BEFORE THE 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

) 

Application of ) 

) 

National Air Cargo Group, Inc. d/b/a ) 

National Airlines ) 

) 

for an exemption pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 40109 ) 

and an amended certificate of public convenience ) 

and necessity pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 41102 ) 

(foreign scheduled air transportation of persons, ) 

property and mail) ) 

) 

Docket OST-2012-0204 

CONSOLIDATED ANSWER OF NATIONAL AIRLINES TO 

SUPPLEMENTS TO PETITIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION 

OF UNITED AIRLINES AND DELTA AIR LINES 

Communications with respect to this document should be addressed to: 

Mark W. Atwood 

Cozen O'Connor 

The Army and Navy Club Bldg. 

1627 I Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20006 

(202) 463-2513 

Counsel for National Airlines 

Dated: October 11, 2013 
BEFORE THE 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

) 

Application of ) 

) 

National Air Cargo Group, Inc. d/b/a ) 

National Airlines ) 

) 

for an exemption pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 40109 ) 

and an amended certificate of public convenience ) 

and necessity pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 41102 ) 

(foreign scheduled air transportation of persons, ) 

property and mail) ) 

) 

Docket OST-2012-0204 

CONSOLIDATED ANSWER OF NATIONAL AIRLINES TO 

SUPPLEMENTS TO PETITIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION 

OF UNITED AIRLINES AND DELTA AIR LINES 

United Airlines' and Delta Air Lines' campaign to eliminate National Airlines as a 

perceived competitive threat in the U.S.-Dubai market has enjoyed some success. 

Thanks to United's intervention, the General Services Administration has terminated "for 

convenience" the City-Pair Program contract that National was awarded on August 16, 

2013, handing United the remaining six of the 1,730 routes it sought, and leaving 24 city 

pairs from the United States to Afghanistan without GSA-contracted U.S. carrier service. 

Not content with this victory, United and Delta have filed another round of 

pleadings before the Department, supplementing the answers they filed to the 

Department's Order to Show Cause (Order 2013-4-12) tentatively awarding National 

scheduled passenger authority (U.S. points-UAE-Afghanistan points). The Department 

sensibly deemed those answers, filed four months late, petitions for reconsideration. 
United's and Delta's supplements add nothing meaningful to their initial answers, 

which were fully rebutted by National in its Answer of September 4 and Reply of 

September 9 in this docket. National does, however, wish to address a couple of points 

made in those supplements. 

First, United says that in light of the GSA's contract termination, "National's 

intentions are unclear," and suggests that its application "may be moot...." To clarify: 

National fully intends to implement the scheduled services between U.S. points and four 

points in Afghanistan for which it was found fit, to the same extent as it would have had 

the GSA contract remained in effect. The carrier's ability to do this, of course, is 

dependent on the approval and implementation of a codeshare agreement, which still 

requires further steps. National is still working to complete the FAA processes so that 

the remaining steps can be taken. 

It bears emphasis that the service proposed by National was never contingent on 

the existence of a GSA contract. The carrier had not even bid on that contract when it 

first applied for scheduled passenger authority. National believes that the traffic will 

support its service with or without such a contract, especially considering that it will still 

be the only U.S. carrier operating scheduled passenger service into Afghanistan. Thus, 

while United would no doubt like to think that the matter is now moot, it is not. 

Delta makes the charge that National is "creat[ing] a subterfuge for Emirates" to 

obtain Fly America Act traffic, and that "National is doing little more than renting its U.S. 

carrier code to Emirates." National takes the strongest exception to this charge, which 

completely ignores the facts as presented in its application. National has provided U.S.- 

Afghanistan cargo service to the U.S. military and other government agencies for over 

2 
ten years. This service has also involved traffic stops in Dubai. As an outgrowth of its 

heavy involvement in this market, National began providing passenger service into 

Afghanistan, on a single-entity charter basis, to one of the major government 

contractors, Fluor Corporation, in 2011. This passenger service, provided with Boeing 

757 aircraft, has operated daily between Dubai and points in Afghanistan for almost two 

years, and depends on other carriers to bring the passengers into Dubai. This, of 

course, requires passengers to make at least two separate sets of travel arrangements. 

Given the number of U.S. government and government contractor passengers 

that did not qualify for its Fluor charter, National determined to meet the need for singlecarrier service, and this was the genesis of its application for scheduled passenger 

authority. It believed, and still believes, that this service would fill an important need 

even if operated on a Dubai-Afghanistan stand-alone basis. However, to enable 

passengers to book single-carrier flights all the way into Afghanistan, and to enjoy the 

benefit of traffic under the Fly America Act restrictions, National approached Emirates 

as its logical codeshare partner. There is simply no basis for inferring that Emirates is 

using National as its pawn in a ploy to take Fly America traffic from U.S. carriers. Such 

a conclusion is illogical given the background of National's proposed service. And, 

incidentally, it is false. 

Delta attempts to draw a parallel with the case of TIE Aviation, Inc. (Order 2000- 

9-20). That case, however, is easily distinguished, and does not apply to National's 

situation at all. To begin with, TIE was applying for its initial certificate of public 

convenience and necessity; until that time, it only had authority as a Part 298 air taxi, 

and a fitness finding to operate small aircraft as a commuter. It had never been found fit 

3 
to operate large aircraft (i.e. over 60 seats), and did not even propose to operate such 

aircraft. Its application for certificate authority was solely for the purpose of being able 

to enter into codeshare agreements with foreign carriers to transport mail. That being 

the case, the applicant made no attempt to show its fitness to operate large aircraft, and 

thus the Department had no basis on which to grant TIE a certificate. As the 

Department found, TIE was proposing effectively to hold out "no more than indirect air 

carriage as an air freight forwarder." 

The contrasts with National's situation are obvious. National has held certificate 

authority for 10 years, first as a cargo carrier, 1and since 2010 as a passenger charter 

carrier. 2These certificates assume, by definition, operation of large aircraft, and indeed 

National is operating large aircraft between the United States, UAE and Afghanistan 

today, including in the Dubai-Afghanistan markets. Once National implements its 

scheduled passenger service, it will be operating large aircraft in the scheduled DubaiAfghanistan markets, and offering codeshare service on the U.S.-Dubai segments. This 

is precisely the service for which the Department found National fit. This is a very far cry 

from an air taxi that acts only as a freight forwarder for carriers operating large aircraft. 

The fact that the aircraft that Emirates uses on these routes (Boeing 777, A340 or A380) 

are larger than the aircraft National would use (Boeing 757) is of no consequence — they 

are all large aircraft within the legal meaning of the term. 

Seen in the full context of the facts of the TIE case, the quotation that Delta 

isolates — "we do not find that it is in the public interest to permit TIE to hold out service 

as a direct air carrier that it is not capable of providing in its own right" — takes on a very 

National's initial certificate authority was issued under the name Murray Air, Inc. (Order 2003- 

6-26). 

2 Order 2010-11-25. 

4 
different meaning than that which Delta assigns it. It has never been DOT's policy to 

prevent carriers from offering codeshare service on routes which may be too long for 

the particular type of aircraft that they operate. The requirement is that each carrier 

hold necessary scheduled authority for the market. That requirement is fully met in 

National's case. 

ACCORDINGLY, National Airlines requests that the Department deny the 

petitions for reconsideration filed by United, Delta, Airlines for America and the Air Line 

Pilots Association, or, upon reconsideration, affirm the decision made in Order 2013-7- 

12. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Mark W. Atwood 

Cozen O'Connor 

The Army & Navy Club Bldg. 

1627 I Street, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20006 

Tel. 202-463-2513 

Email: matwoodRcozen.com 

Counsel for National Air Cargo 

Group, Inc. d/b/a National Airlines 

Dated: October 11, 2013 

5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I certify that I have served the foregoing document on the following persons on 

this 11 th day of October, 2013, in accordance with the Department's Rules of Practice: 

francis.heil@aa.com 

robert.wirick@aa.corn 

jrichardson@johnlrichardson.corn 

russell.pommer@atlasair.corn 

sascha.vanderbellen@delta.corn 

chris.walker@delta.corn 

esauer@ssd.com 

charters@evergreenairlines.corn 

kevin.montgornery@polaraircargo.com 

Russell.bailey@alpa.org 

dberg@airlines.org 

agoerlich@ggh-airlaw.com 

anita.mosner@hklaw.com 

jennifernowak@hklaw.com 

howard.kass@usairways.corn 

Benjamin.slocurn@usairways.corn 

mbenge@zsrlaw.corn 

psanderlin@kalittaair.corn 

john.s.duncan@faa.gov 

lhalloway@crowell.com 

grnurphy@crowell.com 

Sarn tta.c.barne @d

r

lta

.

corn 

M. Pefley 

LEGALU 743 1433 \1