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EPA Has Not Implemented 

Adequate Management 

Procedures to Address

Potential Fraudulent 

Environmental Data 

Report No. 14-P-0270 May 29, 2014

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Report Contributors: Laurie Adams

Jerri Dorsey

Jeffrey Harris

Jee W. Kim

Calvin Lin

Denton Stafford

Patricia Brooks Taylor

Abbreviations

CIO Chief Information Officer

CLP Contract Laboratory Program

EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

OCEFT Office of Criminal Enforcement, Forensics and Training

OECA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance

OEI Office of Environmental Information

OI Office of Investigations

OIG Office of Inspector General

OSWER Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response

Cover photo: EPA photo of a laboratory.

Hotline Suggestions for Audits or Evaluations

To report fraud, waste or abuse, contact us 

through one of the following methods:

To make suggestions for audits or evaluations, 

contact us through one of the following methods:

email:

phone:

fax:

online:

write:

OIG_Hotline@epa.gov

1-888-546-8740

1-202-566-2599

http://www.epa.gov/oig/hotline.htm

EPA Inspector General Hotline 

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Mailcode 2431T

Washington, DC 20460

email:

phone:

fax:

online:

write:

OIG_WEBCOMMENTS@epa.gov

1-202-566-2391

1-202-566-2599

http://www.epa.gov/oig/contact.html#Full_Info

EPA Inspector General 

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Mailcode 2410T

Washington, DC 20460
 

 14-P-0270

May 29, 2014

Why We Did This Review

The purpose of this review was 

to determine the use of 

procedures by the 

U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA), other federal 

agencies and states to manage 

the communication of and 

appropriate action on

laboratory data determined to 

be fraudulent. We refer to this

as a due diligence process. 

The EPA relies on external 

laboratories to provide 

environmental testing data and 

results. Intentionally falsified or 

fraudulent data can impact the 

public’s trust in the EPA and 

could have serious implications 

for protecting human health 

and the environment from 

hazardous or toxic substances.

The report addresses the

following EPA goals or

cross-cutting strategies:

 Cleaning up communities 

and advancing sustainable 

development.

 Addressing climate change 

and improving air quality.

 Protecting America’s 

waters.

For further information, 

contact our public affairs office 

at (202) 566-2391.

The full report is at:

www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2014/ 

20140529-14-P-0270.pdf

 

EPA Has Not Implemented Adequate 

Management Procedures to Address

Potential Fraudulent Environmental Data

 What We Found

The EPA lacks a due diligence process for 

potential fraudulent environmental data. The 

agency has three policies and procedures

that address how to respond to instances of 

fraudulent data, but they are all out of date or 

unimplemented. Our survey of EPA regional 

offices disclosed that a majority of 

respondents were unaware there was a 

policy, and approximately 50 percent expressed the need for such policies and 

procedures. The EPA plans to issue revised policy by fiscal year 2017. Until then, 

unimplemented and out-of-date policies and procedures—and lack of EPA staff 

awareness of those policies that do exist—create risk that EPA staff will fail to 

properly communicate the information regarding fraudulent data to appropriate 

program offices and data users; review and analyze the data for potential impacts 

to human health and the environment; or review and amend, if possible, past 

environmental decisions that were based on fraudulent data. According to staff of 

the federal agencies and states we contacted in this evaluation, they also do not 

have formal, written due diligence processes.

Further, the EPA does not consistently notify the states when laboratory due 

diligence activities can begin during or following a fraud investigation that affects 

state environmental programs. The agency does not have a policy on 

communicating case information with the states and other regulating parties 

during investigations, due to the sensitive nature of investigations which could be 

jeopardized, and because rights of innocents could be threatened and suspects 

could be unfairly maligned in an ongoing fraud investigation. As a result, 

laboratory fraud cases may not include a due diligence review. In such cases, 

potentially negative impacts to human health and the environment due to 

fraudulent lab data could go undetected.

 Recommendations and Planned Corrective Actions

We recommend that the agency incorporate a process to respond to instances of

fraudulent data into its current policy until the revised policy is issued. We also 

recommend that the agency state the details of a laboratory fraud due diligence 

process in its new policy. Further, we recommend that the agency develop 

guidelines outlining the response when fraudulent laboratory data is discovered 

in ongoing criminal investigations. We recommend training on laboratory fraud 

due diligence processes and procedures for all relevant staff. The EPA agreed 

with our recommendations and we agreed with the EPA’s proposed corrective 

actions.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Office of Inspector General

At a Glance

The EPA is not ensuring that 

fraudulent laboratory 

environmental data is being 

communicated to appropriate 

program offices and data 

users, reviewed, and analyzed 

for its impact on human health 

and the environment.
May 29, 2014

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: EPA Has Not Implemented Adequate Management Procedures to Address

Potential Fraudulent Environmental Data 

Report No. 14-P-0270

FROM: Arthur A. Elkins Jr.

TO: Renee P. Wynn, Acting Assistant Administrator and Chief Information Officer

Office of Environmental Information

Cynthia Giles, Assistant Administrator

Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance

Mathy Stanislaus, Assistant Administrator

Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response

This is a report on the subject evaluation conducted by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This report contains findings that describe the problems 

the OIG has identified and corrective actions the OIG recommends. This report represents the opinion of 

the OIG and does not necessarily represent the final EPA position. Final determinations on matters in 

this report will be made by EPA managers in accordance with established audit resolution procedures. 

The EPA offices having primary responsibility for the issues evaluated in this report are the Office of 

Environmental Informations’ Quality Staff office; the Office of Enforcement and Compliance 

Assurance’s Office of Criminal Enforcement, Forensics, and Training; and the Office of Solid Waste 

and Emergency Response’s Office of Superfund Remediation and Technology Innovation. 

Action Required 

You are not required to provide a written response to this final report because you provided agreed-to 

corrective actions and planned completion dates for the report recommendations. The OIG may make 

periodic inquiries on your progress in implementing these corrective actions. Should you choose to 

provide a final response, we will post your response on the OIG’s public website, along with our 

memorandum commenting on your response. You should provide your response as an Adobe PDF file 

that complies with the accessibility requirements of Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as 

amended. 

We will post this report to our website at http://www.epa.gov/oig. 

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460

THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please contact Carolyn Copper, 

Assistant Inspector General for Program Evaluation, at (202) 566-0829 or copper.carolyn@epa.gov; 

or Jeffrey Harris, Director for Toxics, Chemical Management, and Pollution Prevention Evaluations,

at (202) 566-0831 or harris.jeffrey@epa.gov. 
EPA Has Not Implemented Adequate Management 14-P-0270

Procedures to Address Potential Fraudulent Environmental Data

Table of Contents

Purpose...................................................................................................................... 1

Background ............................................................................................................... 1

Responsible Offices.................................................................................................. 2

Prior Reports ............................................................................................................. 2

Scope and Methodology........................................................................................... 3

Results of Review ..................................................................................................... 4

EPA’s Existing Laboratory Fraud Due Diligence Policies or 

 Guidance Are Outdated or Unimplemented .............................................. 4

EPA Lacks Policy for Notifying the States When Due Diligence 

 Can Begin as a Result of Laboratory Fraud Investigations........................ 6

Conclusions............................................................................................................... 6

Recommendations .................................................................................................... 7

Agency Comments and OIG Evaluation .................................................................. 8

Status of Recommendations and Potential Monetary Benefits ............................. 9

Appendices

A Agency Response to Draft Report and OIG Comment................................... 10

B Distribution ....................................................................................................... 16
14-P-0270 1

Purpose

The purpose of this report was to determine the use of procedures by the 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), other federal agencies and states to 

manage the communication of and appropriate action on laboratory data 

determined to be fraudulent. 

Background

The EPA relies on external laboratories to provide environmental testing data and 

results. Fraudulent practices in environmental testing laboratories can have serious 

consequences. For example, Intertek Testing Services was fined $9 million for 

falsifying test results of environmental tests. Intertek conducted environmental 

sample analysis, primarily as a subcontractor, for environmental consulting firms 

and federal, state and local governments nationwide. The tests were used for 

decision making at Superfund and hazardous waste sites to determine site safety 

and to monitor the migration of hazardous wastes, including cancer-causing 

petrochemicals. Intertek billed for $35.7 million in tests between 1994 and 1997. 

During that time, the laboratory handled as many as 250,000 environmental 

samples from 59,000 polluted sites across the country. Falsifying test results 

related to potential routes of human exposure can create risk of serious medical 

problems, including increased risk of cancer.

The EPA defines laboratory fraud as “the deliberate falsification of analytical and 

quality assurance results.” A number of laboratory practices may constitute fraud, 

including:

 Fabricating data.

 Intentionally calibrating equipment using other than accepted procedures.

 Modifying samples to alter characteristics.

 Manipulating analytical results.

 Substituting samples, files or data.

The consequences and impacts of fraudulent data for the EPA can include: 

(1) a decline in public confidence in the EPA, (2) consumption of the EPA’s 

limited government resources by revisiting decisions made based on fraudulent 

data and determining appropriate corrective action, and (3) delays in executing 

response actions or cleanups while laboratory data is reviewed. From an 

environmental and human health protection perspective, the most serious 

consequence of laboratory fraud is the possibility that false negatives were 

reported. A false negative occurs when a laboratory reports that certain potentially 

hazardous compounds were not present when they were present.
14-P-0270 2

Responsible Offices

The EPA’s Office of Environmental Information (OEI) manages the agency’s 

Quality Management Program. This is the EPA program to ensure quality data 

and provide management controls to guard against the use of poor or low quality 

data in EPA decisions. This program develops agencywide policies, procedures 

and tools for quality-related activities involving the collection and use of 

environmental information. OEI also oversees the implementation of quality 

systems by the agency. 

The two organizations responsible for investigating laboratory fraud cases within 

the EPA are the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance’s (OECA’s) 

Office of Criminal Enforcement, Forensics, and Training (OCEFT) and the Office 

of Inspector General’s (OIG’s) Office of Investigations (OI).1 OCEFT

investigates criminal violations of the EPA’s pollution control requirements. OIG

Special Agents conduct investigations of allegations of fraud, waste and abuse by 

EPA employees or recipients of federal funds or other benefits related to the 

EPA’s programs. 

The EPA’s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER), through 

its Office of Superfund Remediation and Technology Innovation, manages and 

supports the Contract Laboratory Program (CLP). The CLP is a national network 

of EPA personnel, commercial laboratories and support contractors whose 

fundamental mission is to provide data of known and documented quality. The 

CLP supports the EPA’s Superfund program.

Prior Reports

EPA OIG Report No. 2006-P-00036, Promising Techniques Identified to Improve 

Drinking Water Laboratory Integrity and Reduce Public Health Risks, issued 

September 21, 2006, found that in situations where inappropriate or fraudulent 

procedures were detected, the EPA lacked standardized methods and guidance on 

how the affected data would be handled. The report concluded that while OEI had

developed training to deter and detect improper laboratory practices, fraud 

detection and reporting were outside the scope of the existing Quality System 

Policy. The report recommended that OEI develop agencywide policy on how data 

originating from laboratories under investigation, indictment and/or conviction 

would be handled. The agency agreed with our recommendation and issued the 

Chief Information Officer (CIO) 2106 Quality Policy and Procedure2in 2008.

 

1 A Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2006 by OECA and OIG which identifies and defines each 

office’s respective areas of investigative responsibilities.

2 OEI issued CIO 2106.0, Quality Policy, and its supporting CIO 2106-P-01.0, Procedure for Quality Policy. 
14-P-0270 3

Scope and Methodology

We performed our evaluation from August 2012 to February 2014 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require 

that we plan and perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient and appropriate 

evidence. Further, this evidence must provide a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions. The evidence obtained during this evaluation provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our objective.

To address our objective, we reviewed and analyzed relevant agency policy, 

procedure and guidance documents. We interviewed program directors and staff 

from OEI; OCEFT; OSWER; and the OIG’s OI. We also interviewed former 

members of OECA’s laboratory fraud workgroup and a retired OEI Director. 

Further, we interviewed quality control managers from EPA Regions 2, 9 and 10.

We reviewed laboratory fraud cases from both the OIG’s OI and OECA’s OCEFT. 

We selected a sample of OCEFT and OI cases closed during the last 5 years that 

involved laboratories and data associated with EPA programs delegated to the 

states and a municipality. For each case, we reviewed the investigative 

documentation provided by OCEFT and OI and then interviewed related 

individuals to obtain insight into any follow-up actions associated with the case. 

The states we contacted in the case reviews included Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, 

Indiana, Michigan, Oregon, and Washington. We also contacted the municipality of

New York City. 

We surveyed all 10 EPA regions to request information on any follow-up or due 

diligence activities the offices take upon discovering fraudulent laboratory data. 

Where needed, we conducted follow-up interviews based on survey responses.

For comparative purposes and possible best practices, we also reviewed guidance, 

policies and procedures used by other federal agencies for any follow-up or due 

diligence activities the agencies take upon discovering fraudulent laboratory data.

We interviewed staff from the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration;

U.S. Department of Agriculture; U.S. Department of Energy; U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development; 

and the U.S. Department of Defense’ Army Corps of Engineers, Naval Sea Systems 

Command and Air Force Civil Engineer Center.

Throughout this report we refer to the laboratory fraud due diligence process. For 

the purposes of this evaluation, we define a laboratory fraud due diligence process 

as including all of the following elements: (1) the communication of laboratory 

fraud information between enforcement and program offices and data users, (2) the 

review and/or assessment of fraudulent laboratory data to determine its impact on 

human health and the environment, and (3) the review and/or amendment of past 

environmental decisions predicated on fraudulent laboratory data.
14-P-0270 4

Results of Review

The EPA lacks a due diligence process for potential fraudulent environmental 

data. Although the EPA has three instruments that address how to respond to 

instances of fraudulent data,

3

each instrument is out of date or unimplemented. 

Our survey of EPA regional staff on their knowledge and use of the EPA’s 

fraudulent data policies and procedures found that a majority of respondents were 

unaware there was a policy, and approximately 50 percent expressed the need for 

such policies and procedures. The EPA plans to issue revised policy by fiscal year 

2017. Until then, unimplemented and out-of-date policies and guidance—as well 

as a lack of EPA staff awareness of those policies that do exist—create risk that 

EPA staff will fail to communicate the information regarding fraudulent data to 

appropriate program offices and data users; review and analyze the data for 

potential impacts to human health and the environment; or review and amend, if 

necessary, past environmental decisions that were based on fraudulent data.

The federal agencies and states we contacted in this evaluation also do not have 

formal due diligence processes, according to their representative staff. Most of the 

federal agencies and states we contacted described quality assurance programs; 

however, the agencies and states did not have written policies or procedures for 

due diligence after the determination of fraudulent laboratory data. The states 

generally conducted laboratory fraud due diligence using a case-by-case (ad-hoc) 

approach.

Further, the EPA does not consistently notify states when laboratory due diligence 

activities can begin during or following a fraud investigation that affects state 

environmental programs. The agency does not have a policy on communicating 

case information with the states and other regulating parties during investigations, 

due to the sensitive nature of investigations which could be jeopardized, and 

because rights of innocents could be threatened, and suspects could be unfairly 

maligned in an ongoing fraud investigation. As a result, laboratory fraud cases 

may not include a due diligence review. In such cases, potentially negative 

impacts to human health and the environment due to fraudulent lab data could go 

undetected. 

EPA’s Existing Laboratory Fraud Due Diligence Policies or Guidance

Are Outdated or Unimplemented

The EPA has not fully implemented existing laboratory fraud due diligence 

policies for programs in which the EPA has oversight responsibility, as well as for 

programs delegated to the states. As such, the EPA cannot ensure that the 

following are undertaken: (1) the communication of laboratory fraud information 

among enforcement and program offices and to data users, (2) the review and/or 

assessment of fraudulent laboratory data to determine its impact on human health 

 

3 OSWER Contract Laboratory Program’s Roles and Responsibilities Guidance Document (2007); OEI’s Procedure 

for Quality Policy (2008); and the OECA OCEFT’s Laboratory Fraud Workgroup Report (2002).
14-P-0270 5

and the environment, and (3) the review and/or amendment of past environmental 

decisions predicated on fraudulent laboratory data. 

EPA Contract Laboratory Program’s Due Diligence Process Outdated 

The CLP’s4due diligence directive Roles and Responsibilities Guidance 

Document is outdated, according to the CLP branch chief. This guidance 

provides details regarding reporting requirements for any suspicion of fraud, 

waste or abuse involving a CLP laboratory, as well as actions to be taken by 

CLP staff during an OIG lab fraud investigation. For example, when a CLP 

lab is suspected of fraud, OSWER CLP staff should be notified. OSWER’s

CLP then notifies relevant parties, stops sample shipments and/or conducts

additional audits as appropriate. OSWER is in the process of revising this 

guidance because it does not accurately reflect current business processes, 

such as the computer automation of reports and compliance checks. In 

addition, these revisions will help the document to be more streamlined, 

readable and user friendly.

OEI’s Quality Procedure for Questionable Data Never Implemented

The agency issued CIO 2106—its Quality Policy and Procedure—in 2008.

CIO 2106 applies to all EPA programs. CIO 2106 establishes a required 

response/notification process5 when the agency has data quality concerns, 

including fraudulent laboratory data. This process includes notification to 

senior agency officials6and use of program or regional office procedures to 

conduct management reviews of quality issues. 

OEI’s Director for Quality Staff stated the agency did not fully implement

CIO 2106. Rather, current OEI management encourages the use of the 2000 

CIO 2105.0 Quality Policy and Procedure (referred to here as CIO 2105). 

However, the CIO 2105 quality documents do not describe the 

notification/follow-up process detailed in the CIO 2106 Quality Policy and 

Procedure. OEI plans to revise CIO 2106 to incorporate portions of CIO 

Policy 2105 and issue the revised CIO Policy by fiscal year 2017. As a result,

the EPA currently has no final or interim agencywide follow-up procedures to 

address fraudulent laboratory data.

 

4 The CLP supports the EPA’s Superfund program, created under the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, 

Compensation and Liability Act and amended by the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act.

5 The notification process was included in response to the 2006 OIG report, 2006-P-00036, which recommended a 

need for agency policy to address fraudulent data.

6 This notification should include a description of the issue or problem, the name of the entity that produced the 

product, and timeframe of when the product was received by the agency. This procedure further requires each 

program or regional office to have procedures to review products to determine (1) the extent of any potential impact 

to the agency should the product be used, and (2) any remediation steps to be taken to address concerns raised with 

the continued use of the product.
14-P-0270 6

OECA’s Laboratory Fraud Workgroup’s Due Diligence Process 

Not Developed into Policy or Guidance

In 2001, OCEFT issued a laboratory fraud workgroup report acknowledging 

an increasing trend of laboratory fraud cases at that time. The workgroup7

evaluated the extent of laboratory fraud in environmental regulatory programs 

and made recommendations to improve internal EPA controls to detect fraud 

in laboratories performing analysis for the agency. The report detailed a 

laboratory fraud due diligence process, to include: (1) the creation of 

coordinating committees composed of OECA and program office staff to 

identify impacted EPA regions and to share information about fraudulent data,

and (2) the regional program office roles in reviewing data for health and 

safety issues and communicating such information to all impacted parties.

The workgroup report and the due diligence process was issued as a 

“practical resource” but was not developed into official policy or guidance.

EPA Lacks Policy for Notifying the States When Due Diligence 

Can Begin as a Result of Laboratory Fraud Investigations

We reviewed eight state laboratory fraud cases8and found that the EPA did not 

consistently notify the states when laboratory fraud due diligence could be 

initiated when an investigation is either underway or completed. The agency lacks

policy on communicating case information with the states and other regulating 

parties during investigations. Due to the sensitive nature of OECA OCEFT and 

OIG OI investigations, one of the states that we interviewed waits for a “green 

light” from the enforcement offices to conduct follow-up or due diligence work. 

Another state took immediate action. One other state reported that it was not 

notified of the investigation by the enforcement offices. OCEFT staff stated that 

with ongoing investigations, OCEFT does not alert relevant regulating parties of 

case-related information. This is because the investigation could be jeopardized,

the constitutional rights of innocents could be threatened, and suspects could be 

unfairly maligned before there is proof of illegal activity. When cases are closed, 

OCEFT does not communicate directly to regulating officials for follow-up 

purposes and relies on publicizing case results to alert regulators.

There is potential for laboratory fraud cases to not include a due diligence review. 

If states/municipalities received no response from the enforcement offices, they 

may not be conducting laboratory fraud due diligence efforts. In these cases, 

potentially negative consequences for human health and environmental protection

may be not be communicated or addressed.

 

7For this effort, OCEFT assembled a workgroup comprised of forensic scientists, criminal and civil investigators, 

and attorneys from both the EPA and the U.S. Department of Justice.

8 Four cases involved drinking or waste water programs, one case involved asbestos, one case involved air pollution, 

one case involved lead paint, and one case involved soil testing.
14-P-0270 7

Conclusions

The EPA has not fully implemented its existing policy and guidance on laboratory 

fraud due diligence and most regional officials surveyed were unaware there was 

a policy. Other existing guidance is out of date. In our opinion, the EPA has weak

management controls for identifying parties responsible for responding to 

occurrences of fraudulent laboratory data and cannot ensure that due diligence 

efforts are taking place. The EPA took important steps more than a decade ago to 

address this by issuing its 2001 laboratory fraud workgroup report and, more 

recently, with its 2007 CLP guidance and 2008 Quality Policy and Procedure.

However, no due diligence policy was created from the workgroup report, the 

CLP guidance section on this issue needs updating, and the quality policy has not 

been implemented. Given the EPA’s reliance on laboratory data and the potential 

human health and environmental impacts of fraudulent data going unaddressed, 

the EPA should take steps to strengthen program controls and processes.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for Environmental Information: 

1. Incorporate a “Notification Process” similar to that found in CIO 

Procedure 2106 into CIO Procedure 2105 until the revised CIO Policy 

2106 is reissued. 

2. Include in the revised CIO Procedure 2106 specific due diligence steps for 

laboratory fraud that provide procedural details on communication and 

coordination efforts between program and enforcement staff, review and 

analysis of data for any impacts to human health and the environment, 

communication of any impact information to data users, and amendment

of past environmental decisions impacted by fraudulent data. 

3. Provide training on the “Notification Process” and the revised CIO 

Procedure 2106 to the EPA staff working with laboratory data.

We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance 

Assurance:

4. Develop guidelines outlining response steps when fraudulent laboratory

data is discovered in ongoing criminal investigations.

We recommend that the Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency 

Response: 

5. Update the CLP Roles and Regulations Guidance Document. 
14-P-0270 8

6. Provide training to CLP staff on the updated CLP Roles and Regulations 

Guidance Document.

Agency Comments and OIG Evaluation 

The agency concurred with our findings and recommendations, and provided 

corrective actions and estimated completion dates that meet the intent of the 

recommendations. The recommendations are considered resolved and open with 

corrective actions ongoing. No further response to this report is required. The 

agency’s detailed response is provided in appendix A. Our response to the agency 

is embedded in appendix A. The agency also provided technical comments on the 

draft report, which we have incorporated into our report as appropriate.
14-P-0270 9

Status of Recommendations and 

Potential Monetary Benefits

RECOMMENDATIONS

POTENTIAL MONETARY 

BENEFITS (in $000s)

Rec. 

No.

Page 

No. Subject Status1 Action Official

Planned 

Completion 

Date

Claimed 

Amount

Agreed-To 

Amount

1 7 Incorporate a “Notification Process” similar to that 

found in CIO Procedure 2106 into CIO Procedure

2105 until the revised CIO Policy 2106 is reissued.

O Assistant Administrator for

Environmental Information

12/31/17

2 7 Include in the revised CIO Procedure 2106 specific 

due diligence steps for laboratory fraud that provide 

procedural details on communication and 

coordination efforts between program and 

enforcement staff, review and analysis of data for 

any impacts to human health and the environment, 

communication of any impact information to data 

users, and amendment of past environmental 

decisions impacted by fraudulent data. 

O Assistant Administrator for 

Environmental Information

12/31/17

3 7 Provide training on the “Notification Process” and 

the revised CIO Procedure 2106 to the EPA staff 

working with laboratory data.

O Assistant Administrator for 

Environmental Information

3/31/17

4 7 Develop guidelines outlining response steps when 

fraudulent laboratory data is discovered in ongoing 

criminal investigations. 

O Assistant Administrator for 

Enforcement and 

Compliance Assurance

9/30/14

5 7 Update the CLP Roles and Regulations Guidance 

Document.

O Assistant Administrator for 

Solid Waste and Emergency 

Response

12/31/15

6 8 Provide training to CLP staff on the updated 

CLP Roles and Regulations Guidance Document.

O Assistant Administrator for 

Solid Waste and Emergency 

Response

12/31/15

1 O = recommendation is open with agreed-to corrective actions pending 

C = recommendation is closed with all agreed-to actions completed 

U = recommendation is unresolved with resolution efforts in progress
14-P-0270 10

Appendix A 

Agency Response to Draft Report

and OIG Comment

April 1, 2014

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Response to Office of Inspector General Draft Report No. OPE-FY12-0023: 

“EPA Has Not Fully Implemented Management Procedures to Address for 

Fraudulent Environmental Data,” dated February 18, 2014

FROM: Renee Wynn /s/

 Acting Assistant Administrator 

and Chief Information Officer

Office of Environmental Information

Cynthia Giles /s/

Assistant Administrator

Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance

Mathy Stanislaus /s/

Assistant Administrator

Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response

TO: Arthur A. Elkins, Jr.

 Inspector General

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the issues and recommendations in the subject audit 

report. Following is a summary of the agency’s overall position, along with its position on each 

of the report recommendations. For those report recommendations with which the agency agrees, 

we have provided either high-level intended corrective actions and estimated completion dates to 

the extent we can or reasons why we are unable to provide high-level intended corrective actions 

and estimated completion dates at this time. 

AGENCY’S OVERALL POSITION 

Office of Environmental Information (OEI)

The Office of Environmental Information (OEI) proposes that the title of the report be modified 

to reflect that no actual fraud was found or identified in the report and recommendations. Upon 

reflection, OEI believes that the title of the report is misleading and should be modified. OEI 

proposes the following title for this report, “EPA Has Not Implemented Adequate Management 

Procedures to Address the Potential for Fraudulent Environmental Data.” 

 
14-P-0270 11

OEI concurs with Recommendation 1 to “Incorporate a notification process similar to that found 

in CIO Policy 2106 into CIO Policy 2105 until a revised CIO Policy 2106 is reissued.” It is 

important to clarify that the notification process is found in the CIO Procedure 2106, not CIO 

Policy 2106. 

OEI plans to revise the CIO Quality Procedure to include the notification process found in CIO 

Procedure 2106. 

OEI concurs with Recommendation 2 to “Include in the revised CIO Policy 2106, specific due 

diligence steps for laboratory fraud that provide procedural details on communication and 

coordination efforts between program and enforcement staff, review and analysis of data for any 

impacts to human health and the environment, communication of any impact information to data 

users, and amendment of past environmental decisions impacted by fraudulent data.” OEI plans 

to include specific due diligence steps for laboratory fraud in the revised CIO Quality Procedure.

OEI concurs with Recommendation 3 to “Provide training on the Notification Process and the 

revised CIO Policy 2106 to the EPA staff working with laboratory data.” OEI will provide this 

training after the revised Quality Procedure is issued. 

Additionally, OEI is providing technical comments on this report as part of the attachment.

OIG Response: The objective of this review was to determine the use of procedures by the 

EPA, other federal agencies and states to manage the communication of and appropriate 

action on laboratory data determined to be fraudulent—not to find fraudulent laboratory 

data. We discuss a prominent example of fraudulent laboratory data and were made aware 

of ongoing investigations of fraud. The OIG changed the final report title to reflect that EPA 

procedures need to address both suspected and confirmed fraudulent data. 

OIG Response: The OIG revised the final report as suggested.

OIG Response: The OIG met with the agency to discuss the draft findings and 

recommendations. Based on discussions with the agency, it was agreed that the corrective 

action to remedy recommendation 1 would also include the following: “in the interim before 

new policy is published in FY 2017, immediately direct the Regions and requisite Offices to 

implement Section G, Notification Process, of CIO 2106-P-01.0, dated 10-20-08, as 

necessary.” The agency’s corrective actions address the intent of the recommendation. 

Therefore, this recommendation to be resolved.

OIG Response: We concur with the corrective action provided by the agency. This

recommendation is resolved.

OIG Response: We concur with the corrective action provided by the agency. This 

recommendation is resolved.
14-P-0270 12

The Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA)

OECA concurs with Recommendation 4 to “Develop guidelines outlining response steps when 

fraudulent laboratory data is discovered in ongoing criminal investigations.” 

It is important to clarify that lack of such guidelines does not impede OECA’s ability to identify 

and investigate fraudulent laboratory data nor analyze that data for impacts to human health and 

the environment, as distinguished from how that information is shared with the end users of 

potentially fraudulent data. 

Additionally, OECA is providing technical comments on this report as part of the attachment.

Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response (OSWER)

OSWER concurs with Recommendation 5 to “Update the Contract Laboratory Program’s (CLP) 

Roles and Regulations Guidance Documents” and that the May 2007 CLP’s Roles and 

Responsibilities Guidance Document requires updating to better reflect current business practices 

and process flows, including Section 5.8 Investigating Possible Inappropriate CLP Laboratory 

Practices. 

OSWER concurs with Recommendation 6 to “Provide training to CLP staff on the updated CLP 

Roles and Regulations Guidance Document” and intends to provide training to CLP staff on the 

updated CLP Roles and Responsibilities Guidance Document.

If you have any questions regarding OEI’s response, please contact Scott Dockum, OEI Audit 

Follow-Up Manager at 202-566-1914. For OECA’s response, please contract Gwendolyn 

Spriggs, OECA Audit Follow-Up Coordinator at 202-564-2439. For OSWER’s response, please 

contact Melanie Hoff, Branch Chief, Analytical Services Branch, Office of Superfund 

Remediation and Technology Innovation at 703-603-8808.

Attachment

OIG Response: The OIG revised the final report to incorporate this comment.

OIG Response: We concur with the corrective action provided by the agency. This 

recommendation is resolved.

OIG Response: We concur with the corrective action provided by the agency. This

recommendation is resolved.

OIG Response: We concur with the corrective action provided by the agency. This 

recommendation is resolved.
14-P-0270 13

cc: Scott Dockum

 Gwendolyn Spriggs

 Melanie Hoff

 Johnsie Webster

 Jeffrey K. Harris 

 
14-P-0270 14

AGENCY’S RESPONSE TO REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS

Agreements

No. Recommendation High-Level Intended 

Corrective Action(s)

Estimated

Completion by 

Quarter and FY

1 Incorporate a “Notification 

Process” similar to that found in 

CIO Policy 2106 into CIO Policy 

2105 until the revised CIO Policy 

2106 is reissued.

OEI will issue a 

revised CIO Quality 

Procedure and will 

ensure the notification 

process is included.

[Revision provided by 

OEI on April 15, 

2014] In the interim 

before new policy is 

published in FY 2017, 

OEI will direct the 

Regions and requisite 

Offices to implement 

Section G, 

Notification Process, 

of CIO 2106-P-01.0, 

dated 10-20-08, as 

necessary.

1

st Quarter FY 2017

June 30, 2014

2 Include in the revised CIO Policy 

2106, specific due diligence steps 

for laboratory fraud that provide 

procedural details on 

communication and coordination 

efforts between program and 

enforcement staff, review and 

analysis of data for any impacts to 

human health and the environment, 

communication of any impact 

information to data users, and 

amendment of past environmental 

decisions impacted by fraudulent 

data.

OEI will include 

specific due diligence 

steps for laboratory 

fraud in the revised 

CIO Quality 

Procedure.

1

st Quarter FY 2017
14-P-0270 15

3 Provide training on the Notification 

Process and the revised CIO Policy 

2106 to the EPA staff working with 

laboratory data.

OEI will provide this 

training after the 

revised CIO Quality 

Procedure is issued.

2

nd Quarter FY 2017

4 Develop guidelines outlining 

response steps when fraudulent 

laboratory data is discovered in 

ongoing criminal investigations. 

OECA will develop 

guidelines outlining 

response steps when 

fraudulent laboratory 

data is discovered in 

ongoing criminal 

investigations.

4

th Quarter FY 2014

5 Update the CLP Roles and 

Regulations Guidance Document.

OSWER concurs with 

the recommendation 

and will update the 

CLP Roles and 

Regulations 

Document. 

1

st Quarter FY 2015

6 Provide training to CLP staff on the 

updated CLP Roles and 

Regulations Guidance Document.

OSWER concurs with 

the recommendation 

and will provide 

training to CLP staff 

on the updated CLP 

Roles and Regulations 

Document.

1

st Quarter FY 2015
14-P-0270 16

Appendix B

Distribution 

Office of the Administrator 

Assistant Administrator for Environmental Information and Chief Information Officer

Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance 

Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response 

Agency Follow-Up Official (the CFO) 

Agency Follow-Up Coordinator 

General Counsel 

Associate Administrator for Congressional and Intergovernmental Relations 

Associate Administrator for External Affairs and Environmental Education

Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator Environmental Information

Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance Assurance 

Deputy Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response 

Audit Follow-Up Coordinator, Office of Environmental Information

Audit Follow-Up Coordinator, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance 

Audit Follow-Up Coordinator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response