

was not scheduled until 1934, by which time the cost of replacing the 

plant already had been expended on the excess fuel costs.47 

The surveys also began to include subjects of special interest to the 

Chief of Staff. As the budget squeeze became more and more stringent, 

many began to deal with aspects of discipline and morale. Inspectors 

remarked on compliance with the proper wearing of uniforms and on 

the mental and physical fitness of officers to lead. Other topics by 1929 

included the recycling of usable packing materials and the protection of 

classified and fiscal docwnents. Recreational facilities, messes, and 

post exchanges were evaluated for their positive effect on morale. After 

the pay freeze and later pay reduction in 1930, estimates on how Army 

personnel were coping were covered in the discussion on morale. 48 

The corps area surveys contained information on the region- its 

cities, populations, and so forth- and on the assigned military units, 

including statistics on their animals and vehicles. The same data was 

provided for exempted stations that were in the corps area. The distribution of military personnel was listed by category for each site in the 

region. The physical arrangement of the corps headquarters was analyzed for efficiency, and personnel costs were broken down by position 

and function. For example, the combined annual salaries of the colonel 

and warrant officer in the Third Corps Area IG office totaled $10,030 

and that of the two officers, five enlisted men, and ten civilians in the 

signal office $35,147. Rental costs, mileage, supplies, transportation, 

and telephone expenses were reported and compared to previous fiscal 

years and projections.

49 

Some of the suggestions that were made for reducing personnel 

costs were not well received by the headquarters undergoing inspection. In the Third Corps Area, for example, the inspector suggested 

consolidating some staff functions and eliminating some positions. He 

47 Rpt, Rice to OTIG, 2 Jun 29, sub: Inspection and Survey of Carlisle Barracks; Rpt, 

Cygon to CG, 3d Corps AJea, 26 Apr 33, sub: Inspection and Survey of Carlisle 

Barracks. Both in Entry II , RG 159, NARA. 

•s See survey reports in Entry !I, RG 159, NARA. 

•• Rpt, Graham to OTIG, 2 Dec 27, sub: Survey of Headquarters, Third Corps Area, 

Entry II, RG 159, NARA. 

374 
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 

saw further savings in pooling secretarial support, rather than assigning typists to separate offices. He also recommended consolidating the 

duties of some officers in the field, such as having ROTC instructors 

serve also as local recruiters. General MacArthur, the corps area commander at the time, objected strenuously, pointing out that Army policy obliged the corps area headquarters to be sufficiently large to hold 

a full staff at mobilization. What was seen as overage by the inspector 

reflected the need to maintain war-strength levels in key staff elements. MacArthur judged that any more strength cuts would fatally 

impair his mobilization mission. Even in peacetime, as far as 

MacArthur was concerned, his staff was fully employed. He viewed 

travel and liaison- especially to reserve and National Guard units and 

mobilization sites- as essential to fulfilling the corps area's mission 

and concurred with the survey's finding that he should exercise greater 

control over the exempted stations in his region. MacArthur stressed, 

however, that the surveys, in their pursuit of economy, should not lose 

focus on the need for preparedness. 50 

Between November 1928 and March 1929 CoL Duncan K. Major, 

Jr., and Lt. Col. Ben Lear carried out, in addition to the regular schedule of surveys, a special comparative survey of the nine corps area 

headquarters at the request of the Secretary of War. The purpose was 

to provide data to guide changes in headquarters tables of organization. Colonel Major was detailed for the job because he had just completed a two-year tour as a corps area chief of staff, while Colonel Lear 

had considerable experience in the conduct of surveys. Each headquarters was visited for a week, during which statistics were gathered 

and each function observed. Major identified 37 officer and 237 civilian positions that could be eliminated- a cut described by General 

Rivers as "moderate." Standard tables were adopted by August 1929. 

Major also recommended increases in support to the reserves and the 

call-up of some reservists to work in the corps areas. His recommendations were accepted, and correspondence courses were readied to 

train the selected reservists. 51 

Freed of some routine IG duties under the pressure of the surveys, 

inspectors were able to develop more detailed reports on many activities, for example, large medical facilities, where the emphasis was on 

assuring the best possible service to patients in the most economical 

lO I st End, MacArthur, 8 Dec 27, to ibid. 

sl Rpt, Major to TlG, 3 Apr 29, sub: Annual Survey of the Nine Corps Area 

Headquarters, with Rivers' marginalia, Entry II, RG 159, NARA. 

375 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

way. The normal problems, such as warehousing, stock accountability, 

and narcotics secw·ity, were addressed, and opportunities for savings 

were pointed out. Statistics gathered on hospitals included patient costs 

and the percentage of patients who were active-duty soldiers (about 42 

percent). Although the means to save money were a central theme, 

inspectors remained open to ways to improve efficiency, regardless of 

cost. Thus, in 1928 Colonel Van Schaick, detailed to the Office ofThe 

Inspector General to conduct special surveys worldwide, recommended that the Walter Reed Guest House rates be reduced, thereby providing the families of patients an affordable and decent place to stay, and 

that greater expenditures be made on books and amusements as a 

morale measme. All inspectors repeatedly recommended an increase in 

the number of Army dentists, for everywhere they went they found that 

the size of the dental staff was inadequate for the services required. 

Because of budgetary constraints, proposals of this sort usually had to 

be deferred. Nevertheless, the fact that they had been raised permitted 

Army leaders to make overall projections offuture medical capabilities 

and needs. 52 

The 1928 surveys of the sixteen ordnance depots by seven different 

inspectors also raised the issue of poor facilities management. 

Buildings and equipment were deteriorating prematurely because of a 

lack of funds to carry out basic maintenance and repairs. Based on this 

finding, additional funds were given the Ordnance Department to 

counter the trend. Another result of the depot surveys was an increase, 

at General Rivers' suggestion, in the depot commanders' authority to 

direct and coordinate the various bureau activities at their level. 53 

In fact, one major result of the surveys was the adoption in 1929 

of scientific cost accounting procedures, based on commercial practice, at Army depots. The Ordnance Department incorporated the 

requirement for proper budgeting and cost accounting in its depot 

operations procedures, while the Air Corps developed its own system 

for determining and controlling equipment repair costs in its depots. A 

program developed in the Hawaiian Department recorded the costs and 

consumption of expendable supplies in an effort to eliminate waste or 

extravagance. The Office ofThe Inspector General continued to press 

" Rpt, Van Schaick to OTIG, 2 Jun 28, sub: Annual Survey and Inspection of the 

Army Medical Center, Entry II; Rpt, Rice to CG, 3d Corps Area, 22 Jun 27, sub: 

Inspection and Survey of Carlisle Barracks, Entry II ; Rpt, Cygon to CG, 3d Corps 

Area, 21 Jul 30 Entry 26A. All in RG 159, NARA. 

sJ Memos, Rivers to TAG, 31 May 28, and Ames to TIG, 4 Dec 28, Entry II, RG 

159, NARA. 

376 
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 

for the application of similar cost accounting in all supply and related 

activities, hoping to establish a pattern of efficient management 

throughout the Army. 54 

The emphasis on economy demonstrated the need for a more active 

role on the part of every headquarters in maintenance, facilities repairs, 

and property disposal. In 1928, based on The Inspector General's recommendation, funds allotments were processed through channels for 

disbursement to expending agencies. For the first time, this reform put 

each echelon in full control of its own budget. It also forced a better 

analysis of allotments. Hitherto, allocations had been made upon precedent and the convincing tone of the request, rather than upon actual 

need. The new policy required each level of command to better assess 

its needs in order to prepare accurate budgets.

55 

In the next survey cycle Colonel Van Schaick averaged six to eight 

weeks at each major depot, with briefer follow-up visits to gauge the 

response to his findings. He was accompanied by Maj. Frank Holmes, 

a Finance Department officer on IG detail, and by B. H. Simmons, a 

senior civilian accountant. The team not only identified problems but 

also helped the depot commanders resolve them- hence, the substantial amount of time spent at each site. The f indings were passed informally to the Assistant Secretary of War by General Rivers. The visits 

resulted in warehousing improvements, more systematized inventory 

procedures, and greater physical security. Savings and efficiency were 

measured by the reduction in the time needed to fi ll requisitions. The 

New York Depot, for example, now took three weeks versus two- three 

months to fill an order.56 

Other innovations proposed by the team brought about greater 

overall efficiency in operations. Productivity was maintained, despite 

civilian personnel cuts; security was improved and pilferage reduced 

because of the enhanced guard system; and better personnel practices 

were implemented, with hiring priority given to former soldiers. 

Systematizing procedures allowed much better cost accounting. This in 

turn produced quarterly savings of more than one-third over previous 

fiscal years. That the depot commanders sustained the momentum was 

proven during a series of follow-up visits by General Rivers, which verified the execution ofVan Schaick's recommendations. The depots were 

working well by the summer of 1929, and Army leaders considered the 

1-l Rivers Annual Rpts, FY 1928 and FY 1929, Entry 26, RG J 59, NARA. 

ss Ibid., FY 1928. 

S(, Memo, Rivers to Ames, 20 May 29; Memo, Rivers to OTIG, 6 May 29, sub: Beebe 

Report on San Francisco Depot. Both in Entry I I, RG 159, NARA. 

377 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

survey reports, circulated throughout the War Department, as the definitive word on the condition of the Army's epots. 7 

As time went by, the surveys began to have an effect in other areas 

as well. The civilian work force of one corps area was reduced by 50 

percent through attrition. Better laundry and family facilities were 

approved for installation on Army transports. Economies were 

achieved, not only in the depots but elsewhere through the redistribution of surpluses identified in the course of the surveys. The reorganization and consolidation of Quartermaster activities brought a major 

improvement in efficiency and economy. Petroleum purchases, including those of the Air Corps, were centra lized under The Quartermaster 

General, to realize savings through bulk purchases. Finally, for the first 

time, standard tables of organization were developed for nontechnical 

clements, automatically capping their personnel rosters and forestalling 

unauthorized growth.58 

In July 1929 the success of the surveys and the economies they 

generated led President Hoover to order a third series, with the objective of identifying more economies while preparing a rea listic force 

development plan. The War Plans Division worked with the Office of 

The Inspector General because of the anticipated effect of the findings 

on the Army's mission capabilities. The report, completed in November, 

in essence revealed that very little further trimming was possible. It 

stressed the low level of preparedness of the Army, as a result of the 

cumulative effect of small budgets and the decline in strength. By the 

time of the survey the Army was at its nadir, unable to perform its 

mobilization mission as the core of an expanded force. 5

9 

The usefulness of the surveys seemed to decline thereafter, and in 

1930 the Secretary of War directed that inspectors resume the ir customary IGD duties, asking that they maintain their current emphasis on 

economy and efficiency while conducting their general inspections. By 

June the transition back to the traditional system was complete. The 

nearly two and a half years devoted to the economic surveys were 

judged well worthwhile as a means of injecting modern business methods into the Army. Out of them came not only a greater sense of responsibility in the use of public assets but also a reduction of duplicate prac1

' Memo, Ames to TIG, 4 Dec 28, Entry II , RG 159, NARA. 

s• Llrs, OTIG to lnsps, 3 Feb 30, sub: Replies to Memorandum of Data Desired by 

General Drum, Entry 26A, RG 159, NARA. 

,. Mark S. Watson, Chief of Swff: Prewar Plans <md Prepamtions (Washington, 

D.C.: Historical Division, Department of Army, 1950), p. 23; Killigrcw, "Great 

Depression," Ph.D. diss., ch. 2, pp. 2, 9, 18- 19, 26. 

378 
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 

ticcs throughout the Army. Despite reforms at the depots, however, the 

Army still had not devised an entirely satisfactory cost accounting system. Funds disbursement had become well regulated and controlled, 

but there was no simple way to evaluate expenditures at many different 

places. General Drum believed that standard cost accounting was a key 

element to efficient management. He cited the efforts made at the 

depots as "essential preliminaries" to imposing a like system on the 

entire Army. Until that was done, he judged that further business efficiency evaluations would be pointl.ess. 00 

One of the achievements of the last cycle of surveys was the identification of the peaks and valleys in logistical operations. Most facilities were staffed and organized to cope with their maximum capabilities, and as a result personnel and assets were underutilized during 

slack periods. Inspectors' comments on these conditions led to 

improved facilities and resources management. For example, aircraft 

maintenance was scheduled evenly over twelve months, rather than just 

for the spring, leading to better workmanship and resource use over the 

year, with the same productivity from smaller staffs. General Drum, 

who relied on the survey findings to promote business efficiency, maintained that the surveys had stimulated interest throughout the Army in 

getting the most out of what was available.

61 His philosophy was perpetuated in the £GO's emphasis on economy and efficiency in the 

1930s. The economic surveys had hit the right note at a time of very 

limited resources. 

Depots 

With too many unproductive positions and too much paper circulating, 

the Army of the interwar years also carried a heavy burden of useless 

and deteriorating equipment at its depots. As military technology 

advanced, supply administration became extremely complex-a fact 

that inspectors repeatedly noted. Considerable technical knowledge 

was required for preparing requisitions, and the system was completely unresponsive if the nomenclature listed was not accurate.62 

60 Drum Annual Rpt (quoted words), FY 1930, Eutry 26; Logan Lecture to QM 

School, 9 Apr 31, Entry 268. Both in RG 159, NARA. 61 Memo, Drum to OTIG, 16 Nov 31, Entry 26A, RG 159, NARA. 

"' New York Depot lnsp Rpts, 1922- 23, Entry II ; Army Med Ctr Insp Rpts, 

1936-39, Entry II ; England, IG, Camp Benning, Ammal Rpt, 5 Jul 20, Entry 26; 

Helmick Annual Rpts, F'Y 1924 and FY 1927, Entry 26. All in RG 159. NARA Sec 

also Nco-style 426, 14 Aug 23, Neo-stylc 428, 29 Jan 24, and Nco-style 433, II Oct 

26, OTIG fi les, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH). 

379 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Access to the depots did not become routine for inspectors until 

several years after the war. Depots in the United States whose functions 

were unique to a particular department or bureau, such as the Air 

Service, were not inspected by IGs until 1922. These inspections concentrated on operational costs. For example, reports submitted in the 

1920s compared any changes in expenditures both to the previous 

report and to a 1919 base line, and any increases had to be explained. 

The emphasis on finances meant that the IGD accountant was always a 

team member during depot inspections.

63 

However, inspectors went beyond the balance sheet to discover 

problems that had eluded investigators with a narrower focus. For 

example, the Newark Depot was being kept open after the war because 

it contained acres of captured enemy artillery and other materiel held in 

open storage. No one had decided what to do with it. Ordnance inspections dealt solely with technical issues bearing on preservation of the 

hardware. An inspector successfully suggested a different approach. 

Legislative authority was obtained that allowed local governments and 

veterans groups to take items as trophies at their own expense; the 

remainder was scrapped. Concurrently, the lG 's report led to the disposal or salvage of over 5,000 carloads of rapidly deteriorating ammunition. It was apparent that surveillance of the Army's storage system 

was needed if costs were to be reduccd.64 

Between 1921 and 1923 inspectors were required to make detailed 

special inquiries into the disposition of surplus property. Whenever 

they visited a holding area, they reported on the type, quantity and condition or the materiel and made recommendations for disposing of it. 

They rated the efficiency of the personnel, evaluated the materie l on 

hand, and estimated the cost of its maintenance and storage. Finally, the 

inspectors checked on accounting procedures, to assure that funds were 

managed properly and that payrolls for temporary-hire civilians were 

coming from sales proceeds rather than from regular appropriations.65 

Inspectors repeatedly noted the Army's cumbersome storage operations throughout the 1920s and 1930s, with several recommending 

changes to simplify procedures. After the war the depots had remained 

63 Depot lnsp Rpts, Boxes 67 and 69- 70, Entry I I; Rpt, Rivers to OTIG, 28 Jun 22, 

sub: Inspection of New York General Intermediate Depot, Entry II; OTIG lnsp Guide 

5 Notes, Entry 26A. All in RG 159, NARA. 

.. Rpt, Rivers to OTIG, 28 Jun 22, Entry II, RG 159, NARA 

6$ Nco-style 409A, 30 Jul 21, Nco-style 425, 27 Jul 23, and Nco-style 4 15, 27 Jul 21 

(all rescinded 1923), OTIG fi les, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXJI). Temporary-hire civilians 

could not be used for any duties other than those for which they were hired. Later, fGs 

were required to report on what those duties were. 

380 
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 

full of materiel that was no longer needed and, eventually, was obsolete. 

Some items were stockpiled in such great quantities that it was impossible to utilize them before they deteriorated. Other usable items were 

so expensive to store that it was cheaper to get rid of them and buy 

replacements whenever required. Aircraft engines, for example, were 

being maintained and stored when the planes using them no longer 

were in the inventory. The pace of technological developments made 

such situations increasingly common. The problem was aggravated by 

the fact that different storage criteria and cost-accounting methods were 

in use throughout the Army. The confusion encouraged continued 

stockpiling of unnecessary World War I era goods far in excess of 

needs, consuming maintenance and personnel resources while returning nothing to the government. In 1930 General Drum used the data 

from the first two economic surveys to show that reducing nonessential 

stocks and concentrating the remainder into fewer depots would save 

the Army half its warehousing costs.66 

The stark evidence provided by the economic surveys gave impetus to serious cost reductions throughout the storage system. 

Inspectors urged item by item reviews of all stocks on hand. They recommended that all unessential war reserves be destroyed or, if possible, sold as surplus. The pressures of the economic surveys led to 

other cost savings as well. In I 929 the New York Depot commander 

pointed out he could achieve even greater savings if he could forceissue large quantities of generic items held in storage since the World 

War, including china, work clothes, and underclothing. But most requisitioners insisted on brand names, refusing to accept usable but 

nonstandard items. Colonel Van Schaick concurred with the depot 

commander, predicting complete loss of the mater.ial on hand under 

the existing system and huge savings through more vigorous substitution of brand names with generic products. Eventually, the regulations were adjusted, leading to a significant drop in storage and supply costs. Annual inventory adjustments thereafter continued to clear 

the warehouses of unnecessary stockage.

67 

to6 Rpt, Helmick to Col'S, WD, 22 Ocl 25, sub: Inspection of Troops in the 

Philippine Department, Entry II ; Drum Annual Rpt, FY 1930, Entry 26. Both in RG 

159, NARA. 07 Memo, Drum to OTIG, 16 Nov 31, Entry 26A; Memo, Williams to TQMG, 15 

Aug 29, sub: Supplies on Hand at New York Depot, Entry II ; Ltr, TAG to TIG, 23 Aug 

29, sub: irregularities at Brooklyn Base, Entry II ; Ltr, Van Schaick to TIG, (25 Aug 

29], sub: New York General Depot, Entry I I; OTIG Cir Ltr 54, 26 Aug 29, Entry II. 

All in RG 159, NARA. 

38 1 
T HE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Property Disposal 

Measures to dispose of unneeded materiel and facilities were implemented in the weeks after the armistice. Halting contracts, purchases, 

and new construction, the War Department ordered an inventory of 

everything in the system. A number of factors complicated the effortthe need to retain sufficient materiel overseas to support the occupation 

forces; the storage of 600,000 tons of supplies at the docks in France, 

with another 400,000 still en route; and the uncertainty over the size of 

the postwar Army. Despite these concerns, General Chamberlain in 

early December 1918 directed his inspectors to begin the processes of 

property disposal and the salvage or elimination of worthless items.68 

The disposal of surplus equipment remained haphazard at best. 

Inspectors repeatedly urged better accounting methods and coOt·dination between different War Department elements. For example, laundry 

and repair facilities that were needed to prepare other items for sale 

were among the first properties to be sold. Major delays in disposing of 

surplusage were criticized. System changes were implemented in 1920, 

when a special investigation revealed that a depot had sold cement to a 

civilian buyer who resold it- at double the price- to a local construction quartermaster. No one was culpable; the civilian had merely taken 

advantage of the Army's disjointed salvage system.69 

J n 1921 the War Department instructed all IGs to make a specia I 

inquiry into salvage operations as a part of their regular visits. The next 

year the Secretary of War directed that they attend auctions and public 

sales held in their respective areas. At that time the Army was operating twenty-six retail stores for such sales, realizing over $ 10 million 

annually. In each case the inspectors submitted separate reports, for the 

usc of the Assistant Secretary of War and his director of sales. Findings 

continued to show a need for greater coordination. But in 1922, just as 

the system began to function, it was phased out on the grounds that it 

was no longer necessary because most of the large and expensive salvage items had been sold.70 

.s Erna Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army: A HistOJJ! of the Corps. 

1775 1939 (Washington, D.C.: Quartermaster Historian's Office, Office of the 

Quartermaster General, 1962), pp 698-700; Ltr, TAG to TIG, 2 Dec 18, sub: 

Disposition of Useless Property at Abandoned Camps, Entry 34A, RG I 59, NARA . 

.. Risch, Quartermaster Support, pp. 702, 705; Frederick Palmer, Newton D. Baker: 

America at mu·, 2 vols. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1931), 2:4 12; Peyton C. 

March, T!te Nation at War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1932), pp. 

181, 352- 55; Chamberlain Annual Rpt, FY 1920, Entry 26, RG I 59, NARA. 

, Helmick Annual Rpts, FY 1921 and FY 1922, Entry 26, RG I 59, NARA. 

382 
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 

Yet the Army still retained enormous quantities of increasingly 

worthless property. The scale of the problem was difficult to determine. 

Inspectors found during a 1928 special inquiry that accurate balancing 

of stocks on hand against stock record cards was rarely achieved, 

because most of the accountable officers ignored the requirement to list 

overages. Auditors failed to detect the omission, for they rarely checked 

actual stockage if their totals on paper tallied. Some posts held excessive 

supplies that were not reported, and thus others went without items that 

were badly needed. Another flaw developed from the requirement that 

the Finance Department audit all property accounts annually, which 

meant that little, if any, oversight occurred during the intervening twelve 

months. As a result, many small accounting problems compounded 

needlessly before they were discovered. One of the solutions to resolve 

this was a tightening of inventory and iJ1spection procedures. 71 

In 1928 a change in the regulations required nearly all surplus or 

salvage property to be listed on inventory and inspection reports, to 

allow the transfer of one post's surplus to fill another's needs. 

Inspectors had to check more items and to deface them before release 

to a buyer. General Drum simplified the condemnation procedure in a 

second policy change in June 1931, after which corps area commanders 

and IGs could take routine actions without referral to the responsible 

War Department bureau for approval. Condemnation criteria were published in an annual directive. Once property appeared in an inventory 

and inspection report, it could be il1spected for condemnation either by 

an IG, by the local chiefs of supply, or by the services responsible for 

it. Corps area commanders could appoint special inspectors for emergency condemnations when no IG was available. Special property 

inspectors also were authorized at depots or arsenals, where materiel 

was condemned routinely as part of the manufacturing process. n 

The property accountability and warehousing problem diminished 

gradually as the pressure generated by the Inspector General's 

Department began to show results. The advent of the Civilian 

Conservation Corps in 1933 speeded the consumption of inventories at 

various depots. This form of progress, ironically, gave birth to a concern among many officers over the shortage of war reserves in the late 

1930s. General Preston at the end of his tour in 1935 had broached the 

issue, cautioning about insufficient appropriations and the impact on 

71 Rivers Annual Rpt, FY 1928, and Drum Annual Rpt, FY 1930, Entry 26, RG 159, 

NARA. 12 AReg 20- 35, 19 17, 1929, 1931 , 1935, 1937, 1941; Rivers Annual Rpt, FY 1928, 

Entry 26, RG 159, NARA; Call, " Inspector General 's Department," pp. 11- 13. 

383 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

replenishing the war reserves. The little that was spent on modernization had the effect of impeding the process of standardization, which 

further impaired efficient and economical maintenance. The lack of 

funds also hindered proper maintenance of the materiel remaining on 

hand. Similar problems were encountered in each type of depot and 

logistical operation, especia lly transportation. 73 

Transportation 

The Army's retention of a fleet of World War I motor vehicles proved 

to be costly. After the war the Quartermaster General 's Department 

controlled all transportation because of the lessons learned in 1917, 

when several bureaus had tried to run their own transportation systems. 

As the Quartermaster General sought to assert administrative controls, 

lGs were instructed to check on compliance with official transportation 

policies during every inspection. Vehicles condemned in the United 

States were disposed of through Quartermaster channels; those in overseas departments were processed through department channels, since it 

was more economical to sell them locally.N 

Soon inspectors noted that the huge motor vehicle fleet could not 

be used fully. Minor problems often sidelined vehicles indefinitely, 

unable to be repaired because of the diminishing numbers of qualified 

mechanics remaining in the Army after demobilization. As early as 

1922 inspectors urged the adoption of a gradual replacement program 

to forestall growing maintenance costs, but the fleet continued to deteriorate from normal use and exposure. Economical operation no longer 

was possible by 1924, when a vehicular shortage was predictable 

because only 800 postwar motor vehicles were in the inventory and all 

wartime vehicles in storage-16,235- had been issued. As the condition of the wartime vehicles worsened, General Helmick reported in 

1927 that to ride in the old Dodge cars "was an affront to one's selfrespect and a challenge to one's courage."75 

The dilapidated condition of the motor vehicle fleet heavily overburdened maintenance channels. Inspectors mged culling all the vehin Preston Annual Rpts, FY 1 933 and FY 1935, and Reed Annual Rpt, FY 1936, 

Entry 26C, RG 159, NAR.A. On the Civilian Conservation Corps, sec Chapter 12. 

'' Nco-style 279A, 5 Jun 19, Nco-style 279B, 9 Jut 19, and Nco-style 385, 28 Oct 

19, OTIG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH). 71 England, IG, Camp Benning, Annual Rpt, 5 Jul 20; Helmick Annual Rpts, FY 

1922, FY 1924, and FY 1927 (quotation); Drum Annual Rpt, FY 193 1. All in Entry 26, 

RG 159, NAR.A. 

384 
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 

Sgt. John B. 1jJ/er and His Truck. The ramshackle interiVar vehicle 

flee/ benefited/rom tlte skills of mechanics like J)!le1; 1vhose tmck 

had no mechanical .failures in fourteen years. 

cles that were not cost-effective. The shortage of gasoline in June 1929 

compounded matters, with the supply sufficient for operating only half 

ofthe vehicles in service-some 7,500, with another 1,000 on mothball 

status. The remaining half languished virtually unattended, with the 

increasing age of the vehicles forcing maintenance costs ever higher. 

Because of persistent reports by IGs and quartermasters, a few new 

passenger cars were issued in 1929 to offset the poor impression created by the use of dilapidated vehicles. Trucks had remained in better 

condition, largely because of the greater care given them by permanently assigned drivers. This principle was extended to the new cars 

through better training of drivers and mechanics and closer supervision 

of maintenance.76 

The Army finally began to phase out wartime motor vehicles in 

great numbers by the end of 1930. Once the War Department imposed 

limitations on the amount that could be spent on repairing older vehi1

• Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 717; Rivers Amlllal Rpts, FY 1928 and FY 

1929, Entry 26. RG 159, NARA. 

385 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

cles, all those requiring more were pulled out of inventory and sold as 

salvage. Appropriations were made to sustain only 55 percent of the 

aging fleet while new vehicles were being phased in. During 1930 

inspectors condemned nearly 1,800 vehicles, which were sold for salvage. The w1equal distribution of vehicle repair units in corps areas was 

noticed in the course of the exercise. As a result, several maintenance 

units were reassigned at the end of the fiscal year to provide better support geographically and at each maintenance level. The economic surveys had shown the pointlessness of trying to sustain the ancient fleet, 

giving impetus to renovation efforts. 77 

The Army Transport Service (ATS), which had drawn down rapidly after the war, was affected similarly by the tight economic situation. 

By mid- J 92 J the War Department had released all chartered ships, 

acquired only eleven of the seventy-five ships ordered before the 

armistice, and had only sixteen ships in commission by the end of the 

year. In 1928, because of the need to economize, the ATS fleet was 

reduced further to seven passenger, two freight, and one cable vessel. 

Despite its small size, the fleet was a disproportionately rich source 

of inspection concerns for the inspectorate. By the end of 1921 inspection responsibility had reverted from port IGs to corps areas lGs. 

Complaints about service constituted the bulk of their investigations, 

which were unusually time-consuming since witnesses often were scattered throughout the country or were overseas by the time the complaint 

was received. Additionally, the money accounts of all transport quartermasters had to be inspected each time a ship arrived in port. The 

ships themselves were inspected on arrival and departure.

78 

Crowding on sea transports continued to be a major source of 

complaint. Because of the presstLre to operate as economically as possible, ATS managers allocated the extra space that became available 

under peacetime conditions for transporting cargo. With the problem 

of crowding unresolved, inspectors continued to push for more realistic passenger space allocations. In 1928 General Rivers suggested 

empowering corps commanders to remedy the conditions reported by 

inspectors, thus taking some of the pressw-e off ATS personnel at the 

ports. This and several other IG suggestions implemented in 1929 

brought immediate benefits. Transports also were required to obtain 

civilian safety certificates from the U.S. Steamboat Inspection 

Service, raising safety standards and improving lifesaving equipment. 

n Drum Annual Rpt, FY 1930, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

'" Risch, Quartermaster Support, pp. 7 15- 16; Fanner, IG, New York Depot, Annual 

Rpt, 30 Jun 21, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

386 
THE M ANAGERIAL R EVOLUTION 

Post exchanges were established on each ship, along with post offices 

and better medical facilities for female passengers. Fairer accommodation policies were put into effect for officers. General Drum joined 

with the War Department G-4 to persuade The Quartermaster General 

to issue sheets, pillows, and mattresses to troop-bay passengers. Line 

officers were placed on board as permanent commanders of transient 

personnel, enhancing discipline and giving the men a spokesman. 

Finally, in 1931 the fourth, or bottom, tier of bunks was removed from 

the troop bays, taking temptation away from ATS planners and automatically cutting occupancy by a quarter. This move, combined with 

the new safety requirements, made the peacetime troop voyages at 

least tolerable thereafter. 79 

The Air Corps 

At a time when fiscal considerations constrained every aspect of the 

line Army's existence, its airmen represented a special and baffling 

problem. The question of air power and the extent of its development 

dominated Army budget discussions throughout the interwar period. 

Supported strongly by Congress, the arm rapidly grew in significance, 

and in 1926 the Air Service became the Air Corps. But the new organization was expensive, and its needs had to be balanced against those 

of the hard-pressed conventional forces.

80 

All too often the airmen demonstrated that they were better aviators 

than administrators. The inspectorate often served as a brake on their 

excessive enthusiasm or administrative shortcomings. This relationship 

began in 1921 , when General Helmick recommended reducing the 

number of Air Service faci lities. As a result, the sixty-five activities 

then in existence nationwide were reduced to forty-four, and substantial consolidation took place. The Chief of the Air Service pledged further reductions as surplus was disposed of and depots closed down. Yet 

the airmen enjoyed much official and popular support. Some redundancy had to be allowed to continue, because of the need to keep Air 

Service units in each corps area to provide combined-arms training and 

support for reserve components. For the inspectorate, both the newness 

,. Memo, CofS, WD, to TIG, 19 Mar 30; Memo, TIG to TAG, 24 Mar 30, sub: 

Transport Service; Drum Annual Rpts, FY 1930 and FY 1931 ; Ltr, TAG to TQMG, 4 

Jun 30, sub: Faci lities on Army Transports. All in Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

llO Russell F. Weigley, HistOIJ' oft he United States Army (New York: Macmillan Co., 

1967), p. 4 13; Killigrew, "Great Depression," Ph.D. diss., eh. I, p. 6; Barksdale Field 

Insp Rpts, 1933- 36, Entry II , RG 159, NARA. 

387 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

and the expense of the Air Corps meant continuing interest in its activities; even when a large post underwent an installation-wide annual 

inspection, separate inspection reports were made on Air Corps operations and facilities. General Drum adopted the practice of reporting his 

impressions informally to the Chief of the Air Corps after each visit. He 

was particularly concerned with pilot selection and training, and he 

successfully advocated improved psychological testing.81 

Despite the tightening economic pressures of the early Depression 

years, the Air Corps was able to sustain a comparatively higher level 

of spending than the rest of the Army by arguing that further cuts 

would damage severely the civilian aircraft industry. While it stressed 

materiel acquisition over manpower, the rest of the War Department 

pressed for trained cadres to provide a base for emergency expansion. 

Tensions smoldered as Air Corps strength increased at the expense of 

the other arms.82 

General Drum particularly resented the Air Corps' fa ilure to act in 

concert with the War Department in dealing with Congress. The airmen routinely did not participate in the budget process. Drum believed 

that internal debate and additional requests should end, once appropriations requests were consolidated and forwarded by the Secretary of 

War to the Bureau of the Budget. The Air Corps, however, saw things 

differently and continued to emphasize its own unique needs. Drum's 

findings while he was The Inspector General greatly influenced his 

actions while he served as the Deputy Chief of Staff. In 1933 he headed a board that led the way to a complete reorganization of the Air 

Corps two years later.83 

In August 1935 OTIG's Col. WilliamS. Browning was appointed to 

head a subsidiary board to survey personnel assignments and operations in the Air Corps. The board included representatives from the 

Office of the Chief of the Air Corps, from the new General 

Headquarters, Air Force, and from the corps areas concerned. Its primary mission was to validate Air Corps organization and support capability. Complaints had been received about the excessively complex 

base command structure. The Browning board recorrunended exempting all Air Corps facilities and operations, removing them from corps 

area control, and placing them directly under the Chief of the Air 

8

' Helmick Annual Rpt, FY 192 1, Entry 26; Memo, TAG to JG, 14 Jan 22, Entry 26; 

Memo, Drum to CofAC, 23 Apr 30, sub: Observations of Air Corps Installations, 8th 

and 9th Corps Areas, Entry I I. All in RG 159, NARA. 8

' Killigrew, "Great Depression," Ph.D. diss., ch. 3, pp. 11 - 12, and ch. 6, pp. 11- 13. 8

' lbid.; Weigley, Histmy, p. 414. 

388 
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 

Corps. The shift occurred in July 1936. While the arrangement was due 

in large measure to internal squabbles within the Air Corps, the restructuring implied a new inspection responsibility. Col. Roy C. Kirtland, an 

Air Corps officer, was assigned to the Office ofThc Inspector General 

to provide the necessary expertise. During 1936 and 1937 Kirtland personally inspected all Air Corps activities. After primary inspection 

responsibility reverted to corps area commanders as a result of another 

reorganization in 1940, he continued to monitor the corps area lG 

reports and made personal visits to selected air bases. ~ 

One of the reasons for the turmoil in the Air Corps was a controversy over its procurement practices that led to the early retirement of 

its chief, the celebrated General Foulois. The issue began with disputes 

over interpretation of the Air Corps Act of 1926, a law that dealt with 

aircraft procurement in detail, but was unclear about many aspects of 

competitive bidding and negotiated contracts. Although Congress 

seemingly intended most contracts to be made as a result of competitive bidding, quantity purchases continued to be made through direct 

negotiation on the basis of an older law that had not been repealed. 

About 1930 Air Corps procurement officers began to monitor aircraft 

company profits derived from negotiated contracts. Later contracts 

were sometimes let below cost, specifically to reduce total profits.8

j 

The amount of money available at the time, however, necessarily 

limited contracts to a few major producers, while lesser firms were 

ignored. The fact that this practice sidestepped the intent of the J 926 

law was noted by Assistant Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring. In 

December 1933 he blocked Air Corps plans to spend $7.5 million in a 

negotiated contract to buy I 00 aircraft of various types, directing 

instead that bids be solicited. The indirect effect of his order was that 

performance standards on some of the aircraft had to be reduced in 

order to enable at least two companies to compete-much to the chagrin of the Air Corps. Later, Woodring would testify that he honestly 

had not ordered any aircraft changes, while General Foulois would say 

with equal sincerity that the Assistant Secretary had done just that. 86 

3

' Ltr, TAG to Corps Areas CGs, CofAC, GHQ AF CG, and TIG, 22 Aug 35, sub: 

Survey of Personnel Situation of the Air Corps; Ltr, Reed to TAG, 29 Jut 36, sub: 

Assignment of Inspections, FY 1937. Both in Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. Sec also 

John F. Shiner, Foulois and tlte U. S. Army Air C01ps. 1931- 1935 (Washington, D.C.: 

Office of Air Force History, USAF, 1983), p. 210. 

~s Shiner, Foulois, pp. 151 , 153- 55. 

"' Edwin H. Rutkowski, 71tt> Politics oflvli/it(llyAviation Procurement. 1926 1934: 

A Study in tlte Political Assertion of Consensual T/(i/ues (Columbus: Ohio State 

University Press, 1966), pp. 98- 10 I. 

389 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Meanwhile, rumors of aircraft company profits, combined with 

Woodring's procurement directives, caused congressional investigators 

to look into aircraft procurement. When Congress discovered that the 

Air Corps had largely ignored the intent of the 1926 law, Assistant 

Secretary Woodring and General Foulois were called to testify. Their 

testimony appeared to be contradictory and confusing. The investigating committee, as a result, decided to open a full investigation, in part 

at least because of a growing distrust in Foulois' judgment.87 

The Military Aviation Subcommittee of the House Military Affairs 

Committee opened its investigation in March 1934 under the chairmanship of Congressman William N. Rogers. Rogers was suspicious of 

Foulois, and searching for someone to blame for Air Corps problems, 

he saw Foulois as a likely candidate. The general's natural Jack of clarity caused the committee to suspect him of trying to mislead them; 

many of his rhetorical points could not withstand scrutiny, and his harsh 

criticism of the General Staff for impeding Air Corps development lost 

him many allies- particularly, the support of General Drum, by then 

the Deputy Chief of Staff, who resented Foulois' adverse comments. 

The Rogers committee had found enough inconsistencies in Foulois' 

testimony not only to charge him in May with violating the 1926 law 

and with mismanagement and dishonesty but also to ask Secretary of 

War George H. Dern to relieve him. 88 

Foulois was stunned by the committee report. On 18 June the 

problem reached Secretary Dern. Refusing to be hurried, despite congressional pressure, Dern referred the report to Foulois, who took six 

weeks to prepare a rebuttal protesting the lack of due process and 

stressing his right to see the evidence against him. The Secretary 

agreed. The impasse was broken in December by General MacArthur, 

the Chief of Staff, who suggested that The Inspector General include 

the Foulois case in an ongoing investigation of officer conduct 

requested earlier by the Rogers committee. This was an agreeable 

compromise, and the Secretary passed the additional requirement to 

General Preston on the thirteenth. 89 

In early 1935 Preston tasked Col. Walter L. Reed to interview many 

of the same officers who earlier had been critical of Foulois before 

Congress, including General Drum. Reed focused on the veracity of 

f;7 Shiner, Foulois, p. 158. 

" Ibid., pp. 17 1- 76, 182- 83; Rutkowski, Military Aviation Procurement, pp. 81- 83, 

105-Q?, 11 3. 

$'1 Shiner, Foulois, pp. 190-92; Rpt, Reed to TIG, 10 Jun 35, sub: Investigation of 

Maj. Gen. Benjamin Foulois, Entry 268, RG 159, NARA. 

390 
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION 

Foulois' somewhat flamboyant testimony, while the massive amounts of 

information he collected dea lt almost exclusively with procurement 

practices and regulations. Tncluded was considerable data on the airmail service, which tended to show that the general had not lied deliberately about Air Corps capabilities. Testimony on Air Corps needs was 

gathered as well. The views expressed and the tone of much of the testimony showed a division within the War Department over the role and 

status of the Air Corps, with many senior officers stressing that Foulois 

was not a team player. 90 

Foulois, admitting to Reed that some of his rhetoric could have been 

misconstrued, emphasized that he had no intent to deceive. He provided 

affidavits from numerous members of Congress, attesting that they 

understood what he had meant to say and that they had not been misled. 

He further added statements from aircraft company executives, who 

praised his honesty and technical competence. The Foulois investigation 

took nearly six months, with Reed submitting his final report to 

Secretary Dern on 10 June. Four days later Dern released his findings, 

endorsing the view that Foulois had violated the spirit of the 1926 law 

by condoning closed contracts and that he had made exaggerated statements to the congressional conunittee. Dern, however, found no evidence of dishonesty. He gave Foulois a Jetter of reprimand, taking him 

to task for two unjustified statements. Foulois viewed the findings as a 

virtual acquittal but, recognizing that his usefulness and credibility had 

been exhausted, reached the same conclusion as most members of 

Congress- his departure was inevitable. Foulois retired in September.

91 

90 Rpt, Reed to TLG, 10 Jun 35, Entry 268; MFR, Preston, n.d., sub: My 

Remembrance of the Conference With Mr. McSwain at 5 PM, Wednesday, January 16, 

1935, Entry 26C; Ltr, Strayer to TLG, 18 Jan 35, sub: Investigation of Maj. Gen. 

Benjamin D. Foulois, Chief of the Air Corps, Entry 26C; Memo, Humber to SofW, 26 

Apr 35, sub: Investigation of the Chief of the Air Corps, Entry 26C. All in RG 159, 

NARA. See also Rutkowski, MilitaiJ' Aviation Procurement, pp. 126- 30. 9

' Rpt, Reed to TIG, I 0 Jun 35, Entry 268, RG 159, NARA; Shiner, Foulois, pp. 

190- 92, 257; Rutkowski, Militmy Aviation Procuremenl, p. 13 1. 

391 

11 

The State of the Army 

The state of the Army during the interwar years was not encouraging in 

many respects, largely due to a lack of funds- even for necessities. The 

constraints worsened as the decade of change and retrenchment following the war gave way to the decade of national depression. At each 

echelon of command inspectors in their reports provided insightful 

conunentary on the increasing difficulties and on the soldiers' response 

to them, and they undertook many investigations to resolve the variety 

of issues affecting the conditions of military life. 

Investigations Continue 

Many of the IG investigations that had commenced before the armistice 

lasted well into 1919, and wartime issues continued to be the subject of 

a large proportion of investigations into J 925. This was especially the 

case with improper allotment payments, with the lapse of time and the 

difficulty in finding witnesses making them almost impossible to 

resolve. Other wartime issues included paternity claims from France, 

the status of deserters, and the documentation required for less-thanhonorable discharges. 1 

The work load was eased in part through the use of recruiting officers and advisers to civilian components to interview witnesses at various and distant locations. Regardless of who was doing the work, 

General Chamberlain insisted that inspectors be as open as possible in 

the course of their investigations. He made it policy that the senior offi1 IG Special Lnvestigations, Fort Monroe, Box 2, Entry !lA; Helmick Annual Rpt, 

FY 1924, Entry 26. Both in Record Group (RG) 159, National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C. See a lso Memo, Mclntyre to TAG, 8 Mar 

19, sub: Report oflnspector General Relative to Conduct of SATC Unit, Mississippi 

A&M College, Entry 8, RG 165, NARA. 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

cer of a command or staff bureau be notified of any investigation going 

on in his area of responsibility and that those involved be kept informed 

with briefings and summaries. He saw the IG's duty as getting the facts 

within the "limits of justice and common sense. The moment we begin 

to gum shoe [sic] we would lose absolutely our standing with the 

Army." Openness, frankness, and fairness were the best guarantees of 

successfu 1 investigations. 2 

War Department- level investigations tended to become more specific after the war. For a time commanders had the latitude to decide 

where to refer certain types of cases. However, after June 1928 all cases 

of possible graft or improper property disposal had to be referred to the 

Inspector General's Department (IGD), for which inspectors had to 

inquire into the management of funds by anyone even remotely connected with a case and to reach "conclusions as to any liability." In 

addition, the department had to investigate all cases that might ultimately require action by the Secretary ofWar- that is, those involving 

the reputations or pocketbooks of military personnel or of the Army as 

a whole. War Department cases, of course, were brought directly to The 

Inspector General, wllile corps investigations were reviewed at that 

level and then the reports- an original and two carbons- forwarded, 

with recommendations, to the Office ofThe Inspector General (OTIG) 

for final action.3 

Both situations required OTJG's Investigation Division chief to prepare a written review, which, along with the original report, was evaluated by the executive officer and by The Inspector General for comment. The report, the review, and The Inspector General's conclusions 

then were channeled thJough The Adjutant General to a reviewing officer on the General Staff- and perhaps also to The Judge Advocate 

General iflegal issues were involved. After coordination had been completed, a General Staff action officer prepared a final review in the 

form of a staff study. The whole parcel went through the appropriate 

assistant chief of staff to the Chief of Staff, who presented it to the 

Secretary ofWar with his recommendation for final action.~ 

The fate of an IG's recommendation on an investigation could not 

be predicted. One inspector recalled having his views in some cases supported all the way tlu·ough the elaborate review line. But in another case 

The Inspector General disapproved the suggestions of the fie ld inspec2 Notes of an Address by General Chamberlain at a Conference of All Officers of 

the IGD, 29 Dec 19, Entry 26. RG 159, NARA. 

' AReg 20- 30 (quoted words), 1928, and Change 1, 1929. 

• Logan Lecture to QM School, 9 Apr 31, Entry 26B, RG 159, NARA. 

394 
THE STATE OF THE ARMY 

tor, as did one of the reviewers; three others agreed, but the Secretary of 

War eventually upheld The Inspector General's position. In yet another 

case the TG 's recommendations were approved at each level of review, 

only to be changed by the Secretary. If nothing else, the review process 

could not be considered perfunctory. Personal and meticulous attention 

was given to each investigation by everyone involvcd.5 

By the 1930s the War Department inspectorate was averaging 

about sixty major investigations annually. A typical year was 1931 , with 

a total of fifty-eight. Twenty-seven resulted in some form of disciplinary action. Another seventeen concerned funds management, specifically the noncompliance with procedural or regulatory requirements. 

Abuses and neglects of this sort were uncovered increasingly as the War 

Department sought more efficient and economical operations, and the 

rising totals reflected better auditing and supervision rather than a dramatic decline in integrity among the officer corps. 6 

Investigations also developed from service members' complaints. 

For dealing with them, inspectors first held a complaint session during 

each inspection, at which time they recorded the number and types of 

complaints and then summarized their findings and conclusions in a 

report. They were required as well to look into any complaints they 

heard in the course of their informal visits, and they were expected to 

give special attention to any problems brought to their attention by soldiers in confinement. As far as possible, inspectors were to resolve 

complaints during their visits. 7 

Complaints and requests for assistance that could not be dealt with 

satisfactorily within the command were written up in detail and forwarded to the Office ofThe Inspector General, where the information 

was extracted and processed for War Department action. Such cases 

were parceled out to inspectors by the OTIG executive officer, but it 

was not unusual for The Inspector General himself to resolve cases that 

had been addressed to him or had attracted his interest. Many cases 

were referred to other War Department staff elements for resolution, 

and the OTIG executive would notify the complainant of the referral. 

How well this system worked in practice remains a question. A 

soldier who was assigned to Clark Field in the Philippines in the 1930s 

later recalled that an IG visited the post every month to hear gricvs Ibid.; Preston Annual Rpt, FY 1933, Entry 268, RG 159, NARA. 

• Preston Annual Rpt, FY 1933, Entry 268; Drum Annual Rpt, FY 1931, Entry 26. 

Both in RG 159, NARA. 

' For a typical selection of complaint cases, see Box 131, Entry 26C, RG 159, 

NARA. SeealsoAReg20- 10, 1922,1927, 1930, 1939. 

395 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

ances. However, no soldier " in his right mind" ever visited the inspector. "Whether a man had a legitimate grievance or not, just to see the 

IG automatically marked that man as a troublemaker," causing him to 

be singled out by his officers and NCOs for harassment. More often 

than not, this seems to have been the actual situation during the interwar decades.8 

Complaints came from many sources other than service members. 

The Secretary of War passed those that he received to the Office ofThe 

Inspector General for resolution, including letters from relatives of soldiers, protests by lawyers of contractors, and problems raised by other 

elements of the government. In the immediate postwar period, such 

complaints frequently dealt with contract closings and difficulties of 

adjusting to the Army's peacetime procurement routines. The realignment of troops and garrisons also generated complaints, one of which 

again reflected the racial attitudes of the era. 

During the war the Regular Army black combat regiments had been 

stationed along the Mexican border, where they remained after the 

armistice. When they were brought up to full strength with enlistees 

from demobilizing black units, several citizens complained about the 

increase in the number of black soldiers, calling them a community 

menace. In March and April 1920 Major Baer, who had returned to his 

regular grade in the peacetime Army, investigated the allegations. His 

findings were reminiscent of those made by then Colonel Chamberlain 

at Sacketts Harbor in 1908. Baer found that the troops had been 

maligned by a few prejudiced whites, even though most citizens appreciated their presence and their good behavior. He concluded that the 

black troops were not a menace, and he successfully recommended that 

the complaints be dismissed as unfounded.

9 

An enduring complaint was the movement of service members' 

household goods. The inspectorate often served as a court of last resort 

in these cases, when normal claims and insurance sources were unresponsive. In one investigation two complaints against the Washington 

Quartermaster Depot had to be resolved. One officer's goods had been 

damaged en route by fire, while another's had experienced abnormal 

breakage. Each had used the normal procedures to file claims against 

1 Charles Willeford, Somelhing Abow a Soldier (New York: Random House, 1986), 

p. 152. For examples of cases handled by TIGs, see Complaint Files, Boxes 240-48, 

Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 9 Rpt, Baer to OTlG, 23 Apr 30, sub: Investigation of Conditions at Stations 

Garrisoned by the lOth Cavalry, 24th Lnfantry, and 25th Infantry, Entry I I, RG 159, 

NARA. 

396 
THE STATE OF THE ARMY 

the carriers for reimbursement, only to find in both cases that the carriers were unbonded and uninsured. Investigation revealed that the 

depot had taken the carriers' word that they were properly insured and 

bonded. Col. Thorne Strayer was assigned to investigate. He studied 

fully all the procedures involved in household goods shipments, concluded that the Army was at fault for not verifying the carriers' insurance status, and successfully recommended that the Chief of Finance 

approve the officers' claims. 10 

Civilians, both agencies and individuals, also could file complaints. IGD and U.S. Civil Service Commission officials conducted 

joint investigations on issues dealing with employment. Sometimes 

major questions were raised that concerned other government departments, as happened when the U.S. Post Office Department asked the 

Secretary of War to investigate allegations of mail mishandling in the 

Panama Canal Zone. Soldiers' mail was being pilfered. The case went 

to the local IG, Col. Franc Lecocq, who made an extensive investigation. He surveyed civil and military mail-handling procedures and identified the sites where the pilferage probably had occurred. After he had 

verified the allegations, he worked with Post Office inspectors on a 

joint endeavor that resulted in the arrest of a civilian postal employee 

for stealing from the mails. Lecocq successfully encouraged military 

commands to establish tighter mail-handling controls, while his office 

commenced periodic checks to spot trends in complaints about the 

posta I service. 11 

Recruiting and Training 

One of the problems turned up by the economic surveys was the continuing high cost of not only recruiting and training but also retaining 

enlisted personnel. Soldier turnover represented substantial annual 

financial losses. The problem first became apparent in the aftermath of 

the armistice, when the rapid discharge of wartime draftees suggested 

that increased recruitment efforts would be required for the Regular 

Army to meet the strength projections set with the passage of the 

10 Rpt, Strayer to OTIG, 19 Nov 35, sub: Investigation Into the Regulations and 

Procedure Governing Transportation by Commercial Van of the Household Effects of 

OITiccrs on Permanent Change of Station, 19 Nov 35, Entry 26C, RG 159, NA RA. 

" Rpt, Graham to CG. 9th Corps Area, 12 Nov 38, sub: investigation Into Alleged 

Irregularities in Civil Service Appointments at Rockwell Air Depot; Rpt, Lecocq to CG, 

Canal Zone, 3 Sep 35, sub: Investigation Report of Alleged Mishandling of Mail. Both 

in Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

397 
THE INSPECTORS G ENERAL, 1903-I 939 

National Defense Act of 1920. By 1924, however, the available manpower had dwindled to such a point that Army leaders were expressing 

serious concerns.'

2 

The reasons were varied. Recruit depots had not been revived after 

the World War, in part as an effort to reduce the per capita cost of 

recruiting. They had performed a valuable service in screening out 

unsuitable recruits before the Army began to train its soldiers, committing major resources. The relatively low quality of men enlisting in the 

years prior to the Depression underlined the need for a better system. 

For a start, General Rivers recommended that the organization and 

administration of recruiting stations be standardized and that the pay 

and allowances of Army recruiters be brought on a par with their Navy 

and Marine counterparts. Rivers further suggested that recruiters be 

judged, not merely by the raw numbers of men enlisted from their stations, but by the percentage of them who were still in service after their 

initial training. Nearly one-third of the Army's enlisted strength turned 

over annually, and any measure that counteracted this trend would necessarily improve cost effectiveness.13 

The numbers were sobering. In 1928 nearly 40,000 new recruits 

had to be brought in to keep the Army's enlisted strength at a paltry 

1 15,000. Only about half the enlisted force remained in the Army for a 

full term, three years. The others either were discharged early for 

unsuitability or had purchased their discharges. Nearly all of the unprogrammed losses had exhibited physica l or other flaws that should have 

been identified at the time of their enlistment. Yet the manpower drain 

could not be blamed entirely on the lack of effective screening by 

recruit depots. In 1928 inspectors spent the year investigating the reasons for the high loss rate, and they determined that the primary cause 

was the lack of remedial training for marginal recruits. Low pay, lack 

of recreation, and excessive nonmilitary labor duties added to the unattractiveness of Army ife.•~ 

The situation was, if anything, worse in 1929, when about 60,000 

more recruits had to be brought in merely to maintain the Army's 

strength level. At General Rivers' request, the Eighth Corps Area IG 

undertook a special study ofthe situation. The inspector concluded that 

the annual discharge of 5,000 soldiers in the corps area cost the gov11 WD Cir 169, 9 Aug 22; Ltr, TAG to TIG, 22 Jan 25, sub: Reports as to Measures 

Taken To Procure Enlistments. Both in Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

u Rivers Annual Rpt, FY 1928, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

•• Ibid. The Army spent $.60 per man annually on morale activities as compared to 

the Navy's $5.00 annual average. 

398 
THE STATE OF THE ARMY 

ernment $3 million. Many soldiers left the Army so quickly that the service received no return on its investment. Inspectors believed that low 

pay and the lack of opportunity for advancement were the root causes 

for the dissatisfaction; low entry pay served to attract mostly unreliable 

and marginal types to the recruiter, and the situation went downhill 

from there. Once in the Army, many better quality recruits purchased 

their way out as soon as they could; the others simply deserted. 

Ironically, every summer regular units with their inexperienced recruits 

h·ained reserve units filled with men whose careers often went back to 

World War !.'

5 

By 1930 the inspectors' attention to the low quality of recruits had 

begun to pay off. But even with recruiting stations screening applicants 

more thoroughly, the number of unprogrammed losses remained high. 

General Drum ath·ibuted the problem to what he termed the "surge 

approach." Months would go by with low requirements; then, usually in 

the summer, much larger recruiting quotas would be imposed. The 

Inspector General reasoned that the number of qualified applicants at 

any given station was fairly constant every month of the year btlt that 

recruiters bad to lower their standards at surge periods, accepting marginal men to meet their quotas. Drum successfully recommended uniform monthly quotas, not only to increase standards but also to reduce 

recruiting staffs by eliminating the need to prepare for surges.' 6 

Seeking to extend these modest reforms, Drum urged the assignment of SLu·geons to recruiting districts to cull men with physical 

defects. In October 1931 the regulations were changed to discourage 

the enlishnent of married soldiers and to retain only those who could 

prove they had the means to support a family. Despite the Depression, 

turnover remained a problem until about 1935, when recruit depots 

were reopened and the force levels were stabilized. Inspectors now 

began to refocus their efforts on various issues, such as the composition 

of the Army, troop labor, low pay, and stagnant promotion oppornmities. In the meantime, the Army was quite fortunate to have many 

NCOs and officers fully capable of serving several grades higher. 17 

A related issue involved both military training and nonmilitary 

instruction. Immediately after the war the Army had placed consider15 Rivers Annual Report, FY 1929, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 14 Drum Annual Rpt (quoted words), FY 1930, Entry 26; Preston Annual Rpt, FY 

1935, Entry 26C. Both in RG 159, NARA. 

'

1 Drum Annual Rpt, FY 1931, Entry 26; Ltr, TAG to COs, 5 Jan 32, sub: Marriage 

of Enlisted Men, Entry 26; Preston Annual Rpt, FY 1935, Entry 26C; Reed Annual 

Rpts, FY 1936 and FY 1937, Entry 26C. All in RG 159, NARA. 

399 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

able emphasis on vocational and educational training, in part to keep 

the masses of men on hand occupied and in part to attract new recruits 

and justify the role of the military in peacetime. At the end of 1919, 

however, General Chamberlain came to the conclusion that this emphasis was adversely affecting morale and efficiency. He had heard rumors 

that the large number of students had unfairly shifted the bulk of garrison duties to the few "old soldiers" who were not participating. He 

directed all inspectors to be alert to the problem. Nevertheless, by June 

1920 over I 05,000 enlisted men were enrolled in some form of educational or vocational training.'8 

Apart fl·om the successful training of those who were illiterate, the 

program itself had many defects. The War Department provided little 

overall direction, funds and equipment were insufficient, and few competent instructors were available. Many commanders simply resurrected the old garrison schools, in which officers and NCOs had memorized data while trying to stay awake. This was not universally true. For 

example, in 1920 the regimental commander at Fort Huachuca, 

Arizona, served as his own garrison educational and recreational officer, establishing first-rate programs in motor maintenance, carpentry, 

clothing repair, and English for illiterates; his men learned while they 

performed work necessary to post operations. The co1mnander's interest meant that the program got the necessary attention from the entire 

chain of command. But Fort Huachuca was the exception to the rule.

19 

The failure to develop adequate training programs had unforeseen 

repercussions. The recruiting stations had promoted educational and 

vocationa l training as a lure to prospective enlistees long before garrisons 

were prepared to offer worthwhile courses. Recruits were thus dissatisfied and morale suffered. Unit efficiency also was impaired by the 

amount of time consumed in such programs. Disillusioned, many recruits 

took the one-year enlistment option that was offered at the time, and in 

consequence their whole term of service was devoted "to turn[ing] out an 

Lmdisciplined soldier and a superficially trained artisan." 20 

Inspectors, critical of the negative aspects of the system, recommended that standardized training programs and instructional material 

be developed at the War Department level for use throughout the Army. 

11 Notes of an Address by General Chamberlain, 29 Dec 19, Entry 26, RG 159, 

NARA; Chamberlain Annual Report, FY 1920, OTIG files, Pentagon (SAlG-ZXH). 

" Memo, Bacr to IG, 25 Mar 20, sub: Education, Recreation and Morale at Fort 

Huachuca, Entry II, RG 159, NARA. 

'

0 Memo, Baer to lG, 3 Aug 20, sub: Notes on Military, Educational, Recreational 

and Morale Training, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

400 
THE STATE OF THE ARMY 

They also urged that student-to-instructor ratios be specified and 

enforced. Many believed that they saw the solution to the problem in 

the establishment of centralized training centers and schools for soldiers, similar to the system that was already in place for officers. " It is 

no more difficult," said one inspector, "to instruct 1,000 men in one 

school than I 00 in ten." And in fact, this policy was adopted at the end 

of 1920, when, to everyone's relief, the vocational program was 

dropped quietly in favor of broader schooling.21 

The need to inculcate discipline through strictly military training 

remained. General Helmick in 1924 proposed a basic training period, 

to be followed by military occupational specialty training. Thereafter, 

the soldier would join his unit for " training in teamwork." Helmick 

argued that a green soldier could be militarized fully only through this 

three-tiered approach. He believed that the poor showing of many in 

drill, appearance, and military courtesy reflected deficient training that 

began with a soldier's induction. "The recruit of today is imbued with 

the spirit of the times-and this is an undisciplined and reckless era," 

he rctlected.22 

About 17 percent of the eighty major commands investigated by 

the inspectorate were considered unsatisfactory, and their poor performance was attributed to various factors- performing fatigue duties and 

supporting reserve components, among others. But the main cause was 

the lack of supervision on the part of officers and NCOs. Units whose 

leaders demonstrated interest in training continued to perform well, 

regardless of the extra duties imposed upon them. ln such units police 

calls were treated as opportunities for drill; fatigue details were made 

competitive; and so forth. As Helmick demonstrated, good leadership 

ensured good discipline. He acknowledged, however, that substantial 

improvements could only be made by increasing funds for post maintenance in order to free soldiers for additional training.2

J 

The use of troops as laborers, however, continued to be a problem. 

IGs recommended that the practice be reduced to the bare essentials of 

work that was necessary to troop welfare or otherwise of direct benefit 

to the men. But the situation had changed little by the time General 

Drum became The Inspector General, for he reported in 1930 that troop 

11 England, IG, Camp Benning, Annual Report, 5 Jul 20, Entry 26, RG 159, 

NARA. 11 Logan Lecture to QM School, 9 Apr 3 1, Entry 268; Helmick Annual Rpts, FY 

1923, FY 1924 (quotations), and FY 1926, Entry 26. All in RG 159, NARA. See also 

AReg 20 20, 1921. 11 11elmick Annual Rpt, FY 1926, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

40 1 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

labor and civilian-component support severely curtailed tactical preparedness in many units. He considered most units to be both untrained 

and unable to operate their equipment. 

Other factors combined to worsen the situation. The dispersion of 

units, caused by the shortage of housing, reduced the chances for any 

large-scale combined-arms training. This, in turn, meant a diminishing 

number of officers and NCOs with experience in providing large-scale 

administrative and logistical support- a critical problem, exacerbated 

by the large annual turnover of officers that kept many units in constant 

turmoil. A special investigation revealed a turnover rate of 40-50 percent in line units and command tenures of less than four months. Drum 

hoped for an increase in stability, urging a much greater emphasis on 

standardized training and improved quality in the Army school system. 

But problems existed there also.24 

Army Schools 

Each Army school was visited annually by inspectors. Immediately 

after the World War school inspections were highly detailed, partly 

because the school system was being reestablished and partly because 

new approaches to vocational training- stressing practical application 

rather than lecture and theory- were being tried out. The IG reports 

listed the strengths of the faculty and troops, analyzed the quality of the 

students, and gave a brief account of the school and its origins. 

Inspectors described the faci lities and recommended improvements, 

reviewed the establishment's logistical support, and eva luated the methods of instruction and the students' attitudes. 25 

Often the schools served as proving grounds for junior officers 

under consideration for Regular Army commissions. But there were 

some exceptions. The Chemical Warfare Service, for example, was 

found to be using its school to cull undesirable officers; its faculty had 

instructions to improve student quality and, simultaneously, to e liminate those that prove to be unfit. The War Department and the other 

bureaus a lso responded promptly and constructively to school inspection findings. Everyone agreed on the need to susta in a functioning 

2

' Drum also felt lhat dispersion made quick mobilization impossible. The twentyfour infantry regiments were scattered at forty-five different posts, with a battalion or 

less at thirty-four. See Drum Annual Rpts, FY 1930 and FY 1931, Entry 26, RG 159, 

NARA. 2

' For example, see Rpt, Hunt thru CG, 3d Corps Area, to IG, 15 Jul 21, sub: Annual 

Inspection of Finance School, Entry II , RG 159, NARA. 

402 
THE STATE OF THE ARMY 

school system. Unfortunate ly, the lack of funds often prevented the 

implementation of necessary reforms. 26 

fn other cases habit and inertia were at fault. General Helmick had 

long felt that courses in the psychology of leadership should be offered 

throughout the Army school system, and especially at the U.S. Military 

Academy (USMA). He confided that it had taken him five years to rid 

himself of the bad habits and attitudes he had learned as a cadet. l-Ie 

was impressed by the fact that a large portion of von Steuben's colonial 

era Blue Book had been devoted to basic aspects of small-unit leadership, and he believed that it was his duty as Steuben's successor to 

renew interest in the topic. Hence, he brought up the subject on every 

visit he made to West Point as The Inspector General. Receiving no 

response, he formally proposed in June 1924 that a leadership course 

be incorporated into the USMA curriculum. 

Correspondence on the proposal circulated between himself, the 

West Point faculty, and the War Department for over three years. The 

main problem lay in the faculty's reluctance to make a space in the curriculum by sacrificing established courses. This, in Helmick's view, 

was merely an excuse for "doing nothing," and he kept the issue alive 

until his retirement. All he managed to obtain, however, was an agreement that the Military Academy would give added emphasis to leadership during tactical training. General Preston briefly renewed interest 

in Helmick's concept in late 1932, but the introduction of courses in 

the psychology of leadership at West Point was delayed until after 

World War Il. 27 

This setback did not curtail IG interest in Army schools. At the 

Secretary of War's request, the Inspector General's Department carried 

out intensive surveys of the entire educational system between 1929 

and 1931 , ttncovcring many failings. At the conclusion of the first 

series in the late summer of 1929 Col. Pelham D. Glassford reported 

that substantial variations marked many supposedly equal programs. 

Moreover, most courses were geared exclusively to the needs of 

Regular Army officers; NCO training was insufficient; and the courses 

for reserve officers lacked any value. Glassford believed that the school 

z• Rpt, Baer to IG, 28 Jul 20, sub: Armual Inspection of Chemical Warfare School, 

Entry ll , RG 159, NARA. 2

' Ltr, Ilelmick to Superintendent, USMA, 2 Jul 24, sub: Introduction of a Course of 

Instruction in Leadership Into the Academic Curriculum at West Point, and Reply, 5 

Sep 24; Memo (quoted words), Helmick to ACofS, G- 3, WD, 18 Sep 24, same sub; 

Memo, Drum to Helmick, 28 Nov 24, same sub; Chronological History of the EITort of 

The Inspector General To Have a Course in Psychology Included in the Curriculum, 

USMA, 14 Dec 32. All in Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

403 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

system was producing narrow branch specialists, with little sense of 

combined-arms operations. His observations led the Chief of Staff to 

direct General Dnun to make another and more detailed inspection of 

the school system in 1930. J n turn, Drum selected Col. Dana T. Merrill 

to lead the invest gation. ~ 

Colonel Merrill set up a special team and procured, through The 

Adj utant General, data from each school commandant on his organization and curriculum. Merrill asked for information on the number of 

personnel associated with the schools as faculty, students, or support 

troops, as well as for the student-to-faculty ratio for each course. His 

report, completed in June 1931 , enlarged on Glassford's conclusions by 

using newly gathered statistics from thirty schools and from individuals studying at private institutions. In all, 28,7 J 3 officers were active in 

the Army school systen1 and another I ,753 were on ROTC duty. 

Thirteen percent were serving as faculty or admin istrators, while 20 

percent were students- an excessively high ratio, considering the 

maturity and experience of the student body. The fact that one-third of 

the officer corps was engaged in schooling had implications that affected the whole Army.29 

The inspectors estimated that in the normal course of a career, an 

officer would be taken from his regular duties at least five times, for 

periods of up to two years- an average of eight years of training in all. 

Schooling was one of the primary sources of turbulence within the 

Army, and a basic reason why officers served an average of less than 

two years at each post. The implications for troop training were evident. The problem was compounded by the fact that very few of the 

graduating officers were assigned to positions where they could use 

their training. 

Shifting to more practical matters, the inspectors analyzed course 

content at each training level. Officer basic training was supposed to 

be given in garrison schools, while the officers were serving in their 

first assignments. But, because turbulence among their seniors prevented any coherent programs from being developed, officer basic 

tra ining was very uneven, rarely touching on all the required topics, 

11 Memo, Merrill to TIG, 12 Jun 3 I, sub: Army School System, Entry 26, RG 159, 

NARA. 29 Information in this and the next five paragraphs based on ibid. Corps area officers 

were detailed to inspect ROTC units. They forwarded their reports through command 

channels to the Office ofThe Inspector General from 1925 to 1932 and thereafter to the 

War Department G-3. Sec Ltr, TAG to TIG, 3 May 27, sub: ROTC Units, Entry II, RG 

159, NARA. 

404 
THE STATE OF THE ARMY 

especially unit administration and supply. Tactical training was reasonably sound at all types of schools. Leadership and management 

training, however, were deficient; this became apparent when young 

officers were assigned to reserve-component duties, where such skills 

were paramount. The lack of basic training also was reflected in IG 

inspection reports, which repeatedly noted problems in unit administration, supply, and messing. Few of the formal schools offered courses on these topics. 

The inspectors noted a lack of coordination and standardization in 

advanced courses at the Army War College and the Command and 

General Staff CoJlege. In 1930 the two institutions were so parallel in 

their offerings that they could not provide the intended developmental progression. The inspectors suggested complementary course subjects, with the War College focusing on strategy and high-level staff 

work and the Staff College on operations and decision making. The 

same problems pervaded the Army school system, especially the 

schools run by the Air Corps. The latter were so similar that they 

could be consolidated. 

Another dimension was the inappropriateness of some courses, 

which proved to be virtually useless to students. For example, the 

chaplains course at Fort Leavenworth was 50 percent equitationhorseback riding- and only 20 percent counseling and psychology. In 

fact, far too much time was being devoted to horsemanship throughout 

the school system, at a time when increased mechanization was understood to represent the future of the army. Other programs were cluttered with minutiae. For example, at the Quartermaster Subsistence 

School less than I 00 hours were devoted to the subject of management, in contrast to 90 hours allotted for the subject of coffee and 105 

hours for dairy products. Such courses seemed to be designed to produce officers who would be immersed in trivia and incapable of supporting large-scale operations. 

The inspectors recognized that the small size of the Army prevented everyone from obtaining extensive practical experience, and they 

successfully urged that the schools adjust their CWTicula to provide substitutes through case studies and exercises. The War Department G- 3 

assumed the responsibility of coordinating and consolidating programs 

throughout the system, which reduced overhead and indirectly curtailed 

officer turbulence. A more progressive educational system thus gradually emerged, aimed at creating leaders who would be capable of performing command or staff functions commensurate with their grade or 

higher. The value of this transformation in Army education was to be 

proven a decade later during World War IT. 

405 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Subsequently, inspectors confined themselves largely to scheduled 

inspections, paying little further attention to the curriculum. In 1936, 

however, the ChiefofStaffrequcstcd a survey on the quality ofUSMA 

graduates, in response to complaints from corps area commanders that 

new lieutenants were not prepared to assume troop duties. Most 

believed that the USMA graduates needed to attend a basic course that 

would provide them practical, rather than theoretical, training. The 

Military Academy's position was that its mission was to produce future 

senior commanders and staff o'fTicers, rather than platoon leaders. 

Opinion was so divided that the Office ofThe Inspector General handed the issue to the G- 3, where it was soon submerged by the crisis of 

World War II and the pressing need to obtain officers from any source.30 

Morale Issues 

Interest in morale continued in the postwar period, although measures 

intended to chart or otherwise manage it soon became suspect. A formal 

requirement for separate morale reports lasted only from January 1919 

until August 1921. J nspectors found that the mandatory appointment of 

morale officers led many commanders to shirk their own responsibilities 

in this area, while some morale officers, in attempting to diagnose 

potentially demoralizing factors, became magnets for petty complainers. 

Hence, inspectors sought to reemphasize the time-honored command 

obligation, stressing individual character and unit pride.31 

There were, however, practical steps needed to ensure a reasonable 

standard in such basics as food, clothing, and recreation. Soldiers' 

clothing presented a baffling dilemma for inspectors, despite the huge 

wartime stocks at the depots. Immediately after the war inspectors realized that something was amiss in the requisitioning process. Units were 

requesting clothing items properly, but their requests went tmfilled. 

Reports to this efTect went to the Quartermaster General, whose investigation surfaced several problems. Units were ordering clothing on 

prewar forms that listed thirty-two different clothing sizes, although 

during the World War only nine sizes had been made and, beginning in 

1920, eighteen sizes had been approved for manufacture. Depot clerks 

JO Rpt, Martin to TIG, 15 Dec 36. sub: Annual Inspection of USMA, Entry II , RG 

159, NARA; File 333, Inspector General, 1920-45, USMA Archives, West Point, 

N.Y. 

'' Ltr, W. Wood to CofMoraleBr, WDGS, I I Jan 19, Entry II ; Memo, OIG to lnsps, 

25 Aug 2 1, sub: Morale, Entry 25; Memo, Baer to IG, 3 Aug 20, Entry 26. All in RG 

159, NARA. 

406 
THE STATE OF THE ARMY 

had not been instructed to consider reasonable substitutes for requisitions made on the old form. 

Furthermore, postwar recruits on average were smaller than 

wartime draftees, making the wartime stocks less useful than had been 

expected. Apparently, the Quartermaster General already had let contracts for new uniforms, but improvements were not realized until the 

end of 1920 because of the time required to manufacture the items. In 

the meantime, at the OIG's suggestion, the Quartermaster General had 

the requisition forms altered to reflect the new sizes and insh·ucted the 

depots to be more helpful. Thereafter, inspectors reported equipment 

shortages and requisition dates after each visit to pinpoint responsibility for any delays in issuing supplies.32 

The quality of the Army ration always had been a basic morale factor monitored by the inspectors for the Quartermaster General. 

Investigations of rations and messes thus consumed much of their time, 

as did commissary sales. In 1919 a series of complaints about food at 

Army hospitals led General March to request that IGs also examine 

hospital messes whenever they visited a post with medical facilities. 

But most ration-related reports at hospitals were brief, uncritical 

overviews, in which the inspectors noted mess hall visits, menu 

reviews, and cursory fund audits.

33 

A few hospital inspections, however, were much more thorough. 

Col. Robert C. Humber's inspection report of the messes at Fort 

Bayard, New Mexico, proved significant. He reviewed and evaluated 

mess operations, as well as followed up by examining supply methods 

and equipment. His work revealed not only an absence of close cooperation between quartermaster and medical personnel but also a greater 

need for coordination between physicians and dieticians. Much of the 

food service equipment was antiquated, making it virtually impossible 

to deliver a hot meal at bedside, for example. Humber recommended a 

complete survey to determine the type of equipment needed to cook 

and transport food properly. He also suggested more responsive supply 

procedures to assure fresher food and less wastage. His report added 

" Rpt, Irwin ro IG, 7 Jul 20, sub: Inspection of the Aberdeen Proving Ground; Ltr, 

Hanson to OJG, 16 Oct 20, sub: Clothing Sizes. Both in Entry 11 , RG 159, NARA. See 

also Neo-style 383C, 30 Apr 20, OTIG files, Pentagon (SAlG-ZXH). 

)) Rpt, Kenan to IG, 20 Aug 19, sub: Inspection of Camp Hospital Mess; Ltr, TAG 

to IG, 23 Jul 19, sub: Inspection of General Hospitals; Rpt, Desobry to IG, 3 Mar 20, 

sub: Inspection of General Hospital 31 Mess; Rpr, Cummings to IG, 8 Aug 19, sub: 

lnspect"ion of Camp Travis Hospital Mess. All in Entry II , RG 159, NARA. See also 

A Reg 20- 5, 1921 , 1924, 1931 , 1935, 1942; Neo-style 3 79, 29 Jul 19, OTIG files, 

Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH). 

407 
THE INSPECTORS GEN ERAL, 1903-1939 

momentum to initiatives begun earlier by The Surgeon General to 

improve the use of dieticians and to upgrade mess equipment. In cases 

where complaints proved to be justified, the reason was always inefficient or incompetent supervision, which could be rectified by e ither 

retraining or relieving unsatisfactory personne l. '' 

While inspections of hospita l messes continued from 19 19 to 

1927, the focus gradually shifted to the Army ration and its procurement process, especially after the Office of The Inspector General 

issued a special report on the subject in 1924. Disparities in the ration 

between services, and even between Army components, represented a 

serious morale issue in General Helmick's view and was readily perceived at the summer camps, where ROTC or reserve-component 

rations were more generous than the less liberal Regular Army 

allowances. The dissatisfaction among the troops compelled regular 

units to improve the ir own rations, although improperly, by spending 

their unit funds-a practice condemned by inspectors because it curtailed spending for legitimate morale activities. Meanwhile, problems 

a lso had been detected in commissary operations. Colonel Johnson, 

the OTIG inspector who conducted severa l investigations in the 

Panama Department, concluded that the system needed reform. 

Apparently, nobody at supervisory levels knew how to check commissary operations in suffic ient depth to determine whether they were 

being done properly. Johnson developed a guide-eventua lly used 

throughout the Army- that reduced complaints about the commissary 

just as major reforms began in the mess system.Js 

J n 1928 the upgrading of ration allowances ended the existing disparities, took the pressure off unit funds, and assured a more balanced 

diet for the troops. New regulations required all mess purchases to be 

made at post commissaries, which produced savings through bulk purchases and also lowered rates of petty graft. Mess o·fficers at first complained that the system impeded their flexibility in taking advantage of 

local price fluctuations, requiring them to anticipate futme needs in 

time to a llow the commissary to begin its purchasing process. 

Inspectors, however, favored the reform because it ensured greater efficiency and reduced opportunities for corruption.36 

J.O Fitzsimmons General llospital lnsp Rpts, 1922- 27; Rpt, Humber to IG, 12 Aug 

19, sub: Inspection of Fort Bayard Mess, All in Entry II, RG 159, NARA. Sec also 

Nco-style 379, 29 Jul 19, OTIG files, Pentagon (SA IG-ZXH). 

)$ Helmick Annual Rpt, FY 1926; Memo, Johnson to TIG, 13 Jun 27, sub: Scope of 

Policy No. 1- Be Helpful. Both in Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 36 Rivers Annual Rpt, FY 1928, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

408 
T H E STATE OF T H E ARMY 

Mess operations continued to be an item of interest for inspectors in 

1929 as the new purchasing system entered its second full year. Because 

the Chief of Staff showed his personal interest, mess officers made 

greater efforts. The centralized purchasing system proved itself by providing better rations at lower costs, and most objections to it faded away. 

Yet from this success came a new issue, that of standardized menus. IGs 

viewed better coordination between messes as essential if the full benefit of lru·ge-order purchasing was to be realized. Ideally, every mess 

should use the same food items at the same time. Although some commanders recognized the importance of standardization, too often the 

buying power of post quartermasters had been fi·ittered away in effcnts 

to accommodate the whims of each mess. Inspectors successfully 

pressed for menus to be coordinated at least to a degree, to ensure unifonnity in basics while allowing purchasers to take advantage of local 

market conditions. But efforts to replace antiquated kitchen equipment 

proceeded slowly because of the lack of funds.

37 

Mess operations also failed to keep pace with the advances made in 

procurement. Just as in the hospital messes, better trained mess personnel and supervisors were needed. Company officers were encouraged to take special training at local cooks and bakers schools, and 

increased time was devoted during training to menu planning and 

teaching the value of nutrition and balanced diets. In 1931, however, a 

sudden cutback in funds threatened the whole process of reform. As an 

economy measure, the War Department lowered the value of the 

Regular Army ration by 24 percent, from $.50 to $.38, despite the fact 

that the general food index had dropped only I 0 percent in response to 

the Depression and that the Navy Department ration remained steady at 

$.50. The more liberal allowances enjoyed by the Navy and Marines, as 

well as ROTC and CMTC participants, again threatened to demoralize 

the troops. Fortunately, the centralized purchasing system, by then in 

full operation, at least assured the men sufficient food. 38 

Housing was a never-ending problem. In part because of postwar 

reorganization, the size and stationing of the Army was so unsettled that 

little construction or maintenance was performed on posts until well 

after passage of the National Defense Act of 1920. The dispersal of so 

many officers to schools and civilian components deprived the regular 

force of much needed leadership and contributed to the problems that 

followed. By the mid-1920s living conditions at Army posts were a 

!1 Ibid., FY 1929, and Drum Annual Rpt, FY 1930, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 38 Loga11 Lecture to QM School, 9 Apr 3 I, Entry 268; Drum Annual Rpt, FY 1931, 

Entry 26. Both in RG 159, NARA. 

409 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

matter of great concern to Army leaders. In 1923 the Office of the 

Inspector General stated that most buildings were "becoming unfit and 

unsafe for occupancy." The critical deterioration of permanent structures was bad enough; worse was the decay of so-called temporaries 

built during the war, which were becoming uninhabitable. Keeping the 

temporaries even marginally livable imposed a constant drain on scant 

resources, with less and less to show for the effort. Continued use of 

such structures for living quarters both lowered morale and damaged 

the Army's image.

39 

The housing situation for troops began to make a slow improvement in the late 1920s, when a barracks-building program was implemented. Many wartime structures continued to be occupied, however, 

much to the distress of their inhabitants. Additional expenditures on 

upkeep were so uneconomical that only minimum sums were spent, 

with repairs performed by troop labor. Soldiers used a portion of their 

meager wages to buy cleaning and preserving materials that were on 

the Army's short-supply list. The general shortage of officers' quarters especially affected junior married officers, few of whom were 

able to afford suitable rentals. The problem was even worse for married junior NCOs and enlisted specialists, who lived too often in 

squalor in "unsightly colonies of shacks" that post commanders tolerated for lack of any alternative. General Rivers warned that this situation was the reason why the Army was losing personnel who were 

quite expensive to train. Nevertheless, the only result was a policy of 

restricting the acceptance and retention of jun ior married men- hardly a morale enbancer. 40 

Yet in the officer corps, the housing problem, grade stagnation, and 

turbulence were only secondary morale issues compared to pay. In 

1927 General Helmick rated financial worries the biggest problem of 

most officers. By that year the majority of junior officers were finding 

it increasingly difficult to meet their obligations, forcing them to curtail the social activities hitherto expected of them in the name of community cordiality. ln 1928, in the hopes of easing the situation, Rivers 

began to advocate twice-month ly pay for all personnel. The Marine 

Corps and Navy had adopted the practice some time previously, with no 

1

• Helmick Annual Rpt, FY 1922, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA; Lenore Fine and Jesse 

A. Remington, Tfte Co11JS of Engineers: Constmction in the United States 

(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History. Department of the Anny, 

1972), p. 46 (OJG quotation) . 

.. llelmick Annual Rpt, FY 1924, and Rivers Annual Rpt (quoted words), FY 1928, 

Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

410 
THE STATE OF THE ARMY 

Tile Quality of Life. Support .for units even of this size IVere an 

ovenvllelming problem .for the Army. 

adverse affects. ln fact, the system had reduced personal indebtedness 

and credit purchases in exchanges. His proposal was rejected, however, 

on the grounds that it would make mandatory coll ections and deductions more difficult.41 

Concern over morale issues led the Chief of Staff in July 1929 to 

direct The Inspector Genera l to determine "the actual state of mind" of 

officers, soldiers, and loca l civilians. He also wanted lG reports to 

describe and evaluate the morale and recreational facilities that were 

available at each installation that inspectors visited. General Rivers 

suggested that the mental attitude of a command might be deduced 

from a variety of indicators: personal appearance; promptness in 

responding to orders; absence of discontent over minor matters; tolerance for the idiosyncrasies of superiors; use of recreational facilities; 

and extent of on- and off-duty socia lizing. He recommended that 

inspectors carry out individua l and group interviews, and cautioned 

that they should reach conclusions about a unit only after comparing it 

with others under similar conditions: 2 

•• llclmick Annual Rpt, FY 1927, and Rivers Annual Rpt, FY 1928, Entry 26, RG 

159, NA RA . 

.u OTIG Cir 51, 17 Jul29, OTIG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXII). 

411 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

The state-of-mind analysis continued to be an important clement of 

inspection and survey reports throughout 1929 and 1930. The Chief of 

Staff was especially concerned over the effect of pay cuts and promotion freezes that were implemented by the Hoover administration to offset the effects of the Depression. There seemed a real possibility that 

the cuts, when added to poor housing and heavy administrative and 

labor burdens, would be the last straw in the process of demoralization. 

Officers, because they paid many of their own expenses, were especially hard bit. Corps area IGs now estimated that as many as 90 percent of their junior officers were in debt. Professional expenses, such as 

uniform, horse equipment, and the virtual necessity of owning a caroflicial vehicles were few and local travel authorizations were never 

granted- added to the burden. Declining morale in the officer corps 

inevitably affected the enlisted ranks as well.43 

There were some palliative factors. The 1930 lG inquiry into the 

Army's state of mind revea led that morale was higher than expected, 

primarily because of the Depression, which underlined the importance of job security at the same time that it caused a moderate drop 

in the cost of living. The situation was fragile, however. Inspectors 

pointed out that such mitigating conditions were temporary and 

external to the Army. Most soldiers were being sustained by the hope 

that equitable pay and promotion legislation would be passed eventually. The long term solution was to increase their pay until its buying power equaled that enjoyed by similar grades before World War 

I, and the inspectors urged that remedial pay legislation be prepared 

for submission as soon as economic conditions gave it a chance of 

passagc.4·' 

Meanwhile, the continuing problems of officer pay were rendered 

more acute by Army demographics. In 1931, and for the next three to 

five years, a "hump" of captains emerged-those who had entered service in 1916- 18. Their presence doomed younger officers who had 

come on active duty after 191 8 to serving a minimum of sixteen to seventeen years as lieutenants, with correspondingly low pay and mounting indebtedness. The situation, which could only have an adverse 

affect on morale, led to a change in the retirement law in 1935, whereby officers with fifteen or more years of service could retire voluntarily. Dwindling government resources prevented any pay raises in future 

'' llclmick Annual Rpt, FY 1924, Entry 26; Rivers Annual Rpt, FY 1928, Entry 26; 

Drum Annual Rpt, FY 1930, Entry 26; Preston Annual Rpt, FY 1933, Entry 268. All 

in RG 159, NARA. 

'' Drum Annual Rpts. FY 1930 and FY 1931. Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

412 
THE STATE OF THE ARMY 

years, despite IG recommendations that were repeated without effect 

for the rest of tbe decade.45 

Legal Issues 

ln an Army so ill-housed and underpaid, morale problems inevitably 

were reflected in the conduct of the troops. Both desertion and AWOL 

rates were high. Some AWOLs turned themselves in at more desirable 

stations, were tried, served their sentences there, and received new 

assignments on release. The principal force counteracting the desertion 

rate, which was high throughout the 1920s, was the advent of the 

Depression, aided by increased command interest in the proble1n. 46 

One issue that attracted IG attention was the Army practice of paying rewards for the apprehension of deserters. The Army continued to 

request appropriations for this purpose, even though a cutoff of funds 

in June 1932 seemed to have little effect on the number of either desertions or arrests. Senior commanders began questioning the value of 

rewards, arguing that returning deserters to military control was bad for 

discipline. In August 1934 the Secretary of War directed General 

Preston to study whether attempts to revive the program should be continued. The so-called deserter apprehension study lasted four months, 

under the supervision of Colonel Strayer. Taking a historical approach, 

the study showed that rates of desertion increased or decreased in proportion to the economic situation outside the Army. As the number of 

men volunteering for the service increased during periods of economic 

depression, recruiters were able to select the best of many good applicants. Desertion rates consequently declined from 1929 until 1934, 

when a slight rise was noted following the establishment of the Civilian 

Conservation Corps that paid higher salaries.

47 

Yet Colonel Strayer believed that the reward system should not be 

discarded. He was influenced by corps area commanders, the majority 

of whom opined that the appropriations request should continue 

because they foresaw the day when stronger measures against deserters 

might be necessary. All were pessimistic about rehabilitating offenders, 

"' Preston Annual Rpt, FY 1933, Entry 268; Parkinson, 10, Phil Div, Annual Rpt 

(quoted words), 9 Nov 31, Entry 26C. Both in RG 159, NARA. See also Act of 31 Jul 

35 (49 Stat. 507). 

"' llclmick Annual Rpt. FY 1924, and Drum Annual Rpt, FY 1930, Entry 26, RG 

159, NARA 

., Memo, Strayer to TIG, 15 Feb 35, sub: Deserters and General Prisoners, Entry 

261\, RG 159, NARA. 

4 13 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

judging that only a very small percentage would ever become valuable 

soldiers. Strayer agreed, yet considered it essential that the Army have 

an active policy against desertion, including the means to stimulate pursuit and apprehension if necessary. He recommended, however, that 

desertion be redefined; most of the men who were charged might more 

appropriately have been classified as AWOL. His views were accepted 

and, by mid-1935, were reflected in the regulations. Thereafter, the 

number of men dropped from the rolls, or listed as either deserted or 

AWOL, gradually declined.~s 

Cases of desertion continued to occur, however, and one became an 

object of high-level interest. For several years inspection reports on 

Fort Francis E. Warren, Wyoming, chronicled growing desertion and 

court-martial rates, which by 1939 were the highest in the Army. The 

post's problems were a concentrated version of those that had been 

plaguing the Army since the armistice. Barracks were overcrowded and 

recreational facilities poor. Each year the conditions were reported, and 

each year The Quartermaster General was forced to state that, although 

new construction was approved, funds were not available for anything 

except basic maintenance of the existing facilities. The situation was so 

bad that in May L 939 the Chief of Staff, responding to the cumulative 

evidence in IG reports and to the post commander's request, ordered a 

special investigation on crowding at the post.49 

The inspector, Col. Charles F. Martin, documented the overcrowding once more, demonstrating its effect on morale with extensive medical and military justice statistics. He also reviewed the needs of the 

relatively isolated post above and beyond barracks. It was deficient in 

virtually every element of its infrastructure-few sewers, few garages, 

and very limited athletic facilities. Martin praised the efforts of the 

commander and chaplains to ameliorate conditions and to raise 

morale, but concluded that little improvement was possible without 

investment in new construction. The report, with strong endorsements 

from the chain of command, recommended that money be diverted 

from the Secretary of War's reserve fund to build new barracks and a 

gymnasium for the forlorn station. 50 

Many conunanders believed that changes in the military justice 

system, brought about by the National Defense Act of 1920, were as 

"" Ibid.; Ltr, Hayne to TIG, 31 Aug35, sub: Morals of Military Personnel, Entry 26A, 

RG 159, NARA. 

•• Rpt, Martin to TIG, 28 Jul 39, sub: Spcci<tl Inspection of Fort Francis G. Warren, 

Entry I I, RG 159, NARJ\. 

Ibid . 

414 
THE STATE OF THE ARMY 

much responsible for the erosion of morale and discipline as the lack of 

resources and facilities. The changes in question had been aimed at 

eradicating arbitrariness and providing greater protection for the 

accused. Many officers condemned the new court-martial procedures 

as cumbersome and unresponsive, arguing that the technical requirements for carrying out investigations and providing protection for the 

accused were too elaborate. The reforms in their view hindered quick 

justice and encouraged leniency to offenders. Inspectors reported these 

opinions, usually without comment. Their fi_ndings for the most part 

corroborated commanders' assertions that greater firmness was needed 

to reduce desertions and to prevent "change of station AWOLs."$' 

ln 1926 General Helmick, judging the system to be "cumbersome, laborious and subversive of expeditious and effective justice," 

urged that administrative requirements be simplified. Many local 

inspectors proposed that unit commanders have greater powers to dispose of minor cases and that the process of investigating and reporting such cases be different than for major felonies-eliminating, for 

example, the requirement for verbatim transcripts of all procedures. 

They concurred with the line commanders that procedural delays 

were impairing discipline without enhancing justice. ln fact, some of 

the stricter requirements had already been relaxed by the mid-1920s, 

although the new system remained a source of command complaint 

for many years afterward.$

2 

Prison visits by inspectors continued as before, as did virtually all 

of the prewar requirements, such as Leonard Wood's 1911 policy of not 

having parties of garrison prisoners working under guard in public 

view. Every year an inspector visited the military prisoners held in the 

U.S. Federal Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas. Between L 911 and 

1935 their number ranged from 11 to 685. Each was accounted for, 

examined physically, and given the chance to voice any complaints. 

Specialized medical care requests were referred to the prison authorities; clemency requests were fmwardcd only if the prisoner produced 

new evidence, in which case a War Department review sometimes 

resulted. Favorable revisions of pay adjustments and copies of any proceedings were given to military prisoners. Many wanted to be transferred to the nearby Disciplinary Barracks. If possible, the transfers 

" Helmick Annual Rpt (quoted words), FY 1924, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA; Ncostyle 420, 2 Mar 22, OTIG files, Pentagon (SA IG-ZXH). Sec also Terry W. Brown, 

"Tbe Crowdcr-Ansell Dispute: The Emergence of General Samuel T. Ansell," Militwy 

Law Review 35 (Jan 67): 1-45. 

s

2 Helmick Annual Rpt, fY 1926, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

4 15 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

usually were approved. In 1922, as a result of an IG report, 360 prisoners were relocated to the facility.s

3 

In the 1930s the large Army prisons were closed and most of their 

occupants returned to post stockades, mostly tlu·ough the efforts ofThe 

Inspectors General. The Disciplinary Barracks closed in 1930, and 

General Drum was able to show that the result was to increase labor 

resources at posts, reducing the usc of troops for fatigue duties. General 

Preston agreed, believing firmly that military prison operations were 

not cost-effective and that the Army should get out of the business 

entirely. He built on Drum's work, urging a complete review in early 

1932 that eventually resulted in the temporary end of the whole system. 

In June 1934 the Army prison at Alcatraz was transferred to the Justice 

Departments.~ 

One morale and discipline issue affected the general society considerably more than it did the Army. In January 1919 the 18th 

Amendment to the Constitution made prohibition of alcoholic beverages a national policy. Ironically, the Volstead Act enforcing the ban 

had little practical effect on the Army. Various earlier laws had imposed 

limits on soldiers' access to alcohol. The sale of intoxicants in post 

exchanges had been barred since 190 l, despite the objections of many 

officers. A law passed at the outset of World War I, prohibiting the use 

or importation of alcohol on all military installations, remained in 

effect afterward, a forerunner or supplement to the general prohibition 

imposed by the amendment. As a consequence, no new Army policies 

or regulations were issued until 1929, when a low-key policy statement 

resulted in minor changes to the relevant Army regulation for ensuring 

that military practice conformed to federallaw. 55 

Because of current policy, the repeal of the 18th Amendment in 

December 1933 did not affect prohibition on Army installations. This 

was particularly galling because the Navy quickly changed its rules, 

and the general public was enjoying its new freedoms. Inspectors 

" AReg 20- 20, 1921; Memo, CofS, WD, to All Cdrs, 3 Feb 12, sub: Prisoners, in 

Nco-style Compilations, 15 Sep 21 and 12 Aug 27, OTIG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH); 

Military Prisoners, U.S. Federal Penitentiary, lnsp Rpts, 19 11- 35, Entry II , RG 159, 

NARA. 

S< Drum Annual Rpt, FY 1930; Llr, Preston to TAG, 8 Mar 32, sub: U.S. Disciplinary 

Barracks (and follow-up memos thru 6 Dec 33); Llr, TAG to CG, 9th Corps Area, 20 

Mar 34, sub: Transfer of Alcatraz. All in Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

'' Memo, Helmick to CofS, WD, 12 Jul24, sub: Law and Regulations Covering Use 

and Possession of Intoxicating Liquor on Army Posts; Memo, Rivers to CofS, WD, 15 

Jul 29, sub: Enforcement of the National Prohibition Act; OTIG Cir 61, 5 Dec 29. All 

in Entry 26A, RG 159, NARA. 

41 6 
THE STATE OF THE ARMY 

stressed in their reports the installation commanders' concern about 

the morale of their troops, and General Preston recommended 

rescinding the Army's prohibition regulation and publishing a new 

policy. As a result, on 30 April 1934 the Army "went wet," joining the 

rest of the country. 5

6 

Post Exchanges 

Despite the lack of alcohol, post exchanges became an increasingly 

important element in maintaining morale dming the postwar years, and 

TG interest in their operations remained at a high level. Immediately 

after the war, however, their financing was in a state of confusion. Units 

customarily bought shares of the exchange on a per capita basis when 

they joined a new station, purchasing them from the departing units. 

The system had broken down dming the war, partly because units 

moved about in haste and partly because newly activated units lacked 

funds to purchase the shares. 

A typical example of the consequences may be seen in the conditions that existed at Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont, in 1919. The 2d 

Cavalry, in leaving the post in March 1918, had signed over its interest 

to the 310th Cavalry, a new National Army regiment that had no funds 

to pay for the shares. The 3 I Oth was later broken up to form other units, 

all of which were reassigned and demobilized at other posts. While it 

was in Vermont, its inexperienced unit officers had failed to keep accurate records. When a new Regular Army unit was assigned to the post 

in July 1919, it found the exchange accounts in disorder. An I G investigation showed that determining liabilities was virtually impossible, 

and yet it was clearly unfair to force the new unit to assume the 

exchange's debt. When a full audit had been completed, General 

Chamberlain successfully recommended that most of the exchange's 

liabilities be assumed by a War Department sinking fund, which had 

been set up to meet such contingencies. The remaining liabilities were 

to be repaid from future exchange profits.

57 

During the years that followed, General Staff elements waged a 

prolonged effort to reform the post exchange system, finally cuLminating in more centralized policy direction and funding. The actual operal

6 Memo (quoted words), Preston to TAG, 30 Apr 34, sub: Military Prohibition; 

Memo, Browning to TIG, 13 Apr 34. Both in Entry 26A, RG 159, NARA. 

s? Rpt, Chamberlain to Sotw, 7 Aug 19, sub: Fort Ethan Allen Exchange; Rpt, OTIG 

to Sotw, 3 1 Dec 27, sub: Claim of Mrs. Grace Rink, Cafeteria Concessionaire, Aviation 

Mechanics School PX, and Reply, 18 Jan 28. Both in Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

417 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

tion of the post exchanges remained under the jurisdiction of local 

commanders, in part because of IG recommendations. By 1924 the 

exchanges, now the primary source of funds for post athletic and recreational activities, had become big business operations, governed by an 

increasingly complex body of regulations. As a result, their conscientious management entailed more time than one officer could be expected to give as an additional duty, and many inspectors began to suggest 

that qualified uniformed or civilian managers be appointed, at least for 

the larger exchanges.ss 

By 1930 over 200 post exchanges were being inspected throughout 

the Army. In that year a survey of the 83 largest revealed that they were 

doing a high volume of business, producing nearly $11 million in profits that were channeled into morale work or paid as dividends to stockowning units. The dividend proceeds were used mostly for dayrooms 

and company recreational activities. When the War Department directed the larger exchanges to hire civilians to replace the soldiers on their 

staffs, inspectors noted a quick increase in efficiency that offset the cost 

of salaries. They urged that the policy be extended by hiring civilian 

managers at all exchanges, regardless of size, to assure greater expertise and continuity in case of individual or unit reassignments. 5

9 

The demand for stringent economy affected the post exchanges as 

it did all other activities. The War Department Appropriation Act for 

fiscal year 1933 sought to remove soldiers from the exchanges, where 

a few hundred still worked, and redirect them to military duties. It also 

sought to divert military personnel spending from the exchanges into 

local communities hard-hit by the Depression. Hence, the act limited 

the patronage of post exchanges to active-duty military personnel; the 

fami lies of enlisted men, active or retired; and reserve-component 

members on active duty. Officers' family members could use the 

exchanges only with written authority from their sponsor, specifying 

purchases for each visit. The act also prohibited the use of any appropriated fund asset, such as an Army building, in support of exchange 

activities, and it required that the exchanges divest themselves of all 

elaborate merchandise and carry only ordinary expendable items.60 

The act caused considerable hardship for military fami lies and 

civilians working on Army installations. Discharged veterans of World 

War f receiving treatment at Army hospitals could no longer use the 

''Chamberlain Annual Rpt, FY 1920, OTIG files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXII); Helmick 

Annual Rpts, FY 1924 and FY 1927, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA 

l• Drum Annual Rpts, FY 1930 and FY 1931, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA . 

.., WD Appropriation Act, FY 1933, Entry 26A, RG 159, NARA. 

4 18 
THE STATE OF THE ARMY 

Post Exchange, I 02d Engineers 

exchanges; civilian employees could not patronize exchange cafeterias, 

even in remote country districts. The need for a signed permission for 

each visit by an officer's dependent was a great inconvenience. An even 

greater inconvenience for all was the limitation on the types of goods 

that could be sold at exchanges, especially when posts were located far 

from towns and town merchants. The difficulties imposed upon service 

families who lived on island posts, like Fort McDowell in San 

Francisco Bay, were almost insunnountable.

6

' 

The consequences of the act extended well beyond the military 

community. The restrictions on the exchanges were devastating to civilian concessionaires, many of whom were forced out of business. 

Merchants in surrounding communities were hurt by the loss of consignment sales. Low-paid soldiers and their families lacked the funds 

for not only making purchases without the exchange discount but also 

traveling to the nearest store. The exchanges, losing income, began to 

cut their work forces, releasing 300 civilian workers almost at once and 

scheduling another I ,000 for discharge over the fiscal year. On the 

other hand, all of the soldiers who had been working in the exchange 

system had to be retained- even though returning them to military 

duties was one of the Jaw's stated objectives! 62 

•• Memo, OTIG to Sotw, Aug 32, sub: Post Exchanges, and Draft Reply, Entry 26A, 

RG 159, NARA. 

l<l lbid. 

419 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

The drop in exchange profits posed serious problems for morale in 

a variety of ways. The purchasing power of the already slim Army paycheck shrank still further. The activities that had been supported by the 

exchanges-including athletics and libraries- were threatened, as were 

educational facilities for enlisted men's children at many Army posts. 

The Jaw fai led to take into account the differences and unique needs of 

particular posts, from training camps to West Point, where civilian visitors were left without access to alternate facilities. The results embarrassed the Army at every level, while the economic effects in most 

cases proved to be the opposite of what the Jaw's backers had hoped. A 

final loser was the taxpayer, who-as a newspaper in one town with an 

Army post pointed out- would now be obliged to pay for activities previously supported by exchange profits.

63 

Post commanders were quick to complain to The Inspector General 

of the problems engendered by the new policy. General Preston, calling 

the law's effects a classic example of the rule of unexpected consequences, was consh·ained to reply that the Army had no choice but to 

comply. The law itself required the Army to submit a report on exchanges 

to Congress. Using information collected by the local inspectors, the 

OTIG staff prepared an extensive report, detailing not only evidence of 

compliance with the act but also evidence of resulting hardships. The 

report emphasized the fact that the exchanges were nonappropriated 

activities, whose success reduced costs to taxpayers while creating jobs 

and improving morale. A second report six months later summarized 

major unit and garrison commanders' views on the law's effects. Sensitive 

to these findings, Congress at the end of 1933 eased some of the restrictions it had imposed. However, the basic principles of the law remained 

in effect until major changes were made as a result of World War 11.6-1 

Officer Conduct 

During the time when the new exchange rules were taking effect, several cases of corruption on the part of Army officers had come to the 

attention of the House Military Affairs Committee. Such discoveries 

helped to fuel Congress' zeal for reform, while convincing it that corruption was rife throughout the service. In plain fact, enough cases 

involved well-known officers to sustain an aura of scandal. 

o) Ibid.; Oswego (N. Y) Palladium-Times, 15 Dec 32, Entry 26, RG 159. NARA 

.., Ltr, Stone to Preston, 15 Oct 32, and Reply, 19 Oct 32; Ltr, MacArthur to Garner, 

23 Nov 32, sub: Post Exchanges. All in Entry 26A, RG 159, NARA. 

420 
THE STATE OF THE ARMY 

Characteristic was a serious conflict-of-interest case that brought 

two major investigations of Lt. Col. Edward L. Hoffman, the officer 

responsible for parachute design in the Air Corps. General Preston personally conducted a month-long inquiry in January and February 1933, 

at which time Colonel Hoffman denied under oath all association with 

a firm in Cincinnati, Ohio, that manufactured parachutes. The case 

remained closed until early March 1936, when the president of a competing company complained to a member of the House Military Affairs 

Committee of Hoffman's c lose association with the Ohio company. A 

committee investigator verified the allegation. After the War 

Department was notified, the Chief of Staff called for a new inquiry on 

the ninth.65 

Col. William W. McCammon reopened the case for the inspectorate. He reviewed the subpoenaed records of the suspect firm in great 

detail, reconstructing its activities, expenditures, and relationship with 

Colonel Hoffman from the time it was organized in 1927 to the time of 

the investigation. It turned out that Hoffman had been in charge of parachute development at Wright Field in Dayton since 19 I 9. When he was 

reassigned as a reserve aviation adviser to Cincinnati, he persuaded a 

number of local businessmen to incorporate a parachute manufacturing 

firm. He became its principal engineer and was in fact, if not in name, 

its chief executive officer. From 1927 to 1929 Hoffman had himself 

detailed to the Commerce Department, ostensibly to advise that department's secretary on aspects of aviation safety. He actually worked full 

time for the newly founded company, using government faci lities and 

equipment. Later, he was reassigned to Wright Field as the Engineering 

Section's parachute unit chief. He continued to draw a retainer from the 

civilian firm while on this duty. He tried to direct contracts in its favor, 

but without success. The firm was insufficiently capitalized to meet the 

government's requirements, in part because it had spent most of its 

money in payments to Hoffman over the years.(,{) 

By the time of the second investigation in I 936, the company had 

withered away and Hofti11an had been reassigned to the Air Corps 

Tactical School. The statute of limitations precluded his being 

charged with influence peddling, but the Secretary of War reprimanded him for lying under oath during the earlier investigation. 

65 Blanton Testimony in U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 72d Cong., 

2d Sess., 1933, pp. 2263- 65; Ltr, Reed to James, 5 Mar 36, Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

"" Rpt, McCammon to TIG, 27 May 36, sub: Investigation of the Connection of Lt. 

Col. Edward L. HotTman, Air Corps, With the Triangle Parachute Company, Entry 26C, 

RG 159, NARA 

421 
T HE INSPECTORS G ENERAL, 1903-1939 

Hoffman retired immediately thereafter. Hoffman's position as one of 

the most distinguished American parachute inventors brought the 

scandal considerable publicity and made it the object of prolonged 

congressional interest.67 

An even more celebrated case of the time involved Brig. Gen. 

Alexander E. Williams, the Quartermaster Transportation Division 

chief, on whom the House Military Affairs Committee had evidence of 

his accepting kickbacks and bribes. Williams, an 1889 USMA graduate and a Silver Star recipient for action at Santiago, already had been 

the subj ect of three earlier investigations- in 1907, for disregarding 

procedures; in 191 8, for involvement in the black market in France; 

and in 1921, for mismanagement leading to bankruptcy of the 

Munitions Office Cafeteria. In early 1935 the named investigators for 

the case- Colonel Reed, soon to become The Inspector General, and 

Lt. Col. Leo J. Ahcrn- carried out a complete audit of General 

Williams' numerous and compl ex bank accounts, tracking each check 

written and determining the source of every deposit. They verified that 

the general had received money and preferential prices from potential 

contractors and that he had misappropriated both government and 

USMA funds. Finally, he had lied about his associates and his conduct 

to Congress and a District of Columbia grand jury. The investigators 

successfully recommended a court-martial. In February General 

Williams was relieved of his position and reduced to his permanent 

grade of colonel, and after his tria l in May he was dismissed from the 

service without entitlcments.6$ 

Not all officer conduct investigations had such high visibility. One 

began when the Office ofThe Inspector Genera l received an advertisement for an economics book, which was severe ly critical of the 

Roosevelt administration's policies. The author, Edward C. Harwood, 

was a captain in the Corps of Engineers, but in a private capacity he 

served as director of the American Institute of Economic Research, a 

conservative group opposed to current policies. The captain's role 

raised issues of improper political activity and personal conduct. 

Nevertheless, the investigator, Lt. Col. Frank C. Mahin, proposed that 

the captain and his colleagues only tone down their criticisms as long 

as Harwood was director. General Preston disagreed, stating that 

Harwood had shown poor judgment in becoming so deeply involved in 

67 Ibid. 

«~ Rpt, Reed to T!G, 28 Mar 35, sub: Investigation of Brig. Gen. A. E. Williams, 

QMC; Memo, Preston to SoiW, 6 Apr 35. Both in Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. Sec also 

AP News Release, 23 May 35, OTIG fi les, Pentagon (SA!G-ZXII). 

422 
THE STATE OF THE ARMY 

such an organization and recommending his immediate reassignment. 

The Chief of Engineers, who considered Harwood to be necessary in 

his job supporting Works Progress Administration activities in the 

Boston area, interceded, and the two reached a compromise. After the 

Chief of Engineers explained his and Preston's views, Harwood agreed 

to disassociate himself from the institute.69 

Under the rubric of officer conduct, the inspectorate reviewed or 

investigated many cases involving divorce and the child-support or custody agreements that resulted from marital breakups. Often the former 

spouse of an officer would write the Inspector General's Department, 

complaining of her ex-partner's fa ilure to abide by the support agreements made at the time of the divorce or separation. The OTIG staff 

then forwarded the complaint and any documentation to The Judge 

Advocate General's Office for a judgment on the officer's legal obligation. lf decided in the spouse's favor, the Office of The Inspector 

General would treat the case as a complaint of indebtedness and, using 

command channels, instruct the officer to meet his obligation or face 

disciplinary action. 70 

Homes and Cemeteries 

As in the past, the inspectorate continued to oversee the operations of 

not only the retirement homes set up for veterans but also the cemeteries where they were buried. But the inspectorate's traditional oversight 

of the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers (NHDVS) underwent many changes after the war. In 1921 inspection of the home and 

its branches passed temporarily, for budget reasons, from a single OIG 

inspector to the corps area inspectors, who worked under OIG supervision rather than that of their commanders when examining NHDVS 

operations. Inspection by a single OTIG officer was resumed in 1925, 

because of the proven need for expertise and the necessity for saving 

time. The inspector continued to evaluate the finances and condition of 

the facilities, as well as the discipline and morale of the residents. 

Starting in 1928, however, Congress began to consider transferring the 

Nl IDVS to the recently created Veterans Bureau (later redesignated 

Veterans Administration). General Rivers objected to the idea, pointing 

out that the NHDVS was working well at little cost to the government 

and predicting an expansion of NHDVS overhead under Veterans 

.. Rpt, Mahin to TIG, 21 Sep 35, sub: Investigation of Possible Questionable 

Conduct on the Part of Capt. E. C. Harwood, CE, Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

~ Ltr, Malian to Reed, 29 Aug 38, with encls., Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

423 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Bureau control. At Rivers' urging, a special committee, with at least 

one IGD member, was formed to study the issue. As part of this review, 

two Veterans Bureau hospitals, the NHDVS, and the Soldiers' Home 

were inspected in 1929 to provide a source of information for the eventual disposition of the NHDVS. 71 

In spite of these efforts, the need to pare the War Department budget made necessary the transfer of the NHDVS in July 1930 to the control of the Administrator of Veteran Affairs. The transfer left only the 

Soldiers' Home within the purview of the Inspector General's 

Department. The Inspector General continued to inspect the home personally, as required by law, assisted usually by another officer and the 

OTIG accountant. The inspection lasted about three days, with special 

attention given to compliance with requirements from previous visits, 

physical improvements, and financial and administrative operations. 72 

As before, inspection responsibility for the more than eighty 

remaining national cemeteries rested with the Office ofThe Inspector 

General. The routine nature had not changed, with inspectors noting 

the facilities' physical appearance and state of maintenance; evaluating 

the efficiency of the caretaker and his staff; and recommending 

improvements, if any were needed. In the 1920s the inspection reports 

were mostly brief summaries of the work necessary to get the cemeteries in good condition, accompanied by a comment on overall condition. Starting in 1930, however, the reports became much more thorough, as part of the move to monitor expenses. Each one gave a full 

physical description of the cemetery, with comments on its background. The cost of its upkeep was ana lyzed, and statistics on its operations were given. 73 

The value of these inspections was challenged in 1924. Maj. Gen. 

David C. Shanks, the Fourth Corps Area commander and a former 

inspector, was of the opinion that IG visits to the cemeteries were an 

extravagance, whose benefits could be achieved more easily through 

routine quartermaster activities. The Quartermaster General, Maj. Gen. 

William H. Hart, and General Helmick disagreed, sharing the view that 

the cemeteries had a strong potential for mismanagement if not monitored on a regular basis. In fact, at the time of Shanks' criticism the 

Assistant Secretary of War had just directed Helmick and Hart to 

" Rivers Annual Report, FY 1928; Ltr, I lumber to Peck, 20 Scp 21 , sub: Inspection 

ofNHDVS. Both in Entry 26, RG 159, NARA 11 Memo, OTIG to lnsps, n.d., sub: Suggestions Pertinent to Soldiers' Home, Entry 

26, RG 159, NARA. 71 Cemetery lnsp Rpts, Boxes 330- 35, Entry I I, RG 159, NARA. 

424 
THE STATE OF THE ARMY 

arrange their respective biennial visits to fall on alternating years so that 

the cemeteries could be checked annually. The Assistant Secretary's 

obvious interest, as well as the scheduling of other inspections in conjunction with the visits, indicated the need to continue them. ~ 

Experience had often shown that cemetery activities were anything 

but routine. Sometimes they would uncover serious management problems, going well beyond the simple care of facilities. This was the case 

at Fort Barrancas, Florida, during the 1928 inspection. The inspector 

found that although routine maintenance was excellent, the procedures 

for reburials from other cemeteries were completely unsatisfactory. 

Corps area quartermasters failed to either coordinate their actions with 

the caretaker or keep adequate records. As a result, remains no longer 

could be identified, and extensive efforts were required to organize the 

cemetery records. A check throughout the corps areas revealed that a 

similar casual approach characterized other reburials when post cemeteries were closed. In the Fort Barrancas case one officer was disciplined, and improved procedures along with closer supervision became 

established policy for the future.75 

During the period of economic surveys inspectors provided considerable detail on the histories of the cemeteries and on their operation. Major Pritchett, for example, listed the starr and their salaries 

when he visited the Custer Battlefield National Cemetery in 1928. He 

detailed the number of visitors and the degree of public interest shown 

in the site and cited the need for a telephone and better transportation. 

When he visited the site again fifteen months later, he followed up on 

actions begun as a result of his earlier report and reemphasized the need 

for items, such as telephones, which had not been provided. His 

approach was a great help to achieving improvements there, justifying 

expenditures beyond the abilities of the caretaker. 76 

Soldiers' lots iJ1 civilian cemeteries were supposed to be inspected 

in the same marmer as the national sites. Often, however, they were overlooked, and The Quartermaster General would have to remind the Office 

of The Inspector General of the need to have someone check the graves 

at such places as Sitka, Alaska, and Mound City, Kansas. The inspec-

" Ltr. Shanks to TIG. I Nov 24, sub: Mileage, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 7

$ Rpt, Bach to TlG, 19 Dec 28, sub: Inspection of Barrancas National Cemetery, 

Entry II , RG 159, NARA. 

" Rpts, Pritchett to TIG, 22 Jun 28 and 15 Oct 29, subs: Inspection and Survey of 

the Custer Battlefield National Cemetery; Ltr, Griffin to Superintendent, Custer 

Battlefield National Cemetery, 27 Jun 28, sub: Telephone Service. All in Entry I I, RG 

159, NARA. 

425 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

tions usually were made when the corps area IG requested a local officer to visit the sites and report informally on them. Soldiers' lots inspections were incorporated in Army regulations in August 1935, with the 

specification that they were corps area responsibilities. That same year 

the Secretary of War decided to include Confederate cemeteries in the 

inspection program on the same biennial basis as other cemeteries. The 

visits had the effect of keeping cemetery personnel attentive and in helping them get the assistance, funds, and equipment they needed. 77 

Through its cemetery work, the Inspector General's Department 

occasionally found itself saddled with related issues. Thus a congressional inquiry involved the inspectorate briefly with the American 

Graves Registration Service in Europe. After the war a permanent staff 

had remained overseas under the supervision of The Quartermaster 

General to support the work of the American Battle Monuments 

Commission. The agency bore responsibility for the cemeteries in 

Europe that contained the 40 percent of the American war dead whose 

bodies had not been returned to the United States. 

In April 1930 Congressman David A. Reed wrote the Chief of Staff, 

relating rumors of problems in the graves program. General Summerall 

expressed sw·prisc at the allegations, since the War Department had 

enjoyed a steady flow of praise for its graves registration activities. The 

Quartermaster General had visited the cemeteries in November 1929 and 

found them satisfactory. Summerall believed that the negative rumors 

came from persons precluded by law from participating in the gold-star 

pilgrimages, government-sponsored and -financed visits to European 

grave sites that were provided to the next of kin. However, the rumors and 

the lack of any formal audit program for the European graves service, led 

Summerall and The Quartermaster General to agree that the American 

Battle Monuments Commission should be inspected on a regular basis 

like all other Army activities. The Chief of Staff directed that inspection 

begin in the fall, as soon as the pilgrimage season ended. 78 

17 Memo, OTIG to lnsps, n.d., sub: National Cemeteries and Soldiers' Lots 

Remaining Under Jurisdiction of the War Department, Entry II ; Ltr, Gibbons to TIG, 

2 1 Feb 39, sub: Inspection of Cemeteries, Bntry II; Ltr, TAG to CG, 6th Corps Area, 

30 Oct 36, sub: Assignment of Inspections, Entry 26. All in RG 159, NARA. See also 

ARcg 20-10, 1935. 1

$ Ltr, Reed to Summerall, I Apr 30, and Reply, 16 Apr 30; Memo, Summerall to 

TAG, 16 Apr 30, sub: Inspection of Graves Registration Service; Memo, DeWitt to 

Drum, 26 Apr 30, sub: American Graves Registration Service in Europe. All in Entry 

II, RG 159, NARA. See also Erna Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army: II 

HisiOIJ' of the Corps. 1775- 1939 (Washington, D.C.: Quartermaster Historian's Office, 

Office of the Quartermaster Genera l, 1962), pp. 693- 95. 

426 
T H E STATE OF THE ARMY 

Both the Chief of Staff and The Quartermaster General wanted 

General Drum, then The Inspector General, to make the first inspection. 

Although the inspection was scheduled for the fall of 1930, Drum, in his 

usual thorough way, immediately asked the Office ofThe Quartermaster 

General for information he needed to begin planning. By early May he 

had a roster of all employees and salaries, a sununary of authorizing laws, 

and a recapitulation of capital expenditmes going back to the beginning 

of operations in April 1923- a sum of $2.5 million on cemetery construction and improvements. Drum further asked that more detailed 

information on land acquisition, recent expenditures, and memorialization be available upon his arrival in Europe. His inspection lasted from 

mid-October to early December, during which time he visited all cemeteries and memorials under construction and completed a thorough 

review of expenditures and administration. The results of Drum's efforts 

completely vindicated the American Battle Monuments Commission. 79 

Parks and Monuments 

Other IG duties concerned the so-called national military parks at battlefields or places that were considered important to the Revolutionary 

or Civil Wars. The parks had been placed under jurisdiction of the 

Assistant Secretary of War, who managed them through independent 

commissions. The first legislation stipulated that the commissioners for 

the Civil War sites would be veterans of the battle commemorated by 

the park. This arrangement worked reasonably well until the inevitable 

passage of time reduced the availability and energy of those who were 

qualified to serve. Consequently, the laws were changed in 1912 to 

allow the vacancies created by death or retirement to remain unfilled. 

The Secretary of War, or his representative, was named an ex officio 

member of each commission, fully empowered to act with the surviving members. With the passing of the veterans, management of each 

park shifted to the War Department, to be administered by a superintendent appointed by the Secretary ofWar.80 

By 1922 superintendents were in place at all parks but that at 

Vicksburg, whose resident Civil War veteran was still the commissionN Drum Annual Rpt, FY 1931, Entry 26; OTIG Memo, [ 1932], sub: Inspections 

Made by Officers in OTIG and Exempted Stations Assigned to Corps Areas for 

Inspections, Entry 26A. Both in RG 159, NARA. A few years later the inspection program lapsed because of budgetary problems. 80 Memo, Helmick to ASotW, 26 Dec 22, sub: Administration of the National 

Mi litary Parks, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

427 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

er. General Helmick wrote a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of 

War in December, stating that the situation envisaged in the 1912 legislation had come to pass. He recommended that the military parks be 

brought under more formal War Department control, indicating that the 

19 J 2 law gave the Secretary of War the flexibility to manage the parks 

as he judged best. Helmick previously had coordinated his proposal 

with the Quartermaster General, who did not object to bringing the 

parks under his purview in the same manner as national cemeteries, 

subject to the same sort of biennial lG inspection. The Judge Advocate 

General foresaw no problem in such an arrangement." 

As a result, on 3 J January 1923 the Secretary of War directed that 

by I April the operation of the national military parks come under the 

jurisdiction of the Quartermaster General. The Secretary's fi les on the 

parks were transferred to the Quartermaster General's Department in 

the ensuing weeks. The parks were listed in regulations as items for 

inspection, and the first lG visit was scheduled to be made in conjuncti.on with the next regular cemetery visit to the loca l area. General 

Helmick had wanted an immediate inspection to assess the situation 

before the transfer, but travel funds were unavailable. Thus, the corps 

area IG in whose region the parks were located performed the first 

inspection. The Office of the Inspector General gathered copies of laws 

and policies governing the parks and distributed them to the field. 

Initially, the parks were to be inspected every other fiscal year, but in 

1927 the schedule was changed to once every two calendar years to 

allow greater flexibility in combining the parks inspections with other 

scheduled visits in the same rcgion. 82 

The scale of the endeavor increased in October 1924, with the designation of national monuments by Presidential Proclamation. These were 

sites, such as forts and memorials, that were significant historically. The 

Statue of Liberty on old Fort Wood was designated under this category, 

for example. The proclamation specified that these monuments would be 

administered and inspected in the same manner as military parks. 

Inspections began in 1925, with the first reports indicating considerable 

need for repairs and improvements. At their greatest number, there were 

ten monuments and twelve parks requiring inspection (Table 2).

83 

11 Ibid.; Helmick Annual Rpt, FY 1923, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

•z Orders, Weeks to QMG, 3 1 Jan 23; Ltr, Duyne to IG, 14 Mar 24, sub: Inspection 

of National Military Parks; Memo, Watrous to TIG, 21 Sep 27, sub: Inspection of 

Military Parks. All in Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

aJ Memo, Davis to TIG, 23 Jan 25; WD Bul 24, 27 Dec 24, para. 3; llchnick Annual 

Rpt, FY 1926. All in Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

428 
THE STATE OF THE ARMY 

TABLE 2- NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD PARKS AND MONUMENTS 

SUBJECT TO INSPECTION 

Name State C01ps Area 

Antietam National Battlefield Park Maryland Third 

Castle Pinckney National Monument South Carolina Fourth 

Chalmette National Monument Louisiana Fourth 

Chickamauga and Chattanooga 

National Battlefield Park Tennessee Fourth 

Fort Donelson National 

Battlefield Park Tennessee Fourth 

Forts Marion and Matanzas 

National Monument Florida Fourth 

Fort McHenry National Monument Maryland Third 

Fort Niagara National Monument New York Second 

Fort Pulaski National Monument Georgia Fourth 

Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania 

National Battlefield Park Virginia Third 

Gettysburg National Battlefield Park Pennsylvania Third 

Guilford Courthouse 

National Battlefield Park North Carolina Fourth 

Kenesaw Mountain National Monument Georgia Fourth 

Lincoln Birthplace National Monument Kentucky Fifth 

Meriwether Lewis National Monument Tennessee Fourth 

Moore's Creek National Battlefield Park North Carolina Fourth 

Mound City Group National Monument Illinois Fifth 

Petersburg National Battlefield Park Virginia Third 

Shiloh National Battlefield Park Tennessee Fourth 

Stones River National Battlefield Park Tennessee Fourth 

Statue of Liberty National Monument New York Second 

Vicksburg National Battlefield Park Mississippi Fourth 

Source: Inspections, Boxes 148-49, Entry II , RG 159, NARA. 

429 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

The inspections and, later, the surveys conducted on the parks and 

monuments focused on deficiencies in physical conditions that were 

beyond the abilities of local superintendents to correct, with inspectors 

commenting on roads conditions, rights of access across private property, and equipment needs and repairs. Occasionally, IG remarks would 

be more substantial, affecting policy. In 1932, for example, after Maj. 

Leon M. Logan objected in his report to the Confederate bias shown by 

the land purchasing policy of one park commission, increased appropriations were authorized to acquire land significant to federal operations. The inspectors'reports on parks and monuments were processed 

similarly to others originating at the corps areas. Following a review at 

that level, they were forwarded to the War Department inspectorate for 

circulation and file. The program seemed barely under way when the 

Army's association with the parks and monuments ended in 1933 as the 

result of a policy to reduce its nonmilitary activities. In March of that 

year responsibility for them and a few cemeteries began to be h·ansferred by executive order to the Interior Department. The transfer was 

completed by the end of August.84 

All in all, the complex duties carried out by the Inspector General's 

Department provided an excell ent overview of the state of the Army during a difficult, prolonged period of adjustment. While some of the problems were perennial, many others reflected the dwindling resources and 

constricted opportunities that characterized the interwar years. 

Nevertheless, the inspectorate continued to carry out its traditional duty 

of attempting to provide for the welfare of the Army and its soldiers 

from the time of their recruitment until the time of their intermentindeed, even thereafter in the many memorials to their achievements. 

8

' Rpt, Logan to IG, 25 Aug 21, sub: Biennial Inspection of the Fredericksburg and 

Spoltsylvania [sic] County Bat!lcfields Memorial; Ex Order 6228, 28 Jul 33; Ex Order 

6166, 10 Jun 33. All in Entry II, RG 159, NARA. 

430 
12 

Guardsmen and Civilians 

For both the Army and the inspectorate, the postwar era brought a number 

of entirely new responsibilities and duties. Some of the most important 

emanated from the closer relationship being forged between the Army's 

active and reserve components. As outlined by the National Defense Act 

of 1920, both the National Guard and the Organized Reserve Corps 

(ORC) would play a prominent role in any mobilization for some future 

war. And as these components began to receive a greater proportion of the 

Army's slim resources, The Inspector General's Department (IGD) began 

to take a closer look at the performance of these organizations. 

Inspecting the Reserve Components 

With the passage of the National Defense Act, the reserve organizations 

continued to be subject to JG inspections, for which the corps area 

headquarters had primary responsibility. Regular Army officers were 

detailed for temporary civilian-component duty at National Guard 

armories and facilities. Selected and supervised by the corps area 

National Guard affairs officer, they normally performed the inspections. In some commands the National Guard affairs officer himself 

conducted the inspection, assisted by the corps area IGs. The focus of 

each inspection dovetailed to the topics of interest listed on an IG 

checklist, which the Office ofThe Inspector General (OTIG) provided. 

The final inspection report recorded the funds allocated and disbursed, 

provided the statistics on equipment losses, and usually concluded with 

a summary of projected Guard expenditures: 

' Rpt, Townsend to OTIG, 25 May 28, sub: Annual Survey of National Guard Unit 

Activities, Entry II; Helmick Annual Rpts, FY 1924 and FY 1926, Entry 26; Logan 

Lecture to QM School, 9 Apr 31, Entry 268. All in Record Group (RG) 159, National 

Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington, D.C. 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Other Regular Army officers were detailed to conduct annual 

inspections of federally recognized units during their summer training, 

usually with the aid of corps area IGs. Their purpose was to assist 

Guard commanders in correcting any problems that were reported. 

Beyond that, the inspectors' interest lay in determining the units' mobilization readiness. They submitted reports that listed each companysized element and explained any variations from earlier strength 

reports. They also provided the names and duties of the Regular Army 

personnel who were serving as instructors, as well as information on 

federal expenditures and property disposals. Compliance with applicable Army regulations was checked and noted in the reports. The OTIG 

stafT reviewed the reports and then forwarded them to the General 

StafT's National Guard Bureau, which used them as the basis for issuing or recalling equipment and property to Guard units.

2 

The ORC units, because of their federal status, at first were included in the annual corps area inspections. Yet they differed greatly from 

Regular Army units. Despite their tactical designations, these reserve 

organizations in reality formed administrative cadre for mobilization 

units. For example, the 66th Cavalry Division in Omaha, Nebraska, had 

only 286 officers and 49 enlisted men, while the lone unit that it supervised, the Regular Army 15th Cavalry (inactive), had 39 officers and 2 

enlisted men. The command's job was to develop and give instruction 

to reservists in its area, provide them administrative support, and foster 

good relations between the Army and the public at large. Then in 1937 

the tactical designations were changed to "regional reserve districts." 

Thus, the 66th Cavalry Division became the Western Missouri Reserve 

District. Its personnel retained duty positions in the division, should it 

ever be mobilized, and continued to provide branch training for cavalry reservists tlu-oughout the corps area.J 

The ORC units were subject to additional inspections, performed 

by the corps area staff and coordinated by the area's civilian-component 

affairs officer with the local inspector. The only purpose of these 

inspections was to evaluate the work of the Regular Army personnel 

who were assigned to the ORC units as cadre. The inspection reports 

listed unit locations and the number of Regular Army advisers, as well 

2 Rpt, Townsend to OTIG, 25 May 28, sub: Survey of !84th Infantry Regiment, 

California NG, Entry II , RG 159, NARA;AReg20-20, 192 1, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1929. 

' Rpt, Austin to CG, 7th Corps Area, 22 Jun 28, sub: Economic Survey of 66th 

Cavalry Division, 7th Corps Area; Rpt (quoted words), Williams to OTIG, 26 Nov 37, 

sub: Annual Inspection of lleadquarters, Western Missouri Reserve District. Both in 

Entry II, RG 159, NARA. 

432 
GUARDSMEN AND CIVILIANS 

as discussed any problems the advisers might have (for example, the 

high cost of living) and the value of the training they gave. The reports 

were submitted through channels to the Office of The Inspector 

General, where extracts were made and circulated among reserve officers on duty at the War Department. The closely supervised ORC units 

generally were found to be working well within the tight constraints of 

their budgets.~ 

The greater complexity of the National Guard establishment, with 

its ampler resources and fully manned units, naturally attracted more of 

the inspectorate's attention outside the inspection cycle. Many of the 

problems that were uncovered concerned the abuse of authority, the 

improper use of funds, or a combination of the two. Several cases 

proved to be extraordinarily complicated and time-consuming, requiring the temporary detail of many add itional Regular Army officers. 

They surfaced, as a rule, either in complaints made by unit members or 

in audits made by other government agencies. The complaints were forwarded to the Chief of the National Guard Bw·eau and then, regardless 

of their source, to the Office of The Inspector General for resolution. 

A typical case began when a former Georgia guardsman lodged a 

complaint with the local Justice Department office. It appeared that 

men who enlisted in the Machine Gun Troop of the I 08th Cavalry automatically became members of a social group known as the Governor's 

I Iorse Guard, an incorporated organization that unit personnel supported with involuntary pay deductions. The complaint eventually was 

passed to the Fourth Corps Area IG for investigation. Apparently, 

everyone who joined the unit was aware of the conditions, and willingly did so for the chance to ride the troop 's horses. The inspector determined that Governor's Horse Guard funds were kept carefully distinct 

from state and federal funds. The source of the problem turned out to 

be the fact that the best horses were being reserved for the relatively 

small number of unit polo players. The inspector found no illegal or 

incorrect actions. A legal review of the findings requested by the corps 

area conm1ander led General Reed to opine that, although no law had 

been broken, he disapproved of the practice. The National Guard 

Bureau disagreed, however, ruling that the arrangement should be 

allowed to continue at the state adjutant general's discretion.5 

Most troop complaints about abuse of authority by officers were 

unsubstantiated. In one such case the Chief of the National Guard 

• See ORC lnsp Rpts, Box 146, Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

~ Rpt, Matthews to OTIG, 23 Dec 28, sub: Investigation of Alleged Irregularities in 

MG Troop, I 08th Cavalry, Georgia NG, Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

433 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Bureau referred a letter from some former Colorado guardsmen to the 

Office ofThe Inspector General. The guardsmen alleged that their unit 

commander had discharged them improperly and was mismanaging 

unit finances. The case passed through channels to the Eighth Corps 

Area IG, who made the investigation in Denver. Jn the letter the complainants had detailed a litany of abuses-padding payrolls, making 

loans to subordinates, and collecting fines, to name a few- and 

claimed that they had been dishonorably discharged without due 

process. The investigation, however, revealed that all of the complainants had been notorious troublemakers. The inspector found no 

evidence of financial irregularities in the unit or in the commander's 

personal affairs. Every allegation could be countered fully. Although 

the commander had acted incorrectly in sh·iking out the word "honorable" on the discharge certificates, the inspector sympathized with him 

in light of the men's records and merely recommended that new certificates be issued. The state adjutant general supported the IG findings, joining the inspector in successfully recommending that the allegations be disregarded. 6 

However, not all investigations vindicated the authorities. 

Peculation seemed to increase as the Depression decade advanced. 

Many cases came to the attention of the Office of The Inspector 

General after they had been mishandled at local levels in an attempt 

to protect the reputations of those involved. Some cases extended over 

years, because of their complexity and the collateral issues they 

raised. Illustrative of the latter was the case involving a South Dakota 

National Guard unit. In August 1936 the Seventh Corps Area finance 

officer became suspicious of the processing of some payroll checks 

from the Headquarters Battery, !47th Field Artillery, and an investigation ensued. Interviews with one of the proper recipients showed 

that his signature had been forged, that he had never seen the check, 

and that he had not received the money. The matter was turned over 

to the Treasury Department's Secret Service, whose investigation 

proved that the commander was manipulating both the payroll and the 

drill attendance records. His scheme was to report absent or former 

unit members as present at all drills, to retain the government paychecks, and to pay the men with his personal checks for the times they 

actually were present. He then forged signatures to the government 

checks, and the difference went into his bank account. The officer was 

• Rpt, Clarkson to OTIG, 6 May 38, sub: Investigation of Complaints Pertaining to 

Capt. Lou W. Appeldorn, 45th Tank Company, Colorado NG, Entry 26C, RG 159, 

NARA. 

434 
GUARDSMEN AND CIVILIANS 

convicted of forgery and fraud in October 1938 and placed on probation for eighteen months.

7 

NCO Instructor Problems 

Other major investigations involving the National Guard embraced 

whole groups, forcing the Inspector General's Department to augment 

its strength with temporarily detailed officers to cope with the tremendous work load. The first extended case of this magnitude began in 

1934, with a check on the housing allowances paid to Regular Army 

NCOs assigned to Nationa l Guard units as sergeant-instructors. 

Problems with the allowances had been observed in each corps area and 

in Hawaii, and as a result in April inspectors in the fie ld were asked to 

report all such cases to the Office ofThe Inspector Genera l. By June it 

was evident that a critical situation existed throughout the Army. Most 

NCOs were circumventing the relevant regulation, which authorized 

payments for housing costs up to a fixed maximum. Nearly all were 

drawing the maximum, and many had made arrangements with their 

landlords to document fictitious expenses in order to draw the largest 

sum possible. ~ 

The scandal was of great concern to the Army, because it marked 

an ethical breakdown among a largely handpicked group of above-average NCOs. General Preston, after personally conducting the preliminary investigation and follow-up, attributed the root of the problem to 

a confusing change in the regulation that had been issued in 1927. 

Many finance officers were unable to understand or explain the new 

language, and the obscurity had been exploited to create precedents for 

making full payments that were followed by later supervisors. Innocent 

NCOs, seeing others successfully manipulate the system, acted accordingly. The fact that housing a llowances were often insufficient allowed 

many to rationalize their conduct on the grounds that they were merely 

receiving their traditional entitlement to rations and quarters in another 

form. And the process of certification and monitoring was so complex 

that in practice little or no supervision was being applied by accountable officers. Concluding that the War Department had to bear respon-

' Rpt, Wood to OT1G, 13 Dec 38, sub: Inspection of Headquarters Battery, I 47th 

Field Artillery, South Dakota NO; Ltr, Elliot to SotW, 26 Oct 38. Both in Entry 26C, 

RG I 59, NARA. 

• Ltr, Preston to TAG, 27 Oct 34, sub: Irregularities in the Hire of Quarters for Use 

of Sergeant-Instructors Detailed for Duty With the National Guard, Entry 268, RG 159, 

NARA. 

435 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

sibility for such extensive confusion, The Inspector General successfully recommended that a clearer revision of the rules be made and that 

no NCO be prosecuted or forced to reimburse the government, unless 

intent to defraud or to profit from the confusion could be proven.9 

The latter recommendation, of course, meant that everyone who 

had drawn an allowance would have to have his finance claims 

reviewed. Despite the huge dimensions of the task, it became mandatory in January 1935, when the Comptroller General sent the Secretary of 

War a list with the names of forty NCOs who were assigned to the 

Pennsylvania National Guard. All of their finance records contained 

numerous housing allowance violations. The Comptroller asked the 

Secretary to look into the matter, with the implication that he would 

examine the matter himself if the Army failed to do so. Accordingly, 

General Preston tasked his executive, Colonel Humber, to conduct a 

comprehensive investigation of the problem thwughout the Army. Each 

corps area was required to submit data on all the NCOs who had made 

rental agreements since I July 1927. 10 

The investigation that followed lasted until July 1937, at which time 

General Reed was The Inspector General. A total of950 individual cases 

had been examined. Each landlord was sought out and the actual costs 

charged to the NCO were computed. Each corps area commander 

reviewed the cases in his region and made an administrative decision on 

each. The cases then were evaluated at the Office of The Inspector 

General and coordinated with the corps area IG, who spoke for his commander, until a reasonable Anny-wide uniformity was achieved. The 

work load was heavy, for the War Deparh11ent's policy was to analyze 

every case from the viewpoint of equity as well as law. NCOs who were 

found to have profited were required to refund any sum in excess of their 

minimum standard commutation (75 cents per day). " 

The Inspector General's Department, however, continued to feel that 

much of the problem was the responsibility of the War Department. 

General Reed proposed legislation in 1937 to allow the Comptroller 

General to waive the requirement for full restitution in justifiable cases. 

• Ibid. 

'

0 Ltr, McCarl to Sotw, 7 Jan 35; Ltr, Torrey to OTIG, 26 Nov 35, sub: Regular Army 

Personnel on Duty With the National Guard; Ltr, Sullivan to CGs, Corps Areas, 2 Apr 

35, sub: Information re Sergeant-Instructors on Duty With the National Guard. All in 

Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

" Rpt, Mahin to TIG, 4 May 36, sub: Investigation of Rental Quarters of Sergeant 

Earl Fletcher, Massachusetts NG; Rpt, Reed to Sotw, 7 Jan 38, sub: Investigation of 

Officers on Duty in Washington. Both in Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

436 
GUARDSMEN AND CIVILIANS 

Although this measure reduced the 

total from $400,000 to about 

$40,000, the sums many NCOs 

owed continued to seem enormous 

when compared to their $65 

monthly salaries. One NCO committed suicide at the prospect of 

having to repay his debt. In 

August, however, Congress passed 

a bill that permitted the use of discretion. From that time fmward, 

once the OTIG staff and corps area 

commanders reached a consensus, 

their finding was validated at the 

Finance Department and the 

agreed-upon amount was deducted 

from the NCO's pay. Despite this 

lenient approach, one officer and 

seven NCOs were tried, eight Maj. Gen. Walter L. Reed 

NCOs were reprimanded, and thirty-seven officers and thirty-nine 

NCOs were admonished for their parts in the fraud- still a relatively 

small figure compared to the 950 who had been involved.'

2 

In the course of the investigation, audits had revealed possible 

fi"auds as far back as 1922. But General Reed successfully avoided a 

second in-depth probe in favor of handling individually each case that 

was exposed through an audit or an inspection. It was fortunate that he 

did so, for soon an even larger investigation developed from another 

discovery made by the Comptroller General's General Accounting 

Office (GAO) staff. 13 

Another Scandal 

This time the problem lay with the U.S. property and disbursing officers (USP&DOs) assigned to the states. The National Defense Act of 

'

2 Martin Testimony, Mil Affs Cmte, HotReps, 20 Jul 37, Entry 26C, RG 159, 

NARA. Boxes 98- 200 of this entry contain all the individual cases and drafts of Public 

Law 326, 76th Congress, 1st Session. They give a good view of the life of the sergeantinstructors. 

"Ltr, Elliot to SofW, 22 Oct 37, and Memo, Reed to TAG, 4 Nov 37, Entry 26C, RG 

159, NARA. 

437 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

1920 had placed USP&DO appointments under the Secretary of War's 

jurisdiction, but his prerogative had not been exercised, and by the late 

1930s officials were being relieved and vacancies filled by state governors without securing War Department approval. When this was 

brought to the attention of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, then 

Maj. Gen. Albert L. Blanding, he supported tightening the policy and 

suggested further that new appointees undergo a full background investigation. The War Department G- 1 gave the responsibility to corps area 

commanders, who often used their rG or JAG officer for the task. The 

state adjutants general supported these reforms, urging that the 

Secretary be the only person to remove a USP&DO for cause!~ 

Unfortunately, the improvements arrived too late. In March 1937 

the Comptroller General informed the Secretary of War that so many 

problems had been uncovered as to indicate the need for an investigation. The irregularities he cited included embezzlement; intermingling of personal, state, and federal funds; failure to deposit funds; 

improper use of federal property; and persom1el hiring or contracting 

in contravention to federal regulations. General Reed was assigned 

investigative responsibility, and in the summer of 1937 officers from 

the Office of The Inspector General, the Office of The Judge 

Advocate General, and the National Guard Bureau completed a series 

of studies. By September they had reached a consensus on the need 

for reform, recommending that War Department inspections be 

increased. In the meantime, however, a mounting series of discoveries promised a major scandal. 15 

Typical offenses included paying substitutes to keep Guard units up 

to federal recognition strength and routinely forging signatures to pay 

checks. Some frauds were more complicated. For example, the 

Connecticut USP&DO had embezzled $8,500 in 1935 and taken kickbacks from contractors in 1936, and the Ohio USP&DO had used 

incorrect names and partial addresses on legitimate checks as a means 

to delay their cashing, thereby creating a floating fund that- with the 

addition of short payments on contracts-allowed him to hire his two 

" Ltr, Smith to Roosevelt, 19 Feb 34, Entry 268; Rpt, Perley to TJG, 27 Sep 34, sub: 

Investigation of Arkansas NG, Entry 268; Memo, Gullion to TAG, 6 Jul37, sub: United 

States Property and Disbursing OITicers, Entry 26C; Memo, Blanding to CofS, WD, II 

May 37, sub: Investigations of Nominees for Appointments as USP and DO's, Entry 

26C; Memo, Embick to ACofS, G- 1, WD, 19 May 37, sub: Investigation of Nominees 

for Appointment as USP&DO's, Entry 26C; Memo, Beeke to Ex OfT, OTIG, I I Apr 38, 

Entry 26C. All in RG 159, NARA. Sec also AReg 20-10, 1935. 

u Memo, Park to TIG, 28 Jun 37, sub: Inspection of the National Guard; Memo, 

Park to TIG, 20 Sep 37. Both in Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

438 
GUARDSMEN AN D C IVILIANS 

sons, under false names, as surplus employees. IG action revealed the 

irregularities, eventually leading to conviction. 16 

An investigation in August 193 7, prompted by a citizen's complaint, SUti'aced even greater problems in the Nebraska National Guard. 

From 1924 to 1933 firewood cut at Camp Ashland, a federal reservation used for Guard training, had been sold to the federal government 

for use during National Guard encampments. Both the USP&DO and 

the state adjutant general had condoned the practice, claiming that its 

purpose was to compensate the state for physical improvements to the 

camp that could not be funded otherwise. The actual transactions were 

made through a dummy contractor and credited to a so-called 

Quartermaster Fund in the adjutant general's office, but the money 

actually was used to feed livestock the two officers raised on the federal land and to maintain state property on or adjacent to it. The investigation by Col. William S. Wood exposed the fraud and further revealed 

that the USP&DO and the adjutant general were in a conspiracy to 

defraud the government. 17 

The findings were so snuming that General Blanding requested a 

second investigation to develop evidence on the extent of the personal 

gain made by the two officers. Maj. Everett C. Williams reviewed all 

state vouchers and identified eighteen more fraudulent transactions. He 

then developed an audit trail on each transaction, documenting how it 

was made, the sums involved, and who profited. Williams concluded 

that very little of the Quartermaster Fund went to the upkeep of Guard 

property; most ended in the pockets of the two conspirators. The case 

was referred to the Federal Bureau oflnvestigations and eventually the 

state adjutant general and the USP&DO were tried and convicted, long 

after they had been dismissed from the Guard. 18 

Not all investigations uncovered illegal practices. Some, after 

extensive probing, exonerated those involved of criminal intent but not 

of minor irregularities. A typical example was the Alabama National 

Guard investigation in 1938, generated by a GAO audit that found evidence of possible fraud in travel vouchers, food pmchases, and local 

contracting. The Office of The Inspector General referred the case to 

'

6 Rpt, Hunt to TIG, II Dec 36, sub: Investigation of the Office ofUSP&DO Officer, 

State of Connecticut; Rpt, Park to TIG, 27 Jul 38, sub: Investigation of Alleged 

Irregularities and Deficiencies in the Accounts of USP&DO of Ohio; Memo, Reed to 

TAG, 22 Nov 38. All in Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 17 Rpt, Wood to TIG, 16 Sep 37, sub: Special Investigation of Nebraska NG, Entry 

26C, RG 159, NARA. 

'" Rpt, Williams to TIG, 18 Apr 38, sub: Continuation of Speciallnvestigation of 

Nebraska NG, Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

439 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

the Fourth Corps Area JG, Col. Charles H. Patterson. Patterson assessed 

the problem to be a total disregard of regulations and procedures on the 

part of guardsmen and the USP&DO, such as using private cars for 

official travel without prior authorization and subsequently preparing 

the orders; paying for guardsmen's meals en route to summer camp and 

later fabricating receipts for reimbursement; and hiring workmen to 

repair unit buildings and then faking vouchers and contracts for reimbursement. All of these transactions were improper, but they were the 

result, not of criminal wrongdoing, but of uninformed guardsmen trying to get their mission done as best they could. Colonel Patterson successfully recommended that no criminal charges be made. Instead, the 

USP&DO received a letter of admonishment on proper finance procedures, and the state adjutant general began a program of education. The 

case was closed.

19 

Detween 1937 and J 938 the Comptroller Genera l's GAO teams had 

discovered major finance irregularities in eighteen states or territories. 

Embezzlement, nepotism, contract fraud, and a disregard of procedures 

were common, and probes into National Guard financial and property 

practices had begun in seven of the nine corps areas, most of them as a 

result of GAO audits. The biggest case of all was in the New York 

National Guard, which required the investigation of nearly I 00 guardsmen, former guardsmen, and regulars, as well as 200 civilian firms. 20 

By January 1937 two USP&DOs in New York had been relieved, 

having a collective liability for 66,000 questionable vouchers. 

Hundreds of civilian firms or individuals, some possibly fictitious, 

were identified as payees or witnesses to actions connected with 

improper payments. The General Accounting Office assigned eight 

investigators on a special task force in New York to continue the investigation. The magnitude of the situation and the extensive involvement 

of so many key state fiscal officials ultimately led to a blanket sus-

" Llr, Elliot to SofW, 16 May 38; Rpt, Patterson to T1G, 19 Scp 38, sub: 

Investigation of Alleged Irregularities in Payments Made by the USP&DO. State of 

Alabama. Both in Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 10 Llr, Boschem to CoiNG13, 3 Nov 38, sub: In re Comptroller General Letter to 

Secretary of War; Memo, Martin to TIG, 8 Mar 40, sub: Investigations Now Being 

Conducted in the Second Corps Area of Matters Presented to the War Department by 

the Comptroller General ... ; Memo, Martin to Peterson, II Mar 40; Memo, Reed to 

TAG, 19 Jan 39. sub: In re Accounts of M.A. Lee, J. Weston Myers, and W. A. Taylor. 

All in Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. Irregularities were uncovered in California, Florida, 

Indiana, Kentucky, Mi1mesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey. New York, North 

Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, R11ode lsland, Virginia, West Virginia, 

Wisconsin. and the Territory of llawaii. 

440 
GUARDSMEN AND CIVILIANS 

pension of their authority to certify and pay federal vouchers, a necessary action, but one that hindered the capabilities of the New York 

National Guard for nearly a year until new men could be appointed, 

trained, and bonded. 21 

A typical case involved units stationed in Brooklyn. In December 

1937 seven certifying officers and two USP&DOs were implicated in 

various fraudulent practices through which they had embezzled sums of 

money. Erroneous names were carried on civilian payrolls, and the 

salaries were pocketed by the certifying officer. Vouchers were furnished for automotive repairs and services that were never rendered, 

and monies received were diverted to unit association accounts for 

unofficial or state activities. Other vouchers were submitted for tailoring fees that were wholly fictitious, profits again going to the certifying officer. Overpayments were made for other clothing and shoe repair 

services and the difference split between the merchant and the military 

contractor. In some cases false purchase documents had been prepared 

for building materials never provided, resulting again in checks going 

into private profits. ln other cases contracts were given to relatives and 

friends of the certifying officer, instead of being opened properly for 

bids. This particular investigation, which lasted two months, required 

twenty-nine interviews and an elaborate tracing of the financial activities of four different regimental-sized units in Brooklyn. 22 

The collective effects of the New York investigations were felt 

throughout the country long before their completion. They led to a 

tightening ofNational Guard money accountabil ity and accompanying 

IG inspections. The result was an immediate, noticeable improvement. 

The objective of the intense IG involvement had been to provide a basis 

for corrective and disciplinary action and to gather requests for reimbursement or relief from liability from persons involved. Policy decisions had been made by the end of 1939 as to the means of reimbursement. The Comptroller General agreed to allow voluntary repayment 

from officers not guilty of criminal activity and special legislation 

relieved USP&DOs of liability. Several senior guardsmen had their 

careers terminated by withdrawal of federal recognition and elimination by state board. Despite pressures from the Chief of Staff to complete the investigations as quickly as possible, they continued into 

1941. By then the mobilization of the Guard and the statute of limita21 Ltr, Jordan to CG, 2d Corps Area, 18 Feb 37, sub: Investigation of Alleged 

Irregularities in Accounts of USP&DO, State of New York, Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA 

'' Rpt, Colvin to TIG, 3 Aug 38, sub: Investigation of Irregularities in Accounts of 

Former USP&DO's, Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

441 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

tions had obscured the issue to such an extent that all but a few cases 

were closed by December. 23 

Many inspectors were embarrassed by the fact that GAO personnel 

had uncovered the majority ofthe National Guard's problems. They recognized that the Inspector General's Department had not fully complied 

with the National Defense Act of 1 920 in so far as the Guard was concerned. As one inspector explained it, "The IGD has never begun to 

function with reference to the National Guard ... has fallen down on 

its job of keeping the Army honest." Partly at fault was the practice of 

desigl1ating special inspectors from corps area staffs to look at the 

Guard, instead of using detailed IGs. But responsibility of inspecting 

USP&DO accounts, a time-consuming task, had been transferred from 

the Office ofThe Inspector General to the corps area IGs only in 1935. 

More significant had been the lack of funding to support proper, allencompassing inspections. Only during the brief era of economic surveys had there been any pretense at thoroughness. The moderate 

approach of the Inspector General's Department was in sharp contrast 

to that of the General Accounting Office, which provided its investigators sufficient per diem for whatever period was necessary to make a 

thorough inquiry. In one case a GAO crew of four spent over five 

months investigating the accounts of one USP&DO. By comparison, IG 

inspections had been superficial and of very little benefit. Increased 

manpower and resources alone could improve the situat on. ~ 

In March 1938, in light ofthe ongoing GAO investigations, General 

Malin Craig, the Chief of Staff, ordered General Reed to make a detailed 

smvey of general conditions throughout the Guard. He wanted lo determine the condition of federal property under Guard control; to discover 

how deep the corruption went; and to appraise the IGD role in Guard 

inspections, with an eye to improving it. The Chief of Staff requested the 

services of his brother, Lt. Col. Louis A. Craig, then assigned as the 

Third Corps Area IG, to perform the sw·vey. The junior Craig, assisted 

by the OTIG expert accountant, Mr. Simmons, commenced the survey 

on I April. The Third Corps Area commander agreed to add Lt. Col. 

Roscoe C. Batson to Craig's team if the work became overwhelming.25 

23 Drart Llr, Peterson for TAG, 18 Feb 41 , sub: Investigation Regarding Irregular 

Vouchers and Questionable Transactions Reflected in the Accounts of Former 

USP&OO's for New York, Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

" Ltr, Logan to Reed, 17 May 37, Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

" Ltr, Reed to Lecocq, 5 Feb 38; Ltr, TAG to CG, 3d Corps Area, 8 Mar 38, sub: 

Survey of National Guard Disbursing and Property Functions With Particular Reference 

to Future Inspection Procedure; Memo, Martin to TAG, 21 Mar 38, sub: Irregularities in 

Accounts and Records of USP&OO's. All in Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

442 
GUARDSMEN AND C IVILIAN S 

The findings of Colonel Craig's team corroborated the evidence 

already gathered by others and confirmed the existing suspicions about 

the poor quality of IG oversight of the Guard. He, too, found Guard 

practices to be characterized by a disregard of regulations and procedures, resulting in the loss of accountability, diversion of funds, and 

criminal actions unearthed by the General Accounting Office. The 

basic cause for the situation, in his view, lay in the legal status of the 

National Guard, which lacked an effective chain of command under the 

War Department. Since the Guard usually was not in federal service, 

the Army leadership dealt with it through state officials by way of a 

"chain of cooperative communication." War Department control was 

largely theoretical. 

26 

The Regular Army instructors were War Department representatives, but the nature of their mission curtailed their effectiveness. Since 

their ability to function depended largely upon their acceptability to the 

Guard, "getting on" was a primary consideration, seen by many as likely to affect their future careers. Hence, they could not be expected to 

ferret out serious problems voluntarily. Another weak spot was the dual 

status of the Guard. One consequence was that some records and 

reports could be withheld from federal scrutiny; another was the confusion over the sources of its funds that had made accurate accow1ting 

so difficule7 

Colonel Craig acknowledged the failings of IG oversight as it had 

been practiced in the past. Inspections accomplished only a cursory 

review ofUSP&DO records, evaluating the bookkeeping for its administrative correctness rather than its substance. They were too limited in 

scope to be effective in identifying problems. The accuracy of the documentation was never questioned- for example, firms listed on vouchers seldom were verified to see if they and the recorded transactions 

were legitimate- and the routine approva l ofUSP&DO procedures, in 

effect, fostered the fraudulent practices. In sum, the Inspector General's 

Department had failed to carry out its responsibilities for inspecting the 

Guard and no other agency had stepped in to fi ll the vacuum. Colonel 

Craig concluded his report with a number of recommendations, including that the number of inspectors be increased by ten to allow more 

thorough inspections; that procedures be revised to reduce the emphasis on administrative form and give more attention to substance; and 

26 Rpt, L. Craig to TIG, 15 Aug 38, sub: Survey of National Guard and Property 

Functions With Particular Reference to Future Inspection Procedure, Entry 26C, RG 

159, NARA. 

" Ibid. 

443 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

that the Inspector General's and Finance Departments coordinate with 

the Treasury Department and the General Accounting Office to simplify numerous procedurcs. 28 

Based on Colonel Craig's findings, General Reed in October 1938 

requested the additional manpower, which was approved. Concurrently, 

the Nationa l Guard Bureau released sufficient monies to launch the 

increased inspections immediately and also took action to fund in 

future budgets the travel of the ten new inspectors. The new system was 

in place by the spring of 1939. In May General Blanding informed the 

state adjutants genera l of the changes, praising the Inspector General's 

Department for taking the "broad view" in helping the Guard get back 

on the track as a component of the Army. At the same time, General 

Craig notified the corps area commanders that by the end of the year an 

extra officer would be assigned to their headquarters, specifically to 

inspect National Guard activities.

2

g 

Meanwhile, the Office of The Inspector General began to prepare 

new inspection guides, to revise others, and to develop a training program 

for the ten new inspectors. The first such class was scheduled in June 

1939, with the goal of having all the inspectors in the field by the end of 

July. National Guard inspections had to be made by the corps area lOs 

under the general supervision of their commander. But the old practice of 

allowing the local inspector-instructors to inspect armories while the 1Gs 

restricted themselves to a brief review of the USP&DOs' books came to 

an end. Annual inspections of the property records were now required, in 

conjunction with the biennial money account inspections. Despite many 

problems with costs, manpower, training, and clerical support, the new 

policies tightened central control and brought closure to the era of scandals that had damaged the reputations of the Guard and the Army. 10 

The Army and the CCC 

Perhaps the largest and most burdensome of the I GO's postwar duties 

involved the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), an organization con1

$ Ibid. 

:. Llr, Adams to TIG, 6 Oct 38, sub: Inspections of the National Guard, and Reply, 10 

Oct 38; Memo, Blanding to TIG, 17 Oct 38, sub: Allotment of Funds, Fiscal Year 1940, 

Covering Travel and Per Diem ofTen Additional Inspectors for National Guard Activities; 

Ltr (quoted words), Blanding to State AGs, 27 May 39, sub: Inspection of the National 

Guard; Llr, M. Craig to Corps Areas Cdrs, 18 May 39. All in Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

,. Ltr, M. Craig to Corps Area Cdrs, 18 May 39; Ltr, Blanding to CG, I lawaiian 

Dept, 23 Scp 39, sub: AnrlUal Armory Inspections of the Nat ional Guard. Both in Entry 

26C, RG I 59, NARA. 

444 
GUARDSMEN AND CIVILIANS 

ceived by President Roosevelt for relieving the effects of the 

Depression by both promoting conservation and providing jobs for the 

unemployed. When he entered office in March 1933, Roosevelt directed the Secretaries of War, Labor, Interior and Agriculture to develop the 

mechanics for creating such an organization and to identify feasible 

projects for it to perform. The secretaries recommended that the 

Civilian Conservation Corps should be a distinct agency, focused on 

conservation projects that would not compete in any way with private 

industry or other government activities. Its primary mission was to 

ameliorate the unemployment situation among young men. The concept 

was generally well received, although some labor elements feared 

potential competition witb its workers, and a few persons objected to 

another aspect of the scheme-the proposed involvement of the Army. 31 

On 31 March Congress passed the necessary legislation, specifying 

that the Civilian Conservation Corps should carry out useful public 

works, such as reforestation and flood control projects on federal and 

state lands. Congress also authorized the President to not only provide 

for the shelter, transport, and well-being of the persons hired to do the 

work but also to draw on the assets of any federal department or agency 

as necessary. On 5 April Robert Fechner, the vice-president of the 

American Federation of Labor, was named as the head of the Civilian 

Conservation Corps, with the title Director of Emergency Conservation 

Work. To support Fechner, the CCC Advisory Council was created and 

the Secretaries of War, Agriculture, Interior, and Labor were directed to 

appoint representatives. A former IG, Colonel Major, now a General 

Staff operations officer with many special projects to his credit, was 

selected to represent the War Department. He recognized early that the 

CCC's training benefits to the Army were greater than its drawbacks. 

The CCC program grew rapidly, thanks largely to Major's efforts.32 

As first planned, the support provided by the Army to the program 

was to be extremely limited. Labor Department representatives were to 

select and hire the young men, who then were to be turned over to War 

Department personnel for administration and initial processing. The 

men were enrolled through the Army's recruiting organization and 

31 Erna Risch, Quartermaster Support of the Army: A fli.l·toJy of the Corps, 

1775- 1939 (WashingtOJl, D.C.: Quartermaster Historian's Office, Office of the 

Quartermaster General, 1962), pp. 728- 29; John A. Sa lmond, The Civilian 

Conservation C01ps, 1933- 42: A New Deal Case Study (Chapel Hill: University of 

North Carolina, 1967), pp. 1.1- 14 (hereafter cited as CCC). 

JJ Salmond, CCC, p. 45; John W. Killigrew, "The Impact of the Great Depression on 

the Army, 1929- 1936" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1960), ch. 13, p. 32. 

445 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

transported to so-called reconditioning camps, which functioned like 

reception or replacement centers. There they were equipped and given 

some physical conditioning before being shipped to the work sites 

under the supervision of the Agriculture and Interior Departments. At 

that point, the Army's involvement was to end. In this way the first 

camp opened near Luray, Virginia, on 17 April.33 

lnitially, the Labor, Agriculture, and Interior Departments had been 

confident that they had the resources to develop and operate the work 

camps. Even before the first camp opened, however, the scale of the 

operations demanded by the President made it apparent they had undertaken an impossible task. The Chief Forester, Robert Y. Stuart, recommended that the Army assume the responsibility for building and 

equipping the camps and administering them. The technicians of the 

other departments would continue to select and supervise the work projects, and hence would also determine the work sites. The Army, however, had the right to veto any particular site. 

Despite the misgivings of many A.lmy and civilian leaders, the proposal had many good points. The Army was the only organization in the 

country with the ability to enroll the number of CCC men desired by the 

President at the speed he demanded, and the method proposed by the 

Chief Forester allowed the War Department to avoid the political pressures that would inevitably develop around decisions on where to locate 

projects. Although General Drum, now the Deputy Chief of Staff, wished 

to avoid embroiling the Army in routine CCC activities, an expanded role 

for the Army represented the best and cheapest solution. On I 0 April the 

President thus enlarged the Army's mission to full responsibility for CCC 

camp operations under the general supervision of Director Fcchner.34 

Suddenly, the Army thus became responsible for everything to do 

with camp administration, supply, welfare, sanitation, and health care. 

Only the actual work projects would be under the technical representatives of the other federal agencies. When the President specified that 

the program absorb a total of 250,000 men by July, every available 

Army officer had to be diverted to the task. Service schools staged 

early graduations, and many faculty, incoming students, and officers 

detailed to the civilian components were diverted from their prjmary 

duties to CCC camp dutics.Js 

In order to achieve Roosevelt's goals, standard contracting procedures had to be waived and wide authority over movement and disci11 WD Prov Reg, 1933, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA; Salmond, CCC, p. 3 1. 

"Salmond, CCC, pp. 26, 30, 40-41. 

" Ibid., pp. 40-41. 

446 
GUARDSMEN A N D C IVILIAN S 

pline given to local commanders. On the average, the Army processed 

8,450 enrollees daily during May, June, and early July, a greater flow of 

men than during World War I. Over I ,300 camps were quickly established, and by 7 July a total of274,375 men had been brought into the 

Civilian Conservation Corps. 

36 

The effects of this rapid growth were reflected in the experiences of 

two representative posts. Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, had a permanent party of roughly J ,200, but processed 12,000 enrollees during the 

initial surge. The maximum number of CCC men on post at one time 

was 9,274 on 12 June. Six tent camps had to be prepared and hasty 

arrangements made to provide sewage and sanitary systems. The post 

commander, Col. Walter Krueger, won praise from an IG for his skill in 

gaining the willing cooperation of the selectees and the support of local 

politicians and the public. The garrison at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, 

processed 18,000 enrollees and provided cadre for 78 CCC companies. 

Then, like many others, it was confronted soon with the second CCC 

cycle. In October 4,200 of the enrollees who chose not to re-enroll for 

a second six months were processed and discharged. At the same time, 

1 2,000 new men for the second increment were brought aboard, taxing 

the facilities of the post and the ingenuity of the cadre to the maximum 

to care for the new men while maintaining proper discipline. By early 

November 50,000 CCC men had been processed at Fort Sheridan- a 

situation that was typical of the Army as a whole. 37 

Yet this drastic reallocation of manpower proved insufficient to 

meet CCC needs. Furthermore, it could not be sustained indefinitely. 

General Preston pointed out that siphoning away so many leaders from 

the Regular Army made the service incapable of carrying out any other 

major mission. Recognizing the problem, the President in June 1933 

authorized the call-up of I ,500 reserve officers. In September, when 

many of the regulars returned to their primary duties, another 4,400 

officers had to be found for the Civilian Conservation Corps. Hence, as 

regulars were phased out, more reservists were brought in, especia lly 

reserve medical officers and chaplains. By October, when the transition 

"' Ibid., p. 32; Killigrew, ''Great Depression," Ph.D. diss., eh. 12, pp. 7- 10; Charles 

W. Johnson, "The Civilian Conservation Corps: The Role of the Army," (Ph.D. diss., 

University of Michigan, 1968). pp. 93- 94 (hereafter cited as "CCC"); U.S. War 

Department, Annual Report of the Chief of Staff. United States Army, 1933 

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1933), pp. 3- 5 (hereafter cited as 

ARCS). 

)J Rpt, Dwan to CG, 6th Corps Area, 29 Nov 33, sub: Annual Inspection of Fort 

Sheridan; Rpt, Dawn to CG, 6th Corps Area, 28 Nov 33, sub: Annual Inspection of 

Jefferson Barracks. Both in Entry II, RG 159, NARA. 

447 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

was substantially complete, only one regular was left on duty with each 

CCC company and one at each district headquarters. In time, even more 

reservists would be called up, allowing nearly all of the regulars to 

return to their primary duties. As incidental benefits, the call-up 

allowed a partial test of mobilization procedures to be made, while giving the reserve officers valuable experience on extended active duty. 

Indeed, the training opportunity was so good that the Army soon 

restricted CCC positions to officers in the active reserve, excluding 

those who were retired or on disability.3

R 

General MacArthur, the Chief of Staff, welcomed the leadership 

opportunities and administrative challenges represented by the Civilian 

Conservation Corps. However, he cautioned that the program threatened national security in the short term by diverting leaders from their 

units, by making demands on stockpiles, and by forcing reductions in 

individual and unit train ing. Hence, to offset at least some of its deleterious effects, he decided on a decentralized approach to managing CCC 

operations by allowing local commanders the greatest possible flexibility. The corps area commanders were encouraged to "determine for 

themselves appropriate action in the problems that arise" and "whenever necessary to act contrary to War Department instructions or regulations." Each commander was to "follow unhesitatingly the dictates of 

his own judgement," while keeping the War Department informed to 

prevent controversy and confusion. The commanders were told to use 

whatever facilities they needed, but were cautioned not to give military 

training other than physical exercises and games because the enrollees 

were civilians, subject only to moral suasion and dismissal if they violated discipline. Liaison representatives from each of the other federal 

departments concerned were attached to each corps area headquarters 

to provide advice and to assist in camp site selection and assigmnent.39 

Organization below corps area was equally flexible. Ordinarily, a 

number of companies assigned to camps would be grouped in a district 

embracing one or more states. The companies were approximately 200 

strong and were staffed during the mobilization phase with one regular 

officer, three reserve officers, and four enlisted men (first sergeant, 

" Ltr, TAG to Comdts, Svc Schools, 14 May 33, Entry 26; Ltr, AG, 9th Corps Area, to 

All CCC Dist Cdrs, 28 Jul 33, Entry 26; Memo, TAG to All Corps Area Cdrs, 19 Apr 33, 

sub: Civilian Conservation Corps, Entry 26: Preston Annual Rpt, FY 1933, Entry 268. All 

in RG 159, NARA. Sec also Killigrcw, "Great Depression," Ph.D. diss., ch. 12, pp. 23- 24, 

and ch. 13, pp. I, 5, 7; Salmond, CCC, p. 58; and Johnson, "CCC," Ph.D. diss., pp. 63, 68. 

)< Killigrew, "Great Depression," Ph.D. diss., ch. 12, pp. 16 17, 20; ARCS, 1933, pp. 

6 10 (quotations on p. 6): WD Prov Reg, 1933, Entry I I, RG 159, NARA. 

448 
GUARDSMEN AND CIVILIANS 

Sawhill CCC Camp, Tofte, Minnesota. August 1933 

supply sergeant, mess sergeant, and first cook). Districts sometimes 

were divided into subdistricts to handle a large number of units. In 

either case, the intermediate commands normally were headquartered 

at an Army post close to the sources of supply and other support.~0 

The district or subdistrict commanders had a small staff consisting 

of an executive officer, adjutant, chaplain, and surgeon. These headquarters were to interpret and channel the directives coming from 

Director Fechner and the corps area headquarters. The company camps, 

after the mobilization period, eventually were under the command of a 

captain or senior lieutenant, with a junior officer assistant. A camp 

commander's tour was six months, but it could be extended if both he 

and his superior at district headquarters mutually agreed. The commander was responsible for camp operations and administration and the 

morale and welfare of the enrollees. In this latter category, an extensive 

program was developed under the general supervision of The Adjutant 

General. It included corps-wide ath letic programs, camp libraries, and 

post exchanges, all of which over time entailed considerable expenses. 

The captain's authority was broad, to include issuing dishonorable discharges to emollees who failed to measure up. The junior officers normally supervised camp logistics, such as pay, transport, and rations, and 

a medical officer was assigned for every two or three camps.

4 1 

Nearly three quarters of the CCC camps were engaged in 

Agricultw·e Department projects, the majority of which were under the 

auspices of the U.S. Forest Service. Much of their work came under the 

"" Memo, TAG to All Corps Area Cdrs, 19 Apr 33, sub: CCC; CCC Cir 5, 29 May 

33. Both in Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. See also Salmond, CCC, p. 84. 

•• Ltr, TAG to CGs and CofAnns/Svcs, 18 May 33, sub: Religious Ministration for 

Civilian Conservation Corps, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

449 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

category of forest protection and improvement, the most spectacular 

duty being fire fighting. Insect and disease prevention was another 

major project. Forest improvement involved building trails, cabins, and 

shelters, as well as clearing land, building dams, and carrying out reforestation-considered to be the most important function, planting millions of young trees and reclaiming mi II ions of acres. In addition, grazing land and soil conservation projects were undertaken, along with 

some wildlife management. CCC camps also supported the Tennessee 

Valley Authority and the National Park Service, while other CCC units 

fought underground coal mine fires in Wyoming and worked on large 

flood-control projects for the Army Corps of Engineers in Vermont and 

NewYork."2 

The advent of the Civilian Conservation Corps posed numerous 

practical problems for the Army. One of the first was the effect on soldier morale due to pay discrepancies; CCC men drew $30 a month, 

while privates who trained them made but $18. Although War 

Department policy called for only senior NCOs to be assigned, this 

was often impossible, and the higher pay of CCC men caused General 

MacArthur to press for the return of detailed enlisted personnel even 

more quickly than officers. Fortunately, most soldiers were philosophical about the situation. When the local CCC camp was being 

established at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, the inspector reported 

that the soldiers performed their work "cheerfully and efficiently" 

and that their morale was high. Yet he expressed some concern about 

the effect on readiness. Regulars were diverted from their training, 

and reserve summer training had to be curtailed drastically because of 

the diversion of personnel, facilities, and resources to the Civilian 

Conservation Corps. 4

J 

The ill-defined relationship between the Army and Fechner's office 

caused some tensions and at times impeded operations. Fechner coordinated the efforts of the various executive departments involved in 

aspects of the Civilian Conservation Corps. His office staff consisted of 

a deputy, James J. McEntee; a legal assistant, Charles H. Taylor; and a 

publicity assistant, Guy D. McKinney. The office itself was divided into 

four sections: Statistical, Information, Safety, and Investigation and 

Correspondence. The latter section prepared inspection schedules, 

reviewed reports, and answered general inquiries for CCC inspectors. 

•

1 Salmond, CCC, pp. I 21 23. 

•J Killigrew, "Great Depression," Ph.D. cliss., ch. 13, p. 7; Rpt (quoted words), Logan 

to TIG, 26 Apr 33, sub: Annual General Inspection of Medical Field Service School, 

Carlisle Barracks, Pa., Entry I I, RG I 59, NARA. 

450 
GUARDSMEN AND C IVILIANS 

Problems soon developed with The Inspector General over the role of 

the CCC inspectors.~~ 

The involvement of so many executive departments in CCC operations made it difficult for Fechner to assert his influence over the corps. 

He hoped to expand his authority by creating his own inspection service, believing that he could not manage effectively if he relied only on 

the weekly reports given him by the Army. Perceiving a need for his 

own independent sources, Fechner appointed three inspectors and 

instructed them to report only to him. The corps area commanders and 

General Preston, however, were disturbed by his action, which 

encroached on their own prerogatives and responsibilities. The War 

Department found that it could forestall use of the civilian inspectors 

by keeping Fechner fully informed. Since this was the director's objective all along, the arrangement proved to be mutually satisfactory.45 

This cordial working arrangement was not without its upsets. On 

two occasions in 1937 Fechner clashed with the War Department over 

issues directly or indirectly involving IGD interests. That year, the education of enrollees was added to the CCC's basic mission of unemployment relief and conservation. Fechner wanted to place control of the 

new program in his office, reducing the War Department's involvement 

correspondingly. Army leaders rejected the plan, believing that it would 

intrude too greatly into the camp commanders' administrative responsibilities. A confrontation was averted when inspectors noted that the 

transfer of funds necessary to run an education program could not be 

made under the existing appropriation. Hence, supervision of the new 

program remained firmly under Army control:'

6 

A more serious disagreement occurred over the issue of rotating 

Army officers. By 1937 the leadership training value of a camp tour 

was fully recognized, and the War Department wished to spread the 

benefit by replacing all officers who had been on the job eighteen 

months or longer, limiting subsequent tours to no more than twelve 

months. The new policy was put into effect over the objections of 

many ofthe incumbent reservists, as well as members of the corps area 

staffs. A former inspector, Col. Joseph A. Baer, now the Third Corps 

Area chief of staff, warned the Office of The Inspector Genera l to 

expect a barrage of complaints as the program was carried out. 

Director Fechner strenuously objected to the policy, on the principle 

that it was foolish to tinker with a working system and unfair to the 

'" Salmond, CCC, pp. 71- 72. 

" Johnson, "CCC," Ph.D. diss., pp. 34-35 . 

... Ibid., p. 110; Salmond, CCC, pp. 162 63. 

45 1 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

officers affected, and went directly to President Roosevelt in an 

attempt to have it reversed.47 

This action in turn upset the War Department, where officials 

believed that Fechner was trying to influence an interna l departmental policy. The director heightened the confrontation further by criticizing aspects of the Army's CCC disbursement. He objected to the 

fact that only IGs inspected the accounts and asked that his inspectors be allowed to do the same. His proposals were rebuffed strongly 

by Assistant Secretary of War Louis A. Johnson, who referred the 

matter to the standing CCC Advisory Council. The council defused 

the issue, particularly when it became apparent that the President 

strongly supported the Army's view. The Chief of Staff, General 

Craig, restored more cordial relations by assuring Fechner that 

henceforth he would be advised on personnel changes in the CCC 

system.~8 

CCC Special Investigations 

The concern over the effect of the Army's CCC responsibilities on 

defense capabilities was shared by the Chief of Staff and by many 

other high-ranking officers. General Preston predicted that training 

levels would decline to dangerous levels, and morale and discipline 

would falter after the novelty and excitement of the enrollment passed. 

The reserve call-up and General MacArthur's decision to press for the 

earliest possible release of enlisted men from the CCC camps in part 

reflected such worries. In June 1933 MacArthur's deputy, General 

Drum, asked Preston to prepare a detailed overview of the operation to 

document the effect on readiness and counter any future criticism of 

the Army. 49 

As a result, General Preston developed an inspection plan designed 

to gather the broadest amount of information with the least inconvenience to the commanders in the field. The inspections were to be informal, based on the belief that " personal interviews between officers of 

this office and the nine corps area commanders and members of their 

staffs, in addition to visits to important army posts," would provide the 

data needed. Their objective was to gauge "the effect the usc of regular 

., Johnson, "CCC," Ph.D. diss., p. 70. 

•• Salmond, CCC, pp. 172 74 . 

... Johnson, "CCC," Ph.D. diss., p. 14; Memo, Preston to Drum, I Jul 33, sub: 

Submitted as a Result of a Recent Verbal Interview Relative to CCC Activities, Entry 

26A, RG 159, NARA. 

452 
GuARDSMEN AND CIVILIANS 

officers for CCC work has had on the efficiency of the army." General 

MacArthur approved the plan on 5 July.

50 

Preparations for the inspections were unusually thorough. The 

inspectors were instructed to ensure that corps area leaders understood 

their objectives and the need for reliable data. They were to pay particular attention to deficiencies in training and maintenance caused by the 

creation of the CCC cadre. Elaborate guides and questionnaires were 

prepared for the use of IGs and unit commanders. Corps area commanders learned of the program through confidential letters, in which 

they were asked to nominate the CCC camps for unannounced inspections. They also were told that the inspections would require discussions with most senior corps officials. These letters were accompanied 

by lists of questions, to be answered by the corps and post commanders 

and returned to the Office ofThe Inspector General before the visits. 

Among the queries were requests for precise listings by branch of personnel detailed to CCC activities, the types of camps, and the effect of 

cadre work on normal activities.5

' 

A five-man OTIG team conducted the actual inspections between 

18 July and 18 August. After visiting each corps area headquarters, the 

IGs fanned out to visit the posts and depots that had been most directly affected by the CCC call-up. They also inspected a number of CCC 

district and subdistrict headquarters and visited eight-four company 

camps. Commanders and staff officers were interviewed at each location, as were Forest and Park Service representatives and many 

enrollees. On 21 August General Preston convened a meeting to discuss 

the inspection findings with representatives of all War Department elements involved in the CCC mission. 52 

The IGs reported that the program was running well and that the 

performance of units and personnel had been good. Relationships with 

the forestry, park, and agricultural services responsible for enrollee 

work were, for the most part, harmonious. The most sensitive issue 

raised by the civilian representatives was the question of how many 

50 Memo (quotations), Preston to Drum, I Jul 33; Memo, Drum to TIG, 3 Jul 33, sub: 

Inspection and Report on CCC. Both in Entry 26A, RG 159, NARA. 

" Memo, Browning to Preston, 17 Jul 33, sub: Confidential Instructions to 

Inspectors General Who Inspect Civilian Conservation Corps Activities; Ltr, TAG to 

CGs, Corps Areas, 13 Jul 33, sub: lnspection, Civi lian Conservation Corps. Both in 

EntTy 26A, RG 159, NARA. 

sl Marcellus G. Spinks, "Major Problems of the Inspector General, AEF, and Their 

Solution" (Lectme delivered at G- 1 Course No. 5, Army War College, Washington, 

D.C., 9 Oct 33), in Army War College Curriculum Papers, U.S. Army Military History 

Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 

453 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

men were needed for camp overhead. The Forest Service especially 

complained that camp commanders were holding too many men for 

maintenance, mess duties, and similar work, and in some cases the 

complaint was valid. Already aware of the problem, they sought to 

resolve this and similar issues through compromise. Jn time, as routines 

and procedures became established, such issues disappeared. However, 

the !Gs warned of similar problems in the future, when construction of 

side camps or new main camps became necessary.s

3 

The inspectors credited the Army's success in the early phases of 

the CCC operation to General MacArthur's policy of decentralizing 

responsibility to the corps area level. The corps areas had adopted a district system, based on Army posts that served as supply bases for the 

camps. In all but the Sixth Corps Area, the districts provided command, 

control, and administration. The Sixth Corps Area commander retained 

command of all camps, using the districts to coordinate camp activities. 

In some areas where Army posts were few, districts had to be estab1 ished to function like post headquarters; offices and warehouses in 

these cases often were either rented or borrowed from the state or 

municipality. Districts away from established posts were forced to use 

larger numbers of enrollees for housekeeping duties, in the process 

causing some of the friction that had developed with user agencies. 

Many of the first CCC camps had been commanded by Regular 

Army field-grade officers. Around the time ofthe inspections company-grade officers had replaced them, and reservists were appearing in 

growing numbers. By midsummer most of the Regular Army enlisted 

men were returning to their units, to be replaced by enrollees who had 

shown they could perform supervisory functions in supply, mess duties, 

and so forth. The inspectors found the camps to be in good condition, 

considering their origins. Most had begun as tent camps, where administrative buildings and sanitary facilities were constructed first, followed by barracks. Many camp commanders expressed great pride in 

the speed with which they had improved conditions at their camps. By 

August most had such basic amenities as electricity and running water; 

a few already boasted hard-surfaced roads and railways, built with 

enrollee labor. Despite the necessary stress on camp development, 

some enrollees had begun work in forestry and other projects within a 

few days of arriving. Camp staffs, including every maintenance and 

support worker from orderly room clerks to KPs, formed only about 15 

s, Information in this and subsequent paragraphs based on Ltr, Preston to TAG, 8 

Sep 33, sub: Inspection of Conservation Corps Activities of the War Department and 

the Army, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

454 
GUARDSMEN AND C IVILIANS 

percent of the total camp population, and the inspectors suggested that 

the size of the staff should continue to be resolved locally between 

commanders and their civilian counterparts. 

Everyone the inspectors talked with agreed that the CCC mobilization had been a satisfying professional challenge. Mobilization principles had been tested and many junior officers had been given unprecedented opportunities to develop their leadership and initiative. The success of the rapid CCC buildup was the result of an intense effort on the 

part of the Army personnel involved. Many officers and men had 

worked all day, seven days a week, to fulfill their mission. 

Inspectors verified, however, that the focus on the Civilian 

Conservation Corps had affected Regular Army training adversely. The 

proportion of officers engaged directly or inctirectly in CCC activities 

ranged from 69 percent in the Second Corps Area to 49 percent in the 

Eighth Corps Area. Similar statistics prevailed for warrant officers and 

enlisted men. The prime determinant was the number of camps and 

enrollees, which ranged from a high of 379 camps and nearly 91,000 

enrollees in the Ninth Corps Area to a low of 66 camps and 7,200 

enrollees in the Second Corps Area. The high number of reconditioning camps in the Second Corps Area accounted for the large number of 

cadre required there. 

The diversion of so many seasoned Army officers to CCC duty 

had impaired the effectiveness of their units. Even more important, the 

process threatened to reduce the quality of recruit training, extending 

discipline and training problems well into the future. Tactical training 

had virtually ceased, while practice in individual combat skills had 

lapsed. The problem was, not so much a lack of funds, but the inexperience of those left behind to plan and conduct such exercises. 

Although discipline and morale were high, the potential for future difficulties loomed large the longer experienced leaders were kept away 

from their units. 

Readiness seemed to be seriously impaired in other ways as well. 

The IGs found that 139 officers not on CCC duty were commanding 

two or more units and that five commanded five units each. The 

supranorma1 taskings being placed on these officers, as well as the 

consumption of the war-reserve stocks of clothing, tentage, and personal equipment, were of great concern to senior commanders. In 

addition, because of the demands and distractions imposed by the 

CCC enrollment, they could not devote adequate time to training and 

policy matters. Hence, training camps for reserve and Guard forces 

had to be canceled or reduced in scope. As a result, the Army's combat readiness inevitably dec! ined even as the demands of CCC duties, 

455 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-193 9 

with their long family separations and extra personal expenses, 

adversely affected morale. ~ 

The IGs also reported in depth on health and sanitation issues, 

especially the effect of the Civilian Conservation Corps on the medical 

care given to Regular Army personnel and their families. They successfully recommended contracting with local civilian physicians to 

care for the CCC enrollees during the absence of Army doctors. Nearly 

all dental service was provided in similar fashion. Two enrollees for 

each camp were given first aid training at the conditioning centers, further easing the burden, while arrangements were made with local hospitals to provide long-term care to camp personnel. Although inspectors 

considered the payment procedures for hospitals to be unnecessarily 

cumbersome, they had no real way of persuading the civilian faci lities 

to adopt military methods.

55 

The IGs found that in most cases sufficient equipment had been 

issued to the CCC work companies prior to moving to the ir campsites. 

Inevitably, however, some shortages developed, which were either 

relieved through local purchase or by express shipments from distant 

depots. The situation became particularly acute at Fort Knox, Kentucky, 

where quantities of ration items had to be purchased locally to meet the 

demand created by the processing of32,000 men. Complaints were universa l about footwear and the quality of field cooking ranges. 

Inspectors offered various solutions, but in practice the problems usually faded once the decaying World War I stocks had been consumed 

and new issues could be made.56 

Despite these and other teclmical and administrative problems, the 

TGs concluded that enrollee morale was high and that civilians genera lly admired the Army for its CCC rol e. Few major complaints were 

encountered. Cooperation with local communities was judged excellent. The only point of potential friction, they believed, might arise 

from the assignment of all-black work companies. The IGs suggested 

that racial friction be avoided by assigning the black units to duties on 

Army posts, wherever possible.57 

In the late summer of 1934 a second inspection cycle on the same 

scale as the first was under way, with OTIG officers following up on 

" Reliance on ibid. ends here. 

u Ltr, Preston to TAG, 12 Sep 33, sub: Data Concerning CCC Activities Within 

Several Corps Areas, Entry 26, RG 159, NARA. 

«· Rpt·, Allin to TIG, 3 1 Aug 33, sub: Inspections of CCC Activities, 5th, 6th and 7th 

Corps Areas, Entry 26. RG 159, NARA. 11 Ibid. 

456 
GUARDSMEN AND CIVILIANS 

their earlier findings. The adverse effects of the Civilian Conservation 

Corps on Army readiness were still apparent, along with some consequences that had not been discerned the year before. The underlying 

problem had not changed, namely, the large numbers of Army personnel on CCC duty, which was especially critical in line units at the smaller garrisons. Despite the increasing numbers of reservists called up to 

free the regulars, it was not uncommon to f ind 1933 West Point graduates commanding CCC work companies while first lieutenants were 

leading Regular Army battalions. Many officers continued to perform 

multiple major duties, and the IGs reported that the strain was beginning to tell. Unit efficiency continued to be impaired by the absence of 

NCOs. As noted earlier, the result was a steady decline in tactical training and an erosion of discipline and morale. The most evident practical 

effect of the Civilian Conservation Corps, however, was a sharp decline 

in reenlistments. Too many $18-a-month soldiers were leaving the 

Army to become $30-a-month CCC men. 58 

Because of the CCC's high priority for services, support to not only 

active-duty elements but also soldiers and dependents suffered as well. 

Motor transportation and maintenance operations were devoted almost 

exclusively to CCC support. Consequently, tactical vehicles deteriorated, and many of the World War I- vintage trucks in CCC service were 

abused past the point of retention. With Army hospitals and dental clinics operating far beyond their capacities, soldiers and their families 

became victims of a strained medical system, which was extremely 

demoralizing. A large percentage of soldiers experienced serious financial crises, resulting from the combination of pay cuts and the costs of 

CCC temporary duty, which lowered morale even further. The reduction in services extended to depot operations, where regular requisitions had been deferred sometimes for as long as a year while the installations coped with CCC requirements. The IGs considered the Army to 

be sound, but straining under the many demands placed on it. This 

report, along with the growing size of the Civilian Conservation Corps, 

led to increased reserve call-ups. By the end of 1935 the personnel crisis was over, and the Army settled into a more balanced routine.

59 

The IGD and the CCC 

The CCC mobilization added new duties to the IGD's work load that 

went well beyond the major inspections, although no strength increas-

~s Memo, Moses to TlG, 24 Dec 34, and Reply, 2 Jan 35, Entry 26A, RG 159, NARA. 

j • Ibid. 

457 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

es were authorized in the Office ofThe Inspector General or elsewhere 

in the inspectorate. Part of the work derived from the speed demanded 

by the President, which assured that confusion would develop and that 

complaints would be heard from many quarters. 

At first, all complaints were channeled to the War Department, 

where they were waived or held by the Office ofThe Inspector General 

until the mobilization surge had ended. This policy was intended to 

minimize distraction in the corps areas during the critical initial phases 

of the operation. Problems were dealt with as informally as possible; 

action officers contacted one another personally or by telephone; and 

paperwork was discouraged. The Chief of Staff required that a ll CCCrelated questions be answered within forty-eight hours, and his staff 

issued a daily bulletin of decisions to keep everyone informed. Most of 

the conflicts that developed between the Army and the other involved 

federal departments were resolved in the corps areas, in keeping with 

the policy of decentralization.w 

Many complaints dealt with money matters. Indeed, fisca l oversight proved to be a demanding task. The Army had close financial connections with the Civilian Conservation Corps because the Chief of 

Finance had been designated as its fiscal officer and as the Director of 

Emergency Conservation Expenditures. Army officers also acted as 

CCC disbursing officials. In this capacity they were subject to IG 

inspections on the same basis and fi·cquency as those disbursing Army 

funds, even though most of the money came from Interior or Labor 

Department sources. For this reason, in May 1933 General Preston 

directed Major Parkinson, now OTIG's Money Accounts Division 

chief, to become the office expert on CCC finances.6

' 

The relaxed procurement procedures intended to speed the mobilization process gave birth to a number of financial complaints and 

investigations. A five-cent error in the hourly rate for hiring trucks in 

the Shenandoah National Park led to one of the more extended 

inquiries, on which Col. Jesse D. Elliot spent nearly six months in 

1937- 38. The homly rate in question turned out to have been a clerica l 

error. But in the course of his review of four years of back vouchers, 

Elliot discovered thirteen that were fraudulent. Comparison of the 

vouchers with canceled checks revealed irregularities by one of the disbursers at the Army's regional finance office in Washington. When con-

.,. Killigrcw, "Great Depression;• Ph.D. diss., ch. 12, pp. 20-22, and ch. 13, p. 14. 

•• Ltr, SotW to Sofl, 8 Nov 33, EntTy 26; CCC Cir I, 27 Apr 33, Entry 26; Memo, 

Humber to Parkinson, 18 May 33, Entry 26A; Memo, TAG to CofFin, FD, 13 Jul 33, 

Entry 26A; Ltr, Humber to Helmick, 25 Jun 34, Entry 26A. All in RG 159, NARA. 

458 
GUARDSMEN AND CIVILIANS 

fronted with the evidence, the employee confessed to having forged 

vouchers since early 1934. The case proved that proper oversight of 

operations and internal review systems were lacking. As a result, the 

office was restructured and the officers responsible were admonished 

and ordered to make restitution. The investigation had required a 

painstaking review of contracts, vouchers, and procedures at numerous 

Army and civilian locations, growing in the process from a trifling 

issue to a fairly serious mattcr.62 

One of the largest CCC fraud cases involved Reno E. Stitely, an 

Interior Department employee who routinely submitted fraudulent payrolls along with the legitimate ones that he collected as part of his job 

from Army disbursing officers. The fraudulent payrolls were so small 

in comparison to the others that they had escaped notice for some period of time. Then, in Stitely's absence on one occasion, an assistant 

turned in the regular payroll by itself. After checking with the assistant, 

it became clear that no separate small payroll existed. Subsequent 

investigation by fnterior Department and IGD officials showed that 

Stitely had pocketed nearly $60,000 through his scheme. The Office of 

The fnspector General had become involved only at the request of the 

Chief of Finance, who feared that the Army disbursing officers might 

incur a liability for reimbursement. The IG investigator concluded that 

the finance officers had not established any suitable internal mechanisms against such fraud. A listing of all eligible payrolls, for example, 

would have shown something amiss, while a review of canceled checks 

could have been a backup. Stitely was h·icd and convicted, and two concerned finance officers were admonished.63 

A collateral problem surfaced when Secretary of the Interior 

Harold L. Ickes asked for a copy of the IG investigation. Copies already 

had been given to the U.S. Attorney General for the District of 

Columbia and to the Comptroller General. Despite this, Ickes was 

turned down with a routine reply about the need to keep IG records confidential. Angry, Ickes personally pointed out to Secretary of War 

Harry H. Woodring that his investigators had willingly shared their 

work with the IGs, and he threatened to raise the issue with the 

President. The year-long Army IG investigation, he noted, appeared to 

fJ Killigrew, "Great Depression," Ph.D. diss., ch. 12, p. 20; Rpt, Elliot to TIG, 13 Apr 

38, sub: Investigation Covering Alleged lrregularities in the Army Finance Office, 

Washington, D.C., Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA . 

., Rpt, El liot to TIG, 13 Jut 38, sub: Investigation of Alleged Irregularities by the 

Finance Office, U.S. Army, in Paying Certain Vouchers of the National Park Service, 

Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 

459 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

lack any sense of immediacy. Secretary Woodring quickly saw to it that 

Ickes got his copy of the report, while General Reed counseled his staff 

on the need for common sense in replying to cabinet members.64 

Some investigations originated in complaints from the field. In 

January 1935 a CCC employee in Hawaii and his lawyer wrote separate 

letters to Director Fechner and The Adjutant General regarding problems in the worker's pay arrangements. Fechner, in turn, wrote the 

Secretary of War, demanding an investigation. He charged the Army 

disbursing officer with obstructive tactics, causing the dismissal of 

civilian employees, improper financial management, and failing to pay 

the complainant his due. The resulting inquiry, however, proved that 

Fechner was too quick to believe his employee.6

s 

The case went to the newly assigned Hawaiian Department lG, Lt. 

Col. George R. Allin, an officer already familiar with the Civilian 

Conservation Corps. Allin interviewed eighteen witnesses, reviewed all 

financial records of the CCC's Hawaiian office, and analyzed the role 

of the Army disbursing officer. He found that the officer had held strictly to correct procedures in all transactions, sometimes delaying payments until he could verify their legitimacy. These delays apparently 

had upset the complainant. The finance officer had advised the local 

CCC head that he would not honor the vouchers of certain employees, 

because he did not consider them trustworthy. One was the complainant, who, the lG had learned, was a convicted embezzler. The 

money allegedly owed the complainant was being held up because of a 

GAO review into his associated irregularities. Colonel Allin concluded 

that the Army disbursing officer was extremely competent, indeed one 

of the few points of integrity in a corrupt system. Allin cited the officer for efficiently setting up CCC finances in Hawaii and recommended him for a commendation. General Preston and the Secretary of War 

agreed. While Fechner did not apologize for his earlier accusations, the 

undesirable employees were dismissed from the CCC's Hawaiian 

office, and Allin had the satisfaction of witnessing a total overhaul of 

its personnel and operations.66 

The Hawaiian case underscored the encouraging fact that misconduct by members of the Army cadre assigned to the Civilian 

... Ltr, Ickes to Woodring. 8 Oct 38, and Reply, 19 Oct 38, Entry 26C, RG 159, 

NARA. 01 Rpt, Allin to CG, Hawaiian Dept, 19 Mar 35, sub: Investigation of Conduct of 

Captain Herbert Baldwin, F. D., With Respect to Administration of the ECW in Hawaii, 

Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. 66 Ibid. 

460 
GUARDSMEN AND C IVILIANS 

Conservation Corps was rare. The few cases that did arise invariably concerned some form of funds mismanagement, and even these were usually low-level offenses. In a typical case, a corporal escorting enrollees on 

the train from Alabama to Maryland cheated his charges of their ration 

money by collecting their allowance at the sta1t of the trip and then buying cheap food at bulk rates, pocketing the difference. At their destination 

the new men began to complain about the conditions of their trip. Their 

complaints came to the attention of the local lG, who opened an investigation. Because the men had crossed corps area boundaries, the Office of 

The Inspector General became involved in coordinati ng and processing 

the case. The corporal eventually was court-martialed.67 

Financial inspections were the only ones prescribed on a regular 

basis, because CCC regulations did not provide for scheduled general 

inspections. Yet the IGD's reporting on the Civilian Conservation Corps 

remained quite extensive. In addition, officers of many other War 

Department elements interacted with CCC operations. For example, 

representatives ofThe Adjutant General visited the camps to check on 

administration and on morale and welfare programs; Colonel Major, 

the G- 3 officer responsible for CCC oversight, made frequent tours; 

and corps area staff officers also made periodic visits. When IGs conducted an annual inspection of a post or garrison, they inspected all 

CCC activities on the post and prepared reports on them in the same 

manner as for other units, commenting on strength, functions, and mission performance; making recommendations for improvements; and 

proposing commendations for good work. In 1938 a resume of all CCC 

and Works Projects Administration activities on Army posts, including 

a brief description of the projects, their locations, and the dates they 

were undertaken, was added to inspection reports as an annex. The data 

from these various sources ultimately was forwarded to the Office of 

The Inspector General for filing.68 

Inspectors also maintained oversight through special inquiries 

and investigations, which were ordered and conducted in the same 

marmer as for any military unit. In fact, CCC regulations specified 

67 Rpt, Adams to CG, 4th Corps Area, 19 Aug 37, sub: Case of Corporal Columbus 

H. Hatton, Co M, 22d Infantry; Rpt, Batson to TIG, 23 Oct 37, sub: Continuance of 

Investigation of Allegations Against Corp C. H. Hatton. Both in Entry 26C, RG 159, 

NARA . 

.. Rpt, Herr to CG, 2d Corps Area, 21 Feb 36, sub: Annual Inspection of Madison 

Barracks; Rpt, Upson to CG, 2d Corps Area, 22 Apr 38, sub: Annual Inspection of Fort 

Wadsworth and Subpost Mil ler Field. Both in Entry II, RG 159, NARA. Sec also 

Killigrew, "Great Depression," Ph.D. diss., ch. 12, p. 32; Johnson, "CCC," Ph.D. diss., 

p. 118. 

46 1 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

that enrollees would have access to an IG for complaints and grievances. Occasionally, the IGD's interest allowed the informal resolution of issues before they could develop into fu ll-fledged investigations. When complaints about CCC operations arose, corps area IGs 

usually dealt with them and, upon completion, forwarded their 

reports to the Office of The Inspector General for review and filing. 

High-level interest sometimes generated special inquiries, notably 

over the issue of race. Black activists were prominent in criticizing 

recruiting procedures that discriminated racially, and Emmett J. 

Scott, the Third Assistant Secretary of War for race matters during 

World War l, now an official of Howard University, strongly urged 

proportional black participation as CCC enrollees and leaders. His 

demand that black reservists participate fully in the program was 

especially forceful.69 

In 1934 Director Fechner asked the Army to investigate the enrollment and placement of blacks in the Civilian Conservation Corps, after 

receiving numerous complaints of widespread discrimination. The 

investigation showed that wide variations in racial policy existed from 

one corps area to another. In the South the CCC units were strictly segregated, while in New England the relatively few blacks who enrolled 

were attached to white companies. Although the investigation confirmed the allegations of unfairly reduced quotas for blacks, the Anny 

failed to take a strong stand on fairness, citing the difficulty in placing 

black units and the need to a llow each corps area commander to accommodate local conditions. The investigation produced a slight increase in 

black enrollment, but Fechner was forced to tolerate artificial limits on 

the opportunities offered to blacks and to condone a policy of restricting black companies to their home states or to duties on Army posts 

only. From the President down to the local communities, no support 

existed for a more equitable solution. 70 

Complaints about local hiring practices, contracting, and the like 

had to be investigated periodically. Again, such inquiries were almost 

invariably accomplished at the corps area level. The Second Corps Area 

IG, for example, investigated the commander of the Camden, New 

York, CCC camp, when local Democrats accused him of hiring only 

Republicans. The complaint proved to be accurate, and all the men 

.. Draft Memo, OTIG for TAG, 25 Mar 38; Ltr, Reed to Ford, 26 May 38. Both in 

Entry 26C, RG 159, NARA. Sec also Johnson, "CCC," Ph.D. diss., p. 159. 70 Johnson, "CCC," Ph.D. diss., p. 159; Salmond, CCC, pp. 95- 96, I 00; Rpt, Wood 

to CG, 4th Corps Area, 26 Aug 37, sub: Special Investigation of CCC Camp 4735, 

Charlolle, Ark., Entry 26C, RG 169, NARA. 

462 
GUARDSMEN AN D C IVILIAN S 

whose positions had been challenged were fired on the grounds that 

they lacked sufficient skill to hold their jobs. The Army officer in 

charge, who had taken the advice of a local Republican without adequately checking on the men, was admonished. Union labor practices 

and rules, nepotism in hiring, and favoritism also generated lG action 

from time to time. 71 

Complaints about mail handling at the camps arrived in a steady 

stream throughout the first years. In most cases pecuniary liabHity was 

at issue, its determination resting for the most part on an inspector's 

recommendation. The cause of the problems seemed to be the administrative inexperience of the junior reserve officers in charge of mail handling, who also were overwhelmed by many other responsibilities. In 

April 1934 General Preston successfully urged The Adjutant General to 

simplify requirements. Similarly, the handling of enrollee misconduct 

cases had to be modified from standard procedures. Such cases were 

forwarded through channels to the Office ofThe Inspector General for 

a review, which consisted of a procedures check and a recommendation 

for the disposition of the case. Since the enrollees were not subject to 

military justice, the OTIG staff addressed the question of whether the 

men should be discharged and which civilian law enforcement agency 

should be notified about the cases.72 

Fortunately, with the exception of desertion, there were relatively 

few enrollee discipline problems throughout the existence of the 

Civilian Conservation Corps. A few disturbances, however, did 

require investigation. In November 1937 a mutiny broke out in the 

five camps operating in the Shenandoah National Park. The enrollees 

were dismayed by the winter conditions in the Blue Ridge, and ten 

who refused to work had to be discharged. Fechner's staff, as well as 

the Third Corps Area lG, looked into the matter. The problem was 

attributed to the camp leaders' failure either to acclimate their charges 

or to explain grievance procedures to them. Many of the men, who 

had come from Pennsylvania coal mining areas, had assumed that 

striking was the way to get attention. Another case, this time in New 

York, concerned the theft and resale of CCC property. A serious riot 

in Luray, Virginia, in which Southern and Northern men clashed, also 

required investigation, as did liquor distributi on in a Lexington, 

71 Johnson, "CCC," Ph.D. diss., p. 190; File 324.5, CCC lnvesligations, Box 25 I, 

Enlry 26, and Box 23, Entry 26C, RG l 59, NARA. 11 Memo, Preston to TAG, 25 Apr 34, Entry 26; Ltr, Taylor to TAG, 18 Nov 35, sub: 

Alleged Improper Handling of Mail al CCC Camps, Enlry 26C. Bolh in RG 159, 

NARA. 

463 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

Indiana, camp. But such cases were exceptions to the generally orderly operation of the camps, and never approached the scale or intricacy of the CCC's finance problems.7

l 

As world tensions increased during the late 1930s, the con·esponding growth of the U.S. armed forces made it increasingly difficult to obtain qualified active reservists for CCC positions. As a result, 

all the camp cadre positions except the commander's were converted 

in June 1939 to civilian slots, with the War Department retaining its 

authority to select and appoint. But the outbreak of war in Europe 

brought increasing manpower pressures. In March 1940 inactive 

reserve officers were authorized to fill some of the remaining military 

slots, and in September civilians with no reserve affiliation began to 

be accepted for all camp leadership positions, subject to War 

Department approval. ~ 

By now the growing threat of war in Europe and Asia was ch·astica lly changing public perceptions of the military. The history of the 

Civilian Conservation Corps had been marked by constant low-level 

public criticism of the Army's association with it. Periodically, some 

journalist or member of Congress would voice fears about the militarization of American youth, and as a result CCC units had been unable 

to carry out many worthwhile projects on military installations. 

However, as the world situation worsened, calls began to be heard for 

using CCC units on defense projects and popular support increased for 

military training as part of the CCC program. ln a sense, however, these 

changes came too late. The growth of employment opportunities in 

defense industries and draft calls on young men made recruiting for the 

Civilian Conservation Corps harder and gradually eroded its strength. 

The CCC program always had been perceived as a temporary measuTe 

to combat unemployment, and in April 1942 Congress voted to abolish 

the agency. 

The heritage left by what was arguably the New Deal's most successful re lief program proved to be broad and enduring. CCC reforestation and soil conservation had helped to change the face of the 

country. NeaTly three million youths were acclimated to the military, 

learning skills that they would apply during the great mobilization for 

World War U. In add ition, thousands of reserve officers had acquired 

experience that would prove essential to their success in the greater test 

that was coming. The same may be said for the War Department and the 

" Salmond, CCC, pp. 186-88; File 324.5, CCC Investigations. Box 25 I, Entry 26, 

RG 159, NARA. 

" Johnson, "CCC," Ph.D. diss., pp. 88- 89. 

464 
GUARDSMEN AND CIVILIANS 

inspectorate, as both closed out the last of the unique missions that had 

been characteristic of the interwar period.

75 

" lbid., pp. 207, 2 18, 226- 27; Salmond, CCC, pp. 194, 196, 198, 213, 220- 2 1; 

Killigrew, "Great Depression," Ph.D. diss., ch. 13, p. 25. 

465 

ENVOI 

Unchanging Principles in 

Changing Times 

The War Department's reliance on the Inspector General's Department 

(IGD) to monitor the Civilian Conservation Corps' impact in the 1930s 

was a mark of the hard-earned respect won by the inspectorate over the 

preceding decades. Under challenge at the beginning of the twentieth 

century, the Inspector General's Department had survived Secretary 

Root's organizational changes but remained in a sense on probation, 

obliged to prove its value to the new Army hierarchy. Dw·ing this critical period of adjustment such strong capable leaders as Generals 

Chamberlain and Garlington, who served extended tours, preserved the 

IGD's high standards while successfully incorporating many temporarily detailed officers into the department. TlU'ough their committed, 

loyal support and the dedicated efforts of all inspectors, the Inspector 

General's Department became the locus of professionalism at a time 

when the Army desperately needed the stability to offset the centrifugal 

effects of innovation and recurring waves of reform. 

The inspectorate remained as closely knit as it had been in the past. 

New officers themselves were selected carefully, to assure they measured up to the senior inspector's expectations, and either served an 

apprenticeship at the Washington office or attended a formal school to 

acquaint them with their duties. The Inspector General of the Army 

used his personal contacts, with both the inspectors and the commanders in the field, to ensure that high standards would be maintained. 

Uniform procedures were upheld through various IG publications, 

including the Yellow Book and General Drum's inspection guides. Such 

sources ofinfonnation, in combination with the Army regulations, clarified the status and functions of inspectors, making it possible for the 

local IGs to become deeply involved in the unique concerns and programs of their commands. 

The inspectors usually were high-quality officers, intent on helping 

and improving units. They functioned, however, very much in confor-
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

mity with the wishes of their senior commanders. More often than not, 

inspectors were on the scene because of higher-level perceptions of 

failures or shortcomings. Inspected units or installations often forgot 

that IGs merely reflected the concerns of senior officers, and were not 

themselves responsible for the inspections that entailed a lot of extra 

work and were too often perceived as an embarrassing inconvenience. 

While the inspectorate pursued its routine duties, it also became a 

key player in the modernization of the Army. From the beginning, the 

difference between observing the effects of reform and influencing its 

course was less than it seemed. By the end of General Wood's tenure as 

Chief of Staff the Inspector General's Department had matured beyond 

the stage of only making suggestions; it was enforcing the policies of 

the Army's leadership. This enforcement and evaluation role increased 

under such strong officers as Generals March and Pershing to the point 

that it threatened the inspectorate's image as objective evaluators of the 

Army's performance. By the end of World War I the department had 

acquired specific staff functions and exercised a degree of influence 

that was resented by other clements of the service. 

The issues of training and command inspections were classic 

examples. Inspectors were called in every time the senior command lost 

confidence in the ability of subordinates to meet expected standards. 

They filled a vacuum that commanders appeared to avoid, and yet their 

involvement brought reactions from commanders that were sometimes 

hostile. In some cases where the command seemed to fail entirely in 

many of its functions, as the American Expeditionary Forces did, 

inspectors actually became the enforcers of theater policy. Their work 

did not endear them to many officers, even those who recognized that 

IG actions served to improve a chaotic situation. 

The transformation from observers to enforcers had many roots, but 

one was basic. The pace of change and the later wartime expansion of 

the Army so diluted the leadership base that inspectors, as an elite group 

of professionals, had to supply the knowledge and experience that were 

otherwise lacking. As a result, they were propelled into aspects of tactical unit and leadership evaluation that were more appropriate to commanders. Commanders also tended to use IG information as an active 

clement of management actions. On one hand, inspectors might assure 

fairness when officers had to be relieved; on the other, they might ruin 

careers indirectly by denying embarkation clearance to a deploying unit 

or failing it in a field exercise. The adverse consequences of lG actions 

often obscured the more numerous beneficial results. 

After World War I, under the leadership of detailed officers, especially Generals Helmick and Drum, the inspectorate's role shifted to 

468 
UNCHANGING PRINCIPLES IN C HANGING TIMES 

observing administrative and logistical functions and assessing compliance with policy. The Inspector General's Department increased its 

emphasis on teaching and helping, and was called on routinely to 

observe and report on the effects of government and War Department 

policies. Throughout the interwar era the department continued to be the 

source of suggestions for improvements in the condition of the Army. 

Often it was the only spokesman for the rank and file at a time when 

other War Department elements were mesmerized by programs and 

management techniques, with little regard for their effect on people. 

Regardless of emphasis, the inspectorate's work tlu-oughout faithfully reflected the concerns and interests of the War Department leadership. The inspectors performed in the manner, style, and fields 

required by their superiors. In this light it is easy to see why they were 

so preoccupied with tactical operations in 1911, traffic in 1918, and 

business methods in 1923. The IGs were truly serving as the eyes and 

ears of the command, and sometimes also as its fist 

These were the big issues. At another level, the inspectorate performed a routine series of unspectacular but essential tasks that facilitated the Army's smooth daily operations. Every day an inspector 

helped some responsible individual do his job more efficiently and 

effectively. IG oversight in finance, property, and personal conduct 

matters made the inspectorate the conscience of the Army. Its involvement in these related issues perforce made the Inspector General's 

Department the most knowledgeable agency on matters of welfare and 

morale--and thus foremost in reforming the quality of life and improving conditions among all ranks. The department was an essential element in assuring the .Army's modernization, effectiveness, and efficiency. It is hard to picture the Army developing or accomplishing what it 

did without the inspectors. At the same time, it is easy to see why too 

many soldiers neither understood nor valued their work. 

The basic IG duties as formulated by General von Steuben continued to be to inspect, investigate, assist, and teach. Although subject to 

a varying emphasis during the forty years under discussion, none of 

these functions ever lapsed entirely, and each played a role i11 the way 

the inspectorate was seen and used. Experience showed that the inspectorate was most effective when its members in the field worked directly for the local commanders. Subordination to a staff element muted the 

inspectors' effect, while often concealing matters of importance. IGs 

saw their Army from a perspective different from that of their fellow 

officers and staff members. While responding to many pressures, they 

served a valuable flmction for their commanders and the Army. The 

record attests that as a group the IGs did all they could to improve and 

469 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

support the Army while assuring the nation the kind of military establishment it deserved. 

The Inspector General's Department, like the rest of the Army, 

entered a new phase of its history in the years after 1939, bringing it 

new duties to perform in unprecedented situations. Despite this, the 

Army's need for expertise, teaching, and the maintenance of standards and integrity was to prove as great as ever. General 

Breckinridge's 1910 remark to General Garlington summarizing the 

IG role should be recalled: "Your Department is the army's litmus 

paper, making a test of our conditions and status- and the public is 

often the fina l court of appeals."' 

' Ltr, Breckinridge to Garlington, 19 Sep I 0, Entry 35, Record Group 159, National 

Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. 

470 
APPENDIX A 

Commands, Headquarters, and 

Inspectors, 190 1-1940 

Note: The named inspector was in the position on 31 December of each 

year. An asterisk indicates that the officer was not detailed to the 

Inspector General's Department. Commands marked Vacant were 

authorized an inspector but did not have one. Commands with no entry, 

or name, were not authorized an inspector. 

1901 

Division of the Philippines, Manila, Col. Joseph P. Sanger 

Department of North Philippines, Manila, Lt. Col. Louis H. Rucker* 

Department of South Philippines, Cebu, Maj. Frederick A. Smith 

Department of California, San Francisco, Lt. Col. John L. 

Chamberlain 

Department of the Colorado, Denver, Maj. James A. Irons 

Department of the Columbia, Vancouver Barracks, Maj. Herbert E. 

Tutherly* 

Department of Dakota, St. Paul, Maj. Alfred Reynolds 

Department of the East, Governors Island, Col. Peter D. Vroom 

Department of the Lakes, Cbjcago, Col. Ernest A. Garlington 

Department of the Missouri, Omaha, Col. James B. Etwin* 

Department ofTexas, San Antonio, Maj. Thomas R. Adams 

1902 

Division of the Philippines, Manila, Col. Joseph P. Sanger 

Department of the Visayas, Iloilo 

Department of Mindanao, Zamboanga 

471 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Department of California, San Francisco, Lt. Col. John L. 

Chamberlain 

Department of the Colorado, Denver, Maj. James A. Irons 

Department of the Columbia, Vancouver Barracks, Maj. Herbert E. 

Tutherly* 

Department of Dakota, St. Paul, Maj. Alfred Reynolds 

Department of the East, Governors Island, Col. Peter D. Vroom 

Department of the Lakes, Chicago, Col. Ernest A. Garlington 

Department of the Missouri, Omaha, Col. James B. Erwin* 

Department ofTcxas, San Antonio, Maj. Thomas R. Adams 

1903 

Division of the Philippines, Mani Ia, Lt. Col. John L. Chamberlain 

Department of Luzon, Manila, Maj. Hobart K. Bailey 

Department of the Visayas, Iloilo, Maj. Charles H. Watts* 

Department of Mindanao, Zamboanga 

Department of California, San Francisco, Capt. Wait C. Jolmson* 

Department of the Colorado, Denver, Lt. Col. James W. Pope 

Department of the Columbia, Vancouver Barracks, Maj. Lea Febiger 

Department of Dakota, St. Paul, Lt. Col. Alfred Reynolds* 

Deparhnent of the East, Governors Island, Col. Ernest A. Garlington 

Deparhnent of the Lakes, Chicago, Col. Charles H. Hey I 

Deparhnent of the Missouri, Omaha, Vacant 

Department ofTexas, San Antonio, Maj. Thomas R. Adams 

1904, 1905, 1906 

Philippine Division, Manila, Col. John L. Chamberlain 

Deparhnent of Luzon, Manila 

Department ofVisayas, Iloilo 

Department of Mindanao, Zamboanga 

Atlantic Division, Governors Island, Col. Ernest A. Garlington 

Department of the East, Governors Island 

Department of the Gulf, Atlanta 

472 
APPENDIX A 

Northern Division, St. Louis, Lt. Col. Frank K. Wood 

Department of the Lakes, Chicago 

Department of the Missouri, Omaha 

Department of Dakota, St. Paul 

Southwestern Division, Oklahoma City, Lt. Col. Frank West 

Department of Texas, San Antonio 

Department of the Colorado, Denver 

Pacific Division, San Francisco, Lt. Col. Sedgewick Pratt* 

Department of California, San Francisco 

Department of the Columbia, Vancouver Barracks 

Army of Cuban Pacification, Havana, Maj. Charles G. Treat 

1907 

Philippine Division, Manila, Lt. Col. Wilber E. Wilder 

Department of Luzon, Manila 

Department of the Visayas, Iloilo 

Department of Mindanao, Zamboanga 

Department of California, San Francisco, Lt. Col. George L. 

Anderson 

Department of the Colorado, Denver, Maj. Charles G. Morton 

Department of the Columbia, Vancouver Barracks, Vacant 

Department of Dakota, St. Paul, Lt. Col. Francis H. French 

Department of the East, Governors Island, Col. John L. Chamberlain 

Department of the Gulf, Atlanta, Maj. Adelbert Cronkhite* 

Department of the Lakes, Chicago, Col. George F. Chase 

Department of the Missomi, Omaha, Maj. Jacob C. Galbraith 

Department of Texas, San Antonio, Maj. Omar Bundy* 

Army of Cuban Pacification, Maj. Charles G. Treat 

1908 

Philippine Division, Manila, Lt. Col. Francis H. French 

Department of Luzon, Manila 

Depattment of the Visayas, Iloilo 

Deprutment of Mindanao, Zamboanga 

473 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Department of California, San Francisco, Lt. Col. Charles G. 

Woodward 

Department of the Colorado, Denver, Maj. Charles G. Morton 

Department of Dakota, St. Paul, Maj. Samuel W Miller 

Department of the East, Governors Island, Col. John L. Chamberlain 

Department of the Gulf, Atlanta, Maj. Frank G. Mauldin* 

Department of the Lakes, Chicago, Col. George F. Chase 

Department of the Missouri, Omaha, Maj. Jacob C. Galbraith 

Department ofTexas, San Antonio, Maj. Omar Bundy 

Army of Cuban Pacification, Maj. William Lassiter 

1909 

Philippine Division, Manila, Col. John L. Chamberlain 

Department of Luzon, Manila 

Department of the Visayas, Iloilo 

Department of Mindanao, Zamboanga 

Department of California, San Francisco, Lt. Col. Charles G. 

Woodward 

Department of the Colorado, Denver, Lt. Col. Wilbur E. Wilder 

Department of the Columbia, Vancouver Barracks, Vacant 

Department of Dakota, St. Paul, Maj. Samuel W. Miller 

Department of the East, Governors Island, Lt. Col. William T. 

Wood 

Department of the Gulf, Atlanta, Maj. Frank G. Mauldin* 

Department of the Lakes, Chicago, Col. George F. Chase 

Department of the Missouri, Omaha, Maj. James B. Erwin 

Department ofTexas, San Antonio, Maj. Tyree R. Rivers 

1910 

Philippine Division, Manila, Col. John L. Chamberlain 

Department of Luzon, Manila 

Department of the Visayas, Iloilo 

Department of Mindanao, Zamboanga 

Department of California, San Francisco, Maj. George Bell, Jr. 

474 
APPENDIX A 

Department of the Colorado, Denver, Lt. Col. Wilbur E. Wilder 

Department of the Columbia, Vancouver Barracks, Maj. Frank G. 

Mauldin 

Department of Dakota, St. Paul, Maj. Walter H. Gordon 

Department of the East, Governors Island, Col. George F. Chase 

Department of the Gulf, Atlanta, Maj. Alfred M. Hunter* 

Department of the Lakes, Chicago, Lt. Col. Charles G. Morton 

Department ofthe Missouri, Omaha, Maj. Omar Bundy 

Deprutment ofTexas, San Antonio, Lt. Col. Francis H. French 

1911, 1912 

Eastern Division, Governors Island, Col. Stephen C. Mills 

Department of the East, Fort Totten 

Department of the Gulf, Atlanta 

Central Division, Chicago, Lt. Col. James B. Erwin 

Department of tbe Lakes, St. Paul 

Department of the Missouri, Omaha 

Department ofTexas, San Antonio 

Western Division, San Francisco, Col. John L. Chamberlain 

Deprutment of California, Fort Miley 

Department of the Columbia, Vancouver Barracks 

Department of Hawaii, Honolulu 

Philippine Division, Manila, Lt. Col. Chru·les G. Morton (1911) 

Lt. Col. James B. Erwin (1912) 

Department of Luzon, Manila 

Department ofVisayas, Iloilo 

Department of Mindanao, Zamboanga 

1913 

Eastern Department, Governors Island, Col. Stephen C. Mills 

1st Division, Governors Island, Lt. Col. William C. Brown* 

1st Btigade, Albany 

2d Brigade, Atlanta 

North Atlantic Coast Artillery Corps District, Fort Totten 

South Atlantic Coast Artillery Corps District, Charleston 

475 
THE INSPECTORS G ENERAL, 1903-1939 

Central Department, Chicago, Col. Henry P. Kingsbury 

3d Cavalry Brigade, Fort Riley 

2d Division, Texas City, Maj. AndreW. Brewster 

4th Brigade, Texas City 

5th Brigade, Galveston 

6th Brigade, Texas City 

Southern Department, Fort Sam Houston, Maj. Alonzo Gray 

Cavalry Division, Fort Sam Houston 

1st Cavalry Brigade, Fort Sam Houston 

2d Cavalry Brigade, El Paso 

Western Department, San Francisco, Col. John L. Chamberlain 

3d Division, San Francisco 

7th Brigade, Vancouver Barracks 

8th Brigade, Presidio of San Francisco 

Pacific Coast Artillery Corps District, Fort Miley 

Philippine Department, Manila, Col. Jacob C. Galbraith* 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Lt. Col. John B. McDonald 

1st Hawaiian Brigade 

1914 

Eastern Department, Col. John L. Chamberlain 

I st Division 

Central Department, Col. George K. Hunter 

2d Division, Maj. Ralph A. Van Dieman 

Southern Department, Maj. Alonzo Gray 

Western Department, Col. David C. Shanks 

3d Division 

Philippine Division, Col. Jacob C. Galbraith 

Hawaiian Department, Lt. Col. John B. McDonald 

1915 

Eastern Department, Governors Island, Col. John L. Chamberlain 

I st Division, Governors Island, Lt. Col. Frank L. Dodds 

I st Brigade, Albany 

476 
APPENDIX A 

North Atlantic Coast Artillery Corps Disnict, Fort Totten 

South Atlantic Coast Artillery Corps District, Charleston 

Central Department, Chicago, Col. George K. Hunter 

3d Cavalry Brigade, Fort Riley 

2d Division (Southern Department operational control) 

Southern Department, Fort Sam Houston, Maj. JohnS. Winn 

Cavahy Division, Fort Sam Houston 

lst Cavalry Brigade, Fort Sam Houston 

2d Cavalty Brigade, Douglas 

2d Brigade, Laredo 

5th Brigade, San Antonio 

6th Brigade, Douglas 

8th Brigade, Fort Bliss 

Western Department, San Francisco, Col. Guy Carleton* 

3d Division, San Francisco, Maj. John M. Jenkins 

7th Brigade, Vancouver Barracks 

Pacific Coast Artillery Corps District, Fort Miley 

Philippine Department, Manila, Col. David C. Shanks 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Maj. Ernest B. Gose 

I st Hawaiian Brigade 

1916 

Eastern Department, Governors Island, Col. John L. Chamberlain 

I st Division, Governors Island, Col. Thomas Q. Donaldson 

North Atlantic Coast Artillery Corps District, Fort Totten 

South Atlantic Coast Artillery Corps District, Charleston 

Central Department, Chicago, Col. George K. Hunter 

Southern Department, Fort Sam Houston, Col. Frederick R. Day 

Cavalry Division, San Antonio, Lt. Col. John S. Wiru1 

I st Cavalry Brigade, Fort Sam Houston 

2d Cavalry Brigade, Columbus 

l st Brigade, Eagle Pass 

2d Brigade, Laredo 

5th Brigade, El Paso 

6th Brigade, Douglas 

7th Brigade, Douglas 

8th Brigade, Columbus 

477 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Western Department, San Francisco, Col. John B. McDonald 

3d Division, San Francisco, Lt. Col. Frank M. Caldwell 

Pacific Coast Artillery Corps District, Fort Riley 

Philippine Department, Manila, Col. David C. Shanks 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Maj. Herbert 0. Williams 

lst Hawaiian Brigade 

1917 

Eastern Department, Governors Island, Col. Thomas Q. Donaldson 

I st Division, Governors Island, Vacant 

Mid-Atlantic Coast Artillery Corps District, Fort Monroe 

Panama Coast Artillery Corps District, Canal Zone 

Northeastern Department, Boston, Col. Warren P. Newcomb, Ret. 

North Atlantic Coast Artillery Corps District, Boston 

Central Department, Chicago, Col. George K. Hunter 

Southeastern Department, Charleston, Maj. Jacob C. Johnson 

South Atlantic Coast Artillery Corps District, Charleston 

Southern Department, Fort Sam Houston, Col. George 0. Cress 

Cavalry Division, Fort Sam Houston, Lt. Col. John S. Winn 

4th Brigade, Nogales 

Western Department, San Francisco, Col. John B. McDonald 

3d Division, Lt. Col. Frank M. Caldwell 

South Pacific Coast Artillery Corps District, Fort Miley 

North Pacific Coast Artillery Corps District, Seattle 

Philippine Department, Manila, Col. David C. Shanks 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Maj. Herbert 0. Williams 

1st Hawaiian Brigade 

1918 (less tactical units) 

Northeastern Department, Col. Edmund M. Blake 

Eastern Department, Col. Frank E. Harris 

Southeastern Depa11ment, Col. James M. Wheeler 

478 
APPENDIX A 

Central Department, Col. Alexander L. Dade 

Southern Department, Col. Samuel M. Rutherford 

Western Department, Col. Ervin L. Phillips 

Philippine Department, Col. Samuel E. Smiley 

Hawaiian Department, Maj. Edward C. Wallington 

1919 (less tactical units) 

Northeastern Department, Col. Paul Hurst 

Eastern Department, Col. Frank E. Harris 

Southeastern Department, Col. Frederick W. Phisterer 

Central Department, Col. Alexander Dade 

Southern Department, Col. Lincoln F. Kilbourne 

Western Department, Col. Guy Carleton 

Philippine Department, Col. James M. Wheeler 

Hawaiian Department, Col. Vincent M. Elmore 

Panama Department, Col. Harry L. Hawthorne 

Col. Percy M. Kessler (as of June) 

1920 

First Corps Area, Boston, Col. George Blakely 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. Frank L. Winn 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Col. Frank E. Harris 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Col. Frederick W. Phisterer 

Fifth Corps Area, Indianapolis, Col. Charles H. Bridges 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Col. Frank M. Caldwell 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Col. Samuel M. Rutherford 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. Lincoln F. Kilbourne 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Col. Guy Carleton 

Philippine Department, Manila, Lt. Col. James M. Wheeler 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Lt. Col. Vincent M. Elmore 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Col. Edmund M. Blake 

479 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

1921 

First Corps Area, Boston, Maj. Edgar S. Miller 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. Tyree R. Rivers 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Col. Frank E. Harris 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Col. Frederick W. Phisterer 

Fifth Corps Area, Indianapolis, Lt. Col. William A. Austin 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Col. Samuel M. Rutherford 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Col. William T. Johnston 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. Lincoln F. Kilbourne 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Col. Ervin L. Phillips 

Philippine Department, Manila, Col. George Blakely 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Lt. Col. Vincent M. Elmore 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Col. Edmund M. Blake 

District ofWashington, Washington, D.C., Maj. Walter M. Robinson 

1922 

First Corps Area, Boston, Col. George D. Moore 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. Tyree R. Rivers 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Col. Clifton C. Kinney 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Lt. Col. Ernest E. Haskell 

Fifth Corps Area, Indianapolis, Col. Truman 0. Murphy 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Col. Samuel M. Rutherford 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Col. William T. Johnston 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. Lincoln F. Kilboumc 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Col. Ervin L. Phillips 

Philippine Department, Manila, Col. George Blake ly 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Col. Gordon G. He iner 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Col. Frank E. Harris 

District of Washington, Washington, D.C., Maj. Walter M. Robinson 

1923 

First Corps Area, Boston, Col. George D. Moore 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. William C. Rivers 

480 
APPENDIX A 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Col. Alexander T. Ovenshine 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Lt. Col. Ernest E. Haskell 

Fifth Corps Area, Columbus, Col. Truman 0. Murphy 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Col. Samuel M. Rutherford 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Lt. Col. George E. Goodrich 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. Ernest D. Scott 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Col. Walter C. Short 

Philippine Department, Manila, Col. George Blakely 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Col. William T. Johnston 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Col. Frank E. Harris 

Dish·ict of Washington, Washington, D.C., Maj. Walter M. Robinson 

1924 

First Corps Area, Boston, Col. George D. Moore 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. William C. Rivers 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Col. Alexander T. Ovenshine 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Col. Henry S. Wagner 

Fifth Corps Area, Columbus, Col. Truman 0. Murphy 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Col. Howard R. Hickok 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Lt. Col. Fred T. Austin 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. Ernest D. Scott 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Col. Walter C. Short 

Philippine Department, Manila, Col. Casper H. Conrad 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Col. William T. Johnston 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Col. Frank E. Harris 

Dish·ict of Washington, Washington, D.C., Maj. Robert C. Goetz 

1925 

First Corps Area, Boston, Col. George D. Moore 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. William C. Rivers 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Lt. Col. Beverly F. Browne 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Col. Henry S. Wagner 

481 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Fifth Corps Area, Columbus, Col. James M. Graham 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Col. Howard R. Hickok 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Col. Fred T. Austin 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. Ernest D. Scott 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Lt. Col. Royden E. 

Beebe 

Philippine Department, Manila, Col. Casper H. Conrad 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Col. Walter C. Short 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Col. Jacob C. Johnson 

District of Washington, Washington, D.C., Maj. Robert C. Goetz 

1926 

First Corps Area, Boston, Maj. Charles H. Patterson 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. William C. Rivers 

Third Corps Area, Ba ltimore, Lt. Col. Beverly F. Browne 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Col. Henry S. Wagner 

Fifth Corps Area, Columbus, Col. James M. Graham 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Col. Charles E. Stodter 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Lt. Col. William A. Austin 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. Ernest D. Scott 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Col. William R. 

Smedberg 

Philippine Department, Manila, Col. Fred T. Austin 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Col. Walter C. Short 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Col. Jacob C. Johnson 

District of Washington, Washington, D.C., Maj. Robert C. Goetz 

1927 

First Corps Area, Boston, Lt. Col. Charles H. Patterson 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. Robert C. Humber 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Lt. Col. Beverly F. Browne 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Col. Henry S. Wagner 

Fifth Corps Area, Columbus, Lt. Col. Raymond W. Briggs 

482 
APPENDIX A 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Col. Francis Le J. Parker 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Lt. Col. William A. Austin 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. Charles B. Stone 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Col. William R. Smedberg 

Philippine Department, Manila, Col. Fred T. Austin 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Col. Dana T. Merrill 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Col. Charles E. Stodter 

District ofWashington, Washington, D.C., Maj. Robert C. Goetz 

1928 

First Corps Area, Boston, Col. Charles A. Romeyn 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. Robert C. Humber 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Lt. Col. Charles C. Burt 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Col. Henry S. Wagner 

Fifth Corps Area, Columbus, Col. Alexander T. Ovenshine 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Lt. Col. Nelson E. Margetts 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Lt. Col. William A. Austin 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. Charles B. Stone 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Col. William R. Smedberg 

Philippine Department, Manila, Lt. Col. Charles H. Patterson 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Col. Dana T. Merrill 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Col. Charles E. Stodter 

1929 

First Corps Area, Boston, Col. Charles A. Romeyn 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. Robert C. Humber 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Lt. Col. Charles C. Burt 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Col. Henry S. Wagner 

Fifth Corp_s Area, Columbus, Col. Alexander T. Ovenshine 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Lt. Col. Nelson E. Margetts 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Lt. Col. William A. Austin 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. Charles B. Stone 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Col. Herbert J. Brees 

483 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Philippine Deparhnent, Manila, Lt. Col. Charles H. Patterson 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Col. Dana T. Merrill 

Panama Deparhnent, Quarry Heights, Col. Charles E. Stodter 

1930 

First Corps Area, Boston, Col. Charles A. Romcyn 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. Robert C. Humber 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Lt. Col. Albert B. Kaempfer 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Col. Christian A. Bach 

Fifth Corps Area, Columbus, Col. Alexander T. Ovenshinc 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Col. William H. Burt 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Col. Harris Pendelton 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. Charles B. Stone 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Col. Samuel T. Mackall 

Philippine Department, Manila, Lt. Col. John M. Dunn 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Lt. Col. Jay L. Benedict 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Maj. Edgar H. Thompson 

1931 

First Corps Area, Boston, Lt. Col. Luc ian B. Moody 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. Ernest D. Peek 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Lt. Col. Albert B. Kaempfer 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Col. Christian A. Bach 

Fifth Corps Area, Columbus, Col. William E. Hunt 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Lt. Col. Charles H. Thuis 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Col. Harris Pendleton 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. George D. Arrowsmith 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Lt. Col. Samuel T. 

Macka ll 

Philippine Department, Manila, Maj. Herman Erlenkotter 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Lt. Col. Jay L. Benedict 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Col. Raymond W. Briggs 

484 
APPENDIX A 

1932 

First Corps Area, Boston, Lt. Col. Lucian B. Moody 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. Ernest D. Peek 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Col. Raymond W. Briggs 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Col. Christian A. Bach 

Fifth Corps Area, Columbus, Col. William E. Hunt 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Lt. Col. Charles H. Thuis 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Col. Harris Pendleton 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. George D. Arrowsmith 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Lt. Col. Samuel T. 

Mackall 

Philippine Department, Manila, Maj. Kenneth S. Perkins 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Lt. Col. Jay L. Benedict 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Lt. Col. Edmund A. Buchanan 

1933 

First Corps Area, Boston, Lt. Col. Lucian B. Moody 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. Ernest D. Peek 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Col. William W. Taylor 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Col. Christian A. Bach 

Fifth Corps Area, Columbus, Col. William E. Hunt 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Maj. Edward J. Dwan 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Col. Harris Pendleton 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. George D. Arrowsmith 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Col. Ben Lear 

Philippine Department, Manila, Col. Henry C. Merriam 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Lt. Col. Jay L. Benedict 

Panama Depatiment, Quarry Heights, Col. Edmund A. Buchanan 

1934 

First Corps Area, Boston, Lt. Col. Lucian B. Moody 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. Marcellus G. Spinks 

485 
T HE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Col. William W. Taylor 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Maj. Harlan L. Mumma 

Fifth Corps Area, Columbus, Col. William E. Hunt 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Maj. Edward J. Dwan 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Col. Harris Pendleton 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. George D. Arrowsmith 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Col. Harry A. Wells 

Philippine Department, Manila, Col. Henry C. Merriam 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Lt. Col. George R. Allin 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Maj. Reuben N. Perley 

1935 

First Corps Area, Boston, Lt. Col. Frank C. Mahin 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. Marcellus G. Spinks 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Col. William W. Taylor 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Col. Charles H. Patterson 

Fifth Corps Area, Columbus, Col. William E. Hunt 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Col. William S. Wood 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Col. Harris Pendleton 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. George D. Arrowsmith 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Col. Harry A. Wells 

Philippine Department, Manila, Maj. Edward J. Owan 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Col. George R. Allin 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Col. Franc Lecocq 

1936 

First Corps Area, Boston, Lt. Col. Frank C. Mahin 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. Marcellus G. Spinks 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Col. William W. Taylor 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Col. Charles H. Patterson 

Fifth Corps Area, Columbus, Col. Wi lliam E. Hunt 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Col. WilliamS. Wood 

486 
APPENDIX A 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Lt. Col. Leon M. Logan 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. George D. Arrowsmith 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Col. Harry A. Wells 

Philippine Department, Manila, Col. Cassius M. Dowell 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Col. William W. McCammon 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Col. Franc Lecocq 

1937 

First Corps Area, Boston, Col. William E. Hunt 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. Marcellus G. Spinks 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Col. William W. Taylor 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Col. Charles H. Patterson 

Fifth Corps Area, Columbus, Col. Harry A. Wells 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Lt. Col. Leon M. Logan 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Col. William S. Wood 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. Charles P. George 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Col. James M. 

Graham 

Philippine Department, Manila, Col. Cassius M. Dowell 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Col. William W. McCammon 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Col. William R. Henry 

1938 

First Corps Area, Boston, Col. William E. Hunt 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. Troup Miller 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Col. Franc Lecocq 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Col. Charles H. Patterson 

Fifth Corps Area, Columbus, Lt. Col. Lathe B. Row 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Lt. Col. Leon M. Logan 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Col. William S. Wood 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. William F. Robinson 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Col. James M. Graham 

487 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Philippine Department, Manila, Lt. Col. Oswald H. Saunders 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Col. William W. Hicks 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Col. William R. Henry 

1939 

First Corps Area, Boston, Col. William W. Gordon 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Col. Troup Miller 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Col. Leo J. Ahern 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Col. Charles H. Patterson 

Fifth Corps Area, Columbus, Col. John G. Tyndall 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Col. Henry C. Merriam 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Col. John E. Mort 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. William F. Robinson 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Col. James M. Grabam 

Philippine Department, Manila, Lt. Col. Benjamin C. Lockwood 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Col. William W. Hicks 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Col. William R. Henry 

Puerto Rican Department, San Juan, Col. Clyde R. Abraham 

1940 

First Corps Area, Boston, Col. Martyn H. Shute 

Second Corps Area, Governors Island, Lt. Col. Frank B. Jordan 

Third Corps Area, Baltimore, Col. Harry H. Pritchett 

Fourth Corps Area, Atlanta, Col. Charles H. Patterson 

Fifth Corps Area, Columbus, Col. John G. Tyndall 

Sixth Corps Area, Chicago, Lt. Col. John W. Nicholson 

Seventh Corps Area, Omaha, Lt. Col. John E. Mort 

Eighth Corps Area, San Antonio, Col. William F. Robinson 

Ninth Corps Area, Presidio of San Francisco, Col. John D. Reardon 

Philippine Department, Manila, Col. Benjamin C. Lockwood 

Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Col. William W. Hicks 

Panama Department, Quarry Heights, Col. William C. Christy 

488 
APPENDIX B 

Roster of Inspectors, 

Headquarters,AEF and AFIG 

Nflme Commflnd Dates of Assigllment 

Agnew, Ernest H., Lt. Col. AEF 20 Feb 18- 2 Mar 19 

Baer, Joseph A., Col. AEF 29 Jul 18- Jun 19 

Beeuwkes, Henry, Col., MC AEF 18 J un 18- 3 1 May 19 

Biddle, David H., Col. AEF 5 Sep 18- 31 Dec 18 

Bradley, John J., Brig. Gen. AEF 9 Feb 19- 5 Jun 19 

Brewster, AndreW., Maj. Gen. AEF 26 May 17- Jun 19 

Brewster, Daniel B., Capt., USMC AEF 22 Nov 18- 5 Apr 19 

Brown, Laurence E., Capt. AEF 22 Mar 19- 20 May 19 

Bull, Edgar L. Capt. AEF 13 Mar 19- 30 May 19 

Burleson, Richard C., Col. AEF 25 Mar 19- 3 Jun 19 

Carson, Clifford C., Col. AEF 23 Feb 19- 26 May 19 

Chamberlin, Harry D., Lt. Col. AEF 11 Apr 19- 28 May 19 

Clark, RobertS., Maj. AEF 26 May 17- 21 Nov 18 

Conner, Fox, Maj. AEF 26 May 17- 10 Nov 17 

Degen, John A., Lt. Col. AEF 23 Jan 19- 24 Feb 19 

Fleet, Henry W., Lt. Col. AEF 7 Apr 19- 10 Apr 19 

Grace, Joseph J., Col. AEF 8 Apr .19- 26 May 19 

Hanley, Joseph L., Maj. AEF 18 Mar 19- 22 May 19 

Haskell, Ernest E., Col. AEF 23 Apr 19- 31 May 19 

Hay, William H., Col. AFIG 19 Aug 20- 9 May 21 

Henry, T. Charleton, Maj. AEF 19 Nov 18- 29 Jan J 9 

Kinnison, Henry L., Col. AEF 20 Mar 1 9- 20 May 19 

489 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

Name Command Dates of Assignment 

Lewis, David, Maj. AEF 19 Sep 18- 30 Oct 18 

McBride, Robert B., Col. AEF 27 Sep 18- 31 Oct 18 

McDonald, Robert C., Col., MC AEF 2 Jan 19- Jun 19 

Mcilroy, James G., Lt. Col. AEF 28 Sep 18- 20 May 19 

McKenny, Richard 1., Lt. Col. AEF 9 Sep 18- 5 Nov 18 

Magruder, Lloyd B., Maj. AFIG 3 Sep 19- 10 Jan 23 

Martin, Clarence A., Maj. AEF 8 Apr 19- Jun 19 

Matthews, Harry T., Col. AEF II Feb 18- 20 May 19 

Millard, Charles M., Maj. AEF 23 Sep 18- 10 Mar 19 

Moise, Leicester R., Lt. AEF 8 Mar 19- 15 May 19 

Moore, George D., Col. AEF 28 Mar 18- 3 Apr 18 

Morris, William H., Jr., Lt. Col. AEF 16 Jan 19- 15 Mar 19 

Olmstead, Dawson, Maj. AEF 26 Jan 18- 30 Jun 18 

Ovenshine, Alexander T. , Col. AEF 19 Apr 18- 3 Sep 18 

22 May 19- 14 Jun 19 

Parkinson, John L., Maj. A FIG 14 Nov 19- 19 May 22 

Peck, Robert G., Col. AFIG 16 Nov 18- 12 Aug 19 

Pendleton, Harris, Jr., Col. AEF 28 Jan 19- 21 May 19 

Power, Henry C., Lt. AEF I Mar 19- 8 Mar 19 

Read, Alvan C., Col. AEF 20 Sep 18-12 Nov 18 

AFIG 13 Nov 18- 19 Jan 20 

Rice, Charles H., Lt. Col. AFIG 13 Nov 18- 27 Aug 19 

Santschi, Eugene, Jr., Maj. AFIG 28 Jan 22- 19 May 22 

Schudt, Charles 0., Lt. Col. AEF 20 Feb 19- 31 May 19 

Scott, Edgar, Lt. AEF 20 Feb 18- 20 Oct 18 

Spinks, Marcellus G., Brig. Gen. AEF 30 Jun 18- 30 Apr 19 

Stockwell, Fred E., Capt. AEF 22 Mar 19- 2 1 May 19 

Streater, Wallace A., Maj. AEF 11 Nov 17- Jun 19 

AFIG 12 Jan 20-20 Nov 20 

Taggart, Matthew H., Lt. Col. AEF 5 Jan 19- 14 Mar 19 

Taulbee, Edgar W., Lt. Col. AEF 26 Feb 19- 9 Apr 19 

Taylor, Theodore B., Col. AEF 27 Mar 19- 19 May 19 

490 
APPENDIX 8 

Name Comma11d Dates of Assig11me11t 

Thomas, Charles W., Jr., Lt. Col. AEF 3 Sep 18- 30 Jan 19 

Tourtellotte, Neal E., Capt. AEF 8 Mar 19- 22 May 19 

Van Natter, Francis M., Capt. AEF I 1 Feb 19- 22 May 19 

Van Schaick, Louis J. , Col. AFIG 24 Nov 19- 19 Jul 20 

Webb, Arthur L., Maj. AEF 11 Nov 17- Jun 19 

Wimberly, Albert C., Maj. AEF 28 Feb 19- 3 Mar 19 

49 1 
APPENDIX C 

Biographical Notes on Significant 

Senior Inspectors 

These biographical notes on individuals who served mostly as genera l 

officers in the Jnspector General's Department, 1903- 1939, are 

arranged alphabetically. The information in them goes beyond the 

scope of the story of the department but amplifies the record, providing further insight into the character and breadth of the personalities. 

Often, other aspects of their careers have been of greater significance 

or interest, and any summary of their lives given in response to an 

inquiry about them would need their inclusion. The companion volume, 

The Inspectors General of the United States Army, 1 777- 1903, contains 

biographical notes on other key members of the inspectorate. 

BRADLEY, john]. (1869-1948) 

The son of a lawyer, Bradley was born in Cook County, Illinois, on 20 

April 1869. Graduating from the U.S. Military Academy in June 1891 , 

he joined the 14th Infantry as a second lieutenant at Vancouver 

Barracks, Washington. Promoted to first lieutenant in April 1898, he 

deployed with his unit to the Philippines in June but soon was detached 

to be a temporary Quartermaster capta in. After serving as a brigade 

quartermaster and sea h·ansport supervisor, he saw action in January 

1900 as an acti ng aide-de-camp to Brig. Gen. William A. Kobbe during 

operations in the southern Philippines, receiving the Purple Heart and 

Silver Star for his role. He then served as aide-de-camp to Maj. Gen. 

Elwell S. Otis and was promoted to capta in in December 1900. 

Returning to the United States with his regiment in January 1901, he 

was stationed at various posts in the Department of the Lakes. In 

January 1903 Bradley returned to the Philippines, where he performed 

routine company duties on the island of Samar until March 1904. 

492 
APPENDIX C 

That month Bradley was detailed to the Judge Advocate General's 

Department, with duty first at the Presidio of San Francisco and then at 

Vancouver Barracks. Concurrently, he began law studies leading to his 

1908 admission to the Washington State Bar. Returning to the 14th 

Infantry in June 1905 as the regimental quartermaster, Bradley participated in the J 906 earthquake relief in San Francisco and the first 

maneuvers at American Lake, now Fort Lewis. From November 1906 

to June 191 0 he served as the judge advocate of the Department of the 

Columbia. His duty performance established him as fully knowledgeable in all aspects of supply and procurement and also as a man of sterling character and ability. 

From 1911 to 1913 Bradley attended the Army School of the Line 

and the Staff College, both at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. A major 

since May 1912, he was assigned to the 30th Infantry upon graduation in June 1913 and served with that regiment first in Alaska and on 

the Pacific coast and then, after March 1914, in the Canal Zone, 

where he was a member of the Canal Defense Board. As a newly promoted temporary lieutenant colonel, Bradley returned to the United 

States in June 1917, serving briefly as an inspector-instructor to the 

Maryland National Guard. He was promoted to temporary colonel in 

August, at which time he became the chief of the Training and 

Instruction Branch of the War Plans Division. There Bradley worked 

for nearly a year, receiving the Distinguished Service Medal "for initiating and standardizing the training and instruction oftheArmy during its formative period." 

In June 1918 Bradley was promoted to temporary brigadier general and assigned to command a brigade in Maj. Gen. Eli A. 

Helmick's 8th Division, then training at Camp Fremont, California. 

Shortly thereafter, he left that unit to command a brigade of the 82d 

Division in France from mid-November until February 1919, when 

he was detailed to the American Expeditionary Forces IG. Because of 

his legal background, he was selected to head the massive morale 

support investigation then under way. He returned to the infantry and 

his permanent grade of lieutenant colonel in October 1919. After a 

brief stint at Camp Devens, Massachusetts, he was detailed to the 

New York Port of Entry, serving first as the maritime survey officer 

and then as the chief of transportation. Promoted to colonel in 

January 1920, Bradley next served as the chief of staff of the 77th 

Division from July 1921 to July 1923 and then commanded the 18th 

Infantry at Fort Slocum, New York, until his retirement on 28 

December 1927. He entered the practice of law fully thereafter, spe493 
T HE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

cializing in foreign trade issues as well as teaching and writing. 

Active in veterans relief projects in his later years, General Bradley 

died in Detroit, Michigan, on 21 May 1948. 

John J. Bradley, Cullwll Files, U.S. Military Academy Archives; Association of 

Graduates, USMA, Assembly, Apr 49, pp. 8 10. 

BRE.CKINRIDGE.,Joseph C. (1842-1920) 

The son of a Presbyterian minister prominent in the early Republican 

party, Breckinridge was born in Baltimore, Maryland, on 14 January 

1842. He was raised on the family estate in Kentucky and attended 

Centre College and the University of Virginia before the Civil War. 

Although a nephew of Confederate general and former vice-president 

John C. Breckinridge, he entered the U.S Army in 1861 as a Kentucky 

volunteer for the Union. The young officer later received a Regular 

Army commission as a second lieutenant in the 2d Artillery as a result 

of gallantry at the Battle of Mill Springs. A first lieutenant since August 

1863, he saw action in most of the battles fought in the Western theater 

before his capture near Atlanta in July 1864. After the war he served 

with his regiment on the Pacific coast and at various frontier stations, 

rising to captain in June 1874. In January 1881 he was promoted to 

major and assigned to the Inspector General's Department. 

Breckimidge soon gained a reputation as an untiring traveler, visiting 

every post in the West and rising through the ranks until appointed 

Brigadier General, Inspector General of the Army, on 30 January 1889. 

He continued his travels in the States and also made a special European 

tour, studying various armies. 

During the War with Spain Breckinridge requested field duty. 

Appointed a major general in the volunteers, he accompanied Maj. 

Gen. (Vol.) William R. Shafter's V Corps to Santiago as an observer, 

displaying his usual bravery and receiving a citation. He later commanded the I Corps at Camp Thomas, Georgia, preparing it for a projected attack on Havana. At war's end he displayed considerable logistical skill in dispersing his large force to avoid a potential epidemic. 

In 1899, reverting to his permanent grade of brigadier general, 

Breckinridge continued his habit of visiting units wherever they were 

stationed, thoroughly viewing those in Cuba, Puerto Rico, the 

Philippines, and even China and Alaska. At the same time, he kept close 

tabs on admin istrative developments in the Army and Congress that 

affected his department. Conservative, his focus was largely on the 

494 
APPEN DIX C 

improvement of tmit-level operations and specific items of individual 

equipment. Considered an effective defender of the functions of his 

bureau as shown by its survival through the Root reforms, Breckinridge 

strongly opposed plans to eliminate the inspectorate, a stand that ultimately precluded his continuation of service into the new era. 

Consequently, he was promoted to major general and retired on 11 April 

1903. He lived in Washington, D.C., thereafter and was active in veterans and Presbyterian chw·ch affairs until his death on 18 August 1920. 

"Recent Deaths: Joseph Cabell Breckinridge," Army and Navy Joumal, 28 Aug 20, 

p. 1578; National Cyclopedia oj'American Biography, vol. 9, and Who Was Who in 

America, vol. I, s.v. "Breckinridge, Joseph Cabel l." 

BREWSTER, AndreW. (1 862-1942) 

The son of a lawyer, Brewster was born in Hoboken, New Jersey, on 9 

December 1862. He studied law at the University of Pennsylvania and 

was a member of the Pennsylvania and District of Columbia bars. He 

had been practicing law for three years when he accepted a direct commission as a second lieutenant in the 1Oth Infantry on 7 February 

1885. After serving with the lOth at various stations in the West, he 

was promoted to first lieutenant in December 1891 and transferred to 

the 22d Infantry and subsequently to the 9th Infantry at Madison 

Barracks, New York. Commanding Company B when the 9th left for 

Florida in April 1898 and for Cuba in June, Brewster was cited for gallantry at San Juan Hill and saw action at Santiago, from where he was 

medically evacuated in August. He returned to duty in Februru·y 1899, 

received his promotion to captain in March, and served as a transport 

quartermaster until deploying with his regiment to the Philippines in 

October. Here he again was cited for his bravery in the battles at 

Panique and Tarlac. 

The 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, was part of the international force 

sent to China in June 1900 to relieve the Peking legations under siege by 

the Boxers. When the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Emerson H. Liscom, 

was killed early in the fighting at Tientsin, 13 July, Brewster assumed 

command and at one point rescued two of his men who were lying 

wounded in a canal, exposed to heavy fire. For his courage and inspiring 

conduct he was awarded the Medal of Honor, with one of his cotnmanders stating that he was "one of the most competent, efficient and daring 

officers in the army ... [who] always achieves success where success is 

possible." Brewster remained in China until 1905, first as a chief of 

495 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

police in Peking and then as commander of the legation guard. In 1903 

he was assigned the additional duty of attache to China and Japan. 

Brewster returned with Company B, 9th Infantry, in September 1905 

to Fort Porter, New York, moving to Fort Wayne, Michigan, in May 1906. 

He spent most of his time over the next year on detail as an inspectorinstructor to the Kentucky National Guard. His department commander, 

Brig. Gen. William H. Carter, singled him out as being particularly well 

suited to be an inspector general. Newly promoted to major, Brewster 

attended the Army War College from June 1907 to June 1908 and thereafter commanded a battalion of the 19th Infantry at Fort McKenzie, 

Wyoming, until detailed to the Inspector General's Department on 27 

Febntary 1909. He served in the Office of the Inspector General until 

September 1912, when he was transferred as an assistant inspector to the 

Department of the Lakes. He spent nearly all of I 9 13 in Texas as the 2d 

Division TG and then completed a six-month tour as executive officer of 

the Puerto Rico Regiment. However, in June 1914 Brewster, now a lieutenant colonel, was recalled to the Inspector General's Department for a 

second detail. After serving as the Eastern Department inspector until 

January 1915, he returned to the Office of the Inspector General to serve 

as Brig. Gen. Ernest A. Garlington's principal assistant. 

In May 1917 General John J. Pershing selected Brewster, a temporary colonel, to be the lG of the American Expeditionary Forces in 

France, a role in which Garlington considered him "well equipped professionally to get the best there was from his men." Brewster held this 

position until early 1922, rising to the grade of major general. His reassignment to command of the First Corps Area in Boston closed the 

active books of the AEF. He retired on 9 December 1925 and remained 

in Boston, where he practiced law until his death on 20 March 1942. He 

was, in Garlington's words, an "excellent officer and high minded gentleman." Brewster also was a hard-driving, thorough professional, perfect in his role as the lron Commander's eyes and ears. 

File 5728 ACP 1884, Box 941 , Record Group 94, Nalional Archives and Records 

Adminislralion, Washing! on, D.C.; Fred R. Brown, History of t!te Nint!t U.S. lnfanfly, 

1799- 1909 (Chicago: R. R. Donnelley and Sons Co., 1909); U.S. Congress, Senate, 

Commillee on Veterans Affairs, Medal of llonor Recipients. 1863- /978, 961h Cong., 

1st Sess., 1979. 

DRUM, Hugh A. ( 1879-1951) 

The son of a Civil war veteran and career officer, Drum was born at 

Fort Brady, Michigan, on 19 September 1879. He grew up living on 

496 
APPENDIX C 

various military posts and early set his sights on a military career of his 

own. He was commissioned a second lieutenant while a nineteen-yearold student at Boston College by a special act of President William 

McKinley in recognition of the death of his father, Capt. John Drum, 

lOth Infantry, who was killed at the battle of San Juan Hill in 1898. 

Soon afterward, he deployed with his regiment, the 12th Infantry, to the 

Philippines, where he experienced over four years of hard active service 

during the height of the Insurrection and achieved his promotions to 

first lieutenant and captain. He first met Capt. John J. Pershing there 

during the fighting at Lake Lanao. In the course of his campaigning 

Drum developed a lifelong liking and respect for enlisted soldiers, 

which became a consistent feature of his leadership and policies. After 

two years as a general's aide in Colorado, he was reassigned to the 23d 

Infantry in New York State. There, as an additional duty, he fi·equently 

inspected the training activities of the National Guards of New York and 

Massachusetts, gaining an appreciation for issues involving civilian 

volunteers. Following a third tour in the Philippines, he attended the 

Army School of the Line (191 0) and the Staff College ( 1911 ), both at 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which he completed with distinction. 

While at Fort Leavenworth, the Army school system was the focus 

of intense scrutiny. The Inspector General himself, Brig. Gen. Ernest A. 

Garlington, criticized the Army Schoo.! of the Line as being excessively competitive, which placed tremendous pressure on students to beat 

out their colleagues in class rankings. Drum remembered his experience at the school as the toughest but most important of his life. What 

he had learned was to assure him a significant place in the great events 

about to unfold. He was selected after graduation to serve on General 

Frederick Funston's staff on the Mexican border and later on the expedition to Vera Cruz. Funston had specifically requested Drum because 

of his growing reputation as an untiring worker and skilled staff planner. After the Vera Cruz expedition returned to the United States, Drum 

remained on Funston's staff at Fort Sam Houston. When the Funston 

died unexpectedly, the new commander, Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing, 

retained Drum as his chief planner. 

In this position Drum worked out the plans for the defense of the 

Rio Grande frontier and the mobilization and concentration of the 

National Guard during the Pancho Villa crisis of 1916. Pershing was so 

impressed by Drum's performance that he selected him to be a member 

of the advance party that went with him to France after the United 

States declared war on Germany in April 1917. There, in less than two 

years, Drum rose from captain to brigadier general, finishing the war as 

497 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

the First Army's chjef of staff. His accomplishments were responsible 

for much of the success of the American forces. He first drafted the disembarkation plans and selected the ports to be used by the American 

Expeditionary Forces. Thereafter, he headed a group that drew up the 

training programs for the officers and men arriving in Europe. 

Concurrently, Dnrm developed the U.S. strategy for deployment on the 

Western Front. He wrote the rules of engagement for the United States 

forces while also participating on several of Maj. Gen. Andre 

Brewster's inspection teams evaluating combat divisions. 

While General Pershing dealt with his allied counterparts, Drum 

supervised the activation of the First Army. He had the primary role in 

both the planning for and the execution of the St. Mihiel and Argonne 

offensives. His handling of the complexities of the shift fi·om one axis 

of advance to the other was instrumental in assuring effective American 

operations. Drum continued to play a major role when Maj. Gen. 

Hunter Liggett took over the First Army from Pershing's nominal command, successfully unraveling the numerous serious logistical problems encountered in the prolonged Argonne operations. At war's end 

Pershing rated Drum as being in the top 9 percent of all the generals 

who had served in the AEF. 

Drum returned to the United States to spend three years as the 

director of training for the School of the Line at Fort Leavenworth. He 

was credited with being the major postwar influence on the curriculum 

and programs of the school, where he imposed the doctrine of open 

warfare that he and Pershing had adopted in France. He further expanded the philosophy of the school to embrace the concept of preparing 

officers for command as well as staff. After rejuvenating the staff colleges in 1922, Drum spent the last half of the year inspecting elements 

of the New York National Guard. Then came some schooling at Fort 

Monroe, Virginia, after which Drum was assigned to the War 

Department G- 3. There he spent most of his time embroiled in the Col. 

William ("Billy") Mitchell affair and related investigations of the organizational relationships of the Army Air Corps. Dnun was a strong 

advocate of Army control of air power, and he successfully persuaded 

Congress and the WaJ Department not to create a separate air force. He 

then spent four years in the I st Division stationed in New York City, 

ultimately rising to conunand it in 1929. On 12 January 1930 he was 

appointed Major General, The Inspector General of the Army, replacing Maj. Gen. William C. Rivers. 

After General Drum left the Inspector General's Department, he 

commanded the Fifth Corps Area at Fort Hayes, Ohio, until he was 

498 
APPENDIX C 

recalled to Washington in February 1933 to serve as Chief of Staff 

General Douglas MacArthur's deputy. Again, the bulk of his time was 

spent on Army aviation matters, leading to the establishment of a separate air force general headquarters. On two occasions Drum was overlooked for the position of Chief of Staff, being beaten out by Malin 

Craig and then George C. Marshall. He was bitterly disappointed but 

continued to serve, first as the commander of the Hawaiian Division 

and then of the First Army in the early days of World War II. He retired 

from the Army in October 1943, shortly thereafter becoming the president of the Empire State Corporation. He was also appointed conunander of the New York State Guard by Governor Thomas E. Dewey in 

1944, a position he held until 1948. Drum died in his office in the 

Empire State Building on 3 October 1951. 

Elliot L. Johnson, "The Military Experiences of General Hugh A. Drum From 

1898- 1918" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1975); Dictionary of 

American Biography, Supp. 5, s.v. "Drum, Hugh Aloysius;" Current Biography: Who s 

News and Wh)~ 1941, s.v. "Drum, Hugh Aloysius"; "General Hugh A. Drum Dies at 

Desk at 72," Neu' York Times, 4 Oct 51, pp. I, 33. 

HELMICK. Eli A. (1863-1945) 

Born near Terre Haute, Indiana, on 27 September 1863, Helmick 

migrated with his family by covered wagon in 1869 to southeastern 

Kansas, where his father farmed and served as the local doctor. In J 884 

he graduated from the Kansas State Agricultural College in Manhattan, 

having performed so well as a member of the school's cadet corps that 

he was encouraged to apply to the U.S. Military Academy. Accepted, he 

entered West Point in August. While there, he began to form some of 

his ideas on leadership, mindful of the practices he did not approve of 

in the cadet corps. At graduation in 1888 he was commissioned a second lieutenant and joined the 4th Infantry at Fort Spokane, Washington, 

serving until mid-1893 in various capacities, to include commander of 

the Indian Scout Company. For the last six months of 1893 he served 

as the security officer at the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago. 

He later said the need to handle large crowds with a few men introduced him to another style of leadership and persuasion, which added 

to his own growing views of how to manage people. 

For several years he had an approved application for college duty 

on file. He had hoped to return to Kansas State but instead was sent to 

Hillsdale College in Michigan. He bumped the other contender for that 

duty assig1unent, Capt. George L. Brown. This must have influenced 

499 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-193 9 

Brown because, as Helmick's commander in the Philippines, he wrote 

the only critical report on his duty performance contained in his file. 

While this was going on, Helmick was transferred to the I Oth Infantry, 

with which he was to serve for many years. He did a good job with the 

cadet corps at Hillsdale, consistently receiving praise from inspectors 

on their annual visits. However, the school was Baptist in its affiliation 

and largely pacifist in its attitude. In May 1896 Helmick, a first lieutenant since the preceding December, requested that he be relieved and 

that the military department be discontinued due to a lack of institution 

interest and support, with which the Department of the Lakes IG, Lt. 

Col. Peter D. Vroom, concurred. The military unit was c losed on the 

Hillsdale campus, and Helmick was reassigned to the I Oth Infantry at 

Fort Reno, Oklahoma Territory. 

Working with the soldiers of the I Oth Infantry further expanded his 

views on proper leadership . . He later said it was there that he learned to 

appreciate the enlisted man's viewpoint, without which " it is not possible to lead or command him with the fullest success." l-1 is theories were 

put to the test when the regiment left Fort Reno for Cuba on 20 April 

1898. While en route to Tampa, Florida, the port of embarkation, 

Helmick was appointed to his first staff job as regimental quartermaster. He would have preferred to have remained in the line, but characteristically did well in his new job. He served with the I Oth Infantry in 

the early part of the operations against Santiago and then was reassigned as an engineer officer of the 2d Brigade, I st Division, of Maj. 

Gen. (Vol.) William R. Shafter's Fifth Corps. He was cited for gallantry 

while performing those duties and later was awarded a Silver Star " for 

personal bravery and exhibition of iron fortitude and endurance." 

At the end of hostilities he returned to Montauk, Long Island, New 

York, with the brigade headquarters, where he served as the camp ordnance officer until he was ordered back to Fort Reno on 30 September 

to close out the lOth Infantry's business. When two h·oops of the 6th 

Cavalry were sent to garrison the post, he was authorized to return to his 

regiment in Cuba, leaving on 6 February 1899. During his fina l brief 

stay at Fort Reno he had served simultaneously as the quartermaster, 

ordnance, post exchange, signal, commissary, and recreation officer. 

Shortly after returning to Cuba, he was promoted to captain and 

assigned to the staff of the Department of Matanzas and Santa Clara, 

commanded by the able and magnetic Brig. Gen. (Vol.) James H. 

Wilson with whom he became lifelong friends. He performed a variety 

of duties, but most of his time was spent as the department's acting 

inspector and the Provincial Rural Guard inspector. This was the first 

500 
APPENDIX C 

of several assignments in the inspectorate, each of increasing scope. 

General Wilson considered him "first class ... , a serious, sober, dignified and intelligent gentleman." Helmick said working for Wilson 

was one of the great experiences of his career. Under him he learned 

sound management and supervisory techniques, as well as the virtues 

of "organized" hard work. 

Helmick was able to apply what he had learned when the I Oth 

Infantry redeployed to the Philippines in February 190 I. He became the 

military governor of Puerto Princessa on the island of Palawan. He 

filled a vacuum left by the fading insurrecto authorities and for a year 

and a half was the sole source of law and order on that part of the 

island. With little more than his family and a few soldiers to support 

him, he found he had to develop another style of leadership to handle 

the native population. In July 1902, after civil authorities assumed 

much of the Army's role in government, Helmi ck took his company 

back to regimental headquarters at Cotabato on Mindanao. This was 

more hostile country. After a month's adjustment, he was in active field 

operations for the remainder of the year. He commanded a provisional 

battalion in the operations around Lake Lanao. Helmick's regimental 

commander praised him for a good performance, remarking he was 

especially effective with both American and native troops. 

The regiment returned to the United States in 1903, and that fall 

Helmick was sent to Springfield, Massachusetts, as a recruiting officer. 

Here he was exposed to another type of soldier, requiring a different 

type of leadership again. Finding his recruiting duties light, he did considerable work with the 2d Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry Regiment. 

He was impressed by the old traditions of the unit and the dedication of 

its members. He prepared several papers for them, one of which, 

"Remarks on the Insh·uction of a Company in the Field Service," was 

published as a brigade circular. He also was perfecting his German so 

that before his next assignment he could go on leave to Germany to 

observe a German garrison in training. He thus spent the winter of 

1905- 06 in Gottingen, attached to the 82d Kur Hessischen Regiment. 

His report on his experiences appeared in the October 1906 issue of the 

Journal of the United States Infanfl y Association. 

He returned from Europe in time to deploy with the lOth ln f~1ntry 

to Alaska, where he spent two years as a post or company commander 

at Fort Liscum. The only excitement during the tour was when he had 

to take his company to Keystone Canyon on riot duty in September 

1907. Otherwise, duties were normal, although he traveled a great deal, 

inspecting Army signal sites and living conditions among the Indians. 

SO l 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

He also found the time to translate French and German military articles 

for the War Department General Staff's Division of Information. When 

he left Alaska in August I 908 for the Army School of the Line at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, his battalion commander called him a "very 

desirable and efficient officer" in peace and war. 

He did well at Fort Leavenworth, although he did not like the competitiveness and unnecessary pressure put on the students, and was 

immediately accepted for the Army Wru· College after his June 1909 

graduation. Before reporting, he spent the month of August as an adviser at a National Guard encampment, which again stimulated his 

thoughts on how to lead and motivate people over whom one had no 

direct authority. His performance was equally good at the War College, 

which he enjoyed a great deal more. He was recommended for duty as 

a service school tactics instructor or as an inspector general when he 

graduated in October I 910. Instead, he returned briefly to the 1Oth 

Infantry and then on 29 March 191 J, recently promoted to major, was 

assigned as a brigade adjutant in the new Maneuver Division. He had 

no sooner learned his duties than he was picked up for a detail in the 

Inspector General's Department on 27 May. With the exception of less 

than three years, the rest of his service, until his retirement in 1927, 

would be as a member of the inspectorate. After orientation in 

Washington, he was assigned as an assistant inspector to the Central 

Division, based in Chicago. 

The entire Army was still feeling the effects of the I 903 Root 

reforms, with their increased training and personnel standards. 

Inspectors, Helmick found, carried a major burden in explaining them 

to the field while evaluating and reporting on them to the War 

Department. This turbulence, coupled with the growing tensions with 

Mexico, made the Central Division an exciting place to be. The situation emphasized to Helmick how important to the commander a good 

inspector could be in a large complex organization. In May L 914 he was 

assigned as senior inspector to the newly formed 2d Division on the 

Texas coast. While his assistant, Maj. Alexander Dade, accompanied 

the division elements to Vera Cruz, Mexico, Helmick stayed behind to 

assure forward support and to cope with the effects of a devastating 

tropical storm on the division camps. When Maj. Gen. J. Franklin Bell 

replaced Maj. Gen. Frederick Funston as commander, He lmick devised 

a comprehensive inspection and training evaluation program for him. 

Bell remarked that Helmick ranked highest in ability, merit, and character of all the majors in the division. Helmick's experiences with Bell 

caused him to think seriously about systematizing tactical inspections 

502 
APPENDIX C 

and evaluations. His developed views were to prove invaluable during 

the 1916 and 1917 mobi I izations. 

Helmick next served as a battalion conu11ander on the Mexican 

border with the 27th and 28th Infantry, receiving his promotion to lieutenant colonel in July 191 6. Jn September he returned to the Inspector 

General's Department, this time on General Frederick Funston's staff in 

the Southern Department. Promoted to colonel in May 1917, he was 

transferred in June to the Southeastern Department under Maj. Gen. 

Leonard Wood. Both generals considered him dedicated and "excellent 

in drilling, instructing and handling men." At both commands and also 

at the Office of the Inspector General itself, he became actively 

engaged in the inspection and evaluation of National Guard and, later, 

National Army divisions and their cantonments. He developed an effective system to inspect an entire regiment in three days, without wasting 

any of the soldiers' time, which subsequently was published as a guide 

for other inspectors. On his judgment rested not only the careers of 

senior officers but also the determination of shipping priorities to 

France for the units he inspected. 

His exceptional performance was recognized with rapid promotions to temporary brigadier general in February 19 18 and to temporary major general in July, when he assumed command of the newly 

formed 8th Division at Camp Fremont, California. His tenure was 

marked by a rise in division morale and the initiation of numerous 

innovative training ideas. His successful techniques had the division 

ready for deployment in record time, and he took the advance party 

to France just before the armistice. Because of the end of hostiliti es 

the division's main body did not sail, and GeneJal Helmick and most 

of his staff were assigned to the huge Base Section No. 5 at Brest. Lt. 

Gen. Robert L. Bullard, wartime commander of the Second Army, 

later conunented that soon after Helmick's arrival, things improved to 

the point that there was no basis for complaint. After the war he was 

awarded the Distinguished Service Medal for "brilliant administrative ability and energy in successfully directing the manifold activities" of the port, at whi ch time he demonstrated his largess by crediting his inspector, Col. Walter L. Reed, a future The Inspector 

General, for ferreting out the problems and solving them while they 

were manageable. 

in March 1921 Helmick was promoted to permanent brigadier general. His brilliant performance led to his appointment as the Acting 

Inspector General on 5 July 1921 and as Major General, Inspector 

General of the Army, on 7 November 1921, replacing Maj. Gen. John 

503 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

L. Chamberlain. He was the first officer not a member of the old permanent department to become the senior inspector and, with the title 

change in 1924, the first to be known as The Inspector General. He 

served in this capacity until 27 September 1927. During his tenure he 

confirmed his reputation as a leading authority on the psychology of 

leadership and leadership techniques. Most manuals on the topics were 

referred to him before publishing. His lectures and views on the subject 

were often quoted in military and civilian publications. After his retirement in 1927, he entered the insurance business for several years and 

was very active in Washin&rton civic affairs. He eventually moved to 

Honolulu, Hawaii, where he died on 13 January 1945. 

Eli A. llelmick, "From Reveille to Retreat: An Autobiography of Major General Eli 

A. Helmick." custody of U.S. Army Military llistory Institute Archives (MHI), Carlisle 

Barracks, Pa., and copy at East Carolina University Archives, Greenville, N.C.; lnterv, 

author with C. Helmick, 3 Feb 83, Inspector General Collection, MHI; File ACP 1888, 

Record Group (RG) 94, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), 

Washington, D.C.; File 350.00 I, Entry 268. RG 159, NARA; Eli A. Helmick, Cullum 

Files, U.S. Military Academy Archives; Robert L. Bullard, Personalities tmd 

Reminiscences of the 11~11' (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1925), p. 335: 

Association of Graduates, USMA, Assembly, Jul 46, pp. 4 5; ''Oificial Orders," Army 

and Navy J(mmal, I Oct 27, p. 89; "Promotions and Retirements," Army and Navy 

Joumal, 12 Nov 21 , p. 253; George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of the Officers 

and Graduates of the U.S. Milif(//JI Academy . .. , various vols., No. 3276. 

PETERSON, Virgil L (1882- 1956) 

Peterson was born in Campbellsville, Kentucky, on September 1882. 

After graduating from Centre College in 1902, he taught school for two 

years before being admitted to the U.S. Military Academy. At graduation in 1908 he was commissioned a second lieutenant and joined the 

3d Battalion of Engineers at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he performed unit duties as well as some short map-making tours in Ohio and 

Indiana. In November 1910, after completing a fourteen-month course 

at the Engineer School then in Washington, D.C., he was assigned to the 

new Maneuver Division at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Promoted to first 

lieutenant in February 19 1 I, he began a three-year tour in November in 

the Philippines and completed numerous major engineering tasks there, 

including a topographical survey of the islands. He also served as Maj. 

Gen. J. Franklin Bell's aide from September 1913 to September 1914 

while continuing to supervise various engineering projects. 

At the end of 1914 Peterson returned to the United States, where he 

commanded engineer companies in Washington, D.C., and on the 

504 
APPENDIX C 

Mexican border, rising to captain in February 1915. In April 1917 he 

went with his company briefly to Washington, receiving his promotion 

to temporary major in June. He subsequently assumed command of the 

9th Engineers and later the 8th Engineer Battalion (Mounted), both at 

El Paso, Texas, earning his promotion to temporary lieutenant colonel 

in December. In the spring of 19 18 he returned to the East. From April 

to August, when he was promoted to temporary colonel, he commanded the 4th Engineers Training Camp at Camp Lee, Virginia, and then 

the Engineer School now located at Camp Humphreys, Virginia, until 

June 1920. He became noted for his innovative techniques and was 

credited with improving engineer training while shortening the length 

of the course. 

After reverting to his permanent grade of major in May 1920, he 

was assigned to various engineer districts in New England, serving 

most of his time as Providence district engineer. From 1924 to 1925 he 

completed the General Service Schools course at Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas, where he remained as an instructor until July 1929. At this time 

he returned to Washington, D.C., to become the first National Capitol 

assistant director of public buildings and parks and subsequently the 

chief of the Miscellaneous Civil Section in the Office of the Chief of 

Engineers, earning his promotion to lieutenant colonel in November 

193 J. From August 1932 to June 1933 he was a student at the Army 

War College and, after graduating, became the Los Angeles district 

engineer. ln February 1934 he assumed command of the 3d Engineers 

at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. 

I le returned to the United States in 1936 to become the district 

engineer of the Detroit River and Harbor District, receiving his promotion to colonel in October. He was reassigned as the chief of staff of the 

Sixth Corps Area at Fort Sheridan, lllinois, in March 1937. The corps 

area commander at the time was Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, who was 

impressed by Peterson's performance. Drum's recommendations were 

instrumental in Peterson's appointment to Major General, The J nspector 

General of the Army, on 24 December 1939, replacing Maj. Gen. 

Walter L. Reed. 

Assuming his duties 9 February 1940, Peterson served as The 

Inspector General for the duration of World War [J. He was credited 

with seeing more men, maneuvers, and facilities than any other officer 

in the Army. The scale and pressures of the job began to affect his 

health to the point that he agreed only to the extension of his detail until 

the war was over. After suffering a heart attack, he was reassigned in 

June 1945 to the Army Service Forces, serving as director of personnel 

505 
THE INSPECTORS G ENERAL, 1903-1939 

until his medical retirement 28 February 1946. Ilc lived in retirement 

in Washington, D.C., where he died on 15 February 1956. 

"Obituaries," Army and Navy Journal, 25 reb 56, p. 27; "Virgil L. Peterson," New 

York Times, 16 reb 56, p. 29; "1 100 Inspectors General Form Elite Corps of Anny," 

Jtla ~!tington Daily Neu•s, 6 May 44, p. 7; "Virgi l L. Peterson- Inspector General Reports 

on All Phases of Army," Washington Post, I I Feb 43, p. B I; George W. Cullum, 

Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. ;\1/i/itary Academy . .. , 

various vols., No. 4644; Association of Graduates, USMA, Assembly, Jut 56, pp. 81- 82; 

Biography File, llistorian's Office Archives, U.S. Am1y Corps of Engineers, Fort 

Belvoir, Va. 

PRESTON,John F. (1872-1960) 

The son of a prominent lawyer, Preston was born in Baltimore, 

Maryland, on 5 November 1872. He completed his education at the 

City College in 1890 and subsequently attended the U.S. Military 

Academy, commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1894. He served 

with the 16th Infantry in Utah and Washington, spending part of the 

time as a quartermaster and commissary officer. Promoted to first 

lieutenant in April 1898, he deployed in June with his regiment to 

Cuba, where he saw action at San Juan Hill- he received the Silver 

Star for leading his men in the charge on the enemy's works on I 

July- and at Santiago. He remained in Cuba until September and then 

returned brie fly to the United States. ln May 1899 he deployed with 

his regiment to the Philippines, where he participated in five engagements against the insurrectos. From 1900 to 190 I he performed revenue and provost duties in the islands. A captain since February 190 I, 

he took command of Company F, 26th Infantry, on 5 September. After 

six months with the company, he was appointed adjutant general of the 

4th Separate Brigade. 

In July 1903 Preston returned to the United States, where he performed various regimental duties at Fort Sam 11ouston, Texas; briefly 

commanded Fort Brown, Texas; and served at the I 904 St. Louis 

Exposition. ln May 1907 he returned to the Philippines with the 26th 

lnfantry, servi ng as a company and batta lion commander. In June 1909 

he was reassigned to command Fort Brady, Michigan. In March 191 I 

he was detailed to the Pay Department at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, during 

which time he served as paymaster for the Maneuver Division at Fort 

Sam Houston, Texas. He returned to Fort Sam Houston in November 

I 9 I 2, where he was post quartermaster. In March 191 3 he became the 

506 
APPENDIX C 

quartermaster of the Southern Department, where he acquired extensive experience in finance and disbursing activities. He next joined the 

4th Infantry at Galveston, Texas, in August 1914, serving with it on the 

Mexican border until he was appointed inspector-instructor of the Texas 

state troops in July 1916. He returned to the 4th Infantry, a major, and 

moved with it to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, in June 1917. 

Preston was promoted quickly to temporary colonel and transferred in September 1917 to Camp Devens, Massachusetts, to command the 303d fnfantry, 76th Division. He organized, trained, and 

deployed to France with this unit in July 1918. He commanded the 

regiment at the St. Amand Training District until October, when he 

took over the 152d Infantry Brigade. His commander cited him for his 

thorough administrative knowledge and exceptional tactical abilities. 

The 303d was known for its sharp organization and good discipline. 

Preston was noted for his popularity, "pleasant personality and gentle 

manners." Shortly after the a rmistice he was assigned to command the 

327th Infantry, 82d Division, which he led until returning from overseas with it in May 1919. He briefly commanded the 63d Infantry at 

Madison Barracks, New York, and then attended the School of the 

Line (distinguished graduate 1920) and the General Staff School 

( 1921) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Promoted to permanent colonel 

in July 1920, he remained as an instructor at the StafT School until 

August 1922. He subsequently attended the Army War College in 

Washington, D.C. 

Graduating in June 1923, Preston was assigned to the Eighth Corps 

Areas headquarters at Fort Sam Houston, serving briefly as the G- 3 

and then as the chlef of stafT until October 1926. After infantry refresher training at Fort Benning, Georgia, he returned to Fort Sam Houston 

and assumed command of the I st Infantry. He deployed with it to Fort 

Francis E. Warren, Wyoming, in June 1927 and then was detailed to the 

Inspector General's Department on 20 November 1928. He served as 

the executive officer in the Office of The Inspector General until 

appointed Major General, The Inspector General of the Army, on I 

December 193 L, replacing Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Drum. 

After his four-year detail, General Preston sought to be appointed as governor ofthe Soldiers' Home. When that fai led, he reverted 

to his permanent grade of colonel and returned to Fort Sam Houston. 

There, he served as corps area c ivilian components officer until his 

retirement on 30 November 1936. He entered banking in San Antonio 

thereafter, eventually rising to become director of one of the largest 

banks in the city. He retired again in 1950 and died in San Antonio on 

507 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

I July 1960. Good natured, able, and well liked, General Preston 

brought an unusually broad range of experience to the Inspector 

General's Department. 

John F. Preston. Cullum Files, U.S. Military Academy Archives; File AG 201, St. 

Louis, Mo.; George W. Cullum, Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of 

tire U.S. Mili/{//y Academy ... , various vols., No. 3583. 

RfAD,Aivan C. (1873-1920) 

Although born in Marshall County, Tennessee, on II September 1873, 

Read came from an old Louisiana family and grew up in that state, the 

son of a Baton Rouge lawyer. He graduated from Louisiana State 

University in 1892 and taught school while earning a master's degree, 

which he received the next year. He entered the U.S. Military Academy 

in 1894 and graduated early with the rest of his class in April 1898, 

commissioned as a second lieutenant. He joined the 13th Infantry at 

Tampa in May, deployed to Cuba, and saw action at San Juan Hill and 

at Santiago. Diagnosed as having yellow fever on 12 July, he returned 

to the United States, finally rejoining his regiment at Fort Porter, New 

York, on 1 November. The 13th Infantry had suffered heavily in Cuba, 

leading to Read's promotion to first lieutenant in March 1899, a month 

before the unit deployed to the Philippines. Read fought in nine 

engagements in central Luzon, being cited again "for marked coolness, intelligence, efficiency and gallant conduct under fire." He further distinguished himself organizing civil government in the town of 

San Manuel. 

He returned to the United States in May 1902 for a year's duty at 

the Alcatraz Disciplinary Barracks, earning his promotion to captain in 

December. In April 1903 he assumed command of a company in the 

12th Infantry at Whipple Barracks, Arizona, and in September he 

accepted a four-year assignment as professor of military science and 

training at his old alma mater, during which time the visiting inspectors 

praised him in their reports for running an excellent, well-received program. In September 1907 he returned to the 12th Infantry at Fort Jay, 

New York, deploying with it to the Philippines in June 1909. He commanded his company for most of this period, occasionally acting as battalion or regimental adjutant. Read next attended the Army School of 

the Line at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from August 19 J I to June 19 J 2. 

In November 1912 he was assigned as a major in the Puerto Rico 

Regiment. Jn August 191 5 he joined the 9th lnfanh·y on the Mexican 

508 
APPENDIX C 

border at Laredo, Texas, serving there as executive officer until May 

1917. He was promoted to temporary lieutenant colonel and reassigned 

to Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, where he was senior instructor and 

later commandant of an officers training camp. 

Read was detailed to the Inspector General's Department in 

November 1917, leaving for France the next month to become the 1st 

Division IG. He was promoted to temporary colonel on 9 May 1918. 

During June and July he attended the Langres Genera l Staff College. 

Thereafter he worked at the Advanced Headquarters, American 

Expeditionary Forces, and in November became the Third Army and 

later American Forces in Germany IG. He served in that capacity 

until his untimely death from influenza on 19 January 1920. As Maj. 

Gen. Andre W. Brewster, the AEF IG, had remarked earlier, Read's 

"able handling of his important duties assured prompt and adequate 

means were always provided for improving conditions .... " The 

cheerful and well-liked inspector would have been pleased with such 

an epitaph. 

Alvan C. Read, Cullum Files, U.S. Military Academy Archives; Fijiy-first Annual 

Report o.f the Association o.f Graduates o.f the United States MilitCtiJ' Academy, 14 Jun 

20, pp. 117- 21; "Recent Deaths: Alvan Chambliss Read," Army and Navy Joumal, 7 

Feb 20, p. 698. 

REED, Walter L (1 877-1956) 

The son of the famed Army doctor, Reed was born at Fort Apache, 

Arizona, on 4 December 1877. He traveled with his family and completed his education in the District of Columbia schools and at the RandolphMacon Academy. He worked as a bookkeeper for a District of Columbia 

fuel dealer for over two years before entering the Army. In early 1898 

Reed applied for a direct commission, but the advent of the War with 

Spain led him to enlist in C Battery, 2d Artillery, at Washington Barracks 

on 17 June 1898. He served with the battery for the next three months at 

Fort Warren, Massachusetts, rising to the grade of quartermaster 

sergeant. The battery deployed to Cuba in August for occupation duty, 

and in May 1899 Reed was transferred to N Battery as first sergeant. 

During that period he again applied for a commission. His battery and 

regimental commanders, both Civil War veterans and c01mades of 

Secretary of War Russell A. Alger, enthusiastically supported his request. 

Other officers providing support included Surgeon General George M. 

Sternberg, Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler, and Col. Leonard Wood. 

509 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Although he asked to stay in the artillery, Reed was commissioned 

as a second lieutenant on 25 July 1900 and assigned to the lOth 

Infantry. His assignment to that regiment began a lifelong, warm association with Capt. Eli A. Helmick, who came to look upon the younger 

man as his protege. In February 190 I the unit returned from Cuba to 

Fort Robinson, Nebraska, where Reed was appointed quartermaster 

and commissary officer for the 2d Battalion. Deployed to the 

Philippines in March, his unit arrived in time to participate in the Lake 

Lanao operations, eventually going into garrison at Cotabato on 

Mindanao. There, Reed served as provost and town treasurer in addition to his assigned logistical tasks. At his own request, he was reassigned to Company G on ll December 1902. He served with that company even after returning to the Presidio of San Francisco in 

September 1903. He was promoted to first lieutenant in January 1904 

and in April assumed command of Company M and then in July of 

Company A at Fort Lawton, Washington. In February 1906 he received 

new orders for recruiting service at Columbus Barracks, Ohio, where 

he commanded a training company and escorted groups to their new 

units. He was cited for a superb job managing the huge general mess 

at Columbus Barracks. 

In August 1908 he rejoined his own regiment at Fort Benjamin 

Harrison, Indiana. He served as regimental and post adjutant until 

December, when he was made post exchange officer. Along with the 

retail store and other concessions, he oversaw the management of a 

farm and diary. Throughout 1909 he periodically served as post or unit 

adjutant while continuing with his PX functions. The same held true 

after he was assigned in June 19 10 to Company C. He finally shed his 

PX duties in March 1911 , when the I Oth Infantry relocated to Fort Sam 

Houston, Texas, to be part of the new Maneuver Division until June. In 

September the regiment next moved to the Canal Zone. Company C 

was stationed at Camp E. S. Otis, Las Cascades, where Reed, as the 

company executive, managed the unit funds and mess and, as cited in 

the inspectors' reports, demonstrated "excellent business sense." 

Promoted to captain in April 1914, Reed assumed command of his 

company in July. He held this position until October, when he left for 

the United States. 

Reed had requested duty with the militia in Maryland or Virginia in 

order to be c lose to home. The best that could be done was to assign 

him as an inspector-instructor to the New Jersey National Guard, with 

duty station at Newark. He was so successful working with the Guard 

that he was elected major of the 4th New Jersey lnfantry at the time of 

5 10 
APPENDIX C 

the 1916 call-up. He could not accept the state commission, so the governor issued it as an honor instead. Reed was on several inspection 

teams in I 916, observing mobilized guard units in Florida and Georgia 

and ended the year as a mustering officer, demobilizing New Jersey 

units. He reversed the process in the first months of 191 7, recalling 

units. Promoted to temporary major in July, he remained with the New 

Jersey Guard until October, when he was assigned to the Inspector 

General's Department in Washington. 

Receiving his promotion to temporary lieutenant colonel in May 

1918, he joined the 7th Division at Camp MacArthur, Texas, in 

August, serving as its inspector. In September the unit deployed to 

France. In October, when Regular Army officers were taken from 

division-level IG positions, he became the assistant lG at the Second 

Army. 1n February 1919 he was transferred to Base Section No.5 at 

Maj. Gen. Eli A. Helmick's request, serving as the inspector until the 

base was closed and receiving his promotion to temporary colone l in 

May. He then moved to the dwindling American Expeditionary Forces 

IG office and eventually became the American Forces in France 

inspector. He returned to the United States in 1920, becoming a permanent lieutenant colonel in July, and embarked upon several years of 

schooling- School of the Line, 1921; General Staff School, 1922; 

Army War College, 1923; and Naval War College, 1924. He remained 

at the Naval War College as an instructor until June 1928, when he 

was assigned as executive officer of the 29th Infantry at Fort 

Benning, Georgia. His promotion to permanent colonel was eifective 

in May 1930. He assumed command of the 12th Infantry at Fort 

Howard, Maryland, in January 1933, serving in that position until 

detailed to the Inspector General's Department in October 1934. He 

served as its executive officer in Washington unti I 1 December 1935, 

when he was appointed Major General, The Inspector General of the 

Army, replacing Maj. Gen. John F. Preston. His tour ended 23 

December 1939, and he retired 30 April 1940. General Reed was 

reca lled to active duty in April 1942 as a member of the War 

Department Personnel Board, headed by former Chief of Staff 

General Malin Craig. He retired again on 25 June 1946 and lived in 

Washington, D.C. until his death on I May 1956. 

File AG 197038, Record Group 94, National Archives and Records Administration, 

Washington, D.C.; "Obituaries," Army. Navy, Air Force Journal, 5 May 56, p. 32; Mark 

S. Wa1son, Chief o.f Staff: Prell'ar Plans and Preparations (Washinglon, D.C.: 

II istorical Division, Departmenl oft he Army, 1950), p. 252; Who Was Who in American 

llisto1y The Militwy, s.v. "Reed, Walter Lawrence." 

5 11 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

RIVERS, William C. (1866-1943) 

Rivers was born in Pulaski, Tennessee, on 11 January 1866. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1887, four years after his older 

brother, Tyree, for whom he was nicknamed. Commissioned as a second lieutenant, he began his service with M Troop of the I st Cavalry as 

part of the first Army unit to assume control of Yellowstone National 

Park. He quickly learned a new style of leadership, dealing with tourists 

and recalcitrant ranchers and hunters over whom he held only the powers of persuasion. After performing as a unit supply officer in the field 

during the Ghost Dance campaign of 1890- 91, he returned to the East 

for a two-year assignment as West Point's quartermaster. During his 

next tour as the Indian agent for the White Mountain Apaches in 

Arizona, he kindled a respect and empathy for native peoples that 

became a permanent part of his outlook, further broadening his capacity to cope with the unusual. He was promoted to first lieutenant in 

August 1894. 

In June 1898 he deployed with his regiment to Cuba, briefly serving in the Santiago campaign until invalided home to Montauk Point, 

New York, with malaria. His first opportunity to influence the 

Inspector General's Department came in the fall , when he served as 

recorder on the board that developed the regulations for the new Army 

Transport Service. 

Rivers, a captain since February 190 I, achieved considerable 

prominence throughout the Army thereafter as the Military Academy's 

adjutant for the four years up to 1903. This was a time of major construction on the campus, and he was responsible for much of the administrative detail. Tt was also his lot to organize the spectacular West 

Point's centennial celebration in 1902, which involved graduates and 

foreign dignitaries from around the world. One of River's most pleasant achievements derived from this. Because of the anniversary he 

revived the virtually moribund Association of Graduates, personally 

writing letters and persuading most of the ex-Confederate graduates to 

return for the event, many of them for the first time since before the 

Civil War. 

Rivers was among the first group of officers selected to serve on the 

newly created War Department General Staff in 1903 and was assigned 

to the Philippines. He arrived after the official ending of the Insurrection, 

but quickJy noted numerous problems pertaining to civiJ affairs and pacification. Promoted to major in March 1911, he became increasingly 

involved with these issues. In 1912 he was transferred to the newly 

512 
APPENDIX C 

formed Philippine Constabulary as its inspector and later as its assistant 

chief, with the temporary rank of colonel. He served tlu·oughout the archipelago, participating in many minor engagements. During this period he 

gained a sympathy and respect for the Filipinos, whjcb in later Life was to 

make him an outspoken advocate for their independence. He rose to the 

rank of brigadier general when he was named chief of the Constabulary. 

But in 1914, under the provisions of the so-called Manchu Jaw, he reverted to his permanent grade. He returned to the United States, assigned to 

the 2d Cavalry at Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont. In July 1916 he received a 

double promotion to lieutenant colonel and colonel on the same day and 

assw11ed conunand of his regiment. 

When war was declared against Germany in April 1917, part of the 

2d was organized as the 18th Cavalry. Rivers remained with the new 

unit as its commander when it was redesignated as the 76th Field 

Artillery and assigned to the 3d Division. In France he led the 76th in 

every action in which his division was engaged, from Chateau Thierry 

to the Meuse-Argonne. He was cited with the Croix de Guerre by the 

French for his exceptional leadership in command of an extemporaneous group of fourteen batteries during the 1918 Battle of the Marne. He 

received the Distinguished Service Medal from the United States and 

in October 1918 was promoted again to temporary brigadier general to 

command the 5th Artillery Brigade. Rivers returned to the United 

States in mid-1919, once again reverting to colonel, this time to command the 12th Cavalry and the Subdistrict ofNew Mexico. In 1920 he 

assumed command of the 3d Cavalry, his last branch assignment, during which circumstances thrust him to the fore in 1921 as he organized 

and conducted the ceremonies and security measures incident to the 

burial of the first Unknown Soldier and also the Washington 

Disarmament Conference. 

His broad experience, flexible and sympathetic leadership, and 

strong organizational talents had marked him as a major candidate for 

high position. Accordingly, he was assigned as the Second Corps Area 

IG, based in New York City. This was traditionally the most important 

field office in the Inspector General's Department. On 27 September 

1927 he was appointed Major General, The Inspector General of the 

Army, replacing Maj. Gen. Eli A. Helmick and gaining a general officer's commission for the third time. 

On I l January 1930, because of age, he retired from the Army, at 

the time the oldest and longest serving officer and last member of his 

Class of 1887 on active duty. During his retirement General Rivers 

remained active, working as a volunteer for the Bishop Brent Fund. He 

513 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

also became a prolific writer on military and political subjects, particularly on the issue of early Philippine independence. He died at his 

wife's home in Fletcher, North Carolina, on 10 July 1943. 

Nathaniel F. McClure, cd., Class of 1887, United States Militmy Academy: A 

Biograpltical Volume (Washington, D.C.: P. S. 13ond Publishing Co., 193 7), pp. 163- 65; 

George W. Cullum, Biogmphical Register of the Officers <md Graduates of the U.S. 

Militmy Academy . .. , various vols., No. 3197; Frederic V. Hemenway, History of the 

Third Division USA in the World Jlfar (Andcrnach-on-thc-Rhine, 1919), pp. 253- 61; 

William C. Rivers, Cullum Files, U.S. Military Academy Archives; "Col. Rivers 

Succeeds llelmick," Army and Navy Journal, 27 Scp 27, p. 64. 

SPINKS, Marcellus G. (1874-1943) 

Born in Mississippi, Spinks was a coast artilleryman with extensive 

experience commanding units in his branch and with service on the 

War Department staff His classmates from West Point in 1898 included Fox Conner and Alvan C. Read among several others who wou ld 

become prominent staff officers in the American Expeditionary 

Forces. In September 1917 he was detailed as an inspector of the 90th 

Division at Camp Travis, Texas. In November he became 4th Division 

IG, and in March 1918 he was reassigned as an inspector in the 

Services of Supply, AEF, where the senior IG, Brig. Gen. John S. 

Winn, considered him to be "a superior officer in every way." On 1 

July 19 18 Maj. Gen. AndreW. Brewster, the AEF IG, designated him 

as his assistant, a position he held until returning to the United States 

in April 1919. Brewster judged him to be "an accomplished officer 

with excellent self-control ... , a respected leader." In November 

1930, after nearly ten years in branch assignments after the war, 

Spinks returned to the Inspector General's Department, where he 

served as Deputy Inspector General for four years and then as the 

Second Corps Area JG until his retirement in 1938. He was a strong 

contender for selection for the position ofThe Inspector General during that time. He died at Hampton, Virginia, on 28 November 1943. 

File 20 1.6EE, Record Group 407, National Archives and Records Administration, 

Washington, D.C.; Association of Graduates, USMA, Assembly, Jul44, p. 809. 

WOOD, William T. ( 1854-1943) 

The son of a Methodist minister, Wood was born in Trving, Illinois, on 

19 June 1854. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1877, 

514 
APPENDIX C 

commissioned as a second lieutenant, and was assigned to the 18th 

Infantry. He served with the 18th at locations throughout the West, 

except for three years as a professor of military science at Illinois 

Industrial College and two years on recruiting duty. A first lieutenant 

since October 1886, he served as the regimental quartermaster during 

this period, for which he was cited for his business sense and organization that set examples and resulted in Army-wide changes in commissary operations. In May 1898 Wood, a captain for four years, deployed 

with his regiment to the Philippines, where he was wounded in fighting 

around Manila and later received the Silver Star for "fortitude and gallantry on the field of battle." He then served as chief of ordnance for 

the Philippine Division, seeing more action during the Insurrection. 

From November 1899 to June 1900 he was the collector of customs and 

assistant treasurer in the island government. 

Wood ren.trned to the United States for recruiting duty and then, as a 

major, was reassigned to the 20th Infantry at Fort Sheridan, Illinois. 

While there, he successfully requested a detail to the Inspector General's 

Department under the new 190 I detail law. His former Philippine 

Division commander, Maj. Gen. Elwell S. Otis, supported his application, saying Wood was "thoroughly qualified for any duty .... Whenever 

we had a particularly difficult labor to petform, we seem to have selected Wood to do it." Wood first was assigned fi·om January 1904 to Jtme 

J 905 as the assistant to the Atlantic Division rG, Col. Ernest A. 

Garlington. When Garlington was reassigned to Manila, he asked specifically for Wood to accompany him. He wanted his assistance because of 

his infantry background and also because of his knowledge of money 

accountability. When the poor health of the Inspector General of the 

Army mandated Garlington's early ret11rn home in July 1906, Wood, a 

lieutenant colonel since February, was named the Philippine Division IG. 

He held this position during the final phases of the Manila Depot investigation and was cited by General Leonard Wood for doing exceptional 

work. Colonel Wood was reassigned in August 1907 to be Garlington's 

assistant at the Office of the Inspector General in Washington. He served 

there until July 1909, running the inspectorate during Garlington's 

absences. Wood was the first of the detailed officers to have his tour in 

the Inspector General's Department extended with a second consecutive 

detail. He ended this second tour as the Department of the East IG from 

July 1909 to March 1910, at which time he was promoted to colonel. 

He assumed command of the 19th Infantry at Camp Jossman in the 

Philippines, serving until July 1911. He then was reassigned to command the Recruit Depot at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, where he 

SIS 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

established a reputation as a kindly disciplinarian, alert to the welfare 

of his men, and also was successful in several confrontations with commercial interests to assure fairness in contracts and services. He was 

recommended for promotion, but a routine physical found him to be 

physically disqualified, and he was forced to retire on disabi lity in April 

1913. He then served as treasurer of the Soldiers' Home in Washington, 

D.C., until recalled to active duty on 16 May 1917. Brig. Gen. John L. 

Chamberlain, the Inspector General of the Army, wanted Wood to run 

the office as he had done for Garlington. Wood was promoted to 

brigadier general on 18 February 19 18. He continued to serve as the 

Deputy Inspector General until he retired again on 30 September 1920. 

He returned to the Soldiers' Home, where he was its secretary until 

1931. He died in Washington on 18 December 1943. Characterized as 

a kindly man with a warm personality, he was known as well for his 

extreme efficiency. General Chamberlain said of him, "Whenever I am 

called away, I never have to think of my office. Wood is there." 

File 4321 ACP 1877, Record Group 94, National Archives and Records 

Administration, Washington, D.C.; Association of Graduates, USMA, Assemb(l', Jul44, 

pp.3-4. 

516 
Bibliography 

Archival Collections 

The basis for any study of the Inspector General's Department in the 

first part ofthe twentieth century must be the extensive holdings of the 

National Archives and Records Administration in Washington, D.C. 

Record Group (RG) 159, Records of the Office of The Inspector 

General, is the greatest single source, for it includes copies of virtually 

all of the correspondence and the investigation and inspection reports, 

with supporting documents, generated during the period. A card index 

file developed by the Office of The Inspector General has survived, 

providing a good guide to the material. Knowledge of the Army's decimal filing system is essential to maximize use of the post- World War 

I files. Equally important to this study is RG 120, Records of the Office 

of the American Expeditionary Forces (World War I), which documents 

all IG and other operations in France during the war and in the postwar 

activities throughout Europe. IG correspondence or reactions thereto 

a lso can be traced in RG 94, Records of The Adjutant General's Office, 

l780s- 1917, and RG 407, Records of The Adjutant General's Office, 

1917- . These are so voluminous that they should be used only to track 

particular points not fully addressed in RGs 159 and 120. Also of some 

help are RG I 1 2, Records of the Office of The Surgeon General 

(Army); RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special 

Staffs; RG 393, Records of the U.S. Army Continental Commands, 

1821 - 1920; and RG 394, Records of the U.S. Army Continental 

Commands, 1920- 1942. 

These official records were greatly enhanced by various manuscripts and document collections in other repositories. The holdings of 

the U.S. Army Military History Institute (MI-11), Carlisle Barracks, 

Pennsylvania, contain the personal papers of several important officers 

who served as inspectors during the period under study, particularly 

those of Marcellus G. Spinks and Eli A. Helmick. Student papers by 

these officers and lectures given by them later as senior members of the 

Army may be found in the Army War College Curriculum Papers. The 

517 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

MHI Archives has in its custody General Helmick's autobiography, a 

copy of which is on file at the East Carolina University Archives, 

Greenville, North Carolina. lt also has a special IG collection, where 

the researcher will find most of the documentation acquired for this 

volume, including the tape-recorded interviews. Both the MHI 

Archives and the Army Library at the Pentagon, Arli ngton, Virginia, 

have large collections of published congressional and military documents and regulations pertaining to the Inspector General's Department 

that were essential to this study. Finally, excellent biographical material on many inspectors may be found in the holdings of the U.S. Military 

Academy, West Point, New York, particularly in its Cullum Files. 

Printed Documents 

Department of the Army. Historical Division. The United States Army 

in the World Wcu; 1917- 1919. 17 vols. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1948. 

Hunt, Irwin L. "American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 

1918- 1920: Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs." 

Mimeographed, 4 vols. Coblenz, J 920. Copy in Army Library, 

Pentagon, Arlington, Va. 

Ney, Virgil. The Evolution of the US. Army Field Manual- Valley 

F01ge to Vietnam. CORG- M- 244. AD820286. Cameron Station, 

Va.: Defense Document Center, 1966. 

Parsons, John R. , .Jr. "History of Inspection in the Armed Forces." 

Mimeographed. Headquarters, USAF, 1981. 

U.S. Army, American Expeditionary Forces. " Inspection of 

Administration, Disbursements, and Accounts." General 

Headquarters, AEF, 1918. OTIG files, Pentagon (SATG-ZXH). 

U.S. Army War College, Historical Section, The Genesis of the 

American First Army. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

Office, 1938. 

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Military Affairs. General 

Johnson Hagood on National Defense and the Reo1ganization of 

the Army . 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1933. 

---. Hearing on Staff Service of the Army, Term of Enlistment in the 

Army, General Service C01ps in the Army, Consolidation of 

Certain Branches of the War Department and the Army. 62d 

Cong., 1st Sess., 1911. 

---. Hearings on Army Re01ganization. 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 

1919. 

518 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

- --.Hearings on a Bill To Increase the Efficiency oft he Army. 58th 

Cong., I st Sess., 1902. 

---. Historical Documents Relating to the Re01ganization Plans of 

the War Department and to the Present National De:fense Act. 

69th Cong., 2d Sess., 1927. 

---. Relief of the Adjutant General of the Army From the Duties of 

His Office. 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 1912, H. Doc. 508 . 

. Report of War Policies Committee. 72d Cong., 2d Sess., 1932, 

H. Doc. 163. 

- --. Reports of Inspections of Disbursements and Transfers by 

Officers of the Army. Letter From the Secretwy of War Transmitting 

1352 Reports. 65th Cong., 3d Sess., 1919, H. Doc. 1559. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Military Affairs. Additional 

Testimony Relating to the Brownsville Affi·ay Taken by the 

Honorable Milton D. Purdy, Assistant to the Attorney General of 

the US., and Major Augustus P Blocksom, IGD, US. Army. 60th 

Cong., 1st Sess., 1908, S. Doc. 355. 

---. Affray at Brownsville, Texas. Hearings Before the Committee 

on Militcoy Affairs Concerning the Affirty at Brownsville, Texas, 

on the Night of August 13 and 14. 1906. Vols. 1 and 3, 59th Cong., 

2d Sess., J 907. 

---. Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances, 1903- 1922. 67th 

Cong., 2d Sess., 1922, S. Doc. 263. 

---.Hearing on S. 3792 To Re01ganize and Increase the Efficiency 

of the United States Army, and.for Other Pwposes. 66th Cong., 2d 

Scss., 1920. 

---. Hearings Before the Committee. 65th Cong., 2d Scss., 1918. 

---. Message From the President of the United States Transmitting 

a Leifer From tlte Secret(lly of War Containing Additional 

Testimony in the Brawnsville Case. 59th Cong., 2d Sess., 1907, S. 

Doc. 155, pt. 2. 

---. Message Fram the President of the United States Transmitting 

a Report With Several Documents, Including a Leiter of Geneml 

Nettleton, and Memoranda as to Precedents for the Summmy 

Dischcnge or Mustering Out of Regiments or Companies. 59th 

Cong., 2d Sess., 1906, S. Doc. 155. 

---. Personal Narrative of the General Staff System of the 

American Army by Major General William Harding Carter. 68th 

Cong., 1st Sess., 1925, S. Doc. 119. 

---. Politics of Our National Defense: Hist01y of the Action of 

Political Forces Within tl1e United States Which Has Shaped Our 

519 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

MilitWJ' National Defense Policies Form 1783 to 1940 Together 

With Document 107, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., 1906. 

---.Reorganization oftheArmy. 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 1917. 

---. Special Committee Investigating the National Defense 

Program. 80th Cong., 2d Sess., 1948, S. Doc. 440. 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Veterans Affairs. Medal of Honor 

Recipients, 1863- 1978. 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979. 

U.S. War Department. Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, United States 

Army, 1933. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 

1933. 

---. Annual Report of the Inspector General. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1900-40. 

---. Annual Report of the Secretcuy of War. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, I 900-40. 

---. Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, 

American Expeditioncuy Forces. Washington, D.C.: Government 

Printing Office, 1920. 

---. A Manual for Courts-Martial, 1921. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1920. 

---. Report of the Chief, Division of Militia Affairs, 1911. 

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1912. 

---. War Department Decimal File System. Rev. ed. Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943. 

U.S. War Department. Inspector General's Department. Report of an 

Inspection of the Several Branches of the National Home for 

Disabled Volunteer Soldiers. I 0 vols. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1896- 1919. 

---. A Guide for the Use of Officers of the Inspector General's 

Department, 1908. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

Office, 1908. 

U.S. War Department. Office of the Inspector General. Affray at 

Brownsville, Texas, August 13- 14, 1906. investigation of the 

Conduct of US. Troops. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

Office, 1906. 

---. Catechism of lnstmctions for Keeping the Record of 

Corre.spondence in the Various Offices at the Headquarters of 

MilitCIIy Posts, at Which the System of Record Keeping Prescribed 

Shall be Authorized by tl1e War Department. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1909. 

---. Compendium of Important Regulations, Orders, and 

Instructions of the War Department Relating to the Organization, 

520 
B IBLIOGRAPHY 

Equipment, and 1nstmction of the Field Artille1y. Washington, 

D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1906. 

- - - . A Guide for the Use of Officers of the Inspector General~· 

Department, 1911, Corrected to April 1, 1917. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1917. 

Books and Memoirs 

Allen, Frederick L. Only Yesterday. New York: Harper and Row 

Publishers, 1931. 

Allen, Henry T. My Rhineland Journal. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 

1923. 

---. The Rhineland Occupation. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill 

Co., 1927. 

Ambrose, Stephen E. Duly, Hon01; Count1y: A HistOIJ' of West Point. 

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966. 

- - - . Upton and the Army. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 

Press, 1964. 

American Battle Monuments Commission. American Armies and 

Balllejlelc/s in Europe. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 

Office, 1938. 

Armstrong, David A. Bullets and Bureaucrats: The Machine Gun and 

the United States Army, 1861- 1916. Contributions in Military 

History No. 29. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982. 

Ashburn, P.M. A Histo1y of the Medical Department of the US. Army. 

Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1929. 

Association of Graduates, U.S. Military Academy. Sixty-sixth Annual 

Report of the Association of Graduates of the USMA at West Point, 

New York. Newburgh, N.Y.: Moore Printing Co., 1935. 

Bach, Christian A., and Hall, Henry N. The Fourth Division: Its 

Services and Achievements in the World War. N.p., 1920. 

Bacon, Robert, and Scott, James B. The MilitCIIJ' and Colonial Policy 

of the United States: Addresses and Reports of Elihu Root. 

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1924. 

Barbeau, Ar1hur E., and Henri, Florette. The Unknown Soldiers: Black 

American Troops in World War I. Philadelphia: Temple University 

Press, 1974. 

Barnett, Corclli. Britain and Her Army, 1509- 1970. New York: William 

Morrow and Co., 1970. 

Bayliss, Gwyn M. Bibliographic Guide to the Jivo World l#trs. Ann 

Arbor, Mich.: R. R. Bowker Publishing Co., 1977. 

52 1 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Beale, Howard K. Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World 

Power. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956. 

Beaver, Daniel R. Newton D. Baker and the American Mtr Effort, 

1917- 1919. Lincoln: University ofNebraska Press, 1966. 

Bernardo, C. J., and Bacon, E. H. American Militmy Policy: Its 

Development Since 1775. Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service 

Publishing Co., 1955. 

Blumenson, Martin. The Patton Papers. 2 vols. Boston: Houghton 

Mifflin Co., 1972- 74. 

Bradley, John. Allied Intervention in Russia. New York: Basic Books, 

1968. 

Brereton, Lewis H. The Brereton Diaries: The Mtr in the Air on the 

Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941-8 May 1945. 

New York: William Morrow and Co., 1946. 

Brown, Fred R. Histaty of the Ninth US. lnfantt y, I 799- 1909. 

Chicago: R. R. Donnelley and Sons Co., 1909. 

Bullard, Robert L. American Soldiers Also Fought. New York: 

Longmans, Green and Co., 1936. 

---. Personalities and Reminiscences of the War. Garden City, 

N.Y.: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1925. 

Butt, Archibald. Taft and Roosevelt: The Intimate Letters of Arc/rie Bull, 

Militaty Aide. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1971. 

Carter, William H. The Life of Lieutenant General Chaffee. Chicago: 

University of Chicago Press, 1917. 

---.The American Army. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1915. 

A Chronicler [John Cudahy). Archangel: The American War With 

Russia. Chicago: A. C. McClurg and Co., 1924. 

Clark, Edward B. William L. Sibert, The Army Engineer. Philadelphia: 

J. P. Lippincott and Co., 1930. 

Clary, David A., and Whitehorne, Joseph W. A. The Inspectors General 

of the United States Army, 1777- 1903. Washington, D.C.: Office 

of The Inspector General and U.S. Army Center of Military 

History, 1987. 

Clendenen, Clarence C. Blood on the Border: The United States Army 

and the Mexican Irregulars. London: Collier-Macmillan, 1969. 

Coffman, Edward M. "American Command and Commanders in World 

War f." In New Dimensions in Militmy Hist01y: An Anthology, 

edited by Russell F. Weigley. pp. 176- 96. San Rafael, Calif.: 

Presidio Press, 1975. 

---. Hilt of tire SIVord: The Career of Peyton C. Marclr. Madison: 

University ofWisconsin Press, 1966. 

522 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

---. The War To End All Wars: The American Militmy Experience 

in World War I. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. 

---. The Young Qlflcer in the Old Army. Harmon Memorial Lecture 

in Military History No. 18. Colorado Springs, Colo.: U.S.A.F. 

Academy, 1976. 

Cohen, Stan. The Tree Army: A Pictorial History of the Civilian 

Conservation Corps, 1933- 1942. Missoula, Mont.: Pictorial 

Histories Publishing Co., 1980. 

Coletta, Paola. The Presidency of William Howard Taft. Lawrence: 

University of Kansas Press, 1973. 

Cornebise, Alfred E. The AMAROC News: The Daily Newspaper of the 

American Forces in Germany, 1919- 1923. Carbondale: Southern 

Illinois University Press, 1981. 

---. Typhus and Doughboys: The American Polish Typhus Relief 

Expedition, 1919- 1921. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 

1982. 

Cosmas, Graham. An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the 

Spanish-American War. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 

1971. 

Cramer, Clarence H. Newton D. Baker: A Biography. Cleveland: World 

Press, 1961. 

Crowell, Benedict, and Wilson, Robert F. The Road to France: The 

Transportation ofTroops and MilitCIIy Supplies, 1917- 1918. New 

Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1921. 

Cuff, Robert D. The War Industries Board: Business-Government 

Relations During World War I. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 1973. 

Cullum, George W. Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates 

of the US. Mi!i!Clly Academy . . . . Various class numbers. 

Current, Richard N. SecretClly Stimson: A Study in Organization. New 

Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1954. 

Dale, Ernest, and Urwick, Lyndall F. Staff in Organization. New York: 

McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960. 

Daniels, Jonathan. The Time Between Wars: Armistice to Pearl Harbor. 

New York: Doubleday and Co., 1966. 

Deutrich, Mabel F. Struggle for Supremacy: The Career of General 

Fred C. Ainsworth. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1962. 

DeWeerd, Harvey A. President Wilson Fights His War: World War] and 

the American Intervention. New York: Macmillan Co., 1968. 

DeWitt, Harry M. The General Staff Washington, D.C.: Govenunent 

Printing Office, 1953. 

523 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Dickinson, John. The Building of an Army: A Detailed Account of 

Legislation, Administration and Opinion in tlte United States. 

1915-1920. New York: Century Books, 1922. 

Dierks, Jack C. A Leap to Arms: The Cuban Campaign of 1898. 

Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott and Co., 1970. 

Duffy, Francis P. Father Duffy's St01y- A Tale of Humor and Heroism, 

Life and Death With the Fighting Sixty-Ninth. Garden City, N.Y.: 

Garden City Publishing Co., 1919. 

Dupuy, R. Ernest. The Compact Histo1y of the United States Army. Rev. 

ed. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1961 . 

Dupuy, R. Ernest, and Baumer, William H. The Little WCtrs of the 

United States. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1968. 

Dupuy, R. Ernest, and Dupuy, Trevor N. Brave Men and Great 

Captains. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959. 

--- . MilifCIIJ' Heritage of America. New York: McGraw-Hill Book 

Co., 1956. 

Elting, John. American Army Life. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 

1982. 

English, George H. HistOIJ' of the 89th Division. N.p., 1920. 

Fine, Lenore, and Remington, Jesse A. The C01ps of Engineers: 

Construction in the United States. Washington, D.C.: Office of 

the Chief of Military History, Department of the Anny, 1972. 

Finnegan, John P. Against the Specter of a Dragon: The Campaign .for 

American MilitCIIJ' Preparedness. New York: Greenwood Press, 

1974. 

Fleming, Peter. The Fate of Admiral Kolchak. London: Rupert HartDavis, 1963. 

Fletcher, Marvin. The Black Soldier and Officer in the United Stales 

Army, 1891- 1917. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 

1974. 

Flint, Roy K. "The United States Army on the Pacific Frontier, 

1899- 1939." In The American Milita1y and the Far East, edited 

by Joe C. Dixon, pp. 139- 54. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air 

Force History, USAF, 1980. 

Foncr, Jack D. Blacks and the MilitCIIJ' in American His/OIJ': A New 

Perspective. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974. 

Forsyth, George A. The St01y of the Soldier. New York: D. Appleton and 

Co., 1905. 

Fosdick, Raymond B. Chronicle of a Generation: An Autobiography. 

New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958. 

Fraenkcl, Ernst. Militwy Occupation and the Rule of Law: 

524 
B IBLIOGRAPHY 

Occupational Govemment in the Rhineland, 1918- 1923. New 

York: Oxford University Press, 1944. 

Frye, John H. II. HistOIJ1 of the Sixth Field Artil/e,:y. Harrisburg, Pa.: 

Telegraph Press, 1933. 

Ganoe, William A. The HistOty of the United States Army. New York: 

D. Appleton and Co., 1924. 

Goode, Paul R. The United States Soldier's Home. Richmond: Richard 

Byrd Press, 1957. 

Gordon, Dennis. Quartered in Hell: The St0/)1 of the American North 

Russian Expeclitioncuy Force, 1918- 1920. Missoula, Mont.: 

Doughboy Historical Society and G.O.S., 1982. 

Graves, William S. America's Siberian Adventure, 1918- 1920. New 

York: Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith, 1931. 

Greene, Francis V The RevolutionCIIy ff'ar and the MilitCIIy Policy oftlze 

United States. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911. 

Hagedorn, Hermann. Leonard Wood: A Biography. 2 vols. New York: 

Harper and Brothers, 1931. 

Hagood, Johnson. The Services of Supply: A Memoir of the Great War. 

Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1927. 

---. We Can Defend America. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran 

and Co., 1937. 

Haines, Aubrey L. The Yellowstone St01y: A Hist01y of Our First National 

Park. 2 vols. Yellowstone Park: Yellowstone Library and Museum 

Association; Denver: Colorado United University Press, 1977. 

Halliday, E. M. The Ignorant Armies. New York: Award Books, 1964. 

Hammond, Paul Y. Organizing for D~(ense: The American MilitaiJ1 

Establishment in the Twentieth Centwy. Westport, Conn.: 

Greenwood Press, 1977. 

Hampton, Duane. How the US. Caval!y Saved Our National Parks. 

Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971. 

Harbord, James G. The American Army in France, 1917- 1919. Boston: 

Little, Brown and Co., 1936. 

Hart, B. H. Liddell. The Real Wcu; 1914- 1918. 1930. Reprint. Boston: 

Little, Brown and Co., 1964. 

---. Reputations Ten Years After. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 

1928. 

Hassler, Warren W, Jr. The President as Commander-in-Chi~{ Menlo 

Park, Calif.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1971. 

Heitman, Francis B. Historical Register of the United States Army From 

Its 01ganization, September 29, 1789 to September 29, 1889. 

Washington, D.C.: National Tribune, 1890. 

525 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Historical Register of the United States Army From Its 

Organization, September 29, 1789 to March 2, 1903. 2 vols. 

Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1903. 

Helmick, Eli A. "From Reveille to Retreat: Autobiography of Major 

General Eli A. Helmick." Custody of MHI Archives, Carlisle 

Barracks, Pa. Copy at East Carolina University Archives, 

Greenville, N.C. 

Hemenway, Frederic V HistOIJ' of the Third Division USA in the World 

War. Andernach-on-the-Rhinc, 1919. 

Hennessy,JulietteA. The UnitedStatesAirArm,Aprii186JtoApril 1917. 

USAF Historical Study No 98. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: 

Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1958. 

Hewes, James E., Jr. From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and 

Administration, 1900- 1963. Washington, D.C.: Government 

Printing Office, 1975. 

Higham, Robin. A Guide to the Sources of United States Militmy 

Hist01y. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, J 975. 

Higham, Robin, and Mrozek, Donald. A Guide to the Sources of United 

States Militmy HistOIJ': Supplement I. Hamden, Conn.: Archon 

Books, 1981 . 

HistoJJ' of the 332d JnfanliJ'. Akron, Ohio: 332d Infantry Association 

Reunion, September 1929. 

Hittle, J. D. The MilitCtiJ' Staff: Its Histo1y and Development. 

Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Co., 1961. 

Hoyt, Charles B. Heroes of the Argonne. Kansas City, Kans.: Franklin 

Hudson Pub I ishing Co., 1919. 

Huidekoper, Frederic L. The Militmy Unpreparedness of the United 

States: A HistOIJ' of American Land Forces From Colonial Times 

Until June /, 1915. New York: Macmillan Co., 1915. 

Huston, James A. The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775- 1953. 

Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United 

States Army, 1966. 

Huzar, Elias. The Purse and the Sword: Control of the Army by 

Congress Through MilifGIJ' Appropriations, 1933- 50. lthaca, 

N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1950. 

James, D. Clayton. Tl1e Years of MacArthur. Vol. l, 1880- 1941. Boston: 

Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970. 

Jessup, Philip C. Elihu Root. 2 vols. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 

1938. 

Johnson, Hugh S. The Blue Eagle From Egg to Earth. Garden City, 

N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1935. 

526 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Johnson, Virginia W. The Unregimented General: A Biography o.f 

Nelson A. Miles. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962. 

Jones, Wayne S. Ben: The Life of Benjamin Seth Jones, 1877- 1943. 

N.p., 1984. 

Karsten, Peter. "Armed Progressives: The Military Reorganizes for the 

American Century." In Building the Organizational Society, edited by Jerry Israel, pp. 197- 232, 295-307. New York: Free Press, 

1972. 

Kellog, Walter G. The Conscientious Objector. New York: De Capo 

Press, 1970. 

Kemble, C. Robert. The Image of the Army Officer in America: 

Background for Current Views. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 

Press, 1973. 

Kenamore, Clair. From Vauquois Hill to Exermont: A Histmy o.f the 

Thirty:fi.fth Division o.f the United States Army. St. Louis, Mo.: 

Guard Publishing Co., 1919. 

Kendall, Sylvian G. American Soldiers in Siberia. New York: Richard 

R. Smith, 1945. 

Kolm, Richard, ed. MilitCtly Laws of the United States From the Civil War 

Through the War Powers Act of /973. New York: Arno Books, 1979. 

Kreidberg, Marvin A., and Henry, Merton G. Histmy o.f Military 

Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775- 1945. DA Pamphlet 

No. 20-142. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955. 

Lacy, Leslie A. The Soil Soldiers: The Civilian Conservation C01ps in 

the Great Depression. Radnor, Pa.: Chilton Book Co., 1976. 

Lane, Ann J. The Brownsville Affair: National Crisis and Black 

Reaction. Port Washington, N.Y.: National University Publishers, 

Kennikat Press, 1971. 

Lane, Jack C. Armed Progressive: General Leonard Wood. San 

Francisco: Presidio Press, 1978. 

Lawton, Eba A. Histmy of the Soldiers' Home, Washington, D.C. New 

York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, Knickerbocker Press, 1914. 

Leckie, Robert. Tlte Wars of America. 2 vols. New York: Bantam Books, 

1968. 

Leighton, Isabel, ed. The Aspirin Age, /9/9- 194/. New York: Simon 

and Schuster, Clarion Books, 1968. 

Leopold, Richard W. Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition. 

Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1954. 

Lerwill, Leonard L. The Personnel Replacement System in the US. 

Army. Da Pamphlet No. 20- 211. Washington, D.C.: Govenunent 

Printing Office, 1954. 

527 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Lettau, Joseph L. In Italy With the 332d lnfan!IJ'· Youngstown, Ohio: J. 

L. Lettau, 1921. 

Lewis, David. "A Short Account of My Experiences in the American 

Expeditionary Forces on Service in France, 191 8-1919." OTIG 

files, Pentagon (SAIG-ZXH). 

Lewis, George G., and Mewha, John. HisfOIJ' of Prisoner of War 

Utilization by the US. Army, 1776-1945. DA Pamphlet No. 

20-213. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955. 

Liggett, Hunter. A. E. F: Ten Years Ago in France. New York: Dodd, 

Mead and Co., I 928. 

---. Commanding an American Army: Recollections of the World 

War. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1925. 

Link, Arthur S. Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917. 

New York: Harper and Row 1963. 

Lockmiller, David A. Enoch H. Crowder: Soldie1; Lawyer and 

Statesman. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1955. 

Lord, Walter. The Good Years: From 1900 to the First World War. New 

York: Harper and Brothers, 1960. 

Luckett, Richard. The White Generals: An Account qfthe White Movement 

and the Russian Civil War. New York: Viking Press, 1971. 

McClure, Nathaniel F., ed. Class of 1887, United States Militmy 

Academy. Washington, D.C.: P. S. Bond Publishing Co., 1938. 

McEntee, Girard L. /ta~v's Part in Winning the World War. Princeton, 

N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1934. 

Manning, Clarence A. The Siberian Fiasco. New York: Library 

Publishers, 1952. 

March, Peyton C. The Nation at War. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 

Doran and Co., 1932. 

Matthews, William, and Wecter, Dixon. Our Soldiers Speak, 

1775- 1918. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1943. 

May, Ernest R. The World War and American Isolation, 1914- 1917. 

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959. 

May, Ernest R., ed. The Ultimate Decision: The President as 

Commander-in-Chief New York: G. Braziller, 1960. 

Meinecke, Friedrich. The German Catastrophe. Translated by Sidney 

B. Fay. Boston: Beacon Press, I 968. 

Merrill, James M., ed. Uncommon Valor: The Exciting Sto1y of the 

Army. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964. 

Millett, Allen R. The General: Robert Bullard and Officership in the 

United States Army, 1881- 1925. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 

Press, 1975. 

528 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Millis, Walter. Arms and Men: A Study in American Militai JI Hist01y. 

New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956. 

--- . The Martial Spirit: A Study of Our War With Spain. Boston: 

Houghton Miffi in Co., 193 1. 

Morison, Elting E. Men, Machines and Modem Times. Cambridge, 

Mass.: MIT Press, 1966. 

---. Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Hemy 

L. Stimson. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960. 

Mowry, George E. The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of 

Modem America, 1900- 1912. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 

1958. 

Muller, William G. The Twenty-fourth lnfanfly, Past and Present. 1923. 

Reprint. Fort Collins, Colo.: Old Army Press, 1972. 

Munson, Edward L. The Management of Men: A Handbook on the 

Systematic Development of Morale and the Control of Human 

Behavior. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 192 1. 

Nelson, Keith L. Victors Divided: America and the Allies in Germany, 

1918- 1923. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975. 

Nelson, Otto L., Jr. National Security and the General Staff. 

Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1946. 

Nenninger, Timothy K. The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: 

Education, PIVjessionalism and the Officer Co1ps of the United 

States Army, 1881- 1918. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978. 

Palmer, Frederick. America in France. 1918. Reprint. Westport, Conn.: 

Greenwood Press, 197 5. 

---. Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of General Tasker 

Howard Bliss. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1934. 

--- . Newton D. Baker: America at War. 2 vols. New York: Dodd, 

Mead and Co., 193 1. 

Palmer, John M. America in Arms: The Experience of the United States 

With Military Organization. New Haven, Conn: Yale University 

Press, 1941. 

---. Washington, Lincoln and Wilson. New York: Doubleday, Doran 

and Co., 1930. 

Pappas, George S. Prudens Futuri: The US. Army War College 

1901- 1967. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Association of the U.S. Army 

War College, 1967. 

Pershing, John J. My Experiences in the World War. 2 vols. New York: 

Frederick A. Stokes Co., 193 I . 

Pogue, Forrest C. George C. Marshall: The Education of a General. 

New York: Random House, 1963. 

529 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Pratt, Fletcher. Eleven Generals: Studies in American Command. New 

York: W. Sloane and Associates, 1949. 

Pringle, Henry F. Theodore Roosevelt. New York: Harcourt, Brace and 

Co., 1931. 

Re inhardt, George C., and Kintner, William R. The Haphazard Years: 

How America Has Gone to War. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 

and Co., 1960. 

Risch, Erna. Quartermaster Support of the Army: A HistOJy of the 

Corps, 1775-1939. Washington, D.C.: Quartermaster Historian's 

Office, Office of the Quartermaster General, 1962. 

Root, Elihu. Five Years of the lf0r Department. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing OJTice, 1904. 

---. The Milita'J' and Colonial Policy of the United States: 

Addresses and Reports by Elihu Root. Edited by Robert Bacon 

and James Brown Scott. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 

Press, 1916. 

Roth, Russell. Muddy Gl01y: America:., indian Wars in the Philippines, 

1899-1935. W. Hanover, Mass.: Christopher Publishing House, 

1981. 

Rutkowski, Edwin H. The Politics of Milit01y Aviation Procurement, 

1926- 1934: A Study in the Political Assertion of Consensual 

Values. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966. 

Salmond, John A. The Civilian Conservation Co1ps, 1933- 42: A New 

Deal Case Study. Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 

1967. 

Schaffer, Rona ld, comp. The United States in World War 1: A Selected 

Bibliography. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Clio Books, 1978. 

Schley, Winfield S. The Rescue of Greely. New York: Charles Scribner's 

Sons, 1885. 

Schulz, Gerhard. Revolutions and Peace Treaties, 1917- 1920. London: 

Methuen and Co., 1972. 

Scipio, L. Albert II. Last of the Black Regulars: A Histo1y of the 24th 

lnfelllfl:)' Regiment. Silver Spring, Md: Roman Publishers, 1983. 

Scott, Hugh L. Some Memories of a Soldier. New York: Century, 1928. 

77th Division Association, HistOIJ' of the Seventy-seventh Division, 

August 25th, 1917- November lith, 1918. New York: 77th 

Division Association, n.d. 

Sexton, William T. Soldiers in the Sun. Harrisburg, Pa.: Military 

Service Publishing Co., 1939. 

Shanks, David C. As Tltey Passed Through the Port. Washington, D.C.: 

Cary Pub! ishing Co., 1927. 

530 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Shiner, John F. Foulois and the US. Army Air C01ps, 1931- 1935. 

Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, USAF, 1983. 

Si lverlight, John. The Victors' Dilemma: Allied Intervention in the 

Russian Civil WCII; 1917- 1920. New York: Weybright and Talley, 

1970. 

Skillman, Willis R. The AEF: Who They Were, How They Did ft. 

Philadelphia: George W. Jacobs and Co., 1920. 

Smith, Daniel M. The Great Departure: The United States and World 

Warl, /914- 1920. New York: John Wiley and Sons, lnc., 1965. 

Smythe, Donald. "General of the Armies John J. Pershing." In The War 

Lords: Milit(IJy Commanders of the Twentieth Centwy, edited by 

Michael Carver, pp. 160- 75. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1976. 

Society of the Fifth Division. The Official HisfOIJ' of the Fifth Division, 

USA. Washington, D.C.: Society ofthe Fifth Division: 1919. 

Society of the First Division. Histo1y of the First Division During the 

World Wa1; 1917- 1919. Philadelphia: Jolm C. Winston Co., 193 1. 

Spaulding, Oliver L. The US. Army in War and Peace. New York: G. P. 

Putnam's Sons, 193 7. 

---. The Second Division, American ExpeditionCIIJI Force, in 

France 1917- 1919. New York: Historical Commission, Second 

Division Association, 1937. 

Speakman, Harold. From a Soldiers Heart. New York: Abingdon Press, 

1919. 

Stallings, Laurence. The Doughboys: StOIJ' of the AEF; 1917- 1918. 

New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1963. 

Stanley, Peter W. A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the 

United States, 1899- 1921. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 

Press, 1974. 

---. Sentimental Imperialists: T!te American Experience in East 

Asia. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1981. 

Steel, Ronald. Walter Lippman and the American Centwy. Boston: 

Little, Brown and Co., 1980. 

Stimson, Henry L., and Bundy, McGeorge. On Active Service in Peace 

and War. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947. 

Strakhosky, Leonid M. The Origins of American Intervention in North 

Russia (1918). New York: Howard Fertig, 1937. 

Taber, John H. The Story of the I 68th ll?f'cmfi:J'· 2 vols. Iowa City: State 

Historical Society of Iowa, 1925. 

Thian, Raphael P. Legislative Hist01y of the General Staff of the Army 

of the United States .fl'om 1775 to 1901. Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 1901. 

531 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Thomason, John W., Jr. Fix Bayonets! New York: Charles Scribner's 

Sons, 1926. 

Toland, John. No Man:'> Land, 1918- The Last Year of the Great War. 

New York: Doubleday and Co., 1980. 

Tompkins, Frank. Chasing Villa: The St01y Behind the Story of 

Pershing~· Expedition Into Mexico. Harrisburg, Pa.: Military 

Service Publishing Co., 1934. 

Trask, David F. The War With Spain in 1898. New York: Macmillan Co., 

198 1. 

Twichell, Heath, Jr. Allen: The Biography of an Army Officer. New 

Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1974. 

Unterberger, Betty M. America's Siberian Expedition, 1918- 1920. 

Ra leigh, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1956. 

Vandiver, Frank E. Black Jack: The Life and Times of John J Pershing. 

2 vols. College Station, Tex.: Texas A. & M. University Press, 

1977. 

Watson, Mark S. Chief of Staff Prewar Plans and Preparations. 

Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 

1950. 

Weaver, John D. The Brownsville Raid. New York: W. W. Norton and 

Co., 1970. 

We igley, Russell F. "The Elihu Root Reforms and the Progressive Era." 

In Command and Commanders in Modem WC/Ifare: The 

Proceedings of the Second MilitCIIJ' Hist01y Symposium, US. Air 

Force Academy, 2- 3 May 1968, edited by William Geffen, pp. 

11- 27. 2d ed., en!. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 

Headquarters USAF, and U.S. Air Force Academy, 197 1. 

---. HistOJ y of the United States Army. New York: Macmillan Co., 

1967. 

--- . Towards An American Army: Militcuy Thought From 

Washington to Marshall. New York: Columbia University Press, 

1962. 

Weigley, Russell F., ed. TheAmericcm MilitClly: Readings in the Hist01y 

of the MilitClly in American Society. Reading, Mass.: Add isonWesley Publishing Co., 1969. 

Wheeler, Joseph. The Santiago Campaign, 1898. Port Washington, 

N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1971. 

White, John A. The Siberian Intervention. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 

University Press, 1950. 

White, Lonnie J. Panthers to Arrowheads: The 36th (Texas-Oklahoma) 

Division in World War f. Austin, Tex.: Presidia! Press, 1984. 

532 
B IBLIOGRAPHY 

Wiebe, William J. The Search for Orde1; 1877- 1920. New York: Hill 

and Wang, 1967. 

Willeford, Charles. Something About A Soldier. New York: Random 

House, 1986. 

Williams, T. Harry. Americans at WCtr: The Development of the 

American Mi/ita1y System. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 

University Press, 1960. 

---. The HistOJy of American Jirteu·s From Colonial Times to World 

War I. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981. 

Wright, William R. A Hist01y of the Sixty-sixth Field Artil!etJ' Brigade. 

Denver, Colo.: Smith, Brooks Printing Co., n.d. 

Articles 

Allen, Henry T. "The Organization of A Staff Post Adapted to the 

United States Army." Journal of the Milita1y Service Institution of 

the United States 28 (Mar 01): 169- 83. 

---. "Proposed Reorganization For Our Central Staff." Journal of 

the Militmy Service Institution of the United States 27 (Mar 

1900): 26- 30. 

Ansell, S. T. "Military Justice." MilitaiJI Law Review Bicenteru1ial Issue 

(Sep 75): 53- 61. 

"Army Increase To Cost a Billion." New York Times, 6 Nov 15, p. 4. 

Brown, Terry W "The Crowder-Ansell Dispute: The Emergence of 

General Samuel T. Ansell." Militmy Law Review 35 (Jan 67): 1-45. 

Bush, Sterling C. "Eyes and Ears of the Commander." Army 

Information Digest, Jan 63, pp. 42-46. 

Butler, Maria B. "The National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers." 

Hmpers New Monthly Magazine 73, no. 47 (Oct 1886): 683- 95. 

Call, Luther P. "The History, Organization and Fw1ction of the Inspector 

General's Department." Reserve Officer 16 (Oct 39): 11- 13. 

Coffman, Edward M. "The Battle Against Red Tape: Business Methods 

of the War Department General Staff, 1917- 1918." Military 

A./fail:<; 26 (Spring 62): 1- 10. 

---. "Sidelights on the War Department General Staff in Its Early 

Years." Militmy Affairs 39 (Apr 74): 71- 72. 

Colby, Elbridge. "Elihu Root and the National Guard." Militcuy AffaiJ :<; 

23 (Spring 59): 20, 28- 34. 

Cooling, Benjamin Franklin. "Enlisted Grade Structure and the Army 

Reorganization Act of 1920." Milita1y Affairs 31 (Winter 67): 

189- 94. 

533 
THE INSPECTORS G ENERAL, 1903- 1939 

Cosmas, Graham A. "From Order to Chaos: The War Department, the 

National Guard and Military Policy, 1898." MilitaJJ' Affairs 29 

(Fa ll 65): I 05- 21. 

---. "Military Reform After the Spanish-American War: The 

Reorganization Fight of 1898- 1899." Militcu:v ;~ffa irs 35 (Feb 7 1 ): 

12- 18. 

Damon, Allan L. "The Great Red Scare." American Heritage 19 (Feb 

68): 22- 27, 75- 77. 

Deutrich, Mabel E. "Fred C. Ainsworth: The Story of a Vermont 

Archivist." Vermont llistoiJ' 27 (Jan 59): 22- 33. 

DeWitt, John L. "Brief Historical Description of the Organization of 

the War Department General Staff, United States Army." 

Quartermaster Review 12 (Sep-Oct 32): 29- 32. 

Ebstein, Fred H. E. 'Twenty-first Regiment oflnfantry." Journal of the 

MilitGIJ' Ser vice Institution of the United States 12 (Jul 1892): 

844-50. 

Fleming, Thomas J. "Two Argonnes." American Heritage 19 (Oct 68): 

44-45, 88- 94. 

"Further Promotion to General Officers." Army and Navy Joumal, 21 

Feb 03, p. 607. 

Gallagher, Bernard J. "A Yank in the B. E. F." American Heritage 16 

(Jun 65): 18- 26, 101-08. 

Garlington, E. A. "The Seventh Regiment of Cavalry." Joumal of the 

MilitCIJy Service lnslitulion of the United States 16 (Jan 1895): 

649- 65. 

Ha lliday, E. M. "Where Ignorant Armies Clashed by Night." American 

Heritage 10 (Dec 58): 26- 29, 120-25. 

Herring, George C., Jr. "James Hay and the Preparedness 

Controversy, 1915- 16." Journal of Southem HistOJy 25 (Nov 

64): 383-404. 

Hewes, James E., Jr. "The United States Army General Staff, 

1900-1917." MiliiGIJ' Affairs 38 (Apr 74): 67- 74. 

Jackson, Chester V. "Mission to Munnansk." United States Naval 

Institute Proceedings 95, no. 2 (Feb 69): 83- 89. 

Jameson, Frank H. Letter to the Editor. New York Times, .13 May 1922, 

p. 12. 

Johnson, Jacob C. "A Chain of Responsibility." Army and Navy 

Joumal, Jui- Aug 27, pp. 1047-48, 1068, 1090, 1108, 11 28, 1150; 

Sep-Oct 27, pp. 13, 34, 47, 67, 74, 92, 107, 132, 138, 152. 

Lane, Jack C. "American Military Past: The Need for New 

Approaches." MilitCtiJ' Affairs 41 (Oct 77): I 09- 13. 

534 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

---. "Leonard Wood Leads His Team From Victory to Defeat" 

American History Jllustrated I (Aug 66): 23- 24. 

Linn, Levan P. "Army Inspector Genera l System." Army b1formation 

Digest, Oct 64, pp. 13- 17. 

Love, Edmund G. "The Case of the 'Fighting Irish' : An Illustration of 

American Indifference to Regimental Traditions." Militcuy Alfail~'i 

1 I (Spring 47): 46-48. 

Luckett, Judith A. "The Siberian Intervention: Military Support of 

Foreign Policy." Militcuy Review 64 (Apr 84): 54-63. 

McLaughlin, Patrick D. "Doughboy Diplomats: The U.S. Army in Italy, 

1917- 1919." Army, Jan 71, pp. 30- 37. 

McReynolds, G. B. "Notes on Some Random Activities of the Field 

Artillery Board." Field Arti!!ery Journa132 (Jul 42): 505- 10. 

Marx, Wilhelm. "Rhineland Occupation." Foreign Affairs 7 (Jan 29): 

198- 203. 

Millett, Allan R. "The General Staff and the Cuban Intervention of 

1906." MilitcuyA.Ifairs 31 (Fall67): 113- 19. 

Millett, John D. "The Direction of Supply Activities in the War 

Department." American Political Science Review 38 (Apr 44): 

249- 65; 38 (Jun 44): 475- 98. 

Morey, Lewis S. "The Cavalry Fight at Carrizal." Journal of the US. 

Cavaliy Association 27 (Jan 17): 449- 56. 

"Newton D. Baker on Executive Influence in Military Legislation." 

American Political Science Review 50 (Sep 56): 700-70 L. 

Preston, John F. "Inspector General's Department of the Army." Army 

and Navy Journal, 7 Oct 33, pp. I 03, 116. 

Ranson, Edward. "Nelson A. Miles as Commanding General, 

1895- 1903." MilitmyAffctirs 29 (Winter 66): 179- 200. 

"Recent Deaths: Alvan Chambliss Read." Army and Navy Journal, 7 

Feb 20, p. 698. 

"Recent Deaths: John Cabell Breckinridge." Army and Navy Journal, 

28 Aug 20, p. 1578. 

Reddick, L. D. "Negro Policy of the United States Army." Journal of 

Negro Hist01y 34 (Jan 49): 9-29. 

Riepma, Siert F. "Portrait of An Adjutant General: The Career of Major 

General Fred C. Ainsworth." Journal of the American Mi!itCIIy 

Histo1y Foundation 2 (Spring 38): 26- 35. 

Ruhl, Arthur. "What Is the Matter With the U.S. Army?" Co!!ier 's 

Magazine, J 5 Apr J I, pp. 17, 39-41. 

Semsch, Philip L. "Elihu Root and the General Staff." Milita1y Af]ctirs 

27 (Spring 63): 16-27. 

535 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

Spector, Ronald. "You 're Not Going To Send Soldiers Over There, Are 

You!" Milita'J' Affairs 36 (Feb 72): 1-4. 

Stallings, Laurence. "The War To End War." American Heritage 10 

(Oct 59): 5- 6, 84- 85. 

Stansfield, George J. "A History of the Judge Advocate General's 

Department, United States Army." Milita1y Affairs 9 (Fall 45): 

2 19- 37. 

Sutton, John L. "The German General Staff in U.S. Defense Policy." 

Mi!i!CIIJI Affairs 25 (Winter 62): 197- 202. 

Tinsley, James A. "Roosevelt, Foraker and the Brownsville Affray." 

Joumal of Negro Histo1 y 41 (Jan 56): 43-65. 

Todd, Fred J. "Our National Guard: An Introduction to Its History." 

Mi!itCIIy Affairs 5 (Summer 41 ): 73- 86; 5 (Fall 41 ): 152- 70. 

Tolley, Kemp. "Our Russian War of 1918- 19." United States Naval 

fnstitute Proceedings 95, no. 2 (Feb 69): 58- 72. 

Triache, George N. "A Comparative Study of the United States Army." 

lnfanlly Journal 13, no. 7 (Apr 17): 615- 25. 

Van Piper, Paul P. "A Survey of Materials For the Study of Military 

Management." American Political Science Review 44 (Sep 55): 

828- 50. 

Watson, Mark S. "First Vigorous Steps in Rearming, 1938- 39." 

Milita1y Affairs 12 (Summer 48): 65- 78. 

Wyche, Ira T. "Mission and History of the Inspector General's Office." 

Armored Cavahy Journal 56 (Apr 47): 38-41. 

Yoshpe, Harry B. "Economic Mobilization Planning Between the Two 

World Wars." Mili!CIIy Affairs 15 (Winter 51): 199- 204. 

Dissertations and Theses 

Baldwin, Fred D. "The American Enlisted Man in World War !." Ph.D. 

dissertation, Princeton University, 1964. 

Brown, Richard C. " Social Attitudes of American Generals 

1898- 1940." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1951. 

Franklin, Ben G. "The Military Policy ofthe United States, 1918- 1933: 

A Study of the Influence of World War I on Army Organization 

and Control." Ph.D. dissertation, University of CaliforniaBerkeley, 1943. 

J lacker, Barton C. "The War Department and the General Staff, 

1898- 1917." Ph.D. dissertation, Un iversity of Chicago, 1963. 

Hampton, Duane. "Conservation and Cavalry: A Study of the Role of 

the United States Army in the Development of a National Park 

536 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

System, 1886- 1917 ." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado, 

1965. 

Johnson, Charles W. "The Civilian Conservation Corps: The Role of 

the Army." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1968. 

Johnson, Elliot L. "The Military Experience of General Hugh A. Drum 

From 1898- 1 918." Ph.D. dissertation, University of WisconsinMadison, 1975. 

Jornacion, George W. "The Time of Eagles: United States Army 

Officers and the Pacification of the Philippine Moros, 

1899- 1913." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maine, 1973. 

Killigrew, John W. "The Impact of the Great Depression on the Army, 

1929- 1936." Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1960. 

McKenna, Charles D. "The Forgotten Reform: Field Maneuvers in the 

Development of the United States Army, 1902- 1920." Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1981. 

Miewald, Robert D. "The Stability of Military Managerial Doctrine: 

The United States Army, 1866- 1941." Ph.D. dissertation, 

University of Chicago, 1967. 

Miller, Robert A. "The United States Army During the 1930's." Ph.D. 

dissertation, Princeton University, 1973. 

Nesmith, Vardcll E., Jr. "The Quiet Paradigm Change: The Evolution of 

the Field Arti llery Doctrine of the United States Army, 

1861- 1905." Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1977. 

Raines, Edgar F. "Major General J. Franklin Bell and Military Reform: 

The Chief of Staff Years, 1906-1910." Ph.D. dissertation, 

University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1976. 

Roberts, William R. "Loyalty and Expertise: The Transformation of the 

Nineteenth-Century American General Staff and the Creation of 

the Modern Mi litary Establishment." Ph.D. dissertation, Johns 

Hopkins University, 1980. 

Rohl, James W. "The General Staff and American Military Policy: The 

Formative Period, 1898- 1917." Ph.D. dissertation, University of 

Texas, 1967. 

Sapp, Diane E. "Our Mission Our Future: The United States 

Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas." M.A. thesis, 

University of Minnesota, 198 1. 

Skelton, William B. "The United States Army, 182 1- 1837: An 

Institutional History." Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern 

University, 1968. 

Yenzon, Anne C. "The Papers of General Smedley Darlington Butler, 

USMC, 19 15- 1918." Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1982. 

537 
ABMC 

Accts 

ACofS 

Adj 

Adv 

AEC 

AEF 

AFIC 

AFIF 

AFIG 

AG 

AGO 

AGO 

APM 

A Reg 

ARJG 

ARSW 

Arty 

ASofW 

AWOL 

Bn 

Bul 

Bus 

Cdr(s) 

CE 

CG 

ch. 

CinC 

Cir 

Civ Affs 

CMTC 

Cmte 

538 

List of Abbreviations 

American Battle Monuments Commission 

Accounts 

Assistant Chief of Staff 

Adjutant 

Advanced 

American Embarkation Center 

American Expeditionary Forces 

American Forces in China 

American Forces in France 

American Forces in Germany 

Adjutant General 

Adjutant General's Department 

Adjutant General's Office 

Assistant Provost Marshal 

Army Regulation 

Annual Report of the Inspector General 

Annual Report of the SecrefaiJ' ofWar 

Artillery 

Assistant Secretary of War 

absent without leave 

Battalion 

Bulletin 

Business 

Commander(s) 

Corps of Engineers 

Commanding General 

chapter 

Commander-in-Chief 

Circular 

Civil Affairs 

Civilian Military Training Corps 

Committee 
Co 

co 

CofAC 

CofArms/Svcs 

Coffiurs 

CofF 

CofMiiBur 

CotNGB 

CofPerBr 

CofS 

CofSccs/Svcs 

CofSciSubsec 

Com 

Comdt 

Comm 

Con g. 

comp. 

Corresp 

CSigOfT 

Ctr 

DA 

DCofS 

Dept 

Dist 

diss. 

Div 

ed. 

encl(s). 

End 

Ex 

Exh 

FA 

FD 

FY 

G- 1 

L IST OF ABBREVIATIONS 

Company 

Commanding Officer 

Chief of Air Corps 

Chief of Arms and Services 

Chief of Bureaus 

Chief of Finance 

Chief of Militia Bureau 

Chief of National Guard Bureau 

Chief of Personnel Branch 

Chief of Staff 

Chief of Sections and Services 

Chief of Selection Subsection 

Commission, Commissioned 

Commandant 

Communications 

Congress 

compiler 

Correspondence 

Chief Signal Officer 

Center 

Department of the Army 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

Department 

District 

dissertation 

Division 

editor, edition 

cnclosure(s) 

Endorsement 

Executive 

Exhibit 

Fi eld Artillery 

Finance Department 

Fiscal Year 

Personnel officer or section of divisional or higher 

staff 

539 
G- 2 

G- 3 

G-4 

G- 5 

GAO 

Gen 

GerArmCom 

GHQ 

GO 

Gov 

GS 

HO 

HofRef 

Hosp 

Hq 

JAW 

IG 

JGD 

lnf 

Insp(s) 

lnstrs 

Interv(s) 

JAG 

Ltr(s) 

LOC 

Joe. cit. 

Med 

Memo(s) 

MFR 

MG 

MHI 

540 

T HE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Intelligence officer or section of divisional or 

higher staff 

Operations officer or section of divisional or 

higher staff 

Supply officer or section of divisional or higher 

staff 

Training officer or section of divisional or higher 

staff 

General Accounting Office 

General 

German Armistice Commission 

General Headquarters 

General Order 

Governor 

General Staff 

Historical Division 

House of Representatives 

Hospital 

Headquarters 

in accordance with 

Inspector General (Army), inspector general 

Inspector General's Department 

Infantry 

Inspector( s ), 1 nspection( s) 

Instructions 

lntervicw(s) 

Judge Advocate General 

Lettcr(s) 

Line-of-Communications 

in the place cited 

Medical 

Memorandum( a) 

Memorandum for the Record 

machine gun 

U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle 

Barracks, Pa. 
Mil Affs 

Mil Sec 

MP 

NARA 

n.d. 

NG 

NHDVS 

Off(s) 

OIC 

OIG 

Opns 

ORC 

OrdC 

Org 

OTIG 

Per Br 

Phil 

PL 

PM 

pt. 

Pres 

Prov 

Pun Exp 

PXReg 

QMC 

re 

RG 

ROTC 

Rpt(s) 

Sec 

Sess. 

SG 

so 

Sofl 

L IST O F ABBREVIATIONS 

Military Affairs, Militia Affairs 

Military Secretary 

Military Police 

National Archives and Records Administration, 

Washington, D.C. 

no date 

National Guard 

National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers 

Officer(s) 

Officer-in-Charge 

Office of the fnspector General 

Operations 

Organized Reserve Corps 

Ordnance Corps 

Organization 

Office ofThe Inspector General (1924) 

Personnel Branch 

Philippine, Philippines 

Public Law 

Provost Marshal 

part 

President 

Province, Provisional 

Punitive Expedition 

Post Exchange Regulation 

Quartermaster Corps 

regarding 

Record Group 

Reserve Officers Training Corps 

Report(s) 

Section, Secretary 

Session 

Surgeon General 

Special Order 

Secretary of the Interior 

541 
Sotw 

SReg 

Svc 

TAG 

Telg 

TIG 

VSMA 

USMC 

USP&DO(s) 

vol(s). 

WD 

WDGS 

WPD 

542 

THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Secretary of War 

Special Regulation 

Service 

The Adjutant General (1907) 

Telegram 

The Inspector General ( 1924) 

U.S. Military Academy 

U.S. Marine Corps 

U.S. property and disbursing officcr(s) 

volume(s) 

War Department 

War Department General StafT 

War Plans Division 
Index 

Abraham, Lt. Col. Clyde R., 255 

Accountants, assignment to AEF, 11 9- 20 

Accounting 

adoption of scientific cost, 376 

lack of standard system of cost, 373 

Adjutant General School. 337 

Adjutant General's Dc1>aruncnt (AGD). 301. 

314 

duties of, I 0, 366 

historical and personnel records branches 

transfer, 12 

jurisdiction over recruit depots, 79 

preparation of militia inspection instructions, 67 

recommendation of consolidation with 

IGD, 22,24 

relationship with IGD, 3 19- 20,332 

Aeronautical Service, 48 

Agnew. Lt. Col. Ernest II., 192 

Aguinaldo, Emilio, 258 

Ahern, Lt. Col. Leo J., 337n54, 422 

1\hrweiler. 272 

Ainsworth, Maj. Gen. Fred C., 11- 16,91, 320 

Air Brigade, 1st, 192 

Air Coq>S, 332, 376, 378, 387- 91 

Air Coq>s Act of 1926, 389- 9 1 

Air Corps Tactical School, 421 

Air Service, 192 95. 369, 387 

Alabama National Guard, 439 

Alaska Telegraph, 64 

Alcatraz prison, 85, 4 16 

Alcohol 

abuse, 289 

prohibition of, 416 

Alexander, Maj. Gen. Robert. 179.210 

Alger, Russell A., 9 

Allen, Maj. Gen. llenry T .. 34, 38 

AFIG commander, 277,280- 81, 292 

AFIG inspections, 279, 287- 89 

international incidents, 292, 293-94 

Allied High Commission, 277,281,287 

Allin, Lt. Col. George R., 460 

Ambulance traffic, 217 18. See also Trafl'ic 

management. 

American Battle Monuments Conunission, 

426-27 

American Embarkation Center. 262 

American Expeditionary Forces (AEF). See 

also Pershing, General John J.; 

Brewster, Maj. Gen. Andre W. 

armies. See First Army; Second Army; 

Third Army. 

assignment of accountants to, 119- 20 

depot divisions, 185- 86, 262 

evolution of the inspectorate. 160-62 

IG's role and duties, 157- 60, 16&--69 

inspectorate's stre ngth and weaknesses, 

162--68 

officers' hostility to IGs, 468 

training, 12 1- 23. 142-43 

training inspections. 168 72 

unit logistical ofrieers. 223 

American Forces in Germany (AFlG). 

276-77,282 

American Red Cross, 273 

armistice aflemmth support, 243 

assignment io identification and burial 

process, 220 

criticism of overseas activities, 246 

inspection of accounts, 64 

investigation of overseas activities, 249 

morale-support activities, 148-49, 195 

Ammunition expenditures, 200, 205, 225 

Andcrnach, 272. 275 

Angers, 245 

Animals 

burial of, 220 2 1 

disposing of surplus, 309 

inspection of, 166. 187,234 

supply and care of, 164, 225- 26 

wounded, 204 

Antwerp. 274, 275, 280 81 

Archangel, 296 

Argonne, 164, 165. See also Meuse-Argonne 

offensive. 

A.-misticc aftermath, 233- 35, 242 

Army. See U.S. Army. 

Army-Navy Economy Board, 329 

Army Transport Service (ATS), 386 

Army War College, 337, 338, 405 

Arsenals, 65, 372. See a/~o Depots. 

Artillery School of Fire, 48. 59, 138 

Aviation School, 49- 50 

AWOL. 413- 14 

543 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Babcock. Maj. Conrad L., 162 

Babcock, Maj. Franklin, 337n54 

Baer, Col. Joseph A., 126, 161. 162, 167, 

171,235,239,451. 

Advanced Headquarters IG, 197- 98 

inspection reports and, 24 1 

investigation of racial complaints, 396 

Bailey. Maj. Gen. Charles J., 171 

Baker, Col. Chauncey B .. 113 

Baker, Newton D., 30, 38. 368 

administration of\VW I operations, 

Ill 12 

appointment of Graves to Siberia, 304 

and conscientious objectors issue, 150- 51 

and investigation ofYI'viCA's overseas 

activities. 248 

views on I GO's postwar mission, 315- 16 

Barger, Lt. Col. Byron L .. 222 

Barry, General Thomas H., 20 

13ase Section No. I. See St. Nazairc port. 

Base Section No.2, 189 

Base Section No.3. 183 

Base Section No. 5. See Brest. 

Batson. Lt. Col. Roscoe C., 442 

Beehives, 252 

Becuwkcs, Col. llenry, MC, 196, 197, 229 

Bell, Lt. Col. George, Jr., 26 27, 37 

Bell, Mllj. Gen. J. Franklin. 14. 22 

Bcllicourt, 136 

Bendorf, 275 

Bergdoll. Pvt. Grover C., 291 92 

Berry, Col. Lucien C., 34 

Blanding, Maj. Gen. Albert L .. 438- 39, 444 

Bliss, Brig. Gen. Tasker II., 29, 45 

Ulocksom, Lt. Col. Augustus P., 78. 88- 9 1 

Blois, 230 

Board of Alaska Road Commissioners. 64 

Bolsheviks, 296-97 

Bony, 136 

Boone. Capt. Abbott, 281 

Borah, William E., 92 

Boyd, Capt. Charles T., 34 

Bradley, Brig. Gen. John J .. 248 51 

Breckinridge. Maj. Gen. Joseph C., 5, II, 

13 14, 16, 21, 27, 67,315,332,470 

investigation of Manila Medical Depot, 

97 

tactical exercises and, 54 

Brest. 180. 274 

Base Section No.5. 265- 70 

guidance for IG of, 260 

Brewster, Maj. Gen. Andre \V., 87, 106, 187 

Advanced Headquarters IG, 197 

Base Section No. 5 inspection. 266 

corpse-robbing investigation, 221 

544 

Brewster. Maj. Gen. Andre \V.- Continued 

and establishment of separate SOS, 

177 82 

guidance to inspectors, 166-67 

guidelines to troops in armistice anermath, 234 

inspection ofThird Army, 272 

investigation of YMCA's overseas activities, 247-48 

as Pershing's IG in France, 115 16, 119, 

158-61 

and quality of inspectors, 162- 65 

SOS funds inspections, 182- 83 

Brewster, Lt. Daniel B .• USMC, 259 

Britton, Maj. Edward E., 162, 228, 259-65 

Brown, Brig. Gen. Lytle, 143 

Browning, Col. William S., 388 

Brownsville (Texas) incident, 88- 93 

Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, 326, 

327 

Bullard, Lt. Gen. Robert L., 160, 211 

Bureau of the Budget, 326-27 

Buria I of the dead, 234 

during Meuse-Argonne oiTensive. 219- 20 

during St. Mihicl offensive, 204 

Burnham, Mnj. Gen. William P., 170 

Burton, Brig. Gen. George H., 14. 2 1. 4 I, 42 

and business methods inspections, 6 1 

and depot and arsenal inspections. 66 

and recruiting, 78- 79 

support for military prison system, 103 

Business methods. 61 63 

Outler, Brig. Gen. Smedley, USMC, 266- 67, 

269 

Buxton, Maj. G. Edward, Jr., 200 

Caldwell, Lt. Col. Frank M., 50 

Calhoun, John C., 4 

California Debris Commission, 64 

Camouflage and concealment measures, 

202-03.213,2 16 

Camps 

Ashland, Nebraska, 439 

Gordon, Georgia, 138 

Jackson, South Carolina, 125 

Perry, Ohio, 145 

Stotsenburg, 1

1hilippine Islands 346 

Canteens. See Post exchanges: YMCA. canteen ope rat ion. 

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 374. 450 

Carpenter, Col. Edward, 202-03. 236 

Carranza, Venusti:1110, 33 

Carrizal, battle at, 34- 35 

Carter, Edward C., 246 
INDEX 

Carter, Maj. Gen. William II., 25, 26 

Casual Officers Camp, 245 

Casualties, 200. See also Burial of the dead; 

Replacement flow. 

representatives, 249 

treaunent of, 217 18 

Cavalry regiments 

2d.417 

I Oth, 33, 34, 35 

13th, 33, 39 

108th, 433 

3 10th.417 

Cemeteries, 423 27. See also Custer 

Battlefield National Cemetery. 

Confederate. 426 

in Europe, 426 

inspection of, 106 08 

soldiers' lots in civilian, 425-26 

Chamberlain, Maj. Gen . .fohn 1..., 44, 103, 

227,393,417,467 

and conscientious objectors issue, 15 1 

defense of I GO's 1>0stwnr mission, 

317- 18 

and field artillery's problem during WW 

I, 136-37 

and IGO's adjustment during WW I, 

114-16 

ancl iGD's postwar posture, 3 14-15 

inspection of AI'IG, 287- 88 

inspection of Aviation School, 49-50 

inspection of Liquidation Commission, 

274-75 

inspection of Signal Corps aviation training program, 153 55 

Madison Barracks incident investigation 

by, 94-95 

National Guard camps inspection by, 124 

and recall of reserve officers, 117- 19 

and standardization of supply articles, 65 

suggestion about recruiting, 78 

and YMCA issue, 247 

Ch:1plains 

assignment to prisons. I 03 

buria I process dut ics, 219- 20 

CCC enrollment of, 447 

complaints over mbbing the dead, 22 1 

course at Fort Leavenworth, 405 

coverage of activities in momlc report, 

150-52 

inspection of activities, 251 

Chateau-Thierry, 191 

Chaumont. 197 

Chemical Warfare Service, 402 

Cheppy. 213 

Chief of Artillery. 58 

Chief of Finance, 315 16, 458, 459 

Chief of Ordnance, 4 1-42 

Chief of Staff 

approach to tactical inspections issue, 

140-41 

concern over momle issues. 411- 12 

establishment of position, I I 

Root and the position of. 11- 12 

China, inspection of U.S. troops in, 348, 

35 1-52 

Civil alfairs policies and issues 

A FIG's IG investigation of: 286- 87 

Third Army territorial organization and, 

276 

Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), 329, 

333,383,413 

creation and mission of, 445-46 

special investigations, 452- 57 

support from the /\!'my. 445- 52 

Civili;m Military Tmining Corps (CMTC) 

Program, 321. 325, 329 

Civil-military relations, as an inspection item, 

359 

Clark, Maj. RobertS., 117, 160. 162 

Clem, Col. John L., 100 

Clcmenceau, Georges, 212 

Clothing and personal equipment, 36 

Coast Artillery, 59th, 346 

Const Artill ery Corps, 58 

Coast Artillery School, 47-48 

Coblenz, 27 1, 276 

Cochem, 272 

Cochran, Capt. William B .. 93- 94 

Columbus, New Mexico. 33. 71 

Command and Gcneml Staff College, 405 

Commissary operations. 408 

Commission on Tmining Camp Activities. 152 

Committee on Economy and Effic iency, 14, 

63 

Communications, 205. 2 11- 12 

Complaints, 85- 86 

about conditions nt Orest. 268-69 

about operation of convoys, 39 

anonymous, 86 

CCC enrollees' grievances and. 46 1- 62 

grievances and, 243 46 

investigntions of, 39, 87-88 

Comptroller General. See also General 

Accounting Ofl'ice (GAO). 

housing allowance violations, 436 

investigation of USP&DOs, 438 

Conflaus. 255 

Congress 

concern for veterans. See Cemeteries; 

Homes. 

545 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Congress- Continued 

downsizing of the Army by, 325 

I louse Military Affairs Committee investigations, 42 1 22 

issue ofNHDVS transfer to Veterans 

Bureau, 423 24 

mandate to reduce American presence in 

Germany, 282 

opposition to American presence in 

Germany, 28 1 

opposition to American presence in 

Siberia, 308u83 

pressure for reduction of War Department 

manpower, 371 

support for Air Corps, 387- 88 

vote to abolish CCC, 464 

Conner, Maj. Gen. Fox, 73, ll6, 160,343 

Conrad, Col. Casper M., Jr., 370 

Conscientious objectors, 150-51 

Coolidge, Calvin, 326 

Corps Areas 

country's division into, 324u23 

economic survey of. 3 74 

effect of National Defense Act of 1920, 

321- 24 

emergency condemnation of property, 383 

IG oiTiccs. 342. 374- 75 

IGs in, 342-44. 359, 362, 433, 434, 440 

inspections, 343. 442, 454 

national parks and monuments in, 429 

Corps of Artillery, 58 

Corps of Engineers, 41. 344. 422, 450 

Corruption 

in the Army, 97 101 

of Army officers. 420 

Cosby, Lt. Col. S1>enccr, 136 

Crnig, Lt. Col. Louis A., 442-44 

Craig, General Malin, 193, 271, 279, 284, 

442,452 

Cress. Lt. Col. George 0., 34-39 

Custer Battlefield National Cemetery, 425 

Czech Legion, 297 

Dade, Col. Alexander, 50 

Dallam, Col. S. Field. 202, 204, 214, 239 

Daniels, Josephus, 269 

Dawes, Charles G .. 274-75, 326 

Demobilization. 274, 313 

Denison, Col. Franklin A., 174 

Dentists, 376 

Depots. See also Arsenals; Ordnance depots; 

Recruit depots. 

adoption of scientific cost accounting in, 

376 

546 

Depots-Continued 

in AEF, 185 86, 262, 263 

inspection of, 65,97- 101,372,379- 8 1 

survey and improvements of overall efriciency. 377 

Depredations, 175- 76 

Dern, George II., 390- 91 

Desertion, 84-85, 4 13, 463 

deserter apprehension study, 4 13- 14 

investigations of, 393 

Devereaux, Maj. J. Ryan, 180 

Dick Act. See Militia Act of 21 January 1903. 

Dickinson, Jacob M., 23 

Dickman, Maj. Gen. Joseph T., 27 1- 72 

Discharges 

complaints of discharged soldiers. 245-46 

dishonorable, I 02 

investigations of less than honorable, 393 

Disciplinary Barracks, 415- 16 

Discipline, 84 85, 135, 142, 184, 239, 452. 

See also Conscientious objectors; 

Straggler control program. 

armistice aftermath, 233- 34 

court-marti;JI cases as indicators of, 141 

impact of officer turbulence on, 231 

issue with CCC, 463 

issues in AEF, 172- 76, 204 05 

mail delivery, 254 

march, 213 

monthly rCI>OI'I, 24 t 

problems with AFIG, 283 

road, 2 11 

at Tientsin Barracks. 352 

training and, 401 

Division of the Philippines, 97 I 0 I 

Helmick's inspection of, 345-48 

VanSchaick's inspection of, 348- 51 

Divisions 

I st. 195.272 

I st Cavalry, 344 

2d, 158, 191, 195,217,233 

3d, 191 

4th, 204, 272 

5th. 172 

6th, 164,216 17 

8th, 266, 303 

26th, 2 16, 236 

27th, 136 

28th. 134, 17 1, 187, 189. 2 12. 221,234 

32d, 143,239 

33d. 234 

35th, 213 

37th, 166, 222 

39th, 135 

40th. 135 
INDEX 

Divisions- Continued 

41st, 185 

42d, 2 14,236 

66th Cavalry, 432 

77th, 209, 223, 228 

78th, 146, 223 

79th, 199, 208, 218, 243 

8 1st, 171 

82d, 138, 165, 169, 194, 200,215- 16, 

222 

83d. 135 

85th, 298 

88th, 135 

89th, 233, 272 

92d, 173, 175 

93d, 173 

Donaldson, Brig. Gen. Thomas Q., 181 , 194, 

346 

Drum, Maj. Gen. llugh /\ .. 166, 202, 335, 

34 1-42,370- 7 1,360- 6 1,363,399, 

416,452,467,468 

anempt at increasing units stability, 402 

goal of paperwork reduction. 367- 68 

inspection of cemeteries, 426-27 

inspection philosophy and focus, 356- 59, 

379 

Durham, Maj. James II., 94-95 

Dwan, Maj. Edward J., 352 

Economic surveys, 361, 37 1- 79 

Educational facilities. See also Schools: 

Training. 

inspection of Army and civilian, 46 51 

and system surveys, 403- 04 

Ehrenbreitstein Fortress, 272, 287 

18th Amendment to Constitution, 416 

Elliot, Col. Jesse D .• 458 

Employment issues, 397 

Equipment 

complaints about, 36 

deterioration of, 379 

impact of CCC on unit, 456 

inspection of, 171 

physical security, 186 

review and redistribution of AEF, 186 

schools priority, 139 

transponation system, 225 

unit, 141 

waste, 225 

Erwin, Lt. Col. James B., 26 

Evacuation 

of anima ls, 226-27 

patient status. 26 1 

of wounded and prisoners, 205, 217- 19 

Fall, Albert B .. 39 

Fechner, Robert, 445, 449- 51, 460. See also 

Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). 

Federal Bureau of l>risons, I 03 

Field Artillery, 33 1 

inspections, 57, 58--61 

problems during \V\V I, 136 39 

l:ield Artillery Brigades 

8th, 266 

15th, 138 

Field Artillery Corps, 58 

Field Artillery regiments 

4th, 34 

24th (PS), 346 

I 47th, 434 

Fimmce Department. 33 1. 340 

Finance School, 337 

Fire protection, 374 

First Army 

headquarters, 197 

General Order 38, 237-4 1 

IG activities, 199- 200 

Fish, Capt. 1-lamilton, 188 

Fleet, Lt. Col. llcnry W., 184 

Foch, Marshal Ferdinand, 212, 293 

Fomker, Joseph B., 90, 91- 92 

Forts 

Oarrancas, Florida, 425 

Bayard, New Mexico, 407 

Bliss, Texas, 344 

e than Allen, Vermont, 417 

Francis E. Warre n, Wyoming, 414 

1-lamilton, New York, 344 

lluachuca, Arizona, 400 

Jay, New York, 342 

Knox, Kentucky, 456 

Leavenworth, Kansas, 17, 68, 405 

McDowell, California, 419 

Monroe. Virginia. 17, 47,83 

Niobrara, Nebraska, 88 

Re no, Oklahoma, 88 

Riley, Kansas, 17, 25 

Sam Houston. Texas, 90, 138, 344 

Sheridan, Illinois. 447 

SilL Oklahom:r. 138 

Slocum, New York, 79 

William McKinley, Philippine Islands, 

346 

Wood, New York. 428 

Fosdick, Raymond B., 148-49, 243, 250 

Foulois, Brig. Gen. Bertiamin D., 192- 94, 

389- 91 

nuem zation prohibitions, 234 

Frclinghuysen, Joseph S., 245 

French Sixth /\rmy, 192 

547 
THE INSPECTORS G EN ERAL, 1903-193 9 

Funds. See also Economic surveys; U.S. 

t>ropcrty and disbursing oO'iccrs 

(USP&DOs). 

closing of accounts in Siberia, 308, 309 

inspections, 48. 63- 65, 182 83, 3 15- 16 

ofThird Army units, 284 86 

oversight of CCC, 458 

ove1'Sight at depots, 380 

Funston, General Frederick, 34, 258 

Galbraith, Maj. Jacob G .. 47, 91 

Gambling, 289 

Garlington, Brig. Gen. Ernest A., 14-15.20, 

21, 34, 467, 470 

and appointment of ad hoc IGs, 32 

and Army motori?ation, 28 

and business methods inspections. 14-15 

and Chief of Ordnance, 41 -42 

and conciseness of inspection reports, 43 

functions of IGD vs. Gencml Staff, 23 

inspection ofthc Manila Quartermaster 

Oct>Ot, 98 

interest in penology, I 04 

investigation of Brownsville incident, 

89- 90 

issue of release of infonnation from annual reports, 45 

and military schools inspections, 47 

and National Defense Act of 1916, 30 

and National Guard, 70- 71 

overview of IGD's performance for Chief 

of Stan: 21 - 22 

recommendation on motion picture programs, 83 

and wctical inspections, 56- 57 

Garrison. Lindley M .. 29-30. 86 

Gcneml Accounting Onice (GAO) 

audit of National Guard USP&DO 

accounts, 440 

vs. IG inspections ofUSP&DO accounts. 

442-44 

relationship with IGD, 327 28 

General Staff 

bill, II 

connict with IGD, 21- 24 

Foulois' criticism of, 390 

paperwork burden, 366- 68 

personnel survey, 370 

sut>ervision of supply and administrative 

activities, 365 66 

Glassford, Col. Pelham D., 403 

Goethels. Maj. Gen. George W.. 113 

Gould. Lt. Kingdon, 188 

Governor's llorse Guard, 433 

548 

Groves. Maj. Sydney C., 306 

Graves, Maj. Gen. William S .. 303 05 

Graves Rcgistmtion Service, 426 

Gray, Maj. Alonzo, 45, 108 

A Guidejorthe Use ofO.Dlcers of the 

Inspector Genemls Department. See 

Yellow Book. 

llaan, Maj. Gen. William G., 230 

llagood, Maj. Gen. Johnson, 177. 330 

llnrbord, Maj. Gen. James G., 178 79, 181, 

266,295,319 

I larding, Warren G., 275, 326 

Harries, Brig. Gen. George H., 265 66 

llart, Maj. Gen. William II., 424 

llarts, Brig. Gen. William \V., 279 80 

llarwood. Capt. Edward C., 422 

Hay. James. 23, 29- 30 

I lay, Col. Willimn H., 278- 81,284, 29 1- 94 

I lazing, 51 

Health issues 

impact of CCC on, 455, 457 

inspection of, 171 

in momle report, 150 

Helmick, Maj. Gen. Eli A., 20-21,47,53. 

116, 124, 134, 146, 319- 20, 327,334, 

338,341,401,424,468 

assignment to Base Section No. 5, 266, 

268 69 

attempt at Army administrative reform, 

365- 67 

Guidefortlte Rapid Inspection of Large 

Units, 127-33 

inspection of troot>S in the Far East, 

345-48 

introduction of leadership course into 

USMA curriculum, 403 

National Guard inspections by, 73- 75 

report 011 War Department downsizing, 

369 

"llclpful Suggestions to Inspectors." 356 

Henry, Maj. T. Charlton, 199,208 

II ides, disposition of. 37. See also Animals. 

Hindenburg Line, 136 

Hines, Maj. Gen. John L., 240 

llixson, Lt. Col. Arthur G., 340-41 

II ixson Liquidmion Fund, 340- 4 1 

Hoflinan, Lt. Col. Edwurd L., 421 22 

llolmes, Maj. Frank. 377 

llomes, 104 06, 423- 24. See also National 

Home tor Disabled Volunteer Soldiers 

(NiiDVS); Soldiers' Home. 

I long Kong, 348 

lloover, llcrbcrt, 328 29, 378 
INDEX 

llorscs and mules. See also Animals. 

burial of. 221 

purchase of local, 52 

usc for transportation, 27 28 

Hospitals, 372 

AEF field, 196 

inspection ol: 42, 141 , 246, 407- 08 

treatment of injuries from nonhostile 

causes, 186-87 

Household goods shipments, 396- 97 

Housing allowances, 435- 37 

Housing problems, 409- 10 

llughcs, Col. John H., 161 , 179 

Humber, Col. Robert C., 407, 436 

Humphrey, Brig. Gen. Charles F., 98, 99 

Hunt. Col. Or.t E., 366 

Ickes, Harold L., 459- 60 

Infantry 

coordination with artillery, 204 

training, 144-45 

Infantry Brigades 

23d,346 

I 54th, 210 

163d, 248 

Infantry regiments 

5th, 289 

15th, 346 

24th, 93 97 

25th, 88 93 

27th, 303 

28th, 272 

31st, 303, 346 

45th (PS). 346 

57th (PS), 346 

106th, 136 

305th, 258 

307th, 209, 228 

308th, 210 

339th, 298, 300 

370th, 174 

372d. 174 

lnflucnz.1 epidemic, 228- 29. 265 

Initial Protective Force, 330 

Insignia and decorations, 257- 58 

Inspection ofllrmies in lite Held, 201 

Inspection re1>orts, 41-46, 355 56. See also 

Officers. 

on activated and deployed units, 141-43 

on Army ration and procurement proce.ss, 

408 

on clothing, 407 

critic ism of, 166 

daily, 199- 20 I, 224 

Inspection reports Continued 

military prisoners issue in, I 02 

on morale issues affecting state of mind. 

411 - 12 

periodic and monthly, 240-42 

on post exchange system, 417- 20 

on recruiting stations, 77- 78 

systematization of, 139-40, 199 

Inspections 

of2d Division, 191 

of 3d Division, 192 

of 5th Division. 17 1 

of 10th Cavalry, 34- 35 

of 21st Railroad Engineers Regiment, 255 

of 28th Division, 171 

of 35th Division, 213 

of81st Division, 171 

of 82d Division, 171 

of AEF discipline issues, 172 76 

of AEF medical operations, 195 97,2 19 

of AEF training, 168- 72 

of Air Corps activities, 389- 90 

of animal care, 186, 226 

of Army school system, 402- 06 

of Artillery School of Fire, 48 

of Aviation School, 48- 50 

of base sections, 183- 84. 189 

of billeting and bivouac areas, 252 

of burial procedures, 220- 21 

business methods, 61- 63 

of CCC's impact on Army, 452- 57 

of cemeteries, I 06 08, 426-27 

of Coast Artillery School, 47-48 

of commissary operations, 408 

of condemned property, 26, 28 

of corps areas, 343 

of depot activities, 65- 66, 97- 10 I. 224 

of field artillery. 58 61, 137- 39 

of field maneuver division, 25 27 

of First Army rear <~reas, 2 15 

funds, 63-65, 182- 83 

garrison and unil, 5 1- 53 

guidance for, 20 I 

guidelines and standards, 356-57 

improvements brought about by, 36 40 

inspectors' role in tactical, 361-<i2 

of Liquidation Commission, 274-75 

of medical evacuation system, 260 61 

of mess operations, 407-09 

militia, 67- 75 

morale and welfare, 149- 52. See also 

Chaplains; Conscientious objectors. 

of motor vehicle fleet, 385- 86 

of national battlefield parks, 427- 30 

of national cemeteries, 424-26 

549 
T HE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903-1939 

Inspections- Continued 

National Guard, 30 

of National Guard USP&DO accounts, 

438-44 

of National Home for Disabled Volunteer 

Soldiers, 423 24 

organizational, 236-42 

of post exchanges, 418 

prisons, I 02- 04, 184, 415 

recruit depots, 79 

of reserve components, 431- 34 

of Siberia expedition, 307-09 

of Signal Corps aviation training program, 153- 55 

of Soldiers' llome, I 05 

ofSOS facilities, 180- 82 

systematization of, 139-43 

tactical, 53-57, 121 

of Transportation Service, 254-55 

of U.S. forces overseas, 344-51 

of welfare and momle, 241-42 

during WW I. 123 24, 126, 134 36 

Inspector General's Department (IGD) 

AEF's IG and, 157 58 

AGO's duties vs., 18, 67 

CCC and, 444, 457- 64 

connict with General Staff, 21 24 

congressional support for. 318 

day-to-day administrntion, 339 

duties in northwestern Russia, 300- 303 

duties in Siberin, 306 09 

expansion during WW I, 11 4-21 

headquarters organi7.1tion, 336 -37 

interwar investigations, 394 

:and National Defense Act of 1916, 31 

organization in Germany, 278- 82 

personnel during interwar period, 

330-35 

postwar organintion and mission, 316- 17 

postwM role definition, 313- 16 

problems with CCC inspectors' role, 451 

role in reform, 13- 18 

strength and organization, 18-2 1 

The Inspectors Gcnernl. See by individual 

name. 

lns1>ectors genernl 

Advanced Headquarters, 205, 208 

;umual reports, 44 

armistice aftermath role and duties of, 

233- 35 

army and corps, 200, 202, 213 

as Army's efficiency experts. 356- 57, 

371 - 72 

in corps areas, 342--44, 359, 362 

duties during AEF operations, 197- 200 

550 

Inspectors generni- Continued 

duties with A FIG and Third Army, 

283- 87 

duties and qualities, 3- 4 

embarkation guidelines, 260 

geographical distribution of, 19, 27 

impact of General Order 38 on, 237- 38 

lack of career advancement for, 163 

and National Guard USP&DO accounts, 

438-44 

problems in AEF, 162-68 

rnilhead, 224 

resentment of daily report requirement, 

201 

role in AEF, 158- 60 

role during combat, 209- 1 0 

routine tasks, 469 

senior animal. 227 

special assignments, 187 90, 334, 

358- 60 

tactical unit, 28- 29, 198 

traffic crisis control. See Trnffic management. 

training for position of, 337 ·38 

lntcrnalional crisis, 291- 95 

Investigations 

of 305th Infantry, 258 

of black-markctcering, 224 

of corruption in theAnny, 97- 101 

of crowding a1 Ft. Frnncis E. Warren, 

Wyoming, 414 

interwar, 394-97 

of NCO housing allowances, 436 

of racial issues. See Brownsville (Texas) 

incident; Madison Barracks (New 

York) incident. 

of railroad-related cases, 254 

of USP&DOs, 438- 39 

of YMCA's overseas activities, 248- 51 

Ireland, Maj. Gen. Mcrritte W., MC, 195 

Ironside, Maj. Gen. Edmund, 299- 300 

Irwin, Col. George Le R .. 338 

Is-sur-Tille. 256 

Japanese government, reaction to American 

presence in Siberia, 304-05 

JciTcrson Barmcks, Missouri, 447 

Johnson, Brig. Gen. Evan M .. 210 

Johnson. Col. Jacob C., 169- 70, 199, 

2 10- 11,235,408 

and implementation of Gene•~• I Order 38, 

236-42 

and inspection standards. 191 

Johnson. Louis A., 452 
INDEX 

Judge Advocate General, 339. 428. See af.w 

Otrice ofThc Judge Advocate General. 

Judge Advocate General's Department, 87. 

150,314 

Kenan. Maj. Owen T .. 180 

Kennedy, Maj. Gen. Chnse W.. 146 

Kent, William T., I 06 

Keppel, Frederick P., 149 

and chaplain issue, 151- 52 

and conscientious objectors issue, 151 

Kernan. Maj. Gen. Francis J., 177- 78 

Kirtland. Col. Roy C., 389 

Kitchens. 135 

Knights of Columbus, 148, 150 

Kolchak, Alcx<mdcr. 304, 308 

Krueger, Col. Walter, 447 

Lassiter, Maj. William, 26, 58- 59 

Lauber, Lt. Col. Philip, 163 

Lea, Col. Luke, 258 59 

Lear, Lt. Col. Ben, 375 

Lecocq. Col. Franc, 397 

Legal issues, 413 16 

Lc Mans. 227, 246, 262, 264 

Lewis. Maj. David, 164,217 

Lewis, Lt. Col. George C., 255- 56 

Liaison procedures, 205, 208 

Liggett, Maj. Gen. Hunter, 192- 93, 198, 215. 

238,277 

Ligny-en-Barrois, 197 

Lineberger, Walter F., 294 

Line-of-communic;~tion (LOC) organization. 

176-79. See al.1o Services of Supply. 

Litter-bearers, 218 

Livestock, inspection of, 172, 346. See also 

Animals. 

Logan. Maj. L<:on M., 428- 30 

London, 180, 184 

Lovering. Lt. Col. Leonard A., 89 

Lucas. Lt. John P., 39 

Lusitania, 29 

McAndrew, Maj. Gen. James W., 240 

MacArthur, General Douglas, 329- 30, 

349- 50,390,450,452 

as commander ofThird Corps Area. 375 

and management of CCC operations. 

448-49,454 

McCammon, Col. Willimn W .. 421 

McCleave. Col. Robert, 198 

McEntee, James J., 450 

Machine Gun Banal ions 

7th, 191 

306th, 209 

Mcilroy, Lt. Col. James G., 22 1, 235, 245 

McKenney. Lt. Col. Richard 1., 180, 188 

McKinley, William, 9 

McKinney, Guy D., 450 

McNair. Maj. William S .. 72 

McRae, Maj. Gen. James H .. 347 

Madison Barracks (New York) incident, 

93- 96 

Madson, Pvt. Howell. 292 

Magruder, Lt. Col. Lloyd B .. 180. 184, 278, 

280,282.284 85, 295 

Mahin, Lt. Col. Frank C .. 422 

Mail service, 242. 252 54 

complaint about CCC, 463 

investigation of, 397 

Maintenance, 377 

aircraft, 193, 379 

cost of vehicle, 384 85 

housing. 410 

impact of CCC on, 453- 54. 457 

road, 199,205. 211 

tank, 214 

vehicle, 186, 225 

Major, Col. Dunc:m K .. Jr., 375,445,461 

Malone, Brig. Gen. Paul 13., 263- 64 

Manila Commissary Depot, 97 

Manila Medical Depot, 97 

Manila Quartermaster OeJ>Ot, 98 

March, General Peyton C., 194,315- 16.468 

and conscientious objectors issue, 150 51 

coordination of \VW I operations. 

112- 13. 119 

inspection of A FIG, 287- 88 

Mnrcy, Brig. Gen. Randolph 13., 4 

Marine Brigade, 4th, 158 

Marshall, Col. George C., Jr., 68, 205 

Mars-sur-Allier, 227 

Martin. Col. Charles F.. 414 

Man hews, Col. I larry T., 263-44 

Mayo, Katherine. 248 

Medical organizations 

replacement now and lack of medical 

screening, 228 29 

structure of, 27 

Medical personnel, 141, 147. 195- 97 

for CCC, 447 

during Meusc-Argonnc oiTensive, 218 

during St. Mihiel offensive, 203- 04 

Merrill, Col. Dana T., 404 

Messes, 81,407- 08 

Meuse-Argonnc offensive, 165, 166, 175, 

205,208- 24 

551 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

Miles, Ll. Gen. Nelson A., II, 13 

Military police, 175 76. See also Straggler 

control progr:nn. 

impro1>cr actions allegations aga inst, 290 

quality of, 268 

traOic now and. 203, 21 I. 216 

Military Police Corps, 175 

Military prisons, 101 04. See also Alcatraz 

prison; U.S. Federal Penitentiary. 

Military Secretary's Office, 12 

Militia, inspection of, 67- 75 

Militia Act of21 J;muary 1903.67 68 

Militia Affairs Division, WDGS, 67, 68, 69 

Mills, Col. Stephen C., 25 

Mitchell, Col. James 0., 180, 184 

Mitchell, Col. William"Billy," 192 93 

Montfaucon, 208. 212,222 

Montgomery, Col. John C., 281 

Monuments. See National monuments. 

Morale. See also Fosdick, Raymond 13.; Mail 

service; Post exchanges. 

effect of criticism on, 167 

impact of CCC on, 452, 455 

inspections of welfare and, 148 50, 

24 1- 42,374 

issues, 406- 12 

Morale Branch, establishment of, 152 

Morris, Col. Willis V., 306-09 

Morrison, Maj. Gen. John F., 140, 144 

Morton, Lt. Col. Chnrles G., 50 

Moll, John R., 248 

Mound City, Kansas, 425 

Muir, Maj. Gen. Charles H., 221 

Munson, Brig. Gen. Edward L., 152 

Murmansk, 296, 298 

Muster roll. e limination of, 14-15 

National Defense Act of 1916, 24, 29 33, 

Ill, 114,313 

application to National Guard, 71- 73 

and field art i llcry, 60 

National Defense Act of 1920, 280, 285, 398, 

431 

application to National Guard, 442 

division of country into corps areas, 321, 

3241123 

strength of IGD set by. 331- 32 

structural changes within War 

Department. 324 

National Guard, 29 31, 33, 321, 431. S(!e 

also Militia. 

inspections during WW 1, 134- 35 

peacetime adjustment, 324 

reduction of training funds, 329 

552 

National Guard Contnued 

sergeant-instructors housing allowance 

scandal, 435- 36 

as a source of IGD manpower, 335 

during WW 1, 121- 24 

National Guard Bureau, 438- 39 

National !-lome for Disabled Voluruecr 

Soldiers (N II DVS), I 05-{)6, 340, 423 

Na tional battlefield parks, 427- 30 

National monuments, 428- 30 

National Park Service, 450 

Nebraska National Guard, 439 

Neufchateau, 197 

Nevers, 177 

Newark Depot, 380 

New York General Intermediate Depot. 373, 

377,381 

New York National Guard, 440 41 

Occupation army. See Third Army. 

O'Connor. Col. Charles M., 86 

Office of Public Ouildings, 369 

OITicc of the Chief of Chaplains, 369 

Office oft he Chief of Infantry. 369 

Office of thcf rhc Inspector Gcncml 

(OIG/OTIG) 

change from OIG to OT1G, 320 

collateral duties, 340 

decentralization, 359- 64 

evaluation of Army's CCC responsibilities, 452 57 

guidelines for National Guard inspections, 444 

inspection standards for economic surveys, 372 

internal controls, 355- 59 

officer evaluation by. 147. 229- 30 

relations with War Plans Division. 142-43 

report on cemetery system, I 07 

review of complaints, 87, 433- 34, 

462- 63 

service schools inspections, 17,47- 5 I. 

403- 04 

subordinate divisions, 18 19, 336, 339, 

340 

unit business practices inspections, 17 

WW I duties of, 115. 143 -44 

Office ofThc Judge Advocate General, 423. 

438-39 

Officer Reserve Corps, IGD, I I 7, 335 

OITicers. See also Reserve OffiCCI'S Training 

Corps (ROTC) Program. 

appointment of welfare, 251 

evaluation of. 145-48,229 30 
INDEX 

OITicers-Continuccl 

pay of, 4 12 

personal conduct or, 187- 88, 420-23 

recall of reserve, I 17- 19 

Oliver, Robert Shaw, 89 

Olmstead, Maj. Dawson. 136-39, 161 

Omsk. 304 

Ordnance Corps, 324, 331, 369 

Ordnance Department, 36 37, 376 

Ordnance depots, 376 

Organized Reserve Corps (ORC), 32 1, 325, 

330,43 1 

inspections of, 432 

as a source of manpower, 334-35 

Ovenshine, Col. Alexander T., 173-74, 

195- 96,234 

Overman Act of May 1918, 112, 114 

Palmer, Lt. Col. Robert D., 3 14, 3 18 

Paperwork 

complexity and volume of, 37,364-71 

reduction tasking, 284, 366, 367 

Paris, 177 

Parker, John D., 332 

Parkinson, Maj. John L., 280- 81, 458 

Parks. See National bauleficld parks. 

Paternity claims, investigation of, 393 

Pallerson, Col. Charles II., 371, 440 

Pallon, Col. George S., 11 6. 257- 58 

l,aulding, Col. William, 93- 97 

Pay, 242, 250. 410 II 

cuts, 457 

discrepancies. 450 

freeze and reduction, 374 

officers, 4 12 

Pay cards, 169 

Peck. Col. Robert G., 172, 2 13, 278, 337 

Peking, 348 

Penn, Brig. Gen. Julius, 146 

Pennsylvania National Guard, 436 

Pershing, General John J., 33, Ill, 163, 366, 

468. See also American Expeditionary 

Forces (AEF); Brewster, Maj. Gen. 

AndreW. 

closing out of fi nal AEF mailers, 277 

First Army commander, 197 

inspection ofThird Army, 272 

involvement in General Order 38 implernentat ion, 240 

and officer conduct, 187- 88 

planning of\V\V I operations, 112- 14 

policy regarding officers, 229-30 

relationship with Brewster, 158- 59 

reliance on AEF inspectorate, 168-72 

Personal conduct 

of aviators, 194 

IG investigations of, 187- 88 

Persormel issue, 141. 173 

credentials and duties of IG's officer augmentees, 333 34 

headquarters reductions, 368-71 

OIG civilian strength, 332 

Philippine Department IG oiTice, 345 

Philippine Scouts, 350 

Plumley, Charl es A., 86 

Poole, Maj. Gen. Frederick C., 298- 99 

Pontanezen, 266- 67, 269 

Port activities, 184 

Post. Lt. Henry B., 49 

Post exchanges, 82 84. 284, 374, 387, 

417-20,449 

Powell, Maj. E. Alexander, 188 

Preparedness, 18, 29, 375. See also National 

Defense Act of 19 16. 

emphasis on, 57 

impact of CCC on, 455- 56 

Preston, Maj. Gen. John F., 332. 341, 362- 63, 

383,390,403,413 

and CCC, 447, 451- 53,458 

and housing allowance investigation, 

435 

and officer conduct investigation, 42 1 

Prisoners of war, 187, 200, 234, 297, 308 

Prisons 

Army, I 02- 04, 4 16 

conditions of, 287 

District of Paris. 184 

inspectors' visits to. 415- 16 

Pritchell, Col. liarry II., 358- 59, 425 

Proctor, Redfield, 78 

Prohibition, alcoholic beverages, 416 

Property 

damage claims, 189, 252 

disposal of Third Army, 285 

economic survey of. 373 

salvage and diSJ>OSal, 186, 377, 382- 83, 

394 

Prostitution houses, ISO 

Provost Marshal's Department, 283, 291, 292, 

294 

Punitive Expedition, 33-40 

Pmdy, Milton D., 91 

Pursuit Service, 192 

Quartennaster Corps, 324. 332, 369 

Quartennastcr General 

inspection of cemetery system, I 07- 08 

testing of truck, 28 

553 
THE INSPECTORS GENERAL, 1903- 1939 

Quartermaster General's Deparuncnt, 65 

administrative contro l of transponation, 

384 

ccntr·:1lization of petroleum purchase, 378 

clothing requisition problems, 406 07 

housing issues during WW I. 122 23 

inSJX-'Ction of, 62 

jurisdiction over nntional banlc ficld 

parks, 428 

Quarters, 80-81 

Racial issues. See also Brownsville (Texas) 

incident: Madison Barracks (New 

York) incident: Scoll, Emmell J. 

in AEF, 174-75 

in CCC, 462 

recurring complaints, 396 

Railroad Engineers Regiment, 2 1st, 255 

Railroads, 205 

after the armistice, 254- 57 

refurbishment of German. 274 

Trans-Siberian, 297, 304-05 

Rankin, Jeanelle, 308n83 

Rations, 81- 82, 407- 08 

Read, Col. Alvan C., 278- 79, 285. 293 

Record and Pension Office, 11 - 12 

Recreational facilities, 374, 449 

Recrui1 depots, 79 80, 398 

Recruiting 

of 25th Infantry dischargecs, 9 1 

and interwar training, 397-402 

monitoring of. 77 80 

Reed, David A., 426 

Reed, Maj. Gen. Walter L., 117, 134, 269, 

282,333,359.37 1,390- 9 1,422. 436, 

460 

insJX:Ctions of National Guard USP&DO 

accounts. 442. 444 

investigative responsibility of USP&DOs, 

438-39 

Reinhart, Mary Roberts, 269 

Release of information, 45 

Religious activities, 150. See also Chaplains. 

Rcmoum Service, inspection of. 226 

Replacement Depot, I st, 263 

Replacement now, 227 29 

Reserve Officers Tn1ining Corps (ROTC) 

Program, 3 1. 325, 329 

Retention. enlisted personnel, 397 99 

Retirement law, 412 

Rice, Lt. Col. Charles II., 198, 215, 278 

Rich, Lt. Col. Albert T., 2 10 

Richardson, Pvt. James, 94 

Richardson. Brig. Gen. Wilds P., 300 30 I 

554 

Rivers. Maj. Gen. William C., 138, 337. 342, 

356,373,376.410 

recruiting stnndardization, 398 

review o f' N II DVS issue, 423- 24 

Roberts. Col. Thomas A., 174 

Rogers, William N., 390 

Roosevelt, Lt. Andre, 188 

Roosevelt, Fmnklin D., 327, 329,445-47 

Rooseve lt, Theodore, 89, 90, 92 

Root, Elihu, 6 1,467 

Army reforms. 9- 13 

suppori for establishment of organized 

militia, 67 

and tactica l exercises, 25 

Rollcrdam, 274, 275 

Ruggles, Col. James A .. 301 

Russia 

American intervention in, 296 300 

collapse of czarist regime and withdrawal 

from war. 295- 96 

Sacket1s Harbor, 93, 94. 96, 396 

St. Aignan. 263 

St. Mihiel offensive, 186, 188, 194, 197- 99, 

202- 05 

St. Nazairc port, 17 1, I 77, 183 

Base Section No. I, 183.264 

guidance for IG of, 260 

inspection of, 259-65 

Salvage Service, 225 

Sammons, Maj. Edward C., 243 

Sanger, Col. Joseph P., 97 

Sanitary conditions, 135, 170 

impact of CCC on, 455 

inspection of, 181 

Scales. Maj. lloward N., 301 - 03 

Schools 

Army, 402 06 

Adjutant General, 337 

Army Service, 68 

Artillery. 48, 59, 138 

Aviation. 49 50 

Coast Artillery, 47-48 

for drivers and motor officers, 186 

equipment priority for, 139 

Finance, 337 

at Fort Leavenworth. 338 

inspections of, 17. 42 

Scott, Lt. Edgar. 194 

Scott, Emmett J., 462 

Scott, Maj. Gen. llugh L., 7 1 

Scriven, Brig. Gen. George P., 49 

Sea transports, 386- 87 

Second Army. 160. 255 
INDEX 

Self-inflicted wounds, 186 87 

Selfridge, U. Thomas W., 49 

Services of Supply (SOS) 

embarkation requirements, 262, 265 

establishment and organization of, 

177-80 

funds inspc<:tions. 182-83 

inspectors' duties and work load, 180....86 

lack of policies and supply problems, 

224-25 

merger with AEF headquarters, 277 

Shanghai, 348 

ShallkS, Maj. Gen. David C., 80- 81, 424 

Shenandoah N:ttional Park. 463 

Short, Maj. Charles A., 69 

Siberia, U.S. forces in. 303 09 

Signal Corps, 48- 50, 153 55, 279 

Silesian Brigade, 293 

Simmons, B. 1-1. , 377, 442 

Sitka, Alaska, 425 

Slocum, Col. Henry J., 39 

Soldiers' Home, Washington, D.C., 103. 105, 

340 

Somervell, Lt. Col. Brehon. 281 

Spc<:ial Regulation Number 69, 140 

Spinks, Brig. Gen. Marcellus G., 68. 121 , 

163, 180. 187. 198.208,243,254, 

264,3 14 

Stables, 252 

Stacey, Col. Cromwell, 2 10 

StMbird, Brig. Gen. Alfred A., 136-39, 266 67 

State-of-mind analysis, 411 12 

Steamboat Inspection Service, 386 

Steuben. Maj. Gen. Friedrich W. A. von, 4, 5, 

403,469 

Stewart. Col. George E .. 298, 300 

Stimson, Henry L .. 13- 15, 27 

Stitely, Reno E., 459 

Storage facilities, 373. 380 

Straggler control program, 222- 23 

Strayer, Col. Thorne, 2 14, 397. 413- 14 

Streater, Maj. Wallace A .. 120, 162. 182, 285 

inspection of Liquidation Commission, 

275 

investigation of speculation on German 

mark fluctuation, 289- 90 

SOS disbursing accounts inspections, 181 

Stuart. Robert Y., 446 

Summerall, General Charles P. , 320, 362- 63. 

426 

Supply sen•iccs, 176 81 

Tall. William II., 13 14.61 

and Brownsville incident, 90- 91, 92 

T:1fl. William H.- Continued 

and Manila Quartermaster Depot inspection, 100 0 1 

and recruiting. 78 

Taggart. Lt. Col. Matthew II., 171- 72 

Taylor, Charles H., 450 

Third Army, 271- 77 

Tientsin, 348 

Tientsin Barracks, 351 52 

Todd. Maj. Henry D., Jr., 47 

Torrey, Maj. Zerah W., 85 

Tours, 177, 180, 181 

TraiTic management, 199, 203, 205, 208, 

211- 12,216 17 

Training. See also Replacement now; Signal 

Corps. 

AEF, 121- 23, 142-43 

/\FIG, 277 

allied officers as supervisors, 142 

armistice aftermath, 242--43 

civilian camp, 18. See also Civilian 

Military Training Corps (CMTC) 

Program. 

courses for reservists, 375 

82d Division, 169 70 

impact of CCC on, 453. 455 

inspections, 3 15 16 

inspections of AEF combat, 180....81 

interwar educational and vocational, 

399-400 

interwar recruiting and, 397- 02 

issue in inspection reports, 141-42 

of National Guard inspector-instructors, 

68 

occupation :mny, 272 

pmctical field, 53 54 

savings through reduction in, 330 

standardization of, 143-44 

T1-ansportation Service, 184, 255, 294 

Transportation system. 181, 384-87 

82d Division problem, 170 

economic survey of motor vehicles, 373 

equipment abandonment and absence, 225 

horses and mules. 27- 28 

impact of CCC on motor. 457 

inspection of, 184 

logistical officers' impact on, 223 

Travel expense, inspectors, 362-63 

Travel orders, 355 

Trier, 235, 241, 272, 275, 276 

U.S. Army 

budget and downsizing of, 325- 26 

centralized administration. 364-71 

555 
THE INSPECTORS G ENERAL, 1903-1939 

U.S. Army- Continued 

in the field, 24-29 

Great Depression and funding of, 328- 29 

interwar recruiting and retention, 398 99 

peacetime strength, 321 

phasing out of wartime motor vehicles, 

385- 86 

retail stores, 382 

Root reforms and the new, 10-13. 55 

school system, 402 05 

storage system, 380 

support to CCC, 445- 52 

U.S. Civil Service Commission, 397 

U.S. Federal Penitentiary, I 03 04, 415 

U.S. Forest Service, 449- 50 

U.S. Liquidation Commission. 274- 75 

U.S. Marine Corps, 262 

U.S. Military Academy (USMA). 403 

discipline issues, 51 

inspection of, 42, 47 

survey of graduates' quality, 406 

U.S. Post Ofl'ice Department, 397 

U.S. property and disbursing officers 

(USP&DOs), 437-44 

Vandalism. 175 

Van Schaick, Col. Louis, 278, 345, 348 51, 

376,377 

Vehicles 

maintenance and repair. 186, 225. 385- 86 

shortage, 170- 71 , 268 

Venereal diseases, 150, 169, 173, 181.352 

Versailles Treaty, 276, 286, 293 

Vestal, Col. Samuel C., 230 

Veterans Bureau, 423 

Veterinary activities, 134, 226- 27. See t1lso 

Animals. 

Vicksburg, 427 

Villa. Pancho, 33 

Vladivostok. 296, 304, 305, 308 

Volstead Act, 416 

Walter Reed Guest House, 376 

W:1r Department 

control of 11<1tional parks, 428 

coordination and consolidation of school 

system programs. 405 

economic surveys, 3 72 

interwar investigations, 394-97 

nonmilitary aspects, 344 

oversight board, 366 

phasing out of wartime motor vehicles. 

385 86 

556 

War Department- Continued 

postwar inspection. 368 

proposal of merging of Navy with, 329 

relations with CCC, 445,448.451- 52 

relations with OTIG, 362 64 

structur:.l changes, 324 

War Industries 13oard, creation of, 112 

War Plans Division (WPD), 140, 142- 43 

collaboration with OTIG on tbird series of 

surveys, 378 

review of IGD's funct ions, 3 13- 15 

War Risk Insurance, 340 

Washington Barracks Engineer School. 48 

Waste, equipment, 225 

Webb, Maj. Arthur L., 120, 162 

Weeks, John W., 368 

Welfare 

appointment of welfare officer, 251 

of troops. 148- 52,243-46,268 

Welfilre organizations, 246 5 1, 273, 328. See 

also American Red Cross: YMCA. 

Wcygand, General Maxirnc, 294 

Whittlesey, Maj. Charles W., 209- 10 

Wickersham, 13rig. Gen. Ira P., 69 

Williams, Brig. Gen. Alcxan1Jcr E., 422 

Williams, Maj. Everett C., 439 

Wilson, Woodrow. 16, 29, 33 34 

administmtion and WW I, 111- 12 

and conscientious objectors issue, 150 

and Eastern Front intervention, 296 97 

Winn, Brig. Gen. JohnS., 161 . 179- 81. 189, 

226 

Wood, Maj. Gen. Leonard, 13, 15, 24. 40, 

285,3 17,347,415,468 

approval of Board on Business Methods 

recommendations. 62 

connie! with Ainsworth, 14- 16 

development of civilian training camps, 

18 

economy measures irnl>lcmentation. 17 

and inspection reports. 43 

Madison Barracks investigation by, 93 94 

and military prisoners issue, I 01- 02 

opposition to merger of I GO/General 

Staff. 23. 24 

and tactical inspections, 54-57 

Wood, Col. WilliamS., 439 

Wood, Brig. Gen. William T., 98- 100, 118, 

124, 143 

Woodring, Harry H., 389. 459-60 

Wotherspoon, Maj. Gen. William R., 57 

Wright Field. 42 1 

Yellow Book. 20, 139, 181, 356. 467 
YMCA, 273 

armistice anennath support, 243 

assignment to identification and burial 

process, 220 

INDEX 

YMCA- Continucu 

canteen operation, 250 

criticism of overseas activities, 246- 51 

morale-support activities, 148- 50, 195 

557