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S. HRG. 113–153 

SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE IN SOMALIA: CONSOLIDATING GAINS, CONFRONTING CHALLENGES, AND CHARTING THE PATH FORWARD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 8, 2013 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware, Chairman

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Aynte, Abdi, director, Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, Mogadishu, Somalia ........................................................................................................................... 34 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37 

Coons, Hon. Christopher A., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement . 1 

Dory, Amanda, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC ...................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10 

Flake, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from Arizona, opening statement ....................... 3 

Hogendoorn, Dr. E.J., deputy director for Africa, International Crisis Group, 

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 40 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 43 

Le Sage, Dr. Andre, senior research fellow for Africa, Institute for National 

Strategy Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC ................... 27 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29 

Lindborg, Hon. Nancy, Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington, DC ......................................................................................... 12 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13 

Thomas-Greenfield, Hon. Linda, Assistant Secretary of State for African 

Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ......................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1) 

SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE IN SOMALIA: 

CONSOLIDATING GAINS, CONFRONTING 

CHALLENGES, AND CHARTING THE PATH 

FORWARD 

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher A. 

Coons (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Coons, Flake, and McCain. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

Senator COONS. I am pleased to call to order this hearing of the 

African Affairs Subcommittee on security and governance issues in 

Somalia. 

Let me at the outset say that in this Government shutdown, I 

think it remains critical first that we fulfill our constitutional duty 

in a bipartisan manner to examine ongoing and pressing national 

security issues. I also think that the shutdown, as we will examine 

in this hearing, is having a significant and potentially greater 

impact on our ability to execute effective diplomacy, to provide 

meaningful development assistance, to analyze intelligence in a 

timely and thoughtful way in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere. 

And so I think it is relevant to our current state to have this hearing today, and I am grateful for the cooperation of the full committee chair and ranking and my ranking, Senator Flake, in allowing us to move forward today particularly given the very strong 

panels of witnesses we have before us. 

As we work together to help Somalia chart a course that may 

lead to a more stable and secure future, I think it is additionally 

helpful for us to provide a strong example of a functioning democracy that we can be proud of here at home. 

I would like to welcome, as I mentioned, Ranking Member Flake 

and other members of the committee who may join us and our distinguished witnesses on our first panel: Assistant Secretary of 

State for African Affairs, Linda Thomas-Greenfield; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa, Amanda Dory; and USAID Assistant Administrator for Bureaucracy—excuse me—Democracy—— 

[Laughter.] 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2 

Senator COONS [continuing]. Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, Nancy Lindborg. Nancy Lindborg is not the Assistant Secretary for Bureaucracy but for Democracy. Forgive me. 

On our second panel, we will have Andre Le Sage, senior 

research fellow for Africa at the National Defense University’s 

Institute for National Strategic Studies; Abdi Aynte, founder and 

executive director of the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies in 

Mogadishu. And thank you for the effort involved in your travel 

here to join us today. And E.J. Hogendoorn, deputy director for 

Africa at the International Crisis Group. 

Thank you to all of our witnesses. I know in several of your cases 

it was difficult to make preparations, given the shutdown. I am 

grateful for your cooperation and presence here today. 

Today’s hearing comes almost exactly two decades after the battle of Mogadishu, in which 18 Americans were killed defending 

U.S. interests and providing vital humanitarian assistance to 

Somalia. Following the United States withdrawal that occurred 

after that and after 20 years of state collapse, lawlessness, and 

general difficulties in Somalia, recent developments have given us 

significant reasons to be hopeful. Broad progress in Somalia is due, 

in no small part, to the security gains made by the African Union 

mission in Somalia known as AMISOM, consisting of Kenyan, 

Uganda, Burundian, and other African national troops in coordination with the Ethiopian military. AMISOM has deprived al-Shabaab of territory and revenue creating much-needed space to begin 

building a functioning state and state structures. This stability has 

allowed Somalia to form a constituent assembly, an elected new 

government which was official recognized by the United States last 

year. 

As our witnesses will testify, while much progress has been 

made, significant challenges still remain. The Somali people are 

frustrated with the government’s failure to provide basic services, 

education, and health care and others, and the humanitarian situation remains severe. This year, for example, there are more than 

2 million Somalis without adequate food access, and recently more 

than 160 confirmed cases of polio have emerged, just a reminder 

of the very fragile health and humanitarian situation in Somalia. 

Recognizing these matters cannot be fully addressed without a 

functioning state, the Somali people are impatient with the central 

government’s lack of leadership on forming federal states, as 

required by the constitution. The government now has 36 months 

to complete a constitution, conduct a constitutional referendum, 

and hold national elections. Increased security has provided the 

foundation for stability and governance, but as the horrific attack 

in Kenya 2 weeks ago demonstrates, al-Shabaab still is capable of 

operating both within and beyond Somalia’s borders. The unconscionable targeting of innocent civilians by al-Shabaab requires our 

attention and resources, and as we consider what it means for 

Somalia, American interests in the region, and our allies in the 

region, it is worthy of extra attention today. This is why I will soon 

introduce, along with Senator Flake, a resolution condemning the 

Westgate attack and reaffirming U.S. support for Kenya and for 

regional efforts to counter terrorism. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3 

This hearing is an opportunity to consider how U.S. support can 

help Somalis build on gains in security and governance. Since 

2006, our country has provided nearly $700 million of support to 

AMASOM and the Somali National Army, in addition to the nearly 

$140 million to support stabilization, democracy, and economic 

growth in the past 2 years. 

Despite these investments, I am concerned our strategy has not 

fully kept pace with changing realities on the ground, particularly 

concerns about governance, and I intend to introduce legislation 

requiring the administration to present its Somalia strategy to 

Congress with benchmarks for progress and a timeline for implementation, which I hope we can discuss in more detail today. 

I am particularly pleased to welcome Assistant Secretary Thomas-Greenfield for her first hearing before our committee before 

being confirmed to her post and again express gratitude to Mr. 

Aynte for traveling from Mogadishu to be with us today and to all 

of our witnesses for the skills, expertise, and background you will 

bring to this hearing. 

With that, I will turn it over to Senator Flake for his opening 

statement. 

Senator. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF FLAKE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA 

Senator FLAKE. I thank the chairman. I appreciate him holding 

this hearing and for you making the sacrifice to be here and some 

challenges with the shutdown and obviously geographical challenges as well. So thank you for being here. 

As events of the past weekend indicate, United States interests 

continue to be threatened in Somalia. Nearly 20 years to the day 

after the battle of Mogadishu, unfortunately known as ‘‘Blackhawk 

Down,’’ U.S. special forces once again risked their lives in defense 

of those interests. Yet, 20 years later, it seems that the same problems that plagued Somalia earlier since the collapse of the central 

government in 1991, and perhaps even before, continue to plague 

it today. 

Today’s hearing will provide us with an excellent opportunity to 

evaluate current United States policy toward the Somali Government, which the U.S. Government recognized for the first time earlier this year. That is significant and we need to make sure that 

that leads to something positive. It is encouraging that the recognition occurred, but we need to make sure, like I said, that is moving 

in the right direction. 

The security situation and the threat posed by al-Shabaab also 

need to be assessed, especially in the wake of the Nairobi terror 

attack in the past couple of weeks. 

Lastly, the assistance that the United States provides to Somalia 

for development and security needs to be examined to ensure the 

tax dollars spent in Somalia go to support United States objectives 

there. 

This hearing today I feel is important as a first step to help 

ensuring that in another 20 years we will not be hearing reports 

of United States special forces risking their lives again in Somalia. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today, and again 

thank you to the chairman for pushing forward on this. I think it 

is a good show that we are still having hearings and moving forward even with the shutdown. So thank you for being here. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Flake. 

And now we will move to our first panel of witnesses. Broadly 

speaking, we would encourage you to keep opening comments to 5 

minutes, but please, we are here to hear from you. So first, if we 

might, Madam Assistant Secretary. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LINDA THOMAS–GREENFIELD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Good afternoon, Chairman Coons, 

Ranking Member Flake. It really is my pleasure to appear before 

you today to talk about Somalia. You reminded me this is my first 

hearing since taking over my position about 2 months ago, and it 

really is important for me because, as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Somalia will remain a top foreign policy priority for the 

Department of State as it has for the Obama administration. 

This past year marked significant changes in Somalia and in our 

bilateral relationship with Somalia. The election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was a welcome signal that room for political 

progress in Somalia was opening. This was made possible in part 

because of the international community’s support for the Djibouti 

Peace Process and the leadership role of our regional partners, 

notably the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on 

Development, IGAD. On January 17, we formally recognized the 

Federal Government of Somalia after two decades of transitional 

governments. Nonetheless, the U.S. Government also understood 

very clearly that Somalia would face considerable challenges as it 

worked to rebuild its statehood. 

The successes of the African Union mission in Somalia, AMISOM 

troop-contributing countries, and strategic partners to combat and 

eviscerate al-Shabaab are demonstrating the strength of an African-led model. Nonetheless, this Somalia-based al-Qaeda affiliate 

remains a dangerous presence. The all-too-recent terrorist attack 

on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, for which al-Shabaab 

has taken credit, is a chilling example of the challenges for Somalia 

and the region. The attack suggests that violent extremism in the 

Horn of Africa may be evolving. It also makes clear that 

al-Shabaab presents a threat to U.S. partner nations in East 

Africa, to American citizens, and to U.S. interests in that region 

and elsewhere. 

Al-Shabaab must be stopped. The Federal Government of Somalia must increase its capacity to counter al-Shabaab, unify a fractured political system, and provide basic services to the Somali people. For all this, the Government of Somalia needs our support and 

much more. Our primary interest in Somalia is to help the people 

of Somalia build a peaceful nation that is stable with a stable government that is able to ensure civil security and services for its 

citizens. 

This leads me to turn to what our policy engagement is in 

Somalia. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5 

Prior to our recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia, 

our Somalia policy had three primary elements: provide support for 

the African Union mission in Somalia, or AMISOM as it is commonly known, and AMISOM’s strategic partner Ethiopia, to combat 

al-Shabaab and provide political space for the government to operate. Second, we wanted to respond to the humanitarian crisis and 

initiate stabilization where possible. And third, we wanted to promote our dual track policy. This is prior transition. 

Post transition, the three elements of our Somali policy have 

evolved and it is as follows. 

First, we continue to support AMISOM as the primary stabilizing 

force in Somalia, as we expand our assistance to the Somali 

National Army to build its institutional and operational capacity. 

From fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2013, the United States 

obligated approximately 512 million U.S. dollars in support of 

AMISOM, in addition to our assessed contributions for the U.N. 

logistics support package for AMISOM. During the same period, we 

obligated more than $170 million to support the Somali National 

Army to counter al-Shabaab more effectively. 

Second, we have shifted focus from humanitarian crisis response, 

now concentrating on security and stability, laying the foundation 

for economic recovery through our development-focused programming. In fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013, we provided nearly 

$140 million in funding to support Somalia’s stabilization, democracy, and economic growth activities. 

Third, our dual track approach concluded with the successful 

completion of the Djibouti Peace Process and the recognition of the 

Federal Government of Somalia. The United States has underscored the importance of outreach and engagement with the 

regional administrations to form the federal framework. We will 

continue to fund humanitarian assistance and civil society programs in Somaliland and Puntland with an objective of improving 

regional collaboration toward federalism. 

Our assistance to Somalia includes an emphasis on human 

rights, on accountability, child soldier prevention, countering 

human trafficking, and budget transparency and fiscal management. 

The tragic and cowardly attack on innocent civilians at Kenya’s 

Westgate Mall has underscored vulnerabilities in the Horn of 

Africa and demonstrates that al-Shabaab has a capable network in 

East Africa and it is willing to carry out attacks outside of Somalia. 

Concerted pressure from AMISOM and the Somali National Army 

has weakened al-Shabaab’s ability to wage conventional military 

offensives and to hold territory inside Somalia. We attribute this 

to the success of the African-led model for achieving greater stability in Somalia. However, al-Shabaab is able to conduct destabilizing operations in East Africa. 

The Department is working closely with our regional partners on 

counterterrorism efforts and we are reviewing internally what further resources we can provide to shore up AMISOM and further 

support their efforts, secure the border of Somalia and its neighbors, and contribute to the international effort to shape the Somali 

National Army into a cohesive, professional, and effective force. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6 

For the United States to effectively engage on these complex 

issues, understand local dynamics, build relationships, and manage 

our expanding programs in Somalia, we eventually need to establish a permanent U.S. diplomatic presence there. Ultimately, it is 

the security condition in Somalia that will dictate when we can 

establish a more permanent presence, and we recognize that the 

time is not right for that at this time. However, we are moving in 

that direction. Our current posture allows for our Nairobi-based 

diplomatic team to travel to the Somali capital and other key regions with increased frequency and duration, as security conditions 

permit. 

Building political cooperation among Somali regions and clans in 

support of the federal framework is essential if democracy, economic growth, and security are truly to take hold in Somalia. This 

is a message that President Hassan Sheikh emphasized during his 

Washington meetings with Secretary Kerry, with Secretary Hagel, 

with National Security Advisor Rice, and with me when I met with 

him in New York. We see budding signs that Hassan Sheikh is 

meaningfully engaging regional administrations: the Somalia Federal Government signed the Jubaland Accords on August 22, recognizing that regional entity and mapping a way forward to become 

a federal state; the federal government introduced a roadmap to 

the 2016 elections with a focus on political inclusion and security; 

and Mogadishu and Somaliland came to an agreement on regulating air space, a step toward wider reconciliation. 

Ultimately, the development of participatory, accountable, and 

representative governmental institutions that respond to the needs 

of the Somali people will secure that country’s future. We are committed to working with the government and the people of Somalia 

to help them realize that vision. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Thomas-Greenfield follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY LINDA THOMAS-GREENFIELD

INTRODUCTION

Good afternoon, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, and distinguished 

members of the mommittee. It is my pleasure to appear before you today to talk 

about Somalia, which, during my tenure as Assistant Secretary of State for African 

Affairs, will remain a top foreign policy priority for the Department of State, as it 

is for the Obama administration. The past year marked significant changes in 

Somalia and in our bilateral relationship with Somalia. The election of President 

Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was a welcome signal that room for political progress in 

Somalia was opening. This was made possible, in part, by the international community’s support of the Djibouti Peace Process and the leadership role of our regional 

partners, notably the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD. On January 17, we formally recognized the Federal Government of 

Somalia (FGS), after two decades of transitional governments. Nonetheless, the U.S. 

Government also understood very clearly that Somalia would face considerable challenges as it worked to rebuild its statehood. 

The successes of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), AMISOM 

troop-contributing countries, and strategic partners to combat and eviscerate 

al-Shabaab are demonstrating the strength of an Africa-led model. Nonetheless, this 

Somalia-based al-Qaeda affiliate remains a dangerous presence. The all-too-recent 

terrorist attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, for which al-Shabaab 

has taken credit, is a chilling example of the challenges for Somalia and the region. 

This attack suggests that violent extremism in the Horn of Africa may be evolving. 

It also makes clear that al-Shabaab presents a threat to U.S. partner nations in 

East Africa, to American citizens, and to U.S. interests. Al-Shabaab must be 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

7 

stopped. The Federal Government of Somalia must increase its capacity to counter 

al-Shabaab, unify a fractured political system, and provide basic services to the 

Somali people. For all this, the Government of Somalia needs our support—and 

much more of it. Our primary interest in Somalia is to help the people of Somalia 

build a peaceful nation with a stable government, able to ensure civil security and 

services for its citizens. This in turn will prevent terrorists from using Somali territory as a safe haven. 

U.S. POLICY AND ENGAGEMENT IN SOMALIA

Prior to our recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia, our Somalia policy 

had three primary elements: 

(1) Provide support for the African Union Mission in Somalia, or AMISOM as 

it is commonly known, and AMISOM’s strategic partner Ethiopia, to combat 

al-Shabaab and provide political space for the government to operate; 

(2) Respond to humanitarian crises and initiate stabilization where possible; 

and 

(3) Promote our ‘‘dual-track’’ policy. 

Post transition, these three elements of our Somali policy have evolved as follows: 

• First, we continue to support AMISOM as the primary stabilizing force in 

Somalia, as we expand our assistance to the Somali National Army to build its 

institutional and operational capacity. From FY 2007 through FY 2013, the 

United States obligated approximately $512 million in support of AMISOM, in 

addition to our assessed contributions for the U.N. logistics support package for 

AMISOM. During that same period, we obligated more than $170 million to 

support the Somali National Army to counter al-Shabaab more effectively. 

• Second, we have shifted focus from humanitarian crisis response, now concentrating on security and stability, laying the foundation for economic recovery 

through our development-focused programming. In FY 2012 and FY 2013, we 

provided nearly $140 million in funding to support Somalia’s stabilization, 

democracy, and economic growth activities. 

• Third, our dual-track approach concluded with the successful completion of the 

Djibouti Peace Process and the recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia. The United States has underscored the importance of outreach and engagement with the regional administrations to form the federal framework. We will 

continue to fund humanitarian assistance and civil society programs in 

Somaliland and Puntland, with an objective of improving regional collaboration 

toward federalism. 

Our assistance to Somalia includes an emphasis on human rights and accountability, child soldier prevention, countering human trafficking, and budget transparency and fiscal management. 

WESTGATE ATTACK

The tragic and cowardly attack on innocents at Kenya’s Westgate Mall has underscored vulnerabilities in the Horn of Africa and demonstrates that al-Shabaab has 

a capable network in East Africa and is willing to carry out attacks outside Somalia. 

Concerted pressure from AMISOM and the Somali National Army has weakened 

al-Shabaab’s ability to wage conventional military offensives and to hold territory 

inside Somalia. We attribute this to the success of the African-led model for achieving greater stability in Somalia. However, al-Shabaab can still conduct destabilizing 

operations in the East Africa region. The Department is working closely with our 

regional partners on counterterrorism efforts, and we are reviewing internally what 

further resources we can shore up to further support AMISOM, secure the borders 

of Somalia and its neighbors, and contribute to the international effort to shape the 

Somali National Army into a cohesive, professional, and effective force. 

U.S. PRESENCE

For the United States to effectively engage on these complex issues, understand 

local dynamics, build relationships, and manage our expanding programs in Somalia, we eventually need to establish a permanent U.S. diplomatic presence in Somalia. Ultimately, it is the security conditions in Somalia that will dictate when we 

can establish a more permanent presence and we recognize that the time is not 

right to do this. However, we are moving in that direction. Our current posture 

allows for our Nairobi-based diplomatic team to travel into the Somali capital and 

other key regions with increased frequency and duration, as security conditions 

permit. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

8 

FEDERALISM/POLITICAL COOPERATION

Building political cooperation among Somali regions and clans in support of the 

federal framework is essential, if democracy, economic growth, and security are 

truly to take hold in Somalia. This is a message that President Hassan Sheikh 

emphasized during his Washington meetings with Secretary Kerry, Secretary Hagel, 

and National Security Advisor Rice. We see budding signs that Hassan Sheikh is 

meaningfully engaging regional administrations: The Somali Federal Government 

signed the Jubbaland Accords on August 22, recognizing the regional entity and 

mapping a way forward to become a federal state; the Federal Government introduced a roadmap to the 2016 elections with a focus on political inclusion and security; and Mogadishu and Somaliland came to an agreement on regulating air-space, 

a step towards wider reconciliation. 

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the development of participatory, accountable, and representative governmental institutions that respond to the needs of the Somali people will secure 

the country’s future. We are committed to work with the Government and people 

of Somalia to help them realize this vision. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Madam Assistant Secretary, and I look forward to a round of questions on the topic. 

If I might, next Deputy Assistant Secretary Dory. We look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF AMANDA DORY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. DORY. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, distinguished members of the subcommittee, and staff, thank you for the 

opportunity to appear today to update you on the Department of 

Defense’s role vis-a-vis Somalia and the way ahead there. 

The United States, as you know, has not maintained an official 

military relationship with Somalia since the early 1990s, in large 

part because there was not a United States-recognized Government 

of Somalia until 2013. 

In light of the recognition in January 2013, the Department of 

Defense, in close cooperation and coordination with the State 

Department, seeks to develop a normalized military-to-military 

relationship with the Somali National Security Forces, SNSF. 

Somalia is emerging from 20 years of civil war, as all have 

acknowledged. Since 2006, al-Shabaab has led a violent insurgency 

in southern and central Somalia, first against the former transitional federal government and now against the Federal Government of Somalia and African Union Mission in Somalia— 

AMISOM—forces. Once controlling most major Somali cities, 

al-Shabaab operated with impunity. 

Today, Somali, AMISOM, and Ethiopian forces have weakened 

al-Shabaab as a conventional fighting force in Somalia. However, 

al-Shabaab is still dangerous and capable of conducting sophisticated, unconventional attacks to disrupt AMISOM operations and 

the Somali Government. Recent events in Mogadishu and Nairobi 

are sobering reminders. Thus, for the foreseeable future, we must 

maintain focus on Somalia to sustain security progress made to 

date, as al-Shabaab is likely to remain the primary threat to Somalia and East African stability for some time to come. 

The significant gains achieved by Somali and AMISOM forces 

over the past few years have been critical in providing space for the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

9 

political process that resulted in Somalia’s transition to government now officially recognized. Somalia faces many challenges 

ahead, but it is moving forward on a positive path that was hard 

to imagine 5 years ago. As military-to-military relations mature 

and are normalized with Somalia, DOD, through U.S. Africa Command, will work with the State Department to design security 

cooperation activities to assist with the development of a unified 

Somali security force. 

There have also been tremendous gains at sea. In and around 

the Horn of Africa, piracy has virtually been eliminated. As a maritime nation, the United States relies on the unhindered use and 

access of the seas to ensure our economic well-being. As recently 

as 2011, Somali pirates held nearly 600 mariner hostages aboard 

28 captured ships and roamed an area the size of the United 

States. Today, thanks to changes in business practices by the commercial maritime industry and the presence of international naval 

forces, piracy is almost nonexistent off the coast of Somalia. 

DOD’s approach to the region and to Somalia reflects the U.S. 

national security strategy, the strategy vis-a-vis sub-Saharan 

Africa, and the Defense Strategic Guidance. DOD focuses in particular on advancing peace and security by working with partners 

to address security threats of shared concern and to create an environment that enables improved governance and sustainable broadbased development. 

Looking forward, DOD will work, in conjunction with the State 

Department and other U.S. Government agencies, to provide security assistance to build the capacity of Somalia’s security institutions, including their ability to counter terrorism, secure borders 

and coastline, and reinforcing democratic values and the rule of 

law. Additionally, we will continue to work with the State Department to support AMISOM and its troop-contributing countries in 

their efforts to counter and defeat al-Shabaab. 

AMISOM represents an important success story in which African 

forces from Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti, and Sierra Leone 

have collaborated to progressively regain territory from al-Shabaab, 

working in collaboration with the Somali National Army, as well as 

Ethiopian forces. The United States and other international partners have provided critical training and equipment assistance to 

facilitate these efforts. 

Once appropriations are approved for the Department of Defense, 

fiscal year 2014 would be the first in 20 years in which DOD is 

able to support Somali National Security Forces directly with title 

10 activities. 

DOD has put in place a senior military representative at the 

Somali Affairs Unit in Nairobi, who performs a role similar to that 

of a defense attache ́, and we will increase our presence in Mogadishu in tandem with the State Department. 

DOD personnel are now participating in both the Joint Security 

Committee led by the Somali Government and the Somalia Defense 

Working Group led by the United Nations on a regular basis. Moreover, we have made a concerted effort to increase our key leader 

engagements with senior Somali officials. This summer, the commander of USAFRICOM, General Rodriguez, made his initial visit 

to Mogadishu. Additionally, Secretary Hagel hosted the President 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

10 

of Somalia and his Chief of Defense at the Pentagon at the end of 

September. These face-to-face engagements have been critical in 

identifying and better understanding Somalia’s security needs and 

concerns. 

In conclusion, Somalia will continue to present a complex and 

fluid set of challenges and opportunities. However, with sustained 

assistance from the United States and other international partners, 

Somalia’s national security apparatus will be better positioned to 

fend off the al-Shabaab insurgency and gradually transform the 

fragile state into a success story. 

Thank you for your enduring support to our men and women in 

uniform and our dedicated team of civilian professionals. We look 

forward to working with you on Somalia and the other elements of 

our Africa policy. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dory follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY AMANDA J. DORY, 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for this opportunity to update the subcommittee on the Department of Defense’s (DOD) vision and role in Somalia. 

INTRODUCTION

The United States has not held an official military relationship with Somalia 

since the early 1990s, in large part because there was not a U.S.-recognized Government of Somalia until 2013. 

In light of the January 2013 recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia, 

the Department of Defense, in cooperation and close coordination with the Department of State (DOS), seeks to develop a normalized military-to-military relationship 

with the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF). Both agencies intend to work 

together in assisting Somalia to build the operational capacity of the SNSF and support the development of Somali security institutions. 

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Somalia is emerging from 20 years of civil war and the oppressive control of 

al-Shabaab. Since 2006, al-Shabaab has led a violent insurgency in southern and 

central Somalia, first against the former Somali Transitional Federal Government, 

and now against the Federal Government of Somalia and African Union Mission in 

Somalia (AMISOM) forces. Once controlling most major Somali cities, al-Shabaab 

operated with impunity. 

Today, Somali, AMISOM, and Ethiopian forces have weakened al-Shabaab as a 

conventional fighting force in Somalia. However, al-Shabaab is still dangerous and 

capable of conducting sophisticated unconventional attacks to disrupt AMISOM 

operations and the Somali Government. Recent events in Mogadishu and Nairobi 

are sobering reminders. Thus, for the foreseeable future, we must maintain focus 

on Somalia to sustain security progress made to date, as al-Shabaab is likely to 

remain the primary threat to Somalia and East Africa stability for some time to 

come. 

The significant gains achieved by Somali and AMISOM forces over the past few 

years have been critical in providing space for the political process that resulted in 

Somalia’s transition to a government now officially recognized by the United States. 

Somalia faces many challenges ahead, but it is moving forward on a positive path 

that was hard to imagine 5 years ago. As military-to-military relations mature and 

are normalized with Somalia, DOD through U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) 

will work with the DOS to design security cooperation activities to assist with the 

development of a unified Somali security force. 

There have also been tremendous gains at sea. In and around the Horn of Africa, 

piracy has virtually been eliminated. As a maritime nation, the United States relies 

on the unhindered use of the seas to ensure our economic well-being, and we seek 

to ensure the same freedoms for other nations. As recently as 2011, Somali pirates 

held nearly 600 mariners hostages aboard 28 captured ships, and roamed an area 

the size of the United States looking for their next opportunity. Today, thanks to 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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changes in business practices by the commercial maritime industry, and the presence of international naval forces, piracy is almost nonexistent off the coast of 

Somalia. The last successful hijacking of a major commercial ship was in May 2012. 

DOD SECURITY ASSISTANCE /COOPERATION

DOD’s approach to the region and to Somalia reflects the U.S. National Security 

Strategy, the U.S. Strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa, Presidential Policy Directive 

23 on Security Sector Assistance (SSA), and the Defense Strategic Guidance. DOD 

focuses in particular on advancing peace and security by working with partners to 

address security threats of shared concern and to create an environment that 

enables improved governance and sustainable broad-based development. 

Looking forward, DOD will work, in conjunction with the DOS and other U.S. 

agencies providing security sector assistance to build the capacity of Somali security 

institutions in pursuit of the following objectives: (1) improve Somalia’s ability to 

counter terrorism and secure its borders and coastline, and (2) reinforce democratic 

values and respect for rule of law. Additionally, we will continue to work with the 

State Department to support AMISOM and its troop-contributing countries in their 

efforts to counter and defeat al-Shabaab, creating space for the extension of governance throughout Somalia’s territory. AMISOM represents an important success 

story in which African forces—from Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti, and Sierra 

Leone—have collaborated to progressively regain territory from al-Shabaab, working 

in collaboration with the Somali National Army as well as Ethiopian forces. The 

United States and other international partners have provided critical training and 

equipment assistance to facilitate the efforts of these forces. 

Once appropriations are approved for the Department, fiscal year 2014 (FY 2014) 

would be the first in 20 years in which DOD is able to support the SNSF directly 

with title 10 funding. Accordingly, USAFRICOM is working closely with Combined 

Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA) and DOS to ensure all proposed security cooperation programs are complementary to other ongoing U.S. Government 

and international efforts and are consistent with all laws affecting U.S. assistance, 

including the Child Soldiers Prevention Act. Initial training proposals for FY 2014 

will likely focus on logistics, personnel management, finance and budgeting, and 

maintenance, all of which were requested by the Somali leadership. 

DOD has put in place a Senior Military Representative at the Somali Affairs Unit 

in Nairobi, who performs a role similar to a Defense Attache ́, and we will increase 

our presence in Mogadishu in tandem with the State Department. CJTF–HOA personnel are now participating in both the Joint Security Committee led by the Somali 

Government and the Somalia Defense Working Group led by the United Nations 

on a regular basis. Moreover, we have made a concerted effort to increase our key 

leader engagements with senior Somali officials. This summer, the Commander of 

USAFRICOM made an initial visit to Mogadishu. Additionally, Secretary Hagel 

recently hosted the President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his Chief 

of Defense, General Elmi, at the Pentagon. These face-to-face engagements have 

been critical in identifying and better understanding Somali security needs and 

concerns. 

With regard to maritime security, DOD has played and is playing a significant 

role in countering piracy and maritime crime.In 2009, we established Combined 

Task Force 151 (CTF–151) in a dedicated effort to prevent further attacks in the 

Gulf of Aden and off the eastern coast of Somalia. The United States has both commanded this Task Force and provided naval forces to it. In addition to CTF–151, 

the U.S. Navy also participates in NATO’s counterpiracy efforts in the Horn of 

Africa, as part of Operation Ocean Shield. Today, pirates no longer roam freely. 

However, notwithstanding the positive trends of the past 2 years, the decline in 

piracy is perishable if these measures are not maintained. 

Finally, DOD and DOS will explore opportunities to increase the SNSF border 

security capabilities; assist Somalia’s maritime security capacity; build a Somali 

counterterrorism capability to deal with terrorists threats; and assisting in justice 

sector reforms. 

CONCLUSION

Somalia will continue to present a complex and fluid set of challenges and opportunities. However, with sustained assistance from the United States and other 

international partners, Somalia’s national security apparatus will be better positioned to fend off the al-Shabaab insurgency and gradually transform the fragile 

state into a success story. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

12 

Thank you for your enduring support to our men and women in uniform, and our 

dedicated team of civilian professionals. We look forward to working with you in the 

months ahead. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much. 

Last on our first panel, Assistant Administrator Lindborg, 

please. 

STATEMENT OF HON. NANCY LINDBORG, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. LINDBORG. Good afternoon. Thank you, Chairman Coons and 

Ranking Member Flake. I really appreciate the opportunity to 

speak with you today and most importantly appreciate your ongoing support for our assistance programs that make a difference in 

the lives of millions around the world. 

I last testified in front of this committee about Somalia in August 

2011, and that was as the worst drought in East Africa in 60 years 

had plunged more than 13 million people in the region into crisis 

and just after the July 20th U.N. declaration of famine in Somalia. 

At the height of that crisis, 4 million Somalis’ survival depended 

on receiving emergency assistance, and although the entire region 

suffered, only in Somalia did the drought result in famine. As 

noted, it was the deadly combination of drought, 20 years of conflict, a failed state, and the presence of armed terrorists that led 

to the death of hundreds of thousands of Somalis. And as Amartya 

Sen has famously said, famines do not happen in democracies. 

So 2 years later, it is a remarkable story that we are telling right 

now, that Somalia has its first legitimate central government since 

1991. It has a democratically elected President and Parliament. 

And I am very pleased to report that just recently I was in Brussels where 58 countries gathered in support of a compact for Somalia that focuses not on famine, but on peace and prosperity. The 

recent, very tragic al-Shabaab attack in Nairobi underscores the 

need to reaffirm our commitment to helping Somalia on its pathway to peace and prosperity and economic growth and providing 

alternatives to violent extremism. 

Since 1991, USAID’s work in Somalia has been defined by a prolonged, complex humanitarian emergency. However, over the past 

5 years with increasing security gains, USAID has been able to 

increase our support in five key areas for transition, and most 

importantly in 2012, USAID’s democracy and governance efforts 

supported the formation of Somalia’s first national government in 

22 years. With other donors, we provided logistics support, constitutional experts to help convene traditional elders and representatives from a cross section of Somali society into a constituent 

assembly. USAID partners mounted a massive civic education campaign to mobilize support for the constitution drafting process and 

its eventual adoption by the constituent assembly. This assembly 

elected new members of Parliament who then selected the new 

President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, through a democratic process. 

Globally we see that the greatest poverty and insecurity persists 

in weak and fragile states that are plagued by stubborn conflict. 

In 2011, a group of 19 self-identified conflict-affected and fragile 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

13 

states established a new framework for helping countries climb out 

of protracted conflict called the ‘‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.’’ This new deal calls for a clear focus on five key peacebuilding and state-building goals, including legitimate politics, 

security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and services. 

The compact that we all just endorsed in Brussels with the Government of Somalia sets us on a roadmap to achieve those goals with 

very clear benchmarks: a federal constitution by 2015; credible 

elections by 2016; 30 percent quota for women’s participation; state 

security institutions; and so forth. The new deal hinges firmly on 

mutual accountability and a state-society relationship that is based 

on inclusion and on dialogue. This very specifically means involving 

previously marginalized populations, broad civil society consultations, and vital dialogue with regional entities like Somaliland and 

Puntland. This approach recognizes that security, development, 

and governance are deeply intertwined and must be pursued 

together. 

Today food insecurity levels in Somalia are at the lowest point 

since before the 2011 drought. Yet, three key challenges remain. 

These food security gains are very fragile. We have ongoing 

humanitarian needs with 870,000 people still in crisis; insecurity, 

as al-Shabaab and other armed groups continue to limit access; and 

thirdly, access, which is vital to carrying out both continuing 

humanitarian efforts and expanding our development actions. 

Finally, Somalia is challenged not only by conflict and weak governance but also with the severe weather shocks that are coming 

in ever-faster cycles. So it is impossible for communities to escape 

these cycles of crisis. As we have done in other parts of the Horn 

and in the Sahel, USAID is focused not just on saving lives but 

building resilience so communities are better prepared for, and able 

to recover from, the next shock like the drought of 2011. 

Ultimately, the Somali people must be the primary architects of 

peace, democracy, and development in their country, and Somalia 

would not have the opportunity that it has today were it not for 

the many members of the Somali community in and outside of the 

country who are making a daily decision to focus on a future built 

on hope and peace rather than on conflict and despair. We know 

the road is long. The challenges are steep this will not be fast nor 

will it be easy, but with the specific commitments of the new deal, 

that roadmap, with the specific commitments and continued focus 

by the people and the Government of Somalia, we believe that right 

now represents the best chance for peace in two decades and the 

United States will remain a committed partner. 

Thank you again and I look forward to questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR NANCY LINDBORG

Good afternoon and thank you, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, and 

members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on African 

Affairs for the opportunity to speak with you today about the complex state of governance, development, and security in Somalia. Thank you also for your continued 

support for our assistance programs that make a difference in the lives of millions 

every day. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

14 

INTRODUCTION

In 2011, the worst drought in East Africa in 60 years plunged more than 13.3 

million people into crisis. USAID and the international community’s response to the 

devastating Horn of Africa crisis helped meet the needs of 4.6 million people across 

the region. Despite these efforts, in July 2011, the United Nations declared famine 

in two areas of southern Somalia. Additional areas slipped into famine in the weeks 

to follow and at the height of the crisis, 4 million Somali lives depended on receiving 

emergency assistance. 

While the drought affected millions across the region, only in Somalia did drought 

result in famine. This is not a designation we use lightly, as it means that at least 

20 percent of households face an extreme lack of food with evidence of starvation, 

death, and destitution; more than 30 percent are acutely malnourished; and the 

mortality rate exceeds two deaths per 10,000 people a day. In Somalia, it was the 

deadly combination of drought, 20 years of conflict, a failed state, and the presence 

of armed terrorists that led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands Somalis. As 

Amartya Sen famously said, famines don’t happen in democracies. 

Now, 2 years later, Somalia has its first effective central government since 1991, 

with democratically elected President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and a new Somali 

Federal Parliament. Somalis have worked hard to establish the foundation of their 

state based on significant efforts to forge a national consensus. And I am very 

pleased to report that I recently returned from an international meeting on Somalia 

focused on peace and prosperity, not famine. In Brussels on September 16, 58 countries and 11 international organizations gathered in support of a compact that outlines a roadmap forward. Emerging from 20 years of conflict will be a long and 

bumpy road, but Somalia is now heading in the right direction, with the best chance 

in 20 years to move toward a better future. 

Today I am pleased to talk to you about this opportunity, the new frameworks 

and international partnerships in support of Somalia, and what USAID is doing to 

help Somalia transition out of conflict, fragility, and chronic poverty. 

The recent, tragic al-Shabaab attack in Nairobi only underscores the need for the 

international community to reaffirm our commitment to assist the development of 

a more legitimate, inclusive democracy in Somalia. This will be central to peace, 

prosperity, economic growth, and to providing positive alternatives to violent extremism in those communities most at risk of recruitment and radicalization to 

violence. 

EMERGING FROM TWO DECADES OF CONFLICT

USAID’s work in Somalia for the last two decades has been defined by a prolonged complex humanitarian emergency and significant security constraints. Since 

1991, widespread and persistent food insecurity, civil strife, interclan conflict, political instability, endemic poverty, and recurrent cycles of flooding and drought have 

resulted in severe humanitarian needs. For decades weak governance and insecurity 

have inhibited meaningful solutions and prevented humanitarian aid from reaching 

many who need it most. 

However, over the last 5 years, enabled by security advancements made by the 

U.N. Security Council authorized African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 

USAID has increased support focused on three areas critical for transition: stronger 

ties between government and community; economic opportunity through improved 

government-private sector relations; and improved government ability to provide 

basic services. 

Most importantly, in 2012, USAID’s democracy and governance efforts supported 

the formation of Somalia’s first national government in 22 years. USAID and other 

international development partners provided logistics support and constitutional 

experts to help convene traditional elders and representatives from a cross-section 

of Somali society in a Constituent Assembly. This Assembly elected new Members 

of Parliament, who then selected President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud through a 

democratic process. USAID partners mounted a massive civic education campaign 

to mobilize support for the constitution-drafting process and its eventual adoption 

by the Constituent Assembly. 

THE NEW DEAL FOR ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE STATES: A WAY FORWARD FOR SOMALIA

Globally, we are seeing that the greatest poverty and insecurity persists in those 

states plagued by weak and fragile governments and stubborn conflict. These environments require a distinct approach. In 2011, a group of 19 self-identified ‘‘conflict 

affected and fragile states,’’ working with development partners and international 

organizations, identified a new framework for helping countries climb out of proFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

15 

tracted conflict called the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. The New 

Deal calls for a clear focus on five key peace-building and state-building goals: legitimate politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and services. 

Based on research by the World Bank, this approach recognizes that security, development, and governance are deeply intertwined. 

The New Deal calls on Somali Government officials, international donors, and 

civil society to work together to create a common plan. It hinges firmly on the notion 

of mutual accountability and a commitment by both fragile states and their international partners to build mutual trust by providing aid and managing resources 

more effectively and aligning these resources for results. 

Since 2013, with the consolidation of the Somali Central Government and a new 

committed government partner, USAID has been working closely with international 

development partners to apply the New Deal in Somalia. Just last month in Brussels, together with our colleagues at the State Department, international development partners, and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, we endorsed the 

terms of a compact focused on moving all stakeholders toward shared state-building 

and peace-building goals. This plan includes benchmarks for success and roles and 

responsibilities with clear leadership by the Government of Somalia. 

Fostering a strong state-society relationship, inclusion, and dialogue are all key 

elements of this effort; in Somalia this means involving previously marginalized 

populations and vital dialogue between the Government in Mogadishu and regional 

entities like Somaliland and Puntland. Planning endeavors must be given the 

necessary time, enabling outreach to regional stakeholders and civil society. This is 

key to participatory democracy. We understand that such consultations are timesensitive, but it will be time well-spent. By their nature, consultations often generate a wide range of opinions regarding the best way forward, which helps leaders 

chart effective solutions with buy-in from the people. 

The Compact sets forth the intent of the Government of Somalia and the international community to work together to achieve vital priorities including: finalizing 

and adopting a federal constitution by December 2015, holding credible elections by 

2016, fulfilling a 30-percent quota for women’s participation in representative bodies, strengthening the capacity of state security institutions to provide basic safety 

and security, and implementing a national program for the treatment and handling 

of disengaged combatants. Importantly, it commits donor participants to provide aid 

in a conflict-sensitive manner, which is crucial given Somalia’s complex conflict history and dynamics. 

USAID’s ongoing democracy and governance work is already helping to make 

progress toward these goals by supporting Parliament’s capacity-building and 

engagement with civil society as well as the use of financial software systems to 

improve revenue collection and promote accountability. 

The last 20 years in Somalia have demonstrated just how fragile the state-building process can be. In Somalia, we all know that the road is long and challenges 

remain steep, but with its specific commitments, and committed partners, we 

believe the New Deal represents the best chance for peace and development in two 

decades. 

CONTINUING CHALLENGES

Today, food insecurity levels in Somalia are at the lowest point since before the 

2010–11 drought. However, insecurity, lack of access, and ongoing humanitarian 

needs remain key challenges. These recent food security gains are very fragile with 

870,000 people still in crisis and another 2.3 million people on the brink of falling 

back into crisis. Malnutrition levels remain elevated, with roughly 206,000 children 

under the age of 5 acutely malnourished; more than 1.1 million people are internally 

displaced, primarily in southern and central Somalia, in addition to the 1 million 

Somali refugees in the region. 

Recent violence—including intercommunal violence in Kismayo town, surrounding 

areas of Lower Juba Region, and in and around Mogadishu—underscore the ongoing 

insecurity challenges throughout the country. 

Moreover, without consistent government control over rural areas, armed groups 

will likely continue to limit access for humanitarian and development workers. AlShabaab and other violent extremist groups continue to interfere with relief operations in rural areas across southern Somalia, including in Middle Juba Region and 

parts of Bakool, Bay, and Gedo regions. The withdrawal of the Ethiopian National 

Defense Force from Bay Region’s capital city of Baidoa may further restrict humanitarian access and result in additional population displacement. Similarly, increasing 

security efforts by the Kenya Defense Forces may have access implications in 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

16 

Kismayo and reignite tensions in the community. Access will be vital to carrying 

out both continuing humanitarian efforts and expanding development activities. 

BUILDING RESILIENCE

With climate change, we know severe weather shocks are coming even faster, 

making it even more impossible for the poorest communities to escape a vicious 

cycle of crisis. We are bringing our development and humanitarian teams together 

for joint analysis and planning toward the shared goal of strengthening resilience 

to make communities, institutions, and society as a whole better prepared for and 

able to recover from shocks such as the drought and famine of 2011 and 2012. 

For example, humanitarian activities supporting pastoralist livelihoods are linking up with long-term economic growth efforts focused on animal health and livestock production. USAID’s Resilience Agenda—an effort to do business differently 

and more closely coordinate with international partners to help vulnerable communities escape cycles of crisis—and the New Deal framework share the goals of improving livelihoods, generating employment, fostering inclusive growth and conflict 

management. Importantly, good governance is at the center of both comprehensive 

approaches. 

CONCLUSION

For Somalia to break free of recurrent violence, stabilization activities must be 

supported by political actors, civil society members, and a Somali population committed to a comprehensive peace-building process that ensures widespread participation but also emphasizes reconciliation over narrow interests. Ultimately, the primary architects of what peace, democracy, and development efforts look like must 

be the Somali people. Somalia would not have the kind of opportunity it has today 

were it not for the many members of the Somali community who make a daily decision to focus on a future built on hope and peace rather than on conflict and despair. And the United States remains a committed partner. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much. 

I think we will do 7-minute rounds, if we might. 

Thank you very much to all the members of the first panel for 

your testimony and frankly for starting by focusing on the enormous progress that has been made in the last 2 years since you 

first testified, Assistant Administrator Lindborg, a reminder that 

there has been real progress in dealing with the famine and the 

humanitarian crisis, in dealing with piracy which has been dramatically curtailed, and in making steady progress toward a legitimate state recognized by the United States and laying the platform 

for progress toward a federal-state structure and toward moving 

forward with dealing with some of the unresolved constitutional 

issues. Significant progress. 

I would like to ask first of all three of you, if I might, what 

impact is the current federal government shutdown having on your 

ability, your departments’ abilities or stations’ abilities to review 

and approve programs, to carry out and deliver needed development, diplomacy, intelligence, or other defense-related services, and 

were this shutdown to continue for another few weeks, would those 

impacts strengthen or become more pronounced in any way? 

Please, if you might. 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. If I may start. Thank you very much 

for that question. And I think I can say and I am sure my colleagues will agree that the shutdown has had an enormous impact 

on our ability to coordinate foreign policy within the interagency 

framework as some of our colleagues within the interagency are on 

furlough and they are not available for us to coordinate with or 

speak with. And it is really important, if we are to have an interagency process, that everyone is at the table. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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We are also not in a position to travel. In the case of travel to 

Somalia, that is a two-sided problem because of security now—our 

people are not traveling, but had there not been a security issue, 

they still could not travel because we have a travel moratorium. 

And then, thirdly, our Ambassadors are not able to host events 

that build on the critical relationships that we need to develop to 

do our jobs. 

I think an important part is we are not able to monitor our 

assistance. Senator Flake mentioned the large amount of taxpayer 

dollars that are supporting Somalia. We feel responsible for those 

taxpayer dollars, and in order to ensure that those dollars are 

going to where they need to go, we need to be able to get out in 

the field and monitor, and the shutdown will certainly impact that 

as well. 

Senator COONS. Ms. Dory. 

Ms. DORY. Similarly to the areas laid out by my colleague, I 

would just add from DOD’s perspective, civilian employees in particular for the first week of the shutdown were affected and that 

significantly diminished our ability to operate across the Department in all key areas, whether it was acquisition, personnel readiness and training, policy development, et cetera, et cetera. 

There are also kind of unexpected ways where the shutdown 

impacts, for example, the inability to make cash expenditures. That 

could be fine as far as if you are thinking about cash expenditures 

to entertain a visiting delegation, for example, that perhaps that 

could be set to the side temporarily. But when it comes to aircraft 

who are paying fees of various kinds, whether it is refueling in 

overseas locations and you are unable to expend cash, that is just 

a very small example of the limitation imposed by the shutdown. 

And then perhaps most fundamentally is just the absence of 

understanding for fiscal year 2014 what our planning levels are to 

work with and that impedes on the longer term business in the 

Somalia context, for example, what title 10 DOD resources and 

title 22 State Department resources will be available to be brought 

to bear, whether it is vis-a-vis Somalia or any of the other countries in the region. 

Senator COONS. Ms. Lindborg. 

Ms. LINDBORG. I would just add to that. We are in a really critical time as we move toward these important milestones that will 

be critical for seizing this moment for helping Somalia move forward. This is an effort that the United States is doing in close partnership with the international community. There are a number of 

important meetings that we are constrained in being able to participate in right now. At a moment where we want to be at the 

table to talk about the importance of accountable transparent governance and of a functioning government, we are not able to be 

there in addition to the constraints to our travel and our ability to 

work with the interagency because of furloughs. 

Senator COONS. Several of you mentioned that this particular 

structure, AMISOM, is in some ways a model of African-led 

regional security being successful. I would be interested in each of 

your respective spheres sort of how you see that model playing out 

going forward. What are the lessons learned, strengths, weaknesses? I have represented in a number of settings that this is 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

18 

something we really ought to be looking to more broadly where we 

have a number of different nations coming together operationally 

driving al-Shabaab out of significant swaths of the country, stabilizing the security of the country, making possible development, 

improved security, improved statecraft. Overall, frankly, it has gotten very little attention in the domestic U.S. press, but compared 

to what was the condition in Somalia a year or 2 ago, this has been 

a truly outstanding success of a model that is AU-chaired and African-led. So I would be interested, if you might, Madam Secretary, 

what you see as the lessons learned, the strengths and weaknesses, 

and what we should be expecting going forward for the AMISOM 

mission. And then each of you in turn. 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Thank you very much for that question. 

And I do think the AMISOM model is a model that can be used. 

Some of the lessons, as I look back on this in my limited time in 

this office, but with much experience on the continent, is, I think, 

we have to do a better job of ensuring that we provide the support 

that AMISOM needs to do its job. While at the UNGA in New 

York, I met with the Foreign Minister of Uganda, and he said we 

have the people to put on the ground, but we still need the support 

to move those people around. We need the enablers. And because 

of our budget cycles and how we budget, we are not always able 

to provide them with that support as early as they need that support. We also want to be able to continue to support them, and 

each year, because of our funding cycles, sometimes there is a 

delay in when we can get our support out to them. 

You talk about how we might use this model. A similar model 

was used in Mali where I was a few weeks ago for the inauguration 

of the new President of Mali. In less than 18 months, we were able 

to bring that country back into a democratic country moving forward because of an African-led process supported by us. 

Thank you. 

Senator COONS. And what sort of lessons might we learn about 

the stabilization and the transfer of security function from 11 to 

the Somali National Forces, Assistant Secretary Dory? 

Ms. DORY. I think as we look at the success of AMISOM—and 

there are many successes associated with it—one of the challenges 

is just the pulling together all of the external supporters with all 

of the different coalition of the willing that the troop contributing 

countries who step up and answer the call and just managing 

across that complexity is one of the biggest challenges and can 

make things slower and less efficient than otherwise would be the 

case. 

I do think you are seeing replication of the model in other locations because it is successful, whether it is countering the Lord’s 

Resistance Army that we have talked about in other contexts 

where you have the United States and other enabling regional 

partners taking the lead to pursue the Lord’s Resistance Army, a 

similar model in the Mali context where you had regional forces 

first in the African-led International Support Mission to Mali 

—AFISMA—configuration and now as a U.N. mission, that are 

being supported by external parties as well. So I think the replication is an indicator of the success. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

19 

Our part is really bringing the targeted training capacity and 

bringing in enablers, as Assistant Secretary Thomas-Greenfield 

referred to. Sometimes that can be quite challenging, especially in 

the area of logistics, which is the true shortfall when you look 

across the many different missions on the African Continent, both 

the logistics capabilities of African partners themselves and then 

the tools with which we are able to support them. 

Thank you. 

Senator COONS. Building on airlift capacity is, I think, a longterm goal we all share. 

And if I might, just in conclusion, Assistant Administrator Lindborg, how do you see AMISOM’s success in terms of stabilization 

and security contributing to the development picture you mentioned in your testimony, that they are inextricably intertwined? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Absolutely. Somalia is a perfect example of how 

one needs security for development but also how development leads 

to greater security. And so as we continue to push our development 

programs into south-central Somalia, the opportunity is to help citizens gain greater confidence in both local and central governing 

structures and to receive the services that are absolutely essential 

for their well-being and for their support for the way forward. This 

is supported by greater security. So it is a hand-in-hand proposition 

that going forward will be important that we are able to realize the 

gains from both security and development working together for 

peace and prosperity. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. Thank you all. 

Continuing on AMISOM, I was just looking at a map provided 

by the Atlantic Council in terms of the area of the country controlled by government forces and whatever, and it is pretty small. 

Ms. Dory, can you explain how far out of Mogadishu does the government’s writ actually go? I mean, how much are we actually controlling outside through AMISOM or the security forces there? 

Ms. DORY. Right. So what AMISOM has succeeded in doing 

essentially is taking away the revenue generation prospects for 

al-Shabaab that were related to the port operations in both Mogadishu and Kismayo. So in focusing first on those population centers 

and liberating them from al-Shabaab, that was a critical step taken 

in terms of weakening their sustainment capabilities. As you have 

seen on the map, the forces have since pushed out of both of those 

population centers farther into the countryside, but there are 

swaths of Somali territory that are not under effective control of 

the central government at this point. And there are corridors in 

between, some of the major centers that are maintained and 

patrolled by AMISOM. But it is quite clear that there remains 

additional territory that is available to al-Shabaab as a sanctuary, 

and that is really the work ahead both with AMISOM and with the 

Somali National Army to continue to pressure al-Shabaab so that 

they continue to fracture and continually are displaced from the 

locations that they are currently occupying such as Barawe which 

we saw over the weekend is a current node for al-Shabaab. 

Senator FLAKE. Is AMISOM engaged in counterinsurgency activities at all, or is that just the security forces? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

20 

Ms. DORY. AMISOM is pursuing al-Shabaab directly alongside 

the Somali National Security Services. So they are enabling one 

another. At various times, one takes the lead or the other takes the 

lead. But in the vast majority of operations, they are operating 

together. 

Senator FLAKE. And in 2010, the AU wanted to change the role 

of AMISOM from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, and that was 

objected to by the United Nations. Is that a distinction without a 

difference, or does that matter? 

Ms. DORY. I think that refers to the rules of engagement that 

they are operating under, and AMISOM at this point is operating 

with robust rules of engagement where they are not a defensive 

force, they are an offensive force. They are making peace. 

Senator FLAKE. Now, is the transition happening quickly enough 

in terms of turning over the security functions to the country’s 

security forces? 

Ms. DORY. In my view, the transition is happening as quickly as 

it can, which by definition is slowly because the ability of the 

Somali National Army to actually take over is quite constrained at 

this point. The Somali National Army is about 17,000 strong at 

this point based on the count from their chief of defense, General 

Elmi, but of that force, many are militia forces or other individuals 

who are under the banner of the Somali National Army, some of 

whom have been trained. Many have not. They have been trained 

by a variety of external sources. So there are some major capability 

gaps as far as the Somali National Army’s ability to step in for 

AMISOM. And I think we would forecast that it will be a period 

of time before the SNA is ready to step up and take over the mission currently performed by AMISOM. 

Senator FLAKE. Ms. Lindborg, you were talking about the government there. You mentioned that the Parliament is democratically 

elected, as well as the President or you referenced them as democratically elected. Is it not more of an appointment there by tribal 

elders? And then the President is then elected by the MPs. But 

how much of an election is it for the Parliament, and how much 

legitimacy do they have going forward? 

To preface that, there was some criticism. I think the Economist 

wrote a year ago or so that some of the MP slots were going for 

about $25,000, and there was some corruption alleged. Can you 

talk about that and how we are moving away from that or what 

legitimacy the government has going forward? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Yes. There have definitely been challenges of corruption in Somalia through the years. The importance is the commitment of the current government to move beyond that as they 

look at that list of benchmarks with the elections and the new constitution over the next several years. It is a 36-month timetable. 

There is historically a great deal of factionalism within Somalia 

that will be important to have the kind of inclusive dialogue over 

the next 36 months to find a way forward that enables that kind 

of participation in the solution. This is one of the best opportunities 

that Somalia has had in two decades with an inclusive process, and 

that kind of planning will have to continue where you bring in 

regional entities and you bring in a lot of the local governments 

that have been critical for holding communities together over the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21 

last several decades but now need to come together under an umbrella of the central government or a federated government. 

Senator FLAKE. The President was elected by the Parliament. 

The Parliament was elected or appointed? The current Parliament. 

Ms. LINDBORG. It was selected by this assembly process, and 

then, yes, they selected the President. And as we gear toward the 

2016 Presidential elections. 

Senator FLAKE. Great. Back to the security environment, the raid 

that occurred last weekend, nobody faults—I guess it was not successful. We did not get our target there, and I am sure the commanders made the right decision. But how does that affect our policy going forward? What challenges does that present to us to have 

another failed raid into the country? Does that embolden al-Shabaab, or what happens, Ms. Dory, moving ahead? 

Ms. DORY. From my perspective, taking direct action is one element of the multifaceted approach being taken vis-a-vis al-Shabaab 

and the circumstances under which that is pursued were outlined 

by the President in his National Defense University speech. There 

are selected cases where that will be pursued. 

More importantly, though, is the indirect approach and the three 

major pieces of that. We have talked about two of them in particular. One is continuing to support AMISOM and its activities 

against al-Shabaab. The second is working with Somali National 

Security Services and their ability to develop an effective counterterrorism capability going forward. And the third that we have not 

really touched on yet is the work that we are doing with the other 

partners in the region on a bilateral basis, whether it is directly 

with the Kenyans, directly with the Ethiopians, Djibouti, and 

Uganda. All of them have faced various threats from al-Shabaab 

based on their willingness to participate in AMISOM. Several of 

those have borne the results in terms of attacks in their territory. 

And a key part of the strategy vis-a-vis al-Shabaab is also the continued support to those bilateral partners in the region. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses. 

Ms. Dory, the operation in Somalia—it is my understanding from 

published reports that they did not go forward with the mission 

because there was greater resistance than they had anticipated. Is 

that an accurate media depiction of what happened? 

Ms. DORY. Senator, I think to discuss the operational details; we 

would have to move into a different setting. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, could you say whether the media reporting was accurate or inaccurate? 

Ms. DORY. I think to get into the operational details that would 

confirm or not confirm the media reporting would require us to 

move into a different setting. 

Senator MCCAIN. So I guess what you are saying is that we have 

to have information in a secure setting, but it is OK if the media 

report events and yet you can neither corroborate nor deny those 

events. Is that correct? 

Ms. DORY. That is correct in this setting. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

22 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, do not be surprised, Ms. Dory, when 

there is skepticism here about the activities that you engage in. 

The fact is it was a failure. The fact is that there was an intelligence failure there, otherwise the mission would have been completed. And I guess maybe in another setting, maybe in the New 

York Times or the Washington Post, we will find out exactly why 

it failed. 

Ms. Dory, given last weekend’s operation was justified under the 

AUMF which, we understand from his State of the Union speech, 

President Obama seeks to repeal, how will terrorist groups like 

al-Shabaab be targeted and will these types of operations be justified in the future, absent an AUMF? 

Ms. DORY. Senator, I believe going back to the earlier discussion 

about the direct and indirect approach, at the present time Authorization for Use of Military Force—AUMF—remains in force and is 

legally available for the direct approach, and the corollary to that 

is enabling the regional partners, whether it is the Somalis 

directly, whether it is the regional players who are willing to participate in AMISOM as troop-contributing countries, or others on a 

bilateral basis, that that will continue to be a core element of the 

strategy in terms of countering the activities and disrupting 

al-Shabaab. 

Senator MCCAIN. Absent an AUMF, would this operation have 

been legal? 

Ms. DORY. Senator, I am not prepared with the legal analysis for 

you today, but I can come back to you with a response on that. 

[The following information for the record from the Department of 

Defense to the above question follows:] 

Absent the 2001 AUMF, the President always reserves the right under constitutional authority to order certain types of military action in the interest of national 

security. For example, U.S. Armed Forces took limited forcible action against elements of al-Qaeda in the 1990s, prior to the enactment of the AUMF. Accordingly, 

without the current express statutory authorization, the recent counterterrorism 

operation in Somalia would have been permissible. 

Senator MCCAIN. Is it your opinion as to whether it would be 

legal absent an AUMF? 

Ms. DORY. I do not have an independent personal opinion to complement the legal analysis at this point. 

Senator MCCAIN. Ms. Linda Thomas-Greenfield, in Somalia it is 

my understanding that most of the work is being done by private 

contractors. Is that true? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. We do have private contractors assisting us in Somalia, but we are using a mixture of that, as well as 

direct support to our AMISOM and other strategic partners such 

as the Ethiopians, and we also work very, very closely with 

AFRICOM and have some AFRICOM support there. 

Senator MCCAIN. Does that mean you have American troops in 

Somalia? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. No, sir. We do not have troops, but we 

do have an advisor working with the Somalia Government and we 

do work with the Somali national military outside of Somalia doing 

training, and we also occasionally send people in to do training 

with them. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

23 

Senator MCCAIN. How do you maintain oversight of what these 

contractors are doing if there is no American military there? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. We do send people in on a regular 

basis to monitor when we are able to travel, when security allows 

us to travel inside. And that is part of the issue that we have, that 

we are not able to travel on a regular basis, but when we are able 

to travel, we are able to do that kind of monitoring. And we also 

work and monitor them through our operations in Nairobi. 

Senator MCCAIN. These contractors are often operating in what 

is effectively a combat zone. Would you agree? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Occasionally it is a combat zone. 

Senator MCCAIN. You spoke about the goal of normalizing our 

military-to-military relationship with Somalia. Could you describe 

what that would look like? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. What I would hope for—and it was 

DDAS Dory who talked about the military-to-military relationship. 

It is my hope that once the security situation there is enabling, 

that we would have our military doing regular programs through 

the same kinds of programs that we do elsewhere in Africa that 

provide direct training and support to the Somali military. One of 

our primary goals is to build a professional army there that is able 

to provide security and is professional and has capacity to respond 

to al-Shabaab. 

Senator MCCAIN. On what grounds did we decide to send contractors in as opposed to our military in? Was it the threat? Was 

it contractors do a better job? What guided that decision? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. We do a mix. We have always had contractors who have supported our efforts, but in some places we do 

have military. So it was not a decision that we would only use contractors. I think contractors were simpler for us to use on this occasion, but at a point when the security situation changes, we certainly would look at other options. 

Senator MCCAIN. So it was based on the security situation. 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. I think that was part of the issue. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, if it is the security situation that would 

guide your decision whether to send them in, I would imagine it 

was the security situation that led you to keep them out. 

I thank the witnesses. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

As the Senator referenced and as a number of us have discussed, 

there have been developments in the region, both in Kenya and 

Somalia that I think called for a classified briefing, particularly on 

the Westgate attack in Nairobi and some of the intelligence gathered from there and the regional implications, as well as recent 

developments in Somalia. And I would welcome the opportunity to 

discuss the timing in which that might be possible. 

Senator MCCAIN. Could I just say I am sure the chairman understands the frustration when we read things in the media that are 

believed to be factual and we cannot find out in open session 

whether it is true or not. I think the American people probably 

deserve to know if it is carried in the media. 

Senator COONS. I suspect we broadly share frustration about 

many of the things we read in the media, not all of which I believe. 

But I do think at the outset of the hearing I expressed my gratiFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

24 

tude to the witnesses for their ability to come today given the 

impact of the shutdown on departmental resources, legal advice, 

preparation, and otherwise. And I do think it is appropriate for us 

to continue some of this line of dialogue in a classified setting, if 

we could, as soon as possible. 

If I might, Assistant Administrator Lindborg, I would be interested. USAID has run programming designed to counter violent 

extremism and jihadist tendencies within Somalia. Could you say 

something about the small scale or local or quick impact projects 

that I believe have been sort of the exemplar of this sort of ongoing 

effort in the areas that have been secured through AMISOM efforts 

to try and stabilize the situation and then lay the groundwork for 

more long-term development work? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Yes. You characterized that exactly right. There 

is an opportunity to show quick wins to some of the communities 

where you have initial greater security and work with them so 

those communities identify what are their priorities and coinvest 

with them in a way that enables local governance structures to 

have greater credibility with their communities and to align that 

then with the central approach as it evolves and address essential 

services, things like additional schools, basic infrastructure. 

At the same time, we are very focused on what is a large youth 

population to provide alternatives to extremism and through our 

Somali youth initiative working to both provide secondary education opportunities, as well as economic options and ways for them 

to participate in civic life. We think this is absolutely critical especially for those groups. 

And with your permission, I also wanted to just clarify Senator 

Flake’s question about the democratic election of the President and 

the assembly. The constituent assembly was formed and they then 

elected the President. Somalia is not currently able to have the 

kind of representative elections that we think about in this country. That is a part of the big effort over the next several years, is 

to provide that kind of election commission and voter registration 

that they are simply not equipped to do right now. So there is a 

difference between democratically elected and elected through representative voting that I wanted to just use the moment to clarify. 

Senator FLAKE. Yes. I just was taken a bit aback when you said 

‘‘democratically elected’’ earlier on. It is more like selected. And I 

agree we are not at a point where we can expect anything else, but 

we cannot lead people to believe that we have a democratically 

elected government there. 

Ms. LINDBORG. It was not a full every voter through the country 

but a cross section in this constituent assembly which did provide 

a legitimate government to enable us through this important period 

at the same time that we are working at the community level to 

enable those gains to be realized. 

Senator COONS. And the overarching goal of the 2016 process is 

to ultimately get to a place where a legitimate national election is 

possible. 

Ms. LINDBORG. That is right. 

Senator COONS. Universal suffrage. 

Ms. LINDBORG. Absolutely, with a constitution. And so it is also 

the process of drafting the constitution and enabling a process of 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

25 

reconciliation and a more inclusive dialogue including, by the way, 

the diaspora, which is an important player in all of this. 

Senator COONS. A steady transition from 20 years of statelessness, lawlessness, and violence to a functioning democracy is part 

of the objective of this hearing is to understand how best we can 

support that work. 

You have just come back from the new deal conference. I would 

be interested in hearing in a little more detail how the international community is coordinating its support for this ongoing 

transition in Somalia and what you see as our role and the international community’s role in how well coordinated it is toward the 

goals we have been discussing. 

Ms. LINDBORG. I think this is an essential opportunity because 

it enables the international donor community to come together in 

a more coordinated way and to support a plan and a framework 

that is owned by the Somalis with the key priorities that were laid 

out. We are able to work together against those priorities, and 

there are conversations, very vigorous conversations, with the U.K., 

with Sweden, and our other development partners on how to ensure that our support equals and aligns behind the key priorities. 

There is also a timing urgency here, that it is in these moments 

where there is this rush of confidence and the sense of possibility 

that we step forward in a coherent manner that moves us forward 

against a very ambitious timetable. So it is important to grasp, as 

they call this, ‘‘the golden hour’’ of possibility and enable that confidence to turn into real results. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Madam Assistant Secretary, if I might, what is our overall strategy—help me better understand it—to simultaneously strengthen 

ongoing Somali-led efforts to develop centralized state institutions 

and a coordinate federal system given clan-based power centers 

and some recent ad hoc efforts to form federal states such as Jubaland. My impression from your opening testimony is you think 

there is steady progress toward both, but there is some tension 

between whether there is a centralized strong state or a really federalized structure. What do you see as our strategy and the path 

forward in this particular part of the process? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Our primary goal is that there will be 

a strong federal framework that will allow the various components 

and various groups outside the central government to participate 

in a process of governing the entire country of Somalia. We do need 

a central government that can provide services, that can lead, that 

can develop the policies and strategies going forward, but that government has to recognize the components outside of the central 

government. So we have encouraged cooperation and implementation of the federal framework. We have encouraged the government 

to be in close coordination and cooperation with Somaliland. We 

were very supportive of the Jubaland agreement, and we are 

encouraging further agreements along those lines. The President of 

Somalia has expressed his views that he is prepared to move forward in that direction, and we are backing him in those efforts. 

Senator COONS. Terrific. Thank you very much. 

Senator Flake. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

26 

Senator FLAKE. Ms. Thomas-Greenfield, you mentioned $140 million going to, I think you said, economic growth activities and 

democracy activities. Can you further detail where that is going 

and who is administering that? I think you mentioned the figure 

$140 million. Right? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. That’s correct. AID Assistant Administrator Lindborg will address those details. Some $170 million is 

going to our efforts to support the capacity of the Somali National 

Army and supporting training for that, but we also are building 

democratic institutions that are being worked with USAID. 

Senator FLAKE. OK. Can you further detail the democracy activities or economic growth activities that we are involved in? 

Ms. LINDBORG. Sure. We have about a $64 million program for 

2011 and 2012—sorry—2012 and 2013 that is working to—some of 

the activities that I already detailed to help set up the constitution, 

to support the move toward elections. That also includes work in 

Somaliland and Puntland with those governments to continue to 

support the very important advances they have already made on 

democratic approaches, transparency, accountability, and to align 

their policies with the federal government and includes a lot of the 

work on setting up the independent election commission and the 

electoral law, the mechanics, to make the gains that we need in the 

next 36 months. 

Senator FLAKE. Turning to Somaliland and Puntland, you kind 

of make it sound as if they are okay with this arrangement, and 

that is not the sense I have received from them. They want to be 

recognized on their own. Can you kind of explain the difference 

here? 

Ms. THOMAS-GREENFIELD. Yes, and that is the sense we have 

gotten as well, that they have worked to develop and stabilize the 

areas that are under their control, but we are following in the lead 

of the AU. We have not recognized them as separate governments 

at this time because the AU has not made that recognition. But we 

continue to support their efforts to provide security and services to 

the people that they are currently supporting. 

Senator FLAKE. You mentioned some of the funding is actually 

going to Somaliland and Puntland to help them. What is their 

understanding as to what they are to do with this money? Are they 

establishing their place in a federal system? Because it sounds to 

me, when you talk to them, that they have a completely different 

idea of where they are going. What is your understanding, Ms. 

Lindborg? 

Ms. LINDBORG. As I indicated, there is continued help particularly to support the accountability and transparency that they 

quite appropriately have already made gains with, and at the same 

time, we are doing it in a way that very expressly indicates the 

goal of having that align with the central government in a centrally 

federated system. 

Senator FLAKE. And they accept that? 

Ms. LINDBORG. There are conversations ongoing. 

Senator FLAKE. All right. Just kind of a general observation and 

I will go ahead and stop. But we all know this is tough work. This 

is a tough environment. You know, where you had basically a lawless situation with no central government for 20 years, nobody can 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

27 

expect it to immediately transform into some flourishing democracy. We understand that. But I get the sense from the testimony 

that you are painting a little rosier picture than actually exists 

there, and I am not sure that that does us any good as those who 

have to authorize and appropriate money to sustain programs. And 

I will be interested in the next panel to see their thoughts on that. 

But just to let you know, we recognize this is tough and it is 

going to be a rocky road, but it does not do us any good to gloss 

over difficulties. And my suspicion is that, you know, the government—they are trying. We want them to succeed. We recognize 

them. But there are likely large swaths of the country that do not 

recognize the government as legitimate, and we need to recognize 

that and move forward. But it is a tough road. I know we are doing 

the best we can, but it is likely a more difficult situation than perhaps we are told. 

But I thank you. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Flake. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. No more questions. 

Senator COONS. For this panel then, if I might—we do have a 

whole other panel, and we hope to come to some conclusion of this 

hearing. I want to thank you for your testimony and for your very 

hard work. There has been significant progress made in Somalia 

relative to where it was 2 years ago, a lawless state characterized 

by widespread piracy, humanitarian crises, and the utter absence 

of a functioning federal government. So to Senator Flake’s point, 

great progress has been made, but significant hurdles and challenges remain, as I believe you have been clear. And I look forward 

to working with you closely as we articulate together a coherent 

U.S. strategy moving forward to take advantage of this moment 

and this opportunity. 

Thank you. 

And I would like to invite our second panel to take their places 

in front of the committee. 

[Pause.] 

Senator COONS. I would like to welcome our second panel today: 

first, Andre Le Sage, senior research fellow at the National Defense 

University’s Institute for Strategic Studies; Abdi Aynte, founder of 

the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies in Mogadishu; and E.J. 

Hogendoorn, deputy director for Africa at the International Crisis 

Group. And I would like to invite each of you in turn to make your 

opening statement, if you might, to the committee. 

Dr. Le Sage. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ANDRE LE SAGE, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW FOR AFRICA, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC 

STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Dr. LE SAGE. Thank you, Senator Coons, Senator Flake, and 

members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to appear before you 

today. 

As requested in your invitation, I will focus my remarks on the 

status of al-Shabaab and international efforts to defeat that terFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

28 

rorist group. I would be grateful if my full written statement could 

be included in the record. 

Senator COONS. Without objection. 

Dr. LE SAGE. Al-Shabaab has been weakened as a national insurgency force. However, it retains the capability to conduct targeted 

guerilla and terrorist attacks against Somali, United States, and 

partner nation interests. This was vividly demonstrated in September when al-Shabaab-linked gunmen stormed the Westgate shopping complex in Nairobi killing scores of innocent civilians. Without 

additional efforts to defeat al-Shabaab, it is only a matter of time 

before the group and its affiliates undertake additional deadly 

attacks. 

Al-Shabaab, currently led by the group’s emir, Ahmed Abdi 

Godane, has controlled much of south-central Somalia since 2006. 

However, over the past 2 years, the tide has turned dramatically. 

AMISOM has partnered with former clan militia that have integrated into the Somali National Army. They pressured al-Shabaab 

to withdraw from Mogadishu in August 2011 and then seized 

neighboring towns. In 2012, Ethiopia and Kenya also worked with 

clan militia to liberate the towns of Baidoa and Kismayo. In central 

Somalia and Puntland, clan leaders and local administrations have 

also mobilized to resist the al-Shabaab movement. 

In response to the military superiority of AMISOM in Ethiopia, 

al-Shabaab has avoided conventional engagements. Instead the 

group has shifted its forces to safe havens that lie just outside of 

AMISOM’s reach. Examples include Barawe in Lower Shabelle, 

Bulo Burti in Hiran region, and the Golis Mountains in Puntland. 

From these locations, al-Shabaab employs its intelligence wing, the 

Amniyat, to launch hit-and-run attacks and place IED’s and carry 

out assassinations and suicide bombings. The Amniyat, led my 

Mahad Karate, is comprised of hard-liners loyal to Godane. 

At the same time, al-Shabaab’s regional governors are essential 

components of its network. They maintain al-Shabaab’s control 

over local populations, allow terrorist training camps to operate, 

raise funds through taxes and extortion, conduct recruitment, and 

manage clan relations. 

As the Westgate attack shows, al-Shabaab also retains a significant external operations capability. These individuals, including 

both Somalis and foreign fighters, are only loosely under Godane’s 

control. They are dedicated to exporting terrorism across East 

Africa and work closely with affiliates such as al-Hijra in Kenya 

and the Ansar Muslim Youth Centre in Tanzania. 

Since becoming the group’s emir, Godane has personalized command and control and marginalized senior al-Shabaab leaders who 

disagree with his decisions. Long-standing tensions between 

Godane and his deputy, Mukhtar Robow, broke into open violence 

in June 2013. Many analysts hoped this internal conflict would 

weaken al-Shabaab. However, this is not the case. For several 

years, Godane has been building a splinter faction primarily based 

around the Amniyat and has taken control of the group’s funding 

and operational planning. 

Al-Shabaab’s long-term strategy does remain a matter of debate. 

The group may be playing a waiting game, retreating from large 

battles to preserve its strength and using terrorist attacks to stay 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

29 

relevant for as long as possible in hopes that the wider political 

context in Somalia and East Africa will change, allowing al-Shabaab to resurge. This would be the case if the Somali Government 

fails, if al-Shabaab can align with clan-based opposition groups, or 

if new regional crises force AMISOM troop-contributing countries 

to depart Somalia. 

Godane and his hard-line supporters have no allusions that they 

can impose an extremist state on Somalia if AMISOM and regional 

forces continue to make the progress they have done and the 

Somali Federal Government works to stabilize the area. In this 

case, the group may be satisfied managing a clandestine jihadist 

struggle that commits nihilistic acts of violence for as long as 

possible. 

To conclude, although al-Shabaab has, indeed, lost control of key 

cities in Somalia, the group has recalibrated its approach and 

remains a vicious enemy. The United States and its Somali and 

international partners need to redouble efforts to roll back the 

group while supporting Somalia’s Federal Government to consolidate security gains. This requires a combination of efforts. 

First, we must revive the regional offensive against al-Shabaab, 

including increased operational and intelligence support for both 

AMISOM and Ethiopia. 

Second, it is critical to develop a capable and professional national security structure in Somalia that can fight side by side with 

its regional partners. 

Third, additional diplomacy and foreign aid are needed to support the Somali Federal Government and the local administrations 

with which it is working to oppose al-Shabaab and to build a federal structure. They need to negotiate power and resource-sharing 

deals that allow the country’s federal structure to function. 

Finally, we must continue supporting Somalia’s neighbors, particularly Kenya where the Westgate attacks took place, but also 

Tanzania and other countries that serve as hosts to al-Shabaabaffiliated movements in the region. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to testify, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Le Sage follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. ANDRE LE SAGE

Thank you and good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss Somalia’s ongoing political and security transition, and the ways in which the United 

States can promote stability and combat terrorism in East Africa. 

Mr. Chairman, as requested in your letter of invitation, I will focus my remarks 

on the status of al-Shabaab in Somalia, and the progress of international efforts to 

defeat that terrorist group. Before I begin, let me note that my comments reflect 

my personal analysis, not the positions of U.S. policy or the National Defense 

University (NDU). 

My overall assessment is that al-Shabaab has indeed been weakened as a conventional insurgency force. However, it retains the capability and intent to employ guerilla and terrorist attacks that inflict deadly harm against U.S. and partner-nation 

interests both inside Somalia and across the region. This was vividly demonstrated 

on September 21, when al-Shabaab-linked terrorists stormed the Westgate shopping 

complex in Nairobi, Kenya, killing scores of innocent civilians—including Africans 

and non-Africans; Muslims and non-Muslims; men, women and children. 

Without additional efforts to defeat the group, it is only a matter of time before 

al-Shabaab undertakes additional deadly attacks. Moreover, there is a significant 

danger that al-Shabaab’s brutal tactics will set a precedent for other al-Qaeda-affiliFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

30 

ates and ‘‘lone wolf’’ terrorists that are intent on doing harm to the United States 

and its allies. 

THE POLITICAL & SECURITY CONTEXT

Al-Shabaab—which is currently led by the group’s emir, Ahmed Abdi ‘‘Godane’’— 

was established by 2004 by a small group of Somali Islamist militants. They had 

been part of an earlier Islamist movement—Al Itihad al Islamia (AIAI)—and had 

provided protection and support for the Al Qaeda East Africa (AQEA) cell that was 

responsible for the 1998 attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. As 

of 2004, al-Shabaab operatives were functioning independently from AIAI, conducting assassinations of Somali peace activists and security officials, as well as foreign 

journalists and aid workers. 

Al-Shabaab’s existence became publicly known in 2006 when it served as a selfappointed vanguard force within the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). The UIC took 

control of much of southern Somalia after it defeated the clan-based warlords that 

had dominated southern Somalia since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. 

Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia from 2007–2009 defeated the UIC, and 

installed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and African Union (AU) 

peacekeepers in Mogadishu. 

While the TFG languished amidst political infighting, al-Shabaab successfully 

launched an insurgency campaign that gradually retook control of southern Somalia. Moreover, al-Shabaab increasingly gained control over all foreign fighters in 

Somalia, including those loyal to AQEA. This was a byproduct of the success of 

international security operations targeting senior AQEA operatives Saleh Ali Saleh 

‘‘Nabhan,’’ Fazul Abdullah Mohamed ‘‘Harun’’ and others. As a result, the alShabaab movement today combines the traits of a local insurgency seeking to impose an extremist Islamic state on Somalia, and the traits of a transnational terrorist group that seeks to conduct attacks outside of Somalia’s borders in the name 

of global jihad. 

In 2011, the tide began to turn dramatically against al-Shabaab. The African 

Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) partnered with former clan-based militia in 

Mogadishu that had been integrated into a nominal Somali National Army (SNA). 

They succeeded in pressuring al-Shabaab to execute a ‘‘tactical withdrawal’’ from 

Mogadishu in August 2011, and subsequently liberated several key towns in Lower 

and Middle Shabelle regions from al-Shabaab control (including Afgooye, Merka, 

Jowhar, Wanleweyn and others). Combined ground offensives by Ethiopian and 

Kenyan militaries then succeeded in wresting control of those countries’ border regions from al-Shabaab, and liberated the major cities of Baidoa and Kismayo in 

2012. Finally, in Central Somalia, Ethiopia supported clan leaders and the Sufist 

movement Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ) to create local administrations that 

could resist al-Shabaab’s presence. 

SOMALIA’S FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

As al-Shabaab lost ground, there was a general assumption that the movement 

was significantly weakened and could be defeated by (1) the gradual expansion of 

AMISOM’s area of control, and (2) efforts to build a post-transitional national government. Global attention slowly shifted away from security issues to Somalia’s 

political scene with the establishment of Somalia’s Federal Government (SFG) in 

September 2012. 

The SFG—led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, Speaker of Parliament 

Mohamed Osman Jawari, and other Somali intellectuals with longstanding civil 

society ties—has received remarkable levels of international support. This includes 

inter alia the formal recognition of the Federal Government by dozens of countries 

around the world and the reestablishment of traditional diplomatic ties; increased 

foreign aid from the United States and other major donors; the partial lifting of the 

international arms embargo on Somalia; negotiations with the World Bank and 

International Monetary Fund to reestablish formal relations; and efforts by the 

United Nations to shift from Kenya-based, cross-border to in-country operations. 

The leadership of the SFG will be critical to completing Somalia’s transitional 

process, and they will require substantial international diplomatic, military and 

financial support in the process. At the same time, it is important to understand 

that much of Somalia’s political and security progress over the past few years has 

been the result of a combination of factors: 

1. Somalia’s warlords and militia-factions, which dominated the country’s political, 

economic, and security affairs since 1991, were disarmed by the Union of Islamic 

Courts (UIC) in 2006. Since then, the warlords have not been able to rebuild their 

powerbase and no longer exercise a veto on Somalia’s progress. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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2. At the same time, popular support for al-Shabaab has dwindled quickly. When 

it controlled most of southern Somalia, the group failed to govern effectively. It dispensed with international aid agencies amidst famine conditions, levied high taxes 

and forced conscription to support the group’s war effort, and imposed extremely 

severe forms of shari’a law. As a result, Somalis had little interest in continuing 

to support the group, while more moderate Islamist movements splintered away. 

3. Many major clans—whose warlords had been disarmed by al-Shabaab—have 

worked to reestablish their political position and began to resist the movement. This 

includes major segments of the Marehan and Ogaden in Gedo Region, former supporters of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) in Bay and Bakol Regions, the 

Hawadle in Hiraan, and the Habr Gedir who supported formation of the Sufist 

movement Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ) movement, Galmudug State and Himan 

and Heeb State. With assistance from Ethiopia and Kenya, these groups began to 

create local administrations and participate in anti-Shabaab military activities. 

4. AMISOM is an overwhelming military force relative to both al-Shabaab and 

any clan-based forces that may oppose its mandate. AMISOM now requires additional forces and enablers (including helicopters) to continue their advance, but thus 

far have been able to roll back al-Shabaab and hold locations that they ‘‘liberate.’’ 

5. Many of Somalia’s militia are slowly integrating into battalions and brigades 

that form the nucleus of the Somali National Army (SNA) in Mogadishu. Outside 

the capital city, militia that were initially proxy forces for Ethiopia or Kenya may 

now be incorporated into a national command-and-control structure. All of this is 

supported by Western aid that provides salaries, training, equipment and mentors 

to professionalize the SNA—much of which has been funded by the United States. 

6. Finally, regional politics across the Horn of Africa have begun working in 

Somalia’s favor. In particular, Ethiopia is now working to support the SFG, including brokering the recent Addis Ababa agreement to form the Interim Jubba Administration. At the same time, countries such as Eritrea—which previously supported 

spoilers of Somalia’s peace process—are no longer significantly active in the country. 

In addition to supporting the SFG, defeating al-Shabaab and building a sustainable post-transition government for Somalia will require national, regional, and 

international efforts to sustain these trends. 

THE CURRENT AL-SHABAAB THREAT NETWORK

Despite these positive political developments, al-Shabaab remains a determined 

and vicious enemy. To conserve its forces and resources, al-Shabaab has avoided 

direct, conventional engagements with AMISOM, the Ethiopian military and the 

emerging SNA forces. Instead, al-Shabaab has withdrawn from their areas of 

advance and shifted its forces and focus in several directions to establish new safe 

haven areas, including: 

• Southwest Somalia Safe Haven: A zone in the far southwest of Somalia that 

lays between the villages of Barawe in Lower Shabelle, Jilib in Lower Juba, 

Bardhere in southern Gedo, and Dinsoor in Bay region. • Central Somalia Safe Haven: A zone in the central regions north of Mogadishu, 

based in Bulo Burti village of southern Hiran region and extending west in 

Bakol region, east to the towns El Bur and El Dheer in Galgadud, and south 

into rural areas of Middle Shabelle. • Golis Mountains Safe Haven: A small, mountainous zone outside Bosasso city 

in the northeastern region of Puntland, running from Galgala toward Badhan, 

and affording al-Shabaab with the potential to attack key Puntland cities 

including Bosasso, Garowe and Galkayo. • Somaliland Safe Haven: The northwestern area of Somaliland, al-Shabaab 

likely retains a limited capacity to operate. While al-Shabaab has no standing 

military capacity in this region, it does maintain a clandestine network capable 

of terrorist attacks, and a network of facilitators that support recruitment, 

indoctrination, training, weapons trafficking and support for the movement of 

men and materiel. 

In these safe havens, al-Shabaab’s regional governors and ideologues are essential 

components of the network. They maintain al-Shabaab’s local control, allow for terrorist training camps to operate, raise funds from taxes and extorting the local community, and manage clan relations and recruitment. Their ranks include wellknown al-Shabaab leaders—such as Yassin Kilwe and Abdulkadir Mumin in 

Puntland; Hassan Yakub and Hassan Fidow in Central Somalia; Yusuf 

Kabakutukade in Middle Shabelle; Moalim Jinow in Bay and Bakol Regions; and 

Abdirahman Fidow and Mohamed Dulyadeen in the Juba Valley area. However, 

despite their critical role in the group’s hierarchy, these leaders do not appear to 

be the focus not a focus of counterterrorism efforts. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Al-Shabaab employs its intelligence wing, the Amniyat, to infiltrate SFG- and 

AMISOM-held cities and to emplace improvised explosive devices (IEDs), conduct 

assassinations or carry out suicide bombing attacks. This group, led by Mahad 

Mohamed Ali ‘‘Karate,’’ is comprised of hard-liners loyal to al-Shabaab’s emir 

Godane and serves as the movement’s parallel governance structure to monitor and 

regulate the actions of other leaders who may be opposed to Godane. In addition, 

al-Shabaab’s guerilla militias are used primarily for hit-and-run attacks against 

AMISOM and SNA forward operating bases and main supply routes. 

Finally, as demonstrated by the Westgate mall attack last month, al-Shabaab 

retains a significant ‘‘external operations’’ cadre, existing either within or distinct 

from the Amniyat unit. These individuals, including both Somalis and foreign fighters, are dedicated to expanding the reach of al-Shabaab and the wider al-Qaeda network to conduct terrorist operations outside of Somalia. The region has a long history of terrorist attacks, including the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in 

Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the 2002 attacks targeting tourists in Mombasa, and 

the 2010 Kampala attacks the end of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. As al-Shabaab has 

lost ground in Somalia, more of its trained and battle-hardened fighters have 

focused on other parts of East Africa, particularly through cooperation with local 

affiliates such as Al Hijra in Kenya, and the Ansar Muslim Youth Centre (A–MYC) 

in Tanzania. 

SUSTAINING AL-SHABAAB: FUNDING AND PERSONNEL

Al-Shabaab’s finances have been dramatically reduced as a result of its loss of 

safe haven to the military offensives undertaken by AMISOM, regional partners and 

the SFG. Prior to those offensives, Kismayo seaport—from which charcoal and other 

commodities were traded—provided al-Shabaab with its primary source of revenue. 

Nonetheless, al-Shabaab is still able to access funds and manage their distribution 

across its areas of operations in order to sustain its personnel and undertake guerilla attacks. In particular, al-Shabaab continues to levy taxes on national and 

regional trade routes that cross al-Shabaab safe haven areas. The group extorts revenue from major businesses under threat of attack and coerces donations in cash 

or in kind from clan-based communities in areas that it controls. Finally, alShabaab likely still receives foreign donations by supporters of its jihadi ideology. 

Al-Shabaab today has a reduced number of personnel as the result of two factors: 

first, the growing resistance of major Somali subclans, and second, the successful 

military offensives by AMISOM, regional partners and the SFG. As a result, many 

clan-based militia who joined al-Shabaab when the movement occupied their traditional clan areas or who supported al-Shabaab in order to gain financial payments 

have left the movement. The reduction in the number of clan-based personnel supporting al-Shabaab is a positive factor in so far as the reduction degrades the fighting capabilities of the movement. However, a smaller, more ideologically committed 

force is easier to sustain for al-Shabaab’s leadership, particularly given the group’s 

potentially declining access to funds. 

Nonetheless, al-Shabaab has demonstrated its capacity to sustain thousands of 

personnel in its safe haven areas, and remains able to surge militia in the hundreds 

against specific targets, particularly in rural areas of south-central Somalia. In addition, some Somali sub-clans—for example, the Duduble and Murosade in Mogadishu 

and Central Somalia, or the Warsangeli and Lelkase in Puntland—have aligned 

themselves with al-Shabaab in order to strengthen their lineages’ hand in longstanding struggles against other subclans for local political and economic control. 

This affords al-Shabaab a continued supply of militia recruits and funding, as well 

as safe haven and safe passage. 

AL-SHABAAB’S INTERNAL CONFLICTS

Since its creation, al-Shabaab was nominally led through the collective decisionmaking of its Shura Council. However, following the appointment of Godane as the 

group’s emir, he has personalized command-and-control, marginalized other senior 

al-Shabaab leaders who disagree with his decisions, and even arrested or killed 

Somali and foreign fighters who seek to develop their own operational plans. 

Longstanding leadership tensions between al-Shabaab’s emir Godane and his deputy, Mukhtar Robow, broke into open violence in June 2013. Forces loyal to Godane 

killed several key leaders, including Godane’s mentor, Ibrahim Haji Jama ‘‘alAfghani.’’ Following the fighting, Robow has sought protection in has clan’s home 

on the border between Bay and Bakol regions. Meanwhile, the U.S. jihadist Omar 

Hammami ‘‘Abu Mansor al-Amriki’’ was killed by Godane’s faction, Hassan Dahir 

Aweis (one of the original AIAI leaders from the 1990s) fled and was arrested by 

the SFG, and other senior leaders expect they may be next. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Many analysts and policymakers hoped this internal conflict would weaken alShabaab and make it less capable to launch attacks. However, that is obviously not 

the case. For several years, Godane had been building and taking firm control over 

a splinter faction of al-Shabaab—primarily based around the Amniyat intelligence 

unit—and he has centralized control over the al-Shabaab movement, including its 

forces, funding and operational planning. 

It is worth noting that the Amniyat, which leads attacks against Somali and 

AMISOM forces in Mogadishu, was barely impacted when the infighting broke out 

this past summer. Their attack rate in Mogadishu never fell, and the severity of 

those attacks never dulled. Over the past year, they have also succeeded in 

conducting several major attacks including those against senior SFG officials, the 

Turkish Embassy, the United Nations compound, as well as popular restaurants 

and hotels. 

AL-SHABAAB’S STRATEGY AND THE WESTGATE ATTACK

Al-Shabaab’s long-term strategy is not entirely clear. On the one hand, the group 

may be playing a ‘‘waiting game.’’ By this analysis, al-Shabaab is working hard to 

stay alive, to preserve its strength and to stay relevant for as long as possible. It 

hopes that the wider political context in Somalia and the region will change and 

al-Shabaab will have an opportunity to resurge. This would be the case if the SFG 

fails to rebuild a national government, if new clan-based opposition groups emerge 

with which al-Shabaab can align its movement, or if new regional crises force 

AMISOM to depart Somalia. 

On the other hand, Godane, his loyal Amniyat structure, and his external operations cadre may have no illusions that they will eventually succeed in imposing an 

extremist Islamic state on Somalia. By this account, the group is satisfied with managing a clandestine jihadist movement that inflicts serious harm through nihilistic 

violence for as long as possible. 

In this context, the attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi should not 

come as a surprise. Al-Shabaab and its regional networks across East Africa have 

long harbored both the ambition and capability to conduct such a deadly attack. 

Nonetheless, the attack begs a series of questions regarding the level of external 

threat posed by al-Shabaab. 

There should be no doubt that al-Shabaab’s emir and spokesman both claimed 

credit for the attack, and have threatened additional bloodshed. Almost certainly, 

the Westgate attack was a combined operation involving an element of the alShabaab network in Somalia, and an element of the its Kenyan affiliate, the Al 

Hijra network. From an intelligence perspective, the key is to identify exactly which 

individuals were involved and their chain of command. Was the attack authorized 

and directed by Godane to demonstrate that he is now fully in charge of the alShabaab movement and indispensable to al-Qaeda’s senior leaders despite his 

group’s recent infighting? Or, was the attack planned and undertaken by remnants 

of the AQEA network and foreign fighters that have felt undermined by Godane— 

acting independently and forcing al-Shabaab leadership to catch up? 

It will also be critical to assess what form of ‘‘intelligence failure’’ allowed the 

Westgate attack to happen. In short, we need to understand why the attack cell was 

not identified in advance. How long was the attack cell in Kenya before they took 

action? Was the attack cell ‘‘too quick’’ from its infiltration into Kenya until the execution of their plot for local security service (even with foreign assistance) to take 

action? Was the attack cell in Kenya for a long time and parts of previously identified, but considered a ‘‘watch target’’ by mistake? Or, was the attack cell not identified at all due to sufficient compartmentalization and operational security? 

The challenge in answering these questions today is the huge amount of contradictory information that exists in the public domain, and the possibility of developing reasonable hypotheses to support many different assessments. Answers to 

these questions will eventually emerge as the investigation moves forward. In the 

meantime, it is critical to focus on the best possible response to prevent such an 

attack from happening again. 

CONTINUING THE FIGHT AGAINST AL-SHABAAB

As detailed above, al-Shabaab has indeed been weakened as a conventional insurgency force inside Somalia. However, the group has recalibrated its approach and 

retains the capability and intent to employ guerilla and terrorist attacks. In response, the United States and its Somali, regional and international partners need 

to redouble their efforts to roll back al-Shabaab and build a national, federal government for Somalia that can consolidate the country’s security gains into the future. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Succeeding to defeat the al-Shabaab insurgency and prevent the resurgence of 

al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist cells across East Africa will require a combination of 

efforts: 

• Reviving Regionally-Supported Offensive Operations against al-Shabaab: 

Æ Increase intelligence collection and sharing, as well as operational support, 

for regional security partners to support targeted operations that remove 

key al-Shabaab and other al-Qaeda-linked operatives from Somalia, and 

disrupt terrorist training camps. 

Æ Strengthen regional military commitments to sustain and increase the 

capabilities of AMISOM and their ability to work alongside the SFG’s security structure and regional partners, including Ethiopia. 

Æ Invest in the development of a capable and professional national security 

structure in Somalia, including the Somali National Army (SNA), the 

National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and the Somali National 

Police (SNP), including careful attention to the integration of anti-Shabaab 

forces at the local and regional levels. 

• Support for the development of Somalia’s federal system: 

Æ Provide diplomatic and foreign aid support to the SFG and its local-level 

Somali governance partners to achieve negotiated durable political agreements, power-sharing and resource-sharing deals that allow for the emergence of a federal governing system. 

Æ Address the vexing and politically charged question of how ‘‘federalism’’ 

will be implemented, including the need to finalize the Provisional Constitution and to negotiate with both longstanding, quasi-independent administrations in Puntland and Somaliland, and nascent, clan-based administrations formed across south-central Somalia. 

Æ Ensure the continued formation of national security forces that reflect the 

decentralized, clan-based reality of the country’s post-war political economy, 

which is enshrined in Somalia’s new federal structure. 

Æ Support the SFG and its federal units to develop, resource, and implement 

sectoral strategies and regulatory mechanisms to ensure the delivery of 

essential public goods, including health care, education and development, 

as well as training a new civil service cadre after 20 years without a functioning government. 

Æ Support the SFG and its federal units to establish positive control over 

Somalia’s resource flows, including anticorruption efforts and tax revenues 

from Mogadishu’s key economic infrastructure points (airport, seaport, 

checkpoints, and markets). 

• Support for regional partners to combat terrorism: 

Æ Continue support for Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia and other 

regional partners who are vulnerable to attacks by al-Shabaab and its 

regional affiliates, including Al Hijra and the A–MYC. 

Æ Build regional security cooperation between these countries and the SFG 

to prevent future attacks. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Dr. Le Sage, for that testimony. I look forward to the opportunity to ask questions, if I 

might. 

Next, Mr. Aynte. 

STATEMENT OF ABDI AYNTE, DIRECTOR, HERITAGE 

INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, MOGADISHU, SOMALIA 

Mr. AYNTE. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, thank you 

very much for the opportunity to participate in this important 

panel at this critical juncture in Somalia’s history. 

One year after the formation of the first nontraditional government in over 20 years, there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic 

about the future of Somalia. The Somali people are determined 

more than ever to reclaim their dignity and, above all, their place 

among the community of nations. 

They have also identified a common enemy to peace and stability. Citizens across the country are countering al-Shabaab’s 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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destruction and despair with construction and hope. Signs of economic vibrancy are reemerging. The Somali diaspora are returning 

in large numbers, bringing with them much-needed skills, business 

opportunities and, most importantly, a sense of normalcy. And this 

is where the issue of remittance comes in and it is important for 

the United States to support the flow of remittance to the people 

of Somalia. 

Significant parts of Somalia suggest Somaliland and Puntland 

and others are also enjoying relative peace, stability, and selfgovernance. 

With regards to security, gains are less encouraging. Despite losing control of most major cities in Somalia, al-Shabaab fighters 

remain a major threat to peace. The capital of Mogadishu, where 

I came from just 2 days ago, is under constant assault. 

A key challenge to the restoration of stability is the chronic 

weakness of security apparatuses. Command, control, and coordination is demonstrably weak due to the fragmentation of militias 

forming the security forces. Training, especially on protection of 

vulnerable civilians, remains poor and uncoordinated with many 

countries running various programs. The composition of forces does 

not reflect the regional and clan diversity of the Somali people, 

depriving the security forces of a much-needed legitimacy. 

The U.S. Government has provided significant support to Somalia’s struggling security forces and the African Union peacekeeping 

missions for many years. This support from the United States and 

other development partners is literally all that is standing between 

the collapse of the federal government and its survival. 

The U.S. Government must, however, utilize its support innovatively. Tactical counterterrorism measures, surgical strikes, and 

the provision of ammunition were necessary for some time, but now 

there is a greater need for strategic partnership. Resources must 

be channeled toward rebuilding competent, professional, accountable, and broadly representative Somali security services that have 

both the qualitative and quantitative advantage over the enemy. 

AMISOM has done an excellent job of recovering regions from 

al-Shabaab’s tyranny, but they cannot become a substitute for 

indigenous forces. Somali forces can ultimately defeat al-Shabaab. 

Security is inextricably linked to political accommodation and 

reconciliation, which is partially why Somalia adopted a federal 

model of governance nearly 10 years ago. But a consensus on which 

type of federalism remains elusive. Successive governments have 

failed to translate the federal vision into viable member states. 

Frustrated with the lack of progress at the national level, communities across the country are taking matters into their own hands 

and are carving out fiefdoms along clan lines. The American dual 

track policy, which led to direct U.S. engagement with subnational 

entities, sent the wrong signal that the international community 

was promoting sectarian polities at the expense of a contiguous federal government. 

The process of federating the government faces three enormous 

challenges. 

First, the provisional constitution is deeply ambiguous and contradictory about the shape and the future of the Federal Government of Somalia and divisions of powers between the center and 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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the peripheries. The meaning of federalism broadly misunderstood 

by the Somali people, many of whom are legitimately nervous 

about an overly centralized state. This is compounded by the 

absence of an effective judicial branch that can interpret constitutional provisions. 

Second, state institutions that are supposed to play a leading role 

in the national dialogue and the design of a suitable federal structure are yet to be established. The constitution calls for the formation of nearly a dozen independent commissions, half of which are 

instrumental to the federation process, such as the Boundaries and 

Federation Commission, the Inter-State Commission, and the Constitution Review and Implementation Commission. These delays 

are inexcusable. 

The federal government garnered an unprecedented support from 

the Somali people following its inauguration in September 2012. It 

also won an unparalleled backing from the international community, including formal recognition by the U.S. Government for the 

first time in 20 years, easing of the U.N. arms embargo, monthly 

direct budgetary support from Turkey, and an expanded African 

Union peacekeeping mission. Many Somalis believe that the federal 

government has fallen significantly short of using that positive momentum to advance inclusive politics and dialogue with key domestic actors, including existing and emerging federal member states, 

traditional elders, and civil society. 

Third, neighboring countries are sometimes seen as undermining 

state-building efforts by encouraging and sometimes helping with 

the formation of more subnational entities to suit their own interests. While Ethiopia and Kenya face real threats from Somalia, as 

we have seen in the recent appalling attack in Nairobi, their 

unchecked interference risks destabilizing the country and a reversal of recent fragile gains. 

The provisional constitution of Somalia envisions elections to 

take place toward the end of 2016. While this is not impossible, it 

is highly improbable, given the magnitude of tasks ahead. It should 

remain an admirable goal for the current government, but we must 

not substitute state-building for process-building. Elections are not 

an end in themselves, but rather a means toward the more vital 

objective of forming a viable state. That includes finalizing the constitution, settling on a federal structure, and adopting political 

party laws. 

The challenges of facing the process of federation and political 

consolidation in Somalia are tremendous but not insurmountable. 

First, the provisional constitution is a deeply flawed document 

that contradicts itself and puts future member states and the federal government on a direct collision course. The Somali people and 

their government need urgent assistance in this regard. 

Priority must be given to the formation of the Review and Implementation Commission and Boundaries and Federation Commission. Once established, they will need considerable financial and 

human resources to engage in genuine national dialogue. There are 

a number of American institutions with relevant experience that 

can provide essential support in this area. 

Second, assistance to the Somali Government must be contingent 

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sional constitution and its own national plan. If none of the commissions is established by early next year, the Somali people will 

lose faith in the government’s commitment to offer something more 

than its predecessors. 

The United States and its allies should assist the Somali people 

to develop mechanisms to hold their government accountable. 

Somali civil society has always been, and will continue to be, a 

powerful force for progress. The role of civil society is currently 

worryingly absent. Civil society institutions must be strengthened 

and given the tools they need to effectively monitor the progress 

and integrity of the government. 

Third, as an important ally to both Kenya and Ethiopia, the 

United States has a moral obligation to exert pressure on the two 

countries to allow the Somali people and their government to 

engage in a national reconciliation. Interference galvanizes militant 

groups and further divides Somali communities. 

The United States should certainly continue to assist both countries in mitigating the security threats they face, but Kenya and 

Ethiopia must realize that only a democratic, strong, and vibrant 

Somali state on their borders is the greatest guarantor of security 

and prosperity in the region. 

Mr. Chairman, it is at times easy to dismiss Somalia as being 

irreparable and the archetypal failed state beyond hope. But as 

those of us who have given up their comfortable lives and families 

in the diaspora and returned home can attest to, progress is possible, and it is happening right now. 

Somalia has made a profound leap from where it was just 31⁄2

years ago when I first started going back home. At the time, 

al-Shabaab controlled 75 percent of Mogadishu and almost 60 percent of the entire nation. Pirates were disrupting global shipping 

lanes. The very notion of government was actually contested across 

the country. 

But with the support of international partners like the United 

States, the European Union, the African Union, the United Kingdom, and Turkey, and others, Somalia is slowly emerging from the 

abyss. What it now needs is relentless efforts to rebuild inclusive 

state institutions that have legitimacy, capacity, and resources 

needed to finish the mammoth tasks ahead. 

I thank you on the subcommittee for this opportunity to present 

my views and will be happy to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aynte follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ABDI AYNTE

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, subcommittee members, thank you for 

the opportunity to participate in this important panel at this critical juncture in 

Somalia’s history. 

My name is Abdi Aynte, and I am the executive director of the Heritage Institute 

for Policy Studies. Although born in Mogadishu, I was reared in the United States. 

Our family fled to America to escape the violence that engulfed Somalia as it degenerated into civil war and state failure. I went to college in Minnesota, and graduate 

school at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC. 

I include this personal history because in the aftermath of the cruel attack on 

civilians at the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi, some reports suggest one or 

more Somali-Americans, perhaps from Minneapolis, may have participated in the 

attack. As once a member of the Somali diaspora in America, I want to assure subcommittee members, and indeed all Americans, that the overwhelming majority of 

Somalis living in the United States love and respect this country and are indebted 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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to it for the opportunities it has provided to them. They have nothing but contempt 

for the al-Shabaab terrorists and what they have done to Somalia and stand with 

all civilized nations in denouncing their actions. 

The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies was established in Mogadishu in January 2013. It is Somalia’s first independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank. It 

aims to inform and influence public policy and practice through empirically based 

research and analysis, direct engagement with senior policymakers and advocacy 

through the media, and to promote a culture of learning and research in the Somali 

region. Our most recent publications are briefing papers recommending how the 

international community can support the Federal Republic of Somalia through 

the ‘‘New Deal’’ development assistance and option for resolving the crisis between 

the central government of the Federal Republic and the people of Lower Jubba, 

Middle Jubba, and Gedo regions. More on the institute is on its Web site: 

www.heritageinstitute.org 

One year after the formation of the first nontransitional government in over 20 

years, there are reasons to be cautiously optimistic about the future of Somalia. The 

Somali people are determined, more than ever, to reclaim their dignity and, above 

all, their place among the community of nations. 

They have also identified a common enemy to peace and stability. Citizens across 

the country are countering al-Shabaab’s destruction and despair with construction 

and hope. Signs of economic vibrancy are re-emerging. The Somali diaspora are 

returning in large numbers, bringing with them much-needed skills, business opportunities and, most importantly, a sense of normalcy. Significant parts of Somalia, 

such as Somaliland in the northwest and Puntland in the northeast, are enjoying 

relative peace, stability and self-governance. 

With regards to security, gains are less encouraging. Despite losing control of 

most major cities in Somalia, al-Shabaab fighters remain a major threat to peace 

and stability. The capital, Mogadishu, where I came from 2 days ago, is under constant assault. Grenade attacks, assassinations, suicide bombings, and JED attacks 

remain all too common. And as the recent Nairobi attack demonstrates, the 

Shabaab remains a lethal force as a militia in an asymmetrical warfare. 

A key challenge to the restoration of stability is the chronic weakness of the security apparatuses. Command, control, and coordination is demonstrably weak due to 

the fragmentation of militias forming the security forces. Training, especially on protection of vulnerable civilians, remains poor and uncoordinated with various countries running programs. The composition of forces does not reflect the regional and 

clan diversity of the Somali people, depriving the security forces of a much-needed 

legitimacy. This is largely due to the unintended consequences of liberating parts 

of the country from al-Shabaab, and recruiting from these regions. 

The U.S. Government has provided much-needed support to Somalia’s struggling 

security forces, and the African Union’s peacekeeping mission for many years. This 

support, from the U.S. and other development partners, is literally all that stands 

between the collapse of the Federal Government and its survival. 

The U.S. Government must, however, utilize its support innovatively. Tactical 

counterterrorism measures, surgical strikes, and the provision of ammunition were 

necessary for sometime, but now there is a greater need for strategic partnership. 

Resources must now be channeled toward rebuilding competent, professional, 

accountable and broadly representative Somali security services with clear command and control. In order to defeat al-Shabaab, the Somali security forces need 

to be given a qualitative advantage over their enemy. At the moment, both sides 

are using mainly AK47s and RPGs. Armored personnel carriers, night vision goggles 

and air capability would be necessary. 

AMISOM has done an excellent job of recovering regions from the Shabaab’s tyranny, but they cannot become a substitute for indigenous forces. Somali forces can 

ultimately defeat al-Shabaab. 

Security is inextricably linked to political accommodation and reconciliation, 

which is partially why Somalia adopted a federal model of governance nearly 10 

years ago. But a consensus on which type of federalism remains elusive. Successive 

governments have failed to translate the federal vision into practical and viable 

member states. Frustrated with lack of progress at the national level, communities 

across the country have taken matters into their own hands, and carved out 

fiefdoms along clan lines. The American Dual Track Policy, which led to direct U.S. 

engagement with subnational entities, sent the wrong signal that the international 

community was promoting sectarian polities at the expense of a contiguous, federal 

government. Regional administrations practically run their affairs like independent 

states with virtually no input from the federal government. 

The process of federating the country faces three enormous challenges. First, the 

Provisional Constitutional is deeply ambiguous and contradictory about the shape 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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of the future Federal Government of Somalia, and division of powers between the 

center and peripheries. The meaning of federalism is broadly misunderstood by the 

Somali people, many of whom are legitimately worried about an overly centralized 

state, much like the military regime of Siyad Barre. This is compounded by the 

absence of an effective judicial branch that can interpret constitutional provisions. 

The ambiguity of the Provisional Constitution has allowed political elites to interpret it to suit their own narrow interests. Consequently, existing and emerging 

member states are being formed with little or no consideration to economic, political, 

and social viability of the state, and with a deeply worrying lack of inclusivity and 

transparency. Rights of unarmed clans and minorities are routinely ignored, and 

processes to establish federal member states are done in the most secretive fashion. 

Second, state institutions intended to play a leading role in national dialogue and 

the design of a suitable and agreeable federal structure are yet to be established. 

The Provisional Constitution calls for the formation of nearly a dozen independent 

commissions, half of which are instrumental to the federation process, such as the 

Boundaries and Federation Commission, the Inter-state Commission, and the Constitution Review and Implementation Commission. The Federal Government is far 

behind schedule on the establishment of these commissions. 

These delays are inexcusable. The Federal Government garnered an unprecedented support from the Somali people following its inauguration in September 

2012. It also won an unparalleled backing from the international community, including formal recognition by the U.S. Government for the first time in 20 years, easing 

of the U.N. arms embargo, monthly direct budgetary support from Turkey, and an 

expanded African Union Peacekeeping Mission. 

Many Somalis believe that the Federal Government has fallen short of using that 

positive momentum to advance inclusive politics and dialogue with key domestic 

actors, including existing and emerging federal member states, traditional elders, 

and civil society. 

Third, neighboring countries are undermining national reconciliation efforts by 

encouraging and sometimes helping with the formation of more subnational entities 

to suit their own domestic interests. Jubbaland was the most recent example. It was 

no secret that Kenya has organized, financed, and lobbied the international community to recognize the establishment of a ‘‘buffer zone’’ in its border with Somalia. 

While Ethiopia and Kenya face real threats from Somalia—as we’ve witnessed in 

the recent appalling attack in Nairobi—their unchecked interference risks further 

destabilizing of the country and a reversal of recent fragile gains. 

The Provisional Constitution of Somalia envisions elections to take place toward 

the end of 2016. While this is not impossible, it’s highly improbable given the magnitude of the tasks ahead. It should remain an admirable goal for the current government, but we must not substitute state-building for process-building. Elections 

are not an end in themselves, but rather a means toward the significantly more important objective of viable state formation, including finalizing the constitution, settling on a federal structure and adopting political party laws. In the absence of 

these steps, preparing for elections is a futile exercise. 

The challenges facing the processes of federation and political consolidation in 

Somalia are tremendous, but not insurmountable. 

First, the Provisional Constitution is a deeply flawed document that contradicts 

itself and puts future member states and the federal government on a direct collision course. The Somali people and their government need urgent assistance in this 

regard. 

Priority must be given to the formation of the Review and Implementation Commission and Boundaries and Federation Commission. Once established, they will 

need considerable financial and human resources to engage in genuine national dialogue. There are a number of American institutions with relevant experience that 

can provide essential support in this area. 

Second, assistance to the Somali Government must be contingent upon measurable gains. It must be held accountable to the Provisional Constitution and its own 

national plan. The culture of willfully missing constitutional deadlines must not be 

tolerated. If none of commissions is established by early next year, the Somali people will lose faith in the government’s commitment to offer something more than 

its predecessors. 

Somalis are rightfully worried that important transitional tasks will remain 

unfinished in 3 years when the government’s mandate comes to an end. Without 

strong support from the U.S. and other development partners there is a grave risk 

of the country slipping back into chaos. The United States and its allies must seize 

this opportunity to consolidate recent gains. 

The U.S. and its allies should assist the Somali people to develop mechanisms to 

hold their government to account. Somali civil society has always been, and will conFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

40 

tinue to be a powerful force for progress. The role of the civil society is currently 

worryingly absent. Civil society institutions must be strengthened and given the 

tools they need to effectively monitor the progress and integrity of the government. 

Properly amplified internal voices can induce change from within. 

Third, as an important ally to both Ethiopia and Kenya, the United States has 

a moral obligation to exert pressure on the two countries to allow the Somali people 

and their government to engage in a national reconciliation. Interference galvanizes 

militant groups and further divides Somali communities. 

The U.S. should certainly continue to assist both countries in mitigating the security threats they face. But Kenya and Ethiopia must realize that a democratic, 

strong, and vibrant Somali state on their borders is the greatest guarantor of security and prosperity in the region. 

It is, at times, easy to dismiss Somalia as being irreparable, the archetypal failed 

state beyond hope. But as those of us who have given up their comfortable lives and 

families in the diaspora to return home can attest to, progress is possible. And it 

is happening across the country. 

Somalia has made a profound leap from where it was just 31⁄2 years ago, when 

I first started returning home. At the time, al-Shabaab controlled 75 percent of 

Mogadishu and almost 60 percent of the entire nation. Pirates were disrupting 

global shipping lanes. The very notion of government was contested across the 

country. 

With the support of international partners like the United States, the European 

Union, the African Union, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and others, Somalia is 

slowly emerging from the abyss. What it needs now is relentless efforts to rebuild 

inclusive state institutions that have the legitimacy, capacity, and resources needed 

to finish the mammoth tasks ahead. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Aynte. 

Dr. Hogendoorn. 

STATEMENT OF DR. E.J. HOGENDOORN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR 

FOR AFRICA, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Dr. HOGENDOORN. Thank you, Senator Coons and Senator Flake, 

for this opportunity. 

Crisis Group has been working on Somalia since 2002 from our 

office in Nairobi, and we frequently travel to the country for 

research purposes. 

Conditions in Somalia have improved. AMISOM, now including 

Kenya, has with the help of Ethiopia, the Somali National Army, 

the Sufi group, Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa, and various allied clan 

militias, dealt al-Shabaab a serious strategic setback. Somalia 

also has a new albeit provisional government that is qualitatively 

better than previous administrations. The international community 

quickly recognized this government, and in September it pledged 

$2.5 billion in support. 

However, the federal government only has de facto control over 

Mogadishu and parts of the south. Al-Shabaab is down but not out. 

It controls huge swaths of south and central Somalia and it still 

is able to hit high-profile targets. 

The government also needs donors to pay security forces and to 

rebuild. Security in Mogadishu and elsewhere remains dependent 

on AMISOM and will likely for some time to come. 

Neither AMISOM nor the government can impose a peace. Stability is only possible through a nationwide process of negotiation, 

power-sharing, and improved governance. 

Arguably, Somalia’s most intractable issue is the question of federalism. Simply put, there remains serious disagreement between 

those who would like to see Somalia become a strong unitary state, 

one that can stand up to its neighbors, and those that fear a cenFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

41 

tralized government would be dominated by a single clan or group 

of clans, as it was during the Siad Barre era. 

Agreement on the powers of the federal government needs to be 

thrashed out quickly, otherwise Somalia risks embarking on a disruptive, piecemeal approach in the establishment of local administrations and federal states. The federal government quickly ran 

into trouble on the issue of federalism in Jubaland in southern 

Somalia, which was exacerbated by ambiguity in the constitution 

about who leads the process of creating these states. 

Neighboring countries also have significant security interests in 

Somalia, and all have sizeable forces in the country. Beyond the 

Horn, Muslim Somalia is very much linked to the Middle East, and 

Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey are very active in the country. 

Ethiopia is Somalia’s historic rival. Addis Ababa, promoting its 

own system of ethnic federalism, is a strong proponent of federalism and a seemingly logical, bottom-up approach of state-building 

in Somalia. However, many Somalis see this as a ploy to keep their 

country weak and divided and are, thus, wary of international 

pressure to devolve power. 

Kenya forcefully intervened in 2011 to create its own buffer state 

and facilitate the return of nearly half a million Somali refugees. 

It subsequently joined AMISOM but often follows its own interests. 

In Jubaland, Kenya has thrown its support behind Ahmed Madobe 

and not the federal government. Publicly Kenya is looking for an 

exit, but Somalis view this claim with great skepticism. According 

to the U.N. monitoring group, Kenyan politicians and officers are 

earning money from the trade, including banned charcoal passing 

through Kismayo. And more important, most believe Kenya wants 

to control southern Somalia because it has large oil and natural 

gas deposits. 

Al-Shabaab is aggressively trying to turn the local population 

against what it calls Christian Kenyan occupiers, and the Westgate 

Mall attack was an attempt to trigger a crackdown to that end. 

Beyond the regional states, a number of Muslim countries have 

taken an active interest in Somalia. This greater regional interest 

allows Somalia to play different states off against each other, particularly Muslim states against Ethiopia. 

International cooperation is also complicated by a host of international organizations, including the United Nations, the African 

Union, and EGAD, the regional organization in East Africa, with 

no clear division of responsibilities or a lead actor. 

The greatest problem was, and arguably remains, the overlapping mandate of the AU and the United Nations. The AU has the 

military peace enforcement responsibility, but by virtue of having 

been in Mogadishu for the last 4 years in fielding a force of over 

17,000 troops, it is a political actor. While the U.N. has a political 

mandate, it is very much involved in security policy, security sector 

reform, and the vexing issue of federalism. Both missions are also 

headed by special representatives who reportedly get on well, but 

they and their staff have no clear instructions on how to share 

responsibilities. 

The Westgate Mall attack. Much has been written about the latest terrorist attack. It is, however, important to note that this has 

long been expected and was certainly not the first, only the most 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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destructive. It is important that the Kenyan Government prevent 

a backlash against its Somali and Muslim population, lest it does 

exactly what al-Shabaab was seeking. 

What should the United States do in the opinion of Crisis Group? 

First of all, it should support and prioritize nationwide negotiations on the type of federalism this federal government will implement and insist that the formation of new states adhere to a rulebased process. It should continue to support local and regional 

administrations’ capacity-building, but this must be linked to reconciliation and measures to ensure minority clans are adequately 

represented in those governments. 

Currently it is very difficult for aid agencies to provide development assistance in insecure areas. Yet, it is in these areas where 

assistance can be of the greatest benefit. Congress should consider 

supporting a smaller, high-risk but high-reward fund managed by 

the Office for Transition Initiatives for symbolic projects in Somalia’s periphery. 

Congress should also note that the 2016 elections are not far 

away. They are already behind schedule, and election assistance 

should be quickly funded by donors. 

More attention should also be given to countering radicalization 

in Somalia and the horn. The United States should be giving quiet 

assistance to such programs. 

The U.S. Government should also place much greater emphasis 

on reconciliation, both with armed factions and on a national level 

between clans. It should provide support for local peace and reconciliation conferences that can feed into larger regional conferences. 

It should also provide the new U.N. mission, UNSOM, with all 

the capacity necessary to coordinate assistance effectively, and it 

should insist that the federal government does so effectively as 

well. 

The State Department and DOD should also start working 

with AMISOM to clearly articulate a multiyear exit strategy for 

its intervention in Somalia, and this should be linked with 

incremental support to the creation of a professional, mixed-clan 

national army. 

Last, the United States should convene an international working 

group to help create a transparent mechanism to monitor revenue 

collection in Somalia’s major ports and airports, including an oversight board with a mixed international and Somali composition and 

supported by experts, as was done in Liberia, to ensure that port 

revenue is used to develop all regions in Somalia equitably. 

In conclusion, Somalia remains an extremely weak and fragile 

state. Its security is dependent on external sources. Its sovereignty 

is threatened, and its stability is far from certain. Yet, it is at an 

inflection point where the hope of achieving sustainable progress is 

becoming real if, and only if, the international community works 

together toward that goal and Somalis honestly confront the governance challenges facing their country. 

I thank you and look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hogendoorn follows:] 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. E.J. HOGENDOORN

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Chairman Coons and the other 

members of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs for inviting Crisis Group to testify today on Security and Governance in Somalia. Crisis 

Group has been working on Somalia since 2002, and has produced some 18 in-depth 

reports and briefings on the conflict there and continues to follow events there 

closely from our office in Nairobi, with frequent visits to the country’s various 

regions. 

Crisis Group is an independent, nonpartisan, nongovernmental organization that 

provides field-based analysis, policy advice, and recommendations to governments, 

the United Nations, the European Union, and other multilateral organizations on 

the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. Crisis Group was founded in 1995 

by distinguished diplomats, statesmen, and opinion leaders including Career 

Ambassador, Mort Abramowitz; Nobel Prize winner and former Finnish President, 

Martti Ahtisaari; late Congressman, Stephen Solarz; and former U.N. and British 

diplomat, Mark Malloch-Brown. 

Ambassador Thomas Pickering is our current chairman. Louise Arbour, former 

chief prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and for the 

former Yugoslavia, and past U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, is our current president. In 2011, Crisis Group was awarded the Eisenhower Medal for Leadership and Service. 

Crisis Group publishes some 80 reports and briefing papers annually, as well as 

a monthly CrisisWatch bulletin. Our staff is located on the ground in 10 regional 

offices, and 16 other locations, covering between them over 60 countries and focused 

on conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building. We maintain advocacy and 

research offices in Brussels (our global headquarters), Washington, and New York. 

We have liaison offices in London, Beijing, and Moscow. 

THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Conditions have improved in the last several years. The African Union Mission 

for Somalis (AMISOM), now including Kenya, has with the help of Ethiopia, the 

Somali National Army (SNA), the Sufi Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa, and various clan 

militia allies dealt the armed Islamist fundamentalist group Harakat al-Shabaab 

al-Mujahedeen (Mujahidin Youth Movement), better known as al-Shabaab a serious 

strategic setback by formally ejecting it from Mogadishu, Afgooye, Baidoa, Merca, 

and Kismayo (it still has an underground presence in these cities). This represents 

a huge psychological blow and has deprived the group of major revenue sources. 

Al-Shabaab has also been weakened by internal conflict, and several large and important factions have left the organization. Mogadishu, although it continues to be 

plagued by assassinations and occasionally larger asymmetrical attacks, is more 

secure; resulting in thousands of residents returning, and a torrent of business 

investment in the city’s reconstruction. 

Somalia also has a new, albeit still interim government that is qualitatively better 

than previous administrations. Neither President Hassan Sheikh nor Prime Minister Abdi Shirdoon played major roles in civil war. They appointed a relatively lean 

and technocratic Cabinet. In addition, the new 225-member Parliament is more representative than previous iterations. 

The Somali Federal Government (SFG) also developed a ‘‘Six Pillar’’ strategy that 

focuses on stability, economic recovery, peace-building, international relations, and 

national unity. Optimism led the international community, including the U.S., to 

quickly recognize the new government and in September it pledged some $2.5 billion 

in ‘‘New Deal’’ support that, conditioned on greater transparency and governance 

reforms, will go through the SFG. If allocated efficiently, this money could be a huge 

boon to the country and its people. 

A REALITY CHECK

Despite all its good will, the SFG is still a provisional government, with de facto 

control only over Mogadishu and parts of the South, and dependent on foreign 

troops to keep its enemies at bay. Al-Shabaab is down but not out. It controls, or 

at least is able to operate at will in, huge swaths of south and central Somalia, and 

still able to hit high-profile targets in Mogadishu’s heavily fortified areas, including 

the national courts, the U.N. compound, the Turkish Embassy, and popular gathering places such as the Village restaurant. Somalia also remains an extremely poor 

country, the SFG generates very few of its own resources, and is largely dependent 

on the international community to pay its security forces and begin the difficult and 

very expensive task of rebuilding after nearly 20 years of state collapse. A lot of the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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taxes and fees on trade transiting through ports and airports (the major sources of 

official revenue) is still ‘‘captured’’ by corrupt officials and local clans and businessmen. Furthermore, the international community has pumped hundreds of millions 

of dollars into security sector reform since 2000, with little tangible positive impact 

and arguably exacerbated instability. Security in Mogadishu, and elsewhere, 

remains dependent on AMISOM, and will likely for some time to come. 

Yet AMISOM alone, with some 17,000 troops cannot pacify an area the size of 

New Mexico. The government also cannot stabilize Somalia through military measures alone—it cannot impose a peace—it must recognize its limitations and accept 

that stability is only possible through a nationwide process of negotiation, powersharing with other political forces and improved governance. 

Al-Shabaab also remains a potent threat, as demonstrated by Westgate Mall operation in Nairobi, and high profile attacks in Mogadishu and elsewhere. Ahmed 

Godane appears to have taken firm control of the organization and seems intent on 

regionalizing his operations. Al-Shabaab is a serious regional threat and has links 

to other extremist groups in the Horn and the continent. ‘‘Hard’’ counterterrorist 

measures can only be so good, it will be extremely difficult for regional states, the 

SFG, and AMISOM to protect soft targets from terrorist attacks. 

THE CHALLENGE OF FEDERALISM

Arguably the most intractable issue is the question of federalism. Despite 5 years 

of work, the committee drafting Somalia’s new constitution was unable to reconcile 

different positions on the devolution of power and left many provisions on federalism vague or unaddressed in the provisional constitution that forms the basic 

law of the SFG. Put simplistically, serious disagreements remain between those who 

would like to see Somalia become a strong unitary state—one that can stand up to 

neighbors, such as Ethiopia, that have long meddled in its affairs—and those that 

fear a centralized government would be dominated by a single clan, or group of 

clans—as it was during the Siad Barre era—and would then deny them their fair 

share of resources. This divide also tends to follow clan lines with many Hawiye 

clans, who dominate central and south Somalia and particularly greater Mogadishu, 

supporting a unitary state, while many Darod clans, who dominate Puntland and 

Jubaland, are strong proponents of federalism. 

Agreement on the powers of the federal government need to be thrashed out 

quickly, otherwise Somalia risks embarking on a ‘‘piece-meal’’ approach in the establishment of local administrations and federal states. The SFG quickly ran into trouble on the issue of federalism, exacerbated by ambiguity in the constitution about 

who leads the process of creating states. Instead of building its own legitimacy by 

focusing on the service provision in Mogadishu and other liberated areas, or working 

with de-facto authorities, the SFG forcefully inserted itself into the Jubaland process, in far away Kismayo, southern Somalia, by appointing its own district-level officials (as was allowed by the constitution). The local authorities ignored the SFG 

(and the constitution), convened a conference, and ultimately elected a former alShabaab commander, but now Ethiopian and Kenyan ally, Ahmed Mohamed Islam 

‘‘Madobe’’ in April. Pushed by proponents of a strong central state, the SFG continued ratcheting up the pressure and at one point al-Shabaab militias allowed proSFG forces to move troops and ‘‘technicals’’ through their territory on the way to 

Kismayo. Barre Hiraale, a SFG ally (and a former proxy of Ethiopia) even publicly 

announced that his forces were colocated with al-Shabaab and planning joint operations against Madobe. Several violent clashes followed, and only under concerted 

pressure from Ethiopia, Kenya, and the international community were the two sides 

able to reach a tentative agreement, in Addis Ababa, on the establishment of the 

Jubaland Interim Administration: with Madobe the President for no more than 2 

years and a promise that the SFG would take control of Kismayo port and airport, 

provided the revenues would remain in the region. The agreement was guaranteed 

by Ethiopia as chair of the Intergovernment Authority on Development (IGAD), the 

regional security organization. Somalia’s neighbors thus facilitated the peace, but at 

the same time also are laying the ground for further conflict. 

This week Madobe, beholden to his Ogaden clan, refused to meet the SFG per the 

Addis Ababa Agreement’s terms, and thus seemingly rejected it. Jubaland is very 

much an Ogaden-dominated state, and if the interim administration is not careful 

it will drive alienate minority clans from the region to support al-Shabaab or other 

armed opposition groups. Kenya in particular may then be pulled into supporting 

an increasingly unpopular regional government, which could be further exploited by 

al-Shabaab to characterize its intervention as an ‘‘occupation’’ (much like it did the 

Ethiopian intervention from 2006–2009) and Madobe as a puppet. It must be the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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SFG’s role to represent the interests of minority clans, and not allow dominant clans 

to dictate particular state’s political dispensations. 

REGIONAL POLITICS

The region has significant security interests in Somalia, and immediate neighbors 

Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda all have sizable forces in the country. 

Beyond the Horn, Muslim Somali is very much linked into the Middle East, and 

Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey are very active in the country. 

Despite its size, Djibouti plays a significant role, in large part because much of 

its population is Somali and many Somali businessmen either do business in, or 

have strong ties with businessmen from the country. Djibouti has also hosted several multiyear Somali peace processes and its elite have strong ties to Somali leaders. Its forces are now based in relatively quiet central Somalia. 

Ethiopia has been Somalia’s historic regional rival: disputes over control of the 

Ogaden region, which Somali nationalists consider to be part of ‘‘Greater Somalia’’ 

continue, and led to a brief war (1977–78) and much longer proxy conflict. Calls for 

the annexation of the Ogaden, as well as other parts of greater Somalia, remain 

popular with Somali nationalists, and pandering to this sentiment by the Islamic 

Court Union (ICU) was part of the reason Ethiopia intervened in Somalia in 2006. 

Addis Ababa quickly expelled the ICU from major cities, and then remained to prop 

up the then Transitional Federal Government (TFG). This led to the rise of al-Shabaab, which presented itself as the most effective force fighting Ethiopian ‘‘occupation.’’ It was during this period that the group received its most significant diaspora 

support—not because they shared its ideology, but because they saw al-Shabaab as 

part of a liberation struggle. The intervention cost Ethiopia dearly, and 3 years 

later, Addis quietly relented to the selection of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the 

former chairman of the ICU as the new TFG President. Ethiopia quickly withdrew, 

with AMISOM only slowly replacing it as the force protecting the embattled government. Since then Ethiopia has focused largely on supporting groups that can effectively act as a buffer along its borders, many of whom are resistant to the new central government. This includes Somaliland and Puntland State. 

Ethiopia, promoting its own system of ‘‘ethnic federalism’’ is a strong proponent 

of federalism in Somalia, and has long supported a seemingly logical ‘‘bottom up’’ 

approach of state-building. Many Somalis, however, see this as a ploy to keep their 

country weak and divided, and this very much plays into the hostility of many 

toward international pressure for the SFG to truly devolve power. While overstated, 

Ethiopia is wary of a strong Somali central state, particularly if it is close to countries perceived as hostile by Addis Ababa. 

Kenya is a relatively new entrant in Somalia. Nairobi forcefully intervened in 

2011 to create its own buffer state and facilitate the return of more than 0.5 million 

Somali refugees currently living in the country. Kenya subsequently joined 

AMISOM, but often follows its own interests. In Jubaland, Kenya has thrown its 

support behind Ahmed Madobe, its most effective proxy force leader. Publicly Kenya 

is looking for an exit, but Somalis view this claim with great scepticism. According 

to the U.N. Monitoring Group, Kenyan-Somali politicians and Kenyan military officers are allegedly earning large amounts of money from trade, including illegal charcoal, passing through Kismayo, and more importantly most believe Kenya wants to 

control southern Somalia because it has large oil and natural gas deposits. Al-Shabaab is aggressively trying to turn the local population against the Kenyan ‘‘Christian’’ forces occupiers, and the Westgate Mall attack was an attempt to trigger a 

crackdown to that end. 

Uganda is most removed, but remains the dominant actor in Mogadishu (despite 

the presence of a large Burundian continent) because of the size of its contingent 

and the forceful personality of President Museveni. It contingent is also accused by 

Somalis of profiteering from the war. Previously very active, Museveni lately has 

been distracted by political turmoil in Kampala and has taken a less force role, 

ceding some influence to Ethiopia and Kenya. 

Beyond the regional states, a number of Muslim countries have taken an active 

interest in Somalia. Turkey is perhaps the most prominent country, and to its credit 

played a major role in responding to the latest famine in 2011, and then subsequently has arrogated a substantial role for itself, and its companies, in the reconstruction efforts. Qatar has also played a major role, particularly in its support for 

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his supporters from Damul Jadiid (New 

Blood), a faction of Al-Islaah, the Somali wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. The 

emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood has also increased the interest of Egypt, 

which before Tharir Square had been in major competition with Ethiopia over influence in Somalia. The greater regional interest allows the SFG to play different 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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states off each other, particularly Muslim states against Ethiopia. The influence of 

Damul Jadiid has led Somalia to re-orient somewhat away from IGAD and AU 

toward Middle East. This has complicated Somalia’s relationship with Ethiopia and 

Kenya, and to a degree with the U.N. 

THE ‘‘INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’’: HERDING CATS

Not only is international involvement complicated by numerous bilateral countries 

with individual agendas, but there are also a number of international organizations, 

including the U.N., AU, and IGAD (not to forget, occasionally, the League of Arab 

States, the World Bank, and NATO) active in Somalia with no clear division of 

responsibilities or lead actor. (This sometimes was a problem within the U.N. and 

AMISOM as well, where agencies did not cooperate or contingents did not follow the 

chain of command). They are also joined by a number of special envoys with unclear 

roles vis a vis the international organizations, the missions in Somalia or ambassadors accredited to Mogadishu. 

The greatest problem was, and arguably remains, the overlapping mandates of 

the AU and the U.N. The AU has the military peace enforcement responsibility, but 

by virtue of having been in Mogadishu for the last 4 years and fielding a force of 

over 17,000 troops is a major political actor in Somalia, while the U.N. has a political mandate, but by virtue of security being a huge part of reestablishing stability 

in the country (as well as supply a great deal of support to AMISOM, through 

UNSOA, and the government) was very much involved in security policy and security sector reform. Both missions are also headed by special representatives with no 

clear instructions on how to share responsibilities. This was a particular problem 

for AMISOM and UNPOS, particularly because UNPOS was based in Kenya and 

its senior staff rarely spent much time in Mogadishu. 

It is too early to tell if new United Nations Assistance Mission for Somalia 

(UNSOM), established on 3 June 2012 can succeed where so many others have 

failed. Its mandate includes the provision of policy advice to the SFG and AMISOM 

on peace-building and state-building in the areas of: governance, security sector 

reform and rule of law (including the disengagement of combatants), development 

of a federal system (including preparations for elections in 2016), and coordination 

of international donor support. It is also tasked to help build the SFG’s capacity to 

promote respect for human rights and women’s empowerment, promote child protection, prevent conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, and strengthen justice institutions. To strengthen intra-U.N. coordination, a major problem since 

UNPOS was created in 1995, a post of the Deputy Special Representative of the 

Secretary-General/Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator will be established on 

1 January 2014 and ‘‘structurally integrated into UNSOM.’’ 

Importantly, UNSOM is based in Mogadishu and will be deployed across Somalia, 

as requested by the Federal Government and as conditions permitted—so far it is 

only present in the capital, Garowe, Baidoa and Kismayo (it has not received permission to establish an office in Hargeisa). The Security Council emphasized the 

need for coordination, and UNSOM and AMISOM will work ‘‘on parameters for 

practical partnership on the ground.’’ To date UNSOM is just starting to deploy 

with approximately 50 staff in Mogadishu, whose mobility is severely subscribed 

because of insecurity (the U.N. compound was attacked on 19 June and 1 permanent staff, 3 contractors and 4 guards were killed, along with at least 6 Somali bystanders). It will not be up to full strength until early 2014, depending on the security situation. 

The major role for UNSOM will be coordinating security sector reform and international support. As was noted by the U.N. technical assessment team, ‘‘A common 

and closely coordinated strategy for international security support, which sets out 

clearly the respective responsibilities for the Africa Union, the United Nations, other 

allies, and Somali forces, with clear timelines and appropriate resources is a priority.’’ Security training is now being conducted by Somali forces, the European 

Union Training Mission (EUTM), Turkey, Ethiopia, and Bancroft Global Development, a private company. This is ostensibly coordinated through a UNSOM facilitated and Somali-led steering group. Much work remains to be done. According to 

the last U.N. report, Somali forces continue to face significant logistical challenges 

and ‘‘indiscipline continued to present a challenge, and there were reports of clashes 

within Somali security forces in Baidoa and Buurhakaba, and an increasing number 

of desertions in Bay and Bakool. Furthermore, police continue to face serious capacity gaps and ‘‘international support, including stipends and training continues, but 

lack of coherence undermines its effectiveness.’’ 

Donor coordination will be equally challenging. Encouragingly the SFG has developed the Somali Compact that strives to provide an overarching strategic framework 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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for coordinating political, security and development efforts over the next 3 years. It 

will remain to be seen if the donor community, in its New Deal pledges, will adhere 

to that framework, especially as counterterrorism priorities again rise to the fore 

with the recent Westgate Mall attack. 

THE WESTGATE ATTACK

Much has already been written about the latest al-Shabaab attack in Nairobi. It 

is however important to note that it had long been expected, and it was certainly 

not the first, only the most destructive, with consequently the most media attention. 

Since Kenyan troops went into Somalia, militia groups have launched some 50 

attacks into northeastern Kenya, and a number of grenade attacks in Mombasa and 

Nairobi. Almost all seem to have been aimed at creating a backlash against Kenyan 

Somalis and Muslims, deepening sectarian divisions and driving those populations 

to provide more support to radical Islamist groups. A related goal was to put pressure on Kenya to withdraw its forces from southern Somalia, either because it was 

unwilling to pay the price at home, or because the local population was turning 

against AMISOM. It is therefore important that the Kenyan Government prevent 

a backlash against its Somali and Muslim population, lest it does exactly what 

al-Shabaab was seeking. 

WHAT THE U.S. CAN DO

• Support and prioritize nationwide negotiations on the type federalism the SFG 

will implement. Insist that the formation of new states adheres to a rule-based 

process. 

• Continue to support local and regional administrations’ capacity-building, particularly through the Local Stability Fund proposed by the U.K. at the London 

Conference in 2012, but this must be linked to reconciliation and measures to 

ensure minority clans are adequately represented in those governments. 

• It is very difficult for aid agencies to provide development assistance in insecure 

areas of Somalia, yet it is in these areas where assistance can have the greatest 

marginal benefit, particularly for nascent local administrations. Congress 

should consider supporting a ‘‘venture development fund’’ managed by OTI to 

provide small and quick high risk, but high reward grants for symbolic projects, 

such as medical clinics and boreholes, focused on local governments in Somalia’s 

periphery. Such projects would provide much-needed services and much-needed 

legitimacy to local authorities and a tangible reward for withdrawing support 

from al-Shabaab. This is what many Islamic NGOs are doing in Somalia. 

• The 2016 elections are not so far away. Crucial constitutional commissions, such 

as Boundaries Commission and Independent Constitutional Review Commission, are not yet established. If there are many setbacks, it is quite likely the 

polls will have to be delayed, which will be extremely destabilizing. (The SFG’s 

vision 2016, is already signaling the need for contingency plans if one-personone-vote elections are not possible at that time.) Election assistance should 

already be funded by donors. Thought should also be given to piloting smaller 

municipal elections. 

• More attention should be given to countering radicalization in Somalia and the 

Horn. The U.S. should give quiet assistance to programs that articulate the 

argument that radicalisation is largely driven by a unique set of beliefs alien 

to Somalis and an extremist and literal interpretation of holy texts. 

• Help develop effective, long-term counter- and de-radicalisation strategies for all 

the countries in the Horn of Africa. As Crisis Group noted in ‘‘Kenyan Somali 

Islamist Radicalisation’’ (25 January 2012), a link exists between radicalization 

and terrorism, but counterterrorism tactics aimed only at stopping al-Shabaab 

and other militant groups should not become the only official response. Counterradicalization—reducing the appeal of radicalism—and de-radicalization—persuading people who are already in radical organisations to leave them—are 

long-term processes that require tact and patience. 

• Place much greater emphasis on reconciliation, both with armed factions and 

on a national level between clans. Provide support to local peace and reconciliation conferences that can feed into larger regional conferences only after most 

local disputes have been resolved. These conferences should be completed before 

elections. 

• Provide UNSOM with all the capacity necessary to coordination assistance 

effectively. Insist that the SFG does so effectively as well. 

• Have the State Department and DOD work with AMISOM to clearly articulate 

a multiyear exit strategy for its intervention in Somalia. This should be linked 

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with incremental support to the creation of a professional, mixed-clan national 

army. • Develop a mechanism with AMISOM to coordinate the activities of allied local 

administration security forces. This should run in parallel to negotiations on the 

roles and responsibilities of the regional, state, and federal governments. • Because no one knows how much revenue is generate by individual ports and 

airports, much conflict in Somalia is over assumed revenue flows and the division thereof. As Crisis Group suggested in ‘‘The Kenyan Military Intervention 

in Somalia’’ (15 February 2012), the international community should convene an 

international working group to help create a mechanism to transparently monitor revenue collection Somalia’s major ports and airports, particularly in 

Bossaso, Mogadishu, Merca, and Kismayo, including an oversight board with 

mixed international and Somali composition and supported by experts (forensic 

accountants) and international customs officers, much as was done in Liberia; 

and ensure that the revenue is used to develop all regions in Somalia. 

CONCLUSION

The SFG remains an extremely weak and fragile state, its security dependent on 

external sources, its sovereignty threatened and its stability far from certain. Yet 

it is at an inflection point where the hope of achieving sustainable progress is 

becoming real if, and only if, the international community work together to that goal 

and Somalis honestly confront the governance challenges facing their country. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Dr. Hogendoorn. 

Let me start with your last of many recommendations first and 

work back to the previous. 

First, I will ask of all three of you a question about sort of the 

security situation and the financing of al-Shabaab and what are 

the strategic challenges we face and then, second, about federalism. 

All three of you had some interesting comments about federalism. 

On the first question, my sense is that al-Shabaab has been principally financed through the charcoal trade when they controlled 

Kismayo and parts of the coastline and through the extraction of 

taxes from those communities they control. And the U.N. monitoring group I think recently described how the regional charcoal 

trade helps finance al-Shabaab. 

What should we be doing here forward to ensure that al-Shabaab 

loses the financial support to continue operations, and what do you 

see as the most important next steps to strengthen AMISOM to 

actually carry out its mission of stabilizing the security of the country to make possible a transition to a more broadly, representative, 

inclusive and professionalized Somali national forces? I would be 

interested in all three of your answers to that set of questions. Dr. 

Hogendoorn, Mr. Aynte, Dr. Le Sage, in order please. 

Dr. HOGENDOORN. As I mentioned before, the charcoal trade is 

actually banned by the U.N. Security Council, and I think that the 

United States should do more to force its partners to, in fact, 

adhere to those prohibitions. 

I think that the real challenge with AMISOM is that it has 

essentially reached a point where it can no longer push farther out, 

and either the international community needs to provide more 

resources to AMISOM to increase its troop capacity and improve its 

ability to reach out or more needs to be done on the political side 

to try to stabilize Somalia. 

Senator COONS. Mr. Aynte, thoughts on how we reduce financing 

to al-Shabaab by whatever means. 

Mr. AYNTE. I think the first thing is we need to know exactly 

where the financing of al-Shabaab is coming from. And the conventional belief was that it was mostly coming from the cities that it 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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controlled and the resources it controlled like the Bakaara market 

in Mogadishu and the port. Now that has gone, I think many of 

us are wondering where the financing still seems to be coming 

through. Part of the answer lies with the fact that they still control 

a considerable amount of land in south-central Somalia. So the 

immediate answer to that is an attempt to try to recapture that 

part of the land. 

I do, though, in relation to this, want to emphasize the importance of really creating an indigenous security force. I think that 

is ultimately where the answer lies. It is considerably cheaper than 

the African Union peacekeeping mission, which is necessary and 

needed and has done a remarkable job up until this moment. But 

I think a serious attempt need to be made both by the Somali Government but by the international partners to try and rebuild a professional, inclusive, and competent security sector. 

Senator COONS. What timeline do you think it is possible to 

rebuild a representative, credible, vetted Somali national security 

force? 

Mr. AYNTE. It is certainly going to take a considerable amount 

of time in my view, and I think both the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan are quite instructive to Somalia both in terms of the timeframe that it could take, but also in the kinds of numbers that we 

need. You have hundreds of thousands of forces created and formed 

for Iraq and close to 300,000 for Afghanistan. Somalia has so far 

only 18,000 security services, half of which are probably engaged 

in VIP protection of individuals and installations. So clearly half 

of them are incapacitated from their main task of dealing with 

al-Shabaab. 

Senator COONS. Dr. Le Sage, if you might, for AMISOM to be 

successful, they need—several of you have recommended greater 

force projection capability, both more advanced weapons systems 

and airlift and attack capabilities. If you might comment more both 

on what AMISOM needs to be successful, what we need to do to 

further restrict al-Shabaab’s resources, and then what does the 

transition look like to a credible national Somali security force? 

Dr. LE SAGE. Thank you, Senator. 

Starting with the issue of al-Shabaab’s funding, charcoal, when 

the movement controlled the port city of Kismayo, was the single 

largest foreign currency earner for the group, but it also generated 

revenues by controlling road junctions and levying taxes there, taxing at markets, and extorting money from businesses which otherwise could not operate. 

Now al-Shabaab has lost control of Kismayo, but it remains very 

close by. So it can tax the charcoal trade at the source of production, rather than at the source of onward distribution. And in this 

sense, their control of the town of Barawe in Lower Shabelle really 

is critical. This affords them the opportunity to impact any trade 

that is coming from Mogadishu to Kismayo and tax it and also to 

still make revenue off of the charcoal business. So in that sense, 

more aggressive operations to actually dislodge al-Shabaab from 

Barawe and other key towns are really going to be the best and 

fastest way of degrading their revenue-earning ability and sustaining the movement in that sense. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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It is absolutely true that AMISOM needs force multipliers, needs 

helicopters, needs additional transport, and potentially additional 

soldiers in order to undertake those movements. Right now, 

AMISOM forces are limited to the same number that they had 

when they only controlled the city of Mogadishu but they are 

spread out in multiple locations, Afgooye, Jowhar, Baidoa, many 

other cities. So they are stuck using that limited number of forces 

in a static security role. 

The fastest way for them to actually free up those forces and be 

able to deploy them in an offensive operation would be if the 

Somali Federal Government worked with local administrations to 

actually craft consensual governance in the area. Local forces, 

particularly the Somali National Army or other militia forces, provide local security, and then let AMISOM take the fight toward 

al-Shabaab and other spoilers of the peace process. 

Senator COONS. One question of all three of you on federalism. 

There seems to be a real tension between a desire for a strong 

national government to be able to resist intrusion from Ethiopia, 

from Kenya sort of meddling by outside forces, one perception goes. 

On the other hand, there is a suspicion of a strong federal or 

national government because of experiences under the Siad Barre 

government, because of the strength of clans, and because of the 

very different cultural and political traditions across the country. 

Managing these with a constitution that in its current form has 

significant internal contradictions around what the federal structure should look like is quite difficult. It is very different from our 

own Articles of Confederation period, but there are some striking 

similarities in that moving toward a healthy and functioning 

national government for purposes of security, taxation, control of 

ports, control of trade is necessary, but there are significant internal concerns that mitigate against a strong unitary federal government. 

What role should the U.S. Government be playing in advancing 

a federal structure, and did our dual track policy actually hurt that 

process? And what do you recommend for U.S. policy with regards 

to federalism and implementation going forward, if you could in 

order, Dr. Le Sage, Mr. Aynte, and Dr. Hogendoorn? 

Dr. LE SAGE. Thank you, Senator. 

The fact is that the Somali Federal Government right now is a 

key actor. It is the key actor going forward in making decisions for 

the establishment of a true federal system that actually provides 

some degree of convergence between the local actors in major towns 

across Somalia’s regions and the central government. But the 

Somali Federal Government is currently only one actor on the 

scene. If we are talking about the locations where Kenya, Ethiopia, 

other AMISOM forces are operating, if we are talking about 

those places where we need to fight al-Shabaab, there are other 

actors of concern. This is the Jubaland authority, the interim 

Juba authority that has been established in Kismayo. This is 

Rahanweyn clan forces that are based in Baidoa working very 

closely with Ethiopia. It is the autonomous regional administration 

of Puntland and also the self-declared independent state of 

Somaliland. In addition, there are many other local administrations loyal to the Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa movements or other 

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smaller, sub-clan-based administrations. These are actually facts 

on the ground. 

There has been a great deal of concern that the United States 

dual track approach was going to reinforce these and in some way 

dismember Somalia and it was going to make it a weaker country. 

The fact is 20-odd years of civil war have decentralized Somalia 

radically and made it a remarkably weak country. The dual track 

approach allowed the United States to engage both at the capital 

level and at that local administration regional level at the same 

time to promote an agenda of convergence. 

Maybe the language needs to be changed at this point in time, 

but that ability to support both levels simultaneously is what is 

ultimately required to promote these power-sharing and resourcesharing deals internally within a town like Baidoa, but then 

between that town and the central government. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Mr. AYNTE. Senator, that is a good question. 

I think it is important to highlight that Somali people, wherever 

they are in Somalia today, do want some sort of a federal structure. 

It is just unclear in their mind. We are actually engaged in a 

research at the moment looking at this, and what we found are 

that there are universal demands for basic things in the debate on 

federalism. Every Somali wants to elect his or her local and 

national leaders. Secondly, they want to get government services 

closer to where they are. Thirdly, they want to see an equitable 

sharing of natural resources, and fourthly, they would like to see 

constitutional guarantees against government intrusion upon their 

individual and group rights. 

We believe these are the four issues that can help and push forward the debate and the framework for federalism in Somalia. 

What could the U.S. Government do? 

I think the first thing is really the building and formations of the 

commissions that I talked about, the Independent Commission to 

Review the Constitution, the Boundaries and Federation Commission, and ultimately the Inter-State Commission. I think what 

these three commissions can then do with expertise from the 

United States and institutions that are capable is to lead a 

national dialogue. At the moment, there is virtually no dialogue 

about federalism at the national level. You know, politicians are 

talking to each other and mostly to advance a group or individual 

interests. 

But I think what needs to happen is a national understanding 

of the options of federalism. When we interviewed people across the 

country about if they understood options on federalism and confederation and decentralized unitary state and devolution of power 

and all of these options, most people did not really understand 

what these options are. So I think a civic education process is 

really needed. But that needs to happen alongside the commissions. 

The third step that the United States could help with is the 

finalization of the provisional constitution, which again is deeply 

ambiguous, contradictory in many ways. 

So I think these three steps could be a strong starting point. Of 

course, it is unrealistic to expect that we will have a clearer picture 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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3 years from now, but I think we could be at a strong position 3 

years from now. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Aynte. 

Dr. Hogendoorn. 

Dr. HOGENDOORN. Well, as we know, here in the United States, 

federalism remains an extremely contentious issue—even in these 

hallowed halls. 

I would agree with Andre Le Sage and Abdi Aynte that perhaps 

we need to recast the dual track approach as perhaps the parallel 

approach. 

But I think the important point is that the money cannot go to 

Mogadishu alone. If it goes to Mogadishu, it stays in Mogadishu as 

it is currently mostly. All the progress that we are seeing in Somalia is largely in Mogadishu and it is because all the resources that 

are being pledged to the country are largely staying in the capital. 

That is to some degree understandable. I think when the federal 

government is trying to do things, it is easier to do stuff in the capital than it would be to do in places far away, especially when they 

do not have formal links with these kinds of local administrations 

or they are in very hostile relationships with them as they have 

been with Jubaland. 

I think the important point that people need to recognize is that 

al-Shabaab benefits from these disagreements and it benefits from 

these tensions. And one of the biggest problems is that while 

Jubaland is somewhat more stable and it is arguably less of a safe 

haven for al-Shabaab, the fact that Jubaland is being dominated by 

a single clan allows al-Shabaab to recruit from minority clans who 

feel that they are not being adequately represented by those local 

administrations. And to some degree, al-Shabaab is waiting that 

game in other areas as well, waiting to see those political tensions 

come to the fore and using that as an effective recruiting tool to 

rebuild its ranks. 

Thank you. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. Thank you for your answers to that 

question. 

Senator Flake, thank you for your patience. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. No problem. Those were a lot of the 

questions I had particularly on federalism. 

Mr. Aynte, you kind of addressed it just now in your remarks. 

The provisional constitution is a deeply flawed document and contradicts itself. You were referring mostly to the federalism aspects 

of that? 

Mr. AYNTE. Senator, it is all across, but the federalism is the 

most important element where it really contradicts and puts future 

federal member states on a collision course with the federal government in that it gives—the division of power between the periphery 

and the center is not clear in the document as it stands at the moment. But it is only provisional and it can be improved. 

Senator FLAKE. You mentioned four things that you think are 

expected of people, what they expect out of a central government. 

Do those apply to the folks in Somaliland and Puntland as well? 

It sounds to me as if, speaking with some of their representatives, 

they do not want to share in the country’s resources. They have 

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their own. They want nothing to do with the rest of the country. 

Am I off base there or is that their assessment? 

Mr. AYNTE. Senator, I think Somaliland and Puntland are 

slightly different. 

I think Somaliland is seeking an outright secession from Somalia 

for the last 20 years. It has done a remarkable job of stabilizing 

itself, having a self-rule, and really laying the foundation for democratic institutions and democratic processes, of course, with some 

flaws. 

Puntland is not seeking secession from the rest of the country, 

but it does—like other regions in Somalia, although in theory, it is 

under the federal government, in practice it is very much like 

Somaliland, carrying out its business entirely independently from 

the federal government. Again, this is because of the vacuum that 

exists with the federal government. 

I do, though, think that if a concerted effort is made to clarify 

the constitution and begin this national dialogue on federalism, I 

think there is a real opportunity for engagement with Puntland 

and with other emerging and existing federal member states. 

Senator FLAKE. The last panel was talking about the government 

there and at one point referred to it as a democratically elected 

government. It is not quite that simple. How is it viewed in the 

rest of the country? 

I know going back to—what was it—1998 or so with the first 

attempt to appoint traditional elders who would appoint a constituent assembly of some type or the last kind of iteration of this 

experience, and it did not take hold. What makes this different 

here? Why is this government going to be viewed as anything different than the last attempt, Mr. Hogendoorn? Or is it? 

Dr. HOGENDOORN. Well, I mean, I would agree with everyone or 

most observers that there were very significant flaws with this 

election process. That said, I think that there was a greater 

attempt to ensure that at least the majority of the elders who were 

at this constituent assembly—who then picked the Parliament; who 

then selected the President—were at least somewhat more representative than they had been in the past. It certainly was not a 

perfect process. There were lots of allegations of vote buying, of 

vote rigging, of extortion, and so on and so forth. 

I think people focus mostly on the fact that the Prime Minister 

and the President who were selected—or at least the President who 

was elected and then the Prime Minister who was selected were 

both notably not involved in the civil war in any major way. And 

so this was kind of seen as a bit of a break from the past. And to 

be perfectly honest, the President especially was someone who 

came from civil society who we had worked with in the past, who 

many of us had worked with in the past and were quite excited 

about that possibility. That certainly does not mean that the government is perfect, but we certainly see it as an improvement on 

past regimes. 

Senator FLAKE. How realistic is the 2016 timeframe for elections? 

We seem to have backed a horse now with this government. If it 

does not take place, what is our position? What do we do? Mr. 

Aynte, do you have thoughts there? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

54 

Mr. AYNTE. Well, as I said, I think elections are not impossible 

but highly improbable to take place in 2016, as we understand elections. We might be looking at another ‘‘selectocracy’’ as the 2012 

was called by some people. It could be that we might have elections 

in parts that are a little more stable than others. But considering 

the slow pace of progress in the last year and the work that needs 

to be done, I would be pleasantly surprised if elections take place 

in 2016. 

What are the options after that? Well, I think it will depend on 

what the stakeholders in Somalia want to do, the way forward. Of 

course, not many people are looking forward to the idea of extension. The ‘‘E’’ word is now seen as—you know, no one wants to hear 

that. But I think there has to be some sort of a selection process 

that then brings the country to the next level. 

I should finally say, though, that the reason why this government is possibly seen as a little bit more hopeful than the previous 

ones is people are seeing this as one step toward the greater goal 

of consolidating the gains that have been made over the years, so 

part of an incremental process. 

Senator FLAKE. Mr. Le Sage, with regard to the failed raid last 

week, the last panel did want to go there. What are the implications for the future? Does this embolden the elements we do not 

want to embolden? What happens? What are the practical effects 

of this? And did it surprise you that, one, we launched the raid 

and, two, it ended as it did? 

Dr. LE SAGE. I think the most important recent development in 

terms of strengthening al-Shabaab and exacerbating the threat 

that the movement poses to the region is the Westgate attack. And 

we should not let the sensationalism, frankly, of the events over 

the weekend overshadow that tragedy and the precedent that that 

attack set for jihadists both within the East Africa region but 

potentially on a global scale not to undertake a suicide bombing 

operation that is highly complicated, but to launch a commando 

raid against civilian targets and kill such a large number of people 

in a small time. 

I do believe that this has sent a signal to al-Qaeda senior leadership from Ahmed Abdi Godane. Whether or not he was the actual 

author of this operation, it sent a signal that al-Shabaab is an 

al-Qaeda affiliate that needs to be taken very seriously and that 

his leadership at this point is not in question, that they can launch 

these sorts of attacks. 

And so preventing their affiliates, preventing their external operations group and the larger national insurgency movement that 

gives space for those extremists to operate, preventing them from 

continuing to hold such space in Somalia is really the critical element here. Something like the operation that is reported to have 

taken place in Barawe targeting a specific individual, al-Shabaab 

leader, or leader connected to al-Shabaab—that could do some temporary damage to the group, set back an immediate operational 

plan. But only by removing this group’s safe havens and establishing a functioning national federal government that can actually 

address many of the clan tensions and undermine clan support and 

religious support for extremist splinter movements, that is going to 

be the only way to actually reduce the threat longer term. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

55 

Senator FLAKE. Well, thank you. My time is out. I appreciate it. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Flake, for your engagement 

and your interest. 

I have many more questions I would like to ask. Given the lateness of the hour, I may ask just one or two more briefly, if I might. 

Dr. Le Sage, that last line of questioning suggests that we now 

face some time pressure to support an expansion of AMISOM, both 

its operational reach, its numeric strength, but that we are, at the 

same time, running against a clock to transition to a legitimate 

Somali security force because the longer security across the country 

is made possible by an external multinational force that is nonSomali, the more that creates the opportunity for recruitment and 

for al-Shabaab to simply cast this as an occupation army rather 

than a liberation force. 

Would you agree with that? What do you think is the amount 

of time we actually have, and how pressing is this for regional 

security? 

Dr. LE SAGE. Senator, given the length of time it is going to take 

to build up a professional and self-sustaining Somali national security force, including its army component, its intelligence component, and its policing component, it is urgent that we begin work 

on this today. At the same time, I think it is going to be urgent 

for the next several years, at least 5, to continue very significant 

support for the African Union mission in Somalia until the Somali 

national army forces actually come on line and can take over some 

of the static security positions that AMISOM currently holds. 

If AMISOM was to leave today, the Somali Federal Government 

would very likely fall very quickly, and that is because the Somali 

National Army today is an amalgamation of different clan militias 

that used to report to warlords. And if you go in and look at the 

various brigades in Mogadishu that make up the Somali National 

Army today, it is pretty quick to identify which warlord and which 

militia faction they used to belong to. Their level of national loyalty, their interoperability between various subclans just in the city 

of Mogadishu is remarkably low. 

And frankly, the Somali National Army that is being funded by 

the United States and European partners in Mogadishu is primarily crafted from one clan, the Hawiye clan, to the concern of all 

other clans in the regions across south-central Somalia, Puntland, 

and Somaliland. For this reason, we actually need very quickly to 

expand Somali National Army recruitment, take the clan militias 

from those other areas that either are a part of independent 

administrations or proxy forces for Ethiopia and Kenya and use 

salary payments, frankly, to integrate them into a national force, 

over time train them, equip them, and develop something professional. But that is going to take several years. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

If I might, Mr. Aynte, the issue of remittances, which you mentioned in passing, has been a real concern of mine. Describe, if you 

would, briefly the role of remittances from the United States and 

from Europe and how the Somali economy and the growing sort of 

capacity in Mogadishu and nationally would be affected if the 

mechanisms for transferring remittances were to be blocked? And 

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56 

what do you think we can and should do to try and sustain a pathway for legitimate, vetted remittances? 

Mr. AYNTE. Senator, the scale of remittances to Somalia is larger 

than all international aid combined annually. It is about $1.5 billion a year coming from the Somali diaspora in the United States, 

Europe, Australia, and the Middle East and Africa. There are 

about 2 million Somalis scattered around the world sending money 

back to their relatives. So it is essentially the most important lifeline the Somali people have. I think the banks and other financial 

institutions have legitimate concerns about the rules and regulations both here in the United States but also in the United Kingdom where now Barclays Bank is blocking, or it is about to block, 

remittance companies to open bank accounts within Barclays. I 

think what the U.S. Government can do is to work with partners, 

particularly with the United Kingdom, to try and create a framework whereby the remittance companies can continue to send 

remittances legally to the Somali people. 

The alternative now is, if Barclays goes ahead with its now 

promise to shut down on the Hawale companies in the U.K.—the 

alternative is that many people will go underground, and our ability to see the activities of money transfer from the West to Somalia 

will even become more constrained. So I think this is an urgent 

matter, one that has serious implications, both humanitarian, but 

as well as security both here for the United States but also for the 

Somali people. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Dr. Hogendoorn, last question from me. The previous panel spoke 

some about the model of an African-led indirect action by the 

United States, financing an African-led multilateral force as being 

a possible role model for multilateral action for regional security. 

If we are at this sort of point of inflection where AMISOM either 

succeeds or fails and if actions like the attack in Nairobi put significant pressure on regional partners like Uganda, Kenya, 

Djibouti, Ethiopia, how vital is it for our interests on the continent 

and globally, how vital is it for Somalia’s future that AMISOM succeed and that the regional partners continue to get bilateral support from the United States to stay engaged in this fight and to not 

withdraw? 

Dr. HOGENDOORN. Well, as I mentioned in my testimony, I 

believe, as Dr. Andre Le Sage mentioned, that absent AMISOM, it 

is quite likely that the Somali National Government would collapse. And I think that AMISOM has done a remarkable job over 

the last 3 or 4 years to push al-Shabaab back at enormous cost in 

blood and treasure to the troop-contributing countries. 

I think the largest challenge really, to some degree, is that while 

this has been a very effective military operation, the African Union 

at the moment still lacks the capacity to make this both an integrated political and military operation, which is why we have created this unwieldy hybrid between the United Nations, which has 

a political mandate, and the AU, which has a military mandate. 

And it has always been very, very difficult to try to meld those two 

organizations together since they have different cultures, they 

oftentimes have different leaders who sometimes do not get alone. 

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Currently the U.N. has transitioned to a new mission with a new 

special representative for the Secretary General. That mission was 

just established in June. So it is very early for us to be able to see 

how that will work. He does have instructions from the U.N. Security Council to cooperate with the AU. Those instructions are not 

very clear, as I mentioned in my testimony. And I think it remains 

a work in progress. And unfortunately, as I think all of my colleagues would agree, ultimately the solution in Somalia needs to be 

a political one and AMISOM needs to work within a political 

framework to achieve that goal, and kind of melding those two 

organizations and have them working toward the same goal has 

and will continue to be a challenge. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Senator Flake, any further questions? 

Senator FLAKE. Just one question. 

Mr. Aynte, with regard to the diaspora, it is very involved, obviously, with $1.5 billion a year in terms of remittances. What is the 

feeling in the diaspora generally about the national government 

and the situation there? Can you give some sense of the feeling? 

Mr. AYNTE. Well, you know, I used to be part of the diaspora myself, but now I am back home. 

Senator FLAKE. I know it is not monolithic. I am not trying to 

suggest that, but give me some sense of—— 

Mr. AYNTE. Well, I think like most people in Somalia, the diaspora have welcomed the inauguration of this government in 2012 

in huge numbers. I think a year into it, many people have realized 

that they probably had little higher expectations than realistic and 

are understandably disappointed with the low progress that has 

happened over the past year. But I think many Somalis continue 

to be optimistic and, more importantly, engaging what is going on 

in Somalia both not only in sending remittances but actually the 

diaspora do dominate the political structures across the country 

from Somaliland to Puntland to the federal government where as 

many as 50 percent of the entire Parliament is actually made up 

of diaspora. And something like 60 or 70 percent of the cabinet, 

any given cabinet, is diaspora. So the diaspora are vital to what is 

happening politically and socially and economically and what is 

going on and are engaged and sometimes are holding the government accountable to its national vision. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Flake. 

Thank you to our witnesses today from the first and second 

panel. I will remind all of us where we began, which was the 

impact of the Government shutdown on the capacity of different 

agencies and departments within the United States to continue to 

carry out our development, our diplomacy, our intelligence, and our 

security missions. And I am grateful that all of our witnesses were 

able to come and testify today, and I would appreciate Senator 

Flake’s cooperation in carrying forward this hearing, which I do 

think is an important part of our ongoing discussion about our role 

in Somalia and the region and the world. 

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I will keep the hearing record open until Friday of this week, 

October 11, so that members of the committee who were not able 

to join us today might submit written questions for the record. 

And with that, this hearing is hereby adjourned. 

[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned.] 

Æ 

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